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## **TRANSFORMATION OF UKRAINE'S POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE EVE OF THE WAR: WHAT'S NEXT?**

There has been considered the process of formation and formation of political parties in Ukraine, their peculiarity in relation to the partogenesis of European political parties. There has been noted that the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 became a turning point in the political development of the country and all political institutions. There has been analyzed evolution of quantitative changes of political parties and three main groups among them have been identified. There have been outlined features of the programmatic and ideological characteristics of Ukrainian parties. The volatility parameters of political parties and indicators of the number of party members have been determined. The conclusion about the crisis of the personalistic party model, which dominated Ukraine during the period of independence has been substantiated.

*Keywords: political party, party member, electoral volatility, party program, ideology*

## **Transformacje ukraińskich partii politycznych w przededniu wybuchu wojny: co dalej?**

Rozpatrzono proces powstawania i formowania się partii politycznych na Ukrainie, ich osobliwość w stosunku do partogenezy europejskich partii politycznych. Zauważono, że pełnowymiarowa agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej na Ukrainę 24 lutego 2022 roku stała się punktem zwrotnym w rozwoju politycznym kraju i wszystkich instytucji politycznych. Przeanalizowano ewolucję zmian ilościowych partii politycznych i wyodrębniono wśród nich trzy główne grupy. Nakreślono cechy programowe i ideologiczne partii ukraińskich. Określono parametry zmienności partii politycznych i wskaźniki liczby członków partii. Uzasadniono wniosek o kryzysie personalistycznego modelu partii, który dominował na Ukrainie w okresie niepodległości.

*Słowa kluczowe: partia polityczna, członek partii, zmienność wyborcza, program partii, ideologia*

## **Трансформація політичних партій України напередодні війни: що далі?**

Розглянуто процес утворення та формування політичних партій в Україні, їх особливість щодо партогенезу європейських політичних партій. Зазначено, що

повномасштабна агресія Російської федерації проти України 24 лютого 2022 року стала рубіжним етапом політичного розвитку країни та всіх політичних інститутів. Проаналізовано еволюцію кількісних змін політичних партій і виділено три основні групи серед них. Окреслено особливості програмно-ідеологічних характеристик українських партій. Визначено параметри волатильності політичних партій та показники чисельності членів партії. Обґрунтовано висновок про кризу моделі персоналістської партії, яка домінувала в Україні протягом періоду незалежності.

**Ключові слова:** політична партія, член партії, електоральна волатильність, програма партії, ідеологія.

Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 qualitatively changed the situation in all spheres of the state's life. We will be able to do a full analysis of the obtained and potentially possible consequences of aggression only after the end of the war. However, the format of the changes that the country experienced during the war in the conditions of martial law indicate the possibility and need for a large-scale reboot of the political system and, accordingly, of its main elements. Political parties are one of the key institutions that perform a number of important social functions in a democratic society. Ukraine's acquisition of the status of a candidate country for EU membership in 2022, on the one hand, became a fact of international recognition of the level of social transformations, and on the other hand, it necessitates continuing changes, including in the democratic sphere, in order to meet the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, which is the basis for a positive decision on accession to the European Union. The purpose of our publication is to analyze the state of Ukraine's political parties on the eve of the war and outline the main challenges for the country.

The restructuring process started in the USSR in 1985 and the declaration of Ukraine's independence on August 24, 1991 had a decisive impact on the political activity and attitude of citizens, one of the manifestations of which was the formation of political parties. Although formally the first political party was the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front founded in 1988 (Vasyl Sichko is the first leader)<sup>1</sup>, but in reality the process of forming multi-party system in Ukraine began with the announcement and the beginning of the functioning of the People's Movement of Ukraine<sup>2</sup>.

The NRU (PMU) was formed as an opposition to the "leading and directing role" of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Ukraine, as the republican part of a single party. Despite its formal socio-political status, it was a classical political institute of the movement format, which united supporters of different value systems and worldviews for the sake of eliminating the monopoly of the CPSU and achieving Ukraine's independence. After the collapse of the USSR, the declaration of

<sup>1</sup> Держава, влада та громадянське суспільство у документах політичних партій України (кінець 1980-х – перша половина 2011 рр.). Київ: ППІЕНД ім. І. Ф. Кураса НАН України. 2011. С. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Як громадсько-політична організація НРУ проголосили 8-10 вересня 1989 р. Як партія був зареєстрований Міністерством юстиції України 1 лютого 1993 р.

independence and the banning of the Communist Party of Ukraine in Ukraine, the NRU (PMU) lost its common consolidating goal and became a platform for the formation of new parties. However, the formation of political parties in Ukraine had different reasons than in European countries where this political institution arose and developed. In the European case, political parties were formed as institutions for the representation and protection of group interests of workers, peasants, believers of specific denominations, representatives of ethnic and ethno-linguistic, territorial groups and communities, etc. This property was characteristic of political parties during most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>3</sup>, which was clearly demonstrated in the construction of sociopolitical divisions developed by S. Lipset and S. Rokkan. Instead, after the declaration of independence by Ukraine due to the active processes of transformation, the old structure of group affiliation was already dying, and the new one had not yet formed. Accordingly, the main driving force behind the creation of new parties was the ambitions of politicians; accordingly, the absolute majority of Ukrainian political parties were formed as personalist or leadership parties. They arose around an ambitious/influential politician primarily at the expense of his friends, sympathizers, who made up the core of the leadership and the party itself. Party leaders mostly were and are “for life”, regardless of the results of party activities.

At the beginning of 2022, about 370 political parties were registered in Ukraine<sup>4</sup>. In our opinion, we can structure them based on the participation rate in national/parliamentary and local elections.

From the formal point of view of the law on political parties in Ukraine, they should all have a national character<sup>5</sup>.

**Table 1.** The level of support for political parties in the parliamentary elections in the national electoral district

Year	Number of the registered p.p. (political parties) <sup>6</sup>	Took part in the election <sup>7</sup>	Elected to the Parliament
29.03.1998	37	30	8
31.03.2002	77	33	6
26.03.2006	117	45	5
Special election 30.09.2007	126	20	5
28.10.2014	181	21	5
Special election 26.10.2014	206	29	6
Special election 21.07.2019	349	24	5

<sup>3</sup> Лише у 60-х рр. XX ст. О. Кірксгеймер обґрунтовує появу/існування «всеохопних» партій [1, 188], в подальшому цей тип отримав інші визначення, в тому числі «електоральних партій». Спільними ознаками цього типу партій вважали спрямування своєї діяльності/звернення до представлення інтересів більшості населення/виборців, а не секторальних/окремих суспільних груп.

<sup>4</sup> Станом на 21 грудня 2021 р. в реєстрі політичних партій Міністерства юстиції України було зафіксовано 370 партій. Див.: Реєстр політичних партій Міністерство юстиції України [Електронний ресурс] – Режим доступу: [https://minjust.gov.ua/m/str\\_31094](https://minjust.gov.ua/m/str_31094)

<sup>5</sup> Згідно статті 3 Закону України «Про політичні партії», політичні партії в Україні «створюються і діють тільки із всесукупинським статусом» URL: [zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14#text](http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14#text)

<sup>6</sup> Реєстр політичних партій Міністерство юстиції України [Електронний ресурс] – Режим доступу: [https://minjust.gov.ua/m/str\\_31094](https://minjust.gov.ua/m/str_31094)

<sup>7</sup> Результати обраховані автором на підставі даних Центральної виборчої комісії [Електронний ресурс] – Режим доступу: [svk.gov.ua](http://svk.gov.ua)



However, based on the information of the CEC, which is displayed in Table 1, we can see that there is a clear tendency to reduce the share of political parties that are able to participate in parliamentary elections at the national level by forming their own list, and the share of parties that are able to send their representatives to the parliament is quite small. We can assume that the number of national parties should include those parties that are able to participate in parliamentary elections by nominating a list of party candidates. During the elections, we also deal with parties that, according to the legislation, have the status of the subject of the election process, which involves not only the nomination of party candidates, but also participation in the work of election commissions of various levels. For the parties that register their own list, this is an inherent property. Instead, there are parties that do not nominate their own candidates, but receive quotas in election commissions of various levels. These parties, in our opinion, should not be interpreted as national-level parties. Thus, the share of parties capable of participating in national elections is about 1%.

In addition to the parliamentary elections, we have a number of elections at the local level: to regional, district, city councils, mayors, and united territorial communities (UTCies)

**Table 2.** Quantitative parameters of political parties of Ukraine, taking into account the results of local elections<sup>8</sup>

Year of the elections	Number of registered political parties	Number of parliamentary parties	Number of registered candidates	Number of parties, who held their candidates
2010	151	5	124	124
2015	223	6	122	89
2020	352	5	144	112

Table 2 is compiled based on the results of three elections to local authorities. As we can see, the share of parties that registered their own party lists and managed to send their representatives to the councils of various levels is significantly larger compared to the parliamentary elections. If we calculate these shares based on the results of the last elections in 2020, the share of parties that nominated their candidates will be 40%, and the share of those that sent their candidates to the representative body will be 31.8%. The first and second groups will also include national-level parties, but in total, this second group with the first in its composition will make up less than half of all officially registered political parties. We can conditionally qualify the second group as regional political parties. Regarding the third group, in our opinion, it should be characterized as formal parties, since they have passed the registration procedure and the parties with the tentative title are fixed in the national register. Periodically, especially on the eve of elections, some parties from this group become the basis for the design of a new political actor. Less often, we can see among the parties of this group political forces that tried

<sup>8</sup> Результати обраховані автором на підставі даних Центральної виборчої комісії [Електронний ресурс] – Режим доступу: cvk.gov.ua

to participate in elections of various levels, but did not succeed, they are mostly transformed into second group/regional parties. Regardless of these two peculiarities, this group acts as a reservoir of formally registered and actually inactive parties. Unfortunately, this group constitutes the absolute majority among the political parties of Ukraine represented in the register<sup>9</sup>.

However, the selected quantitative parameters of political parties require additional analysis to understand the state of political parties in Ukraine.

The Law “On Political Parties in Ukraine” gives the following definition: “... this is a registered in accordance with the law voluntary association of citizens-supporters of a certain nationwide program of social development, whose purpose is to promote the formation and expression of the political will of citizens, participates in elections and other political events”<sup>10</sup>. Now we plan to consider the characteristics of the citizens’ association: programmatic and ideological orientation, participation in elections and the state of membership. Now we plan to consider the characteristics of the citizens’ association: programmatic and ideological orientation, participation in elections and the state of membership.

All political parties during their formation and during the registration process presented their own program, but we cannot always talk about a certain correspondence of the party program to a specific ideology. We are proceeding from Roger Eatwell’s definition that: “political ideology is a relatively coherent set of empirical facts and normative beliefs and opinions, focused on the problems of human nature, historical processes and socio-political events/processes. It is traditionally formed in connection with a program aimed at solving short-term problems. Depending on its relationship with the structure of dominant values, ideology is able to perform stabilization or revolutionary functions”<sup>11</sup>. The researcher also emphasized that political ideology is a product of collective but not individual thought. It is also worth adding that each ideology is not a standard, non-changing construct, on the contrary, it constantly changes over time, is modified in response to numerous challenges. We analyzed the programs of all parliamentary parties that were elected to the Verkhovna Rada in 2019. We can state that all party programs are characterized by similarity and a noticeable vagueness of the declared provisions. We consider the following to be the general conclusions of the examination of pre-election programs: 1) the main feature of pre-election programs of parliamentary parties is populism; 2) no program can be considered as an example of a specific political ideology. As a rule, all programs are characterized by a mix of provisions that we can interpret as markers of different ideologies. Such ideological diversity indicates the weakness of the ideological component of parliamentary parties. Unfortunately, a similar situation is characteristic of the majority of active political parties and the absolute majority of registered ones. To some extent, this

<sup>9</sup> Реєстр політичних партій Міністерство юстиції України [Електронний ресурс] – Режим доступу: [https://minjust.gov.ua/m/str\\_31094](https://minjust.gov.ua/m/str_31094)

<sup>10</sup> Закон «Про політичні партії в Україні» URL: [zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14#text](http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14#text)

<sup>11</sup> R.Eatwell, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, New York – Londyn, 2014. – P.17.

situation can be explained by the fact that all political parties in their activities, and especially during elections, focus on the entire population, and not on specific social groups.

However, according to the statistics of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, only 40% of registered parties participate in elections of various levels. At the same time, the parameters of parties' participation in the elections also differ significantly. Stability in the form of constant or repeated participation in elections, which manifests itself in voter support for the party program and its candidates, characteristic of not many parties in voter support for the party program and its candidates characteristic of not many parties.

Accordingly, in our opinion, attention should be paid to indicators of electoral volatility<sup>12</sup>. Based on the data on the results of the parliamentary elections posted on the website of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, with the help of a mathematical display of various options of the electoral volatility index formula, we calculated the indicators of general/total electoral volatility and separately intra-system and extra-system electoral volatility.

**Table 3.** Changes in the level of electoral volatility in parliamentary elections in Ukraine, 1998–2019.<sup>13</sup>

Election years	General/Total Electoral Volatility (V)	Intrasystem electoral volatility (B.V)	Extra systemic Electoral Volatility (A.V)	
	Index indicator,%	Index indicator,%	Index indicator,%	Share in% of total electoral volatility
1998/2002	69,21	6,63	62,58	90,40
2002/2006	56,01	26,99	29,02	51,81
2006/2007	53,86	19,43	34,43	63,92
2007/2012	37,02	14,69	22,33	60,32
2012/2014	84,13	20,87	63,26	75,19
2014/2019	86,04	12,58	73,46	85,37
<b>Average indicator</b>	<b>64,37</b>	<b>16,86</b>	<b>47,51</b>	<b>71,17</b>

With the exception of the case of 2007/2012, during five other parliamentary elections in Ukraine, the electoral volatility index exceeded the 50% mark. This means, that more than half of the citizens of Ukraine at regular or special parliamentary elections left or traditionally leave their previous choice and gave and prefer another political agent/actor, i.e. changed and are changing their electoral choice. If the average indicator of general or total electoral volatility during the specified period of time was 64.37%, then in it extra systemic electoral volatility was 47.51%. In our opinion, high volatility indicators indicate: a weak level of political responsibility of parties, reveal and determine the formality of party programs and the absence of party ideology and the active spread of populism.

<sup>12</sup> Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V. Electoral Performance of New Political Parties in Ukraine. The Context of Electoral Volatility at the Parliamentary Level (1998-2019) // Czech Journal of Political Science/Politologický časopis. 2021. # 3. P. 274-292.

<sup>13</sup> Результати обраховані автором на підставі даних Центральної виборчої комісії [Електронний ресурс] – Режим доступу: cvk.gov.ua

According to the legislation of Ukraine, political parties act as an association of members who must meet a number of requirements and undergo appropriate procedures to acquire their status. Unfortunately, researchers do not have a resource that would give us reliable information about party members. Therefore, we are forced to turn to the results of sociological surveys regularly conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

**Table 4.** Dynamics of the level of membership in political parties of Ukraine according to the data of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 1994-2020,%<sup>14</sup>

1994	95	96	97	98	99	2000	01	02	03	04	05	06	08	10	12	14	16	18	20
0,7	0,6	0,5	0,7	0,9	1,5	0,8	1,7	2,2	2,0	1,9	2,5	4,6	2,8	3,0	1,2	1,4	1,4	1,1	1,7

The table materials show that the situation with the number of members is relatively dynamic. In particular, an interval of one or two years, in a number of cases, shows significant differences in the number of party members. At the same time, another angle of perception of the given indicator will be an assessment of its compliance with the number of citizens. According to the State Register of Voters, during the 2020 local elections, the number of citizens of voting age was approximately 28 million. Accordingly, for this year, the percentages obtained by sociologists should be equal to 476-560 thousand voters.

We interviewed members of political parties in the Lviv region in November-December 2021, who brought their own representatives to the regional and city councils<sup>15</sup>. In the course of the interview, we received mostly estimated parameters of the number of members of party organizations: "Bat'kivshchyna", "European Solidarity", AUU "Svoboda" and the People's Movement of Ukraine were outlined in the range of several thousand; Ukrainian Galician Party – 450-500 members; AUU "Samopomich" – 180 members; "Voice" – about 150 members; "Servant of the people" and "For the future" – less than 50 members. The rest of the political parties that did not make it to the regional council, but participated in the elections to councils of various levels, also modestly estimated the number of available members. Thus, the newly created party "Varta", which passed to the Lviv City Council and relied in the process of creation on representatives of several small parties, previously represented in the political life of the region, has an estimated number of less than 100 party members.

And the "Spiritual Ukraine" party, as it participated only in the elections to the Lviv City Council, but regularly, during a series of recent elections, declares the presence of about 10 members of the party. The given indicators mostly confirm skepticism regarding the hypothetical estimate of the total number of members of political parties of Ukraine in the range of 450-500 thousand and indicate a significantly smaller number of party members.

<sup>14</sup> Українське суспільство: моніторинг соціальних змін. Вип. 7 (21). Київ, 2020. С.449

<sup>15</sup> Romanyuk A. Membership in Ukraine's parties: membership crisis of the party model? Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. – Półrocznik, 2021, #17. – P.6-21.

The interviewed representatives of regional party branches singled out the following main categories of party members (we do not take hired workers into account):

1. colleagues and acquaintances of the leader/leaders of the party cell (they come to the organization at the same time as a certain leader, he relies on them during party work, they act as his reliable support in conflict situations and mostly leave the party organization along with this leader, or when he loses its leading position;
2. persons who count on the political success of the organization and the opportunity to receive certain dividends through this success: getting into deputies or administrative/management positions, provided that the party organization comes to power, the opportunity to lobby for projects via the regional party organization within the region or at the national level, provided that the party is represented in various branches of government through specific individuals or deputies of various levels, the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process within the representative body;
3. Ideologically determined ones or supporters of the values/provisions of the party's program, even more the party's position represented through the public statements of party representatives. This forms a kind of attitude in this group of people that all party members will adhere to, express, discuss/broadcast this attitude/attitudes in the public space in the future;
4. Party members who perceive the party organization as a club where you can communicate on a wide range of topics, under certain conditions get the opportunity for additional or main work.

We must also be aware that many party members interpret their presence in the ranks of the party organization as a patriotic act. Interviews with party representatives also show that party organizations treat groups 2, 3 and 4 with great caution, especially the latter, since its representatives mostly have enough spare time and try to direct the work of party organizations in the format of a discussion club or to solve sensitive problems for them, what, according to party leaders, diverts time and certain resources from the problems or directions of work that are urgent on the part of the party leadership. Actually, they mainly explain the regulation/restriction of entry and the small number of their own party organizations with the fear of representatives of the specified groups joining the party organizations. Thus, our analysis allows us to draw the following conclusions:

Political parties of Ukraine are characterized by a small number of members, at the same time, low quantitative indicators are characteristic of parties throughout the entire time since the formation of the national party system; the small number of party members is due to the weakness of the party structures themselves, the dominant leadership format of the parties, their close connection with sponsors and, accordingly, a low level of trust in the institution of political parties, and a correspondingly low level of intra-party democracy; the need for party

organizations to perform functions related to elections and the functioning of representative institutions of various levels determines the involvement of salaried workers in the work of the party and the inclusion of non-party candidates in the party lists, involving them in the public presentation of the party and the entire process of party functioning; there is a trend that requires further additional analysis, when the parties that emerged and continue to function for a long time (NRU (PMU), Fatherland, Freedom, European Solidarity) and have greater similarity regarding the requirements/parameters of the mass party are relatively more numerous, and the newly created political parties (Servant of the People, For the Future, Vgolos and others), mostly have a minimal or conditional number of members and at the same time are characterized by a significant number of hired workers, show signs of parties of a network format.

At the same time, we need to outline the factors caused by the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022. In our opinion, we can highlight the following factors:

First, virtually all political parties, with the exception of the “Servant of the People” party, have ceased their active activities. We can use other synonyms – frozen, or are in a latent/dormant state. In fact, party work at the regional level is reduced to the media activity of individual party deputies, mainly of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. At the same time, this activity can be interpreted as personal activity designed for the future, when a publicly promoted person will have better chances of getting involved in new political projects. A part of the party deputies is characterized by the attitude of “party consumers”, which manifests itself in solving certain issues with the help of the party’s presence in the institutions of power.

Secondly, as a result of the war, we expect a significant reduction in the influence of the Ukraine main oligarchs. Accordingly, they will not be able to invest in political parties and party projects the amount they invested before the war.

Thirdly, a significant contraction of the economy, as cynical as it may seem, will also affect the ability of wealthy Ukrainian business figures to invest in party projects. We understand you shouldn’t expect the rejection of such attempts, but the amount of investments must be significantly reduced and, accordingly, political life, especially elections, will no longer be astronomically expensive, but must become cheaper, which will pave the way for truly authoritative citizens.

Fourthly, the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine confirmed by the Supreme Court of Ukraine in September 2022 to ban the activities of pro-Russian parties, in particular Opposition Platform – For Life<sup>16</sup> (OPFL) and the loss of deputy mandates by some of the deputies of this party symbolized the collapse of an entire political trend oriented towards Russia. The fact of the war and numerous terrible crimes committed by the Russian invaders should significantly limit or put an end to the Russophile political aspirations of a part of the voters in Ukraine.

Fifth, sociologists record a strong demand for changes in the country in all spheres, including politics. This will also be influenced by the fact of the candidate’s status and the desire

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<sup>16</sup> Радіо Свобода: Верховна Рада ухвалила закон про заборону проросійських партій в цілому – «Слуга народу». [Електронний ресурс] – Режим доступу: [radiosvoboda.org/a/news-rada-zaborona-prorosiiiski-partii/31832306.html](https://radiosvoboda.org/a/news-rada-zaborona-prorosiiiski-partii/31832306.html) (03.05.2022).

to become a member of the EU. The war changed the main part of the citizens and they will transfer these changes to political parties. Undoubtedly, inertia is persistent and will not disappear immediately, and we have confirmation of this, but the demand for civilized politics, including in parties, may have a qualitatively new level.

All of these things, in our opinion, indicates the exhaustion of the resource of personalistic/ leadership parties, or a powerful crisis of this model. The crisis was noticeable on the eve of the war; the war made it more salient and deepened it. The way out of this situation appears to us in the possible decline of most of the currently active political parties, which we can qualify as "old parties". A manifestation of this will be the lack of electoral support for these parties and the formation of new parties that will be oriented towards the expression of group interests.

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## **TOWARDS THE ESSENCE, IMPORTANCE AND RETHINKING OF THE PHENOMENON OF PARTY GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES**

The article is devoted to analyzing the nature and attributes of party government and party governance in European representative democracies, in particular at the background of the relationship between the state, parties and civil society. As a result, attributes have been identified that indicate the expediency of forming party governments for representative democracies, but also some defective manifestations of party government and alternatives to party government have been outlined. On this basis, it is stated that party governments are the “standard” of representative democracies among European countries, although they are or may be characterized by both immanent and congenital defects and distortions associated with the phenomenon of party patronage, the difference between political and bureaucratic components of governance, “decline” or “crisis” of the concept and phenomena of party in Europe, etc. In other words, it is specified that visually, constructively and by the nature of parliamentary support, party governments have been and remain predominant ones in European representative democracies, but they have more and more obvious alternatives, including in the format of non-party and semi-party governments.

*Keywords:* government, party, party government, non-party government, semi-party government, patronage, partocracy, representative democracy, European countries.

## **CHARAKTER I ATRYBUTY PARTYJNEGO RZĄDU I PARTYJNEGO ZARZĄDZANIA W EUROPEJSKICH DEMOKRACJACH PRZEDSTAWICIELSKICH**

W artykule przeanalizowano charakter i atrybuty partyjnego rządu i partyjnego zarządzania w europejskich demokracjach przedstawicielskich, w szczególności na tle relacji między państwem, partiami i społeczeństwem obywatelskim. W rezultacie zidentyfikowano atrybuty wskazujące na celowość tworzenia rządów partyjnych dla reprezentatywnych demokracji, ale także nakreślono pewne wadliwe przejawy rządów partyjnych i alternatywy dla rządów partyjnych. Na tej podstawie stwierdza się, że rządy partyjne są „standardem” demokracji przedstawicielskich wśród krajów europejskich, choć charakteryzują się lub mogą charakteryzować się zarówno immanentnymi, jak i wrodzonymi wadami oraz zniekształceniami związanymi ze zjawiskiem patronatu partyjnego, różnicą między politycznym i biurowym komponentem rządu, „upadek” lub „kryzys” koncepcji i zjawisk partii w Europie itp. Innymi słowy, stwierdzono, że wizualnie, konstruktywnie i z natury



парламентарного попартієвого уряду партійні були і залишаються домінуючі в європейських демократіях представницьких, але мають все більш очевидні альтернативи, в тому в формі безпартійних і урядів партійних.

*Слова ключові: уряд, партія, уряд партійний, уряд безпартійний, уряд партійний, патронаж, партійність, демократія представницька, країни європейські.*

## **ДО СУТНОСТІ, ВАЖЛИВОСТІ ТА ЧАСТКОВОГО ПЕРЕОСМИСЛЕННЯ ФЕНОМЕНА ПАРТІЙНОГО УРЯДУ В ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПРЕДСТАВНИЦЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ**

У статті проаналізовано природу та атрибути партійного уряду та партійного урядування в європейських представницьких демократіях, зокрема на тлі взаємовідносин між державою, партіями та громадянським суспільством. Як наслідок виявлено атрибути, які засвідчують про доцільність формування саме партійних урядів для представницьких демократій, однак також окреслено певні дефектні вияви партійного урядування та альтернативи партійному уряду. На цій підставі констатовано, що партійні уряди є “стандартом” представницьких демократій серед країн Європи, хоча для них властиві чи можуть бути властиві як іманентні, так і вроджені дефекти деформації, які пов’язані із феноменом партійного патронажу, різницею відносин між політичною та бюрократичною складовими урядування, “западом” чи “кризою” поняття та явища партії у Європі тощо. Інакше кажучи, констатовано, що візуально, конструктивно та за характером підтримки в парламентах партійні уряди були та залишаються переважаючими у європейських представницьких демократіях, але вони мають все більше й більше очевидних альтернатив, у тому числі в форматі непартійних та напівпартійних урядів.

*Ключові слова: уряд, партія, партійний уряд, непартійний уряд, напівпартійний уряд, патронаж, партіократія, представницька демократія, країни Європи.*

An attribute of representative democracy, especially in European countries, is that the struggle for political power and the exercise of political power takes place in the context of ensuring the political representation of citizens by their certain “agents” – both institutional (head of state, parliament, government and other institutions) and functional (parties, interest groups, political and surrounding political organizations, etc.). Moreover, such an understanding of the content and orderliness of politics and the political process has long been the norm and in fact is not in doubt by citizens and civil society, although the latter often form additional tools to influence the political process, including various deliberative panels, discussion boards, forums, etc. especially against the background of the relentless development of new channels of political communication.

As a result, on the one hand, it is manifested in the fact that among various aspects and features of political and inter institutional relations, the norm for European representative democracies has long been the formation and functioning as basic and proper party cabinets<sup>1</sup>.

They appear to be a perfectly clear, relevant, statistical and empirical norm in almost all European representative democracies (except for a micro-state like Monaco, where party governments are not the norm), even regardless of their forms and systems of government<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, in recent decades (especially since the 1990s) in some European countries (including at different times in Austria, Andorra, Bulgaria, Greece, Estonia, Italy, Portugal, Ukraine, Finland, etc.) there have been non-partisan / technocratic government cabinets in the past<sup>3</sup>, and in other European countries (for example, in Greece, Estonia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Finland and especially in Romania and France, etc.) or in general in this part of the world governments are characterized by less party involvement, less party determination, although they visually preserve the party logic, party outlines and party framework<sup>4</sup>, but in fact appear as a kind of semi-party government cabinets<sup>5</sup>.

All this inevitably and quite logically puts on the agenda the question of the traditional and current essence, importance, rethinking and alternative of the phenomenon of party government in European representative democracies. The answer to this question is not one-syllable, but involves the passage of different stages and phases of the study. First of all, it is necessary to find out what the nature of party government is and why this format of government cabinet has become the norm for representative democracies in Europe. It is necessary then to characterize the definitive and essential attributes of party governments in representative democracies. And these things will give grounds to talk about alternatives and a possible rethinking of the phenomenon of party government against the background of the real political process in European representative democracies. Moreover, this will be especially relevant against the background of talks and theorizations

<sup>1</sup> Katz R., *Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception*, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s. 31-71.; Rose R., *The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique*, "Political Studies" 1996, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 413-445.

<sup>2</sup> Keman H., *Policy-Making Capacities of European Party Government*, [w:] Luther K., Müller-Rommel F. (eds.), *Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 207-246.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.; Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvosti mizhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku „hlava derzhavy–parlament–uriad” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 306-308.; Woldendorp J., Keman H., Budge I., *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998): composition, duration, personnel*, Wyd. Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Bialoblotskyi Z., *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013, s. 215–239.; Marangoni F., *Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office*, "Bulletin of Italian Politics" 2012, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 135-149.; McDonnell D., Valbruzzi M., *Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2014, vol 53, nr. 4, s. 654-671.; Pasquino G., Valbruzzi M., *Non-partisan Governments Italian-style*, "Journal of Modern Italian Studies" 2012, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 612-629.; Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivnialnyi analiz*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 181-189.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665-693.

<sup>4</sup> Katz R., *Party Government and its Alternatives*, [w:] Katz R. (ed.), *Party Governments: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1987, s. 1-26.; Mair P., *The Challenge to Party Government*, "West European Politics" 2008, vol 31, nr. 1-2, s. 211-234.; Peters G., *Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who's Who and Does It Make Any Difference?*, [w:] Farazmand A. (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage 1997, s. 232-254.

<sup>5</sup> Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 240.;

that have become extremely widespread in recent decades on the topic of the “decline” or “crisis” of the parties’ phenomenon in European representative democracies. After all, many parties have really ceased to be as important as they used to be, and many have simply disappeared from the political arena, what, in turn, has definitely called into question the appropriateness of resorting to the party government format as a basic, instead, it brought to the fore the debate on rethinking and alternatives to the phenomenon of party government in Europe and, more generally, first of all, against the background of the transformation of already classical and traditional party systems in the various representative democracies in the region.

The set research tasks were largely isolated and analyzed by such scientists as R. Andeweg<sup>6</sup>, J. Blondel and M. Cotta<sup>7</sup>, I. Budge and H. Keman<sup>8</sup>, M. Calise<sup>9</sup>, F. Castles and R. Wildenmann<sup>10</sup>, H. Daalder<sup>11</sup>, L. De Winter<sup>12</sup>, R. Katz<sup>13</sup>, H. Keman<sup>14</sup>, M. Laver and I. Budge<sup>15</sup>, M. Laver and N. Schofield<sup>16</sup>, M. Laver and K. Shepsle<sup>17</sup>, P. Mair<sup>18</sup>, G. Pasquino and M. Valbruzzi<sup>19</sup>, R. Rose<sup>20</sup>, E. Schattschneider<sup>21</sup>, P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones<sup>22</sup>, J. Schlesinger<sup>23</sup>, J. Woldendorp, H. Keman and I. Budge<sup>24</sup> and many others.

<sup>6</sup> Andeweg R., *Elite-Mass Linkages in Europe: Legitimacy Crisis or Party Crisis?* [w:] Hayward J. (ed.), *Elitism, Populism, and European Politics*, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1996, s. 143-163.

<sup>7</sup> Blondel J., *The Political Factors Accounting for the Relationship between Governments and the Parties Supporting them*, Wyd. European University Institute 1989; Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Budge I., *Party Identification and Beyond*, Wyd. Wiley 1976; Budge I., Keman H., *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

<sup>9</sup> Calise M., *Il governo di partito*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1989.

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<sup>12</sup> De Winter L., *Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet*, [w:] Blondel J., Thiebaud J. (eds.), *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe*, London 1991, s. 44-69.

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<sup>15</sup> Laver M., Budge I., *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Macmillan 1992.

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<sup>17</sup> Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

<sup>18</sup> Mair P., *The Challenge to Party Government*, “West European Politics” 2008, vol 31, nr. 1-2, s. 211-234.

<sup>19</sup> Pasquino G., *Governments in European politics*, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Routledge 2015, s. 295-310; Pasquino G., Valbruzzi M., *Il potere dell’alternanza. Teorie e ricerche sui cambi di governo*, Wyd. Bononia University Press 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974; Rose R., *The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique*, “Political Studies” 1996, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 413-445.

<sup>21</sup> Schattschneider E., *Party Government*, Wyd. Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1942; Schattschneider E., *Party Government and Employment Policy*, “American Political Science Review” 1945, vol 39, nr. 6, s. 1147-1157.

<sup>22</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665-693.

<sup>23</sup> Schlesinger J., *Political Parties and the Winning of Office*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1991.

<sup>24</sup> Woldendorp J., Keman H., Budge I., *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998): composition, duration, personnel*, Wyd. Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000.

In our study, we will try to systematize them and cover them as widely as possible.

Starting to solve the research tasks, it should be noted that parties in representative democracies in general and in Europe in particular have a special place in the relationship between civil society and the state and it is within the framework of these relations that the understanding of the essence and phenomenon of the party government cabinet is formed against the background of the dependence between the party / parties and the state / institutions of power. The fact is that in almost all representative democracies it is normal to have a certain distance between the policy pursued by an official / bureaucrat and the policy promoted and defended by one or another party member or party, and thus between the managerial and political components of the formation and functioning of governments and governance. Accordingly, due to the fact that parties are the main “agents” voted for during the formation / election of parliaments – and this is not in doubt – government cabinets must in some way inherit the political choices of citizens, and therefore they are composed of members of the elites of those political parties that win the election – alone or in groups or in coalitions.

And this, in turn, means that a party is considered to be a government cabinet whose members or ministers are representatives of parliamentary political parties, what, according to this logic, is considered to be a completely rational and consistent construction of the connection and mutual influence of civil society on the state through the channels of political parties as functional representatives of citizens. In this case, it is expected that members or representatives of party elites within government cabinets and their individual departments and ministries, when giving orders to bureaucrats, should be neutral, for it is the neutrality of officials / bureaucrats inherited or thus acquired that must remain unchanged in the change and rotation of parliamentary parties that form and support government cabinets and delegate their party functionaries as ministers to them, and so on. Otherwise, and vice versa, this is the reason for the formation and development of the phenomenon of political corruption in the functioning of party government cabinets, and thus significantly negativities the role of parties as a channel of interaction between the state / bureaucracy and civil society<sup>25</sup>. Although, in contrast, not in all representative democracies in Europe the distance between ministers and bureaucrats is equivalent and equally neutral, after all, for example, in some states the deputy ministers of party governments are non-partisan, and in some party political ones, and so on.

It follows that there are good grounds for establishing a certain framework for defining the phenomenon of party government in representative democracies. Thus, some researchers believe that party government cabinets are collegial bodies in the structure of the executive branch, which consist of members or representatives of parliamentary parties and are formed on the basis of party-parliamentary affiliation, and therefore in this context the main attribute of party

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<sup>25</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996.; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

governments is the use and appeal to parliaments in the formation, support and functioning of governments as such. In other words, in the case of party governments, all or almost all of the ministerial and prime ministerial posts belong to representatives or members of parliamentary parties who can agree to form or support governments on a party-political basis. And this, in turn, is very satisfying for the format of representative democracies and their understanding of parties as functional structures of a political nature, which arrange the links between civil society and the state and its institutions of power<sup>26</sup>. Other scholars, definitely combining theoretical and practical developments on understanding the phenomenon of parties and party governments in the post-World War II period<sup>27</sup>, instead note that in a representative democracy, any government as a party justifies the attributes that: the party or governments of the government gain control of the executive solely as a result of winning the election; leaders and heads of government are recruited by the government party or parties from their environment; the party or parties of the government, on the basis of political competition, offer voters certain political alternatives; party or parties of the government, being endowed with the positions of ministers and other officials responsible for state policy and the executive branch in general<sup>28</sup>. It is in this way a situation, when party governments in European representative democracies become the center or “core” of the political process and the connection between the state and civil society, although they are determined equally institutionally, electorally, politically and even socially, is achieved<sup>29</sup>.

In this context, it is obvious that, at first sight, the party government is a completely rational format for the development of a “chain” of delegation of power from the people to individual bureaucrats, as it combines political and apolitical logic and components. Therefore, the party government – as it immediately comes to mind – should not be an instrument and a factor

<sup>26</sup> Pasquino G., *Governments in European politics*, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Routledge 2015, s. 295-310.

<sup>27</sup> Daalder H., *Countries in Comparative Politics*, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 3-21.; Katz R., *Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception*, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s. 31-71.; Kirkpatrick E., *Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?*, “*American Political Science Review*” 1971, vol 65, nr. 4, s. 965-990.; Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974.; Rose R., *The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique*, “*Political Studies*” 1996, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 413-445.; Schattschneider E., *Party Government and Employment Policy*, “*American Political Science Review*” 1945, vol 39, nr. 6, s. 1147-1157.; Thomassen J., *Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models?*, [w:] Jennings K., Mann T. (eds.), *Elections at Home and Abroad*, Wyd. Michigan University Press 1994, s. 237-265.

<sup>28</sup> Mair P., *The Challenge to Party Government*, “*West European Politics*” 2008, vol 31, nr. 1-2, s. 211-234.; Romanyuk A., *Lytvyn V., Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv i system kraïn Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvosti mizhinstytutsiïnykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku „hlava derzhavy–parlament–uriad” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 307.

<sup>29</sup> Eppner S., Ganghof S., *Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: the veto control hypothesis reconsidered*, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2017, vol 56, nr. 1, s. 169-186.; Keman H., *Parties and Government: Features of Governing in Representative Democracies*, [w:] Katz R., Crotty W. (eds.), *Handbook on Political Parties*, Wyd. Sage 2006, s. 160-174.; Keman H., *Policy-Making Capacities of European Party Government*, [w:] Luther K., Müller-Rommel F. (eds.), *Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 207-246.; Keman H., *Strategy Development and Variations of Party Government*, Paper presented at the conference “*Political Strategy*” (Lüneburg: Leuphana Universität), 12-13 February 2009.; Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Uriady menshosti v yevropeïskykh parlamentskykh demokratiakh*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017.; Pasquino G., Valbruzzi M., *Il potere dell’alternanza. Teorie e ricerche sui cambi di governo*, Wyd. Bononia University Press 2011.; Schmidt M., *The Impact of Parties, Constitutional Structures and Veto Players on Public Policy*, [w:] Keman H. (ed.), *Comparative Democratic Politics: A Guide to Contemporary Theory and Research*, Wyd. Sage Publishers 2002, s. 166-184.

in the “decline” or “crisis” of parties, and hence the questioning of the expediency of the very phenomenon of party governance within the framework of European representative democracies. The explanation for this is the fact that the very phenomenon of party government and its nature are not monolithic, after all, the relations between parties and governments are also definitely not of the same kind, and therefore generates different influences of parties on the process of bureaucracy and the overall functionality of the state mechanism. It follows that, on the one hand, it is necessary to understand the heterogeneity or need to classify party governments according to their party structure and composition (imposed on the composition of parliament) and, on the other hand, to distinguish between the concepts and categories of the party governance/government affiliation. In addition, the formation and existence of a party government is also understood quite differently, as some political actors perceive it as involving parties in the government cabinet, while others perceive it as a kind of fascination with the party or parties of the government.

Therefore, in practical politics, the intensity of party involvement in government and the closeness of relations between the government and parties that are not members of it but support it may markedly differ. Moreover, it is not necessary for government parties or parties supporting party governments interfere in the activities of governments, as it is possible to move in the opposite direction when governments intervene and put pressure on parties or even promote the formation of new parties, including through the division of existing parties, in particular government ones<sup>30</sup>. It follows that the obligatory attributes of party governments are, on the one hand, the dependence of these governments on the influence of the party or parties that are part of it, and, on the other hand, the replacement of the staff of such governments, in particular the highest ministerial positions – mainly ministers and the prime minister – by elected officials from among parliamentary and governmental parties, since there must be met the requirement that such officials be accountable to the electorate through their parties.

Instead, the contradictory attribute of party governments is that almost all important government decisions must be decided by the people who won the elections, held by government parties, or by individuals appointed and accountable to such people, although this is not always the case in the real political process<sup>31</sup>.

And this does mean that the links between governments and their supporting parties may not be very close or necessarily close, as it is permissible for two political parties to be autonomous within coalitions (such as bipartisan governments). This is especially important because if there is no relationship between two governing parties, then there is no party government, since such a government exists and operates without regard to political parties, although in

<sup>30</sup> Katz R., *Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception*, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s.44.

<sup>31</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000; Katz R., *Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception*, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s.43.

principle this is extremely rare in European parliamentary democracies. However, there are situations where the government's party affiliation is hampered by the fact that it is legally and normatively autonomous or separated from parliament, which is quite common in European representative democracies: either in almost all policy clusters (as is often the case in Ukraine and Moldova), or in individual policy sectors, in particular in all foreign affairs issues or issues (such as in Belgium, the Netherlands, etc.).

It is against this background of an understanding of the phenomenon of party government in European representative democracies that it is clear that there is a range of opportunities for the relations between the state, government, parties and voters not to be fully in line with theoretical expectations, in particular due to the different – more or less – willingness of political parties and individual party members to distance themselves from the temptation to determine the parameters of the bureaucracy functioning. As a result, purely theoretically in this case it is possible to formalize the partocracy – a situation where there is an “unhealthy” and unnatural symbiosis between those who represent society (party or parties) and those who govern society (namely the government and the sector public service), what, for example, at different times was typical for Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, etc. This is compounded by the fact that party cabinets often put pressure on government parties and parties to support party governments in parliaments, forcing them to agree on policies and policies that do not fully meet the electoral, political and other interests of such parliamentary parties. Sometimes this even leads to a situation where the government does not depend on the party or parties supporting the government in parliament, but on the contrary, although purely in theory such influence should be bilateral.

Particular attention should be paid to the fact that in the conditions of formation and functioning of party-type governments there are different options for relations between government parties, government supporting parties and party governments themselves, in particular regarding the development of political policy of governments and appointments to and out of governments. This is manifested in the fact that party governments may or may not imitate the political programs of the parties that compose them. Accordingly, party governments can or cannot consult their support parties in parliaments when developing their government programs. In this context, it is clear that the “partisanship” of governments is facilitated by both joint consultation with parliamentary parties and joint elaboration of their own governmental courses with parliamentary parties, what is not always possible and is far from the norm for all European representative democracies. Therefore, in this sense, there is good reason to say that the government as a party in form is not always a government as a party in essence, content and political manifestations. This remark acquires a relevant and qualitative meaning against the background of the fact that government officials from one party or parties feel much more influential than deputies from the same parties, and therefore it can significantly adjust the

essence of the party government in practice from the theoretically expected<sup>32</sup>. And this is quite true, because in real politics the ministers of party governments are gradually becoming more independent of their government parties, as they gain prestige and popularity, as a result, government parties and government supporting parties in parliaments often criticize government positions and government cabinets in general to some degree, which is especially true in the case of minority party governments<sup>33</sup>.

All of the above justifies the fact that the characteristics of party governments in European representative democracies differ markedly depending on whether the governing party or parties, in particular the largest / dominant of them, dominate the government, or whether there is a balance between the government and the government parties represented in parliament. It follows that such differences in the structure of party government affect the nature of representative democracy and certain forms and systems of government within it, which in turn affects the nature and types of party governments in them. In this context, the phenomenon of so-called party patronage needs special attention, especially if it takes place in systems similar to partocracy. The point is that in this case, the ruling or governmental parties seek to benefit from all levels and varieties and aspects of the relationship between the government and the governing party or parties, in particular in terms of policy development, appointment and patronage.

The role of patronage is especially important in the context of the formation of coalition party governments, when party leaders and party leaders are unable to separate spheres of influence, in particular in the framework of government programs, and therefore feel frustrated by the achievement of certain inter-party compromises. And in this context, it is valid to conclude that the growth of patronage within party governments can significantly undermine the party affiliation of government cabinets, as, for example, was once the case for Spain, Italy and France, which were and remain systems with very different systems of government. On the other hand, party patronage has traditionally grown in those systems that belong to the Westminster or majority, rather than consensus, type of representative democracy, which is influenced primarily by the majority or most competitive format of inter-party competition between the government and government parties and the government and government parties with opposition parties<sup>34</sup>.

As for another reason for raising the question of the expediency or in expediency of the formation and functioning of party governments in European representative democracies, it should be noted that in political science and political practice for a long time there is a huge attention to the topic of "decline", or "crisis" parties. Some even believe that it is appropriate

<sup>32</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

<sup>33</sup> Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; Strom K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1984, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 199-228.

<sup>34</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.



to talk about the “crisis” of parties from the moment they became the basis for the formation and functioning of government cabinets in this part of the world. This problem was especially exacerbated when parties within certain configurations of party systems of individual states (in certain periods of their political history and political process) began technically – due to various crisis situations and conditions – to become incapable in forming and providing support to government cabinets, and in contrast to them sometimes (though as exceptions) so-called non-party or technocratic government cabinets or party-like government cabinets began to emerge, but with a significant share of non-party ministerial staff. This is complemented by the fact that the party as a political organization that reflects or should reflect the interests and needs of certain social groups, cannot be static, but instead is dynamic and changeable, especially in the changing conditions of social and political development (and hence the existing but changing socio-political divisions), which has permanently characterized and still characterizes Europe and it is especially intensified due to the influence of politicized mass media and political discourse<sup>35</sup>.

The fact that in many European countries, including Belgium, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the United Kingdom, France, Ukraine, etc., party functionaries and party goals were very often accused or accused of corruption and illegal behavior. This, in turn, also affects the generation of doubts about the feasibility of forming party governments, in which officials and ministers can be “party” (and therefore probably corrupt) people, although, in contrast, may indicate an increase in the transparency of the political process.

It is also noteworthy that the “decline” or “crisis” of parties occurs in the context of the development of patronage of party governments and governing parties in European representative democracies. This is perhaps the biggest undermining of the theorized nature of party governments in Western democracies. The fact is that it is through patronage, on the one hand, that the “crisis” of the representation of political parties is compensated, in particular reducing their membership and increasing their variability, but, on the other hand, it is patronage that is mistakenly believed to be a way out of a situation that should instead be representative and more natural. As a result, it leads, or at least has the potential to lead to a significant transformation and even collapse of the party system of a state, as a result of which the essence of the phenomenon of party government is lost. Against this background, it is clear that partocracy can be effective only in a limited number of cases, in particular, when it is able to ensure the effectiveness of the party government in order to reach compromises and reduce political tensions or crises. It follows that partocracy with its patronage component – as one of the manifestations of the deformation of party government and the “crisis” of the party phenomenon – can only be acceptable as long as its supporters believe that political decisions must be made jointly

<sup>35</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

and on the basis of compromise. However, if at least one of the partners in the government cabinet – the party's government coalition – challenges this basic principle, then the basis for a "contract" and consensus based on patronage no longer exists.

In general, it follows that the deformation of the essence of party government in European representative democracies is or can be both immanent and acquired. It is immanent due to the fact that the party government is heterogeneous in the formats of the relationship between the political and bureaucratic components, and therefore determines or at least determines the party-patronage. The acquisition of defects in party governance lies in the fact that in recent years there has been a growing "crisis" of the nature and peculiarities of parties and inter-party competition, as a result of which parties are increasingly unable to resolve current agenda issues and sometimes negotiate on the formation of governments on a party basis<sup>36</sup>.

As a result, this often leads to the formation of either non-partisan governments or technocratic governments, or non-partisan or so-called semi-partisan governments. Although purely visually and constructively, as well as in the nature of support in parliaments, party governments are still predominant in European representative democracies, but now they have obvious alternatives. On the other hand, these problems of party governments have been largely obvious and quite noticeable in the past, but this has not changed the nature of the prevailing party governments in the region. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the "crisis" of parties has not been finalized, and therefore it has incompletely or insufficiently destroyed the existing party systems of certain countries in Europe, and therefore the latter continue to produce various forms of party governments. Although, on the contrary, this does not mean that the parties will not decline in the future, including due to significant patronage, and therefore this allotment will undermine the theorized nature of party governments.

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## **NEVER ENDING POLITICAL TRANSITION IN UKRAINE AT THE BACKGROUND OF THE EXPERIENCE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: DYNAMICS AND CORRELATION OF POLITICAL REGIMES AND SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT**

The article tests the assumption that political transition in some countries can be incomplete, at least for a very long period of time, or restored even after the completion of democratization and consolidation of democracies. This is done based on both the modernization, as well as transitological and institutional interpretation of political transition. Empirically, the comparative analysis was carried out on the basis of the case of Ukraine, particularly by taking into account the dynamics of development and making a correlation between the options (more democratic or more autocratic) of hybrid political regime and various options of systems of government (primarily semi-presidentialism) in Ukraine. It is stated that semi-presidentialism can certainly contribute to democratization and completion of political transition in Ukraine, but only in the case of further approval and prolongation of its premier-presidential, rather than president-parliamentary version. This partly corresponds to the logic and choice of systems of government in Central and Eastern European countries, which use parliamentarized systems of government.

*Keywords: political regime, political transition, system of government, hybrid regime, Ukraine, countries of Central and Eastern Europe.*

## **NIEKOŃCZĄCA SIĘ TRANSFORMACJA POLITYCZNA NA UKRAINIE NA TŁE DOŚWIADCZEŃ KRAJÓW EUROPY ŚRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ: DYNAMIKA I KORELACJA REŻIMÓW POLITYCZNYCH I SYSTEMÓW RZĄDÓW**

Artykuł bada założenie, że transformacja polityczna w niektórych krajach może być niepełna nawet przez bardzo długi okres lub przywrócona nawet po zakończeniu demokratyzacji i konsolidacji demokracji. Dokonuje się tego w oparciu zarówno o modernizacyjną, jak i tranzytologiczną oraz instytucjonalną interpretację transformacji politycznej. Empirycznie analizę porównawczą przeprowadzono na podstawie przypadku Ukrainy, w szczególności uwzględniając dynamikę rozwoju i dokonując korelacji między opcjami (bardziej demokratyczną lub bardziej autokratyczną) hybrydowego reżimu politycznego a różnymi opcjami systemów rządów (przede wszystkim półprezydenckich) na Ukrainie. Stwierdza się, że półprezydenccjalizm z pewnością może przyczynić się do demokratyzacji i zakończenia transformacji politycznej na Ukrainie,

ale tylko w przypadku dalszego zatwierdzania i przedłużania jego premierowsko-prezydenckiej, a nie prezydencko-parlamentarnej wersji. Odpowiada to częściowo logice i wyborowi systemów rządów w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, stosujących parlamentarne systemy rządów.

*Słowa kluczowe: reżim polityczny, transformacja polityczna, system rządów, reżim hybrydowy, Ukraina, kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.*

У статті перевірено припущення про те, що політичний транзит у деяких країнах може бути незавершуваним, принаймні впродовж дуже тривалого періоду часу, або ж відновленим навіть після завершення демократизації і консолідації демократій. Це зроблено на підставі як модернізаційного, так і транзитологічного й інституційного трактування політичного транзиту. В емпіричному розрізі порівняльний аналіз здійснено на підставі кейсу України, зокрема через врахування динаміки розвитку та здійснення кореляції поміж опціями (більш демократичними й більш авторитарними) гібридного політичного режиму та різних варіантів систем правління (передусім напівпрезиденталізму) в Україні. Встановлено, що напівпрезиденталізм неодмінно може сприяти демократизації та завершенню політичного транзиту в Україні, однак винятково у випадку подальшої апробації і пролонгації його прем'єр-президентського, а не президентсько-парламентського варіанту. Це частково відповідає логіці та вибору систем правління в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи, які послуговуються парламентаризованими системами правління.

*Ключові слова: політичний режим, політичний транзит, система правління, гібридний режим, Україна, країни Центрально-Східної Європи.*

The issues of political transition have been very popular in Political Science for about half a century, although they are considered by different groups of researchers, in particular the representatives of modernization, transitological and institutional approaches/paradigms. Therefore, various scholars have developed different ideas over a long period of time about what political transition is, what the types and directions of political transition are, what stages does political transition consists of, as well as what consequences does political transition leads to, etc. However, probably the most interesting question, especially in the light of the realities that the world is facing in the recent decades, concerns whether political transition in a particular country and generally (that is theoretically) must necessarily be completed, including in the format of initially democratization and later liberalization or consolidation of democracy, etc. Or on the contrary, can political transition be interpreted as "never-ending" one? Since certain country is able to show more democratic or autocratic features in one or another case, which of course are influenced by various factors, including political traditions, political culture, inter-institutional relations, design of political system, etc. This article proposes to answer this question using the example of Ukraine, which is often positioned (both by theorists and

practitioners) as the case of incomplete or ongoing transition to democracy. However, it is proposed to do this simultaneously at the background of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia), which (according to a number of scientists) have completed or almost completed their transition and became consolidated (sometimes semi-consolidated) and liberal democracies on the eve of their accession to the European Union. On the other hand, these countries were not chosen by chance, since other researchers and various research projects have recently noted the processes such as the "erosion" of democracy both in the world in general, as well as in European countries in particular. Therefore, Political Science faces the question of whether a consolidated and liberal democracy, which has completed its transition to democracy at first glance, can "erode" and deconsolidate, entering a new "round" or format of transition, including in another direction (and therefore understanding) than the transition toward democracy. At the same time, special emphasis in this context will be made on the structuring of political transition due to the identification of peculiarities of relationship between political regimes' transition and dynamics/transition of systems of government in Ukraine at the background of Central and Eastern European countries.

The stated issues are multifaceted ones and have been considered in a whole array of scientific elaborations. In particular, the phenomenon of political transition and its options are discussed by such researchers as D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson<sup>1</sup>, L. Anderson<sup>2</sup>, M. Bratton and N. van de Walle<sup>3</sup>, M. Bernhard<sup>4</sup>, A. Croissant<sup>5</sup>, M. de Melo, A. Gelb and C. Denizel<sup>6</sup>, G. Di Palma<sup>7</sup>, D. Epstein, R. Bates, J. Goldstone, I. Kristensen and S. O'Halloran<sup>8</sup>, J. Fidrmuc<sup>9</sup>, S. Haggard and R. Kaufman<sup>10</sup>, J. Linz and A. Stepan<sup>11</sup>, M. McFaul<sup>12</sup>, G. Munck and C. Leff<sup>13</sup>, E. Osaghae<sup>14</sup>, V. Popov<sup>15</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> Acemoglu D., Robinson J., A Theory of Political Transitions, *"American Economic Review"* 2001, vol 91, nr. 4, s. 938-963.

<sup>2</sup> Anderson A., *Transitions to Democracy*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1999.

<sup>3</sup> Bratton M., van de Walle N., *Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press: 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Bernhard M., Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe, *"Political Science Quarterly"* 1993, vol 108, nr. 2, s. 307-326.

<sup>5</sup> Croissant A., From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization, *"Democratization"* 2004, vol 11, nr. 5, s. 156-178.

<sup>6</sup> De Melo M., Gelb A., Denizel C., Patterns of transition from plan to market, *"World Bank Economic Review"* 1996, vol 10, s. 397-424.

<sup>7</sup> Di Palma G., *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*, Wyd. University of California Press 1990.

<sup>8</sup> Epstein D., Bates R., Goldstone J., Kristensen I., O'Halloran S., Democratic Transitions, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 2006, vol 50, s. 551-569.

<sup>9</sup> Fidrmuc J., Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth during Post-communist Transition, *"European Journal of Political Economy"* 2003, vol 19, nr. 3, s. 583-604.

<sup>10</sup> Haggard S., Kaufman R., Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule, *"American Political Science Review"* 2012, vol 106, nr. 3, s. 495-516.

<sup>11</sup> Linz J., Stepan A., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. JHU Press 1996.

<sup>12</sup> McFaul M., The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, *"World Politics"* 2002, vol 54, nr. 2, s. 212-244.

<sup>13</sup> Munck G., Review: Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective, *"Comparative Politics"* 1994, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 355-375; Munck G., Leff C., Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective, *"Comparative Politics"* 1997, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 343-362.

<sup>14</sup> Osaghae E., The study of political transitions in Africa, *"Review of African Political Economy"* 1995, vol 22, nr. 64, s. 183-197.

<sup>15</sup> Popov V., Shock Therapy versus Gradualism: The End of the Debate (Explaining the Magnitude of the Transformational Recession), *"Comparative Economic Studies"* 2000, vol 42, nr. 1, s. 1-57.; Popov V., Shock Therapy versus Gradualism Reconsidered: Lessons from Transition Economies after 15 Years of Reforms, *"Comparative Economic Studies"* 2007, vol 49, nr. 1, s. 1-31.

D. Rustow<sup>16</sup>, H. Welsh<sup>17</sup> and others. At the same time, some of the researchers, in particular E. Alessandri and M. Altunışık<sup>18</sup>, I. Berend and B. Bugarić<sup>19</sup>, J. Brownlee<sup>20</sup>, J. Calleros-Alarcón<sup>21</sup>, F. Coricelli<sup>22</sup>, C. D'Amore<sup>23</sup>, E. De Giorgi and S. Grimaldi<sup>24</sup>, J. Fox<sup>25</sup>, V. Gelman<sup>26</sup>, C. Gershman<sup>27</sup>, K. Gleditsch and J. Choung<sup>28</sup>, F. Guliyev<sup>29</sup>, J. Hellman<sup>30</sup>, C. Lawson<sup>31</sup>, S. Mendelson<sup>32</sup>, J. Newell and M. Carbone<sup>33</sup>, G. Pasquino<sup>34</sup>, I. Turan<sup>35</sup>, Z. Turk<sup>36</sup>, J. Wright and A. Escribà-Folch<sup>37</sup>, point out the potential/optionality of the so-called "newer-ending" (unfinished) political transition or at least are skeptical that political transition in the direction of democracy should be interpreted as such that still can be finalized, as well as generally the process of development of any political regime. At this background, more and more scientists, in particular D. Ambrose<sup>38</sup>, T. Carothers<sup>39</sup>, P. Cerny<sup>40</sup>, M. De Beistegui<sup>41</sup>, J. Gerschewski<sup>42</sup>,

<sup>16</sup> Rustow D., Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, "Comparative Politics" 1970, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 337-363.

<sup>17</sup> Welsh H., Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe, "Comparative Politics" 1994, vol 26, nr. 4, s. 379-394.

<sup>18</sup> Alessandri E., Altunışık M., Unfinished Transitions: Challenges and Opportunities of the EU's and Turkey's Responses to the "Arab Spring", "Global Turkey in Europe Working Paper" 2013, vol 4.

<sup>19</sup> Berend I., Bugarić B., Unfinished Europe: Transition from communism to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, "Journal of Contemporary History" 2015, vol 50, nr. 4, s. 768-785.

<sup>20</sup> Brownlee J., Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions, "American Journal of Political Science" 2009, vol 53, nr. 3, s. 515-532.

<sup>21</sup> Calleros-Alarcón J., *The unfinished transition to democracy in Latin America*, Wyd. Routledge 2008.

<sup>22</sup> Coricelli F., Democracy in the post-communist world: unfinished business, "East European Politics and Societies" 2007, vol 21, nr. 1, s. 82-90.

<sup>23</sup> D'Amore C., The never-ending Italian transition, "South European society and politics" 2007, vol 12, nr. 2, s. 247-251.

<sup>24</sup> De Giorgi E., Grimaldi S., The Italian political system in the last twenty years: change, adaptation or unfinished transition?, "Contemporary Italian Politics" 2015, vol 7, nr. 1, s. 3-9.

<sup>25</sup> Fox J., The difficult transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico, "World Politics" 1994, vol 46, nr. 2, s. 151-184.

<sup>26</sup> Gelman V., Regime Transition, Uncertainty and Prospects for Democratization: The Politics of Russia's Regions in a Comparative Perspective, "Europe-Asia Studies" 1999, vol 5, nr. 6, s. 939-956.

<sup>27</sup> Gershman C., The Case for Democratic Persistence, "Journal of Democracy" 2018, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 168-173.

<sup>28</sup> Gleditsch K., Choung J., *Autocratic transitions and democratization*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association (Montreal, Canada; March 17, 2004).

<sup>29</sup> Guliyev F., Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An Attempt at Conceptualization, "Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization" 2005, vol 13, nr. 3, s. 393-436.

<sup>30</sup> Hellman J., Winners Take all: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions, "World Politics" 1998, vol 50, nr. 2, s. 203-234.

<sup>31</sup> Lawson C., Mexico's Unfinished Transition: Democratization and Authoritarian Enclaves in Mexico, "Mexican Studies" 2000, vol 16, nr. 2, s. 267-287.

<sup>32</sup> Mendelson S., Unfinished Business: Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, "Problems of Post-Communism" 2001, vol 48, nr. 3, s. 19-27.

<sup>33</sup> Newell J., Carbone M., Italy, the never-ending transition and political science, "Bulletin of Italian Politics" 2009, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 1-5.

<sup>34</sup> Pasquino G., Studying the never-ending Italian transition, "European Political Science" 2006, vol 5, s. 423-433; Pasquino G., Italy: The never-ending transition of a democratic regime, [w:] *Comparative European Politics*, Wyd. Routledge 2008, s. 145-183.

<sup>35</sup> Turan I., Turkey's never-ending search for democracy, [w:] *The Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics*, Wyd. Routledge 2019, s. 27-36.

<sup>36</sup> Turk Z., Central and Eastern Europe in transition: an unfinished process?, "European View" 2014, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 199-208.

<sup>37</sup> Wright J., Escribà-Folch A., Authoritarian institutions and regime survival: Transitions to democracy and subsequent autocracies, "British Journal of Political Science" 2012, vol 42, nr. 2, s. 283-309.

<sup>38</sup> Ambrose D., The erosion of democracy: Can we muster enough wisdom to stop it?, [w:] *Applying wisdom to contemporary world problems*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2019, s. 21-50.

<sup>39</sup> Carothers T., The End of the Transition Paradigm, "Journal of Democracy" 2002, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 5-21.

<sup>40</sup> Cerny P., Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy, "European Journal of Political Research" 1999, vol 36, nr. 1, s. 1-26.

<sup>41</sup> De Beistegui M., The erosion of democracy, "Research in Phenomenology" 2008, vol 38, nr. 2, s. 157-173.

<sup>42</sup> Gerschewski J., Erosion or decay? Conceptualizing causes and mechanisms of democratic regression, "Democratization" 2021, vol 28, nr. 1, s. 43-62.



M. Greven<sup>43</sup>, A. Grzymala-Busse<sup>44</sup>, P. Guasti<sup>45</sup>, A. Pérez-Linan and D. Altman<sup>46</sup>, D. Rodrik and R. Wacziarg<sup>47</sup>, starting from the 2000s note the processes of “erosion” of democracy in Europe (including in Central and Eastern Europe) and the world, which are actually a manifestation of the fact that previously established and even consolidated democracies will not necessarily remain so (the same) in the future. Finally, such researchers as P. D’Anieri, R. Kravchuk and T. Kuzio<sup>48</sup>, A. Karatnycky<sup>49</sup>, P. Kubicek<sup>50</sup>, T. O’Brien<sup>51</sup>, O. Reznik<sup>52</sup>, M. Riabchuk<sup>53</sup>, L. Shelley<sup>54</sup>, note the peculiarities of political transition in Ukraine, but they rarely correlate the parameters of the transition of political regime and the dynamics/transition of system of government in Ukraine.

Taking into account the ideas of various researchers mentioned above, as well as based on our own assumptions, we consider it appropriate to initially dwell on reflections on what political transition is and why political transition should be studied, in particular within the modernization paradigm as a basic framework regarding the definition of the latter. I would like to start my consideration with some theoretical aspects, particularly regarding the essence of political transition as such. It is well known that the issues of political transition are very popular in Political Science, as it is evidenced by the array of its researchers mentioned above. The questions about political transition are traditionally addressed starting with the so-called “third wave” of democratization, although it is purely logically obvious that they were also inherent in previous “waves” of democratization. Nevertheless, considerations about this became especially obvious on the example of post-communist transformations (in various spheres of socio-political and socio-economic life), which began at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. A specificity (very strange as for the modernization paradigm) of nowadays is that researchers and practitioners increasingly highlight the fact that the cases of the so-called “never-ending” political/democratic transition still happen. This is even despite the fact that the post-communist countries of Europe were mostly democratized and even integrated into the European Union, and therefore their

<sup>43</sup> Greven M., The Erosion of Democracy—The Beginning of the End?, *Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory* 2009, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 83-102.

<sup>44</sup> Grzymala-Busse A., *Populism and the Erosion of Democracy in Poland and in Hungary*, Presented at the conference “Global populisms: A threat to democracy” (2017).

<sup>45</sup> Guasti P., Democratic erosion and democratic resilience in Central Europe during COVID-19, *Czech Journal of International Relations* 2021, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 91-104.

<sup>46</sup> Pérez-Linan A., Altman D., Explaining the Erosion of Democracy: Can Economic Growth Hinder Democracy?, *V-Dem Working Paper* 2017, nr. 42.

<sup>47</sup> Rodrik D., Wacziarg R., Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?, *American Economic Review* 2005, vol 95, nr. 2, s. 50-55.

<sup>48</sup> D’Anieri P., *Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design*, Wyd. Routledge 2015; D’Anieri P., Kravchuk R., Kuzio T., *Politics and society in Ukraine*, Wyd. Routledge 2018; Kuzio T., *Ukraine under Kuchma: Political reform, economic transformation and security policy in independent Ukraine*, Wyd. Springer 2016; Kuzio T., *Ukraine: State and nation building*, Wyd. Routledge 2002.

<sup>49</sup> Karatnycky A., Ukraine at the Crossroads, *Journal of Democracy* 1995, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 117-130.

<sup>50</sup> Kubicek P., Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 1994, vol 27, nr. 4, s. 423-441.

<sup>51</sup> O’Brien T., Problems of political transition in Ukraine: Leadership failure and democratic consolidation, *Contemporary Politics* 2010, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 355-367.

<sup>52</sup> Reznik O., From the Orange revolution to the revolution of dignity: Dynamics of the protest actions in Ukraine, *East European Politics and Societies* 2016, vol 30, nr. 4, s. 750-765.

<sup>53</sup> Riabchuk M., Ukraine: Lessons learned from other Postcommunist transitions, *Orbis* 2008, vol 52, nr. 1, s. 41-64; Riabchuk M., Ukraine’s ‘muddling through’: National identity and Postcommunist transition, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 2012, vol 45, nr. 3-4, s. 439-446.

<sup>54</sup> Shelley L., Russia and Ukraine: Transition or tragedy?, [w:] *Menace to Society*, Wyd. Routledge 2017, s. 199-230.

transition should have been completed by the formation of consolidated democracies (with the exception of some new member states of the European Union, which were integrated within the status of semi-consolidated democracies).

Consequently, the first question that arises in this context concerns what transition is and what it is like. If we think about transition within the framework of the modernization paradigm, then it is the process of change of a political regime of a particular country to democracy, which takes place during the period of political modernization of society. Therefore, transition in such a case is synonymous and specified mainly as democratic transition or democratization. Thus, political transition is an interval change from undemocratic or autocratic political regime to a partly or fully democratic political regime. Such a political transition should be supplemented by the processes of legal and political breakdown of institutions and practices of undemocratic (autocratic) political regime. As a result, there initially is an establishment and afterwards strengthening of the network of democratic institutions and practices of civil society, as well as consolidation of the democratic functions and roles of state and institutional structures, etc. In general, this means that political transition under the modernization paradigm is something like a “drive” towards democracy and its constant improvement (in other words, it is about choosing and consolidating democracy instead of autocracy).

Given this, it is quite obvious that democratic transition in such a sense should be finished with establishment of consolidated democracy in a particular country. That is why manifestations and ways of democratic transition under modernization need special attention, particularly in Europe. It is well known that this process took place for a very long time and consistently in Western countries, in particular initially in socio-economic sphere and later in political sphere. Instead, post-communist countries tested and even effectively used the logics of simultaneous transition in different spheres. Therefore, scholars believe that some of these countries have even overcome the so-called “dilemma of simultaneity”, that is the triple or even quadruple post-communist transformation from single-party dominance to competitive and multiparty democracy, from a planned economy to a free market, as well as from an imperial system to a nation-state<sup>55</sup>. The successful result was the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the European Union in 2004 and 2007 (Croatia did it even later). It was revealed and confirmed by the dynamics of changing their political regimes in the direction of greater democracy.

<sup>55</sup> Saliba I., Merkel W., Dilemma of Simultaneity, [w:] Merkel W., Kollmorgen R., Wägener H.-J. (eds.), *The Handbook of Political, Social, and Economic Transformation*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2019, s. 471–479.; Smajljaj A., *Democratization and Neoliberalism in the Balkans: The Dilemma of (In) compatibility of Simultaneity*, Presented at International Balkan Annual Conference (2013); Moszczyńska A., The “dilemma of simultaneity” as a conceptual predictor of post-communist countries of Europe modernization’s logistics: Theoretical and methodological cut, *“Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej”* 2017, nr. 7, s. 111–123.; Offe C., Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, [w:] *The Political Economy of Transformation*, Wyd. Physica 1994, s. 25–43.; Offe C., Adler P., Capitalism by democratic design? Democratic theory facing the triple transition in East Central Europe, *“Social Research: An International Quarterly”* 2004, vol. 71, nr. 3, s. 501–528.; Centeno M., Between rocky democracies and hard markets: Dilemmas of the double transition, *“Annual Review of Sociology”* 1994, vol. 20, s. 125–147.; Dobry M., Introduction: When transitology meets simultaneous transitions, [w:] *Democratic and capitalist transitions in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Springer 2000, s. 1–15.; Kuzio T., Transition in post-communist states: Triple or quadruple?, *“Politics”* 2001, vol. 21, nr. 3, s. 168–177.

This can be confirmed by the Table 1, which is created on the basis of data of the “Freedom in the World” project by the organization “Freedom House”<sup>56</sup>. In addition, similar conclusions and results can be obtained based on the application of other top comparative projects, in particular “Polity 4 or 5”<sup>57</sup> and “Democracy Index”<sup>58</sup> by the EIU. Thus, the project “Freedom in the World” that we used proposes to rank political regimes based on the evaluation and comparison of political rights and civil liberties. According to this project, the lowest score means the highest level of freedom and democracy, and the highest score means, on the contrary, the lowest level or even no freedom. Using the project data, we present the situation and quantitative indicators regarding freedom or democracy in Central and Eastern European countries at the beginning of post-communist transition (in particular, in 1991), on the eve of joining the EU (in particular, in 2003; although some sample countries entered the EU later, than in 2004), in the first year after the beginning of global financial and economic crisis (in 2009), as well as by means of the latest data as of 2021 (estimated in 2022). In addition, the situation in Ukraine is also presented here, but it will be described in more details below. In general, a result was obtained that demonstrates the success of democratic transition in the region on average. However, I suggest paying attention to the Table 1 data highlighted in grey.

**Table 1.** The dynamics of changing political regimes in Central and Eastern European countries and Ukraine (1991–2021)

Country	1991 (start of post-communist transition)	2003 (before joining the EU)	2009 (after beginning of global financial crisis)	2021 (the latest data)
Bulgaria	2,5	1,5	2,0	2,0
Croatia	3,5	2,0	1,5	1,5
Czech Republic	2,0	1,5	1,0	1,0
Estonia	2,5	1,5	1,0	1,0
Hungary	2,0	1,5	1,0	3,0
Latvia	2,5	1,5	1,5	1,5
Lithuania	2,5	1,5	1,0	1,5
Poland	2,0	1,5	1,0	2,0
Romania	5,0	2,0	2,0	2,0
Slovakia	2,0	1,5	1,0	1,0
Slovenia	2,5	1,0	1,0	1,5
Ukraine	3,0	4,0	2,5	3,0

Źródło: *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].

What stands out from these data in Table 1, in addition to everything mentioned above, is that the expected completion of political transition in the direction to consolidated democracy in Central


<sup>56</sup> *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].

<sup>57</sup> *Polity 5 Annual Time-Series, 1946-2018*, Systemic Peace, źródło: <https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].

<sup>58</sup> *Democracy Index 2021: The China challenge*, The EIU, źródło: <https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2021/> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].

and Eastern European countries, which was very often talked about before and immediately after the accession to the European Union, is sometimes not the “end” at all. Since there are regressive processes and something like deconsolidation or “erosion” of democracy, for example in Hungary and partly in Poland, as well as some decrease in freedom and democracy in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovenia. Even more complex processes are the characteristics of Ukraine, where the quality of democracy is either decreasing or increasing, but this country is almost always positioned as partly free<sup>59</sup> (we will discuss this in details later). All these can be traced from the proposed Graph 1, where the previous data are highlighted graphically and in dynamics.

**Graph 1.** The dynamics of changing political regimes in Central and Eastern European countries and Ukraine (1991–2021), “Freedom House” estimate



Źródło: *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].


Then what is “never-ending” political transition and can transition at all be understood differently and within other paradigms, in particular transitological and institutional ones? On the one hand, “never-ending” political transition is a temporal prolongation of measures to establish a network of democratic institutions and civil society practices. Nevertheless, on the other hand, “never-ending” political transition is about the inhibition of the processes of consolidation of democracy, primarily due to opposition of the ruling elite. Consequently, political transition within the transitological and institutional paradigms should be understood not necessarily as the transition of a political regime to democracy, but generally as an interval transition from one political regime to another, even within the subtypes of this regime. As a result of political transition, the established or institutionalized political regimes of the past

<sup>59</sup> *Ukraine: Freedom in the World 2022*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-world/2022> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].

are rejected or denied, and new configurations of the rules are constructed instead. However, it also happens that a particular country “migrates” and “varies” between different options of one and the same political regime or between different dynamics of their development.

In this context, the case of Ukraine is of especial interest. Let’s visually look at the dynamics of political regime in Ukraine in 1991–2021, particularly on the basis of the same “Freedom in the World” project by “Freedom House” (see Graph 2 below). What can we see? The best indicators – at the level of 2,5 points and the status of the so-called free country – Ukraine had in 2005–2009, during the presidency of V. Yushchenko. In all other time periods, Ukraine has been characterized as the so-called partly free country, although it is designated as an electoral democracy by the “Freedom in the World” project. At the same time, the worst indicators – at the level of 4 points – were during the second term of L. Kuchma’s presidency in 2000–2004. It was after this and as a result of this that the so-called “Orange Revolution” took place in Ukraine, which became a factor for democratization and democratic transformation of Ukraine. Quite similarly, we notice fluctuations in the level of freedom and democracy in Ukraine in relation to each president of this country. Therefore, it was similarly one of the main reasons for the so-called “Revolution of Dignity” in 2013–2014.

**Graph 2.** The dynamics of the transition of political regime in Ukraine (1991–2021), “Freedom House” estimate



Źródło: *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].; *Ukraine: Freedom in the World 2022*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-world/2022> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].

Therefore, the level of democracy in Ukraine increases in one case, and decreases due to an increase in the level of autocracy in the other case. This reveals a kind of “never-ending” transition of political regime in Ukraine, but simultaneously prompts the search for the reasons of the former, including institutional ones. If we do not go into details, we could call Ukrainian political regime a hybrid one throughout the entire political history of independent Ukrainian state since 1991. However, in my

opinion, this is not the case, since this regime is volatile one and fluctuates from one option to another, particularly more or less democratic, etc. There are lots of factors that influence the explanation of one or another type of political regime and the nature of political transition in each country, including Ukraine. These are actually political and administrative factors, the level of electoral participation and competitiveness, the guarantee and implementation of human and citizen rights and freedoms, the level of corruption, socio-economic indicators, etc. However, I believe that the main thing in this context is something else, as well as something that primarily and initially unites the aforementioned factors. That is, something more systemic that follows from the very definition of political regime as such. It is common knowledge that political regime is a way of obtaining and exercising political powers, but rights and freedoms go further instead. I am convinced that the systemic institutional framework of a certain country, in particular inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, has a decisive influence on the political regime in this regard. Therefore, it is appropriate here to appeal to the category of system of government. Systems of government can be various, including presidential, semi-presidential or mixed, parliamentary and even semi-parliamentary ones. Presidential system of government (presidentialism) is characterized by a popularly elected for a fixed term president, as well as by presidential administration or cabinet (with or without prime minister) not collectively responsible to parliament, but to president (as in Brazil, Cyprus, Indonesia, Mexico, Singapore, Turkey, the USA, etc.). In turn, parliamentary system of government (parliamentarism) has a non-popularly elected for a fixed term president, as well as a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible solely to parliament, but not to president (as in Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Latvia, etc.). Finally, semi-presidential system of government (semi-presidentialism) is characterized by a popularly elected for a fixed term president, as well as by prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible at least to parliament or both to parliament and president (as in Finland, France, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Ukraine)<sup>60</sup>. For each country in political transition, the choice of system of government is probably the most difficult and important task. Its solution – primarily through the adoption or revision of constitution – somehow affects the entire framework of political system, the political process and socio-political life, and thus a future political regime and nature of political transition.

However, the case of Ukraine is very specific even in this context, since this country chose semi-presidentialism, but this choice was incomplete one. Compared to other Central and Eastern European countries, Ukraine started to solve the task of choosing its system of government very late. Since its constitution was adopted only in 1996, but not in the early 1990s as in most other cases in the region. At the same time, Ukraine turned to the option of the so-called semi-presidential or mixed republic, which it has consistently used since 1996. This constitutional system of government is characterized by the position of popularly elected for a fixed term president, as well as by the institution of

<sup>60</sup> *List of presidential, parliamentary and other countries*, The semi-presidential one, źródło: <http://www.semi-presidentialism.com/list-of-presidential-parliamentary-and-other-countries/> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].; *Up-to-date list of semi-presidential countries with dates*, The semi-presidential one, źródło: <http://www.semi-presidentialism.com/up-to-date-list-of-semi-presidential-countries-with-dates/> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].

cabinet headed by prime minister, who are collectively responsible (or may be dismissed) primarily or necessarily to parliament (and therefore possibly both to president and parliament). A similar system of government in Ukraine was factually used before the adoption of the constitution, although it was rather weakly regulated. Instead, the only exception was the period of 1995–1996, when Ukraine was a temporary case of presidential republic. At that time, the president simultaneously acted both as the head of state and the head of the executive, and cabinet was mainly responsible exclusively to the former, but not to parliament. However, I do believe that this hides the biggest and the most significant problem and the reason for the never-ending political transition in Ukraine. Since the choice of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine has not become a complete and accomplished fact. At least as a result of the fact that this system of government changed from one option to another and vice versa, and this happened more or less simultaneously with the change of Ukrainian presidents<sup>61</sup>.

I don't want to go into details, but there are several classifications of semi-presidential system of government that demonstrate that it should not be viewed as a single entity, but rather as a mixed category<sup>62</sup>. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to refer to the most used and widespread classification of semi-presidentialism into such options as president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems. The latter is mostly called parliamentary-presidential system in Ukrainian Jurisprudence and Political Science. Nominally, these two types are options of semi-presidentialism, since they are distinguished within its definition and do not interrupt it<sup>63</sup>. Instead, the main difference between them is who (from a constitutional point of view and nominal regulations) can dismiss cabinet headed by prime minister. It is only parliament in the case of premier-presidential system or both parliament and president in the case of president-parliamentary system. Thus, it follows from this that changing even one article of constitution (which talks about the possibilities and subjects of cabinet or prime minister resignation) can mean the change in the format of semi-presidentialism (see Table 2 for details on the example of Ukrainian semi-presidentialism).

It is clear that Ukrainian semi-presidentialism is cyclical and volatile one. For example, during 1991–1995 – the time of presidency of L. Kravchuk and partly L. Kuchma – Ukraine factually (before the adoption of its constitution) used president-parliamentarism with dual collective responsibility of cabinet and a peculiar balance of powers between the president and parliament. In 1996–2006 – during the presidency of L. Kuchma – Ukraine also used a president-parliamentary system, but in practice it was characterized by a much stronger president.

<sup>61</sup> Lytvyn V., Theory and Typology, Challenges and Consequences of Semi-Presidentialism Within Republican Form of Government and Prospects for its Reformation in Ukraine, *"The Annals of the University of Bucharest: Political Science Series"* 2016, vol 18, nr. 1, s. 35–65.; Lytvyn V., The Stages of Installation and Institutional, Procedural, Political and Behavioral Attributes of Semi-Presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine: Comparative Analysis, *"Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej"* 2017, nr. 8, s. 15–30.

<sup>62</sup> Lytvyn V., Conditionality, factors and indicators of heterogeneity and typologization of semi-presidential system of government, *"Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej"* 2020, nr. 13, s. 31–55.

<sup>63</sup> Elgie R., Premier-Presidentialism, President-Parliamentarism, and Democratic Performance: Indicative Case Studies, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2011, s. 157–185.; Elgie R., Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 281–299.; Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Shugart M. Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *"French Politics"* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.


**Table 2.** Volatility of the options of semi-presidential system of government in Ukraine (1991–2022)

Time period	Constitutional system of government (factual logic)	Type of semi-presidentialism	President (date of office)	Prime minister (date of office)	Level of freedom / «Freedom in the World» (less = > democracy)
August – December 1991	Parliamentary (parliamentary)	–	–	Fokin (24.08.1991 – 01.10.1992)	3.0
December 1991 – June 1995	Semi-presidential (balanced)	President-parliamentarism	Kravchuk (05.12.1991 – 19.07.1994)	Kuchma (13.10.1992 – 21.09.1993)	3.0
				Zvyagilskiy (22.09.1993 – 15.06.1994)	4.0
				Masol (16.06.1994 – 08.06.1995)	3.5
June 1995 – June 1996	Presidential (presidential)	–		Marchuk (08.06.1995 – 27.05.1996)	3.5
				Lazarenko 1 (28.05.1996 – 05.07.1996)	3.5
				Lazarenko 2 (11.07.1996 – 02.07.1997)	3.5
June 1996 – January 2006	Semi-presidential (presidential)	President-parliamentarism	Kuchma 1, 2 (19.07.1994 – 23.01.2005)	Pustovoyrenko (16.07.1997 – 22.12.1999)	3.5
				Yushchenko (30.12.1999 – 28.04.2001)	4.0
				Kinakh (29.05.2001 – 16.11.2002)	4.0
				Yanukovich 1 (21.11.2002 – 05.01.2005)	3.5
				Tymoshenko 1 (04.02.2005 – 08.09.2005)	2.5
January 2006 – October 2010	Semi-presidential (balanced)	Premier-presidentialism	Yushchenko (23.01.2005 – 25.02.2010)	Yekhanurov (22.09.2005 – 04.08.2006)	2.5
				Yanukovich 2 (04.08.2006 – 16.10.2006)	2.5
				Yanukovich 3 (17.10.2006 – 18.12.2007)	2.5
				Tymoshenko 2 (18.12.2007 – 03.03.2010)	2.5
					3.0
October 2010 – February 2014	Semi-presidential (presidential)	President-parliamentarism	Yanukovich (25.02.2010 – 22.02.2014)	Azarov 1 (11.03.2010 – 09.12.2010)	3.0
				Azarov 2 (09.12.2010 – 03.12.2012)	3.5
				Azarov 3 (24.12.2012 – 28.01.2014)	3.5
February 2014 – until now	Semi-presidential (balanced)	Premier-presidentialism	Turchynov (acting) (23.02.2014 – 07.06.2014)	Yatsenyuk 1 (27.02.2014 – 27.11.2014)	3.0
					3.0
			Poroshenko (07.06.2014 – 20.05.2019)	Yatsenyuk 2 (02.12.2014 – 01.09.2015)	3.0
				Yatsenyuk 3 (01.09.2015 – 17.02.2016)	3.0
				Yatsenyuk 4 (18.02.2016 – 14.04.2016)	3.0
			Zelenskiy (20.05.2019 – until now)	Groisman (14.04.2016 – 29.08.2019)	3.0
				Honcharuk (29.08.2019 – 04.03.2020)	3.5
				Shmyhal (04.03.2020 – until now)	3.0



After the adoption of changes to constitution in 2004 and their implementation from 2006 to 2010 – during the presidency of V. Yushchenko – Ukraine shifted to premier-presidential system with collective responsibility of cabinet solely to parliament. As a result, the powers of president were significantly limited in favor of prime minister. However, the next president of Ukraine V. Yanukovich did not like this and “pushed” in 2010 through the Constitutional Court of Ukraine a decision on the unconstitutionality of changing the system of government in the past. As a result, semi-presidentialism in Ukraine until 2014 was again implemented through the option of president-parliamentary system, where the president once again prevailed. The Ukrainian semi-presidential system of government made another and the last turn after the “Revolution of Dignity” in 2014, once again becoming a premier-presidential republic. Accordingly, it follows that within the framework of never-ending political transition, Ukraine is characterized by never-ending institutional transition. To show this, let’s superimpose the dynamics of political regime transition in Ukraine on the dynamics of institutional transition or cyclical change of systems of government in this country. This is indicated on Graph 3 and Table 3. What can we see?

**Graph 3.** Never-ending transition story: correlation of hybrid regime dynamics and types of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine (1991–2021)



Źródło: *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].; *Ukraine: Freedom in the World 2022*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-world/2022> [odczyt: 01.12.2022]; Table 2.

As it is evidenced, there is a direct relationship between the level of democratization or autocratization of Ukrainian political regime and the choice of president-parliamentary or premier-presidential options of semi-presidentialism. This directly proves that hybrid political regime in Ukraine

in 1991–2021 is not a monolithic option of a completed political transition. Since president-parliamentary system in Ukraine (especially during the presidencies of L. Kuchma and V. Yanukovych) contributed more to centralization and monopolization of power, as well as autocratization of the hybrid political regime. Some scholars even called this format of a hybrid political regime as electoral or competitive autocracy<sup>64</sup>. Instead, premier-presidential option of semi-presidentialism (especially during the presidency of V. Yushchenko, as well as partly P. Poroshenko and even V. Zelenskyi) contributed (at least according to “Freedom in the World” project<sup>65</sup>) to decentralization and demonopolization of power and thus to democratization of the hybrid political regime in Ukraine. The latter is typically characterized as an electoral democracy (see Table 3 for averaged scores).

**Table 3.** Correlation of the hybrid regime dynamics and types of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine (1991–2021), “Freedom House” estimate and own averaged scores

	The average scores of freedoms / “Freedom in the World” (less = > democracy)
President-parliamentarism	3,43
Premier-presidentialism	2,92

Źródło: *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].; *Ukraine: Freedom in the World 2022*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-world/2022> [odczyt: 01.12.2022]; Table 2; Graph 3.

This puts on the agenda the main problem to be solved within the never-ending transition story in Ukraine. The fact is that Ukraine has always been characterized by the desire of presidents to dominate the executive and the political system as a whole. This, in turn, largely autocratizes the political regime of Ukraine and is one of the reasons for the incomplete democratic transition in this country. Thus, the construction of democratic country in Ukraine must take place through the correction and reformation of its system of government. Even regardless of the strength of presidents, prime ministers and parliaments, etc. On the one hand, the goal should be to correct the defects of repeated “privatization” of constitutional development and a kind of “revolutionary constitutionalism” in Ukraine. On the other hand, attention should be paid to growing importance of the institution of parliament within formation and responsibility of cabinets and in determining the key political actor in the executive. In general, this should gradually direct political regime and system of government in Ukraine to the European model of parliamentary democracy, where the primary role in controlling the executive is given to parliament, but not president. The actual systems of government in Central and Eastern European countries are the proof of this. Since they have never tried president-parliamentary system, but instead use either parliamentarism or premier-presidential option of semi-presidentialism. Given this, their transitional mistakes and problems are rare and less complicated than in Ukraine.

<sup>64</sup> Levitsky S., Way L., Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism, *“Journal of Democracy”* 2002, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 51–65.

<sup>65</sup> *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world> [odczyt: 01.12.2022].

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## **PECULIARITIES AND VARIETIES OF THE INSTITUTION OF MONARCHY AND COMPARISON OF THE POWERS OF MONARCHS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES**

The article examines the peculiarities and varieties of the institution of monarchy, as well as offers a comparative analysis of the powers of formal and informal authority of monarchs in European countries. On this basis, it was checked whether the power of monarchs is a factor in the success and prosperity of monarchies. The author stated that there is no really strong monarch on the territory of Europe at the present stage, and almost all the countries considered are constitutional monarchies, where a monarch and his or her actions are significantly limited by constitution, traditions, laws, government and parliament. This is due to the fact that the heads of state in the democratic countries of Europe govern, but do not rule and do not manage, as well as instead perform nominal and symbolic roles. Oddly enough, this is one of the reasons for the success and prosperity of monarchies, although the hypothesis that the power of monarchs correlates with the development results and prosperity rating of certain states has not been directly proven.

*Keywords: monarchy, monarch, powers, the head of state, European countries.*

## **OSOBLIWOŚCI I ODMIANY INSTYTUCJI MONARCHII ORAZ PORÓWNANIE UPRAWNIEŃ MONARCHÓW W KRAJACH EUROPEJSKICH.**

W artykule zbadano osobliwości i odmiany instytucji monarchii, a także zaproponowano analizę porównawczą uprawnień formalnej i nieformalnej władzy monarchów w państwach europejskich. Na tej podstawie zbadano, czy władza monarchów jest czynnikiem decydującym o sukcesie i pomyślności monarchii. Autor stwierdza, że na obecnym etapie na terytorium Europy nie ma prawdziwie silnego monarchy, a prawie wszystkie rozpatrywane państwa są monarchiami konstytucyjnymi, w których monarcha i jego działania są znacznie ograniczone przez konstytucję, tradycje, prawa, rząd i parlament. Wynika to z faktu, że głowy państw w demokratycznych krajach Europy władają, ale nie rządzą i nie zarządzają, zamiast tego zaś pełnią role nominalne i symboliczne. Co może być zaskakujące, jest to jedna z przyczyn sukcesu i dobrobytu monarchii, choć hipoteza, że władza monarchów koreluje z wynikami rozwoju i rankingiem dobrobytu określonych państw, nie została bezpośrednio udowodniona.

*Słowa kluczowe: monarchia, monarcha, uprawnienia, głowa państwa, państwa europejskie.*



## ОСОБЛИВОСТІ Й РІЗНОВИДИ ІНСТИТУТУ МОНАРХІЇ ТА ПОРІВНЯННЯ УПОВНОВАЖЕНОСТІ МОНАРХІВ В КРАЇНАХ ЄВРОПИ

У статті розглянуто особливості й різновиди інституту монархії, а також запропоновано порівняльний аналіз сили формальної та неформальної уповноваженості монархів у країнах Європи. На цій підставі перевірено, чи сила монархів є чинником успішності та процвітання монархій. Констатовано, що на сучасному етапі на теренах Європи немає дійсно сильного монарха, а майже всі розглянуті країни є конституційними монархіями, в яких монарх і його дії суттєво обмежені конституцією, традиціями, законами, урядом, парламентом. Це зумовлено і тим, що глави держав у демократичних країнах Європи панують, однак не правлять та не управляють, а натомість виконують номінальні та символічні ролі. Як не дивно, в цьому одна з причин успіху та процвітання монархій, хоча, на противагу, прямо не доведено гіпотези, що сила монархів корелює із результатами розвитку та рейтингом процвітання тих чи інших держав.

*Ключові слова:* монархія, монарх, повноваження, глава держави, країни Європи.

The peculiarities of the social and political development of many countries of the world in recent decades give reason to talk first about a “democratic explosion” in most of them (especially in the late 1980s – early 1990s, and sometime earlier or later), and subsequently more and more often and more often about the “erosion” or “deterioration” of the level of democracy in many of them. The signs of democratization in the world at different times were the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the socialist camp, the actual victory of the USA as a “promoter” of the democratic world order in the “Cold War”, various “color” revolutions, etc. These events turned out to be enough to confirm the opinion about the democratic political regime as the most effective and the most stable. However, many states in the world were and remain autocratic and have not even tried or hardly tried various signs of democracy. Moreover, against the background of a whole series of heterogeneous crises, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, in particular global financial and economic, European and world migration, demographic, etc., today more and more processes if not autocratization in a completely pure form, then redemocratization, changes in meaning of democracy or “erosion” or “deterioration” of the level of democracy/democratic character both in democracies (some states even cease to be so) and in general in various types of political regimes.

However, these processes and the political reality inherent in them are most often highlighted due to the fact that democracy and democratization or autocracy and autocratization are traditionally evaluated on the example of states with a republican form of government. One way or another, such modern trends as electability, broad political participation, public control, civil society, publicity and openness of politicians are typically associated with republics. And

this is despite the fact that in reality not all republics are democratic, because many of them were and remain or are becoming authoritarian or hybrid political regimes. In other words, this means that today it is the republics that are the main focus of attention of researchers of political transit and constitutionalists, as well as the subject of interest of ordinary people.

Instead, monarchies today are mentioned less and less willingly, and for different reasons. Some believe that monarchies look like they have “outlived” themselves, and therefore they have either already been replaced by republics, or automatically fall into the category of historical heritage or antiquities. In this case, people typically associate monarchies only with certain symbols of this form of government from the past or with certain figures, in particular with feudal Europe or even the medieval world, authoritarianism, the luxury of palaces and the royal family, or until recently with the Queen of England or currently with Arab sheikhs, etc. Others complement this thesis and claim that monarchies outlived their worldview and context in such a way that this form of government today – especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century – is positioned as very politically unmotivated in the conditions of technological development and post-modernism. Some involuntarily miss the fact that today a number of European states are still monarchies, because the latter are often simply called democracies or even parliamentary democracies. This is a little less characteristic for other regions of the world, which are distant from Europe in terms of history and outlook, and where monarchies are called caliphates, emirates, sultanates, etc.

Nevertheless, it is advisable to take a closer look at the phenomenon of monarchy, particularly in European countries, and pay analytical attention to it. At least given the fact that primarily democratic political regimes are really represented in Europe, and those of them that have not ceased to be democracies in recent years or have almost not become less democratic as a result of the global processes of “erosion” of democracy are primarily monarchical, not republican their forms of government. In addition, we can turn to the recently repeated position of the analytical organization “LegatumInstitute”, which in its periodic reports and in the annually updated prosperity index (“LegatumProsperityIndex”<sup>1</sup>) states that the most successful countries in the world today are (in order from the best) Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Germany, Iceland. That is, in this list of top-10 states there are six monarchies and four republics. Instead, the top 10 worst countries on the analytical organization’s list for 2021 were (in order of worst) South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Yemen, Chad, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Syria, among of which there is only one monarchy (for details, see Table 1). At the same time, in this case, the total calculations take into account the indicators of freedom and security (1), personal freedom (2), quality of government (3), social capital (4), investment environment (5), business conditions (6), infrastructure and market access (7), quality of economy (8), living conditions (9), level of health care (10), quality of education (11) and natural environment (12).

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<sup>1</sup> LegatumProsperity Index, Prosperity, źródło: <https://www.prosperity.com/rankings> [odczyt: 30.11.2022].

A very similar pattern can be observed based on the results of previous reports and ratings of this analytical organization or within the framework of other similar projects, in which some European or even non-European monarchies traditionally occupy the top positions. Accordingly, this should radically change the attitude towards the monarchical form of government. After all, what difference does it make who rules the state, if it is effective?

However, in order to say that the most successful and prosperous countries in the world – but primarily in Europe – are such precisely because of the monarchical form of government, it is necessary, in our opinion, to analyze the essence and types of monarchies in Europe, as well as who has the largest influence on decision-making in the state. In other words, it is necessary to understand whether the monarch has real powers or performs a ceremonial role, and on this basis, to compare monarchical states on the basis of a single characteristic.

**Table 1.** Top 10 most prosperous and least prosperous (most declining) countries in the world according to the Legatum Prosperity Index project, as of 2021.

№	Country	Indicators / Separate country ratings by indicators											
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Top 10 most prosperous countries in the world													
1	Denmark	7	2	2	1	4	5	9	8	3	18	3	8
2	Norway	1	1	3	2	5	9	19	11	7	4	10	10
3	Sweden	10	3	6	5	8	16	6	7	5	10	14	1
4	Finland	18	4	1	3	3	11	10	19	9	14	4	2
5	Switzerland	2	10	7	9	13	2	13	1	6	13	8	7
6	the Netherland	9	5	4	7	10	7	2	6	1	9	7	35
7	Luxumberg	3	7	8	19	22	6	11	2	8	12	34	11
8	New Zealand	26	11	5	4	6	14	23	17	30	24	12	4
9	Germany	21	12	9	16	16	13	5	10	2	16	23	14
10	Iceland	6	9	11	6	23	26	18	20	12	8	15	17
Top 10 the least prosperous (most declining) countries in the world													
158	Syria	165	166	164	166	147	164	132	120	100	110	129	158
159	Sudan	161	157	160	148	139	141	146	167	134	123	148	161
160	DR Congo	160	124	158	156	165	157	161	154	158	161	149	101
161	Somalia	159	144	162	129	149	161	152	166	156	163	141	135
162	Eritrea	136	167	163	162	155	158	162	156	163	136	155	116
163	Afghanistan	166	127	144	167	157	136	159	150	151	153	158	162
164	Chad	141	134	161	159	161	163	166	148	165	165	165	95
165	Jemen	163	164	166	154	162	155	153	165	141	137	153	148
166	CAR	154	143	153	163	163	162	167	122	167	167	166	94
167	South Sudan	167	160	165	164	154	149	165	155	166	166	167	121

Źródło: Legatum Prosperity Index; Prosperity, Źródło: <https://www.prosperity.com/rankings>; <https://www.prosperity.com/about/resources> [odczyt: 30.11.2022].

In the case of the monarchies of Europe, this is detailed by checking whether in these popular countries, which are sometimes called monarchies themselves, the monarchs themselves are really weak, as scholars point out, since this does not quite fit into the historically established stereotype of this form of government. After all this will additionally contribute to the development and dissemination of information about monarchies in Europe, and therefore, possibly, to the popularization of this phenomenon. Thus, the purpose of the study is to review and systematize the essence of the institution of monarchy and its classification on the example of European countries, as well as a comparative analysis of the powers of European monarchies in order to develop an understanding of whether monarchs have real power or perform an exclusively symbolic role. It is noteworthy that the specified goal will be partially solved due to the development and approval of comparative and analytical indices that will allow to compare the power of the monarchs of different states, including from the point of view of the functionality assigned to them. Finally, we consider another rather interesting aspect to be the comparison of the power of monarchs and the place of monarchical states in the list of countries within the framework of the prosperity index. At the same time, our hypothesis is that the more powers the monarch has, or, in other words, the stronger the monarch is, the further (worse) will be position of a specific state in the list of successful or prosperous countries.

Regarding monarchies in Europe, it should be noted that this topic is quite controversial and ambiguous, since it can be looked at from different angles. So, someone rejoices at the preserved traditions of governance and, accordingly, defends the institution of monarchy in various European countries, while someone, on the other hand, is very dissatisfied and calls the royal/monarchic surnames a sham and nothing else. This is due to the fact that there are still disputes in society about the position of the so-called ruling monarchs and families in Europe. Similar discussions sometimes arise among scientists. After all, some scientists claim that the European monarchs of our time do not have any real power, being “decorative” and nominal figures and such that they are only symbols of national traditions and former greatness. On the other hand, others believe that monarchs are “sent” from above for good purposes and are positioned as quite influential in European countries to this day (or at least they can become as such if they wish, because they have the resources to do this). One way or another, virtually all European monarchies today are constitutional ones or similar to them, and this means (albeit to varying degrees) that the institution of monarchy in Europe is one in which the power of the monarch is limited, as a result of which he is in some or all spheres of the state power does not possess supreme (as the only political actor) powers. On the other hand, in general, the institution of monarchy in the modern world (and not only in Europe; there are about 40 states with this form of government) is a very flexible and multifaceted phenomenon, since it ranges from the tribal form, which still operates in some Arab states, to the monarchical version of democratic countries, which is characteristic of Europe (although the latter monarchies are also very different, as it will be noted below). This is one of the reasons why some monarchies are

more successful and prosperous than others (including in terms of the quality of life of their subjects), as well as why the influence of the monarchs themselves on the management of their states is different. Much more differences will appear when the monarchy is interpreted not only as a form of government, but as a set of certain ideas of state, spiritual and public order, etc. That is why the monarchy is still preserved and can be evaluated as quite relevant to the times, since it is quite universal in the context of the organization of power and the nation, if only because it can essentially coexist with the majority of modern socio-economic and socio-political development models.

As for Europe itself, this region has the second highest number of monarchies in the world, with 12 examples, including Andorra, Belgium, the Vatican, Denmark, Spain, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Sweden (it is historically known that almost all countries of Western Europe were monarchies for a considerable period of time, but they ceased to be monarchies in an evolutionary or revolutionary way and with an eye on the development of democracy<sup>2</sup>). It follows from this list of countries that the monarchy in Europe is very specific, since the listed cases are almost entirely democratic (or in terms of inter-institutional relations, and/or in terms of the influence of the public and social sphere). Moreover, purely at first glance (and this will be verified later), the idea comes to mind that those monarchies that are territorially smaller, such as the Vatican, Liechtenstein, and Monaco, are more traditional (and stronger than in other cases) today, although they need attention need attention for other reasons as well. On the other hand, first of all logically ordered structuring of the institution of monarchy and its varieties on the examples of European countries definitely needs attention. In this regard, it is necessary to start first of all with the very well-known theorization, according to which all monarchies (including in Europe) should be divided into absolute, parliamentary and mixed/dualistic, and the last two are options of limited or constitutional monarchies<sup>3</sup>. The examples of parliamentary monarchies prevailing in Europe are Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, as well as partially or conditionally, as noted by A. Romanyuk and V. Lytvyn<sup>4</sup>, Andorra. Instead, Monaco and Liechtenstein are typically considered cases of mixed/dualistic monarchies in Europe, and the Vatican is a case of conditionally absolute, but elective (with an elected monarch) monarchy. Of this list of countries, as well as on the basis of taking into account the history of the institution of monarchy over the last hundred years – especially before, during and after the Second World War – it is possible to make an assumption (and it

<sup>2</sup> Roobol W., Twilight of the European Monarchy, *“European Constitutional Law Review”* 2011, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 272–286; Lauvaux P., Les monarchies: inventaire des types, *“Revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques”* 1996, vol 78, s. 23–24; Stepan A., Linz J., Minoves J., Democratic Parliamentary monarchies, *“Journal of Democracy”* 2014, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 35–51.

<sup>3</sup> Stepan A., Linz J., Minoves J., Democratic Parliamentary monarchies, *“Journal of Democracy”* 2014, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 35–51.

<sup>4</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimizhinstytutsiynykh vidnosyn u trykutnykui “blava derzhavy–parlament–uriad” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 89, 99.

is often justified by scholars) that monarchs in Europe on average no longer play a significant role in the political process, which is why monarchies themselves are mostly parliamentary.

As a result, monarchs are not a threat to representative democracy, since the people who live in them – especially in parliamentary monarchies – in any case rule indirectly, in particular through the election of parliaments and the accountability of the prime minister and the government through pre-parliaments<sup>5</sup>. That is why the preservation of monarchies in some European countries happened only as a result of significant losses of royal courts, since they had to agree to constitutions that significantly limited monarchical powers and changed the source of legitimacy of power from “divine right” to “nation”<sup>6</sup>. In this context, the statement of A. Romanyuk and V. Lytvyn is relevant that if any of the monarchs in the countries of Europe made a systematic effort to influence or determine the political process, there would certainly be a public protest and a call for the abolition of the institution of monarchy even in spite of the fact that it traditionally appears as constitutional and even parliamentary<sup>7</sup>.

The phenomenon and institution of the European parliamentary monarchy in Andorra, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden boils down to the fact that the monarch actually (but not always nominally) does not influence the executive power and state policy, since it is either prohibited by law, or the monarch does not exercise the political powers granted to him by tradition or even constitutionally. Instead, the main political figure in such a European monarchical state is the prime minister and the government cabinet headed by him, who dominate the executive power and depend for their formation and responsibility (in particular, possible early retirement) not at all from the monarch (as it was before and with which the monarchy is still stereotypically associated today), and from the nationally elected parliament<sup>8</sup>. In turn, the essence of the mixed/dualistic or semi-parliamentary monarchy, which is characteristic of Liechtenstein and Monaco among European countries, is that the head of state – the monarch – along with the parliament and the government, has a significant influence on the political process<sup>9</sup>, while the legislative process is traditionally anchored in the nationally elected parliament.

Along with this, the monarchs themselves can have some powers within the framework of law-making, which we can follow on the example of Luxembourg, in which since 2003 the

<sup>5</sup> Elgie R., Heads of state in European politics, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis Group 2015, s. 311–327.

<sup>6</sup> Minoves-Triquell J., *Monarchy, a Democratic Paradox: The Head of State in European Parliamentary Democracies: PhD diss.*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2011, s. 25–28.; Fusilier R., *Les monarches Parlementaires – étude sur les systèmes degouvernement (Suède, Norvège, Luxembourg, Belgique, Pays-Bas, Danemark)*, Wyd. Editions Ouvrieres 1960, s. 79, 200.; Stepan A., Linz J., Minoves J., *Democratic Parliamentary monarchies*, *Journal of Democracy* 2014, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 35–51.

<sup>7</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniialnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimizhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku “hlava derzhavy–parlament–uriad” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 101.

<sup>8</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniialnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimizhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku “hlava derzhavy–parlament–uriad” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 101.

<sup>9</sup> Elgie R., Heads of state in European politics, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis Group 2015, s. 311–327.

monarch (who is called the prince) can veto virtually any law passed by the parliament, but at the same time and vice versa, from which it follows that the monarch also has a mandate to legislate. Another feature of this dualistic monarchy is that the prince can hire or fire any elected official and government official, but the people can demand a referendum on the termination of the powers of the prince himself<sup>10</sup>. In a similar way, the prince in another dualist monarchy in Europe – in Monaco – can choose state ministers, members of the government council and judges<sup>11</sup>. Finally, among all European countries, absolute monarchy is peculiar only to the Vatican and is characterized by the fact that the head of state – the monarch or the Pope – appears as the strongest person in the state, since he nominally has both executive and legislative powers<sup>12</sup>. At the same time, it should be noted that almost all monarchies in Europe and absolutely all parliamentary monarchies in this part of the world are hereditary, although monarchs receive their positions on the basis of various systems of succession to the throne (including systems of equal or absolute primogeniture, cognatic or male primogeniture, agnatic or patrilineal primogeniture or the so-called salic system)<sup>13</sup>. In particular, Andorra is technically a semi-elected diarchy, in which one head of state is the popularly elected president of France, and the other is the bishop of Urgel, who is appointed by the Pope. In turn, in the Vatican, the Pope is chosen by a conclave of cardinals, but the powers of the first are unlimited in time and very strong.

From a political point of view, the institution of monarchy in Europe is still preserved, on the one hand, as a political tradition, but at the same time, on the other hand, due to the fact that the monarchs (with the exception of the Vatican, Liechtenstein and Monaco) are very weak or quite weak, at least in fact, if not nominal. This is paralleled by the fact that democratic Europe today is in principle characterized by processes of weakening the positions and powers of heads of state, even if they are presidents (probably with the exception of France and Portugal, if we are talking about Western Europe, or Lithuania, Poland and Romania, if we are talking about Central and Eastern Europe), primarily in favor of governments led by prime ministers, formed and accountable to popularly elected parliaments (which is also the case in most European monarchies, including all parliamentary monarchies).

Accordingly, over a fairly significant period of time, the position – political and scientific (generally stereotypical ones) – that monarchs in Europe are ceremonial and purely nominal ones, and the level of their influence weakening in the political system is still incomplete, and will obviously continue (where this may still be the case) in the future. In other words, and as the researchers note, European monarchs essentially perform a “politically empty” function

<sup>10</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimizhinstytutsiynykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku “blava derzhavy–parlament–uriad” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 102.

<sup>11</sup> Gallois J.-P., *Le régime international de la principauté de Monaco*, Paris 1964, s. 61–64.; Roobol W., *Twilight of the European Monarchy*, “*European Constitutional Law Review*” 2011, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 272–286.

<sup>12</sup> Stepan A., Linz J., Minoves J., *Democratic Parliamentary monarchies*, “*Journal of Democracy*” 2014, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 35–51.

<sup>13</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimizhinstytutsiynykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku “blava derzhavy–parlament–uriad” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 102–103.

that does not bring significant dividends even to the political nation, not to mention the political system<sup>14</sup>.

Nevertheless, the historical roles, political and legal positions and powers of monarchs in the political systems of European countries are different, and therefore they require separate consideration, comparison and systematization. This, on the one hand, is done on the example of individual countries of Western Europe, whose monarchical forms of government are the loudest and most studied in political science, and, on the other hand, in the format of comparison and systematization on the example of complex, qualitative and quantitative (index) analysis of all the countries of this part of the world, which are different types and types of monarchies, which was mentioned above. Accordingly, in addition to the consideration and qualitative comparison of the power of European monarchs, their coverage and reduction to a common analytical denominator is appropriate through the creation of an index/coefficient of the power of European monarchs and, accordingly, its component indicators, which will allow analyzing the power of monarchs and “ranking” the analyzed countries / monarchies of Europe in accordance with the growth indicators of the power of authority of these heads of state. In other words, in such a case, we are actually talking about the coefficient of the power of the monarchs’ authority and the influence of the monarchies as such. After that, as indicated in the tasks of our research, special attention will be focused on the rating of the development of monarchies within the framework of the already mentioned prosperity index (“Legatum Prosperity Index”<sup>15</sup>) from the analytical organization “Legatum Institute” thanks to which it will be possible to check how the power of monarchs compares with the level of prosperity of monarchies in the region.

Therefore, all European monarchies without exception in their various types (parliamentary, dualistic and absolute monarchies) will be subjected to a comparative analysis within the specified subject focus in particular Andorra, Belgium, the Vatican, Denmark, Spain, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom (Great Britain) and Sweden. The level or power of influence of their monarchs will be analyzed and compared based on the array and sum of indicators, various analytical options for answers to which (verification options) have their own scale and rules of evaluation.

We propose to use 9 such indicators and evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 4 points, in particular, depending primarily on the influence of the other indicator within the framework of the total power of the monarchs (accordingly, our own author’s, albeit subjective, position on this issue was used for this purpose).

So, the list of indicators and their rating scale are as follows: 1st indicator – the way the monarch receives his powers and mandate: 0 points – if the monarch is elected, 4 points – if the

<sup>14</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimizhinstytutsiynykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku “hlava derzhavy–parlament–uriad” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 108.

<sup>15</sup> *Legatum Prosperity Index*; Prosperity, źródło: <https://www.prosperity.com/rankings> [odczyt: 30.11.2022].



monarch is not elected, and instead his power and mandate are hereditary; II indicator – the term of the monarch's powers and mandate: 0 points – if the monarch's powers and mandate have a certain term/period of validity; 4 points – if the powers and mandate of the monarch are not limited in time, but are lifelong (of course, the monarch can voluntarily get rid of his position – through the process of abdication – but this is not the case here); III indicator – checking the presence of the institution of the parliament alongside the monarch, which can participate in the legislative process: 0 points – if such an institution exists and is the main or only center of law-making or its analogue, etc; IV indicator – the presence of a restrictive monarch in the monarchy of the constitution in its codified form (constitutions in the monarchy are typically adopted precisely to limit the powers of the heads of state): 0 points – if such a codified and restrictive constitution exists; 4 points – if there is no such codified and restrictive constitution; V indicator – the authority of the monarch to nominate/appoint the prime minister as the head of the government cabinet: 0 points – if the monarch is not endowed with such authority at all; 2 points – if the monarch is endowed with such authority, however, the nomination or appointment of the head of government by the monarch requires the consent and approval of the parliament (the so-called investiture vote); 4 points – if the monarch is endowed with such authority and it is unilateral, that is, it does not require confirmation by any other political institution (primarily the parliament); VI indicator – the authority of the monarch to appoint judges and determine the judicial system of power in the state: 0 points – if the monarch has the listed powers and roles; 2 points – if the monarch has the listed appointing and/or functional powers, but they are limited (or due to the appointment of not all judges, but some of them, or due to the requirements for confirmation of such appointments by other institutions); 4 points – if the monarch is endowed with the listed appointment and/or functional powers but they are unlimited or complete; VII indicator – the authority of the monarch to be the subject of legislative initiative and to introduce bills for consideration by the parliament: 0 points – if the monarch is not endowed with the listed powers; 4 points – if the monarch is endowed with the listed powers; VIII indicator – checking the presence of the monarch of religious or confessional influence on his state: 0 points – if the monarchy is secular, even if the monarch has certain ecclesiastical functions; 4 points – if the monarchy is theocratic and/or the monarch is the head of a certain church or denomination; Their indicator is a check of whether the monarch has military or power influence in his state: 0 points – if the monarch has no such influence either factually or normatively; 2 points – if the monarch has such influence partially, in particular, has some powers in the military sphere, including appointing part of the command; 4 points – if the monarch is undeniably and positioned as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of his state.

Through comparison (see Table 2), it was established that Europe is characterized by relatively weak or not very strong monarchs, because out of the maximum of 36 points, the highest empirically obtained is at the level of 22 points, and the lowest is at the level of 10 points. And

this is on the condition that in this case the constitutionalized or regulated powers of monarchs or their absence and not real political practice were taken into account (and in practice, monarchs today increasingly do not fulfill the powers regulated by them, in particular in favor of other political institutions). Within the sample, the strongest monarchs were found in the case of Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway, somewhat weaker – in the Vatican, the United Kingdom and Monaco, even weaker – in Andorra, Belgium, Denmark, Liechtenstein and Spain, and the weakest – in the case of Sweden. It is also quite remarkable that in Europe there is no single pattern of authority or weakness of monarchs, since some of them have strength in one or another authority, and some — in completely different ones, etc. In general, this proves that, even nominally, the power of authority of monarchs in Europe is a very blurred phenomenon and it is additionally worth thinking about on the basis of practice. On the other hand, it was established that, despite the popular stereotype, monarchs in Europe still have quite serious and not frankly nominal powers, at least formally.

**Table 2.** Verification of the complex index methodology for assessing the formal power of monarchs in European countries and its comparison with indicators of the development/prosperity of states

Country	Indicators of the power of formal authority of monarchs										Prosperity index rating
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	Cyma	
Andorra	0	4	0	0	0	2	4	0	4	14	n.a.
Belgium	4	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	16	23
Vatican	0	0	4	0	4	0	4	4	4	20	n.a.
Denmark	4	4	0	0	4	4	0	2	0	18	1
Spain	4	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	14	24
Liechtenstein	4	4	0	0	0	2	4	2	2	18	n.a.
Luxemburg	4	4	0	0	2	4	4	0	4	22	7
Monaco	4	4	0	0	4	4	4	0	0	20	n.a.
the Netherlands	4	4	0	0	4	4	4	0	2	22	6
Georgia	4	4	0	0	4	4	0	2	4	22	2
United Kingdom	4	4	0	0	4	0	0	4	4	20	13
Sweden	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	3

Źródło: *Legatum Prosperity Index*, Prosperity, Źródło: <https://www.prosperity.com/rankings>; <https://www.prosperity.com/about/resources>[odczyt: 30.11.2022]; Own calculations; n.a. – not available data.

In particular, it was found (both on the basis of quantitative methods and as a result of a qualitative comparison) that in the constitutional monarchies of Europe the head of state typically possesses, at least nominally, simultaneously both separate functions of the legislative power and separate functions of the executive power, although the monarch performs them

jointly either with the national parliament, or with the government. Moreover, as stated by A. Romanyuk and V. Lytvyn, in the system of legislative power, the monarch usually promulgates acts of parliament, sometimes has the right of legislative initiative and even less often has the right of parliamentary veto, while in the system of executive power he is traditionally focused on the functions of international relations and defense issues. As for the religious influence of the heads of the monarchies, it is also gradually limited, since previously the monarchs were often the heads of national churches, and today they are less often endowed with such a status. Nevertheless, in relation to monarchs in Europe, the norm of their personal inviolability and immunity is not completely applied. There is a good reason for this, which is almost always valid in practice, since monarchs are typically positioned and associated as politically neutral with regard to the domestic political life of their states, and therefore they play an important role in ensuring and strengthening the socio-political and national unity of their states. In general, this allows us to affirmatively indicate that, although European monarchs have lost most of their historical powers and functions during total democratization in the past, as well as during the change of the socio-political context, they can still, at least nominally, influence on the formation of political reality. This is especially relevant in the case of hypothetical radicalization of public and political attitudes, terrorist and other threats, economic, social and political crises, when the idea of protecting the nation and sovereignty by means of entrenched political instruments comes to the fore, perhaps the most important of which is the institution of the monarchy and the monarch<sup>16</sup>.

At the same time, it is quite obvious that in no European monarchy, with the exception of the Vatican (and in this case we are talking only about constitutional – parliamentary and dualistic – monarchies), the monarch is not the main political actor in the state, but instead is inferior to this role and the real political one (but perhaps not public) influence on the prime minister, who actually (as well as increasingly nominally) heads the government and the executive vertical as a whole. This is quite surprising, because it may even contradict the data we received in Table 1, but the fact is that in this case we are talking about a real political process, and not normative or constitutional regulations, which sometimes indicate monarchs as relatively strong<sup>17</sup>. It is very easy to demonstrate this on the basis of such a regulatory power characteristic of almost all monarchs in Europe, such as the right or duty to promulgate legislative acts of the parliament<sup>18</sup>. Nominally, such a right or obligation can be interpreted as the right of legislative veto, in practice; European monarchs have long since disputed their duty to unquestionably

<sup>16</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimzhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku "blava derzhavy–parlament–uriad" ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 118.

<sup>17</sup> Elgie R., Heads of state in European politics, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis Group 2015, s. 311–327.

<sup>18</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimzhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku "blava derzhavy–parlament–uriad" ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 122.

sign, rather than promise, normative legal acts of parliaments in their states<sup>19</sup>. Thus, they do not speak for the national will of the nationally elected parliament. In a similar way, European monarchs are virtually powerless in the process of forming governments, because they imitate the political positions and relationships of parties, which correspond through popularly elected parliaments. This happens almost always, with a minor exception in situations when the parties cannot agree on the formation of governments, as a result of which the decisions of monarchs sometimes become decisive<sup>20</sup>.

As a result, the formal powers of monarchs in European countries are typically residual or reserve and are strengthened only in times of crisis or emergency. Instead, in real life, the function of monarchs is usually reduced to social or cultural, because they act as figures around which citizens are united or can be united in periods of national crises or disasters<sup>21</sup>. That is why not monarchs, but heads of governments/prime ministers (if we are talking about monarchies) always participate in the meetings of the European Council at the same level as leaders or representatives of other European states<sup>22</sup>. On the whole, one can draw a conclusion about the real powers of monarchs in European countries based on the consideration and analysis of informal sources, in particular the mass media.

Applying an identical methodological scheme (as in the case of the formal powers of monarchs), it is possible to take into account such indicators of possible informal powers of European monarchs as (with identical answers according to logic: 0 points – the indicator does not work; 2 points – the indicator works partially; 4 points – the indicator is fully activated): I. Is the monarch popular?; II. Does the monarch use coercion?; III. Is the monarch conservative in his views?; IV. Is the level of support for the monarch high among the population?; V. Does the power of the monarch extend to countries other than his own?; VI. Does the monarch have dynastic ties abroad?; VII. Does the monarch support a certain party or lobby its interests? Their verification makes it possible to systematize, in particular using media data, the informal influence of European monarchs, in particular as shown in the table. 3 (in this case, the Vatican case is not taken into account as it is not always relevant). In this case, it was observed that monarchs in Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and the United Kingdom should be considered informally the strongest. Instead, the weakest in this context are the monarchs of such European countries as Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein and Sweden. In general, the indicators of formal and informal authority of monarchs in European countries in this case are almost synchronized and comparable. However, a significant exception is the monarch/

<sup>19</sup> Saalfeld T., 'The United Kingdom: Still a Single "Chain of Command"? The Hollowing Out of the "Westminster Model"', [w:] Strom K., Muller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 648.

<sup>20</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniialnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimizhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku "blava derzhavy–parlament–uriad" ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 123.

<sup>21</sup> Elgie R., *Heads of state in European politics*, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis Group 2015, s. 311–327.

<sup>22</sup> Elgie R., *Heads of state in European politics*, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis Group 2015, s. 311–327.

prince in Monaco, who is formally much more powerful than informally, mainly because he is not very popular and well-known.

**Table 3.** Verification of the complex index methodology for assessing the formal power of monarchs in European countries and its comparison with indicators of the development/prosperity of states

Country	Indicators of the power of informal authority of monarchs								The power of formal authority of monarchs	Prosperity index rating
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	CyMa		
Andorra	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	6	14	n.a.
Belgium	2	0	2	4	0	4	0	12	16	23
Denmark	2	0	2	4	4	4	0	16	18	1
Spain	2	0	2	2	4	2	0	12	14	24
Liechtenstein	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	8	18	n.a.
Luxumburg	4	0	4	4	0	4	0	16	22	7
Monaco	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	6	20	n.a.
the Netherland	4		2	4	4	0	0	14	22	6
Norway	4	2	2	2	2	4	0	16	22	2
United Kingdom	4	0	2	4	4	0	2	16	20	13
Sweden	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	6	10	3

Źródło: *Legatum Prosperity Index*, Prosperity, źródło: <https://www.prosperity.com/rankings>; <https://www.prosperity.com/about/resources>[odczyt: 30.11.2022].;

Own calculations; n.a. – not available data.

Thus, in general, it can be stated that at the current stage, there is no truly strong monarch on the territory of Europe. In general, almost all European countries considered are constitutional monarchies, in which the monarch and his actions are significantly limited by the constitution, traditions, laws, government, parliament, etc. This is due to the fact that today monarchs in European countries are rather a tribute to the traditions of certain countries and most often perform representative functions. Accordingly, on the one hand, institutions of monarchs continue to function in some European states, but they have long since lost the essence of sovereign power. On the other hand, the institutions of monarchs usually currently perform largely symbolic or ceremonial rather than the true political roles and functions with which historical monarchs are stereotypically associated. This is paralleled by the fact that the institution of the head of state in Europe today, with the exception of France and Portugal in Western Europe, as well as Lithuania, Poland and Romania in Central-Eastern Europe (we take into account mainly those countries that are members of the EU or associated with the EU), traditionally and gradually loses its political influence and importance. The consequence of this is the fact that today the political process and structuring of political systems in the format of representative parliamentary democracies is characteristic of European countries, in which decisive executive roles are assigned to governments and prime ministers, not heads of state

(presidents and monarchs), but the main legislators, in turn, are the national parliaments<sup>23</sup>. In other words, this is also due to the fact that the heads of state in the democratic countries of Europe rule, but do not rule or govern, but instead perform nominal and symbolic roles, in particular, presiding over ceremonial events, etc. Surprisingly, this may be the reason for the success and prosperity of these countries.

On the other hand, our study did not prove the hypothesis according to which the power of monarchs somehow correlates with the development results and prosperity rating of certain states. As we can see, the power rating/coefficient of the monarchs and the prosperity rating do not match and are not opposite. Considering this, the power of the monarch is not a direct indication of the state's level of development in terms of economy, entrepreneurship, governance, education, health care, security, personal freedoms, social capital, etc. Although, in contrast, all the European monarchies studied by the organization "LegatumInstitute" are among the top 30 countries with the highest levels of prosperity.

And this is very important, because in general, monarchs have relatively weak heads of state, at least if we take into account the theoretical maximum of one or another analytical technique (including ours). In addition and as a conclusion, it is necessary to testify that the monarchical form of government has not outlived its usefulness at all. After all, monarchies are still in the outpost of states with the highest level of prosperity. Although European monarchs have lost some of their powers (in some cases very significantly) in the process of general democratization of the world and with the change of historical context, they still influence the formation of political reality in their states and even in the world.

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<sup>23</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv i system kraïn Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvostimizhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku "hlava derzhavy–parlament–uriad" ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 89-90.

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## **“THE THIRD”, “THE FOURTH” OR EVEN “THE FIFTH WAVE” OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND AUTOCRATIZATION? THE ESSENCE, DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD**

The article examines the essence, directions, dynamics and consequences of political transitions in Europe and the world, in particular through the prism of what should be the sequence of «waves» of democratization or autocratization from the end of the 20th century until today. It is argued that it is inappropriate to say on average that some “new wave»” of democratization has begun in the world today, but instead the “third wave” of democratization has ended globally and the “third wave” of autocratization has begun. Although, in contrast, the next or “new” “waves” of democratization do sometimes take place in certain regions of the world, but they are not universal one and instead are often replaced by the “rollbacks” from democratization. In general, the current trend is, on the one hand, an increase in the number of autocracies and hybrid regimes in the world and a decrease in the number of liberal and illiberal democracies. On the other hand, the processes of “erosion” of democracy as such continue to take place today, when the quality, level and efficiency of democracy declines in most countries of the world due to various crisis phenomena.

*Keywords: transition, transformation, “wave” of democratization, “wave” of autocratization*

## **„TRZECIA”, „CZWARTA” CZY NAWET „PIĄTA FAŁA” DEMOKRATYZACJI I AUTOKRATYZACJI? ISTOTA, DYNAMIKA I KONSEKWENCJE PRZEMIAN POLITYCZNYCH W EUROPIE I NA ŚWIECIE.**

Artykuł analizuje istotę, kierunki, dynamikę i konsekwencje przemian politycznych w Europie i na świecie, w szczególności przez pryzmat tego, jaka powinna być sekwencja „fal” demokratyzacji lub autokratyzacji od końca XX wieku do dziś. Argumentuje się, że nie należy mówić o tym, że w dzisiejszym świecie rozpoczęła się jakaś „nowa fala” demokratyzacji, lecz że zakończyła się, w ujęciu globalnym „trzecia fala” demokratyzacji i rozpoczęła się „trzecia fala” autokratyzacji. Kolejne lub „nowe” fale demokratyzacji mają wprowadzić czasem miejsce w niektórych regionach świata, ale nie są one powszechne, a zamiast tego często zastępowane są przez „cofanie się” demokratyzacji. Ogólnie ujmując obecny trend, to z jednej strony wzrost



liczby autokracji i reżimów hybrydowych na świecie oraz spadek liczby demokracji liberalnych i nieliberalnych. Z drugiej strony, procesy „erozji” demokracji jako takiej trwają do dziś, kiedy to w większości krajów świata, z powodu różnych zjawisk kryzysowych, spada jakość, poziom i efektywność demokracji.

*Słowa kluczowe: przejście, transformacja, „fala” demokratyzacji, „fala” autokratyzacji.*

## **«ТРЕТЯ», «ЧЕТВЕРТА» ЧИ НАВІТЬ «П’ЯТА ХВИЛЯ» ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦІЇ ТА АВТОКРАТИЗАЦІЇ? СУТНІСТЬ, ДИНАМІКА І НАСЛІДКИ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ТРАНЗИТІВ У ЄВРОПІ ТА СВІТІ**

У статті розглянуто сутність, напрями, динаміку і наслідки політичних транзитів у Європі та світі, зокрема крізь призму того, якою повинна бути порядковість «хвиль» демократизації або автократизації з кінця XX століття і до сьогодні. Аргументовано, що сьогодні усереднено не доречно говорити про те, що в світі розпочалась якась «нова хвиля» демократизації, а натомість глобально завершилась «третя хвиля» демократизації і почалась «третя хвиля» автократизації. Хоча, на противагу, наступні чи «нові» «хвилі» демократизації все-ж подеколи мають місце в окремих регіонах світу, але не є універсальними і натомість часто змінюються «відкатами» від демократизації. Загалом поточним трендом є, з одного боку, збільшення кількості автократій і гібридних режимів у світі та зменшення кількості ліберальних й іліберальних демократій. З іншого боку, сьогодні й далі відбуваються процеси «erozії» демократії як такої, коли через розмаїті кризові явища якість, рівень й ефективність демократії падає у більшості країн світу.

*Ключові слова: транзит, трансформація, «хвиля демократизації», «хвиля автократизації».*

After the collapse of the USSR and the “Warsaw Pact” system, many post-communist countries began “the third wave” of democratization was ongoing in the world. However, everything turned out to be not so simple, since out of all the post-communist countries of Europe and Asia, only a small number of states succeeded in truly democratizing and becoming liberal or consolidated democracies, and that was mainly in Europe. In this case, we are talking about countries that managed to integrate into the European Union, although not all of them on the time of the study, retained their status as liberal democracies, after all in some of the former post-communist countries of Europe, regressive processes, which are often called the “erosion” of democracy, began at various times. In contrast, still other countries were only partially democratized, but never liberalized, and therefore remained either partial or electoral democracies, or hybrid political regimes, or gradually slipped into authoritarianism. In addition, some countries that

managed to democratize to varying degrees during the so-called “third wave” have become less democratic over time. Accordingly, a situation arose when the “third wave” of democratization was soon followed by a “the third retreat” from the idea and logic of democracy, or the so-called the “third wave” of autocratization. Soon, already at the beginning of the 21st century, many countries of the world began to democratize again, and this process began to acquire quite intensive contours. In contrast to them, other countries began or continued to steadily autocratize. All this raised the question for some researchers on whether it is possible to talk about the end of the “third wave” of both democratization and autocratization, and instead on the launch and uptake of the “the fourth wave” of similar (by nature) processes. Accordingly, several research questions definitely need attention, in particular, what are the time frames of “the third wave” of democratization, whether the “fourth wave” of democratization has begun, why in the same time period some countries are democratizing, while other countries are becoming autocratized, and whether the combination of processes is defined can serve to parallelize different “waves” of democratization and autocratization, etc. It is proposed to solve the questions both in general theory and on the basis of an appeal to empirical findings in different countries and regions of the world. At the same time, the reference point will be taken mainly in the late 1980s – early 1990s, when the “third wave” of democratization reached its peak, but never managed to become a one-way process.

Proceeding to the consistent solution of all the questions, it is necessary to establish a theoretical and methodological framework, according to which the transition from one type of political regime to another, to democracy and to autocracy (from democracy), including at the expense of hybrid regimes, is caused by a non-cooperative interpretation transit as such. This means that despite the varying popularity of democracy or autocracy in different time periods and in different countries and regions of the world, political actors and the public cannot agree on a single direction of political transit. That is why some countries in certain periods – definitely depending on the political realities, geopolitical situation, socio-political conjuncture, etc., gravitate towards democracies (i. e. democratize), and others towards autocracies (i. e. autocratize). It was as a result of this that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and during the twenty-year period after that, not even half of the former (or current) post-communist countries of Europe and Asia managed to democratize and become full-fledged democracies, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and this despite the fact that some of them, especially Hungary, very significantly worsened their indicators in the decade after that (thirty years after the collapse of communism). Instead, other countries became democracies only partially, like Bulgaria and Romania, or even satisfying the category of hybrid political regime, as is typical for Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, and also earlier Armenia. Still other countries, after short-term outbreaks of democratization in the early 1990s, began to gradually or sharply autocratize, as, for example, in the case of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, etc. In general, this proves that among the

former (and often current) post-communist countries, the majority did not manage to democratize, because they became options and cases of dictatorships or unconsolidated transit and hybrid political regimes. A similar trend was continuously repeated in other parts and regions of the world where hints of democratization were made by many countries, but very few of them actually implemented democratization and the movement in the direction of consolidated/liberal democracy.

At first glance, the explanation of the mentioned processes of democratization and autocratization is quite simple, but far from linear and one-sided. If only because we are dealing with different and heterogeneous samples of countries that, over long periods of time and even under the same initial conditions, moved and are still moving in significantly different directions<sup>1</sup>. This is supplemented by the fact that political science failed to predict many socio-political processes, including the collapse of communism, and probably will not predict even more processes, since many of them depend not only on institutional, but also on actual political and behavioral factors and a number of exogenous shocks. In addition, the political transit or the transit of political regimes and the movement in the direction of democracy or autocracy in some time periods does not at all repeat similar processes in other time periods. As a result, purely theoretically, the first part of the "third wave" of democratization, which began in the 1970s and 1980s, significantly differed from the second part of this conditional "wave" in the 1990s.

In the same way, democratization and autocratization processes in the early 2000s and later turned out to be even more different, which is purely logical to separate them into a separate cluster, which scientists sometimes call the "fourth wave". Although, again purely theoretically, in such a case it would be possible to talk about five "waves" of democratization and autocratization, provided that the post-communist transit belongs to or reveals the "fourth wave", and the processes surrounding political regimes from the beginning of the 21st century and still "the fifth wave" (in this case, these "waves" intersect and "find" each other).

The attitudes of researchers on this matter are quite different, and in this case we appeal to the most cited and most used among them. Most scientists state that the "third wave" of democratization began in the first half of the 1970s and lasted approximately until the beginning of the 21st century, when many former post-communist countries were integrated into the European Union, and in general democratization (although not completely to consolidated democracies) was oriented 60 countries in different parts of the world<sup>2</sup>. According to this logic, the "rollback" from the "third wave" of democratization (in the direction of autocratization) began in the second half of the 2000s, in particular as a result of a cascade of global or regional crises, in particular financial and economic, migration, demographic, etc., as well as as a result of a series of wars and conflicts. Nevertheless, the author of the concept of "waves" of democratization S. Huntington

<sup>1</sup> McFaul M., The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, *"World Politics"* 2002, vol 54, nr. 2, s. 212-244.

<sup>2</sup> Huntington S., Democracy's Third Wave, *"The Journal of Democracy"* 1991, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 12-34.; Schenoni L., Mainwaring S., Hegemonic Effects and Regime Change in Latin America, *"Democratization"* 2019, vol 26, nr. 2, s. 269-287.

substantiated such logic in his seminal work “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”<sup>3</sup> from 1991, and therefore everything that happened after the collapse of the USSR and similar regimes did not necessarily have to fit into the framework of the “third wave” of democratization according to S. Huntington. Especially since the work of S. Huntington does not mention the collapse of the Soviet bloc, although many scientists still believe that the “third wave” of this author covers the democratic transitions of 1989–1991<sup>4</sup>. At the same time, it is possible to put forward the position that democratization, and later autocratization of the post-communist period (as well as in relation to synchronous events) is something else, which would be appropriate to describe with the term “the fourth wave”, since political processes within this period and cluster of countries had their own well-defined fullness and consistency<sup>5</sup>.

On the other hand, still other researchers point out that the so-called “democratic transits” within the framework of the so-called the “third wave” according to S. Huntington is very often nothing more than transitions from unconditionally autocratic regimes to semi-autocratic regimes that lack status and democratic characteristics<sup>6</sup>. An even more radical, but similar position is expressed by S. Gunitsky, who notes that from the 18th century until the beginning of the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011-2012, thirteen “waves” of democratization and autocratization took place in the world, but this if by “waves” we mean shifts from more autocratic regimes to more democratic ones or vice versa, but not the formation of complete/consolidated democracies or autocracies<sup>7</sup>. Although this logic of distinguishing “waves” of transformations in principle does not contradict the position of S. Huntington himself, who notes that a “democratic wave” is a group of transits from non-democratic to democratic political regimes that take place during a certain period of time and which significantly exceed the transits’ number in the opposite direction during the same period of time<sup>8</sup>. Moreover, other researchers, including S. Mainwaring, A. Pérez-Liñán and F. Bizzarro propose something similar when they claim that a “wave” in this case should be understood as any historical period during which there is a steady and significant increase in the share of competitive regimes (democracies and semi-democracies) or parts of autocratic regimes<sup>9</sup>.

Nevertheless, researchers continue to most often appeal to S. Huntington’s logic and traditionally describe all democratization processes from the mid-1970s to today as the “third wave” of democratization, and all reverse processes as a rollback from this “third wave” democratization

<sup>3</sup> Huntington S., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Wyd. University of Oklahoma Press 1991.; Huntington S., After twenty years: the future of the third wave, *The Journal of Democracy* 1997, vol 8, nr. 4, s. 3-12.

<sup>4</sup> Haggard S., Kaufman R., Democratization During the Third Wave, *Annual Review of Political Science* 2016, vol 19, nr. 1, s. 125-144.

<sup>5</sup> Gunitsky S., From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century, *International Organization* 2014, vol 68, nr. 3, s. 561-597.

<sup>6</sup> Diamond L., Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, *The Journal of Democracy* 2002, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 21-35.; Schedler A., Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation, *The Journal of Democracy* 2002, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 36-50.

<sup>7</sup> Gunitsky S., Democratic Waves in Historical Perspective, *Perspectives on Politics* 2018, vol 16, nr.

<sup>8</sup> Huntington S., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Wyd. University of Oklahoma Press 1991, s. 15.

<sup>9</sup> Mainwaring S., Pérez-Liñán A., *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2014, s. 6.; Mainwaring S., Bizzarro F., The Fates of Third-Wave Democracies, *The Journal of Democracy* 2019, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 99-113.

or as the "third wave" of autocratization<sup>10</sup>. Accordingly, here – including this in our study – the question is whether all democratization and autocratization processes since the mid-1970s are so identical that they can be included in a single consolidated and integral "wave" of democratization and one integral reverse "wave" of autocratization. Or instead, without disputing the date of the beginning of the "third wave" of democratization (even according to S. Huntington), it should be considered as completed by some "third wave" of autocratization, and therefore later the beginning of certain subsequent "waves" of similar processes in different groups of countries, in different regions and in various periods of time.

The theoretical hint at the expediency of such a step is due primarily to the fact that after the Second World War, but to a greater extent from the beginning of the "third wave" of democratization (in the sense of S. Huntington), the formation of the "newest" concepts and "adjectives" of democracy began and there were so many of them, that sometimes even "waves" of democratization or autocratization appear as "adjectives" of the studied political processes<sup>11</sup>.

Moreover, the typology of political regimes as a result of the progress of transitology and comparative political science has developed extremely intensively and extensively, as a result of which today the step of the transit itself to democracy or from democracy (that is, to autocracy) has been significantly "reduced" and the step of the transit itself to democracy or from democracy (that is, to autocracy) was detailed. In addition, in the theoretical environment, the number of concepts of democracy (or even pseudo-democracy), autocracy, and hybrid political regimes is growing more and more<sup>12</sup>. The situation is complicated by the fact that the most important feature of the modern political process and political science is the increase in the number of political regimes that are neither purely democratic nor purely authoritarian. The number of such "intermediate regimes" increases significantly if democracy is interpreted maximally or within the framework of a sociological approach, because "new democracies" are often illiberal<sup>13</sup>. Along with this, it is legitimate to distinguish, already in accordance with the minimalist tradition and institutional approach, both electoral and liberal democracies. In addition, non-democratic political regimes can also be divided into those in which there is multi-party electoral competition (that is, electoral autocracies) and those that are politically "closed" (that is, non-electoral autocracies)<sup>14</sup>. In the end, accumulated theoretical and practical experience during democratization or autocratization does not at all provide unified schemes of the process of consolidation of democracy or autocracy, although the general

<sup>10</sup> Zagorski P., Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?, *Armed Forces & Society* 2003, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 87-116.

<sup>11</sup> Lytvyn V., *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesualni vymiry analizu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Croissant A., Merkel W., Introduction: Democratization in the early twenty-first century, *Democratization* 2004, vol 11, nr. 5, s. 1.; Epstein D., Bates R., Goldstone J., Kristensen I., O'Halloran S., Democratic transitions, *American Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol 50, nr. 3, s. 551-569; Wigell M., Mapping "Hybrid Regimes": Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics, *Democratization* 2008, vol 15, nr. 2, s. 230-250.

<sup>13</sup> O'Donnell G., Delegative Democracy, *The Journal of Democracy* 1994, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 55-69.; Diamond L., Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation, [w:] Farer T. (ed.), *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1996, s. 52-104.; Diamond L., *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1999, s. 42-50; Zakaria F., The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, *Foreign Affairs* 1997, vol 76, s. 22-43.

<sup>14</sup> Lytvyn V., *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesualni vymiry analizu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.

theoretical understanding of them is much poorer than that of democratic or autocratic transit<sup>15</sup>. In this context, even the “test of two transfers of power” proposed by S. Huntington himself does not always help, according to which it is expected, according to the researcher, that democracy becomes irreversible (or consolidated) only if the “democratizing party” (government party) gives way power of the opposition party after the defeat of the first and the victory of the second in the next elections, and later returns to power again in the next electoral cycle. After all, even today there are cases when, even after the implementation of such scenarios, the previously democratic political regimes of some countries became autocratized (as happened in the case of Hungary).

On the basis of all this, the researchers even developed a “thirst” to single out the “next waves” of democratization or autocratization as a tool for structuring and ordering scientific and analytical knowledge – both theoretical and empirical. Or at least they increasingly, especially since the mid-2000s, began to discuss the “end” of the “third wave” of democratization and the beginning of the “third wave” of autocratization.

Against this background, some scientists, including L. Diamond<sup>16</sup>, M. McFaul<sup>17</sup>, A. Abushouk<sup>18</sup>, M. Olimat<sup>19</sup>, A. Sarihan<sup>20</sup>, P. Howard and M. Hussain<sup>21</sup>, M. Cilento<sup>22</sup>, C. Popescu<sup>23</sup>, as well as some others, considering at least reflecting on the fact that from the beginning to the middle of the 2000s it is appropriate to talk about the start of the so-called “fourth wave” of democratization, and hence later the “fourth wave” of autocratization. They do this mainly in the context of the events of the so-called “Arab Spring” – the collapse of several dictatorships/autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa, which are often associated with the events that took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Asia. At the same time, the fact that glimpses of democratization during the “Arab Spring” were relatively short-lived is rarely taken into account here, since a few months after the apparent beginning of democratic transit (increasing the level of democracy in autocracies), most of the Arab “political innovations” were curtailed, causing an inevitable rollback in the direction of autocracies again<sup>24</sup> (as, for example,

<sup>15</sup> Linz J., Stepan A., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 1996.

<sup>16</sup> Diamond L., A Fourth Wave or False Start? Democracy After the Arab Spring, *Foreign Affairs*, May 22, 2011, źródło: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-05-22/fourth-wave-or-false-start>

<sup>17</sup> McFaul M., The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, *World Politics* 2002, vol 54, nr. 2, s. 212-244.

<sup>18</sup> Abushouk A., The Arab Spring: A Fourth Wave of Democratization?, *Domes: Digest of Middle East Studies* 2016, vol 25, nr. 1, s. 52-69.

<sup>19</sup> Olimat M., The Fourth Wave of Democratization, *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 2008, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 16-48.

<sup>20</sup> Sarihan A., Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave of Democratization? The Case of Syria and Egypt, *Turkish Journal of Politics* 2012, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 67-85.

<sup>21</sup> Howard P., Hussain M., *Democracy's Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2013.

<sup>22</sup> Cilento M., The “Fourth Wave” of Democratization and the Difficult Balance between “Transitology” and Area Studies, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 2014, vol 5, nr. 16, s. 658-669.

<sup>23</sup> Popescu C., Is there a fourth wave of democracy or not? An evaluation of the latest theories, *The USV Annals of Economics and Public Administration* 2012, vol 12, nr. 1(15), s. 32-38.

<sup>24</sup> Diamond L., A Fourth Wave or False Start? Democracy After the Arab Spring, *Foreign Affairs*, May 22, 2011, źródło: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-05-22/fourth-wave-or-false-start>; Howard, Phillip N. (2013). „Democracy's Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring” (PDF). OUP. URL: <http://philhoward.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Democracys-Fourth-Wave-First-3-Chapters.pdf>

in Egyptite Bahrain, but not in Tunisia, which managed to successfully consolidate into a relatively stable democratic state, at least by institutional and electoral standards). Other researchers, including I. Szmolka<sup>25</sup>, M. I. Syazli Saidin, W. Kamal Mujaniy and A. Mazuki<sup>26</sup>, etc., in general, on the example of the same countries of the Middle East and North Africa, appeal to the "fifth wave" of democratization in this context, considering the "fourth wave" to be the post-communist transformations in Europe and Asia (thus, they believe that the "third wave" of democratization – in the case of S. Huntington – ended before the collapse of the USSR).

At the same time, these scholars somewhat expand and update the list of transformational cases and processes, in particular by taking into account the problems of protests and democratic movements focused on racial equality, human rights, freedom, democracy and social justice, etc., including in the Arab world, Hong Kong, Chile, Iran, Thailand, Myanmar.

It follows that in the case of singling out the "fourth" or the "fifth wave" of democratization (and, accordingly, justifying the expediency of such singling out), it is necessary to thoroughly and systematically understand the processes and effects of the "third wave" of democratization. At the beginning of the 1990s, the situation regarding the development of democracy in the world looked very optimistic, since this period became a time of a kind of "democratic optimism", when Latin America mostly completed its path to electoral democracy, in conditions of relative political peace, the "Soviet empire" collapsed, an unprecedented series of multiparty elections in African countries took place. At that time, some commentators even began to talk about the "end of history" and the triumph of democracy and the liberal world order. However, even in spite of this, much more skeptical ideas still prevailed in the scientific and analytical environment and, as time has shown (somewhere in a decade, some in a few), this was not at all unfounded. Purely theoretically, it was clear almost immediately, since the majority of the world can become liberal, democratic and peaceful at the same time – and only on the basis of stages of ups and downs, i.e. gradually and in the long term. In practical terms, this meant (and this was previous experience) that the broad democratization of the early 1990s was sooner or later to be replaced by a "reverse wave" of authoritarian regression, as the "waves come and go."<sup>27</sup>

Purely practically, this turned out to be the fact that since 1974, when the Portuguese "Carnation Revolution" took place, the so-called "third wave" of global democratization began in the world, at least according to S. Huntington. As a result, the number of democratic political regimes around the world has almost doubled, even though different researchers, research centers and analytical projects give quite different data on this matter.

For example, according to the data of the project "Freedom in the World" of the organization "Freedom House": the number of free (democratic) countries in 1974 was 44 (29 percent), and

<sup>25</sup> Szmolka I., *The fifth wave of democratization? Processes of Political Change in the Arab World from a Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. University of Granada 2012.

<sup>26</sup> Saidin M., Mujani W., Mazuki A., *New Wave of Democratization: The Case of Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions*, Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Advanced ICT, 2014.

<sup>27</sup> Lytvyn V., *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesualni vymiry analizu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014

already in 2012 87 (45 percent) (in 2008, there were in general 90 or 47 percent)<sup>28</sup>; the number of non-free (autocratic) countries was 65 (or 43 percent) in 1974, it was 48 (or 24 percent) in 2012 (there were 42 or 22 percent in 2009); the number of electoral democracies in 1989 was 69 (41 percent), and 117 (60 percent) in 2012 (there were 123 or 64 percent altogether in 2006-2007 of them). These numbers are impressive, since the breadth and stability of the “third wave” (if we count from 1974 to 2012) of democratization had no precedent in the history of political systems and international relations.

At the same time, since the mid-2000s, the flurry of optimism that accompanied the end of the “Cold War” has significantly weakened. The revival of ethnic violence in the former communist countries and the countries of South Africa, as well as the increase in “new skepticism”, in which special attention should be paid to the explanation of various modifications of authoritarianism<sup>29</sup>. It was gradually supplemented, as mentioned above, by a cascade of world or regional crises, in particular financial and economic, migration, demographic, etc., as well as a result of a number of wars and conflicts. That is why at this time, but precisely starting from the beginning of the 2000s, a number of scientists began to express their disappointment with the socio-political and economic results of the development of democracies and the processes of democratization of the past decades or the countries of the so-called “third wave” – that is, countries that were rapidly democratizing, including some of them in the post-communist region. In this regard, T. Carothers<sup>30</sup> calculated back in 2002 that out of almost 100 countries that left autocracies in 1974 and joined the ranks of democracies, only 18 (10 countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, which joined the EU, as well as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan and Ghana) were on the way to becoming successful and well-functioning (liberal or consolidated) democracies or at least made progress in democratization and maintained positive dynamics in this process (a decade later, only Croatia joined these countries, which also completed its integration into the European Union). It is from this point of view that F. Zakarias wrote about the emergence of the phenomenon of illiberal democracies – that is, countries in which the holding of competitive elections began before the establishment of a valid legal order. The specificity of this statement was the diversity of approaches to the interpretation of the institutional parameters of democracy, since a democratic political regime with strong institutions (and elected bodies in such a case must guarantee civil liberties) is called not only democracy, but liberal democracy, and the word “liberal” is no less important here than “democracy”<sup>31</sup>.

Empirically, this is very important, since most of the countries of Western and Central-Eastern Europe, and sometimes East Asia, first liberalized, and only then became politically democratized. Instead, the countries of Latin America and Africa, etc., first democratized but

<sup>28</sup> *Freedom in the World Country Rating*, Wyd. Freedom House: Official Website, 2012. URL: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20%26%20Ratings%20Overview%2C%201973-2012.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Lyrtyyn V., *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsini ta protsesualni vymiry analizu*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.

<sup>30</sup> Carothers T., The End of the Transition Paradigm, *Journal of Democracy* 2002, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 5-21.

<sup>31</sup> Zakaria F., The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, *Foreign Affairs* 1997, vol 76, s. 22-43.



then began to liberalize, as a result of which this process often met with opposition and was unsuccessful, in particular, because for the economy, democracy without liberalism, without effective institutions that guarantee the rights of economic agents, was not very favorable environment. As a result, some countries of the second group (and later some of the post-communist countries) either became so-called illiberal democracies, or altogether stopped their transit in the direction of democracy and began to autocratize<sup>32</sup>.

Eventually, the attention of researchers to the "inhibition" of democratization processes, and therefore to one or another "wave" of democratization, was conditioned and explained by the fact that in the world at the turn of the millennium a rather large number of "old" (or traditional) varieties of autocracies were preserved in different countries and parts of the world. Moreover, these were completely different options of autocratic regimes (even regardless of their earlier attempts to democratize), among which various researchers single out, in particular: a) one-party regimes in Cuba, China, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, Eritrea, Libya and Syria; b) military regimes in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sudan; c) traditional monarchies of the Arab world (even despite the conceptualization of ideas and the practical implementation of the events of the so-called "Arab Spring", starting from the mid-2000s); d) personalized or bureaucratic autocracy in Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, etc. In addition, transition processes in a number of countries, especially in the post-Soviet space, even if they were initially marked by free and fair elections, were eventually reduced to various manifestations of authoritarianism based on the screen of competition and "electoral façade"<sup>33</sup>. This is how the creation of a whole modal series of concepts of autocratic political regimes took place. After all, the need for an adequate interpretation and comparative analysis of what happened (and is still happening) in most post-Soviet and other countries of the world became the reason for the construction of several new concepts of the development of political regimes – electoral authoritarianism/autocracy, competitive authoritarianism/autocracy, the concept of "virtual politics" etc.

In general, the cascade of events of first democratization and later autocratization of groups of political regimes and even significant consolidation of first democracies and later autocracies led many researchers to the opinion that the "third wave" of democratization reached its logical conclusion precisely in the mid-2000s. Even some further glimpses of democratization in the world did not prevent this, since they were almost immediately opposed by almost instantaneous manifestations of autocratization – both in the same and in other states.

At the same time, some researchers nevertheless began to appeal to the next "waves" of democratization and the next "waves" of autocratization in the world, in particular by taking into account the experience and consequences of the so-called "second wave" of "color revolutions" from the beginning of the 21st century (at the same time, the "first wave" of the "color revolutions" was primarily typical of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the late

<sup>32</sup> Polterovych V., Popov V., *Demokratiya, kachestvo institutiv i ekonomicheskyi rost*, "Oikumena" 2007, vol 5, s. 167-204.

<sup>33</sup> Lytvyn V., *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesualni vymiry analizy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.

1980s and early 1990s). In this context, it should be theoretically noted that we understand “color revolutions” as a concept that is widely used to denote so-called non-violent “revolutions” and mass non-violent protest actions (although, on the contrary, in some cases, weapons are used against peaceful protesters and this leads to the mass death of people), which partly cause the change of political regimes or at least cause their greater dynamics. The so-called “first wave” of the “color revolutions”, which fits into the time frame of the “third wave” of democratization, are such well-known examples as the “Carnation Revolution” on April 25, 1974 in Portugal, which began as a military coup against the political regime E New, however, it immediately took on the characteristics of a campaign of civil resistance for democracy; the “Yellow Revolution” or “Revolution of People’s Power” in the Philippines in 1986, which was caused by acts of regime violence and falsification of elections, and the result was the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of F. Marcos and the partial restoration of democracy in the country; the “Velvet Revolution” of 1989 in Czechoslovakia and similar “velvet revolutions” in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which led to the peaceful overthrow of communist regimes and the transition to liberal political and economic systems; the “Bulldozer revolution” of 2000 in Yugoslavia, as a result of which the regime of S. Milosevic was overthrown, and later the regime of V. Koštunica was established; the “Rose Revolution” of 2003 in Georgia, as a result of which President E. Shevardnadze resigned, and M. Saakashvili was subsequently elected as the new president; the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 in Ukraine, during which a second round of presidential elections was held, in which V. Yushchenko won, and the former opposition came to power; the “Tulip Revolution” of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, as a result of which the regime of A. Akayev was terminated, and the newly elected president K. Bakiyev came to power, etc.

Instead, the quite often separated the “fourth wave” of democratization is outlined by somewhat newer cases of “color revolutions”, including in other regions of the world. In particular, in 2005, the so-called “Cedar Revolution” took place in Lebanon, caused by the introduction of Syrian troops into Lebanon and the pro-Syrian policy of the authorities, as a result of which the state’s policy was changed to a pro-Lebanese one. In 2005, there was an attempt at a “color revolution” (and the so-called Andijan shooting or Andijan uprising) in Uzbekistan, which was caused by dissatisfaction with the economic policy of the president and the arrest of businessmen on charges of extremism. In 2006, there was an attempt of the “Cornflower” or “Denim Revolution” in Belarus, the reason for which was the official results of the presidential elections, and the result was mass arrests of protesters. In 2008, there was also an attempt at a “color revolution” in Armenia, which was marked by mass protests after the presidential elections and as a result of which several people died and several hundred were injured. In 2009, the so-called “Brick Revolution” took place in Moldova, which was also determined by the official results of the parliamentary elections, but the result of which turned out to be a recount of voters’ votes. In 2010, the so-called “Melon Revolution” took place in Kyrgyzstan, caused by dissatisfaction

with the policies of President K. Bakiyev and pressure on the political opposition, resulting in hundreds of victims and the resignation of the government.

At the same time, during 2005-2010, other political events took place in the world, which largely resembled "color revolutions". In particular, the so-called the "Violet" or the "Purple" revolution in Iraq in 2005, in particular during the fall of S. Hussein's political regime, is sometimes considered an example of a "color revolution". The term "Purple Revolution" appeared first shortly after that year's election, particularly in various blogs that supported the US invasion of Iraq in January 2005. Another example of a "color revolution" is sometimes considered to be the "Blue Revolution" in Kuwait in 2005, when in this country there were mass peaceful demonstrations in support of women's suffrage. The result was a woman's right to vote, starting with the 2007 elections. In August and September 2007, Buddhist monks, who usually wear saffron robes, were at the forefront of mass anti-government protests against the military dictatorship regime, political repression, corruption, violations human rights, abolition of subsidies and state terrorism in Myanmar, and the tasks were to establish democracy, hold free elections, guarantee human and minority rights, release political prisoners, and end military interference in politics. Therefore, the events that ended with the suppression of protests, although at the same time some political reforms and the formation of a new government, are often called the "Saffron Revolution". During June 2009 – February 2010, there were mass protests in Iran regarding the official results of the presidential elections, which entered the political vocabulary as the "Green Revolution". The main methods of mass demonstrations were demonstrations, uprisings, civil disobedience, and strikes, which were successfully suppressed by the official authorities with human casualties.

As for the next decade, "color revolutions" were not an exception at all. Evidence of this is, in particular, the fact that in 2010-2011, the so-called "Jasmine Revolution" took place in Tunisia. It was a wave of nationwide protests, caused by dissatisfaction with the policy of the then president Ben Ali, which led to his resignation and the appointment of a new government with significant changes. The cause of the "revolution" was also the economic crisis of 2010, in particular unemployment and rising prices, and the impetus was the public self-immolation of a street vendor whose goods were confiscated by the authorities. This act provoked a series of similar incidents between people in a similar situation, and their funerals very often turned into demonstrations of protest. As a result, there was a successful resignation of the country's president and government, which caused a wave of similar protest actions in other Arab states. In February-March 2011, "pro-democracy" demonstrations took place in China, which were later also called the "Jasmine Revolution", even though they ultimately ended in failure. In 2013–2014, the "European Revolution" or "Revolution of Dignity" took place in Ukraine, which was caused by the departure of the country's leadership from the course of European integration and subsequent opposition to this course, as well as excessive concentration of power in the hands of President V. Yanukovich and his "family", by creating a management system with features of a dictatorship. A little earlier, in 2011, the so-called "Lotus Revolution" took

place in Egypt, as a result of which the regime of H. Mubarak was overthrown. The reason for the protests was the desire to end the regimes of brutal police actions, eliminate the state with emergency legislation, avoid election fraud in the future, as well as the fight against political censorship, corruption, unemployment, rising prices, low wages, etc. With the resources of more than a thousand deaths, thousands of wounded and imprisoned in Egypt, the military came to power, the parliament was dissolved, the government and the security service were dismissed, the former ruling party was terminated, and the prosecution of H. Mubarak, his family and former ministers, as well as finally holding new parliamentary and presidential elections, etc. In Bahrain in 2011-2014, there was the "Pearl Revolution", which took place against the background of the successes and results of the "color revolution" in Egypt and Tunisia, although it turned out to be almost unsuccessful. By analogy, in 2011, the so-called the "Coffee Revolution" took place in Yemen, which was anti-government and directed against the then-current government, however, unlike the previous case, the government was eventually forced to leave the country.

In general, we can conclude from this that "color revolutions" is a rather conditional concept, but it is useful for us from the point of view of defining the trends of socio-political development and, at least partially, the dynamics of the development of political regimes in different countries of the world. This is important, because in general, world experience shows that the phenomenon of "color revolutions" is extremely heterogeneous, and therefore there is no generally accepted approach to its definition. Although, on the contrary, some explanations can be made in this regard, since sometimes such measures nevertheless lead to a cascading increase in democratization trends in the world, and sometimes not at all. The difficulty is that since the mid-2000s, the world has entered a phase when the total number of "rollbacks" from democracy in the direction of autocracy outweighs the reverse trends, as a result of which the democratic recession is intensifying in the world, and there are too few individual examples of democratization compared to cases of autocratization. Accordingly, it is purely statistically difficult or not always appropriate to talk about any "wave" of democratization, but rather one should have in mind a "wave" of autocratization, at least in a global context. On the other hand, it can be said that these processes are increasingly gaining regional significance, since in some regions the number of democracies or more democratic political regimes is increasing, and in other regions the number of autocracies or more autocratic political regimes is increasing. In recent years, this has been additionally affected by various restrictions, in particular due to the opposition of the governments of various countries to the "Covid-19" pandemic in the world, as well as other crisis phenomena and wars. Therefore, in general, this proves that talks about "new waves" of democratization in the world (globally) are premature, and the problem is rather the order of naming the past "waves" of democratization and autocratization in the world.

This proves a whole array of trends that we can see for almost two decades now. As stated above, the growth of the number of democratic political regimes during the "third wave" of

democratization<sup>34</sup>, as well as in some countries (regionally) during the so-called "fourth"<sup>35</sup> or even the "fifth" waves of democratization" (and this is not always a continuation of the "third wave" of the democratization) caused academic attention to be paid to new democratic states outside the Western world<sup>36</sup>. With this in mind, scholars have come to realize over time that the quality of most "new" democracies differs significantly from their counterparts in Western democracies. As a result, it was stated that the division between full (or liberal or consolidated) and partial (or defective) democracies is as important as the earlier division between democracies and autocracies<sup>37</sup>. This was followed by the fact, as it was also mentioned above, that a whole series of concepts and typologies of democracy appeared, among which the most popular are "hybrid regimes", "defective", "liberal", "illiberal" and "consolidated" democracies, etc. In addition, today scientists<sup>38</sup> increasingly note that the ability of states to ensure the rule of law and control corruption is the main factor in distinguishing between effective and ineffective democracies. Accordingly, the peculiarity of the transitiological paradigm has definitely become a change in its content and content, as a result of which the expectation or identification of the "fourth" or the "fifth wave" of democratization can occur only under the condition of rethinking the essence of democracy and autocracy as such.

Moreover, earlier, in particular from 1990 to 2000, the number of autocratic regimes (even before the collapse of the USSR) significantly decreased, but during 2000-2010, the number of autocracies in the world practically reached the level of stability or even growth. Moreover, this trend has once again become almost global, although the largest number of autocracies today is typical for Equatorial and South Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and the smallest number 3 – for Europe and America. Accordingly, the world globally and on average entered not so much the next "wave" of democratization (this can only be said regionally and only contextually), but rather the "wave" of "rollback" from democracy and democratization. Moreover, today the phenomena and processes of transformation of autocracies, in particular from one variety to another, etc., have become very typical<sup>39</sup>.

After all, today, not only the movement in the direction of autocracies or the autocratization of political regimes in general, but also the consolidation of autocratic regimes to replace the processes of democratization in the world is happening more and more often. There are several basic reasons for this. First, it is the very nature of autocracies, which are focused on maximizing

<sup>34</sup> Huntington S., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Wyd. University of Oklahoma Press 1991.

<sup>35</sup> McFaul M., The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, *"World Politics"* 2002, vol 54, nr. 2, s. 212-244.

<sup>36</sup> Collier D., Adcock R., Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts, *"Annual Review of Political Science"* 1999, vol 2, s. 537-565.

<sup>37</sup> Rose R., Democratic and Non-Democratic States, [w:] Haerpfer C. (ed.), *Democratization*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2009.; Ottaway M., *Democracy Challenged*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2003.

<sup>38</sup> Rose R., Democratic and Non-Democratic States, [w:] Haerpfer C. (ed.), *Democratization*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2009.; Welzel C., Alexander A., Measuring Effective Democracy: The Human Empowerment Approach, *"World Values Research"* 2008, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 1-34.

<sup>39</sup> Magaloni B., Kricheli R., Political order and one-party rule, *"Annual review of political science"* 2010, vol 13, s. 130-133.

their temporary preservation. Secondly, one should not forget about the “screen of modernization”, which is most often used to preserve autocratic regimes. Thirdly, some autocratic regimes are indeed the reasons for the formation of “developmental states”, and therefore cannot yet be transformed into democracy, because this issue is not considered a priority even by the population of their countries. Fourth, the survival of autocracies is affected by their current essence and nature, especially when they hold elections and create the appearance of representativeness, but the country develops according to patterns of subordination and “moderate repressiveness”.

Summing up, it must be stated that today, on average, it is inappropriate to say that some “new wave” of democratization has begun in the world, although “waves” of democratization are taking place in certain regions of the world. This, on the one hand, is caused by the increase in the number of autocracies and hybrid political regimes in the world and the decrease in the number of liberal and illiberal democracies. On the other hand, it manifests itself in the processes of the democracy “erosion” as such, when due to various crisis phenomena, the quality, level and effectiveness of democracy declines in most countries of the world. Although, on the contrary, the solution of the current problems should serve the next surge of democratization, and therefore its “new wave”, the orderliness of which in this case is a secondary issue rather than a determining one.

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## **THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF POLITICAL/PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION IN THE CONDITIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL AND OTHER OPTIONS OF NON-PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES IN THE WORLD**

The article considers and systematizes the meaning, functionality, optionality and consequences of political, as well as parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidential and other options of non-parliamentary democracies in the world. It is stated that the opposition in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies should be considered more broadly, but also in a slightly different sense than within parliamentary democracies. In particular, due to the fact that it is not an alternative to the executive, but is a manifestation or a mechanism of checks and balances in the conditions of a "rigid" separation of powers. In addition, it is found that the political opposition in presidentialism is determined by various institutional and political factors that can act as veto players, in particular by federal system, bicameral parliament, type of party system, qualities of the head of state, etc. This "broadens" the spectrum of political opposition in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies, but does not strengthen parliamentary opposition in such political systems. Thus, it is proven that parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies is significantly more limited than in the case of parliamentary democracies, but in general political opposition here is much more "broader".

*Keywords: political opposition, parliamentary opposition, presidential democracy, parliamentary democracy, presidentialism, the head of state, government, administration.*

## **ZNACZENIE I CEL OPOZYCJI POLITYCZNEJ/PARLAMENTARNEJ W WARUNKACH DEMOKRACJI PREZYDENCCKIEJ I INNYCH OPCJI DEMOKRACJI POZAPARLAMENTARNYCH NA ŚWIECIE**

W artykule rozważa się i systematyzuje znaczenie, funkcjonalność, opcjonalność i konsekwencje opozycji politycznej, a także parlamentarnej w warunkach demokracji prezydenckich i innych opcji demokracji pozaparlamentarnych na świecie. Stwierdza się, że opozycja, w przypadku demokracji prezydenckich lub pozaparlamentarnych, powinna być rozpatrywana szerzej, ale też w nieco innym znaczeniu niż w ramach demokracji parlamentarnych. W szczególności ze względu na fakt, że nie stanowi ona alternatywy dla władzy wykonawczej, ale jest przejawem lub mechanizmem kontroli i równowagi w warunkach „sztywnego” podziału władz. Ponadto stwierdza się, że opozycja polityczna w prezydencjalizmie jest zdeterminowana różnymi czynnikami instytucjonalnymi i politycznymi, które mogą pełnić rolę veta, w szczególności

ze względu na system federalny, dwuizbowy parlament, typ systemu partyjnego, cechy głowy państwa itp. „Poszerza” to spektrum opozycji politycznej w przypadku demokracji prezydenckich lub pozaparlamentarnych, ale nie wzmacnia opozycji parlamentarnej w takich systemach politycznych. Udowodniono, że opozycja parlamentarna w demokracjach pozaparlamentarnych jest znacznie bardziej ograniczona niż w przypadku demokracji parlamentarnych, ale generalnie opozycja polityczna jest tu znacznie „szersza”.

*Słowa kluczowe: opozycja polityczna, opozycja parlamentarna, demokracja prezydencka, demokracja parlamentarna, prezydencjalizm, głowa państwa, rząd, administracja*

## **ЗНАЧЕННЯ ТА ПРИЗНАЧЕННЯ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ/ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКОЇ ОПОЗИЦІЇ В УМОВАХ ПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКИХ ТА ІНШИХ ОПЦІЙ НЕПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЙ У СВІТІ**

У статті розглянуто й систематизовано значення, функціонал, опціонал і наслідки політичної та, зокрема, парламентської опозиції в умовах президентських й інших опцій непарламентських демократій у світі. Встановлено, що опозицію у випадку президентських чи непарламентських демократій треба розглядати ширше, однак й в дещо іншому значенні, аніж у парламентських демократіях. Зокрема за рахунок того, що вона не є альтернативою виконавчій владі, однак є виявом або механізмом стримувань і протидії в умовах «жорсткого» поділу влади. Додатково виявлено, що політична опозиція в президенталізмі детермінується різними інституційними і політичними чинниками, які можуть виступати в ролі вето-гравців, зокрема федеративним устроєм, двопалатністю парламенту, типом партійної системи, якостями глави держави тощо. Це «розширює» спектр політичної опозиції у випадку президентських або непарламентських демократій, але не посилює парламентської опозиції у таких політичних системах. Доведено, що парламентська опозиція у непарламентських демократіях суттєво лімітованіша, ніж у випадку парламентських демократій, а загалом політична опозиція тут значно «ширша».

*Ключові слова: політична опозиція, парламентська опозиція, президентська демократія, парламентська демократія, президенталізм, глава держави, уряд, адміністрація.*

A lot is known about the parliamentary opposition in modern political science and practice, and this topic is very much discussed. However, the condition of such a developed state of affairs is that the parliamentary opposition is typically thought about and classically practiced in the conditions of various forms (monarchies and republics) and systems of government (parliamentarism and typically semi-presidentialism), which are reduced to the common denominator of

the so-called parliamentary democracies. And this is not at all surprising, since parliamentary democracies are traditionally called those democratic political systems in which, regardless of the logic of inter-institutional relations, in the triangle “head of state – government – parliament” (which actually determines the form and system of government), the government cabinet (usually headed by the prime minister) if it is not formed, it can certainly be prematurely dismissed (or, in other words, is collectively responsible to) the parliament (and therefore possibly both to the parliament and to the president). Accordingly, the parliament (as such) and its party-political structuring (in particular) initially influence what the composition of the government cabinet will be, that is, which parliamentary political forces will be responsible for the government and will be associated with the government, and what will be the parliamentary political forces in terms of political forces in the parliament opposition in one or another state in one or another period of time. Taking this into account, the parliamentary opposition is determined in this case primarily by the results of the parliamentary elections and the consequences of inter-party or in general political relations between different parties and political actors in the legislature, which, on the one hand, affects the definition of the government, and also, on the other hand, delimits the parliamentary opposition from pro-government parties in the legislature. Nevertheless, parliamentary opposition takes place not only in parliamentary democracies (with parliamentary and semi-presidential systems of government), but also in other political systems in which the formation and responsibility of government cabinets are not determined by the functionality and role of popularly elected parliaments, since in the latter political parties and political actors are nevertheless structured along the lines of power/government–not power/opposition. But in such a context, much less is known about the parliamentary opposition, and therefore in our research the attention will be focused precisely on the correction of the identified deficiency in the development of political science, including through the prism of understanding the political opposition as such (and not only the parliamentary opposition as a type or form of political opposition).

We believe that political opposition in the context of non-parliamentary democracies, including in order to define the format and optionality of parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidential and other democracies, should be discussed broadly. The fact is that in such political systems the government is not formed with the submission and consent of the parliament, the structuring of which should be the basis for distinguishing government and opposition political actors (as in the case of parliamentary democracies), and taking into account who in the process of governing opposes the goals of the executive power (the head of state and/or the government formed by the head of the state), or, in other words, taking into account whose interests and resistance must be reconciled or overcome before that, how the executive power will be exercised (provided, of course, that it is permissible)<sup>1</sup>. Such a rather broad understanding of the political opposition fits into the fundamental principles of the

<sup>1</sup> Schapiro L., Foreword, “*Government and Opposition*” 1966, vol 1, nr.1, s. 2.

development and functioning of democracies as such, after all the essence of the latter comes down, in particular, to the recognition of the right of political and public figures to publicly criticize and challenge the government – that is, in the case of non-parliamentary (primarily presidential) democracies, the head of state, his government/administration and the political system in general<sup>2</sup>. It follows that, regardless of the institutional and procedural option, democracy as such is possible only if it allows the question of political opposition to be raised and resolved as its own “first axis” and a component that ensures political participation and political competitiveness<sup>3</sup>.

This undoubtedly proves that political opposition can be considered very differently, because it has a diverse etymological nature and a social or socio-political essence<sup>4</sup>. At least because in the conditions of a democracy any political position can generate political opposition, and the latter is not necessarily or not always expressed through the parliament or within the framework of the parliament, etc. (which, in contrast, is the norm primarily for parliamentary democracies).

Here, the idea is taken as a basis, according to which the political opposition in the conditions of democracy is a self-sufficient and autonomous entity, because democracy as such (including presidential or more broadly non-parliamentary) involves differentiation or mutual opposition between power and non-power or, in other words, between the representatives of the authorities (the head of the state, his administration or government, etc.) and political actors who oppose the representatives of the authorities or correct them – political opposition<sup>5</sup>. On the other hand, the “authenticity” and “reality” of democracy should imbue the political opposition with real and even institutional (formalized and informal) meaning, since if the political opposition does exist and is influential, then it is definitely a component of the structuring of the political system of one or another country, and quite regardless of the system of government and the option/ model of democracy in it – parliamentary or presidential (though certainly in view of the institutional/constitutional factors, electoral and party system, political culture, etc<sup>6</sup>). In other words, in the conditions of democracy, including the presidential one (primarily within the framework of the presidential system of government), the power (the head of state and/or his administration/government) cannot very effectively dictate actions to his opponents – the political opposition – although he can influence them formally and

<sup>2</sup> Helms L., Introduction: Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues and Perspectives, *“The Journal of Legislative Studies”* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 6–19.

<sup>3</sup> Dahl R., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1971.

<sup>4</sup> McLennan B., Approaches to the Concept of Political Opposition: An Historical Overview, [w:] McLennan B. (ed.), *Political Opposition and Dissent*, Wyd. Dunellen 1973, s. 1–50.; Sadoun M., Opposition et démocratie, *“Pouvoirs. Revue Française d’Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques”* 2004, vol 108, s. 5–21.

<sup>5</sup> Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Die Opposition. Ihre politische Funktion in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Wyd. Beck 1971.

<sup>6</sup> Blondel J., Political Opposition in the Contemporary World, *“Government and Opposition”* 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 462–486.; Foltz W., Political Oppositions in Single-Party States of Tropical Africa, [w:] Dahl R. (ed.), *Regimes and Oppositions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1973, s. 143–170.; Tibi B., Politische Opposition in Westasien und in Afrika. Einige vergleichende und typisierende Betrachtungen, [w:] Euchner W. (ed.), *Politische Opposition in Deutschland und im internationalen Vergleich*, Wyd. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1993, s. 155–172.

informally and vice versa<sup>7</sup>, through which one of the fundamental principles of democracy itself is understood, according to which the nature of the political opposition reflects the nature of political power<sup>8</sup>. Therefore, if we are talking about democracy, then the political opposition within its framework – and regardless of the type/model of democracy – works (as intended) in the role of a mechanism of checks and balances of power, and through both parliamentary and non-parliamentary channels, as well as a guarantee tool political participation and political competitiveness.

It follows that the political opposition in the case of parliamentary democracies is traditionally defined and filled with content in a more structured and clear way, while in the case of presidential and other democracies it is more broad and comprehensive, and therefore rather blurred<sup>9</sup>. This is perhaps the most noticeable given the fact that in presidential democracies the political opposition is not necessarily a means of checks and balances of power (the head of state and/or his administration/government) or a party or political actor that has a minority within the framework of the political process, including these ones in the parliament.

Moreover, quite often the elections of the head of state and the elections of the parliament in such political systems are not synchronous at all, and therefore the party-political structure of the parliament can change within the term of office of one and the same president, which therefore may or may not even be institutionally (in the majority) in opposition to the head of state (as is quite often the case, for example, in presidential republics in the USA and a number of Latin American countries, etc.). Instead, the main factor in this sense is another factor in the systematic definition of political opposition in democracies – the relationship of being in one or another form of disagreement with another authority<sup>10</sup>, in particular, in inter-institutional disagreement between the executive and legislative branches of government from the point of view of the party-political affiliation of their representatives or the majority (in particular in the parliament) of them. Purely mechanistically, this fits into the remarks of scientists, according to which political opposition in a democracy (including a presidential one) takes place when some political actor (party, institution, etc.) “logically and morphologically” opposes the position of the government, primarily the executive one<sup>11</sup>, and even in the form of a political or inter-institutional conflict. Accordingly, the “breadth” of the interpretation of the political opposition in

<sup>7</sup> Lust-Okar E., The Management of Opposition: Formal Structures of Contestation and Informal Political Manipulation, [w:] Schlumberger O. (ed.), *Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 2007, s. 34–35.

<sup>8</sup> Anderson L., Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle East, *Journal of International Affairs* 1987, vol 40, nr. 2, s. 220.

<sup>9</sup> Brack N., Weinblum S., *What do we mean by “political opposition”: A theoretical perspective*, Presented at Potsdam ECPR General Conference (9–12 September 2009); Brack N., Weinblum S., “Political Opposition”: Towards a Renewed Research Agenda, *Interdisciplinary Political Studies* 2011, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 69–79.

<sup>10</sup> Norton P., Making Sense of Opposition, *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 236.

<sup>11</sup> Dahl R., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1966, s. 16–18.; Dahl R., Governments and Political Oppositions, [w:] Greenstein F., Polsby N. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3: Macropolitical Theory*, Wyd. Addison Wesley 1975, s. 116–117.; Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Opposition: Past and Present of a Political Institution*, Wyd. The New Thinker Library 1968, s. 1, 2.

presidential democracies is determined by the understanding of the latter both institutionally and normatively, and structurally and functionally<sup>12</sup>. In this context, it is important that the political opposition – institutionalized or non-institutionalized one – in a presidential and in general any democracy should act as an instrumental channel for ordering and preserving the integrity of the political system, since it should not only be a means and a manifestation of mutual political recognition and competition between power and non-power, but also a kind of “fuse” against sudden outbreaks of possible protests and violence, including at the expense of electoral support, promotion and protection of alternative positions<sup>13</sup>. Although this does not at all exclude the fact that the political opposition, especially in the case of presidentialism, cannot be anti-systemic or obstructive<sup>14</sup>, which is sometimes little or even occurs during the transition of political regimes of presidential or semi-presidential republics (and other non-parliamentary systems of government) from authoritarian to hybrid or democratic, that is, during their democratization. This was most vividly reflected at different times in a number of countries in Latin America, Africa, and even Asia<sup>15</sup>.

On this basis, it can be confidently asserted that the delineation of the political opposition in non-parliamentary democracies differs from a similar one in parliamentary democracies primarily by its “breadth” in the case of the former or, in other words, the fact that in the latter the political opposition is usually perceived more narrowly, concretized and one-dimensional, in particular mainly as the parliamentary opposition<sup>16</sup>. That is why the political opposition in the conditions of a presidential or any other non-parliamentary democracy is much less organized and focused than in the case of a parliamentary democracy, and therefore, unlike the latter, its goal is not necessarily reduced to the change of power – the government or the head of state (as in the case of parliamentary democracies)<sup>17</sup>, – because this, for example, is not the domain of influence and authority of the parliament, which may even be institutionally and politically opposed to the president and his or her government/administration. This is due to the fact that in the conditions of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies, the parliamentary opposition is not at all equal to the political opposition as a whole, but is really only its separate, and not always the most important, cluster. The reason is that political opposition in such political systems is reflected as a manifestation and result of a greater number of options of political competitiveness, although political competitiveness in itself is not a direct predictor

<sup>12</sup> Alibasic A., *Political Opposition in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought in The Arab World*, Kuala Lumpur 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Kolinsky E., Opposition, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science*, Wyd. Blackwell 1992, s. 397–400; Kolinsky E., *Opposition in Western Europe*, Wyd. Croom Helm 1987.

<sup>14</sup> Wjatr J., Przeworski A., Control without Opposition, “*Government and Opposition*” 1966., vol 1, nr. 2, s. 227–239.

<sup>15</sup> Albrecht H., *Political Opposition and Authoritarian Rule in Egypt*, Wyd. Eberhard-Karls Universität Tübingen 2008.; Albrecht H., How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt, “*Democratization*” 2005, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 378–397.; Rodan G., *Theorising Political Opposition in East and Southeast Asia*, [w:] Rodan G. (ed.), *Political Opposition in Industrializing Asia*, Wyd. Routledge 1996, s. 1–39.

<sup>16</sup> Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Opposition: Past and Present of a Political Institution*, Wyd. The New Thinker Library 1968, s. 9.

<sup>17</sup> Brack N., Weinblum S., *What do we mean by “political opposition”: A theoretical perspective*, Presented at Potsdam ECPR General Conference (9–12 September 2009).

of the formation of political opposition. In addition, competitiveness in presidential or non-parliamentary democracies is not only the opposition of the government/executive power and pro-government parties in the parliament against the parties of the non-governmental group in the legislature, but also the opposition of the person of the head of state and the political forces opposing the latter, and as in the parliament, as well as outside the parliament, but not always about gaining power as an alternative in the future. In the case of presidential systems, it is rather about empowering the political opposition with the main function of “checking” or “controlling” the executive power on the part of other institutions, primarily the parliament, or political actors who are political opponents of the executive power (that is, both the president and his or her administration or the government)<sup>18</sup>, thanks to which freedom, competitiveness and, in general, procedural democracy as such is ensured, at least in theory<sup>19</sup>.

It is noted that the parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidentialism is not equivalent to the political opposition as a whole, and that the parliamentary opposition in such a political system has much more functionality and roles, primarily of a deterrent and preventive nature, since it is presidentialism that is characterized by a “hard” and true separation of powers.

In addition, the parliamentary opposition (after all, unlike in parliamentary democracies) mostly occasionally in the conditions of presidentialism serves as an expression of an alternative political course and the course of activity of the executive power (mainly the head of state), and instead is a channel for the articulation of various political interests and social requests, especially in multi-component societies and federal states. And this is even on the condition that different articulations and interests cannot be taken into account or taken into consideration completely<sup>20</sup>, after all this may contradict the political course, which is regulated and determined by the president/executive power in the conditions of non-parliamentary democracies, which a priori are not opposition. In this case, even a situation where the parliamentary opposition will form the majority in the legislature of a presidential democracy will not help, since the executive power in such a political system is not the domain of the parliament – neither in terms of formation, nor even more so in terms of collective responsibility or the possibility of early resignation of the executive power. Instead, no one disputes the importance of the political, including the parliamentary, opposition within the framework of presidential democracy in the format of serving as a channel of communication between the public and the political/executive power regarding specific political issues or in the role of a kind of “safety valve”<sup>21</sup>. Accordingly, regardless of the status of the political opposition in the conditions of presidential democracies, formalized or informal, it can still act as a factor that politicizes the political and

<sup>18</sup> Sartori G., Opposition and Control: Problems and Prospects, *“Government and Opposition”* 1966, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 149–154.

<sup>19</sup> De Jouvenel B., The Means of Contestation, *“Government and Opposition”* 1965–1966, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 155–174.

<sup>20</sup> Parry G., Opposition Questions, *“Government and Opposition”* 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 457–461.

<sup>21</sup> Sartori G., Opposition and Control: Problems and Prospects, *“Government and Opposition”* 1966, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 150.

even apolitical process, in particular at the expense of public discussion and the transformation of certain social issues into political channel.

This, in turn, once again adds systematicity to the democratic political regime under presidentialism, including due to its additional legitimization and response to the requests of the electorate, even if they are not a direct alternative for the head of state and the executive power and do not generate a direct influence on legislative process and governance. On the other hand, it is in the conditions of presidentialism (even within the framework of a democratic regime) that the president and his government/administration have a great “temptation” to ignore the requests and positions of the political opposition, due to which the latter, unlike parliamentary democracies<sup>22</sup>, is a priori oriented not so much towards the government and its conquest, how much for adaptation to power. The situation is even more complicated and worse in the case of a non-democratic (and to a lesser extent – a hybrid) political regime (especially under a presidential or semi-presidential system of government), when various political and even institutional structures and factors significantly prevent the political, including the parliamentary, opposition from achieving its primary and theoretically unconditional goals and guidelines, in particular from the sphere of checks and balances of the head of state and his or her government/administration.

This is not helped by the fact that the political opposition can be institutionalized and formalized, which, by the way, happens more often precisely in the case of non-democratic political regimes, since in democracies (parliamentary and non-parliamentary) the status and role of the political opposition are rather determined conventionally and on the basis of political traditions or, additionally, due to normative regulations. At the same time, in the conditions of presidentialism and sometimes semi-presidentialism, even if they are democracies, it sometimes happens that parliaments are poorly structured, and therefore it is difficult to separate the minority (which is typically oppositional) from the majority. Instead, strangely enough, situations where the majority of the parliament appears in opposition (institutionally) to the head of state and his government cabinet/administration are a clear exception, as this is possible precisely in the case of presidentialism and sometimes semi-presidentialism. However, even this does not interfere with the unity and structuring of the political system, since in such cases and political systems the heads of state/government are responsible for the executive power (as one vertical), and the parliaments are responsible for the legislative power (as another vertical), and nominally without even crossing each other. In view of this, in presidential or non-parliamentary democracies after all it is not capable of grasping it, but on operational tasks and issues of choosing additional (rather than alternative) development paths, etc<sup>23</sup>. Accordingly, the role of the political opposition in the conditions of presidential and non-parliamentary democracies

<sup>22</sup> Norton P., Making Sense of Opposition, *“The Journal of Legislative Studies”* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 238.

<sup>23</sup> Brack N., Weinblum S., *What do we mean by “political opposition”: A theoretical perspective*, Presented at Potsdam ECPR General Conference (9–12 September 2009); Brack N., Weinblum S., “Political Opposition”: Towards a Renewed Research Agenda, *“Interdisciplinary Political Studies”* 2011, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 69–79.



can be played both by parties that have a minority in the legislatures (as in the case of parliamentary democracies), and by parties or political actors that have a majority in the parliaments, as a result of which the political opposition in such a case is inter-institutional. After all, it is possible that the role of the political opposition in the conditions of presidentialism will not be concentrated in the parliament, but outside the framework of any political institutions. Because of this, presidentialism has a greater potential to be a political opposition precisely not from the “chairs” of the parliamentary minority, but simply by politicizing certain issues and broadcasting them to the public and the executive power – the head of state and his or her government/administration.

At the same time, the role and functionality of the actual parliamentary opposition is very specific in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies in general, since this also takes place. Here, first of all, it is necessary to note the idea discussed above, according to which parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies can be expressed both in a parliamentary minority (like parliamentary democracies) and in a parliamentary majority (when the parliamentary opposition acquires the status of inter-institutional opposition to the head of state and its government/administration<sup>24</sup>).

The interpretation of the parliamentary opposition in parliamentary and non-parliamentary democracies is mainly related to the fact that it covers primarily those representatives/parties of the parliament that do not have the status and significance of the government, that is, that are not associated with the head of state and his administration. Instead, the main difference in the determination of the parliamentary opposition is that, within the framework of parliamentary democracies, the parliamentary opposition is determined by the framework of the legislature as the basis of the “merged” (rather than separate) structuring of the legislative and executive sphere of the political process, and in presidential democracies, parliaments have almost nothing to do with this, because they are “involved” only in law-making, and not in the executive vertical, the formation and responsibility of governments, which, in contrast, is the domain of heads of state<sup>25</sup>. Therefore, for parliamentary democracies, the parliamentary format of the political opposition is quite basic, and instead, its extra-parliamentary design appears as a manifestation of the opposition’s dysfunction<sup>26</sup>, but this is not typical for presidential democracies, in which the extra-parliamentary opposition can be much stronger than the parliamentary opposition, and it may not even pose any threat to the political system. In general, this clearly proves that in the case of presidentialism, it is not enough, and often inappropriate, to consider the political opposition as a ratio along the “minority-majority” line in the parliament, because opposition takes place

<sup>24</sup> Blondel J., Political Opposition in the Contemporary World, “*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 462–486.

<sup>25</sup> Dubrow J., Tomescu I., *Political Opposition to the USA Patriot Act of 2001*, Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (14 August 2004); Kramm L., Grundzüge einer Theorie der politische opposition, “*Zeitschrift für Politik*” 1986, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 33–43.

<sup>26</sup> Giulj S., Confrontation or Conciliation: The Status of the Opposition in Europe, “*Government and Opposition*” 1981, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 476–494; Giulj S., *Le statut de l’opposition en Europe*, Wyd. Documentation Française 1980.

not only or not so much between parts of the parliament (as is the basis in parliamentary democracies), and even between the parliament (the party-political majority in it) and the executive branch of government (the head of state and his or her government/administration).

This is supplemented by the fact that parliaments, including in presidential democracies, are not monolithic institutions at all, and therefore their structuring is diverse and variable. That is why the format of the parliamentary opposition is determined by various sets of relations between parties, deputies and generally political actors in legislatures, in particular inter-party ones (including along the “majority-minority” line or even within the pro-government majority or minority), intra-party (even within the party that is associated with the head of state and in general with the executive power), intra-coalition (at the level of legislative coalitions in the parliament), intra-coalition (at the level of legislative coalitions in the parliament), non-party (when the political positions of some actors do not depend on the affiliation of these actors to certain parliamentary parties), etc.<sup>27</sup>, which determine what is and what is not parliamentary opposition in each specific case of presidential democracy.

Such a diversity of manifestations and factors that influence the parliamentary opposition in presidential democracies is due to the fact that in such political systems it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the “majority” and “minority” in the legislature, especially given the fact that nominally it may not affect the executive vertical and the head of state, about which, in principle, the opposition as such should be formed.

In addition, such a variety of interpretations of even the parliamentary opposition in presidentialism proves that it is weakly institutionalized (weaker than in parliamentary democracy), because its format is very fluid and determined by a fairly wide range of loci and types of relations, including inter-party, intra-party, non-party, inter-institutional, etc. In this case, the main thing is that such a parliamentary opposition (if it exists) articulates (including in political discourse and through political behavior) one or another form of disagreement with the executive power<sup>28</sup> (often it is even said that with a political regime or a regime of one or another head of state), which, in turn, is not derived from the institution of the parliament. And this, as the practice of presidentialism attests, is difficult, especially in the conditions of non-democratic political regimes, because it happens that even a nominally regulated political opposition is actually organized in such a way that it does not have the opportunity to act in the parliamentary arena or is presented in the parliamentary arena in an exclusively “facade” way<sup>29</sup>. This is supplemented by the fact that if we are talking about a democratic presidential

<sup>27</sup> Norton P., Making Sense of Opposition, “*The Journal of Legislative Studies*” 2008, vol 14, nr. 1, s.244–246.; Boucek F., Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism, “*Party Politics*” 2009, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 455–485.; King A., Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1976, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 11–34.

<sup>28</sup> Dahl R., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1966, s. 17.; Barker R., *Studies in Opposition*, Wyd. Macmillan 1971, s. 4–5.

<sup>29</sup> Rodan G., Theorising Political Opposition in East and Southeast Asia, [w:] Rodan G. (ed.), *Political Opposition in Industrializing Asia*, Wyd. Routledge 1996, s.17–20.

system in which the parliamentary opposition is quite weak, then in this case the role and functionality of the extra-parliamentary political opposition (it may or may not be associated with the parliamentary opposition) almost automatically grows, in particular through various social groups incorporated into non-parliamentary parties, mass media, interest groups, pressure and lobbies, socio-political movements, social and cultural organizations, corporations, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, etc. However, in this case, everything depends mainly on whether the political (parliamentary and/or extra-parliamentary) opposition is entrenched, stereotyped or institutionalized<sup>30</sup>, and, in the case of presidential democracies, not always in the sense of modifying and adopting decisions of the executive power, but at least of legislative decisions, which go against the decisions of the executive power. And for this, it is important that presidentialism is a case of a democratic political regime and is perceived by political actors as an inter-institutional consensus, which should additionally contribute to reality and functionality (including regarding the role as a “safeguard” and a mechanism of checks and balances), rather than the “facades” of political opposition, as is often or mostly the case in autocratic and hybrid political regimes.

From this we can draw an unequivocal conclusion that the structuring of the parliamentary opposition is influenced by many factors, but the most important and systemic among them is the institutional design, in particular the executive-legislative relations, and therefore the executive-legislative attributes and factors of the structuring of the parliamentary opposition. They primarily appear against the background of the differences between, on the one hand, parliamentary and presidential democracies, as well as, on the other hand, parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems of government, with the well-known condition that the latter should be divided into presidential-parliamentary (as in logic and practice typically more presidential) and parliamentary-presidential or prime-presidential (as in logic and practice typically more parliamentary). The reason and explanation is that the type of democracy and the system of government determine very different conditions for the development of opposition activities and the status of the parliamentary opposition in particular and the political opposition in general. In this context, it should be noted that presidential and very often presidential-parliamentary systems of government (especially if the latter is not a case of parliamentary democracy, and the presidential system is not such a case a priori) are often related in this regard, after all these designs of inter-institutional relations not only exclude, but also provoke the opposition of the parliamentary opposition to the course of the head of state and often his or her government, in particular in the case (when it comes to the presidential-parliamentary system) if the latter reflects the political positions of the head of state.

In addition, it should be noted that for presidential and less often presidential-parliamentary systems of government, a clear distinction between the status of the executive power and the political opposition is typical. After all, the consolidating factor for the functioning of the

<sup>30</sup> Wjatr J., Przeworski A., Control without Opposition, *“Government and Opposition”* 1966., vol 1, nr. 2, s. 227–239.

parliamentary and even the political opposition in general, which does not directly affect the formation and activity of the executive power, is of course the first presidential (and then the parliamentary) elections, which can only bring the former opposition to the executive power. It follows that the parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies does not have sufficiently comfortable conditions for its existence, although it can even act as a majority in the parliament, which is in opposition to the head of state and his or her government/administration in the case of the so-called “divided government” (which quite often happens in the USA and other presidential democracies, which are characterized primarily by separate and asynchronous elections of the president and parliament). After all, although such a situation forces the head of state to seek support from the parliamentary majority, which in this case is oppositional, but in no way nominally limits the executive power of the head of state, who monistically (without the approval of the parliament – as it is in parliamentary democracies) manages it. The situation is complicated by the fact that presidentialism is characterized by a rigid separation of powers (primarily executive – the president and legislative – the parliament) with specific mechanisms of checks and balances, as a result of which there is no need for such an option of inter-institutional relations to be rigidly divided into a parliamentary majority and a parliamentary minority, and therefore the parliamentary opposition can be both a majority and a minority in the legislature. In general, this means that the choice of the system of government and the type of democracy not only reveals the line of activity of the parliamentary and political opposition in general, but also serves as the basis for its definition and essential content, on the basis of which the opposition can be structured primarily in view of its attitude towards the head of state, and to the government, and in general to the executive power, and also in view of the special arrangement of priorities, powers and relations by various institutions. In addition, it affects how the parliamentary and generally political opposition is able to change its emphasis and influence on the head of state and the government, since on the basis of taking into account executive-legislative relations, it is possible to structure their models, in which the distinction between the status of the executive power and the political opposition is inherent or absent.

It is also interesting and obvious that the parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidentialism controls not so much the functioning and alternatives of the executive power (the president and the government or the administration), since it is nominally unable to influence this, but rather the prevention of usurpation of power in the political system by its executive “core”. And such a usurpation of power is quite likely, for which the presidential and some presidential-parliamentary systems are criticized, the structure of which is implemented according to the principle of “the winner gets everything.” All these things determine the specific development of the so-called “principled” political opposition<sup>31</sup>, which very rarely gravitates to

<sup>31</sup> Linz J., Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3–87.

“bargaining” on the basis of coalition and corporatist strategies, but in the conditions of democracy should act as a constructive phenomenon, in which the interests of various veto players are taken into account<sup>32</sup>. In this context, it is theoretically and methodologically important that in countries with a presidential or, more rarely, a presidential-parliamentary system of government (especially if they are democratic), the parliamentary opposition traditionally and on average makes sense only in the struggle for the position of the country’s president, after all it is he who determines the activities of the executive branch of government. This is what makes the parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies a separate analytical cluster, which differs significantly from the parliamentary opposition in parliamentary democracies<sup>33</sup>.

On the other hand, researchers quite often state that this creates conditions according to which the parliamentary opposition within the framework or conditions of presidentialism, in particular due to the relatively low party discipline in voting and due to the impossibility of being an “alternative” to the executive power, in reality is not “real” the parliamentary opposition at all<sup>34</sup>. And this is despite the fact that the nature of politics in legislative assemblies in presidential or non-parliamentary democracies (for example, in the USA or Switzerland, etc.) is very similar to the situation in parliamentary democracies<sup>35</sup>. Instead, the weakness of the parliamentary opposition in the conditions of presidentialism is evidenced by the fact that in such political systems there is an actual transfer of “oppositional functions” from the parliamentary opposition to other participants in the political process, in particular, such as interest groups or mass media, due to which parliamentary opposition is replaced by extra-parliamentary opposition<sup>36</sup>.

After all, presidential or non-parliamentary democracy is specific in that it can be characterized by intra-governmental opposition or opposition in the internal structure of the executive power. This is due to the fact that, as the researchers note, the bureaucracy under presidentialism can be a force in “its own right,” and not from the point of view of inter-party relations and party-political structuring of the parliament. In addition, this is due to the already mentioned “rigid” and special division of power between the executive and legislative branches (which do not “merge” as in parliamentary democracies) precisely in the conditions of presidentialism. The situation is complemented by other institutional and political factors that can act as veto players in the case of presidentialism, in particular, the federal state system, the bicameral parliament,

<sup>32</sup> Tsebelis G., *Veto players: How political institutions work*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2002.

<sup>33</sup> Stepan A., Skach C., Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism, “*World Politics*” 1993, vol 46, nr. 1, s. 1–22.; Linz J., Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3–87.

<sup>34</sup> Dahl R., Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions From Democratic Experience, [w:] Dahl R. (eds.), *Toward Democracy: A Journey. Reflections, 1940–1997*, Wyd. University of California 1997, s. 496–499.

<sup>35</sup> Mayhew D., *America’s Congress. Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison Through Newt Gingrich*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000, s. 106–122.; Sciarini P., The Decision-Making Process, [w:] Kloth U. (ed.), *Handbook of Swiss Politics*, Wyd. Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2007, s. 465–499.; Kerr H., The Structure of the Opposition in the Swiss Parliament, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1978, vol 3, s. 51–62.

<sup>36</sup> Krauss E., The Mass Media and Japanese Politics: Effects and Consequences, [w:] Pharr S., Krauss E. (eds.), *Media and Politics in Japan*, Wyd. University of Hawaii Press 1996, s. 360.; Hallin D., Mancini P., *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.

the type of party system, the personal qualities of the head of state, etc<sup>37</sup>. On the one hand, this “broadens” the range of political opposition in the case of presidential or non-parliamentary democracies, but, on the other hand, it does not strengthen parliamentary opposition in such political systems. Accordingly, this means that the parliamentary opposition in non-parliamentary democracies is significantly more limited than in the case of parliamentary democracies, and in general the political opposition is much “wide”.

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## **IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES IN THE CONDITIONS OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS' FUNCTIONING: THEORIZING AND FINDINGS IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE**

The article analyzes the importance and influence of parliamentary committees in the conditions of minority governments at the theoretical level and empirically, in particular in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The author assumes that the legitimate mechanism of people's representation in countries of this type is the parliamentary method of government formation and responsibility. Therefore, governmental cabinets, including minority ones, depend on party composition of parliaments in their formation, functioning and responsibility. It was suggested that the frequency of minority governments' formation is additionally determined by the specialization of parliaments, in particular through the prism of parliamentary committees as an arena of government-opposition relations, where the opposition almost always prevails in the case of minority governments. However, it was analytically proved that the committees themselves, in particular their various attributes and "power", do not or almost do not affect the frequency of minority governments' formation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the strengthening of committees can serve to strengthen parliamentary opposition, which contributes to the increase in frequency of minority governments' formation.

*Keywords: government, minority government, parliament, committee, countries of Central and Eastern Europe.*

## **ZNACZENIE I WPŁYW KOMISJI PARLAMENTARNYCH W WARUNKACH FUNKCJONOWANIA RZĄDÓW MNIEJSZOŚCIOWYCH: TEORIA I USTALENIA W KRAJACH EUROPY ŚRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ**

Artykuł analizuje znaczenie i wpływ komisji parlamentarnych w warunkach rządów mniejszościowych na poziomie teoretycznym i empirycznie, w szczególności w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Autorka przyjmuje, że prawomocnym mechanizmem reprezentacji społeczeństwa w państwach tego typu jest parlamentarna metoda tworzenia rządu i odpowiedzialności. Dlatego gabinety rządowe, w tym mniejszościowe, na etapie tworzenia, w trakcie funkcjonowania i odpowiedzialności zależą od składu partyjnego parlamentów. Sugeruje się, że o częstotliwości powstawania rządów mniejszościowych decyduje dodatkowo specjalizacja

парламентів, в szczególності через призму комісії парламентарних якo арену релаци рządu-оппозиция, гдзє в przypadku рząduw мнєйшоциowych правє зазвє прєважа оппозиция. Удoвoднєно јєднaк аналитичнє, жє самє комисје, в щєгoлнoсти их рoзнє атрибуты i „мoц”, нє впливають луб правє нє впливають на чєстoтливoст powstawania рząduw мнєйшоциowych в крајах Еурoпы Środkowo-Wschodniej. Јєднoчєснє вzmocnienie комитетoв мoжє служыч вzmocnєнєу оппозиция парламентарнєй, co причыннє сѣ до вzmocnienia чєстoтливoсти powstawania рząduw мнєйшоциowych.

*Слoва клучoвє: рządu, рządu мнєйшоциoвoгo, парламент, комисја, крајє Еурoпы Środkowo-Wschodniej.*

## **ЗНАЧЕННЯ ТА ВПЛИВ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ КОМІТЕТІВ В УМОВАХ ФУНКЦІОНУВАННЯ УРЯДІВ МЕНШОСТІ: ТЕОРЕТИЗАЦІЯ ТА ВИЯВИ У КРАЇНАХ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ**

У статті на теоретичному рівні й емпірично, зокрема в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи, проаналізовано значення та вплив парламентських комітетів в умовах урядів меншості. Автор виходить з того, що легітимним механізмом народного представництва в країнах подібного типу є парламентський спосіб формування та відповідальності уряду. Тому урядові кабінети, в тому числі меншості, в своєму формуванні, функціонуванні і відповідальності залежать від партійного складу парламентів. Висунуто припущення, що частота формування урядів меншості додатково зумовлена спеціалізацією парламентів, зокрема крізь призму парламентських комітетів як арену урядово-опозиційних відносин, де в разі урядів меншості майже завжди переважає саме опозиція. Однак аналітично доведено, що комітети самі по собі, зокрема різні їхні атрибути та «сила», не впливають чи майже не впливають на частоту формування урядів меншості в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Разом із цим, посилення парламентських комітетів може слугувати посиленню парламентської опозиції, а це сприяє збільшенню частоти формування урядів меншості.

*Ключові слова: уряд, уряд меншості, парламент, комітет, країни Центрально-Східної Європи.*

The peculiarity of European parliamentary democracy, in particular in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, regardless of the used systems of government – semi-presidential or parliamentary – is that the legitimate mechanism of people's representation within its framework is considered to be the parliamentary method of government formation and responsibility. That is why in parliamentary democracy it is extremely important to focus attention on the nature of

governments, which always or almost always depend on the party composition of parliaments and, accordingly, are often partisan ones. At the same time, it is the party composition of parliaments that is mostly a condition and reason for separation among governments in European parliamentary democracies, including in Central and Eastern Europe (in the broad – geopolitical or European integration – understanding of this region in our study, in particular in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Montenegro), and majority government cabinets and minority government cabinets. Moreover, in the segment of the former, political science is still considered more informed and developed on average, while the latter are minority governments, primarily due to the fact that they are formed less often (in particular, not in all European parliamentary democracies, including in the region), theoretically and conceptually relatively weakly represented, and therefore definitely actualized by the need for scientific and analytical attention. And this is despite the fact that in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in particular in Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia and the Czech Republic, minority governments still occur (or used to occur) quite often, and in some ones, in particular in Estonia, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Hungary, Montenegro, etc., happened very rarely or even did not happen or do not happen and are rather an exception to institutional and political practice. One way or another, the question of the essence and factors of the formation, functioning, stability and efficiency of minority governments is still on the agenda in the context of European parliamentary democracies, in particular in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. In particular, researchers often appeal to the constitutional-legal, institutional-political, party-electoral, ideological, power-opposition, executive-legislative and intra-governmental attributes of the formation, functioning and responsibility of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies. In our research, we will somewhat narrow our attention and focus on the power-opposition factors and parameters of the structuring of minority governments, in particular on the importance and influence of parliamentary committees in the conditions of the functioning of minority governments, both purely theoretically and within the framework of practical findings in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe.

The specified topic was partially disclosed in the scientific works of such researchers who are mainly interested in the subject of minority governments and the peculiarities of their formation (primarily in the Ukrainians of Western Europe), such as F. Russo and L. Verzichelli<sup>1</sup>, but mainly K. Strøm<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, we appealed to the works scientists from the problems of parliamentary committees and parliaments in general in various European parliamentary democracies,

<sup>1</sup> Russo F, Verzichelli L., *The Adoption of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences?*, Presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops (Salamanca, April 2014).

<sup>2</sup> Strøm K., *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 583–605.; Strøm K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

in particular such as A. Agh<sup>3</sup>, D. Arter<sup>4</sup>, E. Damgaard<sup>5</sup>, W. Francis<sup>6</sup>, G. Hernes<sup>7</sup>, V. Mamadouh and T. Raunio<sup>8</sup>, S. Martin and S. Depauw<sup>9</sup>, I. Mattson and K. Strøm<sup>10</sup>, M. Mezey<sup>11</sup>, D. Olson and W. Crowther<sup>12</sup> and others. Finally, in our study, some existing and own statistical databases on related issues were used, including such as “Comparative political data set”<sup>13</sup>, “Parliaments and governments database”<sup>14</sup>, “Governments in Europe”<sup>15</sup>. Taking into account all the available scientific developments and statistical data, we, in turn, will try to verify and systematize the existing ideas, and it is also possible to update them by taking into account the political, institutional and power-opposition (at the level of parliaments) experience, primarily in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Therefore, the power-opposition dimension of delineating the essence, influence, functionality and duration of minority governments in parliamentary democracies is directly determined by the structuring and composition of national legislatures/parliaments, which, as stated above, are primary in the context of the formation and responsibility of minority governments. The fact is that, purely arithmetically, minority governments in the categories of power-opposition structuring of parliaments are combined/composed by parties that have a minority in parliaments, while nominally opposition parties have a quantitative (not necessarily political) majority in the latter, although some of them support (regularly or ad hoc, with or without agreements) minority government cabinets. Accordingly, some nominally non-governmental, and therefore nominally oppositional parties (they can be called situational) – especially those that provide support and “survival” of minority governments – receive certain political

<sup>3</sup> Agh A., Changing Parliamentary Committees in Changing East-Central Europe: Parliamentary Committees as Central Sites of Policy Making, *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 1998, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 85–100.

<sup>4</sup> Arter D., *The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis*, Wyd. Hurst 1984.

<sup>5</sup> Damgaard E., *Folketinget under forandring*, Wyd. Samfunnsviden-skabeligt Forlag 1977.

<sup>6</sup> Francis W., Legislative Committee Systems, Optimal Committee Size, and the Costs of Decision Making, *Journal of Politics* 1982, vol 44, s. 822–837.

<sup>7</sup> Hernes G., *Interest, Influence and Cooptation: A Study of the Norwegian Parliament: PhD dissertation*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University 1971

<sup>8</sup> Mamadouh V., Raunio T., The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 2003, vol 41, nr. 2, s. 333–351.

<sup>9</sup> Martin S., Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2011, vol 36, nr. 2, s. 339–361.; Martin S., Depauw S., *Parliamentary Committees and Multi-Party Government*, Paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2009 (Lisbon, 14–19 April 2009).; Martin S., Depauw S., *The Impact of Multiparty Government on the Internal Organization of Legislatures*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 69th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, 31 March–3 April 2011).

<sup>10</sup> Mattson I., Strøm K., Parliamentary Committees, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 249–307.; Strøm K., Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies, *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 1998, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 21–59.; Strøm K., Parliamentary government and legislative organization, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 51–82

<sup>11</sup> Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979.

<sup>12</sup> Olson D., Crowther W., *Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments: Comparative Institutionalization*, Wyd. Ohio State University 2002.

<sup>13</sup> Armingeon K., Weisstanner D., Knöpfel L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2020 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Universität Bern 2014, źródło: <https://www.cpd-data.org/index.php/data#Supplement> [odczyt: 30.11.2022].

<sup>14</sup> Döring H., Manow P., *Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies*, ParlGov, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 30.11.2022].

<sup>15</sup> Ieraci G., Poropat F., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, źródło: [http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013\\_full-text.pdf](http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf) [odczyt: 30.11.2022].

dividends (either currently or in the future) from various types of such support. However, given that we are dealing with parliamentary democracies and with democracies in general, one can clearly trace something like a norm according to which such discriminations are significantly limited, since a fair distribution of positions, rules and procedures between government and opposition/situational by parties is preserved (or was preserved until recently) at almost every level and in every aspect of parliamentary activity. Along with this, it should be noted that in the last few years, the indicators of the level of democracy have deteriorated in many countries of the analyzed region, and some of them – in particular Hungary – according to various comparative projects, have even ceased to be democracies, becoming hybrid political regimes. Nevertheless, we take into account all the countries listed above, since we will statistically appeal to data from the past, in particular during 1989/1990-2016, when all the countries listed still remained democratic (even in some cases gradually deteriorating their ratings).

Continuing the above logic, it is important to note that all parliamentary organizational structures in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in general in parliamentary democracies are formed as much as possible on the basis of proportional representation of parties in legislatures<sup>16</sup>. Much less often and even mainly as exceptions, the principles of parity of representation are applied, which are manifested in equal representation in the organizational structures of the parliaments of all parties or of all the total government and all total opposition/non-government parties, regardless of their size in the legislature.

We can observe this, for example, on the example of Slovenia, in which all parliamentary committees are formed according to the proportional principle, i.e. taking into account the party-political configuration of the legislature (i.e. the share of mandates of parliamentary parties), but in the committee for the control of public finances and the committee for the supervision of services intelligence and security, the absolute majority of mandates/members are, surprisingly, deputies from opposition parliamentary groups. In addition, in this country, each standing parliamentary committee has a chair and two deputy chairs, but one of these three must necessarily represent at least one of the opposition parliamentary parties/groups. In contrast, the powers of the parliamentary opposition used to be or still remain quite influential in such countries of Central and Eastern Europe as Serbia and Hungary (although in the latter country they have been significantly weakened politically in the last few years due to the “roll-back” of democracy), but they minority governments are hardly typical or not at all used. For example, in Hungary (at least until 2018), despite the proportional distribution of members of most standing parliamentary committees between parties, some standing committees are formed on the basis of parity, that is, the number of members from government parties is equal to the number of members from opposition parties. In addition, in this country, it used to be

<sup>16</sup> Arter D., *The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis*, Wyd. Hurst 1984, s. 191. Damgaard E., *Folketinget under forandring*, Wyd. Samfunnsviden-skabeligt Forlag 1977, s. 140.; Strøm K., *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 592.

regulated that the National Security Committee (by law) and the Audit and Budget Committee (by political agreement) must be chaired by members of the opposition parties, although minority governments, as mentioned above, hardly ever happen. A similar situation with the absence of minority governments is typical for Montenegro, in which the chairman and deputy chairman of one or another standing parliamentary committee cannot simultaneously represent only the government or only opposition parliamentary parties/groups.

The importance and influence of parliaments in the context of the formation and functioning of governments, in particular minority governments, in parliamentary democracies is supplemented by the fact that without specialization, parliaments themselves or the leading/main chambers of parliaments (where parliaments are bicameral) cannot function as effective instruments of checking and restraining government cabinets and bureaucracy. In addition, it is much more difficult for the government cabinet as such and the leadership of the parliament to control the decentralized discussion process, which generally accompanies parliamentary specialization in various sectors of the economy and social life (typically in parallel with government ministries). Accordingly, specialized (legislative and non-legislative) standing parliamentary committees, given their distinctive attributes, form completely alternative sources of knowledge, information and identification. At the same time, as M. Mezi<sup>17</sup> notes in this regard, effective specialization of legislatures requires a relatively large number of permanent parliamentary committees with fixed areas of jurisdiction, especially when such committees correspond to the specializations of ministries and departments of government cabinets.

However, such logic is implemented extremely rarely, because in European parliamentary democracies it generally happens situationally (and probably most often in Scandinavian countries)<sup>18</sup>. In this case, the law-making process and the support of governments as such deteriorate, as MPs feel uninformed about those issues that are not the arena of responsibility of their standing parliamentary committees. In the case of minority governments, the situation is even more complicate since they are often formed when there is a lack of reliable information; in particular, regarding the adoption of expected regulatory and secondary legal acts. Another point, which in the context of the specialization of parliaments or leading/main chambers of parliaments affects the frequency of formation of minority governments, concerns the consensus-oriented form of decision-making by parliamentary committees. The fact is that minority governments are often formed when the legislation and regulations of parliaments provide for closed, not open, meetings of parliamentary committees. If decisions are made in committees in this way, then they are almost always made at plenary sessions of legislatures, and this, provided that the previous requirements are met, institutionally and party-wise contributes to the formation of minority governments.

<sup>17</sup> Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979.

<sup>18</sup> Hernes G., *Interest, Influence and Cooptation: A Study of the Norwegian Parliament: PhD dissertation*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University 1971.; Olsen J., *Organized Democracy: Political Institutions in a Welfare State – The Case of Norway*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1983.

That is why, purely theoretically, the conclusion of K. Strøm<sup>19</sup> and O. Hellevik<sup>20</sup> that minority governments should more often be formed in political systems where the work of permanent parliamentary committees is organized in such a way as to promote specialization and cooperation between governmental and opposition (non-governmental) parties, that is, between expected alternatives and the current the government and the opposition works. At the same time, one cannot ignore the factors that significantly limit parliamentary specialization, in particular, significant parliamentary variability and the change of deputies and political parties in successive legislatures, as well as the change of membership in permanent parliamentary committees by deputies (especially in the context of successive parliaments). These factors and the low level of expertise of MPs (if any) create even greater priorities and advantages for opposition parties, and therefore contribute to the formation of minority governments.

For at least a partial verification of the assumptions outlined above, we turn to the ratio, on the one hand, of the frequency of formation and functioning of minority governments, as well as, on the other hand, of the institutional and quantitative-dimensional features and attributes of permanent parliamentary committees in the parliamentary democracies of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 / 1990–2015 (see Table 1). The conducted comparative analysis<sup>21</sup> confirms that neither the number nor the size of standing parliamentary committees affect the frequency of formation and functioning of minority governments. Thus, minority government cabinets may form frequently or occasionally in countries where the number and size of standing committees are small and medium, as well as large. However, it is on average clear (see Table 2) that the frequency of formation of minority government cabinets increases somewhat (albeit unevenly) in the course of increasing the number, as well as (up to a certain level) the size of standing parliamentary committees. With regard to taking into account the equality of standing parliamentary committees in terms of size, we confirm that minority governments are, on average, more often formed when they are neither formally nor actually equal in size. In contrast, minority governments are significantly less likely to occur if parliamentary committees are formally and effectively equal in size or close/comparable in size. In terms of the proportional distribution of members of standing parliamentary committees between parliamentary parties/groups, it is quite clear that the outlined attribute of the standing of parliamentary committees does not have any impact on the frequency of formation and functioning of minority government cabinets.

<sup>19</sup> Strøm K., Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 583–605.

<sup>20</sup> Hellevik O., *Stortinget-en sosial elite?: En undersøkelse av sammenhengen mellom sosial bakgrunn og politisk karriere*, Wyd. Pax 1969, s. 138.

<sup>21</sup> Деталізовано і більш статистично наповнено про це йдеться, що правда в іншому контексті, у монографічній роботі автора. Див.: Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Uriady menshosti v yevropeiskyykh parlamentskyykh demokratiakh*, Wyd. Prostir-M 2017.

**Table 1.** The influence of institutional and quantitative-dimensional attributes of standing parliamentary committees on the statistics of the formation and functioning of minority government cabinets in the parliamentary democracies of Central and

**Europe (1990–2015)**

Country	Government statistics (since certain date to December 2015)				Institutional and quantitative-dimensional attributes of standing committees (as of December 2015)					
	All governments	Non-party governments	Party governments		Minority governments %	Actual number of committees	Actual average committee size	Formal/ actual equality of committees in size	Proportional distribution of committee members (formally/ actually)	Formal/ actual combination of membership in various committees
Bugaria (since October 1990.)	13 (5)	4 (3)	4 (0)	5 (2)	38,5	23	19	-/-	+/+	+/-
Estonia (since September 1992)	15 (0)	0 (0)	11 (0)	4 (0)	26,7	11	10	-/-	+/+	-/-
Latvia (since May 1990)	23 (0)	0 (0)	14 (0)	9 (0)	39,1	16	12	-/-	+/+	+/-
Lithuania since March 1990)	18 (1)	0 (0)	12 (1)	6 (0)	33,3	15	11	-/-	+/+	-/-
Poland (since June 1989)	21 (2)	0 (0)	15 (1)	6 (1)	28,6	29	27	-/-	+/+	+/-
Romania (since May 1990	22 (2)	1 (1)	7 (1)	14 (0)	63,6	21	21	-/-	+/+	-/-
Serbia (since January 2007)	4 (0)	0 (0)	4 (0)	0 (0)	0,0	20	17	+/+	+/+	+/-
Slovakia (since June 1990)	15 (1)	0 (0)	10 (0)	5 (1)	33,3	16	13	-/-	+/+	+/-
Slovenia (since April 1990.)	16 (0)	0 (0)	12 (0)	4 (0)	25,0	23	15	-/-	+/+	+/-
Hungary (since April 1990)	11 (0)	0 (0)	9 (0)	2 (0)	18,2	15	13	-/-	+/+	+/-
Croatia (since January 2000)	9 (0)	0 (0)	5 (0)	4 (0)	44,4	29	13	+/+	+/+	+/-
Czech Republic (since June 1990)	16 (3)	2 (2)	9 (0)	5 (1)	31,3	18	18	-/-	+/+	+/-
Montenegro (since September 2006)	4 (0)	0 (0)	4 (0)	0 (0)	0,0	14	12	-/-	+/+	+/-

In view of the existing statistics, the analysis was carried out as of December 2015. *Conventional symbols:* “+” – designation of the option when the indicator being tested is activated; “–” – designation of the option when the indicator being tested does not work. Indicators of equality of committees in terms of size and proportional distribution of committee members formally activate when it is provided for by law, and do not activate when it is not regulated. Instead, the indicators of the equality of committees in terms of size and the proportional distribution of committee members actually work when the situations described by the indicator occur in practice, and do not work if they are not observed in practice. The indicator of combining membership in various standing committees formally works when it is allowed by law or not regulated at all, and does not work when it is not regulated. In contrast, the indicator of combining membership in various standing committees actually works if it is mostly implemented in practice, and does not work if it is mostly not implemented. Statistics for government types are calculated together with acting government cabinets (in parentheses). In each country, the analysis of governments was carried out from the date of the first post-communist and at the same time democratic parliamentary elections. The analysis of institutional and quantitative-dimensional attributes of standing parliamentary committees was also carried out as of 2015, but the price means that a similar situation existed in previous time periods or will be in the future, because the analysis is based on the regulations of the legislatures (in this case – as of 2015). The used regulations are taken from the official websites of the parliaments. Other scientific studies, including our authorship, were also used. *Zdroj:* Strom K., Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies, “The Journal of Legislative Studies” 1998, vol. 4, p. 822–837.; Agh A., Changing Parliamentary Committees in Changing East-Central Europe: Parliamentary Committees as Central Sites of Policy Making, “The Journal of Legislative Studies” 1998, vol. 4, nr. 1, p. 85–100.; Olson D., Crowther W., Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments: Comparative Institutionalization, Wyd. Ohio State University 2002.; Döring H., Manow P., Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies, ParlGov, source: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 30.11.2022].; Armington K., Weissstanner D., Knöpfel L., Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2020 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries), Universitat Bern 2014, *zdroj:* [https://www.cpd-s-data.org/index.php/data#supplement\[odczyt: 30.11.2022\].](https://www.cpd-s-data.org/index.php/data#supplement[odczyt: 30.11.2022].); Iera G., Poropat F., Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set, Wyd. EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, *zdroj:* [http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WNP-DSPES-4-2013\\_full-text.pdf\[odczyt: 30.11.2022\].](http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WNP-DSPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf[odczyt: 30.11.2022].); Panchak-Baloborska N., Uрядy męschostiv yevropejskykh parlamentskykh demokratiakh, Wyd. Prosti-M 2017.



In addition, it should be noted that today in all parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, the members of all or most of the standing parliamentary committees are distributed among the parliamentary parties/groups in proportion to the share of their parliamentary mandates. Instead, parliamentary committees are very rarely, as mentioned above, formed on the basis of parity and even less often due to consideration of the principles of the majority. Accordingly, opposition parliamentary parties have the opportunity to be represented in all standing committees equally and proportionally to the shares of their parliamentary mandates (at least as of 2015–2016). Finally, regarding whether deputies have and exercise the right to combine membership in different standing committees, it is quite obvious that most minority governments (although, as before, with significant exceptions) are formed in those systems in which formally no or nothing is allowed provided for combining the membership of all deputies in several standing parliamentary committees, even though some deputies are actually members of several such committees.

In view of this, it is generally obvious that in determining the influence of the parliamentary opposition on the frequency of formation and peculiarities of the functioning of minority government cabinets in European parliamentary democracies, including in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, consideration of parliamentary committees, in particular their institutional and quantitative-dimensional attributes, has a very relative and indirect meaning. Instead, K. Strom notes that the influence of such attributes of parliamentary committees as their “power” and specificity<sup>22</sup> is more vivid. It is generally believed that systems of strong parliamentary committees (for example, in Latvia, Romania) contribute to the strengthening of the parliamentary opposition, which collectively leads to an increase in the influence of parliamentary committees and the parliamentary opposition on government activities and politics, especially in the case of minority governments, which are generally in the legislature and have a minority in every or almost every standing committee.

Therefore, in this case, minority governments should be formed much more often (if it is institutionally and legislatively possible). Especially when, according to Sh. Martin and S. Depu<sup>23</sup>, when the political system is mostly formed and dominated by coalition governments rather than single-party ones. However, this does not at all mean that in a political system dominated by one-party or minority coalition governments, parliamentary committee systems are stronger. This is even more evident, from B. Powell’s point of view<sup>24</sup>, when systems of strong parliamentary committees are observed in countries with proportional electoral systems.

Partly expanding the proposed remark, A. Leiphart argues that the “strength” of parliamentary committee systems is determined specifically by the predominant type of political institutions in one

<sup>22</sup> Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Strom K., *Parliamentary government and legislative organization*, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin’s Press 1995, s. 51–82.

<sup>23</sup> Martin S., Depauw S., *Parliamentary Committees and Multi-Party Government*, Paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2009 (Lisbon, 14–19 April 2009).

<sup>24</sup> Powell B., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000, s. 34.

or another political system, in particular, by the type of democracy in which the parliament works – consensus or majoritarian<sup>25</sup>. However, even so, the degree of consensus in each political system, being almost always positively related to the “strength” of parliamentary committees, weakens or disappears altogether when a distinction is made between single-party and coalition government cabinets.

**Table 2.** Correlation of the minority government cabinets frequency of formation and functioning and institutional and quantitative-dimensional attributes of standing parliamentary committees in parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (1989/1990–2016)

Attributes of standing parliamentary committees	Frequency of minority governments, %
<i>I. The average actual number of permanent parliamentary committees (q), no</i>	
$q > 20$	40,9
$10 \leq q \leq 20$	23,0
$q < 10$	–
<i>II. Average actual size of standing parliamentary committees (s), no</i>	
$s > 30$	–
$15 \leq s \leq 30$	31,9
$s < 15$	28,1
<i>III. Equality of standing parliamentary committees in terms of size</i>	
III. Equality of standing parliamentary committees in terms of size	22,2
Committees are not formally equal in size, but they are equal ones	–
Committees are not equal in size either formally or in fact	31,3
<i>Proportional distribution of members of standing parliamentary committees</i>	
It is not formally foreseen, but it is actually implemented	–
Formally foreseen and implemented in fact	29,9
<i>V. Combination of membership of deputies in various standing parliamentary committees</i>	
Formally allowed and implemented in fact	26,8
Formally allowed, but not actually implemented	18,2
Not formally allowed, but actually implemented	42,9
Not formally allowed and not actually implemented	–

The weighted average frequency of minority governments for each attribute of standing parliamentary committees is calculated based on the determination of the arithmetic mean frequency of formation, rather than the number of minority governments during each parliamentary term in each CEE parliamentary democracy (in the relevant time frame). In view of the available statistics, the analysis was carried out as of December 2015. The table was compiled based on the data of the table.

1. This is described in detail and more statistically in the author's monographic work. Proştir-M 2017.

On this basis (and also taking into account the statistics on the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe), F. Russo and L. Verzicelli<sup>26</sup> argue that parliamentary committees are the most important tools for monitoring the implementation of political control over government offices in

<sup>25</sup> Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.

<sup>26</sup> Russo F., Verzicelli L., *The Adoption of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences?*, Presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops (Salamanca, April 2014), s. 5–6.

the analyzed type of political systems. The fact is that in all European parliamentary democracies, all draft laws, including those initiated by government cabinets, must be discussed and analyzed by standing parliamentary committees before being presented to plenary sessions of parliaments or leading/main chambers of parliaments. The latter are sometimes formed in the shape of specialized committees, reflecting the competences of government ministries and departments. By covering different policy areas, specialized standing parliamentary committees reduce the information asymmetry that legislatures tend to suffer from. By covering different policy areas, specialized standing parliamentary committees reduce the asymmetry of information that legislatures tend to suffer from. In this regard, the position of M. Mezi is correct, who rightly observes that parliaments with relatively strong directive powers have well-developed standing committee systems that enable them to divide legislative work so that a degree of legislative scrutiny is created in most policy areas<sup>27</sup>. As a result, it is quite clear that the specifics and “strength” of parliamentary committees directly depend on the specifics and “strength”/power of parliaments, and therefore are outlined, according to I. Mattson and K. Ström<sup>28</sup>, by distinctive institutional and procedural attributes of parliamentary committees, which boil down to dimensions such as legislative authority (ie, the ability to initiate or amend legislation) and agenda control.

Taking them as a basis, scientists develop various methods of comparative analysis of the “strength” of standing parliamentary committees. For example, V. Mamadou and T. Raunio<sup>29</sup> proposed an index of the formal “strength” of parliamentary committees, which is based on six indicators. Instead, S. Martin proposed an index of the “strength” of parliamentary committees, which is based on nine institutional features of committee systems, and therefore empirically can range from “0” to “9” points (when an increase in the number of points indicates an increase in the “strength” of committees)<sup>30</sup>.

This index was developed and improved in parallel by S. Martin and S. Depu<sup>31</sup>. They also singled out nine institutional features of parliamentary committees that confirm their “strength”, but defined them quite specifically. Scholars assume that government parties, fearing or facing ministerial reshuffles, are able to agree or at least not object to institutional rules that provide parliamentary committees with some so-called “extended structures and powers” in exchange for the ability to “monitor” coalition partners or by non-governmental/opposition parties (especially in the case of minority cabinets). As a result, Sh. Martin and S. Depu clearly argue that from an institutional point of view, that parliamentary committee is strong, which is structurally endowed with the opportunity

<sup>27</sup> Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979.

<sup>28</sup> Ström K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Mattson I., Ström K., *Parliamentary Committees*, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 249–307.

<sup>29</sup> Mamadou V., Raunio T., The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 2003, vol 41, nr 2, s. 333–351.

<sup>30</sup> Martin S., Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2011, vol 36, nr 2, s. 339–361.

<sup>31</sup> Martin S., Depauw S., *Parliamentary Committees and Multi-Party Government*, Paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2009 (Lisbon, 14–19 April 2009); Martin S., Depauw S., *The Impact of Multiparty Government on the Internal Organization of Legislatures*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 69th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, 31 March–3 April 2011).

to influence the legislative process and can also provide control and supervision over the activities of the government cabinet<sup>32</sup>. In order to check how strong parliamentary committees are, the researchers developed an index of nine indicators. Each of them reveals the peculiarities of choice in the institutional design of committee systems and affects whether parliamentary committees are able to reduce government-ministerial reshuffles and prolong the stability of government cabinets.

I propose to consider and verify the nine indicators in the “strength” index of the parliamentary committees of Sh. Martin and S. Depu<sup>33</sup>. Among them: 1. Do the specializations of parliamentary committees correspond to the specializations of government ministries and departments? Note: the more the committee system corresponds to the ministerial portfolios, the better the committees can monitor the actions and behavior of individual ministers, entire ministries and departments, and also have a decisive say over the content of legislation in one or another policy area. Specialization is defined as the proportion of government cabinet ministers whose portfolios coincide with the specialization of each particular standing committee; 2. Whether draft laws are considered by committees before the plenary session of the parliament or the leading/main chamber of the parliament (in the case of bicameralism). The earlier the committee is involved in the law-making process, the more influential it should probably be. In contrast, it is much more difficult for the committee to influence the draft law, in particular the government bill, if it has already been discussed and voted on at the plenary session of the legislature; 3. Do committees have the right of legislative initiative?

The ability to act independently of the government and independently initiate bills signals the strong role of agenda control by the committee system in the lawmaking process. Even if a cabinet minister shirks promised legislation, a strong committee is usually able to compensate for the minister’s inaction by initiating legislation on its own; 4. Does the parliamentary committee have the right to introduce and adopt changes/amendments to draft laws and already adopted laws? Weak committees have little ability to amend government bills. Instead, powerful committees have the right to revise and amend government bills. But even then, the minister may be entitled to promise amendments to the committee, limiting the committee’s role in scrutinizing and shaping legislation; 5. Can committees compel ministers to attend their meetings? If so, the committees are powerful because they are able to scrutinize and question the activities of ministers, and to identify where ministerial actions differ from coalition agreements (if any); 6. Whether committees can compel civil servants to attend their meetings? If so, then the committees are strong, because civil servants are important sources of ministerial/government information, as well as direct “agents” of ministers. Accordingly, they are able to report on the actions and inactions of ministers, as a result of which committees are better able to monitor and evaluate the activities of governments, government ministries and departments; in particular, it is relevant in the context of minority governments); 7. Do subcommittees exist? It is obvious that subcommittees provide a mechanism for further specialization

<sup>32</sup> Martin S., Depauw S., *Parliamentary Committees and Multi-Party Government*, Paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2009 (Lisbon, 14–19 April 2009), s. 5.

<sup>33</sup> Martin S., Depauw S., *Parliamentary Committees and Multi-Party Government*, Paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2009 (Lisbon, 14–19 April 2009), s. 5–6.

and delegation of workload for committees. Hence, as the consequence of the fact that the work within the committees will be distributed and detailed there may be an increase of the effectiveness of the committee system; 8. Whether the committee may publish the reports of the minority (or of any of its dissenting members)? Such reports are a rather important source of critical information, especially when committees cannot reach consensus, and therefore have the potential to be used as a source of information about coalition disputes. The fact is that one party may publicly disagree with the political positions and proposals of another or other parties (including governmental ones). Therefore, such reports can serve as a tool for opposition parties to propose alternatives to government policy (this is particularly relevant in the context of minority governments); 9. Is the committee's time resource unique? Legislators are endowed with limited resources, not least in the last way and at the expense of time. If MPs have to choose between committee work and plenary work, they may be less inclined to focus on committee tasks. And in order for the committee to be strong, it is important that the period of the committee's work does not coincide with the time of the plenary session. Taking this into account, as well as on the basis of the verification of indicators, which, in our opinion, comprehensively outline the "strength" of parliamentary committees in European parliamentary democracies (according to the list of countries proposed by Sh. Martin and S. Depu<sup>34</sup>), we compare the obtained conclusions with the statistics of the formation and the functioning of minority governments in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe (see Tables 3 and 4).

**Table 3.** The influence of the "strength" of standing parliamentary committees on the statistics of the formation and functioning of minority governments in parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (1989/1990–2015)

Country	All governments	Minority governments	Minority governments %	Attributes of the „power” of standing committees									
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	In total
Estonia (since September 1992)	15 (0)	4 (0)	26,7	0,81	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	5,81
Latvia (since May 1990)	23 (0)	9 (0)	39,1	0,33	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	5,33
Lithuania (since March 1990)	18 (1)	6 (0)	33,3	0,69	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	7,69
Poland (since June 1989)	21 (2)	6 (1)	28,6	0,82	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	4,82
Slovakia (since June 1990)	15 (1)	5 (1)	33,3	0,63	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	7,88
Slovenia (since April 1990)	16 (0)	4 (0)	25,0	0,86	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	7,86
Hungary (since April 1990)	11 (0)	2 (0)	18,2	0,62	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	6,62
Czech Republic (since June 1990)	16 (3)	5 (1)	31,3	0,66	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	6,66

The table uses the calculations of S. Martin and S. Depu (as of 2009), which do not include such countries as Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro. Regarding the statistics of the types of governments, it is calculated together with the acting government cabinets (in brackets). In each country, the analysis of government offices was carried out from the date of the first post-communist and at the same time democratic parliamentary elections. Źródło: Martin S., Depauw S., *Parliamentary Committees and Multi-Party Government*, Paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2009 (Lisbon, 14–19 April 2009); Martin S., Depauw S., *The Impact of Multiparty Government on the Internal Organization of Legislatures*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 69th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, March 31–April 3, 2011); Ieraci G., Poropat F., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUT Edizioni

<sup>34</sup> Martin S., Depauw S., *Parliamentary Committees and Multi-Party Government*, Paper for Presentation at the ECPR.

Università di Trieste 2013, source: [http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013\\_full-text.pdf](http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf)[odczyt: 30.11.2022].; Döring H., Manow P., Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies, ParlGov, source: <http://www.parlgov.org/>[odczyt:30.11.2022].; Panchak-Bialobłocka N., Uriady menhosti v yevropeiskyykh parlamentskykh demokratiikh, Wyd. Prostir-M 2017.

On the basis of such a comparison, it is quite obvious that the average statistical “strength” of permanent parliamentary committees in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe does not unidirectional affect the frequency of formation and functioning of minority governments in the region (at least in most countries of the region). After all, minority governments are both often and rarely observed in those countries that are characterized by strong or weak parliamentary committees. In general, it has been established that minority government cabinets in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are most often found in systems that are characterized by neither maximally weak nor maximally strong parliamentary committees (see Table 4).

However, in such a context one must always take into account the fact that in Central - Eastern Europe parliamentary committees are on average stronger than in Western Europe. This is one of the reasons why minority governments in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe occur even more often than on average in the countries of Western Europe (which is also a certain paradox).

**Table 4.** Correlation of the frequency of formation and functioning of minority government cabinets and the “strength” of standing parliamentary committees in the parliamentary democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (1989/1990–2015)

Attributes of the “strength” of standing parliamentary committees	Frequency of minority governments, %
<b><i>I. The average „strength” of parliamentary committees (p)</i></b>	
$p > 7,0$	30,5
$5,0 < p \leq 7,0$	29,3
$3,0 < p \leq 5,0$	30,0
$p \leq 3,0$	–
<b><i>II. Jurisdiction of Standing Committees Jurisdiction of Ministries (SP)</i></b>	
$SP > 0,67$	27,9
$0,33 < SP \leq 0,67$	27,6
$SP \leq 0,33$	39,1
<b><i>III. The right of committees to consider bills before the plenary session of the parliament</i></b>	
Yes	29,9
No	–
<b><i>IV. The right of legislative initiative of committees</i></b>	
Yes	30,5
No	25,0
<b><i>V. The right of committees to introduce and adopt changes in draft laws and adopted laws</i></b>	
Yes	29,9
No	–
<b><i>VI. The right of committees to mix ministers to attend their meetings</i></b>	
Yes	28,3
No	34,6

Attributes of the "strength" of standing parliamentary committees	Frequency of minority governments, %
<b><i>VII. The right of committees to compel civil servants to attend their meetings</i></b>	
Yes	28,3
No	34,6
<b><i>VIII. Availability of subcommittees of standing committees</i></b>	
Yes	29,8
No	30,0
<b><i>The right of committees to issue minority (dissenting members) reports</i></b>	
Yes	31,7
No	26,7
<b><i>The need to choose between a government meeting and a plenary meeting</i></b>	
Yes	29,2
No	30,1

The weighted average frequency of minority governments for each attribute of the strength of standing parliamentary committees is calculated based on the determination of the arithmetic mean frequency of formation, not the number of minority governments during each parliamentary term in each parliamentary democracy of Central and Eastern Europe (in the appropriate time period). In view of the available statistics, the analysis was carried out as of December 2015. The table was compiled on the basis of the data in the table. 3. This is discussed in detail and more statistically in the author's monographic work. Źródło: Panchak-Bialoblotska N., Uriady menshosti v yevropeiskyykh parlamentskyykh demokratiikh, Wyd. Prostir-M 2017.

The obtained conclusions are positively (i.e., not one-sided) compared with the assessment of the relationship between individual indicators of the "strength" of parliamentary committees and the frequency of the formation of minority governments in parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, it is clear that the "strength" of parliamentary committees cannot be considered a direct predictor of the frequency and effectiveness of minority governments in parliamentary democracies, at least in terms of the countries of the analyzed region. For example, the "strength" of parliamentary committees and the frequency of the minority governments formation are statistically and weighted average directly proportionally related to such indicators of the "strength" of parliamentary committees as: correspondence of the specialization of standing committees to the specialization of government ministries and departments; the right of legislative initiative of parliamentary committees; the right of standing committees to introduce and adopt changes in draft laws and already adopted laws; the right of committees to compel ministers and civil servants to attend committee meetings. In the case of strengthening of other indicators of the "strength" of parliamentary committees, the frequency of forming minority governments does not increase, and sometimes even decreases. All this argues that the "strength" of parliamentary committees should be interpreted only as an additional predictor of the formation of minority government cabinets in parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, although it is much more important in some countries of Western Europe. On the other hand, the strengthening of standing parliamentary committees can serve to strengthen the parliamentary opposition, which, in turn, contributes to the increase in the frequency of the formation of minority governments.

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## **THE FORMATION, OPTIONALITY AND PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POPULISM IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL-EASTERN AT THE BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL THEORIZATIONS AND EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE**

The article analyzes the peculiarities of the formation, optionality and prospects for the development of populism in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe at the background of political theorizations and the European experience. This is done in view of the fact that populism is being talked about both theoretically and practically, as well as in a regional context, in particular in the context of certain samples of countries and even parts of the world. It is revealed that the current understanding of populism is quite blurred by both regional and national specifics, as well as by the conditions in which political actors in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe appeal to or modify the principles and postulates that are classically associated with the phenomenon of populism in political theory and practice, at least in European one. Having studied the options of populism in the countries of the region, it is found that it only partially repeats the attributes of populism in the all-European context, as well as it (especially in the current political situation in the world) is not and cannot be a short-term phenomenon without a future.

*Keywords: democracy, populism, parties, countries of Central and Eastern Europe.*

## **POWSTAWANIE, OPCJONALNOŚĆ/MOŻLIWOŚCI I PERSPEKTYWY ROZWOJU POPULIZMU W KRAJACH EUROPY ŚRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ NA TLE TEORII POLITYCZNYCH I DOŚWIADCZEŃ EUROPEJSKICH**

Artykuł analizuje i charakteryzuje powstawanie, opcjonalność i perspektywy rozwoju populizmu w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej na tle teorii politycznych i doświadczeń europejskich. Dokonuje się to w związku z faktem, że o populizmie mówi się zarówno teoretycznie, jak i praktycznie, a także w kontekście regionalnym, w szczególności w kontekście pewnych przykładów państw, a nawet części świata. Ujawnia się, że obecne rozumienie populizmu jest dość rozmyte zarówno przez specyfikę regionalną i narodową, jak i przez warunki, w jakich aktorzy polityczni w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej odwołują się do zasad i postulatów klasycznie kojarzonych ze zjawiskiem populizmu w teorii i praktyce politycznej, przynajmniej europejskiej, lub je modyfikują. Po zbadaniu wariantów populizmu w krajach regionu stwierdza

się, że tylko częściowo powtarza on atrybuty populizmu w kontekście ogólnoeuropejskim, jak również (zwłaszcza w obecnej sytuacji politycznej na świecie) nie jest i nie może być zjawiskiem krótkotrwałym, bez przyszłości.

*Słowa kluczowe: demokracja, populizm, partie, kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.*

## **СТАНОВЛЕННЯ, ОПЦІОНАЛ І ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ РОЗВИТКУ ПОПУЛІЗМУ В КРАЇНАХ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ НА ТЛІ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ТЕОРЕТИЗАЦІЙ І ЗАГАЛЬНОЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО ДОСВІДУ**

У статті проаналізовано особливості становлення, опціонал і перспективи розвитку популізму в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи на тлі політичних теоретизацій і загальноєвропейського досвіду. Це зроблено з огляду на те, що сьогодні про популізм говорять і загальнотеоретично чи загальнопрактично, і в регіональній прив'язці, зокрема у контексті тих чи інших вибірок країн і навіть частин світу. Виявлено, що поточне розуміння популізму доволі розмите як регіональною чи національною специфікою, так і умовами, в яких політичні актори в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи апелюють чи модифікують принципи та постулати, які класично асоціюються з феноменом популізму у політичній теорії і практиці, принаймні загальноєвропейській. Дослідивши опції популізму в країнах регіону, виявлено, що він лише частково повторює атрибути популізму в загальноєвропейському контексті, а також що він, особливо в поточній політичній ситуації у світі, не є і не може бути короткостроковим явищем без майбутнього.

*Ключові слова: демократія, популізм, партії, країни Центрально-Східної Європи.*

Populism has long since become the outline of political theorizing and political practice in almost every country and in every part and region of the world. Moreover, such a statement is considered valid both currently and in retrospect, since this phenomenon is being resorted to more and more effectively – due to which populism is diversifying, in particular regionally and nationally and has also been resorted to historically, including at the end of the 19th century – in the first half 20th century. Hence, today populism is often talked about in general theoretical or general practical terms, and in a regional context, in particular in the context of certain samples of countries and even parts of the world. Taking this into account, populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe, which only a few decades ago democratized and became part of the united Europe, needs special attention, in particular, on the subject of what is understood in them both theoretically and practically, and regionally or even nationally

populism, as well as what it is and is not, and therefore in what forms it can be expressed. The stated problem is quite relevant, since the current understanding of populism is rather blurred by both regional and national specifics, as well as the conditions in which political actors, including in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe, appeal to or modify the principles and postulates that are classically associated with the phenomenon of populism in political theory and practice, at least pan-European, etc.

In general theoretically (as well as in general on the example of European countries and other parts of the world) defined problems of understanding what populism is and is not, such scientists as J. Abromeit, B. Chesterton, G. Marotta and Y. Norman<sup>1</sup>, M. Berezin<sup>2</sup>, H.-G. Betz and S. Immerfall<sup>3</sup>, R. Brubaker<sup>4</sup>, M. Canovan<sup>5</sup>, C. DelaTorre<sup>6</sup>, P. Diehl<sup>7</sup>, R. Jansen<sup>8</sup>, J. Judis<sup>9</sup>, H. Kriesi<sup>10</sup>, E. Laclau<sup>11</sup>, P. Mair<sup>12</sup>, B. Moffitt<sup>13</sup>, C. Mudde<sup>14</sup>, J.-W. Müller<sup>15</sup>, P. Schmitter<sup>16</sup>, P. Taggart<sup>17</sup>, N. Urbinati<sup>18</sup> and many others. At the same time, the understanding of populism, as mentioned above, is often determined by regional and national specificities, which, on the example of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, is covered in the works of such scientists

<sup>1</sup> Abromeit J., Chesterton B., Marotta G., Norman Y., *Transformations of populism in Europe and the Americas: History and recent tendencies*, Wyd. Bloomsbury Academic 2015

<sup>2</sup> Berezin M., *Illiberal politics in neoliberal times: Culture, security and populism in the new Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge UP 2009.

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<sup>6</sup> Dela Torre C., The Ambiguous Meanings of Latin American Populisms, *Social Research* 1992, vol 59, nr. 2, s. 385-414.

<sup>7</sup> Diehl P., Die Komplexität des Populismus: ein Plädoyer für ein mehrdimensionales und graduales Konzept, *Totalitarismus und Demokratie* 2011, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 273-291.; Diehl P., Populismus, Antipolitik, Politainment, *Berliner Debatte Initial* 2011, vol 22, nr. 1, s. 27-39.

<sup>8</sup> Jansen R., Populist mobilization: a new theoretical approach to populism, *Sociological Theory* 2011, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 75-96.

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<sup>12</sup> Mair P., Populist democracy vs party democracy, [w:] Mény Y., Surel Y. (eds.), *Democracies and the populist challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2002, s. 81-98.

<sup>13</sup> Moffitt B., *The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 2016.; Moffitt B., Tormey S., Rethinking populism: politics, mediatization and political style, *Political Studies* 2014, vol 62, nr. 2, s. 381-397.

<sup>14</sup> Mudde C., The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy, *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations* 2008, vol 3, nr. 7, 24 s.; Mudde C., The populist zeitgeist, *Government and Opposition* 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 542-563.; Mudde C., Kaltwasser R., *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for democracy?*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2012.; Mudde C., Kaltwasser R., *Populism: A very short introduction*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017.

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<sup>16</sup> Schmitter P., *A Balance Sheet of the Vices and Virtues of "Populisms"*, Paper delivered at the conference "The Challenge of New Populism" (The Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, 2006).

<sup>17</sup> Taggart P., Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe, *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2004, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 269-288.

<sup>18</sup> Urbinati N., Democracy and Populism, *Constellations* 1998, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 110-124.

as S. Engler, B. Pytlas and, K. Deegan-Krause<sup>19</sup>, V. Havlik<sup>20</sup>, V. Lytvyn<sup>21</sup>, W. Merkeland, F. Scholl<sup>22</sup>, G. Mereznikov and O. Gyárfášová<sup>23</sup>, C. Mudde<sup>24</sup>, M. Orestain and B. Bugaric<sup>25</sup>, V. Petrović<sup>26</sup>, J. Rupnik<sup>27</sup>, A. Skolkay<sup>28</sup>, B. Stanley<sup>29</sup>, S. Sutey<sup>30</sup>, A. Topisek<sup>31</sup>, M. Tupy<sup>32</sup>, P. U'cen<sup>33</sup>, O. Wysocka<sup>34</sup>, K. Weyland<sup>35</sup> and others.

Taking all of this into account, our article will attempt to systematize the general theoretical/all-European works with the regional specificity of the delineation of populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe, in particular on the subject of whether the latter correspond to the former. To do this, attention will first be paid to how populism is most often understood in political science and practice and in general in the European context, and after that the specifics of the Central-Eastern Europe region will be emphasized. So, it is common knowledge that the term "populism" began to be used in the USA at the end of the 19th century, both to describe forms of political vocabulary and forms of political participation. Later, and more precisely at the end of the 20th century, it became quite obvious that populism is specifically compatible with democracy and, on the one hand, often even opposes liberal and representative

<sup>19</sup> Engler S., Pytlas B., Deegan-Krause K., Assessing the diversity of anti-establishment and populist politics in Central and Eastern Europe, *"West European Politics"* 2019, vol 42, nr. 6, s. 1310-1336.; Deegan-Krause K., Populism and the Logic of Party Rotation in Post-communist Europe, [w:] Gyárfášová O., Mesežnikov G. (eds.), *Visegrad Elections: Domestic Impact and European Consequences*, Wyd. Institute for Public Affairs 2007.

<sup>20</sup> Havlik V., Technocratic populism and political illiberalism in central Europe, *"Problems of Post-Communism"* 2019, vol 66, nr. 6, s. 369-384.

<sup>21</sup> Lytvyn V., Populistski partii u strukturi modernykh partiynykh system krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy: porivnialnyi analiz, *"Osvita rebionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii"* 2012, vol 2, s. 69-77.

<sup>22</sup> Merkel W., Scholl F., Illiberalism, populism and democracy in East and West, *"Politologický časopis – Czech Journal of Political Science"* 2018, vol 25, nr. 1, s. 28-44.

<sup>23</sup> Mesežnikov G., Gyárfášová O., *National populism in Slovakia*, Wyd. Institute for Public Affairs 2008.; Mesežnikov G., Gyárfášová O., Smilov D., *Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Institute For Public Affairs 2008.

<sup>24</sup> Mudde C., *EU Accession and a New Populist Center-Periphery Cleavage in Central and Eastern Europe*, Paper presented at the conference "Dilemmas of Europeanization: Politics and Society in Eastern and Central Europe after EU Enlargement" (Harvard University, 2003).; Mudde C., In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populism in Eastern Europe, *"East European Politics and Societies"* 2001, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 33-53.

<sup>25</sup> Orenstein M., Bugaric B., Work, family, fatherland: The political economy of populism in Central and Eastern Europe, *"Journal of European Public Policy"* 2022, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 176-195.; Bugaric B., Populism, liberal democracy, and the rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe, *"Communist and Post-Communist Studies"* 1999, vol 41, nr. 2, s. 191-203.

<sup>26</sup> Petrović V., Threats to Democracy: Measures Taken by Right-Wing Populist Regimes During the Covid-19 Crisis in Eastern Europe, *"Političke perspektive: časopis za istraživanje politike"* 2020, vol 10, nr. 2-3, s. 51-66.

<sup>27</sup> Rupnik J., Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash, *"Journal of Democracy"* 2007, vol 18, nr. 4, s. 17-25.

<sup>28</sup> Skolkay A., Populism in Central Eastern Europe, *"TWM Working Paper"* 2000, nr. 1, 20 s.

<sup>29</sup> Stanley B., Populism in Central and Eastern Europe, *"The Oxford handbook of populism"* 2017, vol 1, nr. 6, s. 140-158

<sup>30</sup> Sutey S., The populist turn in Central and Eastern Europe: is deliberative democracy part of the solution?, *"European Constitutional Law Review"* 2019, vol 15, nr. 3, s. 488-518.

<sup>31</sup> Topišek A., The political economy of populist rule in post-crisis Europe: Hungary and Poland, *"New Political Economy"* 2020, vol 25 nr. 3, s. 388-403.

<sup>32</sup> Tupy M., The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe. Big Government, Corruption, and the Threat to Liberalism, *"Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Development Policy Analysis"* 2006, nr. 1, 28 s.

<sup>33</sup> U'cen P., Parties, Populism, and Anti-Establishment Politics in East Central Europe, *"SAIS Review"* 2007, vol 27, nr. 1, s. 49-62.

<sup>34</sup> Wysocka O., *Populism in Poland*, Presented at the Fourth ECPR General Conference "The radical populist right in Eastern Europe" (ECPR, 2007).

<sup>35</sup> Weyland K., Neoliberal populism in Latin America and eastern Europe, *"Comparative politics"* 1999, vol 31, nr. 4, s. 379-401.

democracy<sup>36</sup> or, on the other hand, appears as a certain attempt at “people’s democracy”, which is based on the appeals and support of the new political elites by those voters who largely ignore the political process in the context of the crisis of legitimacy of the “old” political elite. Nevertheless, the majority of modern scientists agree that populism is contradictory in theory and in practice, which is why some scientists even state that this term should not be used in social sciences<sup>37</sup>, while other scientists point out that the concept of “populism” is after all, it gained considerable scientific popularity precisely at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries<sup>38</sup>. The main reason is that populism was not and is not limited geographically and culturally, although in some regions or in some periods we notice it in more pronounced forms or presence, etc<sup>39</sup>. In general, in particular, based on the study of an array of general theoretical scientific works, it is generally obvious that, on average, populism is a form of antagonistic political rhetoric or politics, which with extreme ease, and sometimes concretely, simplifies the existing problems and reduces them to vague and unclear solutions, which are typically is characterized by the absence of a long-term, stable and implemented political course<sup>40</sup>.

The explanation is that the populist politician presents himself as an ordinary person who understands the problems of others, in contrast to the “corrupt” elite (as this populist politician notes) who are incapable of governing and also claims that all social interests must be represented without exception, and not only the interests of certain (private) population groups. At the same time, differences between various social groups are overcome by populists with the help of a corresponding difference in political rhetoric, as a result of which populism is differentiated and appears as a systemically ambiguous phenomenon.

In particular, it is generally known that populism can be “elitist” (when it is mostly a means of obtaining and maintaining power) and “popular” (when it is a means of changing power and improving the status and rights of society)<sup>41</sup>. In addition, populism can promote pluralism and democratization in the conditions of autocratic political regimes or, instead, reveal the risks of the decline of democracy in the case of democratic political regimes, etc<sup>42</sup>. In other words, populism should always be perceived in a context-dependent manner<sup>43</sup>. Such features of the theorization of populism certainly influenced and still influence its further development, conceptualization and transformation in a certain direction, including against the background of

<sup>36</sup> Urbinati N., Democracy and Populism, “*Constellations*” 1998, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 110, 116.

<sup>37</sup> De la Torre C., The Ambiguous Meanings of Latin American Populisms, “*Social Research*” 1992, vol 59, nr. 2, s. 387.

<sup>38</sup> Boulanger C., Constitutionalism in East Central Europe? The Case of Slovakia under Meciar, “*East European Quarterly*” 1999, vol 33, nr. 1, s. 21–50.

<sup>39</sup> Lyrzyn V., Populistski partii u strukturi modernykh partiinykh system krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy: porivnialnyi analiz, “*Osvita rebionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii*” 2012, vol 2, s. 69–77.

<sup>40</sup> Lyrzyn V., Populistski partii u strukturi modernykh partiinykh system krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy: porivnialnyi analiz, “*Osvita rebionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii*” 2012, vol 2, s. 69–77.

<sup>41</sup> Laclau E., *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, Wyd. New Left Books 1977, s. 173.

<sup>42</sup> Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, “*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 200.; Hennessy A., *Latin America*, [w:] Ionescu G., Gellner E. (eds.), *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969, s. 29.

<sup>43</sup> Erlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., To define populism, “*Government and Opposition*” 1968, vol 3, s. 176–177.; Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 172.

real manifestations of populism in the world, individual regions and countries, in particular, on the example of the ideas and activities of populist politicians and parties/coalitions. Although populism itself has never been and still has not become consolidated and unidirectional, as it was determined and determined by several groups and options of political practice, and therefore of political theorizing.

As it is mentioned above, one of the main or even the main characteristics of theorizing populism from the second half of the 20th century (especially since the 1970s) is that this political phenomenon and practice is considered in a very broad context. Instead, the populism was thought about earlier mainly in a context outside of European politics, because only since the 70s and 80s of the 20th century it became a phenomenon characteristic both for the European region and for other parts of the world. However, this is precisely what revealed the paradox of the development and conceptualization of populism, at least in its classical perception, since populism at this time – from the moment of the development and growth of the importance of post-materialist values in politics – began to be thought about much more broadly than before, in particular in terms of worldview, doctrinal and in the context political practice and differences from already (for several centuries) established and constantly modified ideologies of political parties, which mainly concerned European countries.

Taking this into account, the term “populism” started to denote and define the direction and components of socio-political discussions in one or another country, although until very recently it meant almost nothing, as it was “empty” in its practical meaning and political and party-electoral content<sup>44</sup>.

Another feature of this process based on the example of European countries and mainly in general theory, was that as soon as populism entered political and doctrinal usage, it began to rapidly modify and diversify. The fact is that many political theorists and practitioners began to appeal to it, considering it to be convenient and encouraging in the expectation of party-electoral and political advantages in the future. Therefore, already in the 80s and 90s of the 20th century, populism began to play and continues to play a practical and pragmatic role in the European political process and political debates, however, the first thing in its negative perception is as a means of achieving/changing power, and only after that as a tool for improving the status and rights of society. In parallel with this, however, too narrowly, as it later became evident, populism in Europe began to be interpreted as the rhetoric of primarily right-wing, far-right politicians and political forces. And this is the main difference between European (primarily Western European) populism of the second half of the 20th century and populism in virtually all other regions and parts of the world. The manifestation of this was the fact that in the first ones “people” are not necessarily poor and disadvantaged, which cannot be said about the second ones. On the contrary, the focus of the understanding of “the people” in Western

<sup>44</sup> Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 122.

European populism, starting from the second half of the 20th century, became its identification with the “general” and ordinary people who fight against corruption, elitism, emigrants, etc.<sup>45</sup>.

Nevertheless, the general theoretical and European understanding of populism was not completed there, as its expansion continued from the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century. This was mainly demonstrated in the fact that populism began to be talked about not only in the context of right-wing or far-right parties and politicians, but also in connection with various measures and tools of demagoguery, which were quite actively used at first by some, and eventually quite a lot of European politicians. Another feature of this period was the fact that under populism came its understanding as an appeal to the “people” primarily through mass media, and not party structures. As a result, a kind of anti-party and even anti-establishment discourse of populism began to take shape. Accordingly, populism in Europe, and later generally theoretically and practically, began to be additionally perceived as measures to condemn certain systemic political elites, and often entire party/political systems, in particular due to a demagogic appeal to the “simple”/“simpler” political decisions and unfulfilled emotional promises of politicians<sup>46</sup>.

In parallel with this, populism began to refer not only to the anti-establishment discourse of individual politicians and parties, but also to the rhetoric and some positions of systemic parties, in particular their appeal to “inclusiveness” or “comprehensiveness” as a manifestation and involvement of “the people” in politics<sup>47</sup>. One of the reasons for this was the very significant weakening of the importance, ideological orientation and organizational structure of traditional parties in European countries (primarily Western Europe), including due to the emergence and spread of various issues and problems of a post-materialist content. In other words, virtually all parties in Europe became more populist and inclusive, when voters began to vote not so much for their programs (as was the case before), but for their leaders, which became the norm and practice of personalization of politics, starting from the end of the 20th century<sup>48</sup>. Accordingly, populism at this time, at least in the Ukraine, became a symptom of the design of parties’ retreat into the background or even to the margins, due to which governance began to become extremely comprehensive and aimed at the promised “interests of all”<sup>49</sup>. As a result, the theorization (but not always the practice in the understanding of the political actors themselves) of European populism, at least in the discourse and mass media, began to become negatively oriented at the end of the 20th century<sup>50</sup>. The main reason for this was that

<sup>45</sup> Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 137.

<sup>46</sup> Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 131.; Taguieff P., *Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem*, “Telos” 1995, vol 103, s. 42.

<sup>47</sup> Mudde C., *The Populist Zeitgeist*, “Government and Opposition” 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 550.; Canovan M., *The People*, Wyd. Polity Press 2005, s. 77-78.; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 87, 139.

<sup>48</sup> Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 150.

<sup>49</sup> Canovan M., *The People*, Wyd. Polity Press 2005, s. 78.; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 96.

<sup>50</sup> Van Kessel S., Bale T., Taggart P., *Thrown with abandon? Popular understanding of populism as conveyed by the print media: a UK case study*, „Acta Politica” 2011, vol 46, s. 115.



the adjective “populist” began often to be associated with the attribute of irresponsibility of the authorities and politicians<sup>51</sup>, and sometimes even with the denial of globalization processes in the world by individual politicians and political forces<sup>52</sup>.

All this was inherited by the fact that in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, populism definitely started to be realized as an anti-systemic phenomenon, at least regarding its understanding and relationship to the development of liberal, and sometimes generally, representative democracy as such. Therefore, the content and content of populism, with the exception of the USA and Latin American countries (there it was perceived positively, at least before), began to become more and more negative, since populism began to be increasingly associated with “crisis”, “erosion” or at least “dangers” democracy both in general and in individual countries and regions of the world<sup>53</sup>.

In addition, populism was constantly interpreted as a challenge and a change in the procedures of democracy, despite the fact that populism is based on the idea of “the people”, and therefore “people’s” representation. That is why, as some scientists point out<sup>54</sup>, populism should be spoken of as a “distortion” of democracy, because this phenomenon combines a specific political context, liberalism (in particular, its principle of non-intervention), anarchism and conservatism, and therefore in such a mixture it appears as a certain “rebellion” against the modern understanding of the state and political system. This is evidenced by the fact that populism is significantly different from democracy, including in the perception of “people” and “nation”. After all, these categories are not determined by solidarity with a specific group of society in populism, but they are only outlined as formal constructs that are in opposition to the political system and the existing and dominant ideas and principles<sup>55</sup>. And this is despite the fact that theorists and practitioners of populism habitually appeal to “the people” through the principles of popular sovereignty and majority<sup>56</sup>.

With this in mind, today it is quite obvious that populism, primarily in European countries, but also mainly in general theory, challenges the current democratic socio-political reality and system<sup>57</sup>, in particular due to the perception of “the people” as a homogeneous majority that counteracts or opposes the political establishment and the political elite. Even more, since populism sometimes turns not so much to anti-systemism, but to anti-partyism, which various

<sup>51</sup> Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, “*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 188.

<sup>52</sup> Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 217.

<sup>53</sup> Abts K., Rummens S., Populism versus Democracy, “*Political Studies*” 2007, vol 55, nr. 2, s.415.; Canovan M., Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy, “*Political Studies*” 1999, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 2-16.; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002.; Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 16.; Galston W., The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy, “*Journal of Democracy*” 2018, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 5-19.

<sup>54</sup> Priester K., *Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 2007, s. 48-51.

<sup>55</sup> Canovan M., Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy, “*Political Studies*” 1999, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 3.

<sup>56</sup> Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 25.

<sup>57</sup> Mudde C., The Populist Zeitgeist, “*Government and Opposition*” 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 543.; Mudde C., *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009, s. 23.; Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 3.; Abts K., Rummens S., Populism versus Democracy, “*Political Studies*” 2007, vol 55, nr. 2, s.420.; Stanley B., The Thin Ideology of Populism, “*Journal of Political Ideologies*” 2008, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 100.

politicians and parties try to instill in their voters and sympathizers<sup>58</sup>. Taking all this into account, it is quite obvious that populism in political theory and practice must be talked about as a multidimensional and multifaceted phenomenon, which is filled with several characteristics that describe different competing perspectives and options of populism as such. Among these characteristics, the following should be distinguished: personalized and paternalistic leadership; heterogeneous and multi-class/complex logic of applying the coalition to the political procession; a bottom-up process of political mobilization that bypasses institutionalized forms of representation; amorphous or eclectic ideology; use of the constructs of distributive justice and methods of clientelism<sup>59</sup>.

Somewhat different, although largely inherited from the countries of Western Europe and from the logic of the general theoretical order, the situation is inherent in other European countries, in particular in Central- Eastern Europe.

In particular, populism in some Central - Eastern European countries and contexts was previously perceived and is still positioned as the result of the electoral success of some politicians at the dawn of independence of new states and/or at the dawn of anti-communism (all these countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s century came out from under Soviet pressure). Especially, given the fact that former communist elites, who actually discredited the “new” political leaders and “new” political elites of the countries of Central - Eastern Europe, opposed these politicians in the post-communist period. Hence, populism in this sense very often came close in its spirit and postulates to conditional nationalism (at the same time repeating the primary logic of interpreting populism in the countries of Western Europe as a manifestation of right-wing and far-right ideologies), because it typically reflected the opposition of the leaders of certain nations/countries to the spirit of supranational elites. Such logic, for example, was triggered quite often in Poland during the period of L. Walesa, A. Lepper and A. Kwasniewski, in Hungary in the case of I. Churka, J. Torgyan, and today V. Orban, in Slovakia in the case of V. Meciar, in Croatia during the period of F. Tudjman, etc. That is why populism in this context, as well as in the countries of Western Europe, began to be perceived, at least by political theorists and in political discourse, mostly negatively and anti-systemically, and primarily by the former communist authorities and former political elites, already in the early 90s of the 20th century. Moreover, this was completely independent of the real political and regime consequences of populism, whether democratizing (as, for example, in Poland and Hungary) or autocratizing (as, for example, in Slovakia and Croatia, etc.).

However, over time, populism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has developed, in particular due to the inclusion on the agenda of various problems of social and political development, in particular, regarding the processes of European integration and the accession

<sup>58</sup> Taguieff P., *Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem*, “*Telos*” 1995, vol 103, s. 32, 34.; Albertazzi D., McDonnell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 21.

<sup>59</sup> Roberts K., *Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America*, “*World Politics*” 1995, vol 48, nr. 1, s. 88.

of the countries of the region to the European Union and NATO, overcoming the consequences of the global financial crisis from 2008-2009, as well as the European migration crisis from 2014-2015, etc. As a result, populism in the countries of Central Europe has acquired a whole series of features and attributes<sup>60</sup> that are regionally peculiar only to it – in contrast to the general theoretical manifestations of populism in the world and, in particular, in the countries of Western Europe. So, firstly, populism as a phenomenon and populist parties in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe, even despite their program principles and manifestos, appeal to “the people” as a whole, in contrast to the corrupt and “helpless” political elites, in which it is compared to populism in the countries of Western Europe. That is, populism as a phenomenon and populists as politicians position themselves as an alternative not to specific political parties or blocs/coalitions, but instead as an alternative to the existing representative democracy and the political system as a whole. This is evident in the fact that populists generally promise, although they do not always try to “revive” the political process and even return “substance” to it.

Secondly, populism and populists in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe (albeit to very different degrees) oppose the fundamental idea of representative democracy, in particular, against the fact that the political majority should be limited to the influence of constitutional levers. That is why the regional family of populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe is mainly majoritarian, because it is centered on the belief that the participation of the majority should be the basis for the legitimization of power and politics. As a result, this regional subtype of populism competes against ideas of minority rights. Thirdly, populism and populists in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe one way or another (mostly) see their task as changing certain elements in the system of liberal consensus, although this was more typical in the period before the countries of the region joined the European Union. This concerned primarily issues of market-oriented reforms, integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, acceptance of the idea of nationalist behavior, etc. That is why populists challenge all or at least some of these taboos, reject the political correctness of liberalism, and also appeal to the ability of citizens to discuss issues that are important for other parties as well. It is also obvious that populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe has lost its primary meaning as an ideology of agrarian radicalism, from which it was originally born, unlike in the countries of Western Europe, etc. Instead, populism as a whole in the region has become sufficiently nuanced and eclectic to claim to be an ideology in the same sense as liberalism, socialism, or conservatism. But this did not prevent the growing interest in populism from covering the main political trends in the contemporary political world of the countries of the region (as a result of which there were real political events and the reasons mentioned above), which are generally depicted by the phenomenon of the growth of democratic illiberalism<sup>61</sup>.

<sup>60</sup> Mudde C., In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populism in Eastern Europe, *“East European Politics and Societies”* 2001, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 33-53.

<sup>61</sup> Lytvyn V., Populistski partii u strukturi modernykh partiinykh system krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy: porivnialnyi analiz, *“Osvita rebionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii”* 2012, vol 2, s. 69-77.

On this basis, it can be stated that the formation of the modern format of populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe was influenced by various leading factors and indicators, among which: the type and features of the communist regime (regimes of "real socialism") in the last period of the existence of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization<sup>62</sup>; the strength and form of resistance of communism in the last period of its existence; the relative success or failure of socio-economic development in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in particular the level of GDP per capita, especially at the beginning of the transition period of development and in conditions of accelerated modernization<sup>63</sup>; readiness or unwillingness of alternative political elites to participate in the political process, including the ease of their access to communication channels; the form of participation of political actors in the first free democratic elections in the countries of the region, including election rules and alternatives; successful resolution and presence of unresolved social contradictions inherited from the previous period of historical development of the countries of the region (status of national minorities, state borders, constitutional system); the impact of the political, social and economic crisis on the stage of liberalization and consolidation of democracies in the region; peculiarities and consequences of European integration and other globalization processes in the region and the world, and therefore social and political contradictions regarding them in the political community<sup>64</sup>.

Taking into account such different factors of the development of populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe, it currently manifests itself primarily in the context of the formation and functioning of populist political parties, since it is based on the analysis of their rhetoric, manifestos and activities that we can talk about the optionality of populism as such. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that relatively "new" parties (which emerged mainly after 2000) in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe were mostly formed or are still being formed not on an ideological basis (or to a lesser extent on an ideological basis), but on the principles of pragmatic centrism, populism and opportunism. Furthermore, even the traditional parties in the region are often ideological (or at least more ideological) only during election campaigns, and instead, in inter-election periods, these parties often revert to populist identification. Most often, this manifests itself in the fact that the most electorally successful parties in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe are free from certain "ideological baggage" and use "comprehensive" electoral strategies<sup>65</sup>. At the same time, among the main features of populist parties in the countries of the region, once again, the following traditionally stand out: appeal to "the people" in general; efforts to create an alternative to representative or liberal democracy;

<sup>62</sup> Bozókai A., From Soft Communism to Post-Communism (Authoritarian Legacy and Democratic Transition in Hungary, [w:] Kovács J. (ed.), *Transition to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Transaction Publishers 1994, s. 121.

<sup>63</sup> Bruszt L., Transformative Politics: Social Costs and Social Peace in East Central Europe, [w:] Kovács J. (ed.), *Transition to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Transaction Publishers 1994, s. 103-120.

<sup>64</sup> Лытвин В., Популістські партії у структурі сучасних партійних систем країн Центральної Європи: порівняльний аналіз, "Освіта регіону: політологія, психологія, комунікації" 2012, vol 2, s. 69-77.

<sup>65</sup> Innes A., Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe: The Great Electoral Lottery, "Comparative Politics" 2002, vol 35, nr. 1, s. 90.

the conviction that the participation of the majority (despite the possibility of disregarding the rights of the minority) should be the basis for the legitimization of politics; the desire to violate the integrity of the liberal consensus system.

As a result of this, populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe from the post-communist period to the present has manifested itself in several varieties (families), among which radical left/right populism, social populism, national populism, centrist (new/latest) populism.

For example, radical left-wing populism is defined on the basis of taking into account the positioning of reformed communist and orthodox left-wing parties, which are on average anti-capitalist and focus on the possibility of an alternative political, social and economic order<sup>66</sup>. This can be best demonstrated by the example of such historical or current political forces in the countries of the region as the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Republic, the "Croatian Labor Party", and the Slovak Workers' Association. In contrast, radical right-wing populism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe combines the features of populism, nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism and typically belongs to the heritage of nationalism of the interwar period, as a result of which it consistently, albeit partially, denies transformational progress, which is most visible in the activities of such political forces in the region, as Party "Greater Romania", Slovak National Party, League of Polish Families, National Union "Attack" in Bulgaria, Croatian Civil Party, etc. In turn, social populism combines traditional agrarian and marginal anti-elitist parties that resist the influence of industrial capitalism and defend the ideas of the traditional agro-industrial sector, which is visible (or rather was visible before) from the rhetoric of such political forces in the countries of the region as "Self-defense of the Republic of Poland", People's Union of Estonia, etc<sup>67</sup>. In contrast, national populism is characterized by increased attention to the legacy of the regimes of "real socialism", moderately appeals to the interests of a mythical and idealized national community, focuses on the search for external "enemies" and "traitors" of national values, and also resorts to an authoritarian style of regulating social relations, what can be concluded from the rhetoric and activities of such political forces as "Law and Justice" in Poland, "Movement for Democratic Slovakia", "Fidesz" party in Hungary, etc. After all, centrist (new/latest) populism is conditioned by parties' evasion of various ideological commitments (as "obstacles" to democracy), appeal to "common sense" and rational solutions, denial of all previous designs and configurations of the political elite. The specificity of the "new" populist parties is that they oppose the ideas of the "outdated" political establishment, which most often serves as a tool for such political forces to achieve success in the electoral and representative dimension of their activities. Among the very famous historical and current examples of such parties in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe are "Direction is Social Democracy" in Slovakia, "Alliance for a New Citizen" in

<sup>66</sup> March L., Mudde C., What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left after 1989: Decline and Mutation, *"Comparative European Politics"* 2005, vol 3, nr. 1, s.25.

<sup>67</sup> Mudde C., In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populism in Eastern Europe, *"East European Politics and Societies"* 2001, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 33-53.

Slovakia, “New Era” in Latvia, “National Movement for Stability and Progress” and “Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria” in Bulgaria, etc.<sup>68</sup>

From this we can draw a fairly obvious conclusion that populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe (both in the post-communist period and after it) is an extremely dynamic phenomenon. The countries of the region are permanently experiencing a transition from radical or moderate forms of populist rhetoric and politics through nationalism and authoritarianism to more moderate tendencies and vice versa (especially in the case of Hungary, since 2010). This is complemented by the fact that the parties of the era of the so-called “new” or the “latest” populism mobilize voters on a significant group of issues, and this is their main difference from other populism options in the region. Even though it is possible to confirm the fact that the formation and functioning of such parties as the “Ataka” National Union in Bulgaria and the Slovak National Party in Slovakia at one time or the “Fidesz” party in Hungary marked or still mark the process of the revival of ethnocentric populism. However, the last case today is rather an exception rather than the norm. In addition, it should be noted that those new parties that oppose the old establishment are often the basis for the emergence of “pure” populism, mainly as a tool for achieving success in elections. It is also obvious that, in contrast to the radical analogues of populism of a right and left nature, which prevailed in the populism environment in the region before, centrist populism largely succeeded in repeating the success of national populism in the 1990s, in particular even attracting the support of voters and forming government cabinets. After all, some of them (in some countries) turned out to be short-lived, while others retained their positions and were included in the mainstream of the political process (in other countries) in Central - Eastern Europe.

The situation is also developed by the fact that populism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was manifested in the past and is still manifested in various forms, in particular in “soft” and “hard” ones. Instead, “soft” populism is typically understood as a challenge to the current system of representation and democracy, in particular the party system, which is based on the idea of a crisis of representativeness. The latter one, according to populist politicians and parties, turns out to be the fact that institutionalized or mainstream parties are corrupt and “cartel-like”, since they are alienated from the people and excessively ideological. Instead, by “hard” populism, we mean those manifestations that are primarily associated with anti-constitutional identifications, since such politicians and parties oppose the current system of representation and the basic principles of liberal democracy – the protection of human and citizen rights, national minorities, etc. However, this gradation of populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe is very conditional, because the dividing line between “soft” and “hard” forms of populism is blurred and can change, what is especially relevant and noticeable in the context of election campaigns. Nevertheless, the examples of “soft” populism at different times

<sup>68</sup> Лытвин В., Популістські партії у структурі сучасних партійних систем країн Центральної Європи: порівняльний аналіз, *“Освіта регіону: політологія, психологія, комунікації”* 2012, vol 2, s. 69-77.

were parties such as the “National Movement of Simeon II” and later the “National Movement for Stability and Progress” and “Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria” Direction is Social Democracy” in Slovakia, “New Era” party in Latvia, Labor Party in Lithuania, etc. Instead, the most famous examples of the “hard” form of populism in the countries of the region were or are the “League of Polish Families” and “Law and Justice” in Poland, as well as the “Fidesz” party in Hungary recently, as it was evidenced or is evidenced by their position in relation to minorities, their attempts to establish criminal responsibility for the actions of political opponents, as well as disrespect for constitutional principles and international obligations<sup>69</sup>.

As a result, the study stated that the understanding of populism in the second half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, including in general theory and in European countries never became consolidated, unified and systematized. After all, on the one hand, this phenomenon is characteristic of both democratic and non-democratic political regimes, which causes its different and changing orientation. On the other hand, populism can be perceived as a negative and positive socio-political phenomenon, although today it is traditionally and predominantly, especially in European countries, interpreted mainly negatively – primarily as a threat to representative and liberal democracy. This is complemented by the fact that the interpretation of populism differs not only from part to part or from region to region of the world, but even from country to country, and therefore it is always necessary to think about it contextually and in the plural. After all, the causes of populism can be both political and socio-economic factors, and therefore this phenomenon cannot and should not be interpreted as something integral and unified (this is especially obvious based on the development of the theory of populism in political science and practice). Instead, populism should be perceived as a heterogeneous and multifaceted phenomenon that outlines ideas, a style of behavior, optional discourse, and a way of political behavior, competitiveness and strategies of political actors and parties in the political process. Perhaps the only common denominator in this section is the awareness that populism promotes and exploits the idea of confrontation and mobilization struggle between “nation” (people) and the “oligarchy” (power or elite). Therefore, it is summed up by the scientific position, according to which populism must be differentiated in plural and in different vectors on the basis of certain criteria, in particular, taking into account its party-ideological or even extra-ideological aspects and determinants and context, and regardless of the region and country where it is operationalized.

In contrast, almost undisputed (with the exception of some countries) were the theoretical conclusions according to which: populism is specifically consistent with democracy, and in theory even contradicts it; populism depends on the specifics of development and influence of traditional party ideologies<sup>70</sup>. After all, the common denominator is that the level of

<sup>69</sup> Лютвнн V., Populistski partii u strukturi modernykh partiinykh system krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy: porivnialnyi analiz, “*Osvita rebionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii*” 2012, vol 2, s. 69-77.

<sup>70</sup> Urbinati N., Democracy and Populism, “*Constellations*” 1998, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 110-124.

development of populism in the world and, in particular, in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe, but especially in the countries of Western Europe, is largely determined by the decline of classical liberalism as such. It is also obvious that populism is not a temporary political phenomenon, because it successfully penetrates the media-centric and personalized component of the modern political process, and is also adapted to new methods of “cozying up” with voters. However, modern or new/latest typical populism is not radicalism, since in practice (especially when it manifests itself in the activities of governments led by populist parties) it mostly stops looking for an alternative to democracy, and instead somewhat modifies its ideal. This, in the case of electoral and managerial/official successes of populist parties, can be the reason for the modification of democracy, although sometimes its deconsolidation.

At the same time, it was possible to argue that in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe populism is quite specific, although it adopts most of the attributes of its counterpart in the countries of Western Europe and in general theoretically. First of all, it should be confirmed that, in general, modern populism in the analyzed region is not radicalism or extremism, since populist parties are not looking for a political alternative to representative democracy, but instead often appeal to such an ideal of democracy, which the establishment and non-populist parties consider dangerous. The previous conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the dividing line between “soft” and “hard” populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe is blurred and volatile. The fact is that since populist parties usually lack internal party structure and discipline (with the main exception of Poland and Hungary), as well as ideological cohesion, they are prone to changes in their profile. This is evident in the fact that the radical and even aggressive rhetoric of populist parties in the countries of the region is very often softened and weakened during, but mainly after, election campaigns, especially during the performance of certain official and, first of all, governmental duties by such political forces and their representatives. Very rarely, the opposite happens, in particular when populist parties become radicalized after coming to power – the formation of government cabinets – however, this is still not enough or is still taking place in some countries of Central - Eastern Europe, in particular in Slovakia in the case of the “Direction is Social Democracy” party, in Poland in the case of “Law and Justice” and in Hungary in the case of the “Fidesz” party, etc.

It is also worth noting that attribute of populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe, that the studied phenomenon is definitely not a purely post-integration phenomenon.

Although, on the contrary, after the accession of the countries of the region to the EU and NATO, the optionality and varieties of populism definitely expanded, but it did not intensify, since the ideas of some populists before the integration period regarding inflated expectations from EU membership and fatigue from long-term austerity measures in the countries of the region mostly did not come true. Perhaps the only current exception can be considered the situation in Hungary during the prime ministership of V. Orbán and the dominance of the “Fidesz” party. Hungary had already this experience in the 1990s, when “Fidesz” once dominated the



political life of this country and this period was marked by nationalist populism. This practice has been continued and significantly intensified since 2010, as a result of which Hungary has ceased to be considered a consolidated democracy, which is a direct proof of the negative relationship between populism and representative democracy. Instead, in other countries of the region, post-integration populism is also quite vividly developed, but it was typically preceded by populism of the period before joining the EU and NATO. The exception is probably only the case of Lithuania, in which populism became the main consequence of this country's entry into the listed supranational structures in 2004.

Instead, an attribute of the development of populism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was that it occupied the niche of liberal political parties, which were very popular in the early 1990s. This means that as soon as voters began to vote less for liberal political parties, which were typically centrist, then the electoral dividends, popularity and influence of various types of populist political forces and politicians increased. This happened when most of the countries of the region began to become liberal or consolidated democracies, since at that time they had sufficient conditions and grounds, as well as legal space for populist parties, in particular, regarding actions in the direction of significant democratic changes in the future. It was at this time that the populist ideas of the so-called post-democracy even began to develop in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe. This was supplemented by the fact that at various times in the countries of the analyzed region, the identification component of the parties that structured the party systems began to grow. However, this was not characteristic of the above-mentioned liberal parties, and therefore their decline resulted in the implementation of identified right-wing and left-wing strategies, from which, among other things, various (ideologically diverse) optional populism began to line up. At the same time,, populism did not emerge as a rebellion against liberalism or neo liberalism, but only paralleled its rather natural and overdue decline in the region. Perhaps the best manifestation of this was the fact that many, if not most, populist parties in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe are neoliberal in terms of their economic platforms and goals, and then additional programmatic attributes and principles are layered on top of them, including anti-egalitarianism and meritocracy, etc.

At the same time, it is quite obvious that populism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially in the current political situation in the world, is not and cannot be a short-term phenomenon without a future. The fact is that after the accession of the countries of the region to the EU and NATO, quite a lot of unforeseen and crisis events took place, which became the basis for the development of populist discourse in the world, Europe and individual countries. There are the world economic crisis from 2008-2009, the European migration crisis from 2014-2015, the Russian-Ukrainian war from 2014, but in a large-scale format from 2022, etc. among these events and factors are the world economic crisis from 2008-2009, the European migration crisis from 2014-2015, the Russian-Ukrainian war from 2014, but in a large-scale format from 2022, etc. and they definitely determined and will determine the success of regional

populism in the future. There are also general or common reasons for this, which are not always related to specific events in real politics. The fact is that politics in general has become more media-centric, digitalized and personified, and the populist parties themselves are well adapted to various types of modern communication and cozying up with voters, etc. For them, politics is very often a show, at least compared to more ideological parties. After all, the development of populism in the countries of Central - Eastern Europe will also take place due to the fact that in this region, on average, no real programmatic and ideological parties have been created, and instead, since the 1990s, political forces are often cartelized and all-encompassing, and therefore, in principle, they are characterized by an appeal not so much to a stable electorate, but to various strata of "the people", which is in the hands of populist politicians and political forces.

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## THE EUROPEAN UNION TRANSPORT POLICY: ESSENCE, PROGRESS, PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

The article analyzes the essence, stages of formation, key priorities, problems, as well as prospects for the development of the EU transport policy. It was stated that the so-called joint transport policy should be considered as a component of coordination and agreement of transport policies and processes at the level of international transport cooperation of the EU countries in general and some of them in particular. The author argued that the common transport policy of the EU (from stage to stage of its development) acquires more and more consolidated outlines, but it is still characterized by significant problems of logistical, infrastructural and political importance. It was noticed that the consolidation of the common transport policy of the EU directly depends on the level of integration of the EU members, but the former is more and more going beyond the EU. At the same time, it was recorded that the deterioration or slowing down of the development of the common transport policy of the EU occurs at the background of various crises and conflicts.

*Keywords: transport, transport policy, infrastructure, logistics, common transport policy, the EU, the EU countries.*

## POLITYKA TRANSPORTOWA UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ: ISTOTA, POSTĘP, PROBLEMY I PERSPEKTYWY ROZWOJU

W artykule przeanalizowano istotę, etapy kształtowania, kluczowe priorytety, problemy, a także perspektywy rozwoju polityki transportowej UE. Stwierdzono, że tzw. wspólna polityka transportowa powinna być traktowana jako element koordynacji i uzgadniania polityk i procesów transportowych na poziomie międzynarodowej współpracy transportowej krajów UE w ogóle, a niektórych z nich w szczególności. Autor podniósł, że wspólna polityka transportowa UE (z etapu na etap jej rozwoju) uzyskuje coraz bardziej skonsolidowane zarysy, ale nadal charakteryzuje się istotnymi problemami o znaczeniu logistycznym, infrastrukturalnym i politycznym. Zauważono, że konsolidacja wspólnej polityki transportowej UE zależy bezpośrednio od poziomu integracji członków UE, przy czym ten pierwszy coraz bardziej wykracza poza UE. Jednocześnie odnotowano, że pogorszenie lub spowolnienie rozwoju wspólnej polityki transportowej UE następuje na tle różnych kryzysów i konfliktów.

*Słowa kluczowe: transport, polityka transportowa, infrastruktura, logistyka, wspólna polityka transportowa, UE, kraje UE.*

## ТРАНСПОРТНА ПОЛІТИКА ЄС: СУТНІСТЬ, СТАНОВЛЕННЯ, ПРОБЛЕМИ І ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ РОЗВИТКУ

У статті проаналізовано сутність, етапи становлення, ключові пріоритети, проблеми, а також перспективи розвитку транспортної політики ЄС. Констатовано, що так звану спільну транспортну політику потрібно розглядати як складову координації та узгодження транспортних політик і процесів на рівні міжнародної транспортної співпраці країн ЄС загалом і деяких з них зокрема. Аргументовано, що від етапу до етапу спільна транспортна політика ЄС набуває все більш та більше консолідованих обрисів, але й досі характеризується значними проблемами логістичного, інфраструктурного і політичного значення. Помічено, що консолідованість спільної транспортної політики ЄС безпосередньо залежить від рівня інтеграції членів ЄС, однак перша все більше і більше виходить за рамки ЄС. Зафіксовано, що погіршення чи сповільнення розвитку спільної транспортної політики ЄС відбувається на тлі різноманітних криз і конфліктів.

*Ключові слова:* транспорт, транспортна політика, інфраструктура, логістика, спільна транспортна політика, ЄС, країни ЄС.

Each country of the European Union (EU), being a part of global economic processes and systems, is simultaneously or primarily a member of the EU. Therefore, the formation and development of the transport system, infrastructure and logistics in them definitely depends on the peculiarities of the transport policy of the EU as an international and supranational structure. The latter (of course not at once, but at least at the time of the study) is determined by the so-called “Common Transport Policy”, which should be considered as a component of coordination and agreement of transport policies and processes at the level of international transport cooperation of the EU countries in general and some of them in particular. Therefore, the common transport policy of the EU countries traditionally serves as an effective tool for attracting investment resources in transport logistics and infrastructure of both the EU countries and, in general, individual European countries, and therefore not only affects the development of transport systems and the transport services market in them, but also acts as one of the tools formation and development of a single economic and social space of the EU. This is primarily due to the fact that the common transport policy of the EU is aimed at the normative and legal regulation of activities of various types of transport and transportation, as well as at the regulation of combined and mixed schemes of transportation. In this context, the issue of the essence, formation, codification and consequences of the EU transport policy, as well as its impact on individual countries, requires comprehensive research attention.

The outlined topic was reflected in the writings of quite a large number of scientists who tried to understand the essence, formation and codification of the EU transport policy in various ways. In addition, it is certainly represented in legislative acts and regulations at various levels. We, in turn,

will pay more attention to the structuring and systematization of the issues identified by various researchers, on the basis of which we will try to draw a comprehensive conclusion about the impact of EU transport policy on transport logistics and infrastructure of individual EU countries.

It is stated in the works of most of the authors that the construction of the common transport policy of the EU was initiated and is taking place in view of the fact that within the framework of the EU, the regulation of transport activities belongs to the common competence of the member states of the Union. Accordingly, the initial (at the time of the formation and expansion of the EU) tasks of the common transport policy of the EU were: formation of uniform rules and regulations for transportation within the EU, to its territory and from its territory or transit transportation on the territory of EU countries; clear regulation of the activities of non-resident transport companies on the EU transport services market; increasing the safety of transport, etc. As time has shown, and what is extremely important, transport and the transport system in general have become one of the key elements of the functioning and development of the economy of each EU country. After all, with the development of economic integration, trade and transport flows have revived. In turn, there have always been and probably will remain more and more new barriers in the field of transport, and therefore the basis for first developing and then improving the common transport policy of the EU. This is how the sum of divided and diversified ("permissive") transport policies and systems of individual European countries is changing into a more consolidated transport policy of the entire EU.

It is important that the difference in views between the politicians responsible for the line of European integration and the experts responsible for the development of the transport policy of the EU and its predecessors in the European region, from the mid-1950s, became the basis for the development of the implementation of the common transport policy of the EU. The fact is that the political and expert environment itself began to realize more and more that without a well-thought-out common transport policy, it is impossible to achieve the integration goal – the creation of a full-fledged single market of goods and services<sup>1</sup>. Especially, considering that in the post-war period the volumes of transport operations between European countries were significantly lower than the corresponding indicators of internal transport for each of the European countries taken separately. This and the destroyed transport infrastructure of Europe in the late 40s and early 50s of the 20th century (as a result of the Second World War) made the issue of developing a common transport policy central to the agenda of the then existing European Economic Community. As a result of the fulfillment of this task, although taking into account the objective integration difficulties on the way to the development of a common transport policy, by the beginning of the 2000s the EU began to be characterized by developed transport logistics and infrastructure, as well as developed competition in all modes of transport.

As a result, today the EU has one of the most developed regional transport and logistics complexes in the world. In it, taking into account the relatively short transportation distances and the high density

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<sup>1</sup> Pak Y., Polyanova T., Common Transport Policy of the European Union: A Road Map for the Eurasian Economic Union, *"MGIMO Review of International Relations"* 2015, vol 3, nr 42, s. 199-209.



of roads, the first place in terms of freight traffic is firmly held by motor vehicles. After all, according to various data from the European Commission, Germany, Poland, and Spain are leading the way in freight traffic, including cabotage operations. France, Spain and Italy are in the top three in terms of the number of registered cargo and specialized vehicles. A significant share of maritime cargo traffic is carried out through the port systems of Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg. Germany, the Netherlands and Romania hold leading positions in inland waterway transport, which account for almost 80 percent of all EU inland waterway transport. As for rail transport, Germany, Poland and France are the leaders within it. In turn, Germany, Romania and Poland are leading in terms of the number of freight car fleets. Poland, Germany and France account for the largest volume of freight traffic in the EU pipeline system. As for the air transportation market, it is mostly represented by passenger transportation within the EU. At the same time, Germany and France are the leaders in the number of civil aircraft, and until recently (before Brexit) the United Kingdom, and in the number of cargo planes – Germany and Spain, as well as the United Kingdom until recently. In general, the largest EU transport hubs are Frankfurt am Main, Heathrow and Amsterdam<sup>2</sup>.

At the same time, the formation of the common transport policy of the EU was not a one-time phenomenon and step, but instead it passed through several stages of development, which largely correspond to the stages of development of the EU itself. The first and the longest stage of the development of the common transport policy of the EU (1957–1985) was due to the signing in 1957 by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg of the “Treaty of Rome” on the occasion of the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC)<sup>3</sup>, which determined the need to create a European network of canals, highways and railways as a prerequisite for the formation of a common market for the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. However, the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome was slow due to the reluctance of the EEC member states not in words, but in fact to transfer control over transport policy to supranational institutions. Such a contradiction can be explained if we take into account the “temporary horizons” of European integration inherent at that time<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, the reluctance of EEC member states to transfer part of their transport powers to the supranational level was explained by a number of reasons, among which the notion of transport as a “public service, an integral part of the national economic and social infrastructure, the responsibility for which should be borne by the state”<sup>5</sup>.

The situation with the unified transport policy began to change significantly only when it was requested by the participants of the common market, who needed to strengthen the freedom of

<sup>2</sup> Pak Y., Polyanova T., Common Transport Policy of the European Union: A Road Map for the Eurasian Economic Union, “MGIMO Review of International Relations” 2015, vol 3, nr. 42, s. 199-209.

<sup>3</sup> Shyba O., *Vplyv rozvytku transportnoi infrastruktury na ekonomichne zrostanntia krain-chleniv Yevropeiskobosoiuzu: Dysertatsiia kandydata nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017, s. 49.; Gromohlasova E., *Opyt transportnoy polityki Evrosoyuzu dlia Evrazii, “Vostochnaia Analitika”* 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.; Vidiakina M., *Instyutsiini aspekty transformatsii spilnoi transportnoi polityky ES, “Zbirnyk naukovykh prats Cherkaskoho derzhavnogo tekhnolohichnogo universytetu. Seriya: Ekonomichni nauky”* 2017, vol 1, nr. 44, s. 26-34.

<sup>4</sup> Gromohlasova E., *Opyt transportnoy polityki Evrosoyuzu dlia Evrazii, “Vostochnaia Analitika”* 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.

<sup>5</sup> Shemiatenkov V., *Evropeiskaia integratsiia*, Wyd. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 2003, s. 192.

movement of goods, services and labor within the EEC<sup>6</sup>. In particular, in 1961, the first guiding principles of the general program in the field of transport were proposed, which provided for equal treatment of carriers and consumers, freedom of action of carriers, etc.

But the EEC countries again showed no real interest in this, and therefore the transport policy continued to be nationally oriented and deterministic, and the already functioning Council of Ministers of Transport was used mainly as a forum and platform for the exchange of ideas. Although, in contrast, in 1962, under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission, the European Agreement on Road Transport was signed under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission. And already in 1963–1979, a list of priorities in the transport sector was published, which included the gradual creation of a joint transport policy, coverage of all types of transport and all markets to ensure maximum efficiency, rational development and optimal use of production factors was published<sup>7</sup>. In addition, on the basis of Directive No. 1017/68 of 1968, the application of competition rules in the fields of rail, road and inland water transport, which obliged the governments of the EEC countries to prevent the creation of dissimilar conditions for various equivalent operations with partners, placing them in competitive disadvantage was regulated. In turn, Directives No. 1191/69 and No. 1192/69 of 1969 established general rules and procedures for the payment of compensation resulting from the normalization of accounts of economic entities and reimbursement of financial costs caused by the fulfillment of obligations inherent in the concept of public services in the field of transport<sup>8</sup>.

However, the turning point in the real development of the common transport policy in Europe was the appeal of the European Parliament to the Court of the European Union in 1982. In its lawsuit, the European Parliament accused the Council of the European Union of failing to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Rome. As a result, the EEC Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and this decision obliged the EEC Council to liberalize cross-border transport in the territory of the EEC, as well as to create conditions for entrepreneurs from one EEC country to be able to participate in the provision of transport services in the territory of another EEC country<sup>9</sup>. In a short while, the publication of the “White Paper” “Completing the Formation of the Internal Market” in 1985 had the immediate consequence. She identified restrictions on the provision of transport services as a serious barrier to free trade and a violation of the terms of the Treaty of Rome, motivated the elimination of internal border controls on the transportation of goods and services, and also outlined the EU’s common transport policy as one aimed at overcoming obstacles between countries and creating of a single European transport space with fair conditions of competition for and between different modes of transport<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> Gromohlasova E., Opyt transportnoy politiki Evrosoyuzu dlia Evrazii, “*Vostochnaia Analitika*” 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.

<sup>7</sup> *Development of the common transport policy. Commission memorandum to the Council (submitted on 8 November 1971)*, Commission of the European Communities 1971, źródło: <http://aci.pitt.edu/5599/1/5599.pdf>[odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>8</sup> Shemiatenkov V., *Evropeiskaia intebratsiia*, Wyd. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 2003, s. 539-540.; Boiar A., Stukalova A., Rozvytok, suchasnyi stan ta aktualni problemy transportnoi polityky Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, “*Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky*” 2011, nr. 21 (seria: mizhnarodni vidnosyny), s. 137-142.

<sup>9</sup> Gromohlasova E., Opyt transportnoy politiki Evrosoyuzu dlia Evrazii, “*Vostochnaia Analitika*” 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.; Shemiatenkov V., *Evropeiskaia intebratsiia*, Wyd. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 2003, s. 194.

<sup>10</sup> Vidiakina M., Instytutsiini aspekty transformatsii spilnoi transportnoi polityky ES, “*Zbirnyk naukovykh prats Cherkaskoho derzhavnoho tekhnolobichnoho universytetu. Seriia: Ekonomichni nauky*” 2017, vol 1, nr. 44, s. 26-34.

Similar measures were continued at the second stage of the development of the EU's common transport policy (1985–1991), which, in turn, became a prerequisite for the adoption of a number of directives and orders during 1985–1991, in particular “CD 440/91” on the development of EU railways, “CR 3820/85” on the harmonization of legislation related to road transport and three liberalization packages (1987, 1990 and 1992) on the peculiarities of the functioning of air transport. Also during this period, transport was included in the Single European Act of 1986, which was a fundamental plan for completing the construction of the Single Internal Market. This marked the beginning of the process of liberalization of the transport services sector in Europe<sup>11</sup>. In general, the second stage of the existence of the UES was aimed at the development of the transport sector with an emphasis on sea, road and combined transport. This coincided with the processes of almost complete opening of the EU national markets of road and sea routes, as well as partial opening of railway, air and river routes. Thus, in 1985, the Convention on International Railway Transportation (adopted in 1980) was implemented, which defined uniform rules for international transportation by various modes of transport and transportation of dangerous goods, the use of infrastructure in international rail traffic, and technical standards of equipment. In turn, in 1986 four regulations were adopted in the maritime transport sector, and in 1989 a number of legal acts were proposed in the air transport sector. In 1988, an impetus was given to revitalizing the development of road transport in the EU, since the Council of Europe first abolished, but later liberalized bilateral licenses for operators<sup>12</sup>. As a result, the share and specific weight of transportation under the quotas of the EEC began to gradually grow.

The processes of creation and development of a common transport policy in Europe were much more intensified during the third stage of its development (in 1992–2000). They were concentrated in the “White Paper” adopted in 1992 on the future development of the common transport policy (“The future development of the common transport policy: a global approach to the creation of a viable transport structure of the Community”), and later in the transport development programs that were developed in 1995–2000 and 1998–2004. Based on the analysis of these documents, it is obvious that the tasks of the third stage of the development of the common transport policy of the European Union (EU) were: increasing the cohesion of the EU countries; development of complex measures for the development of already integrated economies and transport systems with the aim of strengthening economic and social cohesion and reducing differences between regions; limitation of exhaust gas emissions<sup>13</sup>.

At the same time, the key goal of the “White Paper” was the implementation of the policy on the creation and development of trans-European transport networks and the interaction of national

<sup>11</sup> Gromohlasova E., Opyt transportnoy politiki Evrosoyuza dlia Evrazii, “*Vostochnaia Analitika*” 2010, nr. 1, s. 134–145.

<sup>12</sup> *Archive of European integration*, Wyd. University of Pittsburg 2022, źródło: <http://aci.pitt.edu/view/eusubjects/H033006.html>

<sup>13</sup> *Archive of European integration*, Wyd. University of Pittsburg 2022, źródło: <http://aci.pitt.edu/view/eusubjects/H033006.html>

transport networks for this purpose<sup>14</sup>, as well as the increase of transport safety, overcoming the imbalance between different types of transport and the development of intermodal combined transport<sup>15</sup>. However, the political, institutional and budgetary foundations of the EU transport policy, outlined by the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992, became the main ones. From a purely logistical point of view, directive No. 1692/96 from 1996 on the first guidelines of the TEN-T, general recommendations played a decisive role regarding the operation of the network and transport and infrastructure projects of common importance<sup>16</sup>. Following it, in 2000, the European Parliament adopted a decision to fully open the rail transport market by the end of 2008. In addition, it was the Maastricht Treaty that regulated the concept of trans-European networks, which enabled the creation of a single transport infrastructure at the European level. In parallel, in 1994 (for the first time in European politics), 14 projects were identified and approved, which received priority European funding to fill the gaps in the European network of transport logistics and infrastructure. In turn, since 1996, attention began to be paid to the environmental problems of transport policy, since standards were approved regarding atmospheric emissions, aircraft noise levels, and minimization of fuel excise taxes. In the extended version, this was revealed on the basis of the implementation of the transport infrastructure needs assessment project since 1996, which was aimed at coordinating the development of a unified transport network in the candidate countries for EU membership, including in Central – Eastern Europe<sup>17</sup>. The idea was to coordinate infrastructure projects in these countries with those already implemented in the EU, in particular with the aim of extending the existing transport network to new EU member states in the future. The most notable consequence was the adoption in 1998 by 26 member states and candidates for EU membership of a transport network scheme that included more than 18,000 km of highways, more than 20,000 km of railways, 38 airports, 13 sea and 49 river ports<sup>18</sup>.

The improvement of the achieved results took place during the fourth stage (2001–2010) of the development of the common transport policy of the EU (in particular, before and after its expansion, in particular at the expense of the countries of Central – Eastern Europe). A feature of this period was the development and implementation of a new action program (until 2010) in the EU transport sector, primarily based on the opening of new sales markets for EU goods in the countries of Central – Eastern Europe<sup>19</sup>. It was incorporated in the “White Paper” “European transport policy

<sup>14</sup> Boiar A., Stukalova A., Rozvytok, suchasnyi stan ta aktualni problemy transportnoi polityky Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, “*Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky*” 2011, nr. 21 (seriia: mizhnarodni vidnosyny), s. 137-142.; *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on combating HIV/AIDS within the European Union and in the neighbouring countries, 2006-2009*, EUR-Lex, źródło: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52005DC0654> [odczyt: 22.10.2022], s. 194; Vidiakina M., Instytutsiini aspekty transformatsii spilnoi transportnoi polityky ES, “*Zbirnyk naukovykh prats Cherkaskoho derzhavnogo tekhnolohichnogo universytetu. Seriia: Ekonomichni nauky*” 2017, vol 1, nr. 44, s. 26-34.

<sup>15</sup> Shemiatenkov V., *Yevropeiskaia intelmatsiia*, Wyd. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 2003, s. 541-542.

<sup>16</sup> Vidiakina M., Instytutsiini aspekty transformatsii spilnoi transportnoi polityky ES, “*Zbirnyk naukovykh prats Cherkaskoho derzhavnogo tekhnolohichnogo universytetu. Seriia: Ekonomichni nauky*” 2017, vol 1, nr. 44, s. 26-34.

<sup>17</sup> Boiar A., Stukalova A., Rozvytok, suchasnyi stan ta aktualni problemy transportnoi polityky Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, “*Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky*” 2011, nr. 21 (seriia: mizhnarodni vidnosyny), s. 137-142.

<sup>18</sup> Filipenko O., *Pravovyi mekhanizm rehuliuвання spilnoi transportnoi polityky Yevrosoiuzu: Dysertatsiia kandydata nauk*, Wyd. Instytut mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn Kyivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Tarasa Shevchenka 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Shyba O., *Vplyv rozvytku transportnoi infrastruktury na ekonomichne zrostannia krain-chleniv Yevropeiskoho soiuzu: Dysertatsiia kandydata nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017, s. 56.

until 2010: time for decisions” (in which more than 60 reform measures of the common transport policy were proposed), published in 2001, as well as in the adopted in 1999 Regulation no. 1655/99 for the period from 2000 to 2006. These documents provided for many changes in EU financing of various transport, infrastructure and logistics projects, including in new EU member states<sup>20</sup>. Thus, the “White Paper” formulated such main tasks of EU transport policy as: changing the balance between different types of transport; user orientation of transport policy; receiving the effect of the globalization of transport. To achieve them, such areas of transport policy were defined as: mobility of the population and enterprises throughout the EU; environmental protection, energy security, protection of passengers and citizens; innovations<sup>21</sup>. In turn, in 2004–2006, the next step in the reform of the EU transport policy took place, which consisted in the adoption of directives No. 807/2004, 884/2004 and 1791/2006 aimed at revising the guiding principles of its implementation, increasing the number of priority projects to 30, taking into account the expansion of the EU, defining horizontal projects in traffic management, improving the functioning of railway networks, stimulating the development of maritime and inland transport<sup>22</sup>.

Also during this period, in particular in 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was adopted, which states that on the basis of the contractual preambles of the modern EU transport policy, the European Council together with the European Parliament established: general rules for international transport operations carried out from the territory or directed to the territory of an EU country or cross the territory of one or more EU countries; conditions under which non-residents providing transport services can provide them on the territory of EU countries; measures to improve transportation safety<sup>23</sup>.

It is regulated that the Lisbon Treaty was to be applied to transport by road, rail and inland waterways, but the European Council can extend these provisions to the sphere of sea and air transport by qualified majority.

As a result, this led to a situation where within the framework of the EU (already in its expanded version) the main documents regulating the functioning of the transport system were the “Treaty on the EU” and the “Treaty on the Functioning of the EU”<sup>24</sup>, which, among other things, are framework documents in the field of transport law. These documents established that EU countries are prohibited from taking any actions in the transport sector that lead to discrimination or violation of competition rules without the permission of the European Commission. It is also noteworthy that in 2009 the “Green Book” “Towards an integrated trans-European transport network at the service of common transport policy”, in which the expediency of the transformation of the two-level policy system of the

<sup>20</sup> Boiar A., Stukalova A., Rozvytok, suchasnyi stan ta aktualni problemy transportnoi polityky Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, “*Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky*” 2011, nr. 21 (seriia: mizhnarodni vidnosyny), s. 137-142.; Filipenko O., *Pravovyi mekhanizm rehuliuuvannia spilnoi transportnoi polityky Yevrosoiuzu: Dysertatsiia kandydata nauk*, Wyd. Instytut mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn Kyivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Tarasa Shevchenka 2004.

<sup>21</sup> Musys N., *Vse pro spilni polityky Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu*, Kyiv 2005.

<sup>22</sup> Vidiakina M., Instytutsiini aspekty transformatsii spilnoi transportnoi polityky ES, “*Zbirnyk naukovykh prats Cherkaskoho derzhavnogo tekhnolohichnoho universytetu. Seriia: Ekonomichni nauky*” 2017, vol 1, nr. 44, s. 26-34.

<sup>23</sup> Gromohlasova E., Opyt transportnoy politiki Evrosoyuzu dlia Evrazii, “*Vostochnaia Analitika*” 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.

<sup>24</sup> *Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Part Three: Union Policies and Internal Actions. Title VI: Transport*, EUR-Lex, źródło: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E091> [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

trans-European transport network “TEN-T” is substantiated and transition from individual priority projects to basic and key networks, was published. Almost in parallel, in particular in 2010, consultations continued on the future policy of the trans-European transport network, which culminated in the adoption of the “Europe 2020” strategy aimed at in-depth coordination and concentration on projects with a high level of added value, development of innovative financing tools, simplification of access to the capital market, etc.

In addition, the common transport policy of the EU is aimed at solving the problem of overcrowding of road and air routes and freight and passenger transport. An additional challenge for the EU during this period is the dependence of its transport system on oil and gas energy carriers, since until now the majority of all vehicles in Europe depend on oil reserves for their energy needs, which are constantly decreasing. At the same time, at the EU supranational level, it is regulated that by 2050, the Union must reduce harmful transport emissions by 60 percent compared to the level of 1990. This proves that the common transport policy of the EU has reached a transitional or even turning point in its development. On the one hand, it uses previously accepted and implemented rules. On the other hand, its development depends on multimodal transportation, increasing competition, efficiency, speed of movement and passenger comfort, improving the quality of services, and reducing the harmful impact on the environment. In this context, it is obvious, especially after the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, as well as after the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022, that the improvement of the EU's common transport policy is significantly politicized by individual members of the Union.

Therefore, the future of the common EU policy in the field of transport largely depends on the political will of the EU countries themselves, their desire, ability and expediency to solve problems together and properly finance the transport industry at all levels, and recently, most of all, regarding the transportation of oil and gas energy carriers, etc. Nevertheless, as of the moment of the analysis, the common transport policy of the EU is still the one that took place, since it is integratively aimed at solving such problems as ensuring high efficiency, market competitiveness and safety of transport services, reducing the load on the transport infrastructure, developing interaction and changing the ratio between different types of transport, etc<sup>25</sup>. Their result was and continues to be the introduction of technical innovations and the attraction of significant amounts of investment, although still with unresolved problems of overloading of transport networks, environmental pollution and insufficient diversification.

From a political and legal point of view, the fifth stage of the development of the common transport policy of the EU is determined by the sequence of events and acts peculiar to the Union. For example, in 2011, the “White Paper” “A Plan for the Development of the Unified Transport Space on the Way to a Competitive and Resource-Efficient Transport System” was adopted<sup>26</sup>,

<sup>25</sup> Orlova V., Yevropeiska transportna polityka: Oriientyry dlia zaliznychnoho transportu Ukrainy, “*Visnyk ekonomiky transportu i promyslovosti*” 2010, nr. 31, s. 52-56.

<sup>26</sup> *White paper: Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system*, EEA, źródło: <https://www.eea.europa.eu/policy-documents/roadmap-to-a-single-european>[odczyt: 22.10.2022].

which regulates the need to develop a financing mechanism taking into account the specifics of the “TEN-T” program, structural funds and the fund grouping, and measures to preserve the environment are also provided<sup>27</sup>. As a result of this, since 2013, on the basis of Directive No. 1315/2013 on the guiding principles of the development of the trans-European transport network, the EU began to implement an updated policy for the development of the trans-European transport network, the main feature of which is a systemic pan-European network approach with a common set of rules for creation and financing of a network based on nine multimodal corridors in the basic network<sup>28</sup>. This approach is based on the active participation of regions in order to ensure more effective interaction. In the same 2013, Luxembourg adopted a joint declaration “Future cooperation in the field of transport within the framework of the Eastern Partnership”, which approved maps of the regional transport network of the “Eastern Partnership”, which demonstrate the combination of the “Partnership” countries with each other and with EU member states.

Adopted in December 2013, the “TEN-T” guidelines outlined the networks to be created, defined technical requirements and established priority directions, in particular, regarding the elimination of differences in the infrastructure of EU countries, improvement of multimodal connections between different types of transport, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from transport<sup>29</sup>. At the same time, in 2014, as part of the “Budget for Europe 2020”, the amount of investments in the trans-European transport network for the period 2014-2020 was regulated in the amount of 540 billion Euros. Subsequently, in July 2016, within the framework of the mission of representatives of the European Commission, reforms in the transport sector and the priorities of the updated transport strategy were discussed. There was a discussion on priority infrastructure projects with the aim of building the regional key and basic transport network, European financing instruments and prospects for attracting financing through the “Connecting Europe” tool<sup>30</sup>. The new policy also began to pay attention to relations with third countries, such as Switzerland, Norway and Turkey. It is also noteworthy that, after agreements at the political level, the European Commission in 2016 decided to expand the Trans-European transport network at the expense of the Western Balkan countries, opening opportunities for financing projects that are in the focus of mutual interest and contribute to the improvement of connections<sup>31</sup>.

It was thereby regulated that the EU transport network consists of basic and key networks, the completion of which is planned for 2030 and 2050, respectively. These two levels of the transport

<sup>27</sup> Inshakova A., Printsipy pravovogo obespecheniya svobod obshchego rynka v transportnoy politike ES, “Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta” 2012 (Yuridicheskie nauki), vol 17, nr. 3: *Transport statistics introduced*, Eurostat, August 2020, źródło: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Transport\\_statistics\\_introduced](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Transport_statistics_introduced)[odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>28</sup> Vidiakina M., Instyutitsiini aspekty transformatsii spilnoi transportnoi polityky ES, “Zbirnyk naukovykh prats Cherkaskoho derzhanoho tekhnolobichnogo universytetu. Seriya: Ekonomichni nauky” 2017, vol 1, nr. 44, s. 26-34.

<sup>29</sup> *Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU Text with EEA relevance*, EUR-Lex, źródło: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013R1315>[odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>30</sup> Pape M., *The trans-European transport network – state of play*, European Parliamentary Research Service 2020, źródło: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS\\_BRI\(2020\)659430](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2020)659430)[odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>31</sup> *Connectivity Agenda: Co-financing of Investment Projects in the Western Balkans in 2016*, Wyd. European commission 2016, źródło: [https://www.transport-community.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Connectivity-Agenda\\_Paris-2016.pdf](https://www.transport-community.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Connectivity-Agenda_Paris-2016.pdf)[odczyt: 22.10.2022].

system cover all types of transport and their interconnection, as well as relevant information about the road environment and system management. The basic network is designed to ensure the accessibility and connectivity of all EU regions and consists of the most strategically important links and nodes, organized into nine corridors and two horizontal priorities ("European Rail Transportation Management System" and "Maritime Motorways"). It should connect more than 90 major European ports with rail and road connections, almost 40 key airports with rail connections in major cities, 15,000 km of railway track upgraded to high speed, and 35 cross-border projects to reduce bottlenecks<sup>32</sup>. At the same time, each corridor covers three types of transport, several EU countries and border areas.

Among them: 1) Baltic-Adriatic corridor (Poland, Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Italy); 2) the North Sea-Baltic corridor (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium); 3) the Mediterranean corridor (Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary); 4) the East-Mediterranean corridor (Germany, the Czech Republic, and Southeast Europe); 5) Scandinavian-Mediterranean corridor (Finland, Sweden, Germany, Austria, Italy, Malta); 6) Rhine-Alps corridor (Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy); 7) Atlantic corridor (France); 8) the Northern-Mediterranean corridor (Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France); 9) Rhine-Danube corridor (France, Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine)<sup>33</sup>.

In addition, in 2016, the European Commission published the communication "European low-emission mobility strategy", in which it continued to intensify measures to accelerate the decarbonization of European transport. The strategy is primarily aimed at achieving zero emissions, as stated in the "White Paper" "Plan for the Development of a Unified Transport Space – Towards a Competitive and Resource-Efficient Transport System"<sup>34</sup>, in particular, with the aim of achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement of 2015 – an agreement within the framework of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change on the regulation of measures to reduce carbon dioxin emissions from 2020. Against this background, in 2017 the European Parliament, in its resolution on a European strategy for low-emission mobility, emphasized the need for the transport sector to make a greater contribution to the achievement of climate goals. In this context, it emphasized, among other aspects, the need for investment in multimodality and public transport; the need to strengthen price signals by all modes of transport; the importance of digitization in the development of sustainability and mobility in transport. The European Parliament also called for a more ambitious approach to renewable energy sources in transport, as well as the creation of incentives for the use of environmentally friendly alternative fuels for

<sup>32</sup> Pape M., *The trans-European transport network – state of play*, European Parliamentary Research Service 2020, źródło: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS\\_BRI\(2020\)659430](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2020)659430)[odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>33</sup> Vidiakina M., Instytutsiini aspekty transformatsii spilnoi transportnoi polityky ES, "Zbirnyk naukovykh prats Cherkaskoho derzhavnogo tekhnolobichnogo universytetu. Seriya: Ekonomichni nauky" 2017, vol 1, nr. 44, s. 26-34.

<sup>34</sup> *White paper: Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system*, EEA, źródło: <https://www.eea.europa.eu/policy-documents/roadmap-to-a-single-european>[odczyt: 22.10.2022].



different types of transport<sup>35</sup>. A much more recent step was the adoption and publication by the European Commission in December 2020 of the “Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy” along with a plan of actions and initiatives until 2024<sup>36</sup>. This strategy is a road map to put European transport on the “right” path to a sustainable and smart future in various leading sectors.

According to the expected and projected plans, as well as under the condition of combining the appropriate level of ambition and proposed political measures, harmful emissions from transport can be reduced by 90 percent by 2050. Similarly, the European Parliament in January 2020 adopted a resolution on the “European Green Deal”, putting forward some directions for the development of transport under the name “Accelerating the transition to sustainable and smart mobility”<sup>37</sup>.

At the same time, the situation began to change even further in other directions, in particular, the aftermath of the outbreak of COVID-19 and its impact on transport. Thus, in June 2020, the European Parliament adopted a resolution entitled “Transport and tourism in 2020 and beyond”<sup>38</sup>, calling for quick, short-term and long-term support for the transport and tourism sectors to ensure their survival and competitiveness in the situation that has developed in the world. In this context, other relevant acts aimed at combating the immediate negative consequences of the pandemic for the EU transport sector were adopted. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic has become a reminder of the importance of the functioning of transport networks and efficiently organized mobility for citizens, businesses and economic prosperity in the EU and its individual countries. Moreover, the pandemic has highlighted the value of uninterrupted transportation systems during a crisis, including protecting supply chains in crisis situations and providing food and medicine, etc. The reverse side of the medal, also against the background of the pandemic, became the processes of further digitization and digitization of transport logistics and infrastructure in the EU. Yes, we are talking about the financial regulation “Mechanism of connecting Europe”, which “paves” the way to the process called “TEN Streamlining” and consists in the expansion of multimodal corridors throughout the EU. In particular, the main networks are planned to be completed by 2030, including so that passengers can travel through different cities and countries with one ticket and as few transfers as possible. This is possible, among other things, thanks to the intellectual interaction between individual modes of transport, i.e. through increasing their efficiency and preserving the environment. On the

<sup>35</sup> *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards the broadest use of alternative fuels – an Action Plan on Alternative Fuels Infrastructure under Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/94/EU, including the assessment of national policy frameworks under Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/94/EU*, EUR-Lex, źródło: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0652&qid=1556634455269> [odczyt: 22.10.2022]; *European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2018 on deployment of infrastructure for alternative fuels in the European Union: Time to act!*, EUR-Lex, źródło: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018IP0438> [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>36</sup> *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting European transport on track for the future*, EUR-Lex, źródło: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:789:FIN> [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>37</sup> *European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal*, EUR-Lex, źródło: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52020IP0005> [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>38</sup> *European Parliament resolution of 19 June 2020 on transport and tourism in 2020 and beyond*, EUR-Lex, źródło: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52020IP0169> [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

other hand, such innovativeness should contribute to the growth of European integration and ensure the global competitiveness of the EU.

Along with this, in the last few years, the situation in the transport market has been changed by significant political or global factors. First, the EU got rid of one of its former members, the United Kingdom.

As a result, in July 2021, in accordance with Regulation No. 2021/1153 ("Connecting Europe Mechanism 2"), 9 corridors of the core network were partially modified, in particular, on the one hand, some corridors were significantly expanded (for example, when it comes to the Atlantic, Northern-Baltic, Scandinavian-Mediterranean), or, on the other hand, other corridors were transformed (in particular, the Northern-Mediterranean, which after "Brexit" changed to Ireland-Belgium-Netherlands and Ireland-France). Even more, since there have been proposals recently from the European Commission regarding the new Regulation on the TEN-T guidelines, according to which it is possible to cancel some corridors of the main network in the future (among them: the Eastern-Mediterranean and the Northern-Mediterranean), and instead, their integration into other corridors (Rhine–Danube, North Sea–Alpine) and creation of new coordinated corridors (Baltic–Black–Aegean Sea, Western Balkans)<sup>39</sup>. As for the expansion of the corridors to the east (as part of the "Eastern Partnership"), the Trans-European transport network reached Armenia as early as 2019. However, the situation in this direction will obviously change significantly as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which became large-scale in February 2022<sup>40</sup>. It will most likely concern the suspension of the development of transport corridors to the east in the future, and it also concerns the diversification of the transportation of oil and gas energy carriers<sup>41</sup>.

In general, in particular, based on the results of political and legal changes during 2011–2022 and the analysis of the updated policy of building the trans-European transport network, it was established that the EU's attention was gradually switched from individual projects to programs aimed at creating the main network of strategic corridors, which connecting east and west and all corners of the large European geographical region. Accordingly, the East-West connection has become the main priority of the new infrastructure and transport policy of the EU. This is evident at least in the fact that most corridors should have or already have a real "east-west" dimension. Moreover, a significant part of these corridors crosses or touches the transport and infrastructure-logistics system of the countries of the Visegrad Group – Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Therefore, the development of the "TEN-T" program and the common transport policy of the EU in general is designed to eliminate narrow transport passages

<sup>39</sup> *Questions and Answers: The revision of the TEN-T Regulation*, European Commission, 14 December 2021, źródło: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda\\_21\\_6725](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_6725) [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>40</sup> *Russia's war on Ukraine: Implications for transport*, Think Tank European Parliament 2022, źródło: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS\\_BRI\(2022\)733536](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733536) [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>41</sup> *How the War in Ukraine Transforms European Logistics and Affects Prices*, Well Pack 2022, źródło: <https://wellpack.org/how-the-war-in-ukraine-transforms-european-logistics-and-affects-prices/> [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

in a united Europe and contribute to the solution of not only direct transport tasks, but also to serve social and environmental goals and socio-economic development in Europe<sup>42</sup>.

At the same time, after analyzing the state of affairs in the transport and logistics complex of the EU and generally determining the essence of the phenomenon of the unified transport policy of the EU, it is advisable to understand the fact that the transport system of the EU is still a collection of different types of transport<sup>43</sup>. The order with the development of different types of transport and different directions of transport policy in the EU, it was noticed that initially the efforts of supranational institutions were aimed mainly at the liberalization of the transport market on all types of transport, and later completely new and additional issues became on the agenda, in particular, increasing safety and reducing harmful impact on the environment, diversification of supplies, etc. This means that the EU began to develop common standards for the safety and environmental friendliness of transport. Accordingly, the sustainable development and construction of trans-European transport networks have become the new priorities of the EU's common transport policy. For example, in 2001, as already mentioned above, the European Commission published a "White Paper", which emphasized the need to improve transport safety and the harmonious development of all its types<sup>44</sup>. The development of river transport, as well as railway and sea transport, according to the "White Paper", is intended to contribute to the reduction of traffic congestion, which, compared to other types of transport, has the most tangible negative impact on the environment. The development of river transport, as well as railway and sea transport, according to the "White Paper", is intended to contribute to the reduction of traffic congestion, which, compared to other types of transport, has the most tangible negative impact on the environment. This is regulated since after the liberalization of the market of transport services, there appeared conditions for the development of a common (united from national systems) transport infrastructure of the macro-region of European integration. At the same time, it was established that the updated infrastructure should be safe and sustainable from an environmental point of view. In recent decades, precisely such tasks have been implemented with the help of the so-called "communitarian transport agencies" – new authorities with varying degrees of supranational authority.

It is noteworthy that the use of agencies has become a new method for the EU to perform its functions, as European agencies support the decision-making process by gathering technical and other expert knowledge on one or another issue. There are two types of agencies in the EU. Executive agencies are established in accordance with the Regulation of the European Council No. 58/2003 and contribute to the implementation of communitarian programs. Along with this, since the 1990s, agencies have been operating in the EU with functions focused on tasks of a technical or scientific nature. Along with this, since the 1990s, agencies have been operating in the EU with functions focused on tasks of a technical or scientific nature. These agencies are called regulatory, decentralized

<sup>42</sup> Boiar A., Stukalova A., Rozvytok, suchasnyi stan ta aktualni problemy transportnoi polityky Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, "Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky" 2011, nr. 21 (seriia: mizhnarodni vidnosyny), s. 137-142.

<sup>43</sup> Gromohlasova E., Opyt transportnoy politiki Evrosoyuza dlia Evrazii, "Vostochnaia Analitika" 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.

<sup>44</sup> White Paper: European transport policy for 2010: Time to decide. The need for integration of transport in sustainable development, EEA, źródło: <https://www.eea.europa.eu/policy-documents/white-paper-european-transport-policy> [odczyt: 22.10.2022], s. 136.

and independent. Each of the regulatory agencies is established according to a separate regulation that defines the institutional structure of sectoral regulation.

The existing EU transport agencies (such as the European Aviation Safety Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency and the European Railway Agency) belong to this type of agency<sup>45</sup>.

On the basis of the experience of their functioning, it is worth summarizing that the process of emergence of a complex and not so much a national-territorial, as a spatial-functional structure of regulation of the transport industry in the EU has one extremely significant effect. This is the effect of the regulatory activity "exiting" the natural boundaries of the area of European integration<sup>46</sup>. The fact is that the more supranational powers are concentrated in a specific EU agency, the greater its degree of autonomy relative to the political level of the EU, which includes both supranational institutions and national governments. The EU countries themselves (assembled in the European Council), along with the European Parliament, have added special powers to EU agencies, regarding which there is a consensus in the EU that these powers are technical. Therefore, transport agencies seem to be "free" and autonomous from political interference, because they do not depend on political institutions of any level of the EU. Therefore, they must arrive at objective decisions. However, the paradox is that the activities of European transport agencies in relation to operators from third countries can affect the interests of not only specific companies, but also state interests in general. Accordingly, in such a case, it is difficult to resolve conflicts at the level of bilateral political interaction with the EU, because EU agencies occupy a special place in its institutional structure and are formally independent of political interference. This means that EU agencies are new and independent actors in the international arena, but the EU itself is not always able to regulate the international activities of its own agencies<sup>47</sup>. As a result, along with active participation in the development and implementation of internal EU transport policy, various EU structures are also involved in wider international cooperation aimed at the development of transport services and optimization of their use.

In other words, the external dimension of the EU's internal policy is expressed in the promotion at the international level of those norms that were developed to regulate the single internal market of transport services. In response to this, a number of states follow the strategy of "being involved" in the integration processes within the EU, but this strategy consolidates their peripheral position. Hence, the path of Europeanization is often threatened by the loss of the role of an alternative regional leader<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>45</sup> Gromohlasova E., Opyt transportnoy politiki Evrosoyuza dlia Evrazii, "Vostochnaia Analitika" 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.; *Report on the European Road Safety Action Programme: Halving the number of road accident victims in the European Union by 2010: A shared responsibility*, European Parliament Committee on Transport and Tourism 2005, źródło: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-6-2005-0225\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-6-2005-0225_EN.html) [odczyt: 22.10.2022].

<sup>46</sup> Gromohlasova E., Opyt transportnoy politiki Evrosoyuza dlia Evrazii, "Vostochnaia Analitika" 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.

<sup>47</sup> Beck U., *Risikogesellschaft auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*, Frankfurt am Main 1986, s. 300-305; Gromohlasova E., Opyt transportnoy politiki Evrosoyuza dlia Evrazii, "Vostochnaia Analitika" 2010, nr. 1, s. 134-145.

<sup>48</sup> *European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013*, European Union External Action, 19.08.2016, źródło: [https://www.ecas.europa.eu/node/8461\\_en](https://www.ecas.europa.eu/node/8461_en) [odczyt: 22.10.2022].; Cowles G., Caporaso M., Risse T., *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Wyd. Ithaca 2001.; Hix S., Goetz K., Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems, "West European Politics" 2000, vol 23, nr. 4, s. 1-26; Knill C., Lehmkuhl D., The national impact of European Union regulatory policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms, "European Journal of Political Research" 2002, vol 41, nr. 2, s. 255-280.

On the other hand, EU norms are in many ways progressive and useful for individual or other states, including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, due to which the task of developing the foundations of equal partnership instead of mechanical involvement in external supranational governance does not lose its relevance. This determines that the trend of Europeanization of transport regulation outside the EU can be explained taking into account the innovations in the organizational design of the common transport policy of the EU countries. Nevertheless, the growing importance of network forms of cooperation of national authorities on an integration scale and the emergence of European regulatory agencies collectively changed the practice of supranational governance, because the act of delegation of powers ceased to be the only reason for participation in the implementation of the integration agenda.

Other problems of the EU's common transport policy are often considered to be: the situation of railways as a political tool that needs protection and the related need for state intervention in the functioning of the transport market; the degree of autonomy of transport enterprises in the sphere of formation of tariffs; exclusively temporary prospects for the liberalization of international transportation within the EU; inadequate level of harmonization of competition conditions both between modes of transport and within individual types of transport; irresponsibility of the European Commission for the planning and implementation of international infrastructure projects in the field of transport; non-harmonization of some technical standards<sup>49</sup>; traffic congestion in some areas and directions, primarily highways; transport accident; fear of harmful effects on the environment, public health and climate change; excessive consumption of non-renewable resources; social dissatisfaction as a consequence of the constant support of the infrastructure at the expense of drivers as a result of the dispute about the acceptance or rejection of the concept of infrastructure fees<sup>50</sup>.

In addition, one of the main obstacles to the formation of a unified EU transport policy remains the conflict between two trends: the harmonization of competition conditions and the liberalization of market access and pricing. Trying to solve this issue, the Council of Ministers of the EU invariably comes to a dead end, because the measures proposed by the Commission aimed at liberalization are constantly rejected due to the fact that the level of harmonization of competition conditions is insufficient.

Moreover, in recent years in Europe, a tendency towards disproportionately rapid development of road transport to the detriment of other types of transport, first of all railways, has been sharply manifested. Hence, the process of transferring the bulk of transportation to road transport is associated with a change in the nature of transported goods, which led to a change in customer requirements for carriers. On the other hand, the disproportionately rapid development of road transport has led to a number of other problems, in particular environmental problems, which are of great importance in

<sup>49</sup> Mishchenko M., Problemy formuvannya zahalnoievropeiskoi transportnoi polityky, *"Viznyk Dnipropetrovskoho natsionalnogo universitetu zaliznychnoho transportu im. akademika V. Lazariana"* 2009, vol 29, s. 262-267.; Inshakova A., Osnovnyetendentsii razvitiia sovremennoi politiki v oblasti transportnogo prava Evropeyskogo Soyuza, *"Transportnoe pravo. Mezhdunarodnoe, publichnoe i chastnoe pravo"* 2006, vol 28, nr. 1, s. 7-12.

<sup>50</sup> Inshakova A., Printsypy pravovoho obespecheniya svobod obshcheho rynka v transportnoy politike ES, *"Vestnik Permskogo Uryversiteta"* 2012 (Yuridicheskie nauki), vol 17, nr. 3.

Europe<sup>51</sup>. Hence, the main ways of solving the problems of the EU's common transport policy are still, paradoxically, strengthening competition both between modes of transport and between individual companies from different EU countries, etc.

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<sup>51</sup> Mishchenko M., Problemy formuvannya zahalnoievropeiskoi transportnoi polityky, "Visnyk Dnipropetrskogo natsionalnoho universitetu zaliznychnogo transportu im. akademika V. Lazariana" 2009, vol 29, s. 262-267.

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## **SPECIFICS, TRENDS MODELS AND EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM OF URBAN TRANSPORT IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE REGIMES OF „REAL SOCIALISM”**

The article deals with analyzing the historical trends and political/socio-economic preconditions for the formation and reformation of urban transport and urban transportations in the Visegrad Group countries – Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – firstly in the communist and post-communist periods and later after the European integration of the region. On this basis, the specifics, trends, models and effects of the development of urban transportations in the Visegrad Group countries for the entire period after the collapse of the regimes of “real socialism” have been clarified. It has demonstrated that currently urban transportations, in particular due to their incomplete reformation or involvement, are not at the appropriate level to overcome the existing modal split between road and rail transport in the Visegrad Group countries, even in spite of the fact that the countries of the region had tested different models of development and reformation of their urban transport.

*Keywords: transport, infrastructure, urban transport, urban transportation, Visegrad Group countries.*

## **SPECYFIKA, TRENDY, MODELE, EFEKTY ROZWOJU I REFORMY TRANSPORTU MIEJSKIEGO W KRAJACH GRUPY WYSZEHRADZKIEJ PO UPADKU REŻIMÓW „REALNEGO SOCJALIZMU”**

W artykule przeanalizowano trendy historyczne oraz uwarunkowania polityczne i społeczno-gospodarcze kształtowania i reform komunikacji miejskiej w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej: w Polsce, na Węgrzech, w Słowacji i w Czechach – najpierw w okresie komunistycznym i postkomunistycznym oraz później po integracji europejskiej. Na tej podstawie doprecyzowano specyfikę, trendy, modele i skutki rozwoju transportu miejskiego w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej w całym okresie po upadku reżimów „realnego socjalizmu”. Ustalono, że obecnie transport miejski, w szczególności ze względu na jego niepełną reformę nie jest na odpowiednim poziomie, aby przewyższyć istniejący podział modalny między transportem drogowym i kolejowym w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, mimo że kraje regionu testowały różne modele rozwoju i reformy transportu miejskiego.

*Słowa kluczowe: transport, infrastruktura, transport miejski, kraje Grupy Wyszehradzkiej.*

## СПЕЦИФІКА, ТРЕНДИ, МОДЕЛІ Й ЕФЕКТИ РОЗВИТКУ ТА РЕФОРМУВАННЯ МІСЬКИХ ПЕРЕВЕЗЕНЬ У КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ ПІСЛЯ КОЛАПСУ РЕЖИМІВ «РЕАЛЬНОГО СОЦІАЛІЗМУ»

У статті проаналізовано історичні тренди й політичні і соціально-економічні передумови становлення й реформування міського транспорту і міських перевезень в країнах Вишеградської групи – Польщі, Угорщині, Словаччині та Чехії – спочатку в комуністичний і посткомуністичний періоди, а згодом після європейської інтеграції країн регіону. На цій підставі загалом з'ясовано специфіку, тренди, моделі та ефекти розвитку міських перевезень у країнах Вишеградської групи за увесь період після колапсу режимів «реального соціалізму». Встановлено, що поточно міські перевезення, зокрема внаслідок своєї неповної реформованості або задіяності, не є на належному рівні, щоб подолати існуючий модальний розкол між автомобільним і залізничним транспортом у країнах Вишеградської групи, навіть попри те, що країни регіону апробували різні моделі розвитку та реформування свого міського транспорту.

*Ключові слова:* транспорт, інфраструктура, міський транспорт, міські перевезення, країни Вишеградської групи.

It is common knowledge that the current state of development of the transport system and infrastructure in the Visegrad countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia previously depended and still depends on historical trends and political and socio-economic preconditions of their formation and reforming, first communist and later in post-communist periods. However, each country in the region, due to the specific time and circumstances of the epoch-making changes, has its own history of political, socio-economic and systemic transformations into a democratic and market society, which, nevertheless, in the framework of the transition from the regimes of "real socialism" to post-communism, and later the European integration of the Visegrad countries were summed up and imitated by a number of qualitative and quantitative changes of political-institutional and socio-economic nature. The latter finally determined the specific preconditions and features of the development, **transit** and modernization of the transport system and infrastructure in the region. The issue of specifics, trends and effects of development and reform of urban transport within the transport system in the Visegrad countries is no exception in this context, in particular during the period from the collapse of the regimes of "real socialism" to European integration and up to this day, which actually actualizes the presented scientific research.

The stated topic is not very developed in the social sciences, because the vast majority of research literature focuses on the parameters of the development of road and rail transport, as

well as passenger and freight traffic in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in general, and in particular the Visegrad Group countries after the collapse of the regimes of "real socialism". However, some scientific and analytical developments in the stated direction still exist and they are represented by studies of such scientists as U. Altrock, S. Guntner, S. Hunmg and D. Peters<sup>1</sup>, J. Campbell and O. Pedersen<sup>2</sup>, P. Güller<sup>3</sup>, E. Judge<sup>4</sup>, T. Komornicki<sup>5</sup>, T. Lijewski<sup>6</sup>, J. Pucher and R. Buehler<sup>7</sup>, D. Stead, M. De Jong and I. Reinholde<sup>8</sup>, W. Suchorzewski<sup>9</sup> and some others.

The appeal to the results of the listed scientists research gives grounds to assert that against the background of constant competition of railway and automobile, passenger and freight types of transport in the countries of the Visegrad group the outfit of so-called city transportations occupies a special place. This outfit is of considerable interest due to several factors, because: first, urban transport is a cluster of passenger transport, which has been very important in the Visegrad countries since the time of the "real socialist" regimes, and therefore operates today and intensifies the division of transport into rail and road ones; secondly, some (though few of them) types of urban transport are a cluster of transport of passengers, goods and cargo, which was not actually known during the period of "real socialism", but it is increasingly being used today and often serves as a mechanism for bridging the gap between rail and road transport. Thus, the type of urban routing and transportation at first glance is separate from other modes of transportation, but significantly indicates the peculiarities of the development of the entire transport infrastructure and system in the Visegrad countries and therefore requires both separate consideration and comparison.

The phenomenon of urban transport and urban routing is certainly inherent in all countries of the Visegrad Group historically, but today attention is paid to it, because it is a kind of "mirror" of the transport infrastructure and system development in the region. This was especially true shortly before, but mainly after the accession of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Union, as the region began to operate pan-European norms and recommendations, including on the specified problems. In addition, this is obvious given the fact that urban routine: a) is characterized by the relative stability of routes, which allows you to record accurately the changes that occur in it; b) due to the large and traffic capacities, it is focused on the most important highways and directions, connecting the most important centers of formation of passenger flows and even freight

<sup>1</sup> Altrock U., Guntner S., Hunmg S., Peters D., *Spatial Planning and Urban Development in the New EU Member States: From Adjustment to Reinvention*, Wyd. Ashgate 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Campbell J., Pedersen O., *Legacies of Change: Transformations of Post-Communist European Economies*, Wyd. Aldine de Gruyter 1996.

<sup>3</sup> Güller P., *Urban Travel in East and West: Key Problems and a Framework for Action*, [w:] *Sustainable Transport in Central and Eastern European Cities*, Wyd. ECMT 1996, s. 16-43.

<sup>4</sup> Judge E., *The Development of Sustainable Transport Policies in Warsaw: 1990-2000*, [w:] Rydin Y., Thornley A. (eds.), *Planning in a Globalised Era*, Wyd. Ashgate 2002, s. 359-386.

<sup>5</sup> Komornicki T., *Factors of development of car ownership in Poland*, „Transport Reviews” 2003, vol 23, nr. 4, s. 413-431.

<sup>6</sup> Lijewski T., *The impact of political changes on transport in Central and Eastern Europe*, „Transport Reviews” 1996, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 37-53.

<sup>7</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policy in Post-Communist Europe*, [w:] Button K., Hensher D. (eds.), *Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions*, Wyd. Elsevier 2005, s. 725-743.

<sup>8</sup> Stead D., De Jong M., Reinholde I., *Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe*, „disP - The Planning Review” 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73.

<sup>9</sup> Suchorzewski W., *Transport Policy Forum. Transport*

flows; c) due to changes in its geometry reflects changes in urban spaces; d) it is municipalized, and therefore its condition reflects changes in the level of organization of the entire passenger transport system; e) operates in most or even all major cities in the region, which allows you to compare the situation both between cities and in general between countries<sup>10</sup>.

At the same time, in a certain period of time after the collapse of “real socialism” regimes, the development of urban transport in the Visegrad Group countries found itself in a situation where it needed to be updated and modernized, but certainly taking into account the peculiarities of the region. That is why the current state of the urban transport and urban routing development in the analyzed region is not a simple copy of its homologue state in Western Europe countries. As a result, the conclusion is that large-scale institutional transformations are often neither appropriate nor desirable for results that benefit the cities of the Visegrad Group. On the other hand, it is small initiatives that have direct and short-term results and a relatively small budget that often work better and more progressively in constructing more stable urban transport policies and programs in the region. Even though in recent decades, especially after the European integration of the region, there has been a marked increase in the desire to transfer models, concepts, ideas, goals and tools of urban transport policy from one European city to another<sup>11</sup>. And despite the fact that the transplantation of experience can take place in very different ways, in particular in the form of copying policy and legislation, synthesis and hybridization, inspiration and ideas, voluntarily or forcibly<sup>12</sup>, etc.

However, the transplant policy of the Western experience does not always work effectively when the technological, economic, political and / or social positions that cities have achieved over the last decades of their development are very different<sup>13</sup>. In this context, the situation in the Visegrad Group countries is quite specific, as they largely adopt the so-called “donor” practice of Western Europe<sup>14</sup>; however, they still remain “natives” of the Warsaw Pact system, in which a completely different logic and construction of urban transport operated.

<sup>10</sup> Zyuzin P., Transformaciya setej gorodskogo passazhirskogo transporta Centralno-Vostochnoj Evropy (1990-2010 gg.): Avtoreferat dissertacii na soiskanie uchynonij stepeni kandidata geograficheskikh nauk, Wyd. Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet imeni M. Lomonosova 2012.

<sup>11</sup> Bueren E., Bougrain F., Knorr-Siedow T., Sustainable Neighbourhood Rehabilitation in Europe: From simple toolbox to multilateral learning, [w:] de Jong W., Lalenis K., Mamadouh V. (eds.), The Theory and Practice of Institutional Trans-plantation. Experiences with the Transfer of Policy Institutions, Wyd. Kluwer, 2002, s. 263-279; De Jong M., Edelenbos J., An Insider's Look into Policy Transfer in Transnational Expert Networks, „European Planning Studies” 2007, vol 15, nr. 5, s. 687-706; Héritier A., Kerwer D., Knill C., Lehmkuhl D., Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policy-Making, Wyd. Rowman Littlefield 2001.; Stead D., De Jong M., Reinholde L., Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, „disP - The Planning Review” 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73; Stone D., Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the „Transnationalization” of Policy, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2004, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 545-566.

<sup>12</sup> Dolowitz D., Marsh D., Learning from abroad: the role of policy transfer in contemporary policy making, „Governance” 2000, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 5-24; Dolowitz D., Marsh D., Who learns from whom: A review of the policy transfer literature, „Political Studies” 1996, vol 44, nr. 2, s. 343-357.

<sup>13</sup> Campbell J., Pedersen O., Legacies of Change: Transformations of Post-Communist European Economies, Wyd. Aldine de Gruyter 1996; Elster J., Offe C., Preuss U., Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998; Offe C., Designing Institutions in East European Transitions, [w:] Goodin R. (ed.), The Theory of Institutional Design, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998.

<sup>14</sup> Randma-Liiv T., Demand- and Supply-based Policy Transfer in Estonian Public Administration, „Journal of Baltic Studies” 2005, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 467-487.

This means that the technological, economic, political, institutional and social situation in the creditor countries (in Western Europe and in the EU in general) and in the borrowing countries (in this case, in the Visegrad Group countries) is very different<sup>15</sup>. A clear reflection of this is the facts that since most countries in the analyzed region have many years of experience with widespread, but low and medium quality public and urban transport, the level and quality of its modernization are unsuccessful or at least not always successful. Accordingly, in such conditions, the process of transfer and involvement of lessons of urban transport development in the EU for the Visegrad countries can have different forms and consequences.

It is important to note that from the late 80's - early 90's of the 20th century, the countries of the Visegrad Group moved or gradually began to move from centralization to decentralization of power and decision-making processes, , albeit with too large deviations in the scale and depth of the transfer of power and resources from the state to the regional and local levels<sup>16</sup>. Moreover, in the countries of rapid reform (primarily in Poland and the Czech Republic, to a lesser extent in Slovakia and Hungary), local or subnational administrations have gained jurisdiction to provide most processes and services in local infrastructure, ownership of utilities and housing, as well as partly in streamlining the transport system and infrastructure<sup>17</sup>. In turn, in terms of municipal financing, taxes on the turnover of local enterprises were replaced by combined and block subsidies from the state and revenues from local taxes and fees, but with a gradual transition from the first to the second. Therefore, regional or local issues were delivered to local leaders and structures, a significant drawback of which was the mismatch between the new responsibilities of local governments and the funds and resources available to them. In practice, all of this looked like the city had the impossible task of increasing previously very low utility and infrastructure fees (when real incomes fell sharply) and / or increasing local taxation within the framework of extremely weak (at that time) local economy. Instead, the alternative was to reduce services, which did not quite fit into the structure of the declared electoral democracy, which made even local politicians dependent on the satisfaction and sympathy of the electorate.

Accordingly, most cities in the Visegrad Group countries could not resolve this dilemma, which led to a gap between the costs and revenues of companies that provided or provide various utilities and infrastructure, including transportation services. Over time, this underestimation of the situation has also led to deterioration in services, reduction of production efficiency and volume of equipment and infrastructure. After all, the sudden (after the collapse of the regimes of "real socialism") gap between income and expenditure on the ground it was difficult to fill even in the richest cities in the region, including Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw, which significantly deteriorated the quality of transport services on the ground. This was complemented by the fact

<sup>15</sup> Stead D., De Jong M., Reinholde I., Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, „disP - The Planning Review“ 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73.

<sup>16</sup> Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region: World Bank Experience and Strategy, „World Bank Report“ 2002, nr. 25188.

<sup>17</sup> Stead D., De Jong M., Reinholde I., Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, „disP - The Planning Review“ 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73.

that by the end of the 1980s, public transport in the countries of the current “Visegrad Four” was generally quite large, but cheap<sup>18</sup>. Along with low incomes, this meant a high level of the public transport use and a low level of car ownership<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, regulated prices and supply of cars and fuel in most countries in the region ensured that owning and using private transport was extremely expensive and complicated. As a result, most people at the time simply could not afford cars and, of course, could not use them on a regular basis. Even if the number of cars increased during the 1970s and 1980s, most of them were used only on weekends and holidays, but not for daily travel. Another feature was that the providers of public transport services until the late 80’s of the 20th century were mostly state or municipal enterprises organized by type of transport (buses, trams, trolleybuses) or combined into a single company with a monopoly on traffic in cities. As a result, the region’s population suffered from a number of structural problems – cumbersome management and organizational structures, overstaffing (in administrative departments), incompetence, lack of a motivated workforce, excessive bureaucracy, and extreme inefficiency<sup>20</sup>.

The result was that in the early 1990s, the public and urban transport systems found themselves in a state of deep decline, in part due to a wave of macroeconomic reforms and economic downturns. In particular, a significant part of urban transport rolling stock was worn out and obsolete, and the level of fuel consumption and emissions of most vehicles was very high<sup>21</sup>.

In addition, the revenue base of public transport enterprises declined due to inadequate local government budgets and falling incomes, what affected plans to expand and replace transport companies. Maintenance and repairs at this level also declined significantly, causing obsolete infrastructure and rolling stock to begin to crumble<sup>22</sup>. The answer was that with the reduction of subsidies, the public transport system in the region was forced to increase tariffs sharply – both in absolute terms and in terms of inflation, wages and the cost of owning and using the cars<sup>23</sup>.

In addition, not only the cost of public transport has increased, but services have also been significantly reduced, especially in small towns. The fact is that urban transport services became

<sup>18</sup> Pucher J., Buchler R., *Transport Policy in Post-Communist Europe*, [w:] Button K., Hensher D. (eds.), *Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions*, Wyd. Elsevier 2005, s. 725-743.

<sup>19</sup> *Panorama of Transport 1990-2006: sixth edition*, Wyd. Eurostat Statistical books 2009.

<sup>20</sup> Pucher J., Buchler R., *Transport Policy in Post-Communist Europe*, [w:] Button K., Hensher D. (eds.), *Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions*, Wyd. Elsevier 2005, s. 725-743; Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region: World Bank Experience and Strategy, „World Bank Report“ 2002, nr. 25188.

<sup>21</sup> Güller P., *Urban Travel in East and West: Key Problems and a Framework for Action*, [w:] *Sustainable Transport in Central and Eastern European Cities*, Wyd. ECMT 1996, s. 16-43.; Judge E., *The Development of Sustainable Transport Policies in Warsaw: 1990-2000*, [w:] Rydin Y., Thornley A. (eds.), *Planning in a Globalised Era*, Wyd. Ashgate 2002, s. 359-386.; Suchorzewski W., *Transport Policy Forum. Transport Policies in The Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A Decade of Integration: Results and new Challenges*, ECMT 2001.; Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region: World Bank Experience and Strategy, „World Bank Report“ 2002, nr. 25188.; Zachariadis T., Kouvaritakis N., *Long-Term Outlook of Energy Use and CO2 Emissions from Transport in Central and Eastern Europe*, „Energy Policy“ 2003, vol 31, nr. 8, s. 759-773.

<sup>22</sup> Suchorzewski W., *Transport Policy Forum. Transport Policies in The Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A Decade of Integration: Results and new Challenges*, ECMT 2001.; Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region: World Bank Experience and Strategy, „World Bank Report“ 2002, nr. 25188.

<sup>23</sup> Stead D., De Jong M., Reinholde I., *Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe*, „disP - The Planning Review“ 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73.; Pucher J., Buchler R., *Transport Policy in Post-Communist Europe*, [w:] Button K., Hensher D. (eds.), *Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions*, Wyd. Elsevier 2005, s. 725-743.

less frequent, less comfortable and less reliable since not enough funds were available to upgrade and even maintain existing infrastructure and vehicles. Therefore, in the Visegrad countries, both the quality and quantity of public or urban transport services have decreased. However, many central and local governments have still spent heavily on improving and expanding road networks, focusing on high-speed ring roads around cities, bottlenecks in connecting roads, etc. As a result, the supply of road infrastructure has increased, although much slower than the faster growth of the private cars use. This was particularly noticeable given that it was in the early 1990s that almost all restrictions on car ownership were removed, in particular due to the opening of a free market to foreign car manufacturers, what increased the quantity and quality of transport, which could now be purchased by the residents of former socialist countries<sup>24</sup>. In addition, as a strategy of economic development, some central governments of the Visegrad Group countries (but especially Poland and the Czech Republic) began to promote their own automotive industry<sup>25</sup>.

In terms of urban transport, this was reflected in the fact that the increase in motorization and private transport occurred mostly in places of decline of public transport, ie in small towns and rural areas<sup>26</sup>.

This was complemented by the fact that many people bought cars not only because they were more affordable, but also as a symbol of success and independence. That is why people often went beyond their socio-economic means of capabilities and real transport needs<sup>27</sup>. As a result, in the early 1990s, the Visegrad Group's government policies became less favorable to public transport and more adapted to owning and using private cars, leading to a "vicious cycle" of future urban transport reductions<sup>28</sup>. This was reflected in the fact that public transport services, which included most bus and trolleybus lines, suffered foremost from congestion caused by the rapid increase in car ownership and use. This further reduced the attractiveness of public transport services, increased its operating costs and gave additional demand for private transport<sup>29</sup>.

In addition, as a result, by the end of the 1990s, the economic, social and environmental problems associated with the growth of private transport and the equally sharp decline in the use of public transport began to be more widely recognized<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> Stead D., De Jong M., Reinholde I., Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, „disP - The Planning Review“ 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73.

<sup>25</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., Transport Policy in Post-Communist Europe, [w:] Button K., Hensher D. (eds.), Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions, Wyd. Elsevier 2005, s. 725-743.; Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region: World Bank Experience and Strategy, „World Bank Report“ 2002, nr. 25188.

<sup>26</sup> Lijewski T., The impact of political changes on transport in Central and Eastern Europe, „Transport Reviews“ 1996, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 37-53.

<sup>27</sup> Komornicki T., Factors of development of car ownership in Poland, „Transport Reviews“ 2003, vol 23, nr. 4, s. 413-431.; Lijewski T., The impact of political changes on transport in Central and Eastern Europe, „Transport Reviews“ 1996, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 37-53.; Pucher J., Buehler R., Transport Policy in Post-Communist Europe, [w:] Button K., Hensher D. (eds.), Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions, Wyd. Elsevier 2005, s. 725-743.

<sup>28</sup> Judge E., The Development of Sustainable Transport Policies in Warsaw: 1990-2000, [w:] Rydin Y., Thornley A. (eds.), Planning in a Globalised Era, Wyd. Ashgate 2002, s. 359-386.; Pucher J., Buehler R., Transport Policy in Post-Communist Europe, [w:] Button K., Hensher D. (eds.), Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions, Wyd. Elsevier 2005, s. 725-743.

<sup>29</sup> Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region: World Bank Experience and Strategy, „World Bank Report“ 2002, nr. 25188.

<sup>30</sup> Stead D., De Jong M., Reinholde I., Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, „disP - The Planning Review“ 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73.

Local authorities in the Visegrad Group countries have begun to realize that their local transport policies need to be adjusted. The partial solution was made by overcoming the “parking chaos” and creating zonal parking systems, as well as the introduction of new environmental standards. However, in the long run, national policy has continued to be focused on the wider ownership and use of private cars. Therefore, the problem at that time was that buses, trolleybuses and trams often did not have priority on the congested city streets. Although, local authorities have begun at least pay more attention to public transport as an important part of the urban transport system. Over time, this is inherited from the fact that after the initial “shock” from the sudden transition to capitalism in the late 1980s, urban transport systems in the Visegrad Group countries gradually began to recover in the late 1990s. In particular, in partnership with Western European experts, many urban public transport systems in the region have sought to improve the quality of their services, modernize their vehicles and infrastructure, and increase their efficiency, albeit primarily in large cities.

However, despite the fact that many municipalities have taken active steps to improve public transport, their efforts have been largely limited by central governments, which have provided very little funding, technical support, coordination and planning in the urban transport sector. Perhaps the most difficult thing against the background of automotive motorization was to restore a reliable and stable customer base of public transport<sup>31</sup>. Although changes have been made, many cities have turned their systems into public corporations with considerable managerial independence. Thus, even though local government still own public transport systems and set travel and service policies on the ground, corporate governance teams have been given many opportunities to increase efficiency in the sector. This increased customer orientation and led to an increase in attention to the quality of service. This was compounded by the fact that some cities selectively privatized some of their public transport operations. As a result, some of them have constructed new light railways (high-speed trams) or expanded subway systems. Many cities have reconstructed tram tracks, modernized metro stations, and gradually replaced aging buses, trams, trolleybuses, and subway parks with more modern ones. Most cities have also streamlined fares, improved fares and started providing real-time information to passengers at stops. Although the lag behind private road transport on the ground is still quite critical<sup>32</sup>.

In general, it has been demonstrated that the development and reform of urban and public transport in the Visegrad countries took place in constant changes in the functional and morphological structure and transformation of various urban subsystems. It is the transport infrastructure, being one of these subsystems and a link between the territorial and functional

<sup>31</sup> Stead D., De Jong M., Reinholde L., Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, „disP - The Planning Review“ 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73.

<sup>32</sup> Altrock U., Guntner S., Hunmg S., Peters D., Spatial Planning and Urban Development in the New EU Member States: From Adjustment to Reinvention, Wyd. Ashgate 2006.; Pucher J., Buehler R., Transport Policy in Post-Communist Europe, [w:] Burton K., Hensher D. (eds.), Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions, Wyd. Elsevier 2005, s. 725-743.; Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region: World Bank Experience and Strategy, „World Bank Report“ 2002, nr. 25188.



zones of cities, reflected and reflects the content and spatial forms of these processes<sup>33</sup>. Accordingly, the nature of the urban transport systems transformation in the Visegrad Group countries has been and remains an indicator of socio-economic and territorial processes that have taken place and are taking place in the region<sup>34</sup>.

This was especially evident at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, when the transition to a market economy led to a large-scale transformation of urban transport networks both in the process of its development and complexity, and as a result of its limitations. For example, the transport schemes, directions and volumes of passenger flows, which were designed decades before, have drastically changed. As a result of the reorientation of large passenger flows to new “centers of gravity”, in some cases the existing lines of passenger urban transport, which were equipped with relatively expensive (due to the number) infrastructure, were unclaimed. These processes had the most significant impact on land electric transport networks (trams and trolleybuses) and the metro, as the dynamics deteriorated in Poland, improved in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and remained relatively stable in Hungary<sup>35</sup>.

At the same time, it was comparatively found that the Visegrad Group countries tested two different models of development and reform of their urban and public transport. The first model, in the form of “network volume growth”, has been and is characterized by the spatial development of transport networks (even with a decrease in the number of networks themselves), including increasing their length, complicating their topology, connecting autonomous parts into a single network, emerging new autonomous areas<sup>36</sup>. It is recorded in most capitals of the Visegrad countries. For example, in Warsaw, the general geometry of the integrated urban electric transport network has become more complicated due to the commissioning of a completely new type of transport – the metro. As a result, the main load on the transportation of passengers from north to south fell on the subway, while the right bank of the city continued to be served by tram transport. In turn, in Prague, the integrated type of the urban transport network transformation has developed significantly, although the development is mainly due to the subway and to a lesser extent tram transport, but this does not affect the current state of development of trolleybus transport. To a lesser extent, similar processes have taken place and are taking place in Bratislava, where new tram and trolleybus lines are also being constructed. Instead, the second model of development, in the form of “network stagnation”, has been characterized and is characterized either by a weak spatial transformation of urban transport networks, or by the lack of transformation of its integrated network. At the same time, the length

<sup>33</sup> Vaksman S., *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie problemy prognozirovaniya razvitiya sistem massovogo passazhirskogo transporta v gorodakh*, Ekaterinburg 1996.

<sup>34</sup> Zyuzin P., *Transformatsiya setey gorodskogo passazhirskogo transporta Centralno-Vostochnoy Evropy (1990-2010 gg.)*: Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchyonoy stepeni kandidata geograficheskikh nauk, Wyd. Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet imeni M. Lomonosova 2012.

<sup>35</sup> Zyuzin P., *Transformatsiya setey gorodskogo passazhirskogo transporta Centralno-Vostochnoy Evropy (1990-2010 gg.)*: Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchyonoy stepeni kandidata geograficheskikh nauk, Wyd. Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet imeni M. Lomonosova 2012.

<sup>36</sup> Tarhov S., *Evolucionnaya morfologiya transportnykh setey*, Wyd. Universum 2005.

of lines of different types of urban transport may change slightly in one direction or another or may remain stable, as in Hungary. For example, the peculiarity of Budapest is that it has an integrated and wide network of public transport (but especially the subway) has a high level of complexity, but extremely “sluggish” dynamics of its development.

As a result, during the reforms of urban transport, the modernization model of its development has been and remains typical for Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the stagnation or stabilization ones – for Hungary. In the first case, modernization and progress are the result of the growth and complexity of transport networks, the development of transport strategies, sufficient funding for the industry and sound management, improving the quality of transport networks, modernization of rolling stock, etc. As a result, modern standards of traffic organization and passenger service were introduced; introduced tariff zones, night routes and electronic fare payment system, etc.; transport was adapted to serve people with disabilities; tourist-oriented information services has been significantly improved. In the second case, on the other hand, stagnation or stagnancy was due only to the partialness of the measures taken in the first group of countries. Therefore, the situation in this group of countries was characterized and still makes it a relative network, technological and socio-economic backwardness, lack of funds to support fixed assets and network development.

That is why, in light of the dramatic and rapid economic, social and political changes in the Visegrad countries, which were largely inspired by Western Europe, it was logical to assume that the countries of the region should seek lessons (both good and bad) from the European Union, because it could help decision makers to prevent problems before they arise. However, it is clear that the situation has been more complex, in particular in the financial context and in the context of the reform objectives, including urban transport (and transport in general). Therefore, in the Visegrad countries, the simple transfer of the experience of Western European countries did not work, but instead the situation depended and depends on the context (combination of individual actors, ideas, incentives, interests and time)<sup>37</sup>. In addition, the situation in the countries of the region had a psychological dimension, because, on the one hand, most local and national administrations had to experience the problems first hand and bring them to a critical-negative level before taking appropriate measures. On the other hand, road transport and “car” in the Visegrad countries were immediately perceived as a symbol of status, wealth and self-confidence, and not just as a vehicle. Thus, the policies and actions that have influenced and continue to influence the ownership and use of cars are perhaps more unpopular in the countries of the region than in Western Europe, which has modified and is modifying the technique of transplanting the latter’s experience.

This means that large-scale institutional reform and the policy of borrowing from the experience of Western countries is not always a promising way to improve the efficiency of the

<sup>37</sup> Stead D., De Jong M., Reinhold I., Urban Transport Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, „disP - The Planning Review” 2008, vol 44, nr. 172, s. 62-73.

system of reform and development of transport, especially when the subjects of such reform and policy have extremely limited resources. Instead, it is sometimes appropriate to be focused on achieving practical goals and visible accomplishments that can stimulate enthusiasm among stakeholders and the general public, and so to be focused on the diversity of actors in the process and the options for the professional, institutional and cultural environment, etc.

Nevertheless, in general, it can be stated that currently urban transport, in particular due to its incomplete reform or involvement, is not at the appropriate level to overcome the existing modal gap between road and rail transport in the Visegrad Group. Even though the countries of the region have operationalized at least two models of development and reform of their urban transport – in the format of “network growth” (the so-called “modernization” model – Poland, Slovakia and “stabilization” model – Hungary). Accordingly, it is generally proven that the Visegrad Group, as an intergovernmental association of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, on the one hand, corresponds to European trends and processes in the urban transport sector, but on the other hand often positions itself quite separately in particular due to the variability of involvement in modern urban / public infrastructure complexes. And this is actually the dependence of the Visegrad countries on the historical heritage of the so-called regimes of “real socialism”. Therefore, the countries of the Visegrad Group in this context cannot be interpreted as a single and unified whole, as they differ significantly in the specifics of the current state and development and in the regulation of infrastructure in the transport system on the ground.

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