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The peculiarities of membership in political parties of Ukraine through the focus of regional party organizations of Lviv region

The level of studying the issue of party membership by Ukrainian and foreign scholars has been analyzed. Different options for presenting information on the number of party members at the national and regional levels have been considered. Expert estimates on the number of party organizations in Lviv region and indicators of the ratio of members and non-partisans among candidates for regional and city councils during the 2020 local elections in Lviv region have been considered. The main groups of party membership have been singled out. The motivation of participation and non-participation in the work of party organizations has been considered. The tendency of low level of party participation and further reduction of the number of party members in all regional party structures has been stated.

Keywords: political party, member of political party, party structure, regional party organization, intra-party democracy

Specyfikacja członkostwa w partiach politycznych Ukrainy na przykładzie regionalnych organizacji partyjnych obwodu lwowskiego

Analizowany jest poziom badania problematyki przynależności do partii przez naukowców ukraińskich i zagranicznych. Rozważane są różne możliwości przedstawiania informacji o liczbie członków partii na poziomie krajowym i regionalnym. Uwzględniono eksperckie szacunki liczby organizacji partyjnych w obwodzie lwowskim. Przeanalizowano wskaźniki stosunku członków i bezpartyjnych wśród kandydatów do rad regionalnych i miejskich podczas wyborów lokalnych w 2020 roku w obwodzie lwowskim. Wyróżniono główne grupy przynależności partyjnej. Uwzględnia się motywację uczestnictwa i nieuczestniczenia w organizacji partyjnych. Stwierdzono tendencję do niskiego poziomu partycypacji i dalszego zmniejszania się liczby członków partii we wszystkich regionalnych strukturach partyjnych.

Słowa kluczowe: partia polityczna, członek partii politycznej, struktura partii, regionalna organizacja partyjna, demokracja wewnątrzpartyjna

Особливості членства в політичних партіях України через фокус обласних партійних організацій Львівщини

Проаналізовано рівень вивчення питання членства в партіях українськими та зарубіжними науковцями. Розглянуто різні варіанти представлення інформації про кількість членів партій на національному та регіональному рівнях. Розглянуто експертні оцінки щодо чисельності партійних організацій у Львівській області та показники співвідношення членів і безпартійних серед кандидатів до обласної і міських рад під час місцевих виборів 2020 р. у Львівській області. Виділено основні групи партійного членства. Розглянуто мотивацію участі і не участі в роботі партійних організацій. Констатовано тенденцію низького рівня партійної участі і подальшого скорочення кількості членів партії в усіх обласних партійних структурах.

Ключові слова: політична партія, член політичної партії, партійна структура, обласна партійна організація, внутрішньопартійна демократія

At the beginning of February 2021, 365 political parties were registered in Ukraine. At the same time, the process of registration of new parties is permanent, only in 2020 there were registered 12 new political parties by Ministry of Justice. At the same time, there are questions among Ukrainian and foreign researchers as to the assessment of the phenomenon of Ukrainian political parties. The problems are that for most of the current parties the characteristic features are the lack of ideology and dominant populism, the universality of program provisions and ignoring the representation of sectorial / group interests, as well as the lack of intra-party democracy. These and other assessments determine the interpretation of existing political parties as incomplete, or proto-parties¹. In order to correctly assess the party phenomenon in Ukraine, we must consider the compliance of existing entities with the classical criteria / indicators of the party. One of the steps in this direction is the analysis of the state of party membership. The Law on Political Parties of Ukraine considers the requirement of formation and registration of at least fourteen regional and equivalent party organizations to be one of the conditions for registration². Accordingly, the registrar records the number of structural units, however it is difficult for the researchers of political parties to find information on the number of members of both newly formed and parties that have been operating for a long time.

The lack of information on the number of party members is typical for both the national and regional levels. The absence of information does not provide an opportunity to analyze the state and trends inherent in members of political parties.

¹ Требін М. Партія політична // Політична енциклопедія. Редкол.: Ю. Левенць (голова), Ю. Шаповал (заст. Голови) та ін. – К.: Парламентське видавництво, 2012. С. 543-545; Шай Р. Проблеми функціонування політичних партій в Україні та шляхи удосконалення їхньої діяльності // Вісник Національного університету «Львівська політехніка». Серія: Юридичні науки. 2016, № 855. С.285.

² Закон України «Про політичні партії» [Електронний ресурс] –URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14#Text>

For analysis, we chose the political parties represented by the results of the local elections of 2020 in the Lviv regional and city councils of Lviv: “European Solidarity”, “Servant of the People”, AUU “Batkivshchyna”, Association “Samopomich”, AUU “Svoboda”, “Golos”, NRU (PMU), “Ukrainian Galician Party”, “For the Future” and “Warta”. Among the selected parties we can single out the national ones (which operate in most regions of the country): “European Solidarity”, “Servant of the People”, AUU “Batkivshchyna”, Association “Samopomich”, AUU “Svoboda”, “Voice” and de facto regional (because they are represented mainly in one or more areas): NRU (PMU), “Ukrainian Galician Party”, “For the Future” and “Warta”. We are aware that more political parties are officially registered in the region. However, many of these parties are only formally listed in the registration documents, and the registered structural units do not always carry out practical activities³. Therefore, we focused on the regional branches of the parties that received the necessary level of support and entered one of the two or both councils.

According to Article 6 of the Law of Ukraine “On Political Parties” membership in a political party is fixed. The law stipulates that the application of membership in a political party is a statement of a citizen of Ukraine, submitted to the statutory body of the political party on the desire to become a member of this party. The form of membership is determined by the statute of the political party. Irrespective of the peculiarities provided by the statutes, members of the party will be the citizens of Ukraine who have personally applied for membership in a particular political party and met the requirements set out in the charter of the party which the person plans to join. Accordingly, this means that every Ukrainian political party keeps / should keep records of party members. Unfortunately, Ukrainian law does not require mandatory public presentation of quantitative membership parameters.

Researchers in many democracies who study political parties, in addition to party members, distinguish the category of party sympathetics⁴.

This category mainly includes citizens who support the activities of a political party by voting for the party, participating in party events, receiving the party press (previously), subscriptions / visits to party sites / pages on the Internet. Mostly in Ukraine, the practice of fixing the category of sympathetics has not become widespread either in the party environment or by researchers.

Problems of membership in Ukrainian political parties were mostly studied in the context of theoretical and legal aspects of the formation and functioning of political parties and party systems⁵.

³ В аналітичному матеріалі, підготовленому Львівським відділенням ОПОРИ «Спроможність осередків політичних партій у Львівській області» (розміщений 06.07.2020 р.) звертається увага на факт, що не всі офіційно зареєстровані партійні осередки в області можуть навести інформацію, яка підтверджує факт їхньої реальної діяльності. - URL: <https://www.oporuaa.org/report/vybory/partii/20144-spromozhnist-oseredkiv-politichnikh-partii-u-lvivskii-oblasti>

⁴ Raul Gomez, Luis Ramiro, Laura Morales, Jaime Aja. Joining the party: Incentives and motivations of members and registered sympathizers in contemporary multi-speed membership parties // *Party Politics*. 2021. T. 27. Vol. 4.

⁵ Адашич А.І. Правові регулювання статусу політичних партій в Україні // *Право і суспільство*. 2012, № 2. С. 32-40; Ганжа А.М. Політичні партії України як формалізовані патронажно-клієнтарні мережі. *Вісник ХНУ імені В.Н.Каразіна. Серія «Питання політології»*. Вип. 30. 2016. С. 62-65; Розумний М., Павленко І. Партійне законодавство та розвиток політичних партій в Україні. К.: НІСД, 2015; Трансформація партійної системи: український досвід у європейському контексті / За ред. Ю.Якименка. – Київ: Центр Разумкова, 2017. 428 с.; Осауленко С.В. Членство у політичних партіях України: сучасний стан та проблеми нормативної регламентації // *Наукові праці Національного університету «Одеська юридична академія»*. Т. 21. 2018. С. 84-91.

Thus, in the publications of Ukrainian researchers we do not find an analysis of the state and evolution of the membership base at both national and regional levels, although there are a number of analytical investigations into the structure of party cells in Ukrainian political parties⁶.

Instead, these issues have long been the focus of analysis among European and American researchers⁷. In particular, the place and role of party members in the activities of political parties, including in the context of intra-party democracy, were studied by S. Scarrow⁸, K. Janda and G. Borz⁹. In a number of studies, the authors studied the nature and causes of the reduction of members of political parties, which many described as a development crisis¹⁰.

Ingrid van Beren and Thomas Poguntke investigated what factors caused the crisis of party membership and what political consequences it led to. They came to the conclusion that amateur politicians are a thing of the past, and instead modern political parties are becoming “organizational machines” for those politicians for whom politics is a profession¹¹. The state of party membership in terms of their quantitative reduction and the consequences for the party system and democracy in Germany were studied by Alexandra Nonenmacher and Tim Speer¹². The expansion of intra-party democracy, as the main direction of the parties’ exit from the crisis of membership, in particular due to the active holding of open and closed primaries, was analyzed by Julia Sandri and Fulvio Venturino¹³. A number of publications are devoted to the study of current trends in the work of parties to attract new party members and to work with sympathetics, who according to the latest research began to receive rights that were previously reserved exclusively for members of political parties¹⁴.

⁶ Опора: «Партизація» місцевих виборів та спроможність самих політичних партій. Чи співпадають політичні бажання з реальністю? [Електронний ресурс] – URL:<https://www.oporaua.org/report/vybory/partii/20153-partizatsiia-mistsevlkh-viboriv-ta-spromozhnist-samikh-partii-chi-svipadaiut-politichni-bazhannia-z-realnistiu>; Спроможність осередків політичних партій у Львівській області [Електронний ресурс] – URL:<https://www.oporaua.org/report/vybory/partii/20144-spromozhnist-oseredkiv-politichnikh-partii-u-lvivskii-oblasti>

⁷ Parties and Their Members. Organizing for Victory in Britain and Germany. Oxford University Press. 1996. 270 p.; Tan A.C. Party Change and Party Membership Decline: An Exploratory Analysis // Party Politics. 1997. Vol.3. Issue 3. P. 363-377.

⁸ Scarrow S. Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Implementing Intra-Party Democracy. Washington: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 2005; Scarrow S., Bogdan G. Declining memberships, changing members? European political party members in a new era // Party Politics. 2010. Vol.16. Issue 6. P.823-843.

⁹ Kenneth Janda, Gabriela Borz. Contemporary trends in party organization: Revisiting intra-party democracy // Party Politics. 2010. T. 26. Issue 1. P.3-8.

¹⁰ Bernarda L., Sandri G. & Seddone A. Challenges of Political Participation and Intra-party Democracy: Bittersweet Symphony from Party Membership and Primary Elections in Italy // Acta politica. 2017. Vol. 52 (2). P.218-240; Seddone A. & Valbruzzi M. Beyond the crisis...resilience and adaptation. Italian political parties and their organizational transformations // Contemporary Italian Politics. 2020. Vol. 12. Issue 4. P.394-410.

¹¹ Ingrid van Bieren, Tomas Poguntke. The decline of membership-based politics // Party Politics. 2014. Vol.20. Issue 2. P. 205-216

¹² Nonnenmacher A., Spier T. Introduction: German Party Membership in the 21st Century // German Politics. 2019. Vol.28. Issue 2. P. 150-161.

¹³ Sandri G., Venturino F. Party organization and intra-party democracy in Italy // Contemporary Italian Politics. 2020. Vol.2020. Issue 4. P. 443-460.

¹⁴ Susan Achury, Susan E. Scarrow, Karina Kosiara-Pedersen. The consequences of membership incentives: Do greater political benefits attract different kinds of members? // Party Politics. 2020. Vol. 26. Issue 1; Raul Gomez, Luis Ramiro, Laura Morales, Jaime Aja. Joining the party: Incentives and motivations of members and registered sympathizers in contemporary multi-speed membership parties // Party Politics. 2021. T. 27. Vol. 4

The information on the number of party members at the national and regional levels cannot be found in a generalized version in either official government publications or researchers, nor is it available in party publications. One of the possible sources is resources hosted on the Internet. Each of the current political parties in Ukraine has its own website, also the articles devoted to the most of current political parties of Ukraine can be found in Wikipedia in English and other languages. However, for the most part, party websites and relevant Ukrainian-language articles do not provide information on the number of members which researchers can verify. The exception is the Ukrainian Galician Party, which in 2021 declared approximately 1,200 members¹⁵; AUU “Svoboda” estimated the number of members – more than 20,000 on its website in the history section¹⁶; Regarding the People’s Movement of Ukraine, the number of party members in the Ukrainian-language Wikipedia article is estimated at approximately 60,000 members¹⁷, although the English-language publication gives a different estimate of 35,000 ones (for 2016)¹⁸.

The Ukrainian-language article on the “Batkivshchyna” All-Ukrainian Union also provides an approximate number of party members over 600,000¹⁹, and in the English version more than 10,000 ones²⁰. Regarding “European Solidarity”, the Ukrainian-language publication lacks information on the number of members, and the English-language version states “tens of thousands members.”²¹ As to the “For the Future” party, no resource provides even evaluative information, and for the “Servant of the People” party, the English-language version of Wikipedia estimates the number of members in the range between 500 and 1, 000²².

To determine the number of party members at the level of Lviv region, in the absence of publicly available information, we conducted a survey of leaders, in some cases representatives of party organizations. We received the following information (as of October 2021): AUU “Batkivshchyna” – 20,100; ES – 5000; NRU – 4,340; AUU “Svoboda” – 1448; Ukrainian Galician Party – 480; “Samopomich” – 183; “Golos” – 134. Regarding “Warta”, “Servant of the People” and “For the Future”, the number of party members is estimated at less than 100 people in each of them. Simultaneous survey of representatives of political parties on the indicators of membership in others (in parties to which they do not belong), as well as experts gives grounds to question the data obtained on the AUU “Batkivshchyna”,

¹⁵ УПГ: 10 фактів про Українську Галицьку партію [Електронний ресурс] - URL: <https://uhp.org.ua/about/10-faktiv-pro-ugp/>

¹⁶ Історія ВО «Свобода» [Електронний ресурс] - URL: <https://svoboda.org.ua/party/history/>

¹⁷ Вікіпедія: Народний Рух України. [Електронний ресурс] - URL: https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Народний_рух_України

¹⁸ Wikipedia: People’s Movement of Ukraine. [Електронний ресурс] - URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Movement_of_Ukraine

¹⁹ Вікіпедія: Всукраїнське об’єднання «Батьківщина». [Електронний ресурс] - URL: [uk/wikipedia.org/wiki/Всукраїнське_об%27єднання_«Батьківщина»](https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Всукраїнське_об%27єднання_«Батьківщина»)

²⁰ Wikipedia: All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” [Електронний ресурс] – URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-Ukrainian_Union_%22Fatherland%22

²¹ Wikipedia: European Solidarity. [Електронний ресурс] – URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Solidarity#cite_note-2

²² Wikipedia: Servant of the People. [Електронний ресурс] – URL: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Servant_of_the_People_\(political_party\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Servant_of_the_People_(political_party))

the “ES” and the NRU. Most respondents believe that these figures are inflated several times. With regard to the “Batkivshchyna” All-Ukrainian Union and the NRU, it is possible that the figures were in line with the real situation before, but not today.

The interviewed experts state that in the case of parties that have been operating in the political market for a long time: NRU, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda and Samopomich, it is noticeable the trend of the reducing the absolute number of members. All party organizations are characterized by a weak dynamics of new applications for party membership. A certain increase in the number of new members was observed only on the eve of the elections, especially for local councils. This was facilitated by the norm of the Electoral Code (Book 4, Article 192, paragraph 2) that elections of deputies of regional, district, district in the city, as well as deputies of city, village, settlement councils (territorial communities with 10,000 or more voters) are held according to the system of proportional representation according to the open electoral lists of the political parties’ local organizations²³ and the requirements of many party structures for superiority in nominating candidates for party members, or the condition for all party candidates to become party members at the time of nomination, or in the case of election.

The decentralization process launched in 2014 significantly affected the structure of party organizations at the oblast level. First, the introduction of the UTC (united territorial community) as a basic element / level, the election of the UTC chairman and councils forced some of the existing political structures to think about the expediency of preserving party structures, in accordance with the old territorial-administrative division, and the need to form party cells or representatives / supporters in each UTC. Secondly, the change in the construction of districts within oblasts (in Lviv oblast, within the framework of the reform, 7 enlarged districts were created instead of 24 districts) led to the loss of relevance of keeping district party organizations in accordance with the old scheme. As a result, some of the existing parties announced the liquidation of the old district structures and the creation of party structures on the basis of new districts. At the same time, some regional party structures declared caution or anticipation for the creation of new district structures. This is due to the fact that at the legislative level the functional obligations of new districts are not yet clearly defined. The second argument, given by representatives of political parties, is the fear that the long-standing misunderstanding of the functional purpose of the district branch may indicate the temporary nature of such a decision and that in the near future the districts will be liquidated or re-modified. Therefore, regional party organizations mostly declare the transformation of party organizations on the basis of the old district division into new district structures, but not all of them publicly record their formation.

An indirect tool for verifying membership in regional party organizations can be the fact that they nominate candidates for local councils during the 2020 elections.

²³ Виборчий кодекс України [Електронний ресурс] – URL:<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/396-20#Text>

Table 1. The ratio of party and non-party candidates among the subjects of the election process to the Lviv Regional Council in 2020²⁴

	Name of the party	Total number of candidates	Including non-partisans	% non-partisan among the candidates
1	Warta (Guard)	55	45	81,8
2	AUU "Batkivshchyna" "Motherland"	83	15	18,0
3	AUU "Svoboda" "Freedom"	62	18	29,0
4	Golos(Voice)	55	24	43,6
5	Gromadyanska posyciya(Civic position)	64	46	71,8
6	Dukhovna Ukraina(Spiritual Ukraine)	49	47	95,9
7	European solidarity	79	9	11,4
8	For the Future	82	75	91,5
9	NRU (PMU)	84	57	67,8
10	Nash Kray(Our Land)	46	42	91,3
11	AU "Samopomich" Self Reliance	63	38	60,3
12	Syla i chest' Strength and Honor	83	31	37,3
13	Servant of the people	83	83	100,0
14	UDAR(Strike)	49	41	83,7
15	Ukrainian Galician party	84	41	48,8
	The average			62,14

As we can see, out of 15 parties that were registered in the elections to the Lviv Regional Council, only six managed to nominate a full or almost full quota of candidates (84), which is 40%. Filling the full quota, in our opinion, may indicate the presence of a sufficient number of authoritative persons in the party. Accordingly, the very fact of their nomination is a kind of recognition of their work / activity in the party. This fact also testifies to the party's potential, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in particular, the party's readiness to win elections and form the agenda of the regional council and the whole region. Instead, the inability to fill all the seats indicates a lack of enough potential candidates in the party and devalues the statements of regional party leaders about the claim to leadership in the region. The data of Table 1 shows that more than 62 percent of candidates registered by political parties are non-partisan. Only 40% of the parties that took part in the elections managed to fill more than 50% of the list of candidates with party members. The Ukrainian Galician Party should be formally included in this group, as almost half of it consists of party and non-party candidates. At the same time, four political parties "closed" more than 90% of candidates at the expense of non-partisans. Among them is the "Servant of the People" party, which has completely formed a 100% list of non-party candidates. The reasons for this phenomenon will always be individual for each party; in the case of "Servants of the People" we can talk about the launch of the party project only in 2018-2019, and the party "Warta", as a matter of fact, started only in the summer of 2020. At the same time, we can specify common parameters: 1) absence of party members /

²⁴ ЛІБК: Місцеві вибори [Електронний ресурс] – URL: cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2020/pvm035pt001f01=695pt00_t001f01=695pid112=12pid100=46rcj=0.html

sufficient number of party members in organizations, or absence of authoritative personalities among existing members; 2) the desire to get a higher result by attracting to the party lists the authoritative individuals in the region, which, respectively, indirectly indicates a lack, or insufficient number of party members of recognizable individuals with a positive balance of trust; 3) spreading the practice of a kind of fundraising, when non-party candidates are involved, financially or via other resources, in the financing / conducting of the election campaign. For some regional party organizations, such a method of forming the election budget was a condition for their participation in the election, but in some cases (mostly parties that had high ratings and chances of passing) also served as a way of earning money. In our opinion, all these factors acted simultaneously but with different proportions for each particular party. We also assume that for some political parties, which are mostly absent from the political life of the region and the country, the very fact of participation by nominating their own candidates was a self-sufficient one regardless of the result (as a rule, these parties did not actively promote their candidates). Thus, they reminded that the party exists.

Table 2. The ratio of party and non-party candidates among the subjects of the election process to the Lviv City Council in 2020²⁵

Name of the party	Total number of candidates	Including non-partisan	% non-partisan among the candidates
Warta (Guard)	64	48	75,0
AUU "Svoboda" ("Freedom")	64	0	0,0
AUU "Batkivshchyna" ("Motherland")	64	3	4,6
Golos (Voice)	55	11	20,0
Gromadyanska posyciya (Civic position)	43	35	81,4
Dukhovna Ukraina (Spiritual Ukraine)	52	48	92,3
European solidarity	64	5	7,8
For the Future	63	58	92,0
Idea of Nation	39	29	74,3
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	33	5	15,1
PMU	64	47	73,4
Nash Kray (Our Land)	31	31	100,0
Samopomich (Self Reliance)	50	31	62,0
Опозиційна платформа – "За життя" (Opposition platform – "For Life")	31	23	74,2
Syla i Chest' (Strength and Honor)	64	8	12,5
Servant of People	64	64	100,0
UDAR (Strike)	32	21	65,6
Ukrainian Galician party	61	16	26,2
Ukrainian Republican party	31	21	67,7
Average			54,95

²⁵ ЦІВК: Місцеві вибори. Львівська міська рада [Електронний ресурс] – URL: https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2020/pvm056pid10_2=3670pf7691=64097pt001f01=695rcj=0pt00_t001f01=695.html

Comparing the results in Tables 1 and 2, we can state that the assessments of the situation with the regional candidates from the parties and with the candidates for the Lviv City Council will be similar. That is, we can state that there are not enough party members in most oblast structures (and city ones where they existed) to independently fill the full quotas of candidates for oblast and city (oblast center) councils. We observe an even larger share of non-party candidates in relation to other city, district and OTG councils. All these things together indicate a small number of members in regional party organizations. The situation is slightly better for national parties that have been operating on the political scene for a long time, and it is worse for newly formed party structures. Accordingly, with regard to oblast cells, for which there were doubts about the correctness of their self-assessments of party membership, they should most likely be guided by minimum rather than maximum indicators.

Based on interviews with representatives of political parties and experts, we can identify a number of groups among party members who have certain common characteristics. We provide the list not on the basis of ranking from the largest share to the smallest, but by the very fact of presence among party members. These are the following groups: youth, unemployed, retirees. Paradoxically enough, all party structures declare the existence of youth circles within the party. These circles can be institutionalized in various ways, such as the party's youth units or youth groups. The motivation for the presence of young people in political parties is mainly the hope of "making a career", or the interpretation of being part of the party as an opportunity for social growth within a political party. In addition, being in the party provides new opportunities for cooperation both within the party itself vertically and horizontally, and with various state and public structures, as well as joining numerous training programs organized by the party with foreign foundations and party partners.

All the experts we interviewed note the presence of a significant share of the unemployed among party members. This category of party members has in common the availability of spare time and readiness to participate in various events and programs. During the elections, this category is actively interested in performing the functions for which there is provided, primarily financial, compensations. The main motives for joining this category of citizens to party structures are a number of factors, in particular: the loss of work leads to a decrease in the assessment of the person by others and the citizen himself, accordingly, for some, joining and belonging to a political party is a kind of compensation for the lost status, because a person does socially important work, or he (she) belongs to the party, regardless of whether he is in power or in opposition. Important for this category of people is the opportunity to communicate, express their opinion and the formal fact of equality of all party members, regardless of the status of "employed" and "not working". In addition, this category of people sees participation in the party as an opportunity to gain access to people in leadership positions in government, business and other areas, and via which they can get a job in the structures where these people work, or in other ones. The party, especially during elections, involves also a different number

of people to perform temporary paid work. Mostly, these activities do not require special education and training, but they provide a certain level of trust or conviction in party devotion. The motivation of retirees is also close, as they also have a lot of spare time and the need to communicate. Some party representatives noted a kind of fatigue of the party apparatus from this category of party members, explaining this by the fact that retired party members often initiate the formulation and consideration of various issues or initiatives, which “distract” party structures from the tasks to which organizations are directed from the party center. The consideration of these initiatives requires time and resources of the party staff. Therefore, party representatives speak of certain caution in communicating with potential party members who have a retirement age.

At the same time, party representatives noted the presence of a group of activists among party members, who make up small shares in the total membership. This category is characterized by similar logistics of movement to the party. It is that the relatively high level of development of civic structures and volunteerism in the region and in Ukraine as a whole is facilitated or characterized by the presence of public activists in the local communities. In the vast majority of cases, these individuals raise issues relevant to local communities; criticize the position or activities / inaction of the authorities of different levels. This leads to confrontation between these individuals and state or municipal authorities. To implement change and strengthen their position, and sometimes to protect themselves from pressure, civil society activists need institutional assistance or affiliation. Some activists create or join NGOs, but there are also some who cooperate with political parties. Political parties are able to provide them with a wide range of support: legal, media, support by deputies of different levels. Collectively, the entry of local civic activists into local party organizations is logical and important. Both parts are interested in it, as local activists have a certain authority, which must be transferred to the party organization, which such an activist joins. At the same time, especially on the eve of the election, we are witnessing a kind of “hunting” of party cells for public activists, volunteers and popular bloggers in order to attract them to the party, or to accept / approval of various forms of association with the party.

Based on the interviews, we also found out the main factors / motives for citizens to join political parties outside the above-mentioned categories of party members. They are:

1. The desire to become in the future a candidate from the party in elections to councils of various levels;
2. The desire to gain access to state, or within self-governing structures, positions with the assistance of a political party that has a chance to come to power;
3. The expectation to be able to communicate and lobby their own interests via deputies and the executive branch of the government, in case of predicting, that a political party will participate in the formation of power. These are mainly property, land and budget orders;

4. Some citizens, mostly those who have a certain level of income seek to acquire the status of “respectable person” what in the imagination of this category of people is associated and including for MP. This motive also provides opportunities for lobbying their own business interests;
5. Ideological closeness to assessments of the current situation in the country and abroad is growing in a dichotomous and contrasting struggle between the opposition and the government. Relationships are mainly in the format of “game with 0 (zero) options”, when there are only two colors: black and white. Accordingly, other colors and halftones are excluded in the estimates. Under such circumstances, movers and shakers come to the parties ready and “eager” to fight;
6. Traditional affiliation to a certain political party, even rather to a certain direction in the case when a particular party acts as a symbol / identifier of this ideological or ideological direction (Communist party, NRU (PMU), AUU Svoboda);
7. Personal contact with the heads of enterprises / state or municipal institutions / business structures, representatives of a certain political party may be the basis of certain obligations of a citizen to such a representative and the basis for joining a person to the number of party members providing personal request. This group should also include the category of party members who trust their own leader, comrade, acquaintance. The authority of such a person is the basis for joining and staying in the ranks of a particular party structure.

As we can see, the mercantile interests of party members make up the largest part of the motivation system. Interestingly, in the imagination of the average citizen, this assessment is the dominant explanation for the reasons for citizens to join political parties and the reasons for the native’s personal non-partisanship. Such a perception does not contradict, but on the contrary is the basis for the negative perception of the majority of Ukrainian citizens of the political parties’ institution. According to a survey conducted in June 2021 by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 74.2% of respondents in Ukraine did not trust the institution of political parties (in the western part of Ukraine – 73.9%)²⁶.

In our opinion, the inability of political parties to satisfy such mercantile interests and perform a kind of patrimonial function forces some members of the party, who hoped for various dividends from membership, to leave its membership. The grounds for termination of membership by citizens are also: the lack of intra-party democracy and a high level of centralization, when a party member is treated by the leadership as the executor; the gap between the public declaration of the goals and principles of the party and the party leadership and non-compliance with the voiced maxim in practice; close connection of party organizations

²⁶ Політичні партії очима виборців: як створити передумови ефективного представництва. URL: <https://dif.org.ua/article/politichni-partii-ochima-vibortsiv-yak-stvoriti-peredumovi-efektivnogo-predstavnistva>

and especially party leadership with oligarchs and business, respectively, the concentration of party structures on the implementation of profitable business projects, often to the detriment of the community, and so on.

In view of the above, the logical question is – wherefore, for what purpose the party attracts party members, or what functions they perform. First of all, we can name the formally legitimizing party leadership and party program and all party documents. These documents are always presented as a collective product of the party. Lack of membership gives grounds to talk about all the documents and the position of the party as a reflection of the interests of a narrow group – the party leader and his entourage. Second: the need and tradition of some parties to disseminate party messages via party members. As well as the use of members of party structures as representatives of the “people” during various demonstrations of support or non-support / protest about events, statements, etc. In the case of newly created parties, this function is mainly performed via the Internet, party bots. Third: as a formalized sign of the reality of a political party. In fact, we can explain the message on social networks about the sale of the party, when separately representing the officially registered one with the required number of structural units in the required number of the country’s administrative units and about the parties with membership. Fourth, in some parties we can say that party members pay contributions, which are one of the forms of party financing (UGP, NRU, AUU “Svoboda”, Golos, etc.). Accordingly, they have the opportunity to use certain tools to influence the policies of party organizations.

The subject of membership involves outlining their place in the structure of party organizations. The practice of monitoring party organizations and interviewing their representatives allows us to present this structure in the form of concentrated circles.

In our opinion, the core of the party is the party leader and those closest to him. The next group consists of party functionaries, i.e. those who work professionally in party organizations and get payment for it. Formally, they can be assistants to deputies, or be counted in specialized funds, but functionally they are engaged in the affairs of the party. An interesting feature of this group of officials is that not always and not all employees are members of the party. A separate group consists of deputies of the different levels councils. The status of a deputy on a part of a party often involves taking a formal or informal position in the party structure: the head of the party unit, or the curator of a particular region and city (which is not provided by party statutes, but it is used). The next circle is so far made up of party members. A separate group should also include a category of citizens who can be qualified as sympathizers in the Western sense. Their formation has become more apparent thanks to new communication tools, in particular via social networks. A number of recent election campaigns in Ukraine have been characterized by the widespread use of social media opportunities to cover the activity of party organizations, party candidates, and campaigning. Today, all these party organizations have their own Face book pages, have created and administer various groups. The analysis of visitors of these resources testifies to presence among them persons who come to them with certain

periodicity, like certain information or photos, can leave comments (in this case it is not a question of party bots, those who for a reward show party loyalty in various forms). Estimates of party representatives regarding the number of such visitors are, for obvious reasons, subjective, so they are hard to rely on. However, a number of political parties point to the existence of such a phenomenon. Its presence in the practice of party work seems quite logical due to the proliferation of the Internet and the growing number of users.

Thus, our interview of leaders and representatives of regional party organizations of Lviv region allows us to state the presence of a small number of party members in the regional party structures and the tendency to reduce them. Also, with regard to information about party members, we traditionally encounter two tendencies: first: most political parties hide data on the number of party members and their qualitative characteristics; second: quite often political parties exaggerate the number of their own members. In our opinion, this position is due to the widespread belief that information about the presence of a significant number of party members should indicate the high authority and strength of the party in the form of readiness to vote for it and its candidates. Accordingly, data on a small number of party members will be perceived by society as an indicator of the party's weakness and portend its defeat in elections. Among the party members, prominent groups are young people, the unemployed and retirees. In general, some members of the party have mercantile motives, which cause a fairly noticeable phenomenon at the regional level of constant flow of certain people from one party to another, when the choice is based on party affiliation, political majority or high chances of passing to a representative body. At the same time, the presence of a group of public activists who have authority in the community and are able to direct their activities and involve party members and local party organizations is recorded in party organizations. The presence of the latter group among party members gives grounds for cautious optimism about the further development of political parties. In general, the conducted analysis allows us to state that the indicator of party membership at the level of regional organizations in Lviv region is theoretical for many ones. The small number of members is likely to be a symbolic attribute, a tribute to the indicators of political parties accepted in society. Accordingly, it raises the question of verification of all generic indicators of a political party and assessment of the existing in Ukraine phenomenon. And it also raises the question of whether a political party can exist in the absence of membership or their symbolic presence.

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TRANSFORMATION OF THE CZECH ARMED FORCES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF NATO

The authors argue that the Czech Republic's integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has become an important factor in shaping the security system of Central and Eastern Europe and is a part of the vital interests of NATO candidate states and Washington's policy on the European continent. The asymmetry of potentials and the lack of formation of the Czech security sector, as well as the other CEE states, allowed Washington to fill the niche of the so-called "security guarantor" and create an image of a long-term strategic partnership, strong ties between NATO and the United States who were the world leaders at the time. Guarantees of the collective security system of all members of the Alliance, according to Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, were "attractive" to a post-communist state that distrusted its Western partners (in connection with the events of 1938 and 1968) and did not have sufficient resources and defense capabilities to build security on its own. We believe that in terms of the security policy of the Czech Republic, the partnership and cooperation with the United States in the transition phase has created the conditions and tools for the integration of the Czech Republic into the European and transatlantic security system.

Keywords: the Czech Republic, USA, NATO, foreign policy, Czech-American relations, security system, joint security policy

TRANSFORMACJA CZESKICH SIŁ ZBROJNYCH POD AUSPICJAMI NATO

Autorzy artykułu udowadniają, że integracja Republiki Czeskiej z Organizacją Paktu Północnoatlantyckiego stała się ważnym czynnikiem kształtowania systemu bezpieczeństwa państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz weszła w żywotne interesy krajów kandydujących do NATO oraz politykę Waszyngtonu na kontynencie europejskim. Duża różnica potencjału i brak sektora bezpieczeństwa w Czechach, jak również z innych krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, pozwolił Waszyngtonowi wypełnić niszę pewnego „gwaranta bezpieczeństwa”, kształtowanie wizerunku długoterminowego partnerstwa strategicznego, silne więzi z NATO

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i Stanami Zjednoczonymi, którzy w tym czasie byli liderami na świecie. Gwarancje zbiorowego systemu bezpieczeństwa dla wszystkich członków Sojuszu, zgodnie z art. 5 Traktatu Waszyngtońskiego, były „atrakcyjne” dla państwa postkomunistycznego, którzy nie ufali zachodnim partnerom (w związku z wydarzeniami 1938 i 1968) i nie miał wystarczających zasobów i zdolności obronnych, do samodzielnego tworzenia zabezpieczeń. Wierzymy, że w interesie polityki bezpieczeństwa Czech, partnerstwa i współpracy ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi w fazie przejściowej stworzył warunki i narzędzia do integracji Republiki Czeskiej z europejskim i transatlantyckim systemem bezpieczeństwa.

Słowa kluczowe: Czechy, USA, NATO, polityka zagraniczna, stosunki czesko-amerykańskie, system bezpieczeństwa, wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa

ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ ЗБРОЙНИХ СИЛ ЧЕХІЇ ПІД ЕГІДОЮ НАТО

Автори статті доводять, що інтеграція Чеської Республіки до Організації Північноатлантичного договору стала важливим фактором формування системи безпеки держав Центрально-Східної Європи та увійшла до життєво важливих інтересів держав-кандидатів на членство в НАТО і до політики Вашингтона на європейському континенті. Велика різниця потенціалів та не сформованість безпекового сектору Чеської Республіки, як і інших держав ЦСЄ, дозволили Вашингтону заповнити нішу певного «гаранта безпеки», створити образ тривалого стратегічного партнерства, міцних зв'язків із НАТО та США, які в той час були лідерами у світі. Гарантії колективної системи безпеки всіх членів Альянсу, згідно ст. 5 Вашингтонського договору, були «привабливими» для посткомуністичної держави, яка недовіряла партнерам із Заходу (що пов'язане з подіями 1938 і 1968 рр.) та не мала достатніх ресурсних і оборонних можливостей, щоб самостійно формувати безпеку. Вважаємо, що це був правильний крок, з погляду інтересів політики безпеки Чеської Республіки, адже партнерство і співробітництво зі США на перехідному етапі, а також і в наступному періоді, створило умови та інструменти для інтеграції Чеської Республіки в європейську і трансатлантичну систему безпеки.

Ключові слова: Чеська Республіка, США, НАТО, зовнішня політика, чесько-американські відносини, система безпеки, спільна політика безпеки

Relevance of the topic

The transformation of the main priorities of the foreign policy of the CEE states after the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the unification of Germany and

the processes of democratization that took place on the European continent and the Balkans, testified to the inevitability of the evolution of their security system and changes in the political, economic, military and other spheres. The need to form its own security policy arose at the beginning of Czechoslovakia's statehood formation in 1989. However, one of the main factors in the creation of its own bodies and institutions designed to guarantee the security and defense of a small state was the division of the state into the Czech Republic (CR) and the Slovak Republic (SR) on January 1, 1993. After 1993, the Czech Republic's security environment reflected a general trend towards integration with Europe and distancing itself from the communist past. However, the lack of a clear security strategy, defense capabilities and energy dependence of the state held the danger of turning it into a "buffer zone" between the Russian Federation and Germany. The vulnerability of the Czech Republic's political and economic systems required internal reforms and foreign policy support.

Presentation of the research materials

The alternative in this context was to form strong ties with NATO and the United States, which were the world leaders at that time. Guarantees of the collective security system of all members of the alliance, according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, became an "attractive goal" for a post-communist state that did not trust its partners from the West (which is related to the events of 1938 and 1968) and did not have sufficient resources and defense capabilities to form its security independently. An additional factor was also the public opinion's low confidence in the army and other military forces designed to guarantee the security of the state.

The personal factor also played an important role. Vaclav Havel and Madeleine Albright were the main players in the Czech-American relations at that time. In February 1990, President Havel delivered a speech to two chambers of the Czech parliament. He stressed the key role of the United States in shaping the European security system and called on the members of parliament to support the state in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Subsequently, at one of the first meetings of the Chamber of Deputies in April 1993, the President defined the main goal of the Czech Republic's foreign policy – the protection of democratic values and membership in NATO³. Another lobbyist for the Czech Republic's integration into NATO was M. Albright. In 1993-1996, as the US ambassador to the UN, she tried to show Washington the progress and changes that were taking place in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. And in 1996-2000, as the United States Secretary of State, she conducted bilateral negotiations on the formation of the foundations of a common security policy, basic strategic documents and coordination of forces against international threats.

³ R. Khol. *Česka bezpečnostní politika 1993-2004*. [w:] O. Píck, V. Handl (Eds.). *Zahraniční politika České republiky 1993-2004. Úspěchy, problémy a perspektivy*. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2004. s. 40.

One of the first manifestations of US support was the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991, which coordinated NATO's activities with the CEE countries seeking to become members of the alliance. The main requirements of NATO membership for the CEE states were submitted to the Council. The US ambassador to the United Nations M. Albright and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces J. Shalikashvili in a conversation with representatives of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, indicated that the issue of Czech membership in European and Transatlantic security structures will be considered not only in Brussels, but also in Washington. "The security of Central Europe and the Czech Republic depends on the security of the United States and NATO," M. Albright said⁴. President Clinton's congressional report on NATO expansion notes that "peace, stability, and prosperity in Europe are vital to American national security. Therefore, the Czech Republic's accession to NATO will help the United States protect and promote American interests in the transatlantic space."⁵ J. Solak wrote that, in fact, joining NATO took place with the direct participation and control of the United States, that Washington provided the states that declared their desire for integration into NATO with the conditions and instruments of ratification. Therefore, the report on the state of training of the military and defense sectors of the candidate states for participation in NATO was also received by the US government and the Secretary General of the Alliance. The researcher believed that Washington fully used the tools of coordination and control over the integration process⁶.

In 1994, a stronger foundation for security cooperation was formed – the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The main tasks of PfP were related to the preservation of international and regional security systems, defense and military budget planning, strategic policy and military exercises, modernization and professionalization of the army according to NATO standards. PfP included joint exercises and preparation for participation in international operations.

Scientists O. Pick and R. Khol wrote that most of the foreign policy goals of the Czech Republic at the beginning of its formation as a state were realized precisely thanks to Czech Republic's participation in PfP, which laid the foundation for transatlantic cooperation with the United States⁷. As a member of PfP, the Czech Republic has implemented technical, administrative and political changes in the reorganization of the sectors since March 10, 1994. As part of the PfP program, the President of the Czech Republic V. Havel and the US President B.

⁴ М. Олбрайт Госпожа госсекретарь. Мемуары Мадлен Олбрайт / пер. с англ. А. Лисовского, А. Лисицкой, Е. Китаевой. М.: Альпина Бизнес Букс, 2004. С. 473. [M. Olbrajt. Gospozha gossekretar'. Memuary Madlen Olbrajt / per. s angl. A. Lisovskogo, A. Lisicynoj, E. Kitaevoj. M.: Al-pina Biznes Buks, 2004. s. 473].

⁵ Report to the Congress on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement. "Journal of International Security Assistance Management" 1998, nr 3, p. 778.

⁶ J. Solak. Siedemnaście kroków do NATO : narodowe i ponadnarodowe aspekty ratyfikacji układów o członkostwie Polski, Czech i Węgier w Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckim. Warszawa : Biuro Prasy i Informacji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1999. s. 23.

⁷ R. Khol. Česká bezpečnostní politika 1993-2004. [w:] O. Pick, V. Handl (Eds.). Zahraniční politika České republiky 1993-2004. Úspěchy, problémy a perspektivy. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2004. s. 58.

Clinton organized meetings with representatives of other European states, during which they called for cooperation in the PfP program and support for NATO's international operations⁸.

The difficulties associated with changing the security policy in accordance with NATO norms have caused political contradictions in the Czech Republic, related, in particular, to the parliamentary elections before the ratification of the NATO accession pact and discussions on the "Government draft on the decision on the Czech Republic's accession to NATO" document (11.02.1998). Although practically the political forces of the Czech Republic supported the European and transatlantic direction as a key one in the development of the state, the communist and republican parties of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic contradicted this aspiration. It should be remembered that in 1992-1998, the Parliament coalition was formed by the Civic Democratic Party, which emphasized the importance of the US presence in the region. However, the Social Democrats, led by M. Zeman, believed that "the decision on our integration into NATO, as well as holding a referendum on this issue, should be made at the session of the new parliament."⁹ The election did not change the situation: 32.3% of the vote was won by Social Democrats, 27.7% – by Civic Democratic Party. To compromise and form a reliable partner image, on April 15, 1998, the Lower House of the Czech Parliament approved the decision on the Czech Republic's membership in NATO by a majority (154 out of 192 deputies)¹⁰.

On April 30, the Czech Senate ratified the Treaty on NATO Accession by a majority (64 out of 69 deputies) and it was subsequently signed by President V. Havel. This had a positive impact on public support for joining NATO, reaching 54%¹¹.

The cadence of the next government changed the balance of power: in 1998-2004, the pro-government coalition was headed by the Social Democrats, and V. Klaus became the Prime Minister. His pragmatism and focus on the development of the Czech economy coincided with the growth of American investment in strategic industries. A takeover of the "Rakona" plants by the "Procter & Gamble" took place, the United States aerospace firm "Boeing" invested in the Czech "Aero Vodochody"; a tobacco corporation "Philip Morris" invested in the Czech company "TATRA". The volume of the US investment increased to \$3.2 billions¹². The United States was the fourth largest trading partner of the Czech Republic.

An analysis of the reports of the Czech Foreign Ministry shows that in addition to meetings, Presidents V. Havel and B. Clinton developed intersectoral relations between the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, internal affairs, trade and industry, and economic consortia¹³. Coordi-

⁸ V. Havel. Členství České republiky v NATO – spoluzodpovědnost za osud světa. "Mezinárodní politika" 2004, nr. 1, p. 7–8.

⁹ J. Solak. Siedemnaście kroków do NATO : narodowe i ponadnarodowe aspekty ratyfikacji układów o członkostwie Polski, Czech i Węgier w Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckim. Warszawa : Biuro Prasy i Informacji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej , 1999. s. 24.

¹⁰ Problemy bezpieczeństwa Czech, Polski i Węgier w kontekście poszerzenia NATO, red. R.Grodzki, Poznań 2011. s. 285.

¹¹ J. Solak. Siedemnaście kroków do NATO : narodowe i ponadnarodowe aspekty ratyfikacji układów o członkostwie Polski, Czech i Węgier w Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckim. Warszawa : Biuro Prasy i Informacji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej , 1999. s. 37.

¹² Zpráva o zahraniční politice ČR 1998–1999. Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR, s. 100–103. URL: http://www.mzv.cz/file/415493/Zprava1998_1999.pdf [20.04.2020].

¹³ Zpráva o zahraniční politice České republiky za období od ledna 1993 do prosince 1993. Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, 1994. s. 73-74.

nation of the security policy was carried out at the level of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Zieleniec (1993-1997), and later the Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces, general J. Šedivý (1998-2002).

In the context of expanding relations with the United States, we should mention the training program for military and Public Administration representatives proposed by Washington for the exchange of information and acquisition of American experience by Czech officers. More than 50 official meetings and exchanges were held between representatives of the top military leadership, and almost a thousand employees completed internships from three months to three years in the United States¹⁴. One of these employees was general J. Šedivý, who studied at the US Army War College in 1993-1994. Exchange programs have contributed to bilateral cooperation and the implementation of integration policies in transatlantic and European security structures. In addition, in order to modernize the military forces of the Czech Republic, align their professional level and training with NATO norms and standards in 1996, under the “Foreign Military Financing” program, Washington allocated more than \$87 million for advisory assistance and restructuring of the army¹⁵.

An integral condition for Washington’s support for the Czech Republic was the formation of a regulatory framework in the field of foreign and security policy, the preparation of strategic documents in the field of security and defense. Among these documents were the “Law on the Army of the Czech Republic” (1993) and The Military Strategy (1994), which declared the need to form a strong army “ready to respond to any security threat or military attack of the enemy and use the potential of the international security structures and NATO allies.”¹⁶

After the NATO summit in Madrid and receiving an invitation to become a member of the transatlantic security system in July 1997, the Czech government approved the first National Defense Strategy. The document contained wording on the need for systemic changes in the defense policy approach, provided for the creation of a unified security system and proclaimed NATO membership as a means of improving the security and defense of the Czech Republic¹⁷; conditions for the participation of military units outside of the state (with the consent of the parliament); an important document in the field of security policy of the Czech Republic was adopted – Constitutional Law No. 110/1998 “On the Security of the Czech Republic”, which as the main duty of the state defined protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

¹⁴ Ibid., s. 131.

¹⁵ Military spending of the Czech Republic. Global security. URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/cz-budget.html> [20.04.2020].

¹⁶ Bezpečnostní strategie 1999. České strategické dokumenty. URL: <http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/002.pdf> [20.04.2020].

¹⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty, other documents and Summit Declarations. NATO Archives. Files on-line. URL: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049c.html>. [20.04.2020].

the Czech Republic, “protection of democratic values, life, health and property of citizens as the main value”¹⁸.

The next regulatory document that came into force in the event of a critical security situation in the Czech Republic was Decree No. 33 of the government of the Czech Republic dated 11.01.1999. The document allowed the government to gather interdepartmental commissions in a short time to respond to the crisis situation and form an administrative apparatus responsible for the security and defense of the Czech Republic¹⁹.

Despite previous agreements on the formal expansion of NATO during the anniversary summit in April 1999, the US government was interested in signing ratifications as soon as possible. This was defined by the US interest in the transatlantic military intervention against Yugoslavia and the crisis of negotiations on the need to review the new strategic concept of NATO (1991). The increased attention to the security system in Europe on the part of the United States is also explained by the negative reaction of the Russian Federation to the process of integration of the Czech Republic with the Alliance. Threats to block the “START II” Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the “advance” of Russian propaganda in the Czech media space may indicate a “clash” of Russian aspirations to influence the policy of the CEE states with Prague’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Therefore, the negative position of the Russian Federation motivated Washington to focus more material and non-material efforts in expanding NATO even before the summit began.

To this end, on December 8-9, 1998, at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the NATO member states in Brussels, it was decided that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary would become NATO members before April 1999²⁰. However, the intention to ratify the NATO membership agreements caused considerable discussions in the US Congress. Representatives of the Republican Party and Liberals of the Democratic Party opposed the “expansion” of NATO²¹. They pointed out that the conditions for NATO membership were not met, that the military forces were not prepared, that they were unable to maintain a certain level of funding for the integration process of states applying for NATO membership, and so on. Only the intervention of President Clinton, the involvement of experts and representatives of ethnic groups – Americans of Polish, Czech and Hungarian origin – to participate in the hearings on the “expansion” of NATO, changed the negative positions on the integration of the Czech Republic into NATO. An important role before the approval of the ratification agreements of the Czech Republic’s membership in NATO was also played by M. Albright, who assured the

¹⁸ Vláda České republiky vyjádřila souhlas se členstvím v NATO přijela Ústavní Zákon pro Českou bezpečnost 21.1. 1998. Poslanecká sněmovna PČR, tisk 384/0 -PS 1996-1998. Zpráva o zahraniční politice České republiky - MZV ČR. URL: www.mzv.cz/file/13970/zahr.pol._i.doc. [10.04.2020].

¹⁹ Kapitoly o bezpečnosti, red. M. Balabán, A. Rašek, L. Stejskal, Praha, 2008, s. 215.

²⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty, other documents and Summit Declarations. NATO Archives. URL: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>. [20.04.2020].

²¹ Ibid.

US leadership of the need to “expand” the alliance as one of the steps to prevent the spread of Russian influence in the post-communist CEE states.

Despite discussions in the Congress, the US Senate approved and ratified the protocols on Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary’s accession to NATO. After the vote, one of the leaders of the Republican Party, J. V. Rose, explained his position on expanding the Alliance by saying that “otherwise, the Russian Federation will return the “sphere of influence” at the expense of Central Europe.”²² The Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, republican J. Helms, believed that “support of the NATO expansion in the US Senate will contribute to the restoration of historical justice in Yalta, the realization of US national interests and the strengthening of democracy in Europe.”²³

As a result of lobbying for the NATO “expansion” process by the United States, in February 1999, President V. Havel signed an Agreement on the Czech Republic’s accession to the Alliance, and on March 12, Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Kavan received the Agreement from the hands of US Secretary of State M. Albright. In a media report, Kavan said: “This treaty is the result of the Czech Republic’s efforts towards full membership in NATO and the US efforts to consolidate the status of a permanent ally for the CEE states.”²⁴ The entry of the Czech Republic into NATO took place together with the ratification of two main treaties – the Act on the Status of Military Forces of Other States on the Territory of the Czech Republic and the Constitutional Act, which defined the conditions for sending Czech troops to international missions and operations, the activities of internal armed forces and participation in international defense organizations²⁵. Responsibility for the implementation of these regulatory documents was divided between the government and parliament.

At the domestic level, the final consolidation of the security policy of the Czech Republic took place in the same year, 1999, when the Czech Security Strategy adopted by the Parliament came into force. The document established the priority of NATO norms and compliance with the main regulatory legal acts of the Alliance, and also proclaimed the strategic interest of partnership with the United States and the EU in the field of security and defense policy²⁶. For the first time, the main security policy document clearly defined the security environment of the Czech Republic, national interests (which were divided into “vital”, “strategic” and “important”), risks and threats of the Czech Republic; the obligation to train the armed forces for actions in military operations within the framework of NATO multinational forces and the like was

²² Declaration on strategic cooperation in defense between the Czech Republic and the United States. Embassy of the United States in the Czech Republic. URL: http://www.aic.cz/press/Declaration_on_strategic_defense_cooperation.pdf, p. 112. [20.04.2020].

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

²⁴ Zpráva o zahraniční politice České republiky za období od ledna 2006 do prosince 2006. Praha: Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, 2007. s. 156.

²⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty, other documents and Summit Declarations. NATO Archives. URL: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html> [20.04.2020].

²⁶ Bezpečnostní strategie 1999. České strategické dokumenty. URL: <http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/002.pdf>. [20.04.2020].

declared²⁷. The Security Strategy was supplemented by the adoption of the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic. In the same year, the “Concept of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic until 2009” was approved, the basic principles of which defined the norms for modernizing the armed forces to the NATO level and updating the personnel of the security system.

Therefore, the first Security Strategy of the Czech Republic was adopted in accordance with the commitments of the state security concept within the framework of NATO membership. The change in NATO’s Strategic Concept in 2000 for the Czech Republic meant the need to change its approaches to the Czech security system under the terms of membership in the Alliance. The document supplemented the concepts of “risk” and “threat”, fixed provisions on the priority of the EU integration and cooperation with the United States, and focused on the prevention of internal threats and the implementation of NATO membership commitments.

The next stage in the transformation of the Czech security policy was caused by the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the change in the NATO Strategic Concept adopted at the Prague Summit in 2002²⁸. Declaring its solidarity in the fight against terrorism, the Czech government adopted a new “Concept of Czech Foreign Policy 2003-2006” and modified the Security Strategy by adopting a new version in December 2003²⁹. Both documents consolidated the fight against terrorism as a top priority of security policy, and the Czech Republic provided for strengthening its participation in NATO by strengthening its own defense capabilities. The Foreign Policy Concept cemented the role of the United States as a reliable partner, and NATO as a guarantor of security, a “solid force” and a tool for maintaining American forces in the region³⁰. Compared to the 1999 Strategy, the next two versions of the main security document are more expressive, expanded and conceptual. The main difference is a change in the assessment of risks and threats facing the state security policy and ways to combat them. The key “security risks” in the 1999 Security Strategy are: “natural disasters, food and environmental disasters, pandemics”³¹, that is, factors that fall within the sphere of internal security. And the 2001 Security Strategy recognizes the development of the situation in southern Europe as the main threat to the European security system. The change in the emphasis on security threats in the security strategy of the Czech Republic is due to changes in the security policy of the NATO ally – the United States.

The next version of the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic was adopted in 2003. It consolidated the need to fight terrorism as the main threat, pointed out the possibility of

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Prague Summit Declaration, listopad 2002. NATO. URL: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>. [28.04.2020].

²⁹ Bezpečnostní strategie 2003. České strategické dokumenty. URL: <http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/2003%20Bezpecnostni%20strategie%20CR.pdf>. [28.04.2020].

³⁰ Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 1999, 2003, 2011. Ministerstvo obrany CR. Strategické dokumenty. URL: <http://www.army.cz/scripts/modules/fg/fulltxt.php?searchtext=Security+Strategy&x=12&y=7&site=site%3Awww.army.cz+OR+site%3Awww.mocr.army.cz+OR+site%3Awww.acr.army.cz+OR+site%3Awww.mise.army.cz&expr=&filter=0&locale=CZ&sort=rank&tmplid=369/> [28.04.2020].

³¹ Bezpečnostní strategie 1999. České strategické dokumenty. URL: <http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/002.pdf>. [28.04.2020].

using “hard power” together with NATO allies, if necessary. The Strategy also consolidated the indivisibility of the Euro-Atlantic space and declared support for projects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense policy (CSDP), provided that they do not contradict NATO standards. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs C. Svoboda explained that “the issue of mutual cooperation within NATO and the EU plays a key role for the foreign policy of the Czech Republic. But a common foreign and defense policy should complement Euro-Atlantic relations. NATO is more important for us.”³² Therefore, the Czech Republic has formed two main directions of foreign policy – European and Atlantic. According to R. Joch, this created an opportunity for the Czech Republic and other CEE states to become a “link” of Western states, the “old members” of NATO, and the United States³³. R. Khol also wrote about the reverse influence of the Czech Republic on the United States in the common security and defense policy and the interests of Europe³⁴.

Analyzing the main foreign policy line of the Czech Republic governments, we want to point out that along with consolidating the key role of NATO for collective and individual security systems, the development of good relations and close cooperation both with the United States within NATO and the EU, and at the bilateral level, one of the most important priorities of the foreign policy of the Czech Republic was confirmed, regardless of the ideological or political orientation of the government. In the Foreign Policy Concept of the government, V. Špidla (2002-2004) set the main role of the United States in transatlantic relations and as a guarantor of the European security system³⁵. Priorities of the next government of S. Gross (2004-2005) followed the transatlantic tradition of foreign policy, “strengthening partnership relations between the EU, the United States and Canada” and confirmed “readiness to jointly fight modern dangers and threats, including international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international crime.”³⁶ Similarly, the government of J. Paroubek (2005-2006)³⁷, M. Topolánek (2006-2007, 2007-2009)³⁸, J. Fischer (2009-2010)³⁹, P. Nečas (2010-2013)⁴⁰, J. Rusnok (2013-2014)⁴¹ and B. Sobotka (2014-2017) considered partnership with Washington.

³² Perspektivy české zahraniční politiky, rozhovor s Cylem Svobodou, “Mezinárodní politika” 2004, nr. 28, s. 4. URL: <http://www.iir.cz/upload/MP/MPArchive/2004/MP012004.pdf> [29.04.2020].

³³ R. Joch. Je – amá být – česká zahraniční politikapromacrická? “Mezinárodní politika” 2007, nr. 31, s. 2.

³⁴ R. Khol, F. Šulc. Protiraketová obrana: americký projekta jeho mezinárodní souvislosti, Praha, 2004, s. 7.

³⁵ R. Khol. Česká bezpečnostní politika 1993-2004. [w:] O. Pick, V. Handl (Eds.). Zahraniční politika České republiky 1993–2004. Úspechi, problémy a perspektivy. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2004, s. 44.

³⁶ Zahraniční politika ČR. Data, č. 1-7, 2010. Praha: MZV ČR. S. 222-229.

³⁷ Zpráva o zahraniční politice České republiky za období od ledna 2004 do prosince 2004. Praha: Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, 2005, s. 210.

³⁸ Zpráva o zahraniční politice České republiky za období od ledna 2006 do prosince 2006. Praha: Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, 2007, s. 96.; Zpráva o zahraniční politice České republiky za období od ledna 2007 do prosince 2007. Praha: Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, 2008, s. 325.

³⁹ Zahraniční politika ČR za rok 2008. Data, č. 1, 2009. Praha: MZV ČR, s. 178.

⁴⁰ Zahraniční politika ČR. Data, č. 1-7, 2010. Praha: MZV ČR. s. 243.

⁴¹ Česká zahraniční politika v roce 2013: Analýza ÚMV, red. M. Kořanek a kol., Praha, 2014, s. 197.

A kind of generalization and “extension” of the concept of security policy at the international, state and local levels is the Security Strategy 2011, which extends the responsibility for maintaining security not only to state players, but also to the level of international organizations, that the CR is a member of, and local administrations, responsible for implementing security policy at the local level. The main external threats are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and so on. Natural safety risks come last. But an important task of security policy is “the development of a comprehensive, hierarchically organized security system that combines political (internal and external) and military means in ensuring internal and external security systems, protecting the population, economic and financial stability at the legislative and social levels.”⁴²

The security system clearly defined the bodies that implement the security policy of the Czech Republic: “the President, parliament, government, the National Security Council and state authorities at the central, regional and local levels, the armed forces, military security detachments, intelligence and rescue agencies, as well as emergency services.”⁴³ The role of the highest institutions which ensure the security of the state is to perform legislative, executive, and control functions. Thus, the Parliament of the Czech Republic approves laws in the field of security and defense of the state, participates in the formation of security policy and decision-making on the participation of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in international operations. In addition to its legislative function, the parliament also serves as a control body over the activities of the government, state institutions and organizations in the field of security and defense. The functions of monitoring and supervising the state of security and defense are performed by the relevant bodies of the parliament: the Security and Defense Committee operates in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, and the Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Committee operates in the Senate of the Czech Republic. The President of the state is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces and has the right to vote during meetings of the government and the National Security Council. During a military crisis, the president’s functions are expanded. However, in the absence of a military threat, the president is not endowed with special functions.

The 2011 Security Strategy consolidated the indivisibility of the security policy of the Czech Republic and its commonality with the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and the global security system, “one of the country’s long-term interests is to maintain the effective role of the UN and promote the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region.”⁴⁴ The Czech Republic’s accession to NATO contributed to the reform of the military and defense sectors, began the process of professionalization of the army and the formation of a regulatory framework for security policy. The PfP program has become a key form of Czech-American cooperation in

⁴² Bezpečnostní strategie 2011. Ministry of Foreign Affairs České Republiky. URL: https://www.mzv.cz/file/699914/Bezpecnostni_strategie_CR_2011.pdf [14.12.2020].

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

the transition phase, the transition of the Czech Republic to the standards and norms of the so-called first “wave of expansion” of NATO. US support for the foreign policy aspirations of the Czech Republic as part of the collective security system has achieved the goal of maintaining the presence of the Czech Republic and its allies in the transatlantic security system in the context of transformation in Europe and the Balkans.

Proclaiming integration with NATO as the main direction of the Czech Republic’s foreign policy, reforming the armed forces and bringing them in line with the Alliance’s standards has become a priority along with the formation of an independent state. But changing approaches to security and defense policy and modernizing the military sector required increasing expenses on the needs of the national defense industry, forming the foundations of control and management. The effectiveness of the change process and the compliance of the defense complex with NATO standards became obvious at the initial stages of integration, but full membership raised doubts about the defense capabilities of the Czech Republic.

The period of 1999-2003 was particularly active in the development of the security and defense policy of the Czech Republic at the strategic and tactical levels. NATO membership regulated the legal status of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in international operations together with the Alliance forces, expanded the possibilities of joint training events at the military base in Pardubice. During this period, defense spending corresponded to the minimum set by NATO and fluctuated at the level of 2.1% – 2.35%. The increase in military and defense spending is associated with the participation of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in NATO operations: 1999 – the beginning of the operation in Kosovo, 2001 – in Afghanistan and 2003. – in Iraq. But since 2004, there has been a decline in them. This led to the completion of one of the stages of professionalization of the army, its transition to a contract basis (2004) and simultaneous continuation of participation in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

From 2006 to 2014, there was a further decline in defense spending – from 1.72% to 1.08%. In official documents of the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic, the reduction in defense spending was explained by the absence of serious threats to national security. In our opinion, the reduction in the level of spending on the defense complex had several factors. First, there is a general decline in security and defense spending among CEE states. Only Poland managed to keep its defense budget at 2% during the crisis. Secondly, the increase in spending was directed to defense mechanisms for protecting airspace, the purchase of armored personnel carriers and light utility vehicles, the modernization of mechanized troops, transport helicopters, etc., in particular, the purchase of multifunctional combat aircraft “L-159 Alca” in 1999-2008 and the modernization of tanks “T-72M4 CZ” in 2000-2005. However, out of 72 purchased combat aircrafts, only 24 were involved in international missions⁴⁵. Third, the 2008 financial crisis negatively affected the reduction of the defense budget, as a result of which the state budget

⁴⁵ J. Kufčák: The V4 Countries and the Impacts of the Austerity Cuts on their Defence Spending and Armed Forces. “Obrana a strategie” 2014, nr. 2, s. 35-48.

deficit increased from 2.7% of GDP in 2008. Thus, the national debt of the Czech Republic increased from 30% of GDP in 2008 to 35% in 2009. In the context of the state budget deficit, defense spending halved⁴⁶.

Conclusions. So, the integration of the Czech Republic into NATO became an inevitable factor in the formation of the security system of Central European states and was part not only of the vital interests of candidate States for NATO membership, but also of Washington's policy on the European continent. The asymmetry of potentials and the lack of formation of the Czech security sector, as well as other CEE states, allowed Washington to fill the niche of the so-called "security guarantor" and create an image of a long-term strategic partnership. At the same time, from the point of view of the interests of the security policy of the Czech Republic, partnership and cooperation with the United States during the transition stage created conditions and tools for the integration of the Czech Republic into the European and transatlantic security systems.

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⁴⁶ Česká zahraniční politikavroce 2011: Analýza ÚMV, red. M. Kořan, O. Ditrych, Praha, 2012, s. 297.

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FEATURES OF THE FORMATION AND CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The article is devoted to analyzing the peculiarities of the formation, management and current state of development of cultural and social diversity, including through the policy of multiculturalism, in the United Kingdom or, in particular, in Great Britain. This issue has been systematized due to the author's own reflections and taking into account some corrections at the background of the political process in the United Kingdom both before and after the disintegration of the country from the European Union. As a result, the researcher clarified the parameters of cultural and social diversity evolution at the background of the stages of formation and development of the phenomenon and policy of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom. It has been found that both civil society and, at most, political actors in the United Kingdom both simultaneously reject and support cultural diversity as a political goal and set of practices. As a result, the rhetoric of mobilized or politicized, limited or defective and inclusive or integrative, but not polycentric multiculturalism takes shape in the country. However, in contrast, there has been theorized and reflected the irreconcilable and antagonistic opposition of multiculturalism to multiculturalism (social and cultural diversity), which inevitably contributes to the politicization of this issue in the United Kingdom

Keywords: social and cultural diversity, multiculturalism, United Kingdom.

CHARAKTERYSTYKA KSZTAŁCENIA I OBECNY STAN ROZWOJU I ZARZĄDZANIA RÓŻNORODNOŚCIĄ KULTUROWĄ I SPOŁECZNĄ W WIELKIEJ BRYTANII

Artykuł analizuje specyfikę kształtowania się, zarządzania i aktualny stan rozwoju różnorodności kulturowej i społecznej, w tym poprzez politykę wielokulturowości, w Zjednoczonym Królestwie, a w szczególności w Wielkiej Brytanii. Kwestia ta jest usystematyzowana poprzez własne przemyślenia autorskie oraz z uwzględnieniem pewnych korekt na tle procesu politycznego w Wielkiej Brytanii zarówno przed, jak po wystąpieniu tego państwa z Unii Europejskiej. W rezultacie doprecyzowano parametry ewolucji różnorodności kulturowej i społecznej na tle etapów powstawania i rozwoju zjawiska i polityki wielokulturowości w Wielkiej Brytanii. Stwierdzono, że zarówno społeczeństwo obywatelskie, jak i co najwyżej aktorzy polityczni w Wielkiej Brytanii jednocześnie odrzucają i wspierają różnorodność kulturową jako cel polityczny i zestaw praktyk. W rezultacie nabiera kształtów retoryka zmobilizowanego lub upolitycznionego,

ograniczonego lub ułomnego, włączającego lub integrującego, ale nie policentrycznego multikulturalizmu. Natomiast w Wielkiej Brytanii nie do pogodzenia i antagonistyczny sprzeciw wielokulturalizmu wobec wielokulturowości (różnorodności społecznej i kulturowej) jest teoretyzowany i odzwierciedlany, co nieuchronnie przyczynia się do upolitycznienia tego tematu.

Słowa kluczowe: różnorodność społeczna i kulturowa, wielokulturowość, Wielka Brytania.

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ СТАНОВЛЕННЯ І ЧИННИЙ СТАН РОЗВИТКУ Й УПРАВЛІННЯ КУЛЬТУРНИМ ТА СОЦІАЛЬНИМ РОЗМАЇТТЯМ У СПОЛУЧЕНОМУ КОРОЛІВСТВІ

У статті проаналізовано особливості становлення, управління та чинного стану розвитку культурного і соціального розмаїття, в тому числі за рахунок політики мультикультуралізму, у Сполученому Королівстві чи, зокрема, у Великій Британії. Цю проблематику систематизовано за рахунок власних авторських рефлексій та врахування деяких корекцій на тлі політичного процесу у Сполученому Королівстві як до, так і після виходу цієї держави з Європейського Союзу. У результаті з'ясовано параметри еволюції культурного та соціального розмаїття на тлі етапів становлення і розвитку феномена й політики мультикультуралізму в Сполученому Королівстві. Встановлено, що і громадянське суспільство, і щонайбільше політичні актори у Сполученому Королівстві чинно одночасно відкидають та підтримують розмаїття культур як політичну мету і набір практик. Як наслідок цього, оформлюється риторика мобілізованого чи політизованого, обмеженого або неповноцінного та інклюзивного або інтегративного, але не поліцентричного мультикультуралізму. Хоч, на противагу, у Сполученому Королівстві теоретизовано і рефлексовано непримиренне та антагоністичне протиставлення мультикультуралізму мультикультурності (соціальному та культурному розмаїттю), яке неодмінно сприяє політизації цієї тематики.

Ключові слова: соціальне і культурне розмаїття, мультикультуралізм, Сполучене Королівство.

Since the end of the Second World War the modern, especially the European world, is still characterized by constant globalization and expansion of the spectrum, directions and types of migration and intersection of different forms of identity, and therefore more and more culturally and socially diverse. As a result, the countries of the modern world sooner or later face the issue of managing and regulating the processes and aspects of cultural and social diversity, which are addressed in different ways, in particular in the format of policies of assimilation, multiculturalism, integration, cosmopolitanism, etc., but first of all taking into account the specifics of

national identity, phenomenon, model and structure of citizenship, demographic composition of the population, socio-political perception of migration and positions on this subject of basic political and civic actors in a country or even part of the world. The region of Europe, especially its western part, and a Western European country such as the United Kingdom / Great Britain are no exception, but rather an empirical example in this sense (in this study, we deliberately use these names mostly as synonyms, and otherwise make clarifications), which today, but most after the creation and gradual enlargement of the European Union and its evolutionary prototypes, are marked by perhaps the greatest intertwining of socio-political processes, social life, different groups, and therefore different cultures and identities, which are formed from an array of causes and interdependencies. However, the situation in the case of the United Kingdom is extremely relevant, because, on the one hand, Europe as a part of the world is very heterogeneous in this context, and, on the other hand, it is very specific (before disintegration from the European Union) political and managerial the paradigm of perception and management of cultural diversity basically in the United Kingdom. All these things have raised, and still put on the research agenda the issue of the formation, management and current state of development of cultural and social diversity, including due to the policy of multiculturalism, in the United Kingdom.

The stated analytical, theoretical and practical issues are very clearly represented in the scientific works of such scientists as S. Adachi¹, Y. Alibhai-Brown², R. Ashcroft and M. Bevir³, R. Brubaker⁴, T. Cantle⁵, L. Colley⁶, A. Ellis⁷, H. Goulbourne⁸, R. Hansen⁹, S. Hussain¹⁰, C. Joppke and E. Morawska¹¹, A. Kundnani¹², W. Kymlicka¹³, V. Latour¹⁴, N. Meer and T. Modood¹⁵,

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C. Mitchell¹⁶, R. Muir and M. Wetherell¹⁷, P. Panayi¹⁸, B. Parekh¹⁹, P. Pathak²⁰, B. Pitcher²¹, V. Uberoi²², S. Vertovec²³. We will try to systematize this issue through our own author's reflections and taking into account some corrections against the background of the political process in the United Kingdom both before and after the withdrawal of this country from the European Union.

Moreover, acquaintance with the historiographical, and hence the theoretical and methodological basis of our study provides the appropriate prerequisites and grounds to appeal to the history, parameters and current state of development of cultural and social diversity in GB formed evolutionarily and largely politically determined, especially after the Second World War, and distinguish this country from other countries in Europe and the world. That is why our article is focused on the formation of cultural, political, legal, civic and other attributes and practices of cultural and social diversity in the UK, including against the European background.

We decided to focus on the stated issues primarily on addressing the phenomenon and statistics of immigration and social and cultural diversity in GB, both in retrospect (evolutionarily and currently) in the future. The fact is that the colonial heritage of the United Kingdom, together with various immigration movements in the 20th century, has led to an unprecedented diversity of ethnic, linguistic, racial and other groups, cultures and religions in the population of this state. A direct manifestation of this was the fact that according to the results of the last (as of the time of the study) census (on 2011²⁴, including its fourth release from 2014) and estimates of the authoritative organization "Worldometer" (in 2021²⁵) in the United Kingdom there were as many as 8 million representatives (and in 2001, according to the previous census, there were only 4.5 million²⁶) of the so-called "ethnic minorities" (out of more than 63 million of the total population according to the census and more than 68 million population according to "Worldometer"), which were concentrated mainly in England and its largest cities (especially in London, to a lesser extent in Birmingham, Liverpool, Newcastle, Leicester and some other cities). Of these, at least 4.3 million were Asian or British-Asian, 1.9 million were black or black Britons, and finally 1.2 million were of mixed ethnicity.

Although the largest number of immigrants in the United Kingdom at this time (in descending order of their total population from 2019 as of 2019) were from countries such as India, Poland, Pakistan, Romania, Ireland, Germany, Bangladesh, South Africa, Italy, China, Nigeria (for details, see Table 1).

¹⁶ Mitchell C., Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2006

¹⁷ Muir R., Wetherell M., Identity, Politics and Public Policy, Wyd. Institute for Public Policy Research 2010.

¹⁸ Panayi P., An Immigration History of Great Britain: Multicultural Racism since 1800, Wyd. Pearson Longman 2010.

¹⁹ Parekh B., Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2006

²⁰ Pathak P., The Future of Multicultural Britain: Confronting the Progressive Dilemma, Wyd. Edinburgh University Press 2008.

²¹ Pitcher B., The Politics of Multiculturalism: Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2009.

²² Uberoi V., Modood T., Inclusive Britishness: A Multiculturalist Advance, "Political Studies" 2013, vol 61, s. 23-41.

²³ Vertovec S., Super-diversity and its implications, "Ethnic and Racial Studies" 2007, vol 30, nr. 6, s. 1024-1054.

²⁴ Census 2011, Wyd. census.gov.uk, źródło: URL: <https://census.gov.uk/> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

²⁵ U.K. Population (Live), Wyd. Worldometers, źródło: <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uk-population/> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

²⁶ Modood T., Dobbernack J., Meer N., Great Britain, Wyd. School of Social and Political Science 2012.

Table 1. The largest ethnic groups and their countries of birth / origin in the population structure of the United Kingdom (as of 2001–2019)²⁷

Nº	Country of birth or origin	National Census (2001)	United Nations assessment (2015)	Data from the Office for National Statistics (2019)
1	India	467 634	776 603	863 000
2	Poland	60 711	703 050	818 000
3	Pakistan	321 167	540 495	547 000
4	Romania	7 631	89 402	427 000
5	Ireland	537 108	503 288	360 000
6	Germany	266 136	322 220	289 000
7	Bangladesh	154 362	230 143	260 000
8	SAR	141 405	218 732	252 000
9	Italy	107 244	151 790	233 000
10	China	51 078	182 628	217 000
11	Nigeria	88 378	216 268	215 000
12	France	96 281	149 872	185 000
13	Lithuania	4 363	116 861	168 000
14	Portugal	36 555	98 967	165 000
15	USA	158 434	212 150	161 000
16	Spain	54 482	91 179	159 000
17	Australia	107 871	135 786	153 000
18	Philippines	40 118	139 570	153 000
19	Zimbabwe	49 524	132 942	128 000
20	Bulgaria	5 351	51 875	128 000
21	Sri Lanka	67 938	138 752	126 000
22	Jamaica	146 401	172 829	123 000
23	Kenya	129 633	151 073	121 000
24	Ghana	56 112	102 837	114 000
25	Brasil	15 215	56 055	101 000
26	Somalia	43 532	110 775	99 000
27	Hungary	13 159	56 166	98 000
28	Canada	72 518	86 415	95 000
29	Latvia	4 275	66 046	89 000
30	Afghanistan	14 875	68 256	79 000
31	Nepal	5 943	54 695	76 000
32	Iran	42 494	91 087	72 000
33	Slovakia	5 273	67 781	72 000
34	Turkey	54 079	100 956	71 000
35	Netherlands	40 438	68 489	68 000
36	Iraq	32 236	80 939	67 000
37	New Zealand	58 286	67 276	67 000
38	Greece	35 169	39 700	66 000

²⁷ Foreign-born: 1 in 12 in UK born overseas, Wyd. Office for National Statistics 15 December 2005

Nº	Country of birth or origin	National Census (2001)	United Nations assessment (2015)	Data from the Office for National Statistics (2019)
39	Malaysia	49 886	75 182	61 000
40	Russia	15 160	42 491	59 000
41	Cyprus	77 673	84 815	57 000
42	Thailand	16 257	47 389	54 000
43	Uganda	55 213	65 447	52 000
44	Taiwan	6 588	H.д.	49 000
45	Syria	4 168	9 950	48 000
46	Albania	2 314	14 688	47 000
47	Singapore	40 474	45 351	44 000
48	Czech Republic	12 220	41 605	44 000
49	Sweden	22 525	35 055	42 000
50	Egypt	24 700	33 686	39 000
51	Japan	37 535	40 127	39 000
52	Ukraine	11 913	23 414	38 000
53	Colombia	12 331	27 691	38 000
54	Belgium	21 668	29 142	35 000
55	Mauritius	27 078	45 123	34 000
56	Saudis.Arabia	8 789	36 148	33 000
57	Sudan	10 671	19 758	33 000
58	Kosovo	N.D.	9 008	29 000
59	Zambia	21 529	30 897	29 000
60	Malta	30 178	31 758	27 000

Zródło: Ellis A., UK resident population by country of birth, "Population Trends" 2009, vol 135, nr. 135, s. 20-28.; *Foreign-born population of the United Kingdom*, zródło: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign-born_population_of_the_United_Kingdom[odczyt: 20.10.21].; *Country-of-birth database*, Wyd. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, zródło: <https://web.archive.org/web/20090617032129/http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/34792376.xls>[odczyt:20.10.21].; *Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin*, Wyd. UN database2015, zródło:https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/data/UN_MigrantStockByOriginAndDestination_2015.xlsx[odczyt: 20.10.21].; *Overseas-born population in the United Kingdom, excluding some residents in communal establishments, by sex, by country of birth, January 2019 to December 2019*, Wyd. Office for National Statistics, zródło:<https://www.ons.gov.uk/file?uri=%2fpeoplepopulationandcommunity%2fpopulationandmigration%2finternationalmigration%2fdatasets%2fpopulationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality%2fjanuary2019todecember2019/populationbycountryofbirthandnationalityjan19todec1919052020143312.xls>[odczyt: 20.10.21].

This is despite the fact that the population of the United Kingdom, born outside this country, in 2004 was 5.3 million people or ca. 8 percent, in 2011 – 7.9 million people or less than 13 percent, and already in 2018 – 9.3 million people or 14 percent of the total population (for details, see Table 2)²⁸, although a similar trend has been characteristic of Great Britain since the middle of the 20th century.

²⁸ Migrants in the UK: An Overview, Wyd. Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford (24 July 2020), zródło:<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-an-overview/>[odczyt: 20.10.21].

Table 2. Dynamics of change in the population of the United Kingdom born outside this country (as of 1951–2011)

Year of the census	The population born abroad	Increase in the percentage of such population for the previous decade,%	Percentage of such population of the total population,%
1951	2 118 600	0,0	4,2
1961	2 573 500	+21,5	4,9
1971	3 190 300	+24,0	5,8
1981	3 429 100	+7,5	6,2
1991	3 835 400	+11,8	6,7
2001	4 896 600	+27,7	8,3
2011	7 993 480	+63,0	12,7

Zródło: *Foreign-born population of the United Kingdom*, Wyd. Wikipedia, źródło: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign-born_population_of_the_United_Kingdom [odczyt: 20.10.21]; Rendall M., Salt J., *The foreign-born population*, [w:] *Focus on People and Migration: 2005 edition*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2005, s. 131–152.; *Migration in Great Britain: Census factsheet*, Wyd. Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, źródło: <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/migration-great-britain-census-factsheet> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

źródło: <https://web.archive.org/web/200602150114925/http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1312> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

And despite the fact that the total number of immigrants and new citizens of Great Britain from countries outside the European Union exceeded the number (but recently – not a percentage increase) of immigrants and new citizens of this country from EU member states²⁹, and the total number of immigrants and ethnic groups and minorities continued to be growing rapidly even after Brexit, the disintegration of the United Kingdom with the EU, – especially due to the increase in the share of the population of Asian Britons, black Britons and mixed Britons and instead the decrease in the share of the population of “white” Britons (partly see Table 3).

Table 3. Structuring major ethnic groups and minorities in the United Kingdom (as of 2001–2016)

Ethnic groups / minorities	Census 2001 p.		Census 2011 p.		Su8mming up in 2016 p.	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
“White” Britons: in total	54 153 898	92,12	55 073 552	87,17	56 668 000	86,32
Asian Britons: in total	2 578 826	4,39	4 373 339	6,92	4 722 000	7,19
Asian Britons: Indians	1 053 411	1,79	1 451 862	2,30	–	–
Asian Britons: Pakistanis	747 285	1,27	1 174 983	1,86	–	–
Asian Britons: Bangladeshis	283 063	0,48	451 529	0,71	–	–
Asian Britons: Chinese	247 403	0,42	433 150	0,69	–	–
Asian Britons: others	247 664	0,42	861 815	1,36	–	–

²⁹ Migrants in the UK: An Overview, Wyd. Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford (24 July 2020), źródło: <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-an-overview/> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; Vasileva K., *Population and social conditions: 6.5% of the EU population are foreigners and 9.4% are born abroad*, “Statistics in Focus (Eurostat)” 2011, vol 24. “Statistics in Focus (Eurostat)” 2011, vol 24. 20.10.21]; Research report on population estimates by characteristics, Wyd. ons.gov.uk (23 August 2017), źródło: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/methodologies/researchreportonpopulationestimatesbycharacteristics> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

Ethnic groups / minorities	Census 2001 p.		Census 2011 p.		Summing up in 2016 p.	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Black Britons: in total	1 148 738	1,95	1 904 684	3,01	2 065 000	3,15
Mixed Britons: in total	677 117	1,15	1 250 229	1,98	1 062 000	1,62
Others: in total	230 615	0,39	580 374	0,92	1 131 000	1,72
Aggregate	58 789 194	100,00	63 182 178	100,00	65 648 000	100,00

Zródło: 2001 Census KS06 Ethnic group: Key Statistics for local Authorities, źródło: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/census-2001-key-statistics/local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/local-authorities-ks06--ethnic-group.xls> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; 2011 Census: KS201UK Ethnic group, local authorities in the United Kingdom, źródło: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-and-quick-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-the-united-kingdom---part-1/rft-ks201uk.xls> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

Similar cultural and social heterogeneity is also evident in the case of the religious differences that characterize the United Kingdom. After all, despite the fact that the traditional religion in this country is Christianity, in England there is institutionalized Anglican Church, and in Scotland the “national” is the Presbyterian Church, even though it has no official status. In Wales and Northern Ireland, on the other hand, there have been no official churches since 1920 and 1871, respectively, but there is a significant degree of division between Roman Catholics and Protestants in these parts of the United Kingdom³⁰. However, the biggest problem, which stems from religious diversity and differences, is not that there are different denominations of Christianity in this country (because they are traditionally typical of “white” Britons), and that the influential and represented (with the constant growth of its membership and influence) are the rites primarily of Islam, as well as Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism, Buddhism, etc., which are professed mostly by ethnic groups or minorities in this country, including Asian Britons, blacks and mixed Britons³¹ (see Table 4 for details).

Table 4. Representation of the largest religions, denominations and religious communities in the population structure of the United Kingdom (as of 2001-2011)

Religion	Census 2001 p.		Census 2011 p.	
	Number of Worshippers	%	Number of Worshippers	%
Christianity	42 079 417	71,58	37 583 962	59,49
Islam	1 591 126	2,71	2 786 635	4,41
Hinduism	558 810	0,95	835 394	1,32
Sikhism	336 149	0,57	432 429	0,68

³⁰ Fraser A., *The King and the Catholics*, Wyd. Doubleday 2018.

³¹ Modood T., Berthoud R., Lakey J., *Ethnic minorities in Britain: diversity and disadvantage*, Wyd. Policy Studies Institute 1997; *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, Wyd. Runnymede Trust 2000, s. 236. Religion (2001 Census), Wyd. data.gov.uk, źródło: http://data.gov.uk/dataset/religion_2001_census [odczyt: 20.10.21]; 2011 Census: KS209EW Religion, local authorities in England and Wales, Wyd. ons.gov.uk, źródło: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcn%3A77-286262> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; Religion: KS211NI (administrative geographies), Wyd. nisra.gov.uk, źródło: <http://www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/public/Theme.aspx?themeNumber=136&themeName=Census%202011> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; Census 2001: Religion (administrative geographies), Wyd. nisra.gov.uk, źródło: <http://www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/public/Theme.aspx?themeNumber=135&themeName=Census%202001> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

Religion	Census 2001 p.		Census 2011 p.	
	Number of Worshippers	%	Number of Worshippers	%
Judaism	266 740	0,45	269 568	0,43
Buddhism	151 816	0,26	261 584	0,41
Other religions	178837	0,30	262 774	0,42
Atheism	13 626299	23,18	16 221 509	25,67
Undefined religion			4 528 323	7,17
Aggregate	58 789 194	100,00	63 182 178	100,00

Zródło: 2011 Census: KS209EW Religion, local authorities in England and Wales, Wyd. ons.gov.uk, źródło: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcn%3A77-286262> [odczyt: 20.10.21].; Religion (2001 Census), Wyd. data.gov.uk, źródło: http://data.gov.uk/dataset/religion_2001_census [odczyt: 20.10.21].; 2011

In particular, the number of adherents of Islam (primarily due to Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Hindus, as well as some “whites”, and generally due to immigrants of South Asian descent, who among Muslims – 2/3) as of 2011 was in the UK almost 2.8 million people or 4.4 percent of the total population, although in 2001 their number and share was almost twice as small. A similar logic of increasing the number of some religions members during the same period was typical of Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and some other religions, as well as non-religious groups, but was not typical of Judaism and Christianity (their number did not increase, or even significantly) decreased³². In addition, there has been a recent trend in the United Kingdom as to reduction of the worshippers proportion among the “white” population and to increase the proportion of believers among ethnic groups³³, as a result, the (socio-political) division on the basis of religion is increasingly and intensively put on the agenda and politicized in the context of social and cultural diversity in this country³⁴, especially due to the sharp decline in traditional Christianity³⁵ (especially among young people³⁶).

The problem of political, social and cultural disparities in the United Kingdom is also statistically exacerbated by the fact that not all people in the country, especially not all ethnic and minority groups, are fluent in English. After all, even though English, which is actually the official language of the United Kingdom as a native or the first spoken by 95 per cent of the population, there are six regional languages in the country, including Scottish, Ulster-Scottish, Welsh, Cornish, Irish and

³² Modood T., Dobbernack J., Meer N., Great Britain, Wyd. School of Social and Political Science 2012.

³³ Booth R., Census 2011 data on religion reveals Jedi Knights are in decline, “The Guardian” 11 December 2012, źródło: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/11/census-data-religion-jedi-knights> [odczyt: 20.10.21].; Census 2011 – Any other religion?, Wyd. www.brin.ac.uk, źródło: <http://www.brin.ac.uk/census-2011-any-other-religion/> [odczyt: 20.10.21].; Lipka M., Cameron’s Christian country: What the numbers say about religion in the United Kingdom, Wyd. Pew Research 2014, źródło: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/24/camrons-christian-country-what-the-numbers-say-about-religion-in-the-united-kingdom/> [odczyt: 20.10.21]

³⁴ Mitchell C., Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2006, s. 69–117

³⁵ Religious Affiliation, Wyd. British Social Attitudes (Archived on 27 September 2017), źródło: <https://web.archive.org/web/20170927052351/http://www.natcen.ac.uk/media/1469605/BSA-religion.pdf> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

³⁶ 70% of young Brits are “not religious”, BBC News” 21 March 2018, źródło: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-43485581> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

Scottish Gaelic, which are protected by the European Charter of the regional or minority languages, as well as British law, although rarely the subject of direct politicization. Instead, more significant are the problems arising from the use of certain languages as native speakers by immigrants and various members of ethnic and minority groups, primarily Poles (the second most common language in the United Kingdom), French, Chinese, Spanish, Portuguese, etc., and Bengali, Arabic and Tamil and Punjabi, Urdu, etc.³⁷. The fact is that it is for immigrants that languages are very often the subject of identity, and that is why they insist on being given them official, special or specific status, as well as being included in the subject of national referendums in the United Kingdom. It follows that language is not an independent but an ancillary factor in outlining social and cultural diversity in the analyzed state, in particular by addressing the national and racial identities of individual social and cultural groups. This is best evidenced by the fact that in the United Kingdom there are huge differences in national identity, both among the natives of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and between immigrants and ethnic and religious groups in each of these parts of the United Kingdom and in this country as a whole (for details, see Table 5).

Table 5. Diversity of national identities in the population structure of the United Kingdom and its administrative and political components (as of 2011)

National identity	Great Britain	England	Scotland	Wales	Northern Ireland
Only English	51,41	60,38	2,28	11,22	0,60
Only Scottish	5,93	0,79	62,43	0,50	0,37
Only Welsh	3,26	0,55	0,15	57,51	0,06
Only Northern Irish	0,81	0,21	0,33	0,14	20,94
Only British	18,77	19,19	8,37	16,95	39,89
Only English and British	7,82	9,09	1,26	1,54	0,27
Only Scottish and British	1,67	0,15	18,29	0,07	0,09
Only Welsh and British	0,44	0,11	0,06	7,11	0,02
Only Northern Irish and British	0,22	0,03	0,15	0,02	6,17
Other identities' combinations in GB	0,45	0,37	1,01	1,10	0,13
Other identities' combinations inside and outside GB	0,97	0,90	1,25	0,43	3,05
Only Irish	1,31	0,64	0,41	0,32	25,26
Other identities	6,94	7,59	4,01	3,10	3,12

Zródło: 2011 Census, *England and Wales: National identity (detailed), local authorities in England and Wales*, Wyd.ons.gov.uk, źródło: URL: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/quick-statistics-for-england-and-wales-on-national-identity--passports-held-and-country-of-birth/rft---qs214ew.xls>[odczyt: 20.10.21].; 2011 Census, *Northern Ireland: National Identity – Full Detail*, Wyd.nisra.gov.uk, źródło: http://www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/Download/Census%202011_Excel/2011/QS205NI.xls[odczyt: 20.10.21].; 2011 Census, *Scotland: National identity (detailed)*, Wyd. Wayback Machine, źródło:http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/documents/censusresults/release2a/rel2A_NationalIdentity_detailed_Scotland.xls [odczyt: 20.10.21].

³⁷ Ballard R., *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*, Wyd. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd 1994.; Hussain S., *Missing From the "Minority Mainstream": Pahari-speaking Diaspora in Britain*, "Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development" 2015, vol 36, nr 5, s. 483-497.

This calls into question the expediency of highlighting and filling the phenomenon of Britishness or British national identity with content, although this is the phenomenon that British politicians have increasingly addressed and still appeal to³⁸. Moreover, given all this, it has been and remains that cultural and social diversity in the United Kingdom is extremely complex and multifaceted and is typically at the intersection of its understanding between old and established models of post-immigration diversity and new models of immigration, settlement and cultural differences³⁹. This is evidenced by the presence in the United Kingdom, particularly in large urban centers, of many groups of population that are marked by unprecedented diversity and are therefore often characterized as new forms of diversity, “super diversity”⁴⁰ or “hyper diversity”⁴¹ in a multicultural environment (not to be confused with multiculturalism⁴²), which often challenge the already traditional notion of how social and cultural differences should be taken into account and managed and what should be the political reactions to them⁴³. It is especially due to the constantly widening gap between policy and practice at all levels of social life⁴⁴ and the constantly increasing fragmentation of social and cultural differences⁴⁵. This is compounded by the fact that the long experience of Diaspora life of some groups of immigrants in the United Kingdom has led to, and subsequently developed, a tendency to form identities (often combined from different components, including religious, ethnic, linguistic, racial, etc.), who are willing and able to mobilize and / or politicize around complaints and shared claims and value expectations⁴⁶ focused on mutual respect, recognition and equality in a context of cultural and social diversity.

Against this background, and taking into account the remarks of a number of researchers and the official or nominal position of the government (successive governments) in the United Kingdom, it is clear that in this country after World War II was first developed and subsequently implied and implemented theory and the policy of multiculturalism in the context of diverse cultural and social groups and in general on the phenomenon of cultural and social diversity. However, the policy of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom has never been a one-time and one-way phenomenon, but instead has been characterized by certain causes of its origin, successive stages of its development and various consequences, which are of paramount and decisive importance for understanding British multiculturalism as such, in general and in the current (there is a great deal of research on this, so we will not focus separately on the details of British

³⁸ Modood T., Dobbernack J., Meer N., Great Britain, Wyd. School of Social and Political Science 2012.; Uberoi V., Modood T., *Inclusive Britishness: A Multiculturalist Advance*, “Political Studies” 2013, vol 61, s. 23-41.

³⁹ Modood T., Dobbernack J., Meer N., Great Britain, Wyd. School of Social and Political Science 2012.

⁴⁰ Vertovec S., *Super-diversity and its implications*, “Ethnic and Racial Studies” 2007, vol 30, nr. 6, s. 1024-1054.

⁴¹ Muir R., Wetherell M., *Identity, Politics and Public Policy*, Wyd. Institute for Public Policy Research 2010.

⁴² Parekh B., *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2006.

⁴³ Modood T., Dobbernack J., Meer N., Great Britain, Wyd. School of Social and Political Science 2012.

⁴⁴ Muir R., Wetherell M., *Identity, Politics and Public Policy*, Wyd. Institute for Public Policy Research 2010, s. 9.

⁴⁵ Vertovec S., *Super-diversity and its implications*, “Ethnic and Racial Studies” 2007, vol 30, nr. 6, s. 1027-1028.

⁴⁶ Modood T., Dobbernack J., Meer N., Great Britain, Wyd. School of Social and Political Science 2012

multiculturalism, as it should be the subject of separate investigations). After all, it is generally known that, on the one hand, historically and etymologically, the policy of multiculturalism in the UK did not arise suddenly, but had some foundations, which were dependent on the colonialism of the British Empire before World War II (and hence its control of vast territories) and immigration processes in the United Kingdom after World War II⁴⁷.

On the other hand, multiculturalism in the UK has raised, and continues to raise, fundamental issues on the structure and purpose of British public policy. However, the gradual stage of British multiculturalism after the Second World War was never homogeneous, as it went through several stages of its development, in particular: the stage of open borders and free immigration processes in 1945–1962; the stage of the emergence of a specific British approach to the policy of multiculturalism under the auspices of Labor in 1962–1979; the period of stabilization of the “multicultural consensus” regime under the influence of the Conservatives in 1979–1997; a stage of gradual criticism or radical rethinking of the expediency and consequences of the policy of multiculturalism by the “new” Labor and Conservatives in 1997–2016; a period of development in and after Brexit and the resumption of calls for Scottish independence, and therefore the maximum dependence of the external dimension of multiculturalism on the internal social and cultural diversity of the United Kingdom, starting in 2016.

Against this background, in political and managerial terms, the current state of development of cultural and social diversity in the United Kingdom is evidenced primarily by the attitude of the population of this state to the policy of multiculturalism in it, especially in the last two or three decades, but mostly on the eve, against the background and aftermath of “Brexit”. The fact is that in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, even among the predominant sample of people in the United Kingdom who supported immigration and were positive about cultural and social diversity, not everyone supported the policy of multiculturalism and various manifestations of identity⁴⁸, although almost everyone had a negative attitude towards so-called “color racism”⁴⁹. This was particularly noticeable against the background of historical and even internal social and cultural diversity in the United Kingdom, as it was historically composed and consists of four parts – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (which at different times became part of this country), with their own religious, ethnic and other differences⁵⁰. And they have already been affected by cultural and social diversity as a result of immigration processes within the British Empire, which were the main reason for initiating and developing a policy of multiculturalism in the Albion. Although not all theorists and practitioners consider it appropriate to talk about cultural

⁴⁷ Panayi P., *An Immigration History of Great Britain: Multicultural Racism since 1800*, Wyd. Pearson Longman 2010, s. 280.; Goulbourne H., *Race Relations in Britain Since 1945*, Wyd. Macmillan 1998, s. 26.; Hansen R., *Citizenship and Immigration*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

⁴⁸ Voas D., Ling R., *Religion in Britain and the United States*, [w:] Park A., Curtice J., Thomson K., Phillips M., Clery E., Butt S. (eds.), *British Social Attitudes: the 26th Report*, Wyd. Sage 2010, s. 65–86.

⁴⁹ Park A., Curtice J., Thomson K., Phillips M., Clery E., Butt S., *British Social Attitudes. The 26th Report*, Wyd. Sage 2010

⁵⁰ Colley L., *Britons: forging the nation, 1707–1837*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1992.; Ashcroft R., Bevir M., *Liberal Democracy, Nationalism and Culture: Multiculturalism and Scottish Independence*, “Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy” 2018, vol 21, nr. 1, s. 65–86.

and social diversity in the United Kingdom, including internally, on the other hand, they insist on the purely immigrant and external (relative to the state) nature of diversity and the policy of multiculturalism, about which there are almost no objections or less number of them⁵¹.

In terms of the real political process, the situation in the United Kingdom began to be adjusted and changed significantly at the very beginning of the 21st century, as there was a sharp change in the British government's attitude toward immigration, asylum, refugees and multiculturalism, instead, this policy has become more integrative, what has come as a shock to many a man⁵²; especially since the term "integration" has so far been used infrequently in the United Kingdom, in particular due to the emphasis on the feasibility of a multicultural approach to addressing cultural and social diversity. The change was that the consensus on multiculturalism gave way to an almost unanimous consensus against it among the main political parties⁵³, and, oddly enough, among the establishment of "ethnic" and "racial" groups and minorities⁵⁴.

At the same time, the main concern was the particular agenda of minority groups in the United Kingdom and the generally negative impact of multiculturalism policies on national cohesion and identity in this country at the turn of the millennium⁵⁵. This was primarily due to the events and terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, as these events in Britain were perceived as almost "domestic", especially against the background of pre-ethnic unrest in the North and Middle England, including Burnley, Bradford and Oldham, and were followed by the hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq and the bombings in London in July 2005. As a result of these events, local and national reports have stirred up multicultural settlements, expressing rather frontal criticism of multiculturalism as a phenomenon that creates "parallel reality", "fear and even demonization", and thus "intolerance, discrimination and violence"⁵⁶.

In view of this, but within the framework of the need to manage cultural and social diversity as opposed to the policy of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom, the concept of a citizen as a person ready to follow social rules and participate in community and civil society has been taken as a basis. And given that the core values of British society in the 21st century have been tolerance, the rule of law and community participation, and so on, citizenship in the United Kingdom has come to be seen as cultural and social diversity or even as "Britishness", which can guarantee social unity in a culturally diverse country. Instead, the policy of multiculturalism in Britain developed

⁵¹ Modood T., Dobbernack J., Meer N., Great Britain, Wyd. School of Social and Political Science 2012.

⁵² Latour V., The Securitisation of British Multiculturalism, [w:] Garbaye R., Schnapper P. (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Diversity in the British Isles, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2014, s. 38-57.

⁵³ Latour V., Les minorités ethniques et les politiques de retour à l'emploi: étude des stratégies mises en place par l'autorité locale de Bristol, [w:] Révauger J.-P. (ed.), Observatoire de la société britannique N°2 „Les Politiques de retour à l'emploi en Grande-Bretagne et en France”, Wyd. Toulon-Sud Var 2006, s. 214.

⁵⁴ Kundnani A., The Death of Multiculturalism, Wyd. Race Relations Institute 2002.

⁵⁵ Kundnani A., The Death of Multiculturalism, Wyd. Race Relations Institute 2002.

⁵⁶ Cante T., Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team, Wyd. Home Office 2001.; The End of Parallel Lives? The Report of the Community Cohesion, Wyd. Home Office 2004, s. 7.; Latour V., The Securitisation of British Multiculturalism, [w:] Garbaye R., Schnapper P. (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Diversity in the British Isles, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2014, s. 38-57.; Adachi S., Social Integration in Post-Multiculturalism: An Analysis of Social Integration Policy in Post-war Britain, "International Journal of Japanese Sociology" 2011, vol 20, nr 1, s. 107-120.

in previous years and decades at the beginning of the 21st century has been criticized by major political forces for being too narrow in terms of the activity of cultural and social groups, and therefore weakly contributes to radical change in society⁵⁷. This criticism has been compounded by the remarks of many politicians and even theorists that multiculturalism has provoked a backlash among the “white” majority, as a kind of “a culture overdose” through multiculturalism policies has actually led to a deterioration of racial and religious relations throughout the United Kingdom⁵⁸.

And from a political point of view, it was quite easy to be done, since most politicians in the United Kingdom have not always been very friendly to multiculturalism as an option for managing cultural and social diversity, especially against the background of deteriorating relations between communities and the growing terrorist threat in this country, and instead interpreted this policy mainly as declarative and situational. This means that in the event of any threats to cultural and social diversity, politicians and even parties quickly distanced themselves from supporting multiculturalism in the United Kingdom and typically criticized liberal approaches for their problems and gaps. That’s exactly what happened this time; as a result of a series of acts of threat to national security in GB at the beginning of the 21st century, legislation on immigration, asylum and the fight against terrorism was strengthened. All of these activities have traditionally been focused on assimilation rather than multicultural or integration policies, which have often combined counter-terrorism, work with community relations⁵⁹. This has been particularly pronounced during the “Conservatives” rule in the United Kingdom since 2010, in particular the governments of Mr. D. Cameron, Mrs. T. May and Mr. B Johnson, and hence the concepts of “one-nation conservatism” and “collective identity”. On the other hand, the relatively recent changes in the rhetoric on the issue of multiculturalism policy are more tangible and expressed⁶⁰ than the formalized and institutional changes in real politics, consequently, the phenomenon of multiculturalism in this country is better understood as experiencing its “rebalancing” rather than a complete “retreat”⁶¹.

This was particularly evident in the context of the “confusion” and mixing of different approaches to understanding multiculturalism during and after Brexit, – the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, – and the resumption of calls for Scottish independence⁶² (although these appeals have periodically appeared in British politics before).

⁵⁷ Alibhai-Brown Y., *After Multiculturalism*, Wyd. The Foreign Policy Centre 2000, s. 48-53.

⁵⁸ Adachi S., *Social Integration in Post-Multiculturalism: An Analysis of Social Integration Policy in Post-war Britain*, “International Journal of Japanese Sociology” 2011, vol 20, nr. 1, s. 107-120

⁵⁹ Meer N., *Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2010, s. 22-23.

⁶⁰ Meer N., *Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2010, s. 24.; Pathak P., *The Future of Multicultural Britain: Confronting the Progressive Dilemma*, Wyd. Edinburgh University Press 2008, s. 40.; Pitcher B., *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2009, s. 100-101.

⁶¹ Meer N., *Modood T., The “Civic Re-balancing” of British Multiculturalism, and Beyond*, [w:] *Challenging Multiculturalism*, Wyd. Edinburgh University Press 2012, s. 75-96.

⁶² Ashcroft R., Bevir M., *Liberal Democracy, Nationalism and Culture: Multiculturalism and Scottish Independence*, “Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy” 2018, vol 21, nr. 1, s. 65-86.

This, in turn, means that the issue of multiculturalism as an option for managing cultural and social diversity in the United Kingdom is not only the subject of political and political debate, but also goes beyond modern discursive boundaries and concerns important constitutional problems or the specifics of the political system of the analyzed state, which was actually demonstrated during “Brexit”. After all, Brexit was due to contradictory assessments of multiculturalism, national identity and the value of the construction of multiple citizenship⁶³, which became the subject of a referendum on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. In other words, it was multiculturalism that harmed social cohesion in this state, making Brexit the part of a kind of broad political competition for national identity, especially against the background of the internal cultural, social diversity and fragmented nature (among the British, Scots, Welsh and Irish) of British society.

At the same time, the fact that the phenomenon and policy of British multiculturalism today should be spoken of as its consequence in the format of post-multiculturalism has become interesting and still remains interesting, which is manifested, in particular, in the relationship between cultural diversity and social unity or equality of well-being, including within the framework of the philosophy or doctrine of so-called “liberal nationalism”⁶⁴. Its current principles in the context of cultural and social diversity are increasingly considered to be: the perception of liberalism and nationalism as interdependent; basing solidarity and identity on a common statehood, ensuring equality and freedom through citizenship; recognition of the cultural diversity and uniqueness of each group on the basis of democracy and national commonness⁶⁵. And this in principle means that liberal or civic nationalism pushes to renewed options of the cultural diversity managing (as in many other European countries)⁶⁶, in particular, as before, to assimilation, but not so much cultural as civic, which requires minority groups to partially change their attitude to the phenomenon and norms of politeness and education⁶⁷, etc.

As a result, the article demonstrates the peculiarities of the formation and current state of development and management of cultural and social diversity in the United Kingdom, including the stages of formation and development of the phenomenon and policy of multiculturalism in this country. It has been found that both civil society and, above all, political actors in the United Kingdom, in contrast to previous stages in the development of the issue under study, simultaneously reject and support cultural diversity as a political goal and set of practices. As

⁶³ Ashcroft R., Bevir M., Pluralism, National Identity and Citizenship: Britain after Brexit, “Political Quarterly” 2018, vol 87, s. 355-359.

⁶⁴ Tamir Y., Liberal Nationalism, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1993.; Kymlicka W., Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

⁶⁵ Tamir Y., Liberal Nationalism, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1993.; Kymlicka W., Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

⁶⁶ Joppke C., Morawska E., Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2003.

⁶⁷ Brubaker R., The Return of Assimilation?: Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States, [w:] Joppke C., Morawska E. (eds.), Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2003, s. 39-58.

a result, there takes shape the rhetoric of mobilized or politicized, limited or inferior and inclusive or integrative, rather than polycentric multiculturalism. However, in contrast, in the United Kingdom there has been theorized and reflected the irreconcilable and antagonistic opposition to the multiculturalism of multiculturalism (social and cultural diversity), which inevitably contributes to the politicization of this issue.

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MIGRATION AND MIGRATION PROCESSES IN THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXT: METHODS AND THEORIES OF DEFINITION AND APPROACHES TO RESEARCH

The article is devoted to analyzing theoretical, methodological and conceptual parameters of migration issues and migration processes. To do this, the author has considered and systematized the methods and theories of definition and approaches to the study of migration and migration processes. In particular, such approaches to the definition and study of migration as economic, geographical, demographic, philosophical, sociological, psychological, systemic, institutional, as well as synthetic have been emphasized. At the same time, it has been stated that each of the approaches is also traditionally different in definition and methods of the migration study, and therefore they all have been necessarily delineated, analyzed, structured and systematized. It has been shown how theoretical and methodological approaches are correlated with the empirical practice of migration in European countries. The author has summed up that due to the combination of theory and empirical practice, in particular on the example of European countries, each author, using the term “migration”, puts different interpretations into it, using as a guide many different existing categories.

Keywords: migration, migration processes, population, European countries.

MIGRACJA I PROCESY MIGRACYJNE W KONTEKŚCIE TEORETYCZNO-METODYCZNYM: METODY I TEORIE DEFINIOWANIA ORAZ PODEJŚCIA DO BADAŃ

W artykule dokonano analizy parametrów teoretyczno-metodologicznych i koncepcyjnych zagadnień migracji i procesów migracyjnych. W tym celu autor rozważył i usystematyzował metody i teorie definicji oraz podejścia do badania migracji i procesów migracyjnych. W szczególności położono nacisk na takie podejścia do definicji i badania migracji, jak ekonomiczne, geograficzne, demograficzne, filozoficzne, socjologiczne, psychologiczne, systemowe, instytucjonalne i syntetyczne. Jednocześnie stwierdza się, że każde z podejść tradycyjnie różni się także definicją i podejściem do badania migracji, a zatem wszystkie są przeanalizowane, ustrukturyzowane i usystematyzowane. Ustalono, jak podejścia teoretyczno-metodologiczne są skorelowane z empiryczną praktyką migracji w krajach europejskich. Stwierdza się, że ze względu na połączenie teorii i praktyki empirycznej, w szczególności na przykładzie krajów europejskich, każdy autor, posługując się terminem „migracja”, wprowadza do niego różne interpretacje, kierując się wieloma różnymi istniejącymi kategoriami.

Słowa kluczowe: migracje, procesy migracyjne, ludność, kraje europejskie.

МІГРАЦІЯ ТА МІГРАЦІЙНІ ПРОЦЕСИ У ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНОМУ КОНТЕКСТІ: СПОСОБИ І ТЕОРІЇ ДЕФІНІЮВАННЯ ТА ПІДХОДИ ДО ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ

В статті проаналізовано теоретико-методологічні і концептуальні параметри проблематики міграції та міграційних процесів. Для цього автор розглянув та систематизував способи і теорії дефініювання та підходи до дослідження міграції і міграційних процесів. Зокрема, наголос було зроблено на таких підходах до визначення і дослідження міграції, як економічний, географічний, демографічний, філософський, соціологічний, психологічний, системний, інституційний, а також синтетичний. При цьому, констатовано, що кожен з підходів традиційно теж є різновекторним у дефініюванні та підходах до дослідження міграції, а тому всі вони неодмінно розмежовані, проаналізовані, структуровані і систематизовані. Встановлено те, як теоретико-методологічні підходи співвідносяться з емпіричною практикою міграції у країнах Європи. Підсумовано, що зважаючи на суміщення теорії та емпіричної практики, зокрема на прикладі країн Європи, кожен автор, вживаючи термін «міграція», вкладає у нього різні тлумачення, користуючись в якості орієнтира багатьма різними існуючими категоріями.

Ключові слова: міграція, міграційні процеси, населення, країни Європи.

Throughout the history of mankind, especially since the emergence of states, the world has been and still is characterized by processes of population movement from one geographical area and territory to another. These processes have become especially relevant in the context of population movements from one state to another and vice versa, although they also occur in a more internal dimension, in particular through population movements within the same country, etc. One way or another, but such processes are usually called migrations or out-migrations and are the subject of the presented scientific research in a theoretical and methodological context, in particular on methods and theories of definition and approaches to the study of migrations and migration processes.

The term “migration” originates from Latin. *migratio, migro*, which means movement, relocation and transmigration. As early as 1885, the English scientist E. Ravenstein in his work “Laws of Migration” first introduced into scientific circulation the very concept of “migration” and considered it as a continuous process due to the interaction of four main groups of factors, including those acting: at the place of initial residence of the migrant, at the stage of his

movement, from the moment of entry into another country or territory and personal factors¹. At the same time, English scientist formulated a kind of migration laws, which he derived by analyzing migration in Britain and North America. These laws are quite fair today, because they are based on many theories in migration studies – the science of migration. The main ones among them are: most migrations are carried out over short distances; the larger is the territorial center, the more attractive it is for migrants; each migration flow corresponds to its counter-flow; the growth of large cities is more due to population migration than natural increase; the scale of migration increases with the development of industry and trade and, especially, with the development of transport; socio-economic reasons for migration are decisive ones².

However, at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries the destruction of traditional institutions of society has suffered on a global scale. Industrialization, which covered the world at this time, led to the intensification of socio-economic processes in different states and regions. Therefore, migration became the companion of industrial society. By the beginning of the 20th century migration could often be triggered or stopped by government orders, i.e. it was controlled. In addition, the main historical forms of migration were almost conquests, which ensured the colonization of territories, and the slave trade, through which large masses of people moved in stretch. This was complemented by the fact that the lack of transport opportunities provided to the world by technical progress in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, limited the independent migration of people. Because of this, a person's geographical location almost always coincided with a certain social space, and therefore this phenomenon was practically not taken into account when making government decisions. Over time, everything began to be taken into account, and migration became pervasive and began to be treated in both positive and negative contexts and sense.

That is why in the second half of the 20th century an active study of migration began, when a significant number of definitions of this term were formulated in the scientific literature and its classification was developed. Since then, migration has for the first time been recognized as an important territorial, geographical, spatial and political phenomenon in the development of society and the world at large. Thus, in 1974, in the study "Economics of International Migration", this became a classic of migration theory, G. Tapinos, as a leading expert in this sphere, proposed an innovative approach to the definition of the term "migration". In his opinion, if we consider migration from a purely economic point of view, it is a "response to the lack of development"³. In turn, M. Poulen, considering migration through the prism of the spatial dimension, points out that international migration "is a change of country of habitual residence

¹ Ravenstein E., The Laws of Migration, "Journal of the Statistical Society of London" 1885, vol 48, nr 2, s. 167-235.; Palahniuk O., Míhratsiia yak sotsialno-ekonomichnyi fenomen ta heopolitychnyi vykyk rozvytku suchasnoho suspilstva, "Naukovi pratsi Chornomorskoho derzhavnoho universytetu imeni Petra Mohyly kompleksu. Ser. Politolohiia" 2014, vol 230, nr. 218, s. 38.

² Simon J., The economic consequences of immigration, New York 1989, s. 15-18.

³ Tapinos Zh., Mezhdunarodnaya migratsiia naseleniia kak faktor ekonomicheskogo razvitiia. [w:] Tapinos Zh., Ioncev V. (eds.), Mezhdunarodnaya migratsiia naseleniia: Rossiia i sovremenniy mir, Wyd. MAKSS-Press 2001, vol 8, s. 56.

of a person”, when at least one state border is crossed. The time criterion of migration, according to M. Poulen, is related to the identification of the habitual residence of a migrant person by establishing the duration of his residence⁴. At least it follows from this that science does not agree on the definition of migration, but instead one identifies the main approaches to defining and studying migration and migration processes, including economic, geographical, demographic, philosophical, sociological, psychological, systemic, institutional, and synthetic ones. Moreover, each of the approaches is traditionally also different in definition and approaches to the study of migration, and therefore they all need to be considered and systematized.

Thus, within the economic approach there are such theories as the theory of the world (international) labor market, the theory of the world system (“global city”), the theory of segmented labor market (dual labor market theory), neoclassical macro-level economic theory, neoclassical microeconomic theory, new economy theory labor migration, the theory of human (social) capital, the theory of cumulative (accumulative) conditionality / causality.

The theory of the world (international) labor market explains the nature of migration in terms of Marxist ideas. In this context, migration acts as a means of distributing “free” labor between the links of world production. Free labor force is not only those unemployed in the national labor market and the unemployed, but also those who work in organizations, institutions and enterprises of each country and intend to work abroad.

Note that not all the unemployed are part of the free labor force, as some of them focus on employment only in the labor market of their own country and can not be considered as a resource for other countries. Researchers highlight the economic and logistical preconditions for the formation of the international labor market: the former include the inclusion of more and more countries in the world economy, and the latter are the growth of the transport network and improved communication. There is a strong interdependence between large-scale international labor migration and the development of world industry, agriculture and transport. The movement of a large number of employees across state borders contributes to the development of those sectors of the world economy, which most often involve migrant workers, as well as the growth of material and technical base of world industry and transport creates new opportunities for migrant workers⁵.

Another economic theory of migration is the theory of the world system (“global city”) by I. Wallerstein. This theory is also based on the concept of the world labor market. I. Wallerstein considers migration as a consequence of economic segmentation of the world and the existence of a world-system labor market, and therefore the polarization of the world-system. Since the described by scientists system is a market one, its main purpose is to accumulate capital. The latter is optimized by creating a very wide geographical division of labor, which covers the whole

⁴ Pulen M., *Istrochniki dannyh dlya izmereniya mezhhdunarodnoj migracii v stanah Centralnoj Evropy*, [w:] *Mezhhdunarodnaya migraciya naseleniya*, Wyd. MAKSS Press 2000, vol 5, s. 14-15.

⁵ *Naseleniia Ukrainy. Trudova emihratsiia v Ukraini*, Wyd. In-t demohrafii ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen im. M. V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy 2010, s. 15-16.

world. The division of labor involves the flow of goods, capital and labor⁶. The world economy is governed by a small number of economically and politically developed urban centers (“global cities”), which include: in the United States these are New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and in Europe these are London, Paris, Milan, etc.⁷. All other regions of the world system instead form a periphery that provides the world economy with raw materials, land and labor resources and develop depending on the center⁸.

Thus, migration acts as a means of meeting the needs of “stronger” systems of the center due to the “weaker” periphery. Therefore, migration under this approach is considered only movement between unequal segments of the world system, in particular if they are determined by the global division of labor⁹.

To analyze migration processes there is also used the economic theory of the segmented labor market (the theory of the double labor market). The theoretical basis of this concept was laid in the second half of the 20th century in the scientific works of M. Payor. Within this approach, the main factor of migration is the structural needs of the economy in the regions of arrival of migrants (in a large city or country). The labor market is considered here as consisting of individual sectors or segments: 1) primary and secondary; 2) internal and external; 3) formal and informal. The primary sector is filled with a highly skilled workforce (specialists with higher education, management, representatives of the intelligentsia and science, etc.), and the secondary one are low-skilled (support staff, service workers, etc.). According to the scientists, the vast majority of migrant workers on arrival abroad – in the new countries – find work in the secondary labor market. The second segmentation model of the labor market is its division into internal and external in relation to a particular enterprise. The main staff of the company forms the core, which is the domestic market. The external market includes employees who can be involved from the outside to work at this company. According to M. Payor and P. Doring, Gastarbeiter (labor migrants) are focused on a competitive labor market, where the evaluation, distribution of labor and other processes are carried out on a competitive basis, while in the internal labor market they are governed by a set of administrative rules within the external they are controlled by economic variables and factors¹⁰. The third manifestation of labor market segmentation is its division into formal and informal components. The informal (informal, unregulated) sector is characterized by the predominance of manual or technologically simple labor, lack of social protection and access to sources of financing and credit, the dependence of income on the level of risk and certain circumstances. The key question in the theory of the segmented labor market is the question of what is the distribution of labor in the relevant

⁶ Vallerstajn I., *Analiz mirovnyh sistem i situatsiya v sovremennom mire*, Wyd. Universitetskaya kniga 2001.

⁷ Sassen S., *The mobility of labor and capital*, Wyd. Cambridge 1988, s. 128.

⁸ Frey W., *Migration and metropolitan decline in developed countries: a comparative study*, “Population and development review” 1988, vol 14, nr. 3, s. 595

⁹ Svitlov O., *Poniattia „mihratsii“: suchasni pohliady ta mozhlivi perspektyvy v konteksti teorii sotsialnoi mobilnosti*, „Aktualni problemy sotsiologii, psikhologii, pedahohiky” 2012, vol 16, s. 36.

¹⁰ Piore M., Doeringer P., *Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis*, Wyd. Heath Lexington Books 1971, s.4

segments. The scientists link the answer to this question with the cultural and psychological predisposition of employees to one or another type of activity. In particular, some of them explain the increased concentration of foreign workers in the secondary labor market of any recipient country primarily by socio-economic conditions.

In turn, according to neoclassical macro-level economic theory, migration is due to the geographical difference between supply and demand for labor. Moreover, this explanation applies to both international and internal migration. According to this theory, countries (regions) with a surplus labor force have low wages, while regions with a labor force are characterized by high wages. Wages are a major factor in “pushing out” in the migrants’ regions of origin and a major factor in “attracting” migrants in the regions of their arrival. As a result of migration, labor supply decreases and wages increase in poor (capital) countries; while in rich (capital countries) opposite processes occur. According to the provisions of neoclassical macroeconomics, the elimination of the wage gap leads to the end of the movement of labor between countries (regions). However, this thesis does not stand up to criticism, as migration, like any other social process, is characterized by inertia and occurs even after the causes that cause it disappear. After all, investment flows are moving in the opposite direction from the flows of migrant workers, namely from rich countries to poor countries. The factor that attracts investment is increased capital gains in poor countries. The movement of capital also includes human capital, i.e. the movement of highly skilled workers from rich to poor (capital) countries who hope to get high returns out of their skills in a poor (capital) environment¹¹.

In contrast, neoclassical microeconomic theory considers migration between countries as a simple sum of individual movements made on the basis of personal calculations of the benefits of migration. According to this approach, each individual acts as a rational person who decides on the implementation or refusal to move on the basis of calculations in the system of “costs-benefits” of migration. Note, that the costs and benefits of migration can be divided into monetary and non-monetary (which are associated with the weakening or severance of family or friendships and the creation of new ties, learning a new language, being in a cultural environment other than the migrant’s country of origin, the need to acquire new habits). At the same time, when assessing the benefits of migration, only monetary components are taken into account, because, firstly, they are easier to measure and, secondly, according to the classical theorists of neoclassical microeconomics, they have more influence on migration decisions than non-monetary components¹².

¹¹ Naselennia Ukrainy. Trudova emihratsiia v Ukraini, Wyd. In-t demohrafiit ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen im. M. V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy 2010, s. 11.

¹² Massey D., Arango J., Hugo G., Kouaouci A., Pellegrino A., Taylor J., Theories of international Migration: a review and appraisal, “Population and development review” 1993, vol 19, nr. 3, s.434.

Although the latter thesis is the subject of criticism in the connection with the increasing attention to the intangible aspects of human behavior¹³.

Another theory that is focused on migration (namely labor migration) is the theory of a new economics of labor migration, in particular by O. Stark. The focus of this theory is not the individual, but the household at which the migration decision is made. The basis of such a collective decision is not only the desire to maximize the expected income, but also to minimize the risks present in the local labor market. The basis of such a collective decision is not only the desire to maximize the expected income, but also to minimize the risks present in the local labor market. In order to maintain their well-being at the appropriate level, households try to diversify their own resources, in particular labor. Some family members can work in the local labor market, while others, by joint decision of the household, can be sent to another country (region). According to this distribution of resources, in case of deterioration of the economic situation in the local labor market, remittances from migrant workers will provide household members with an adequate level of income. Note that in developed countries, the risks of household loss of income are mainly minimized through the activities of the insurance market (insurance against unemployment, disability, and injury) or government programs. At the same time, in developing countries, such institutional arrangements are imperfect, not available to poor families or simply absent. Access to credit funds for poor families in developing countries is very limited; as such families are often unable to provide collateral to obtain credit. Under such conditions, labor migration becomes an attractive strategy of behavior as an alternative source of capital income. That is why governments can influence the scale of migration not only through policies aimed at improving the labor market, but also through the formation or improvement of insurance and credit systems.

A significant place in the system of economic migration theories of the micro level is occupied by the theory of human (social) capital. The vendor of this concept is G. Becker, who considered various aspects of human behavior as a manifestation of economic feasibility. T. Schultz, J. Minzer, A. Hansen and other scientists made a significant contribution to the development of this theory. The active application of the concept of social capital in the analysis of migration processes began with the work of L. Syaastad. These scientists state that in order to realize migration intentions, not only the desire of the individual is needed, but also various resources. Therefore, researchers talk about the selective nature of migration, as displacement is usually carried out not by the poorest and most disadvantaged sections of the population, but by those who have the necessary set of resources. However, this thesis does not apply to refugees and other persons who move on an involuntary basis.

One of such migration resource is human capital, which includes innate abilities and talents, as well as accumulated knowledge, skills, experience, education, qualifications, information,

¹³ Nascelennia Ukrainy. Trudova emihratsiia v Ukraini, Wyd. In-t demohrafi ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen im. M. V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy 2010, s. 11-12.

physical and mental health, and so on. The migration researchers believe that migrants have more human capital than those who do not dare to move¹⁴. A separate area of research in the theory of human capital is the issue of remittances of migrants as a means of redistribution of income. This topic is relevant for “donor countries” of labor. However, the socio-economic impact of migration transfers on the development of the state is twofold – both positive and negative.

Finally, migration processes, in terms of their reproducibility and self-sufficiency, are explained by the economic theory of cumulative (accumulative) conditionality / causality. The concept of “cumulative conditionality” was introduced into scientific circulation by G. Mirdal. D. Massi also made a significant contribution to the development of the theory. The main thing in this theoretical model is the thesis that each migration movement changes the social context within which there will be made the following decisions on migration. This change is usually carried out in the direction of increasing the probability of subsequent migrations. At the heart of the social significance of work within this concept is the concept of “stigmatization”. When a significant number of migrants occupy certain jobs in the recipient country, the locals label these types of work as “immigrant” (i.e., those that are unacceptable for the local population)¹⁵.

In contrast to economic factors, the influence of mainly geographical factors on migration is reflected in the studies of E. Ravenstein¹⁶, G. Becker¹⁷, M. Poulén¹⁸ and other researchers. Since the mid-60's of the 20th century, especially with the development of population geography and economic geography, social, economic and other factors began to be taken into account. It is within the framework of the geographical approach that such methods of migration analysis as graphical and cartographic were further developed, on the basis of which the first migration models were developed (for example, C. Stoffer' model)¹⁹.

In turn, within the demographic approach definition of migration and migration processes distinguish the theory of population and “demographic transition”. The founder of the theory of population was the French scientist A. Sövi. This theory defines population migration; on the one hand, as a demographic process that affects the reproduction of the population, its gender and age structure and causes changes in demographic development, and on the other – as a multifaceted phenomenon with economic, political, geographical and other aspects, which have an indirect impact on demographic development, taking into account the changes that take place in society²⁰. Instead, the theory of “demographic transition” (N. Keifitz, A. Sövi, L.

¹⁴ Moiseenko V., Hudinovskih O., Teoriya chelovecheskogo kapitala i issledovaniya migratsionnykh processov v Rossii, “Problemy prognozirovaniya” 2000, nr. 4, s. 128.

¹⁵ Naselennia Ukrainy. Trudova emihratsiia v Ukraini, Wyd. In-t demohrafiit ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen im. M. V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy 2010, s. 20.

¹⁶ Ravenstein E., The Laws of Migration, “Journal of the Statistical Society of London” 1885, vol 48, nr. 2, s. 167-235.

¹⁷ Becker G., Economic Analysis and Human Behavior, [w:] Green L., Kagel J. (eds.), Advances in Behavioral Sciences, Wyd. Ablex Publ. Corp. 1987, vol.1, s. 3-17.

¹⁸ Pulen M., Istochniki dannykh dlya izmereniya mezhdunarodnoy migratsii v stanah Centralnoj Evropy, [w:] Mezhdunarodnaya migratsiya naseleniya, Wyd. MAKS Press 2000, vol 5, s. 14-37.

¹⁹ Migratsiya naseleniya: teoriya, politika / ed. by O. Vorobev, A. Topilin, V. Mukomel, Wyd. Ekonomicheskoe obrazovanie 2012, s. 36.

²⁰ Migratsiya naseleniya: teoriya, politika / ed. by O. Vorobev, A. Topilin, V. Mukomel, Wyd. Ekonomicheskoe obrazovanie 2012, s. 33.

Taba²¹) connects migration mainly with demographic processes. The demographic transition involves the analysis of changes in the number and composition of the population due to migration processes and the evolution of economic systems.

As for the philosophical approach to the definition of migration and migration processes, its use can be traced in the concept of “passion impulses”, which was developed by V. Vernadsky²² and L. Gumilev²³. It is based on the concept of energy exchange between the system (human communities or ethnic groups) and the external environment. Passion as a characteristic of behavior is the effect of excess biochemical energy of living matter, which causes changes both in the natural environment and in relations within human communities – ethnic groups. It is individuals who are defined as “passionaries” who are characterized by very active migratory behavior. At the same time, L. Gumilev connects this process with certain periods of ethnic development, each of which changes migration. External migration increases during the inertial stage and during the so-called “explosion” stage – internal migration²⁴.

Within the framework of the sociological approach, there are distinguished the theory of “push-pull” and the theory of migration networks. The theory of “push-pull” is focused on the factors of migration. In particular, in the countries of emigration, the factors of “pushing out” (unemployment, poverty, difficult working conditions, political persecution, low health care, food shortages, wars, discrimination, environmental pollution, natural disasters, etc.) are decisive in the migration movement and in immigration countries the factors of “attraction” are (better living conditions, more opportunities to find work, religious and political freedom, health insurance, higher level of education, etc.). The analytical value of the theory is limited because it is a static model. In addition, it mixes the determinants of migration at the macro level with individual motives.

A similar relative validity of the explanation of migration is characteristic of the psychological approach (O. Blinova, V. Konstantinov, A. Ovchinnikov, M. Slyusarevsky, A. Sultanova). Here the emphasis is on the motivational / behavioral direction (stratification theory of human behavior, the concept of aggregate motivation, etc.), i.e. the motives of migration, which guide migrants at all stages of the migration process. And migration is seen as a way to meet certain needs of an individual or group and as an act of behavior in which the main place belongs to the decision-making mechanism²⁵.

In contrast, the institutional approach focuses on macro-level factors. With the development of migration, a number of private institutions and voluntary organizations, the main function of which is to meet the demand created by the imbalance between the large number

²¹ Kejfic N., Taba L., Burzhua-Pisha Zh., Fajhtinger G., Novoc v zarubezhnoj demografii, [w:] Andreev E., Volkov A. (eds), Demograficheskie modeli, Wyd. Statistica 1977.; Sovi A., Obshchaya teoriya naseleniya. Vol 2: Zhizn naselenij, Wyd. Progress 1977, s. 340-343.

²² Vernadskij V., Biosfera i noosfera, Wyd. Ajris-press 2012

²³ Gumilev L., Emogenez i biosfera Zemli, Wyd. Kristall 2001

²⁴ Migraciya naseleniya: teoriya, politika / ed. by O. Vorobev, A. Topilin, V. Mukomel, Wyd. Ekonomicheskoe obrazovanie 2012, s. 37-38.

²⁵ Migraciya naseleniya: teoriya, politika / ed. by O. Vorobev, A. Topilin, V. Mukomel, Wyd. Ekonomicheskoe obrazovanie 2012, s. 37.

of people seeking access to rich (capital) countries are emerging and the limited number of visas usually issued by such countries. Such imbalances and barriers created by developed countries in the way of access of all interested parties to their territory, form profitable economic niches for entrepreneurs and institutions create preconditions for the development of the migration “black market”. The functioning of the underground market contributes to the exploitation and persecution of migrants, which, in turn, leads to the development of a network of voluntary humanitarian organizations, whose goal is to improve the treatment of legal and illegal migrants, their rights, etc. Scientists conclude that with the formation of a network of organizations aimed at supporting migration, migration flows are becoming increasingly independent of those factors that were the root cause of the development of migration between specific countries (regions)²⁶. Therefore, measures to create a stricter immigration regime may, on the one hand, increase the influence of the “black market” on the course of migration processes, but, on the other hand, provoke opposition from humanitarian organizations working to protect the rights of migrants²⁷.

In the context of defining migration and migration processes is the theory of migration systems within a systems approach is of interest (G. Zlotnik²⁸, J. Fouset²⁹). This theory combines the countries of origin and destination of migrants in a common space – the migration system. The countries that form such systems are characterized by a greater intensity of exchange of goods, services and people. The international migration system includes the “core” (which can be a country or a group of countries) and the “periphery” (countries associated with the “core” of large flows of migrants). The countries within a system do not have to be geographically close.

Migration flows reflect rather political and economic relations, than spatial location. Obviously, geographical proximity contributes to the formation of different relationships between countries, but it does not guarantee such developments, just as a considerable distance does not make them impossible. Most often, large-scale migration takes place between countries that are conveniently geographically located: they are characterized by cultural proximity, are political allies, trade partners, etc. Countries do not have to be part of a single system, as they may belong to several migration systems. However, such membership is more typical of “donor countries” and applies to “recipient countries” very rarely. At the same time, migration systems are not a stable entity, as countries can join or leave them in accordance with socio-economic and demographic changes, political or socio-political situation, and so on³⁰.

²⁶ Massey D., Arango J., Hugo G., Kouaouci A., Pellegrino A., Taylor J., Theories of international Migration: a review and appraisal, „Population and development review” 1993, vol 19, nr. 3, s. 451.

²⁷ Nasilennia Ukrainy. Trudova emihratsiia v Ukraini, Wyd. In-t demografii ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen im. M. V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy 2010, s. 19.

²⁸ Zlotnik H., Empirical identification of international migration systems, [w:] Kritiz m., Lim L., Zlotnik H. (eds.), International Migration Systems: A Global Approach, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1992, s. 19-40.

²⁹ Fawcett J., Networks, linkages, and migration systems, “International Migration Review” 1989, vol 2, s. 671-680.

³⁰ Nasilennia Ukrainy. Trudova emihratsiia v Ukraini, Wyd. In-t demografii ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen im. M. V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy 2010, s. 19-20.

In contrast, some migration theories are quite common and developed, which do not depart from a certain direction of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study and definition of migration, in particular the theory of migration networks, which has successfully formed a separate analytical model in the works of F. Hugo, J. Taylor and D. Massi. The researchers state that the presence or absence of social ties abroad have a significant impact on individuals' decision to move or refuse to do it. Migration networks, which consist of a set of interpersonal connections between current migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in countries (regions) of origin and destination, significantly increase the likelihood of relocation, as they reduce migration costs and risks and thus increase the benefits of such processes. The first migrants who moved to a particular country did not have social contacts there, so the relocation was costly for them (especially if they crossed the border illegally). Once the first migrants have settled in the areas of settlement, there are reduced the costs of potential relocation for their friends, relatives, colleagues and acquaintances. This applies to the monetary costs of moving and settling, information and search costs (time, money and effort spent on finding and obtaining work), opportunity costs (earnings that migrants could earn during travel and job search at destination), psychological costs (associated with changes in the surroundings and the environment). These costs are evident in all migration movements; they increase in direct proportion to the increase in travel distance and increase significantly when it comes to crossing state borders, i.e. external migration³¹.

Accordingly, the representatives of the theory of migration networks claim that only the first flows of migrants come from the middle and upper middle classes of the social hierarchy and are characterized by increased resistance to stress, high level of education and so on. Gradually, as migration networks grow and cover an increasing population, the cost of relocation decreases, and therefore migration flows become less selective and start to represent the community or society from which migrants originate in general. According to this concept, it is quite difficult for governments of countries of origin and settlement of migrants to manage migration flows, as the process of forming networks is beyond their control and takes place regardless of the type of political regime. At the same time, some migration policy mechanisms (aimed at uniting migrants with families in another country) are still effective because they strengthen migration networks by giving family members special rights to enter the country³². Although this can certainly lead to both positive and negative consequences in the socio-political context, in particular regarding the assessment of the identities of the titular majority and immigrants, and so on.

Having analyzed the main theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of migration, comparing their statements with the results of empirical research, the group of

³¹ Massey D., Economic development and international migration in comparative perspective, "Population and development review" 1988, vol 14, nr. 3, s. 397.

³² Nascelennia Ukrainy. Trudova emihratsiia v Ukraini, Wyd. In-t demohrafi ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen im. M. V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy 2010, s. 14-15.

researchers led by D. Massis formulated the main provisions of the so-called synthetic approach or theory of migration³³. According to this theory, migration occurs during social, political and economic transformation, accompanied by the spread of market relations to non-market societies. In the context of economic globalization, the transition to market relations and new methods of production in agricultural and command economies destroys the usual social and economic ties, leads to large-scale displacement of people and their exclusion out of the usual way of life. This creates mobile groups looking for new ways to achieve economic prosperity. One of such ways is employment in expanded national and international labor markets. These processes most often take the form of migration from rural to urban areas or from developing countries to developed countries. That is, the regions to which migration flows are directed are the areas with higher wages. In addition, according to the theory of synthetic theory, the international wage gap is not the only or most important factor that creates migration motivations. Households trying to respond to structural change use migration as a means of overcoming the hardships of a market economy.

Moreover, the state insurance system in the transition period is usually outdated, while government unemployment insurance programs are limited or non-existent. That is why households try to protect themselves from the risks of underemployment and unemployment by labor migration of one or more of his (her) members³⁴.

Empirically, in particular on the example of European countries, this is manifested in the fact that in the early 20th century the governments of these countries tried in every possible way to limit immigration flows, which could significantly upset the traditional for their societies racial-ethnic and, accordingly, cultural-civilization balance. However, after the First and Second World Wars, the situation somewhat changed. Western European countries have opened the “door” for mass migration of their former colonies, who exported cheap labor and occupied economic niches, which were avoided by indigenous peoples (chemical industry, utilities, agriculture, services, etc.). However, until the 70-80’s of the 20th century migrants have traditionally been seen as “temporary guests” (Gastarbeiter), but in the early stages of the regulating migration processes policy did not set the task of socio-cultural adaptation of workers. Only an increase in the share of migrants in the late 20th century up to 10–15 percent of the total population has provoked European countries to take more decisive steps to regulate migration processes and develop policies for their integration (if not assimilation, in particular to replace the policy of multiculturalism in some countries)³⁵. This, in part, was due to the fact that the new migration wave of the 90s of 20th century was characterized by the following features: 1)

³³ Massey D. Sinteticheskaya teoriya mezhdunarodnoj migracii, [w:] *Mir v zerkale mezhdunarodnoj migracii*. Nauchnaya seriya: Mezhdunarodnaya migraciya naseleniya: Rossiya i sovremennyy mir / ed. by V. Ioncev, Wyd. MAKS-Press 2002, vol 10, s. 132-148

³⁴ *Naselennia Ukrainy. Trudova emihratsiia v Ukraini*, Wyd. In-t demohrafi i ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen im. M. V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy 2010, s. 21-22.

³⁵ Apanovich M., *Politicheskie aspekty migracionnykh processov v sovremennoj Evrope* [avtoref. dis. ... kand. polit. nauk: spec. Politicheskie problemy mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenij, global'nogo i regional'nogo razvitiya], Moskva 2012.

there appeared new types of migrants – from highly qualified migrants to asylum seekers, illegal, temporary and transit migrants; 2) the role of some European countries in migration processes has changed, as, for example, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, which have traditionally been “donor countries”, have become attractive for immigration flows; 3) mass migration from East to West, which was feared in the early 90’s of 20th century due to the collapse of the USSR and the liberalization of migration policy in Central and Eastern Europe, there was no significant increase in international migration to and from the countries of Central and Eastern and Western Europe from another eastern direction – from Asia; 4) there was an increase in the number of illegal movements both among those who arrived illegally and among those who remained in the country without legal status; 5) the attention to the issue of forced migration, which began to be considered as part of the broader problem of migration, along with the problem of refugees and asylum seekers increased³⁶.

As a result, and also taking into account the combination of theory and empirical practice, in particular on the example of European countries, it was ascertained that using the term “migration”, each author puts in it completely different interpretations, using as a guide many existing categories with the movement of individuals and its main stages. This situation is very much intensified today by the incessant globalization, which significantly affects most of the phenomena and nowadays processes. In addition, the scientific term “migration” has long been universal, which differs significantly from the period when there were previously only two well-known approaches to defining this process, in particular as relocation (as a “narrow” interpretation of migration) and territorial inter-settle movements (as a “broad” interpretation of migration)³⁷. After all, it is more universal to state that migration (population) is any territorial movement of the population associated with the crossing of both external and internal borders of administrative-territorial entities in order to change permanent residence or temporary stay in the territory for study or labor activity, etc., regardless of the factors under which it occurs³⁸.

Although it is obvious that from the various definitions of migration that exist in science, we can distinguish three conditional approaches to its interpretation, in particular: a) as a spatial movement of persons, regardless of its nature and ultimate goals; b) as the transfer of a person or persons from one state to another in order to change their place of residence for a certain period or forever; c) as a process of spatial movement of a person or persons, which always leads to the territorial redistribution of the population both in the country of origin and in the recipient country.

³⁶ Timur S., Changing Trends and Major Issues in International Migration: an Overview of UNESCO Programmes, “International Social Science Journal. International Migration” 2000, vol 52, nr. 165, s. 259-260.

³⁷ Palahniuk O., Mihratsiia yak sotsialno-ekonomichnyi fenomen ta heopolitychnyi vydyk rozvytku suchasnoho suspilstva, “Naukovi pratsi Chornomorskoho derzhavnogo universytetu imeni Petra Mohyly kompleksu: Ser. Politolohiia” 2014, vol 230, nr. 218, s. 38-39.

³⁸ Mihratsiini protsesy v suchasnomu sviti: svitovi, rehionalnyi ta natsionalnyi vymiry: Poniatiinyi aparat, kontseptualni pidkhody, teoriia ta praktyka: Entsyklopediia / ed. by Yu. Rymarenko, Wyd. Dovira 1998, s. 740.

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INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL DETERMINATION OF PREMIER-PRESIDENTIALISM AS A TYPE OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS AND OPERATIONALISATIONS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The article is dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon of premier-presidentialism as a system of inter-institutional relations both in theoretical terms as well as in the context of the real political process in European countries. In view of this, the author singled out institutional and procedural determinants of premier-presidentialism and stated that premier-presidentialism is a separate type of semi-presidential system of government. In this way, the institutional and political manifestations and the parameters of operationalization of premier-presidentialism in European countries were analyzed. The researcher singled out current and historical cases of premier-presidentialism in the analyzed region and, in view of this, found that premier-presidentialism is generally characterized by monistic collective responsibility of governmental cabinet solely to the legislature, by the president's ability to dissolve parliament and call early elections and hence by the dualism in the executive. It is concluded that premier-presidentialism is characterized not so much by transactional as by hierarchical relations in the triangle "president – governmental cabinet / prime minister – parliament".

Keywords: system of government, semi-presidentialism, premier-presidentialism, president, governmental cabinet, prime minister, parliament, legislature, European countries.

INSTYTUCJONALNE I PROCEDURALNE OKREŚLENIE PREMIER-PREZYDENTALIZMU JAKO TYPU PÓŁPREZYDENCKIEGO SYSTEMU RZĄDU ORAZ JEGO PRZEKAZY I OPERACJONALIZACJA W KRAJACH EUROPEJSKICH

W artykule przeanalizowano zjawisko premier-prezydentalizmu jako systemu stosunków międzyinstytucjonalnych, zarówno w ujęciu teoretycznym, jak i w kontekście realnego procesu politycznego w krajach europejskich. W związku z tym wyodrębniono instytucjonalne i proceduralne wyznaczniki premier-prezydentalizmu i stwierdzono, że premier-prezydentalizm jest odrębnym rodzajem półprezydenckiego systemu rządów. W ten sposób analizowane są instytucjonalne i polityczne przejawy oraz parametry operacjonalizacji premier-prezydentalizmu w krajach europejskich. Wyróżniono aktualne i historyczne przypadki premier-prezydentalizmu w analizowanym regionie i w związku z tym ustalono, że premier-prezydentalizm generalnie

charakteryzuje się monistyczną zbiorową odpowiedzialnością gabinetu tylko przed legislaturą, zdolnością prezydenta do rozwiązania parlamentu i ogłaszać przedterminowe wybory, a więc dualizm we władzy wykonawczej. Stwierdza się, że premier-prezydentalizm charakteryzuje się nie tyle transakcyjnymi, ile hierarchicznymi relacjami w trójkącie „prezydent – rząd/premier – parlament”.

Słowa kluczowe: system władzy, półprezydentalizm (system półprezydencki), premier-prezydentalizm, prezydent, premier, parlament, legislatura, kraje europejskie.

ІНСТИТУЦІЙНА ТА ПРОЦЕСУАЛЬНА ДЕТЕРМІНАЦІЯ ПРЕМ'ЄР-ПРЕЗИДЕНТАЛІЗМУ ЯК ТИПУ НАПІВПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКОЇ СИСТЕМИ ПРАВЛІННЯ І ЙОГО ВИЯВИ Й ОПЕРАЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЯ В ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ КРАЇНАХ

У статті проаналізовано феномен прем'єр-президенталізму як системи міжінституційних відносин, причому як у теоретичному розрізі, так і в контексті реального політичного процесу в країнах Європи. З огляду на це, виокремлено інституційні та процесуальні детермінанти прем'єр-президенталізму і констатовано, що прем'єр-президенталізм – окремішній різновид напівпрезидентської системи правління. У цьому ключі проаналізовано інституційні та політичні вияви та параметри операціоналізації прем'єр-президенталізму в країнах Європи. Виокремлено чинні та вже історичні кейси прем'єр-президенталізму в аналізованому регіоні і, з огляду на це, встановлено, що загалом прем'єр-президенталізм характеризується моністичною колективною відповідальністю урядового кабінету лише перед легіслатурою, можливістю президента розпускати парламент й оголошувати його дострокові вибори, а відтак і дуалізмом у системі виконавчої влади. Підсумовано, що прем'єр-президенталізм характеризується не стільки трансакційними, скільки ієрархічними відносинами у трикутнику «президент – уряд/прем'єр-міністр – парламент».

Ключові слова: система правління, напівпрезиденталізм, прем'єр-президенталізм, президент, урядовий кабінет, прем'єр-міністр, парламент, легіслатура, країни Європи.

Contemporary Political Science and most of its representatives are accustomed to understand semi-presidential system of government (semi-presidentialism) as a constitutionalized structure of inter-institutional relations, which provides simultaneously for the positions/institutions of popularly elected for a fixed term president and prime minister with governmental cabinet collectively responsible at least to parliament (thus possibly responsible either to

parliament and to president¹. Nevertheless, various attributes and indicators of semi-presidentialism, including definitive ones, allow us to argue that the analyzed system of government is very diverse and heterogeneous one. The most important explanation in this context is provided by institutional and procedural factors of the typology of semi-presidentialism, which primarily revolve around the issues of the formation and even more responsibility of governmental cabinets and the possibility of dissolving parliaments/legislatures (it is also possible and expedient to single out the other typologies of semi-presidentialism, in particular based on the diversity of the executive dualism and the powers of various political and power institutions, i.e. presidents, prime ministers, governmental cabinets and parliaments). Therefore, the basic and even classical one is formal (institutional and procedural) typology of semi-presidentialism on the basis of the peculiarities of appointment, but mainly resignation of prime ministers, as well as taking into account the patterns of responsibility of governmental cabinets and the possibility of dissolving parliaments/legislatures, as a result of which researchers (primarily M. Shugart and J. Carey²) distinguish between president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism (or, in other words, between president-parliamentary and premier-presidential options of semi-presidentialism). In this context, the issues of the analysis of institutional and procedural features, logics and parameters of operationalization of premier-presidentialism as a type of semi-presidential system of government are relevant ones, especially and mainly in European countries, where this constitutional design of inter-institutional relations is empirically the most common one and, therefore, perhaps heterogeneous rather than homogeneous one.

This is largely argued on the basis of appeals to researches by various scientists. Some of them are, in particular, engaged into the separation and even comparison of these two systems of government in the framework of semi-presidentialism. Among them there are, for example, such scientists as R. Elgie³, R. Elgie and I. McMennamin⁴, R. Elgie and P. Schleiter⁵, Y. Kim⁶, V. Pasyukova⁷, T. Sedelius, J. Ekman and J. Linde⁸,

¹ Similar definitions can be found in the researches of various scientists. For examples, see: Brunclik M., Kubat M., Contradictory Approaches: Discussing Semi-Presidentialism in Central Europe, "Annals of the University of Bucharest: Political Science Series" 2016, vol 18, nr. 1, s. 67–79; Cheibub J., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, "British Journal of Political Science" 2014, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 515–544; Elgie R., The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21; Elgie R., Variations on a theme: A fresh look at semi-presidentialism, "Journal of Democracy" 2005, vol 16, nr. 3, s. 1–21.; Skach C., Borrowing Constitutional Design: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.

² Shugart M., Carey J., Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, Wyd. Cambridge 1992, s. 19–27.

³ Elgie R., An Intellectual History of the Concepts of Premier-Presidentialism and President-Parliamentarism, "Political Studies Review" 2020, vol 18, nr. 1, s. 12–29; Elgie R., Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2011.

⁴ Elgie R., McMennamin I., Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation under Semi-Presidentialism, "Political Studies" 2011, vol 59, nr. 3, s. 616–635.

⁵ Elgie R., Schleiter P., Variation in the Durability of Semi-Presidential Democracies, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2011, s. 42–60.

⁶ Kim Y., A Troubled Marriage? Divided Minority Government, Cohabitation, Presidential Powers, President-Parliamentarism and Semi-Presidentialism, "Government and Opposition" 2015, vol 50, nr. 4, s. 652–681.

⁷ Pasyukova V., Modes of Post-Communism: Successor Parties, Trade Unions, and the State in Russia and East Central Europe, "Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe" 2010, vol 18, nr. 3, s. 281–298.

⁸ Sedelius T., Ekman J., Intra-Executive Conflict and Cabinet Instability: Effects of Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe, "Government and Opposition" 2010, vol 45, nr. 4, s. 505–530; Sedelius T., Linde J., Unravelling Semi-Presidentialism: Democracy and Government Performance in Four Distinct Regime Types, "Democratization" 2018, vol 25, s. 136–157.

D. Samuels and M. Shugart⁹, M. Shugart and J. Carey¹⁰, etc. Instead, the other researchers, in particular P. Magalhães, L. Aguiar Conraria¹¹ and S. Roper¹², reflect directly on premier-presidentialism, including in European countries. However, despite the considerable attention of these researchers to the issues of premier-presidential semi-presidentialism, they have not yet offered a systematic and unified understanding of the separate system of inter-institutional relations and constitutional design. Accordingly, the task of the presented scientific article is to analyze and compare the features, logics and parameters of the operationalization of premier-presidentialism as a type of semi-presidentialism in European countries.

We believe that the definition and delineation of premier-presidentialism should be done in view of its understanding as a separate type of semi-presidential system of government, in particular within formal (institutional and procedural) typology of the latter. This is especially true and important given the fact that it is necessary to single out such typologies, which mostly revolve around the issues of the formation and even more responsibility of governmental cabinets and the possibility of dissolving parliaments/legislatures, among the various possible factors and indicators of the typologies of semi-presidentialism. This is due to the fact (as noted by R. Elgie¹³) that the definition of semi-presidentialism should avoid theoretical and methodological problems of validity, unreliability and endogeneity, and therefore should serve as a basis for identifying variable types of the analyzed system of government. In other words, the basic or initial typology of semi-presidentialism should be carried out without reference and instructions to the powers of various political institutions and actors, but should be based exclusively on the texts of constitutions and other legal acts that dispositionally outline the patterns of inter-institutional relations within the system of government¹⁴. In this context, the formal (institutional and procedural) typology of semi-presidentialism (primarily by M. Shugart and J. Carey¹⁵), in particular based on the peculiarities of appointment, but mainly resignation of prime ministers, as well as patterns of responsibility of governmental cabinets and the possibility of dissolving parliaments/legislatures, is the main and classical one. It is on this basis that president-parliamentarism (president-parliamentary system of government) and premier-presidentialism (premier-presidential system of government) are distinguished as two

⁹ Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behaviour*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

¹⁰ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Shugart M., *Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Communist Europe*, "Transition" 1996 (13 December), s. 6–11.; Shugart M., *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, "French Politics" 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.

¹¹ Magalhães P., Aguiar Conraria L., *Growth, Centrist and Semi-Presidentialism: Forecasting the Portuguese General Elections*, "Electoral Studies" 2009, vol 28, s. 314–321.

¹² Roper S., *Are All Semi-Presidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes*, "Comparative Politics" 2002, vol 34, nr. 3, s. 253–272.

¹³ Elgie R., McMennamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, August 30, 2007).

¹⁴ Lytvyn V., *Conditionality, factors and indicators of heterogeneity and typologization of semi-presidential system of government*, „Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie” 2020, nr. 13, s. 42.

¹⁵ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 19–27.

separate options of semi-presidentialism. The first mentioned option of semi-presidentialism (which is not a special subject of our study, but is revealed only for the delimitation) presupposes the collective responsibility of prime minister and his or her governmental cabinet both to parliament and president, while the second mentioned option of semi-presidentialism – solely to parliament.

In this context, it should firstly be noted that premier-presidentialism is an institutional and procedural counterweight and alternative to president-parliamentarism. Premier-presidentialism is a formal/constitutional type of (semi-presidential) system of government, where prime minister and governmental cabinet are collectively responsible exclusively to parliament/legislature¹⁶. Consequently, the president under premier-presidentialism cannot be formally subjected to an early unilateral resignation of governmental cabinet, and presidential legislative powers, in addition, can also be severely limited¹⁷. Instead, a popularly elected president, who may or may not be empowered to dissolve the legislature, is empowered in the executive (primarily in foreign policy, national security and defense) and shares it with prime minister and his or her governmental cabinet under this type of semi-presidentialism¹⁸. All this, at first glance, is the basic reason and precondition for naming premier-presidentialism as the French model of semi-presidential system of government, because France (since 1962) was one of the first, but certainly the most theorized of its cases¹⁹. However, this is not entirely true, since premier-presidentialism, being more empirically widespread than president-parliamentarism (at least in European countries), is very variable and cannot be delineated exclusively by the French case, even if the creators and “engineers” of national constitutions of different countries appeal to it as to the main one. A clear manifestation of this is the fact that premier-presidentialism happens or has happened earlier among such cases of European semi-presidentialism as Armenia

¹⁶ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Shugart M., *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 333; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes R., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 357.; Protsyk O., *Semi-Presidentialism under Post-Communism*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 98–116.; Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, August 30, 2007).; Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S., *Semi-Presidentialism: What Have We Learned?*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 264–274.; Moestrup S., *Semi-presidentialism and Power Sharing Does it Work? Examples from Anglophone Africa*, Wyd. National Democratic Institute + IPSA 2011.; Zaznaev O., *Klassifikacii prezidentskoj, parlamentskoj i poluprezidentskoj sistem*, [w:] Farukshin M. (ed.), *Dinamika politicheskikh sistem i mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij*, Vyp 1, Wyd. Kazan. gos. un-t 2006, s. 196.

¹⁷ Schleiter P., *Mixed Constitutions and Political Instability: Russia 1991–1993*, “Democratization” 2003, vol 10, nr. 1, s. 4.

¹⁸ van Cranenburgh O., *Restraining executive power in Africa: horizontal accountability in Africa’s hybrid regimes*, “South African Journal of International Affairs” 2009, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 49–68.; Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 19–27.; Chang C.-H., *The Competition/Cooperation Relationship in Executive Power Operating of Semi-presidentialism*, “International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studie” 2011, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 105–116.; McQuire K., *President-Prime Minister Relations, Party Systems, and Democratic Stability in Semipresidential Regimes: Comparing the French and Russian Models*, “Texas International Law Journal” 2012, vol 47, nr. 2, s. 427–454.; Clark T., Larson J., *The Head of State in Premier-Presidentialism: Weak President or Strong President?*, Wyd. Creighton University 2005.; Schleiter P., *Mixed Constitutions and Political Instability: Russia 1991–1993*, “Democratization” 2003, vol 10, nr. 1, s. 4.; Roper S., *Are All Semi-presidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes*, “Comparative Politics” 2002, vol 34, nr. 3, s. 253–272.

¹⁹ Chernov V., *Sistemy pravleniya v Evrope: klassifikaciya i sravnitel’nyj analiz na primere stran Evrosoyuza*, „Politiya“ 2008, vol 1, nr. 48, s. 142–159.

(in 2005–2018), Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995), Bulgaria (since 1991), Croatia (since 2000), Czechia (since 2012), Finland (since 1919), Georgia (since 2013, but expected by 2024, when it should become a parliamentary system of government), Ireland (since 1937), Lithuania (since 1992), Northern Macedonia (since 1991), Moldova (since 2016, but also in the 90s of the XX century), Montenegro (since 2006), Poland (since 1990), Portugal (since 1982), Romania (since 1991), Serbia (since 2006), Slovakia (since 1999), Slovenia (since 1991), Turkey (in 2007–2018), Ukraine (in 2006–2010 and since 2014), as well as the already mentioned France (since 1962) (see Table 1 for details). Consequently, the study of premier-presidentialism in Europe needs both differentiation and generalization, including in terms of institutional and procedural determination, manifestations and operationalisations of premier-presidentialism as a type of semi-presidential system of government.

The generalizing feature of premier-presidentialism is that the appointment (with or without the consent of the head of state) and the dismissal (necessarily without the consent of the head of state) of prime minister (and sometimes of individual, most of all or all of the ministers) of governmental cabinet *de jure* and *de facto* are the prerogatives of the legislature. In turn, the president (except in the case of Finland since 1999 and except in special situations in other premier-presidential countries) nominates the candidate for the position of prime minister who is represented/proposed and/or supported by the majority in the legislature or parliamentary majority²⁰. It is also interesting that the head of state is officially authorized to nominate the composition of governmental cabinet only in Poland (since 1990) and Croatia (since 2000), as well as historically (in 2005–2018) in Armenia. In turn, the participation of the legislature in granting/giving a vote of investiture to the head or composition of governmental cabinet is not provided only in France (since 1962), but it is inherent in all other European premier-presidential countries. By analogy, the president is not traditionally (with the only exceptions of Ireland since 1937 and Poland since 1997) authorized to confirm the resignation of the head of governmental cabinet by the legislature under premier-presidentialism. On the other hand, about a third of the cases of European premier-presidentialism (see Table 1 for details) provides for the possibility of an official confirmation by the president the composition of cabinet and the possibility for the president to dismiss individual members of governmental cabinet.

²⁰ Protsyk O., *Reforming Cabinets in Post-Communist Countries: Political Determinants of Cabinet Organization and Size*, Presented at American Political Science Association Meeting (Chicago, September 2–5, 2004).

Table 1. Institutional and procedural attributes and parameters of the cases of premier-presidentialism among the current and continuous semi-presidential countries of Europe (as of December 2021)²¹

Country (the years of approval of premier-presidentialism)	President's ability to dismiss cabinet on his or her own	Parliament's ability to dismiss the cabinet (vote of no confidence in cabinet)	President's confirmation of the parliamentary resignation of cabinet (vote of no confidence in cabinet)	Requirement of official nomination of prime minister by the president	President's official ability to nominate the composition of cabinet	Parliament's participation in giving the vote of investiture to the head (composition) of cabinet	President's official ability to confirm the composition of cabinet	Requirement of official confirmation of the resignation of prime minister by the president	President's ability to dismiss individual members of cabinet on his or her own	President's ability to dissolve parliament and call its early election	President's ability to issue decrees with the force of law	President's ability to initiate a referendum on his or her own
Bulgaria (since 1991)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Croatia (since 2000)	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Czechia (since 2012)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Finland (1919–1999)	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Finland (since 1999)	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
France (since 1962)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Georgia (since 2013)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Ireland (since 1937)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Lithuania (since 1992)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Northern Macedonia (since 1991)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Moldova (since 2016)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Montenegro (2006–2007)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Montenegro (since 2007)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Poland (1990–1997)	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Poland (since 1997)	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Portugal (since 1982)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Romania (since 1991)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Serbia (since 2006)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Slovakia (since 1999)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Slovenia (since 1991)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Ukraine (2006–2010)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ukraine (since 2014)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes

Źródło: Own considerations based on the national constitutions of the relevant European countries during the period when they were premier-presidential ones.

²¹ The gray color indicates the historical cases of premier-presidentialism in those European countries that are currently continuing to be semi-presidential ones. In turn, the table does not include historical examples of premier-presidentialism in those European countries that are not continuously or currently semi-presidential ones. Among them are or were such European countries as Armenia (2005–2018), Moldova (1994–2001), Turkey (2007–2018) and Yugoslavia (2001–2002), etc.

This gives every reason to argue that premier-presidentialism, at least in European countries, on average significantly contributes to the inter-institutional balance and compromise between the president and the legislature on the issues of formation and functioning of governmental cabinets, as well as on the issues of governance, political system and political process in general. Since the head of state in the conditions of premier-presidentialism traditionally (unlike the common situations in the conditions of president-parliamentarism) has no power or authority over the governmental cabinet or the legislature, and therefore the president's influence on the system of government is especially complicated in the case of his or her opposition and even obstruction to the majority in parliament²². In this context, delineation of the relationship between the president and the legislature, based on consideration and checking whether the head of state controls parliamentary majority or the majority in parliament and what is the structure of the latter, is a determinant factor of inter-institutional relations under premier-presidentialism. Considering the traditions and peculiarities of governance, inter-institutional relations, the executive dualism and constitutional/political culture in each premier-presidential country has some additional significance in this context.

Accordingly, both the peculiarity and the problem of premier-presidentialism lie in different approaches to the indicators, by means of which different scientists carry out the distinction of premier-presidentialism. On one hand, the scope of constitutional powers of the president, parliament and governmental cabinet is taken into account, nevertheless, on the other hand, the political component is also important, because it is manifested in taking into account the party affiliation or structuring of the head of state, prime minister and parliamentary majority (or minority)²³. Considering unconstitutional factors, including the personal characteristics of the president, prime minister and the speaker of parliament, the features of the specific historical context, the level of political culture and the specifics of political traditions both at the level of separate political actors and society as a whole and so on, is of additional importance. For example, provided that the president of France (and of many other European premier-presidential countries) has the support (especially a stable one) of the majority in the legislature, the head of state concentrates a significant (and greater than constitutionally regulated) scope of powers in the executive, and the prime minister finds himself or herself in a subordinate (secondary) position to the head of state²⁴.

²² Schleiter P., *Mixed Constitutions and Political Instability: Russia 1991–1993*, "Democratization" 2003, vol 10, nr. 1, s. 4.; Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, August 30, 2007).

²³ Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016.

²⁴ Elgie R., France, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 67–85.; Grossman E., *The President's Choice? Government and Cabinet Turnover under the Fifth Republic*, "West European Politics" 2009, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 268–286.; Marrani D., *Semi-Presidentialism à la française: the Recent Constitutional Evolution of the "Two-Headed" Executive*, "Constitutional Forum constitutionnel" 2009, vol 18, nr. 2, s. 69–77.

In this context, premier-presidentialism as a separate type of semi-presidential system of government functions as close as possible to presidentialism by its institutional and procedural logics²⁵. Even though the president does not formally have the right to terminate the powers of prime minister and cabinet, but instead can influence the latter only indirectly, i.e. through a presidential/pro-presidential majority in the legislature. Controversially, some cases of the European premier-presidentialism (for example, in Slovenia and a number of other European countries) also make possible the inter-institutional designs, situations and scenarios, when presidents and prime ministers belong to the same political parties or coalitions and are supported by identical majorities in the legislatures, but the prime ministers, not the presidents, exercise their constitutional powers as best they can and may even dominate in the executive dualism.

In turn, the opposite situation is typical for the cases of premier-presidentialism (mostly in semi-presidential countries, where presidents have the leading influence in the scenario outlined above), when the president and the prime minister cooperate within their own constitutional powers, but they both belong to competing political parties or coalitions in the legislature, as a result the president does not enjoy the support of parliamentary majority or the majority in the legislature. Consequently, if the president loses or does not enjoy the support of parliamentary majority, while the prime minister enjoys the support of parliamentary majority, then the leadership in the power-executive vertical strengthens or shifts towards the head of governmental cabinet and the cabinet itself. The reason is that the inter-institutional confrontation between the president, on one hand, and the parliamentary majority and governmental cabinet, on the other hand, is programmed one and affects the increase or decrease of the constitutional powers of these institutions in such a case. As a result, inter-institutional relations in such cases of premier-presidentialism are determined by the “friction” and disposition between the president as the head of state and the prime minister as the head of governmental cabinet and the executive in general, particularly given that the prime minister and governmental cabinet are collectively responsible exclusively to the legislature or the majority in the legislature²⁶.

Taking into account political and constitutional culture, structuring features of the ruling elite and the personalized-oriented attributes of the presidency and the premiership is of complementary importance to the functioning of European premier-presidentialism in this context. This determines that if the president and prime minister (in the case of coalition governmental cabinet’s formation) belong to the same, identical or related political parties, which have a majority in the legislature, then the inter-institutional relations between the president and parliament are slightly conflicting ones, and the executive “visually” or behaviorally is less dualized than in the case, when the president and prime minister have the support of different political parties in the legislature

²⁵ Shugart M., Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.

²⁶ Chernov V., Sistemy pravleniya v Evrope: klassifikaciya i sravnitel'nyj analiz na primere stran Evrosoyuzha, „Politiya” 2008, vol 1, nr. 48, s. 142–159.; Sydorchuk O., Osoblyvosti vyboriv u napivprezidentskykh respublikakh: dosvid Ukrainyy Polshchi, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk” 2013, nr. 73, s. 342–344.; Shugart M., Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 333.; Choudhry S., Stacey R., Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia, “NYU Law Working Papers: Consolidating the Arab Spring – Constitutional Transition in Egypt and Tunisia” 2013.

and are the political antagonists/opponents of each other, as a result the president and prime minister cannot cooperate within a single configuration of the majority in the legislature. This is especially true when the legislatures are excessively polarized and/or fractionalized and are formed on the basis of the electoral systems with majoritarian/single-member (i.e., TRS and FPTP) or at least mixed electoral formulas, because the latter significantly intensify and stabilize disputes over the distribution of powers in the executive vertical between the president and prime minister, as well as general confrontation between the executive and the legislature.

The positions of the head of state, prime minister and other political actors in the system of party or intra-party hierarchy are another important factor in guaranteeing or limiting the inter-institutional balance and even compromise between the president and parliament on the formation, functioning and responsibility of governmental cabinets in the conditions of premier-presidentialism. For example, if the leader of a political party or electoral bloc/coalition that has a majority in the legislature becomes the head of state, then this leader will dominate the executive. However, if the president is not the leader of a party with a majority in the legislature, but the leader of such a party is the prime minister, then it is quite clear that the format of relations between the president and prime minister will depend on intra-party competition and structuring. For example, after the tragic catastrophe and the death of the Polish President L. Kaczyński in Smolensk in 2010, D. Tusk as the head of the Civic Platform (PO) parliamentary party, which had a relative/plurality majority in the legislature, refused to run for president and continued to serve as the Prime Minister. Instead, B. Komorowski who held the position of vice-chairman in the party hierarchy of PO, ran and won the presidential election. Therefore, it was difficult to talk about the dominance of the president in the system of the executive during this period. An even more interesting and vivid situation in Poland arose in 2015 as the result of the inaugurations and incumbency of the President A. Duda and the Prime Minister B. Szydło from the “Law and Justice” (PiS) parliamentary party, which was and is being currently (formally and actually) headed by J. Kaczyński. The same situation continued during the tenure of all the prime ministers (i.e., twice M. Morawiecki – in 2017–2019 and since 2019, also from PiS) during the two terms (in 2015–2020 and since 2000 and ongoing at the time of our research writing) of A. Duda’s presidency, that is according to the results of the 2015 and 2020 presidential elections and the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections. The most important is that it allowed the PiS party leader J. Kaczyński to informally concentrate powers in his hands and to significantly shift the balance of inter-institutional relations between the president and prime minister in Poland not in their favor, but in favor of the party leader and the informal leader of the state.

All this theoretically and methodologically proves the position of M. Shugart, according to which the cabinet in the conditions of premier-presidentialism can be subordinated to the president only when: a) the president and the parliamentary majority or the majority in the legislature come from the same party or are constructed by ideologically close parties, which form the

governmental cabinet all together; b) the president is the de facto chairman of a party that independently has or composes a majority in the legislature²⁷. However, such a dispositional and common feature of premier-presidentialism as the collective political responsibility of the prime minister and governmental cabinet solely to the legislature²⁸ means that if the legislature elects, appoints or approves a prime minister who is ideologically and party-wise opposed to the head of state, then the latter will have to accept this appointment. In the terminology of M. Shugart, this means that the resulting attribute of premier-presidentialism is that it is described by a governmental cabinet, which is endowed with parliamentary support (not subordinated to the president, but only to the legislature), and therefore the inter-institutional relations between the president and prime minister or between the president and the legislature are purely business or businesslike ones²⁹. The situation is completely different when the results of parliamentary election do not provide the possibility to form a stable majority in the legislature, because the president receives a “mandate” and the role of “mediator” during the process of governmental cabinet’s formation in this context³⁰.

This is especially important when the parliamentary vote of investiture on the formation of governmental cabinet is not constitutionally regulated and provided (this is only the case of France in the conditions of European premier-presidentialism³¹) or when the parliamentary vote of investiture in governmental cabinet is implemented within a negative majority rule (as in Portugal and earlier in Turkey). Instead, the president’s “mediation” is weakened by a constructive vote of no confidence in governmental cabinet (as in Croatia, Georgia, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia and earlier in Turkey), because this mechanism pushes the institution of president into the background during the resignation of the current cabinet and the formation of a new cabinet. On the other hand, it is important that if the president is not authorized to nominate a prime minister (regardless of whether the candidacy of prime minister, the composition and/or the program of governmental cabinet requires the parliamentary vote of investiture), then the outlined example of premier-presidentialism is almost indistinguishable from parliamentarism (this is most true for Finland since 1999).

On average, this regulates that the president in premier-presidentialism is “stimulated” to negotiate with the legislature on the process of governmental cabinet’s formation, and the legislature, in turn, is probably interested in a reciprocating and countering motion. Even though the president theoretically has more significant unilateral nominating powers to recommend a prime minister and form a cabinet, and the legislature is endowed with solely unilateral discretionary

²⁷ Shugart M., *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.

²⁸ Sydorчук O., *Osoblyvosti vyboriv u napivprezidentskykh respublikakh: dosvid Ukrainy y Polshchi*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk” 2013, nr. 73, s. 342–344.

²⁹ Shugart M., *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 333.

³⁰ Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, “Center for the Study of Democracy Paper” 2005, nr. 7, 31 s.

³¹ Elgie R., *France*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 67–85.

powers regarding the resignation of cabinet³², both the head of state and the legislature are still interested in working together and in jointly having their “share” in cabinet and in the political system as a whole³³. This is especially evident given that the process of governmental cabinet’s formation under premier-presidential type of semi-presidentialism involves more than just the choice of a prime minister. This process additionally includes negotiations on party (or non-party) composition of governmental cabinet, appointments to the leading positions in the public sector, the distribution of resources in the legislature, as well as in general on the attributes of political process. As a result, it is clear that inter-institutional relations under premier-presidentialism are not necessarily consensual or even mainstream ones, because they can and should (at least analytically) be complemented by the patterns of inter-party and political competition.

Accordingly, the interaction in the plane “premier-presidentialism and party system” is usually determined by the practical relationships between the president and the prime minister, in particular as to whether the prime minister is subordinated to the president, the president is subordinated to the prime minister or they are in cohabitation (i.e., providing divided majority system³⁴). This is institutionally due to the fact that the initiative to form a governmental cabinet or at least to nominate a prime minister belongs to the president under European premier-presidentialism (with the exception of Finland since 1999). However, in practice this is regulated by the fact that any new governmental cabinet (or the person of its prime minister, its composition and/or its program) must (with the exception of France since 1962) pass the parliamentary vote of investiture. In addition, the formation of a new governmental cabinet under premier-presidentialism is usually associated with the election of a new parliament or the leading chamber of parliament, rather than a president. This requires taking into account the balance and positioning of political parties in the legislature that, in turn, generates opportunities for parties to compete for the participation in governmental cabinet, encourages them to form party blocs/coalitions and distribute cabinet’s portfolios and thus to cooperate with governmental cabinet and to support or disapprove its initiatives or, in total, to the development of party system and its control over the institutions of the executive³⁵.

The situation is compounded by the fact that governmental officials and cabinet ministers in most cases of the European premier-presidentialism can be removed from office only at the request of the prime minister. Instead, the presidents of only a few cases of the European premier-presidentialism are empowered to unilaterally terminate the duties of some cabinet

³² Roper S., Are All Semi-presidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes, “Comparative Politics” 2002, vol 34, nr. 3, s. 253–272.

³³ Garrido A., Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Presented at World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Santiago de Chile, July 2009); Elgie R., McMenamin I., Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, August 30, 2007).

³⁴ Skach C., *Borrowing Constitutional Design: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.

³⁵ Sydorchuk O., Osoblyvosti vyboriv u napivprezidentskykh respublikakh: dosvid Ukrainy y Polshchi, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk” 2013, nr. 73, s. 342–344.

ministers, which generally ensures the loyalty of the ministerial composition of governmental cabinet mainly to the head of governmental cabinet³⁶. A similar, albeit much less average, logics apply to the appointment of the heads of state administrations (if such are regulated by law) or other officials of local government³⁷. Consequently, premier-presidentialism institutionally and politically focuses on the balance of inter-institutional relations between the president and prime minister, as well as (and as a consequence) on institutional (including cabinet one) and political stability, taking into account the number and connections of political parties in governmental cabinet and in the legislature. At the same time, premier-presidentialism is supplementally regulated by the independent (or hypothetically independent) role of the head of state who is also able to function as a stabilizing factor and institution. The fact is that it is the head of state who, in most cases of the European premier-presidentialism, decides whom will be the candidate for the next prime minister in the event of previous governmental cabinet's resignation, although given the support of the majority in the legislature. If this is not possible (each country defines it specifically), then the head of state can traditionally be authorized to dissolve parliament and call its early election on his or her own initiative. In general, this means that premier-presidentialism, at least theoretically, constitutionally, institutionally and procedurally, is more stable than president-parliamentarism (this conclusion is preliminary one, because the latter type of semi-presidentialism needs separate consideration). The reason is that premier-presidentialism focuses on the advantages of both parliamentarism (i.e., encouraging parties to control the formation, functioning and responsibility of governmental cabinets, in particular through increased inter-party electoral competition³⁸) and presidentialism (i.e., seeking to normalize political and systemic role of the president as an "arbiter" of inter-institutional relations of various branches of government).

In contrast, the specificity of the presidency under the European premier-presidentialism (largely with the exception of the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe as well as France) is that the head of state (unlike the president-parliamentary type of semi-presidentialism on average) is traditionally (especially in countries of Western, Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe) deprived of powerful levers of influence on the executive, and therefore the attractiveness of this institution is lower than the attractiveness of the institution of parliament³⁹. This is due to the fact that the field of activity of the president is mostly and traditionally reduced to reconciling and coordination of the conflicting interests of various political parties and institutions, as well as to maintaining the balance of the political system in general. Thus, parliamentary elections

³⁶ Protsyk O., Reforming Cabinets in Post-Communist Countries: Political Determinants of Cabinet Organization and Size, Presented at American Political Science Association Meeting (Chicago, September 2–5, 2004).

³⁷ Pavlenko R., *Parlamentska vidpovidalnist uriadu: svitovyi ta ukrainskyi dosvid*, Wyd. KM Akademia 2002, s. 44.

³⁸ Sydorchuk O., *Osoblyvosti vyboriv u napivprezidentskykh respublikakh: dosvid Ukrainy y Polshchi*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk“ 2013, nr. 73, s. 342–344.

³⁹ Sydorchuk O., *Osoblyvosti vyboriv u napivprezidentskykh respublikakh: dosvid Ukrainy y Polshchi*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk“ 2013, nr. 73, s. 342–344.; Clark T., Larson J., *The Head of State in Premier-Presidentialism: Weak President or Strong President?*, Wyd. Creighton University 2005.

play a major role in the political and behavioral delineation of the institutional and procedural attributes of premier-presidentialism. The fact is that parliamentary elections determine the control over the executive, first of all over the prime minister and governmental cabinet, while presidential elections have if not symbolic then supplementary significance. This is especially true for such cases of the European premier-presidentialism as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, Ireland, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. This applies to a lesser extent to such countries as France and Lithuania (as well as historically to Armenia), since their governmental cabinets are obliged to resign after the inauguration of the newly elected presidents^{40/}

The exceptions in this regard are Georgia and Ukraine (both as such historical cases of premier-presidentialism as Armenia and Turkey), as well as to a lesser extent Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania, where the institution of president does not correspond to the theoretical construct of an “arbiter” of political system, because the head of state quite often (for various reasons and in view of the support in the legislature) transfers to himself or herself a significant part of the powers in the executive and focuses not “over”, but “within” the political system and the system of inter-institutional relations. Accordingly, the president is not always irrelevant in the conditions of premier-presidentialism (even on average), because the head of state may have the right of legislative initiative and veto⁴¹, on the basis of which there is a significant rapprochement with the ideal position of the president⁴². This is often due to the fact that the president relies on the fact of direct legitimacy of his or her power, which differs from the limited powers of the head of state in the executive⁴³. As a result, premier-presidentialism hypothetically and potentially generates the situations of confrontation between the prime minister or parliamentary majority and the president. The fact that the presidential “popular mandate” is supplemented and significantly strengthened by a fixed-term election also contributes to this. This, in the combination with the above-mentioned factors as well as with the historical traditions/features of the political system of each particular semi-presidential country, gives the head of state incentives to use his or her “national-wide popularity” to compensate for the lack of constitutional powers and to oppose the prime minister. In addition, as D. Samuels and M. Shugart⁴⁴ argue, the importance of presidential elections increases when the presidential candidates are the leaders, but not the second, third or any other authorized persons of different parties, because the parties in this case invest large resources in the victory of their nominees. Conversely, according

⁴⁰ Elgie R., France, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 67–85.

⁴¹ Clark T., Larson J., *The Head of State in Premier-Presidentialism: Weak President or Strong President?*, Wyd. Creighton University 2005.

⁴² Tsebelis G., *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Wyd. Russell Sage Foundation 2002.

⁴³ Elgie R., France, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 67–85.

⁴⁴ Samuels D., Shugart M., *The “Semi-presidential” model and its subtypes: Party presidentialization and the selection and deselection of prime ministers*, Paper presented at the Committee of the 10th Congress of the French Political Science Association (Grenoble, September 7–9, 2009), s. 9.

to O. Sydorчук⁴⁵, if the presidential candidates do not show a desire to actively influence the executive and occupy a relatively insignificant position in the party hierarchy, then presidential elections are less significant, in particular compared to parliamentary elections. In summary, this means that the importance of presidential elections and, therefore, the importance of the institution of president in the context of premier-presidentialism depend on the strategy of their participants: if they are aimed at active influencing the political system and forming governmental cabinets, then the role of presidential elections and presidential institutions increases significantly, and vice versa.

However, on the other hand, the majoritarian tendencies of the presidential executive⁴⁶ decrease depending on whether the head of state enjoys the support of the majority in the legislature. The point is, for example, that cohabitation (i.e. divided majority system as well as divided minority system⁴⁷) can have a potential effect in this context, because it can reduce the “presidential orientation” of parliamentary elections and, therefore, of governmental cabinets. Accordingly, it is intuitively clear that the president under premier-presidentialism can maximize his or her influence over the governmental cabinet only by cooperating with the legislature⁴⁸, and that the president cannot exercise actually any power without the help of the prime minister⁴⁹. In other words, the president, yielding his or her powers to the legislature, receives constant influence on the political process and inter-institutional relations and, therefore, rises above the political system, in particular over the system of government.

At the same time and on the contrary, this does not mean that the president cannot try to avoid concessions to the legislature and nominate a prime minister or a governmental cabinet's option that does not have the support of the majority in parliament. However, such a strategy characterizes the institution of president in the conditions of premier-presidentialism very rarely. The reason is that the president clearly understands that such actions only antagonize the legislature and cause the latter to express a vote of no confidence in the “presidential” governmental cabinet. In turn, repeating such a strategy will eventually lead to the president being treated as “incapable of negotiating” and “guilty” of failing to form a stable governmental cabinet⁵⁰. This is largely the reason why the head of state is aware of the fact that the price of his or her “guilt” in the instability of governmental cabinet is too destructive politically. Therefore, all the president's calculations will conclude that there is a need to bargain

⁴⁵ Sydorчук O., *Osoblyvosti vyboriv u napivprezidentskykh respublikakh: dosvid Ukrainy y Polshchi*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk“ 2013, nr. 73, s. 342–344.

⁴⁶ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 282.

⁴⁷ Skach C., *Borrowing Constitutional Design: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.

⁴⁸ Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, August 30, 2007).

⁴⁹ Elgie R., France, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 67–85.

⁵⁰ Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, August 30, 2007).

with the legislature, especially if the latter can unilaterally form a governmental cabinet. However, it is also noticeable that the president's ability to influence the governmental cabinet and the political process after the confrontation as well as to reconcile interests with the legislature will be much less than in the case of the initial bargaining with parliament. In contrast, if the legislature tries to maximize its influence on the governmental cabinet and the political process as a whole, in particular without taking into account the interests of the head of state and given that the head of state cannot dismiss the governmental cabinet, then only the parliament will be solely "guilty" of governmental and political instability. Consequently, the legislature, in particular its majority, is also aware that such a strategy is too destructive politically for parties opposed to the president (which have the majority in the legislature).

In general, this means that the legislature and the president in the conditions of premier-presidentialism have direct and indirect incentives to negotiate with each other and reach an agreement on the formation and responsibility of governmental cabinet, and this distinguishes premier-presidentialism from president-parliamentarism. This is due to the fact that premier-presidentialism is logically (though not in all semi-presidential countries in Europe) constructed on the basis of a series of cross-relations – between the president and prime minister, between the president, prime minister and parliamentary majority, between the executive and other state structures, between the political elite and the people⁵¹. The result is the minimization of the risks of institutional collapse and relative political/inter-institutional stability, which should theoretically help to improve the consolidation of democracy. At the same time, such incentives are limited or disappear only when a new majority in parliament is formed as a result of the parliamentary election, especially if it is actively opposed to the president and, therefore, can legitimately refuse to bargain and negotiate with the head of state, even if it threatens the fact of cohabitation. Therefore, all responsibility for the political process in this case lies on a governmental cabinet and the majority in the legislature, and the powers of the president are limited.

On average, this fits into M. Shugart's logic and theoretical/methodological remark, according to which the president in the conditions of premier-presidentialism is characterized as a "head of state with considerable powers" only when he or she can dissolve the legislature or veto its legislation⁵² (or appoint the head of governmental cabinet if the legislature cannot do so as a duty. These powers of the head of state somewhat expand the "business" or transactional nature of the inter-institutional relations in the conditions of premier-presidentialism, because the former give the latter a transactional character in the format of the president's bargaining with the legislature and, accordingly, with the prime minister and governmental cabinet. For example, the president's legislative veto forces the governmental cabinet and the legislature to function more farsightedly. This is especially true when overcoming the presidential veto requires a qualified majority in the legislature. However, even when overcoming the legislative veto

⁵¹ Elgie R., France, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 67–85.

⁵² Shugart M., *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, "French Politics" 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 339.

requires the support of an absolute majority in the legislature, this may be a more complicated procedure than adopting a regular act of parliament. The reason is that laws in a significant number of European semi-presidential countries are passed by a relative majority, and therefore governmental cabinet must more closely mobilize the legislature in the event of a legislative veto. The powers of the president are further strengthened within premier-presidentialism when the head of state is authorized to appoint or nominate a formator (or an informant, to a lesser extent) during the formation of governmental cabinet⁵³.

Ultimately, this means that premier-presidentialism in the context of the institution of the head of state is characterized by certain “presidential features”, i.e. constitutional conditions that allow the president to be endowed with and act on the basis of a “separate mandate”⁵⁴. On the other hand, premier-presidentialism is moving away from presidentialism at the same time, because: a) it is necessarily conditioned by the possibility of the resignation of governmental cabinet by the legislature; b) it traditionally provides for the possibility of dissolving the legislature by the head of state. In this context, the presidential powers to dissolve the legislature (as a “non-attribute” of parliamentarism) balances the parliamentary powers to resign governmental cabinet (as a “non-attribute” of presidentialism). It theoretically and methodologically means that any hypothetical system of government, where the president may dissolve parliament, but governmental cabinet is not responsible to the legislature or its majority, will act against the principles of inter-institutional control, equilibria, checks and balances. On the other hand, if a popularly elected president is an “agent” of the electorate, then he or she must have the constitutional authority to demand the cooperation from the side of the majority in the legislature. And complementary: it is the voters under premier-presidentialism who decide whether to strengthen or weaken the president’s actual powers over the legislature and the prime minister, or vice versa.

The competency and functional specificity of premier-presidentialism is that the prime minister or governmental cabinet and the president are formally and mostly actually endowed with separate (but not necessarily unrelated) powers in the executive. As a result, premier-presidentialism is almost always unquestionably characterized by the dual/dualistic nature of the executive. This is reflected in the fact that the prime minister traditionally (with or without the participation or consent of the president) forms his or her governmental cabinet and directs/coordinates its work, primarily in the fields of social and economic policies. Instead, the president, who may even be authorized to appoint some cabinet ministers, is traditionally able to influence social and economic policy-making, but mainly determines the foreign policy course of the state and is responsible for national security and defense.

⁵³ Shugart M., *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 338; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, “Center for the Study of Democracy Paper” 2005, nr. 7, 31 s.

⁵⁴ Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, “Center for the Study of Democracy Paper” 2005, nr. 7, 31 s.

All this is a reason to argue that the president in the conditions of premier-presidentialism can be endowed with both legislative (non-political) and non-legislative (political) powers⁵⁵. Moreover, the head of the premier-presidential state does not necessarily have legislative (non-political) powers, but necessarily has non-legislative (political) powers, particularly in the executive, even if he or she is unable to exercise most of them alone or independently. This or rather the combination and comparison of the legislative and non-legislative powers of presidents is the basis of the internal taxonomy of the two types of premier-presidentialism⁵⁶, in particular: the “French” one, which is characterized by a greater number of legislative powers and a smaller volume of non-legislative powers of presidents; the “moderate and formal” one, which is characterized by relatively small legislative and greater non-legislative powers of presidents⁵⁷. At the same time, the proposed evaluation model is not consolidated one, because it does not take into account some important aspects of the institution of presidency, which do not belong to legislative and non-legislative powers of presidents, but significantly affect their role and place in the political system. In particular, these are the patterns of early termination of powers of presidents and the peculiarities of the powers of presidents in relation to the judiciary. This conclusion is complemented by R. Elgie⁵⁸, D. Samuels and M. Shugart⁵⁹, who do believe that different cases of premier-presidential semi-presidentialism determine different political effects and depend to a large extent on both institutional and non-institutional factors.

This means that premier-presidentialism can be presidentialized both formally and informally or both institutionally and behaviorally, in particular through political parties. Moreover, as noted above, presidents in the conditions of premier-presidentialism acquire informal political influence if the president and the majority in the legislature belong to the same political party and/or the president is the head of his or her political party *de facto*⁶⁰. In other words, premier-presidentialism can create the necessary conditions for formal/institutional presidentialization, but instead only or exceptionally sufficient (rather than necessary) conditions for informal/political presidentialization. In summary, this means that the degree of influence of the head of state under premier-presidentialism depends not only on constitutional norms, but also on the way how parties solve their internal problems, in particular on the transfer of powers and coordination of powers. Accordingly, it is quite correct to conclude that the degree of presidentialization of premier-presidentialism decreases when the president and the parliamentary majority belong to mutually opposed/oppositional parts of the party and ideological spectrum,

⁵⁵ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992

⁵⁶ Roper S., *Are All Semi-presidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes*, “Comparative Politics” 2002, vol 34, nr. 3, s. 258–259.

⁵⁷ Zaznaev O., *Klassifikacii prezidentskoj, parlamentskoj i poluprezidentskoj sistem*, [w:] Farukshin M. (ed.), *Dinamika politicheskikh sistem i mezhdunarodnyh odnoszenij*. Vyp 1, Wyd. Kazan. gos. un-t 2006, s. 196.

⁵⁸ Elgie R., *Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism and Their Impact on Nascent Democracies*, “Taiwan Journal of Democracy” 2007, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 53.

⁵⁹ Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: A Neo-Madisonian Theory of Party Organization and Behaviour*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Philadelphia, 2006).

⁶⁰ Shugart M., *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.

and therefore the system of government works exclusively according to formal and constitutional patterns⁶¹. This expectation is due to the fact that governmental cabinet in the conditions of premier-presidentialism depends exclusively on the confidence of the majority in the legislature, the opposite or non-opposite one to the head of state. However, if such a majority is opposite or oppositional one, it eliminates internal and narrow-party sources of presidential influence on the legislature, shifting the theoretical attention to the phenomenon of cohabitation (which is discussed in various relevant studies).

In this context, it is important to take into account the authority or non-authority of the head of state to dissolve the legislature, since these powers serve as a very important basis for the internal taxonomy of all the cases of the European institutional and procedural premier-presidentialism. Based on the so-called “neo-Madison perspective”⁶², the cases of the European premier-presidentialism should be divided into the cases of parliamentary-like premier-presidentialism, when the president cannot dismiss the prime minister and/or governmental cabinet and cannot dissolve the parliament (Finland since 1999, Montenegro in 2006–2007, Northern Macedonia and Turkey earlier), and cases of classical premier-presidentialism, when the president cannot dismiss the prime minister and/or governmental cabinet, but may dissolve the parliament (all other cases of premier-presidentialism among the current and continuous semi-presidential countries of Europe; see Table 1 for details). It is clear that through the application of the logic of the internal taxonomy of premier-presidentialism this type of semi-presidentialism is heterogeneous one in its institutional and political stability and democratic effectiveness. The reason is that of all the cases of European premier-presidentialism the most stable ones (even much close to president-parliamentarism) are those where the president has considerable executive powers, as well as legislative and non-legislative powers in general. In this case, the constitutional obligation of the branch of government or political institution that initiates the dissolution of another branch of government or political institution also to be re-elected one is considered as a “safeguard” for premier-presidentialism to “slide” into authoritarianism and instability⁶³.

Overall, the article found that premier-presidentialism (or semi-presidentialism with only parliamentary responsibility of governmental cabinet) is a system of government, where cabinet and prime minister are collectively responsible exclusively to the legislature. Consequently, the president

⁶¹ Samuels D., Shugart M., The “Semi-presidential” model and its subtypes: Party presidentialization and the selection and deselection of prime ministers, Paper presented at the Committee of the 10th Congress of the French Political Science Association (Grenoble, September 7–9, 2009).

⁶² Shugart M., Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 328, 333–335, 339; Carroll R., Shugart M., Neo-Madisonian Theories of Latin American Institutions, [w:] Munck G. (ed.), Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Volume I: Theories and Agendas, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2007, s. 51–104; Samuels D., Shugart M., Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behaviour, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.; Elgie R., McMenamin I., Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, August 30, 2007); Samuels D., Shugart M., The “Semi-presidential” model and its subtypes: Party presidentialization and the selection and deselection of prime ministers, Paper presented at the Committee of the 10th Congress of the French Political Science Association (Grenoble, September 7–9, 2009).

⁶³ Movchan U., Raboriahova I., Statusno-rolovi osoblyvosti instytutu prezydenta na rynku vlady, „Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V. N. Karazina: Serii: Pytannia politolohii” 2010, vol 16, nr. 885, s. 89–97.

under premier-presidentialism cannot be subjected to an early unilateral resignation of governmental cabinet, and presidential legislative powers can also be severely limited. However, this does not necessarily diminish the president's influence in the system of government, since the head of state may be empowered to dissolve the legislature, usually nominates a candidate for the position of the head of governmental cabinet, is empowered in the executive and shares the executive with the prime minister and his or her cabinet. Thus, premier-presidentialism is characterized mainly by hierarchical relations between the president, prime minister and parliament (often not known in whose favor), and therefore is relatively conflictive only depending on the party affiliation of the president and prime minister and the composition of the legislature. This means that premier-presidentialism is a separate type of European semi-presidentialism, which significantly affects the formal and actual powers of the institutions of president, prime minister and parliament, since it can have both institutional and procedural (formal) as well as political and behavioral (actual) consequences.

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SOCIAL FACTORS AND CONSEQUENCES OF COVID-19 MORBIDITY AND COUNTERACTION IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL-EASTERN, SOUTH-EASTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE: REGIONAL COMPARISON AS OF 2020–2021

The article provides a regional comparison of social, political and economic factors and consequences of morbidity and counteraction to COVID-19 in the countries of Central-Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe during the 2020–2021 period. To do this, there have been made correlations between the morbidity and counteraction to COVID-19 in the analyzed regions and its individual countries with such indicators as the dynamics of political regimes change, human development, equality or inequality of resource allocation, GDP per capita, governance efficiency, etc. Some of the correlations have been shown to be positive and some of them to be negative ones. Most importantly is, however, that the situation with COVID-19 has an extremely negative impact on the dynamics of political regimes in the analyzed regions, in particular on the “erosion” of democracy and autocratization.

Keywords: COVID-19, democracy, autocracy, hybrid regimes, morbidity and counteraction to COVID-19, countries of Central-Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.

CZYNNIKI SPOŁECZNE, KONSEKWENCJE CHOROBY ORAZ KONTROLA COVID-19 W KRAJACH EUROPY ŚRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ, POŁUDNIOWO-WSCHODNIEJ I WSCHODNIEJ: PORÓWNANIE REGIONALNE W LATACH 2020-2021

W artykule dokonano regionalnego porównania społecznych, politycznych i ekonomicznych czynników oraz konsekwencji zapadalności i przeciwdziałania COVID-19 w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Południowo-Wschodniej i Wschodniej w latach 2020–2021. W tym celu dokonano korelacji między występowaniem i przeciwdziałaniem COVID-19 w analizowanych regionach i poszczególnych krajach z takimi wskaźnikami, jak dynamika zmian politycznych, rozwój społeczny, równość lub nierówność alokacji zasobów, PKB na mieszkańca, zarządzanie itp. Niektóre korelacje okazały się dodatnie, a niektóre ujemne. Co jednak najważniejsze, sytuacja z COVID-19 ma niezwykle negatywny wpływ na dynamikę reżimów politycznych w analizowanych regionach, w szczególności na „erozję” demokracji i autoryzację.

Słowa kluczowe: COVID-19, demokracja, autokracja, reżimy hybrydowe, zapadalność i przeciwdziałanie COVID-19, kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Południowo-Wschodniej i Wschodniej.

СОЦІАЛЬНІ ЧИННИКИ І НАСЛІДКИ ЗАХВОРЮВАНОСТІ ТА ПРОТИДІЇ COVID-19 В КРАЇНАХ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНОЇ, ПІВДЕННО-СХІДНОЇ І СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ: РЕГІОНАЛЬНЕ ПОРІВНЯННЯ СТАНОМ НА 2020–2021 РОКИ

У статті здійснено регіональне порівняння соціальних, політичних та економічних чинників й наслідків захворюваності та протидії COVID-19 в країнах Центрально-Східної, Південно-Східної і Східної Європи упродовж періоду 2020–2021 років. Для цього здійснено кореляції захворюваності та протидії COVID-19 в аналізованих регіонах та його окремих країнах із такими показниками, як динаміка зміни політичних режимів, показники людського розвитку, рівності чи нерівності розподілу ресурсів, ВВП на душу населення, ефективність урядування тощо. Продемонстровано, що деякі кореляції є позитивними, а деякі негативними. Однак найважливіше те, що ситуація з COVID-19 вкрай негативно впливає на динаміку розвитку політичних режимів в аналізованих регіонах, зокрема на “ерозію” демократії і автократизацію.

Ключові слова: COVID-19, демократія, автократія, гібридні режими, захворюваність та протидія COVID-19, країни Центрально-Східної, Південно-Східної і Східної Європи

At the beginning of 2020, our world began to (suddenly and unexpectedly, but gradually) plunge into the era of morbidity and counteraction to COVID-19. For almost two years, all countries of the world have been living within the new reality, which puts on the agenda not only the issue of personal and national health, but also its relationship with the parameters of socio-economic and socio-political development – both in the global scale, at the regional level and at the level of individual states, etc. The countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe – primarily in their geographical sense – are no exception in this context, these are of particular interest analytically and predictively, as they differ in their political regimes (democracies, autocracies or “hybrids”), indicators of human development, equality or inequality of resource allocation, GDP, government efficiency, etc., they are quite different – both individually and regionally – in the indicators of morbidity and resistance to COVID-19. Therefore, taking into account such differences between various indicators and their comparison should be interpreted as quite interesting and relevant analytically and predicatively – empirically.

This is especially evident given the indisputable fact that the countries of these regions of Europe successfully and mostly (in most cases – on average) demonstrate a global trend, which is that the COVID-19 era intensified the so-called processes of “erosion” of democracy, which in a number of case countries began at the end of the last decade, but (until 2019-2020) have somewhat mostly slowed down recently. This manifested itself in the fact that the corona virus pandemic led to a massive – and even the largest in peacetime decline in political rights and civil liberties and fueled the current trend of intolerance and censorship of mutually contradictory or opposing views. It was inherited from the fact that on the basis of various evidence of a new deadly disease, most people came to the conclusion that the prevention of catastrophic deaths justifies the temporary loss of rights and freedoms.

Also theoretically and in the context of world civilization development it is important and empirically obvious that with the spread of COVID-19, particularly during 2019-2020, the governments of quite a few democracies or countries of the so-called democratic orientation and spectrum (not to mention autocracies and hybrid political regimes) have not only once but sometimes systematically resorted and appealed to excessively (for habitual conditions) strict and direct control over social life and to rather significant discriminatory restrictions on human and civil rights and freedoms, primarily for assembly and right to move freely (according to some sources, these were the largest restrictions in the history of the peaceful political process)¹.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that in almost all countries of the world, including the analyzed regions of Europe, the wave of false and misleading information, which in some cases was intentionally generated by political organizations and leaders, flooded communication systems and networks of many countries obscuring reliable data and endangering the very lives of individuals. As a result, some authoritarian or targeted actions by the authorities have become necessary, which on average have been and remain to be aimed at the national security protection in the categories of the nations. However, with the peculiarity that purely theoretical such actions of the authorities in countries with developed and consolidated democracies are nominally initiated and implemented within the limits of freedom as necessary and extreme measures, proportional and appropriate to certain threats from COVID-19. Instead, in a number of autocracies and even hybrid regimes, various actions of the government, including under the guise of counteracting the epidemic, were mainly used against the opposition and to strengthen political regimes and so on². Accordingly, it inevitably follows that among the vast array of factors and consequences

¹ Democracy Index 2020: In sickness and in health?, Wyd. The Economist Intelligence Unit 2021, s. 14, źródło: https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=democracy2020 [odczyt: 20.10.21].; Autocratization Turns Viral: Democracy Report 2021, Wyd. V-Dem Institute 2021, źródło: https://www-dem.net/media/filer_public/c9/3f/c93f8e74-a3fd-4bac-adfd-ee2cfbc0a375/dr_2021.pdf [odczyt: 20.10.21].

² Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy under Siege, Wyd. Freedom House 2021, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege> [odczyt: 20.10.21].; Special Report 2020: Democracy under Lockdown, Wyd. Freedom House 2021, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/democracy-under-lockdown> [odczyt: 20.10.21].; Maerz S., Lührmann A., Lachapelle J., Edgell A., Worth the sacrifice? Illiberal and authoritarian practices during Covid-19, “The Varieties of Democracy Institute Working Paper” 2020, nr. 110, źródło: https://www-dem.net/media/filer_public/14/e0/14e03f3b-1c44-4389-8edf-36a14f08a2d/wp_110_final.pdf [odczyt: 20.10.21].

of morbidity and counteraction to COVID-19, many, but a very important part is occupied by political or socio-political, including political regimes.

In general, today almost all theorists and practitioners and most analytical organizations around the world and at various international structures state that due to the fact that COVID-19 has spread around the world, the global community is characterized by a fairly persistent global stagnation of freedom. It is manifested in the fact that democracy degrades in almost all profiles and planes, but above all in the competition of elections, the rule of law, the restriction of socio-economic freedoms, movement, and assembly, etc. As a consequence, the decline in the level of democracy is characteristic both directly for democracies as such and for other types of political regimes, which are at least minimally characterized by at least some sprouts of pluralism and liberalism, while being completely undemocratic in systemic terms. On this basis, it is clear that the changes caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have left many societies, with different types of political regimes, different income levels and different demographics, in a much worse political situation than before, in particular, with a more expressed political, racial, ethnic and gender inequalities, etc., and thus with a much greater vulnerability to the future and expected consequences of current processes³.

Most importantly, however, even if the pandemic is slowed down or overcome, the effects of the “erosion” of democracy will not be immediately reversed and removed, due to the reactions of states and governments to the increase in the morbidity of COVID-19⁴. This is due to the fact that almost all the restrictions that have been introduced and may continue to be implemented in the fight against COVID-19 are not entirely consensual and debatable in terms of the pros and cons of government policy of a state, after all, it is the tendency of many politicians and government officials to silence discussions that is most detrimental to the “restoration” and progress of democracy. In other words, this is due to the fact that, both in democracies and especially in authoritarian states, the impatience with which politicians and the media have tried or are trying to suppress debate and censor critics of restrictive policies under COVID-19 is of the greatest concern.

In practical terms, we can trace this situation on the example of the analyzed regions of Europe on the basis of appeals to the indicators and dynamics of the level of democracy (or autocracy) of all analyzed countries in the sample during 2019-2020 (of course, according to the results presented, respectively, in 2020-2021), in particular in the framework of projects “Freedom in the World” (FiW) (organization “Freedom House”)⁵, “Democracy Index” (DI) (organization “The Economist Intelligence Unit”)⁶ and “Varieties of Democracy” (V-Dem,

³ Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy under Siege, Wyd. Freedom House 2021, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

⁴ New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated, Wyd. Freedom House 2021, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

⁵ Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy under Siege, Wyd. Freedom House 2021, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

⁶ Democracy Index 2020: Illness and in health, Wyd. Economist Intelligence Unit 2021, źródło: <https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

in terms of the so-called “Liberal Democracy Index (LD)” (see The V-Dem Institute)⁷ (for details, see Table 1). The fact is that in 2020 (according to surveys published in 2021) – compared to 2019 (according to surveys published in 2020) – the situation with the level of democracy, regardless of existing political regimes, on average (taking into account the data of the listed projects, and taking into account the average indicators) and at least partially: has worsened in Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Armenia, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia, Hungary and Ukraine; has remained relatively or approximately stable – in Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Romania, Croatia and the Czech Republic, as well as in autocratic Azerbaijan and Russia; has improved – exclusively in Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Montenegro and autocratic Turkey. At the same time, in the regional context, the situation with the relative level of democracy has deteriorated the most, which is rather surprising in the most democratic (compared to other analyzed regions of Europe) region of Central and Eastern Europe, to a lesser extent in the less democratic region of South-Eastern Europe to a lesser extent – in the least democratic region of Eastern Europe, and then ultimately – on average in the entire sample of analyzed European countries.

Complementing the situation is the fact that statistically this conclusion is confirmed by the data of the projects “Democracy Index” (DI) and “Varieties of Democracy” (V-Dem), but instead no average correlations in the dynamics of political regimes (excluding changes in individual European countries) were observed in the case of recourse to the project “Freedom in the World” (FiW) (for details, see Table 1).

Table 1. Indicators of political development and dynamics of change of political regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe against the background of the COVID-19 epidemic (time section and comparison of data as of 2020 and 2021)

Country	Dynamics of change of political regimes, averaged over the situation as of 2019–2020					
	FiW, 2021 (2020)	FiW, 2020 (2019)	DI, 2020	DI, 2019	V-Dem (LD), 2020	V-Dem (LD), 2019
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE						
Bulgaria	2,0 / 78	2,0 / 80	6,71	7,03	0,491	0,513
Estonia	1,0 / 94	1,0 / 94	7,84	7,90	0,832	0,841
Latvia	1,5 / 89	1,5 / 89	7,24	7,49	0,736	0,743
Lithuania	1,5 / 90	1,0 / 91	7,13	7,50	0,760	0,764

⁷ V-Dem Dataset: Version 11.1, Wyd. V-Dem 2021, źródło: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-dem-dataset-v111/> [odczyt: 20.10.21].; Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy During COVID-19 (March 2020 to June 2021), [w:] Pandemic Backsliding Project (Pan-Dem), Wyd. V-Dem 2021, źródło: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/PanDem/> [odczyt: 20.10.21].; About the Global Monitor of COVID-19's impact on Democracy and Human Rights, [w:] The Global State of Democracy Indices, IDEA 2021, źródło: <https://www.idea.int/gsoi-indices/about-covid19> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

Country	Dynamics of change of political regimes, averaged over the situation as of 2019–2020					
	FIW, 2021 (2020)	FIW, 2020 (2019)	DI, 2020	DI, 2019	V-Dem (LD), 2020	V-Dem (LD), 2019
Poland	2,0 / 82	2,0 / 84	6,85	6,62	0,487	0,533
Romania	2,0 / 83	2,0 / 83	6,40	6,49	0,552	0,467
Slovakia	1,0 / 90	1,5 / 88	6,97	7,17	0,756	0,732
Slovenia	1,0 / 95	1,0 / 94	7,54	7,50	0,651	0,737
Hungary	3,0 / 69	3,0 / 70	6,56	6,63	0,368	0,370
Croatia	1,5 / 85	1,5 / 85	6,50	6,57	0,641	0,619
Czech Republic	1,0 / 91	1,0 / 91	7,67	7,69	0,708	0,703
On average in the region	1,6 / 86	1,6 / 86	7,04	7,14	0,635	0,638
COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE						
Albania	3,0 / 66	3,0 / 67	6,08	5,89	0,403	0,407
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4,0 / 53	4,0 / 53	4,84	4,86	0,340	0,345
Kosovo	4,0 / 54	3,5 / 56	–	–	0,430	0,423
Northern Macedonia	3,0 / 66	3,0 / 63	5,89	5,97	0,428	0,428
Serbia	3,5 / 64	3,5 / 66	6,22	6,41	0,239	0,260
Turkey	5,5 / 32	5,5 / 32	4,48	4,09	0,111	0,109
Montenegro	3,0 / 63	3,5 / 62	5,77	5,65	0,347	0,347
On average in the region	3,7 / 57	3,7 / 57	5,55	5,48	0,328	0,331
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES						
Azerbaijan	6,5 / 10	6,5 / 10	2,68	2,75	0,066	0,060
Belarus	6,5 / 11	6,5 / 19	2,59	2,48	0,076	0,112
Armenia	4,0 / 55	4,0 / 53	5,35	5,54	0,597	0,636
Georgia	3,5 / 60	3,0 / 61	5,31	5,42	0,506	0,512
Moldova	3,0 / 61	3,5 / 60	5,78	5,75	0,467	0,450
Russia	6,5 / 20	6,5 / 20	3,31	3,11	0,104	0,110
Ukraine	3,5 / 60	3,0 / 62	5,81	5,90	0,348	0,316
On average in the region	4,8 / 40	4,7 / 41	4,40	4,42	0,309	0,314
On average in the sample	3,1 / 65	3,1 / 65	5,90	5,93	0,458	0,461

Zródło: *Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy under Siege*, Wyd. Freedom House 2021, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege>[odczyt: 20.10.21].; *Democracy Index 2020: In sickness and in health?*, Wyd. The Economist Intelligence Unit 2021, :<https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/>[odczyt: 20.10.21].; *V-Dem Dataset: Version 11.1*, Wyd. V-Dem 2021, źródło: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-dem-dataset-v111/>[odczyt: 20.10.21].

In a single context and on the example of individual states of the analyzed regions of Europe, the above mentioned conclusions and correlations have a lot of interesting confirmations and manifestations. Thus, in Hungary, a number of emergency measures allowed the government in summer and autumn of 2020 to make emergency decisions, even though the cases of coronavirus in that country at that time were insignificant. In political terms, the fact that Orbán's national government began to abuse its powers excessively, in particular by canceling financial assistance to municipalities headed by the opposition and opposition political forces⁸. This was certainly facilitated by the fact that over the last decade, as Prime Minister, V. Orbán has managed to strengthen his personal, political and institutional influence, and Hungary has slipped from a free state or consolidated democracy to a partially free state or a hybrid political regime. A landmark step in this regard took place in December 2020, when Hungary's flexible and "manual" parliament approved amendments to the country's constitution that transferred state assets to institutions leading policies loyal to the ruling coalition, significantly reducing independent oversight and control over government spending.

Similar restrictions are implemented in other countries of the analyzed regions of Europe. Thus, in Russia, they found themselves in the fact that, for example, Moscow officials and bureaucrats at one time imposed openly politicized restrictions on mass gatherings. In particular, the restrictions applied to meetings as such, but did not affect rallies organized with the support of central and official authorities. In Serbia, on the other hand, the situation unfolded in such a way that it was due to certain actions and restrictions as a result of COVID-19, primarily in terms of meetings and social contacts that the term of the national parliament was extended and its early elections postponed⁹, in particular from April to August 2020. Thus, the emphasis is on the fact that it is the coronavirus that has caused gender inequality, in particular due to the specific restriction of press freedom.

The opposite situation was typical for Belarus, whose president Alexander Lukashenko was perhaps the biggest opponent of the phenomenon of the COVID-19 pandemic in the world, as he and the official authorities for a long time refused to officially not only recognize but also accept the threat of this disease.

This, in contrast, led to a huge outbreak of coronavirus in this country, which by European standards is not very large in population. It follows that the situation regarding the fight against COVID-19 in Belarus was controlled not so much by the state as by civil society, which has traditionally been perceived and has recently been particularly perceived as anti-government and directed against Lukashenko, especially against the background of the

⁸ Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy under Siege, Wyd. Freedom House 2021, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege>[odczyt: 20.10.21].

⁹ Serbia postpones April 26 elections due to coronavirus outbreak – state election commission, "Reuters", March 16, 2020, źródło: <https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-serbia/serbia-postpones-april-26-elections-due-to-coronavirus-outbreak-state-election-commission-idUSL8N2B99BP>[odczyt: 20.10.21].

position of civil society on the falsification by the President the last presidential election in 2020. Even more, because Minsk's official position on COVID-19 was one of the factors in the fall in the ratings of the self-proclaimed president of Belarus. Therefore, it follows that the refusal to recognize and oppose COVID-19, and not vice versa, was one of the factors of further autocratization of the political regime in the state.

At the same time and even more, theoretically, methodologically and analytically important is not only the demonstrated influence of the era of morbidity and counteraction to the COVID-19 epidemic on the general "erosion" and conditional "rollback" of democracy in Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, however, and the impact of the level of democracy or autocracy (hybridism) and various socio-economic factors and effects of development of the region on the situation and the fight against the pandemic¹⁰ (statistically see the comparison of data Tables 1, 2 and 3, and instead correlation see table 4). In particular, in this context, it has been found in our study that a higher level of democracy (democracy rather than hybrid political regimes and autocracies), at least as of 2020 (averaged under various projects), i.e. according to research from 2021, is positively compared and correlated with the increase in the number of cases of morbidity and deaths per 1 million people, as well as with the percentage of mortality and vaccination against the disease (primarily due to greater reliability and objectivity of information in democratic political regimes), however, in contrast, it mostly or not at all correlates with an increase in the number of tests per 1,000 people, a decrease in the share of positive tests, and an increase in the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people in a given state and region. Interestingly, more democratic political regimes, on average, resort to tougher government action to combat COVID-19, which is one of the main reasons for their very objective and greatest decline in democracy (although, with all this, they continue to be the most democratic compared to other countries in a region of Europe).

¹⁰ Maerz S., Lührmann A., Lachapelle J., Edgell A., Worth the sacrifice: Illiberal and authoritarian practices during Covid-19, "The Varieties of Democracy Institute Working Paper" 2020, nr. 110, źródło: https://www.v-dem.net/media/finder_public/14/c0/14c03f3b-1c44-4389-8cdf-36a141f08a2d/wp_110_final.pdf[odczyt: 20.10.21].

Table 2. Statistics and dynamics of changes in the morbidity and response of COVID-19 in Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe (time section and comparison of data as of March 27, 2021 and October 11, 2021)

Country	Averaged and cumulative indicators of morbidity and counteraction to COVID-19 in relation to the situation since the beginning of the pandemic and as of 27.03.2021 and 11.10.2021.																				
	Cases per 1 million people		Deaths per 1 million people		Mortality, %		Tests per 1 million people		Share of positive tests%		Vaccinations: at least once per 100 people		Vaccinations: twice per 100 people		The level of the government action rigidity%		Beds per 1000		Опийнава тиванисъквита		
	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	27.03.21	11.10.21	
	COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE																				
Bulgaria	47171	76027	1820,5	3162,8	3,86	4,16	291,3	723,6	23,2	12,6	4,99	20,41	1,26	19,79	50,93	47,22	7,45	75,05			
Estonia	77448	124771	648,3	1056,5	0,84	0,85	841,9	1507,0	20,8	14,3	14,45	57,83	4,56	54,41	62,04	25,00	4,69	78,74			
Latvia	53396	92279	992,5	1503,0	1,86	1,63	935,2	н.д.	3,9	н.д.	5,53	51,59	1,16	48,10	56,48	37,96	5,57	75,29			
Lithuania	78407	131341	1300,0	1951,0	1,66	1,49	838,7	2000,8	6,4	10,4	11,91	65,75	5,54	60,88	63,89	30,09	6,56	75,93			
Poland	58703	77342	1367,4	2007,3	2,33	2,60	303,9	547,9	19,8	3,5	10,00	52,61	5,20	51,70	75,00	38,89	6,62	78,73			
Romania	48456	71403	1195,4	2071,8	2,47	2,90	340,4	695,1	23,5	22,3	9,81	32,05	4,75	28,92	63,89	55,56	6,89	76,05			
Slovakia	65386	78006	1726,5	2332,1	2,64	2,99	4274,3	7741,0	1,0	5,6	11,27	45,26	4,68	41,64	71,30	34,72	5,82	77,54			
Slovenia	101995	145110	1929,4	2221,1	1,89	1,53	1202,6	782,3	2,9	19,6	9,20	54,64	5,03	50,37	69,44	35,19	4,50	81,32			
Hungary	64675	86095	2044,6	3145,4	3,16	3,65	413,3	687,2	26,7	5,0	19,70	61,36	7,10	58,98	79,63	27,78	7,02	76,88			
Croatia	64771	102416	1430,4	2150,6	2,21	2,10	366,2	713,7	13,8	14,3	8,18	45,40	1,97	40,03	43,52	33,80	5,54	78,49			
Czech Republic	141098	158522	2407,1	2844,3	1,71	1,79	н.д.	н.д.	5,2	1,5	10,47	56,98	4,11	56,00	81,48	32,41	6,63	79,38			
On average	72864	103937	1533,0	2222,4	2,24	2,34	980,8	1711,0	13,6	10,9	10,50	49,44	4,12	46,44	65,24	36,24	6,12	77,58			
COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE																					
Albania	42964	60970	765,9	966,6	1,78	1,58	179,7	н.д.	17,3	н.д.	0,21	33,49	0,02	29,00	60,19	41,67	2,89	78,57			
Bosnia and H-na	49388	73918	1895,9	3359,9	3,84	4,55	232,9	384,1	33,0	23,8	н.д.	22,50	н.д.	15,57	45,37	35,19	3,50	77,40			

Kosovo	43550	90347	937,0	1674,0	2,15	1,85	н.д.	685,7	н.д.	1,3	н.д.	46,43	н.д.	35,63	62,04	52,78	н.д.	н.д.
Northem Macedonia	60589	93631	1748,1	3288,6	2,89	3,51	289,5	н.д.	28,3	н.д.	0,25	38,22	0,0	35,94	н.д.	н.д.	4,28	75,80
Serbia	85474	146328	757,0	1272,1	0,89	0,87	489,5	850,4	31,1	29,8	20,08	44,31	13,47	42,41	54,63	47,22	5,61	76,00
Turkey	37694	87898	366,7	780,4	0,97	0,89	441,2	1060,2	11,9	8,4	9,74	64,16	7,63	54,60	72,22	58,33	2,81	77,69
Montenegro	142871	215799	1975,9	3171,7	1,38	1,47	н.д.	н.д.	н.д.	н.д.	2,36	39,96	0,25	35,80	н.д.	н.д.	3,86	76,88
On average	66076	109842	1206,6	2073,3	1,99	2,10	326,6	745,1	24,3	15,8	6,53	41,30	4,27	35,56	58,89	47,04	3,83	77,06

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Azerbaijan	25088	48202	341,6	653,1	1,36	1,35	н.д.	484,5	н.д.	8,7	5,03	47,83	н.д.	40,18	70,37	58,33	4,70	73,00
Belarus	33614	59274	234,0	455,8	0,70	0,77	558,0	н.д.	7,5	н.д.	0,21	23,67	0,11	17,24	27,78	19,44	11,00	74,79
Armenia	63964	91963	1164,3	1878,3	1,82	2,04	277,6	596,6	18,6	10,2	н.д.	11,59	н.д.	5,73	н.д.	н.д.	4,20	75,09
Georgia	70774	159703	939,0	2329,0	1,34	1,46	н.д.	2236,3	н.д.	5,5	н.д.	25,19	н.д.	22,10	64,81	39,81	2,60	73,77
Moldova	55940	76337	1186,2	1751,5	2,12	2,29	н.д.	453,0	н.д.	18,9	0,84	20,50	0,00	20,20	65,74	25,93	5,80	71,90
Russia	30564	52686	656,4	1463,4	2,15	2,78	814,4	1340,8	3,0	4,9	4,32	33,97	2,95	30,91	40,28	57,87	8,05	72,58
Ukraine	38745	61364	762,9	1439,0	1,97	2,35	180,4	305,5	29,9	30,6	0,44	17,51	0,00	14,26	62,04	58,33	8,80	72,06
On average	45441	78504	754,9	1424,3	1,64	1,86	457,6	902,8	14,8	13,1	2,17	25,75	0,77	21,52	55,17	40,28	6,45	73,31
	63285	98469	1223,7	1957,2	2,00	2,14	698,5	1252,4	16,5	12,6	7,57	40,53	3,49	36,42	61,05	39,77	5,64	76,21

Zródło: Ritchie H., Mathieu E., Rodés-Guirao L., Appel C., Giattino C., Ortiz-Ospina E., Hasell J., Macdonald B., Beltekian D., Roser M., *Coronavirus Pandemic* (COVID-19), Wyat. OurWorldInData.org, źródło: <https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; Hale T., Angrist N., Goldszmidt R., Kira B., Petherick A., Phillips T., Webster S., Cameron-Blake E., Hallas L., Mejumdar S., Tatlow H., A. *global panel database of pandemic policies* (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker), Wyd. Nature Human Behaviour 2021, źródło: <https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/projects/oxford-covid-19-government-response-tracker> [odczyt: 20.10.21]

Accordingly, in this sense, there is a significant paradox of the situation, as such correlations and ratios work in part in the event of a deterioration in the level of democracy, at least in comparison with data as of 2020 compared to as of 2019, but primarily due to the largest and not the least democratic countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe (for details see Table 1). However, in general, the respective improvement in the level of democracy is relatively positively correlated with an increase in the number of cases (per 1 million people), the number of deaths (per 1 million people) and the number of tests (per 1,000 people) (primarily due to greater reliability) and objectivity of information in the case of democratization), as well as with a decrease in the share of positive tests (as a percentage), but does not correlate at all with the increase in the mortality rate (as a percentage), the number of vaccinations (per 100 people) and the increase in the number of hospital beds (per 1 thousand people) (see Table 2). In contrast, it has been observed that the level of vaccination in the countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe increases on average with a relative deterioration of the level of democracy in these regions of Europe. But the biggest paradox in this context is the fact that the reductions in the level of democracy of political regimes in the three regions of Europe on average it does not depend and does not affect the tightening of government action to combat COVID-19 (see Table 2), instead, these processes are completely parallel. Therefore, in this regard, it can be stated that political factors – primarily the dynamics of changes in political regimes – in the analyzed context are quite significant, but they depend primarily on the objectivity of information and willingness to actually solve current problems with COVID-19.

On the other hand, it is political or socio-political factors, in particular the dynamics of change of political regimes, that mainly determine how socio-economic factors and consequences of COVID-19 morbidity and counteraction work or do not work on the example of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern countries and Eastern Europe, in particular in terms of such indicators, as the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI)¹¹, the Gini-I Resource Inequality Index¹², nominal GDP per capita (GDP PC Nom.)¹³, Government Performance Index under the “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI GE) project¹⁴”, Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)¹⁵, primarily with regard to the situation as of 2020 (as at the time of the study data on 2021 are almost not available).

Accordingly, their correlation with the level of morbidity and resistance to COVID-19 is also relevant or at least interesting, as it may cause either certain systemic and recurring connections and consequences, independent or less dependent on political motives, or certain

¹¹ Human Development Index, Wýd. UNDP 2021, źródło: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

¹² Gini index, Wýd. The World Bank 2021, źródło: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SLPOV.GINI> [odczyt: 20.10.21].; Gini Coefficient by Country 2021, Wýd. World Population Review, źródło: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/gini-coefficient-by-country> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

¹³ GDP per capita (current US\$), Wýd. The World Bank 2021, źródło: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDPPCAP.CD> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

¹⁴ The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, Wýd. World Bank 2021, źródło: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

¹⁵ Corruption Perceptions Index, Wýd. Transparency International 2021, źródło: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/table/nzl> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

situational conclusions, which depend on the political or socio-political context (statistically, see the comparison of data in Tables 1, 2 and 3, and instead correlated, see Table 4).

Table 3. Indicators and parameters of socio-economic development in the countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe against the background of the epidemic COVID-19 (time section of 2019 and 2020)

Country	Socio-economic factors and consequences, governance context, averaged over the situation in 2020				
	HDI, 2020 (2019)	Gini-I, 2020	GDP PC Nom. 2020, \$	WGI GE, 2020 (2019)	CPI, 2021 (2020)
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE					
Bulgaria	0,816	37,15	9 826	65,38	44
Estonia	0,892	32,18	22986	85,58	75
Latvia	0,866	33,71	17230	83,65	57
Lithuania	0,882	36,98	19883	81,25	60
Poland	0,880	30,19	15304	73,08	56
Romania	0,828	35,14	12813	40,38	44
Slovakia	0,860	25,77	18669	74,04	49
Slovenia	0,917	24,84	22627	82,21	60
Hungary	0,854	29,76	15373	70,19	44
Croatia	0,851	29,80	14033	67,31	47
Czech Republic	0,900	25,43	25039	78,37	54
On average in the region	0,878	31,00	17 617	72,86	54
COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE					
Albania	0,795	28,49	4898	50,48	36
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0,780	32,29	4721	28,85	35
Kosovo	–	–	4141	39,42	36
Northern Macedonia	0,774	35,44	6019	52,40	35
Serbia	0,806	27,85	7497	53,37	38
Turkey	0,820	43,61	7715	54,33	40
Montenegro	0,829	31,60	7933	58,65	45
On average in the region	0,801	33,21	6 132	48,21	38
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES					
Azerbaijan	0,756	22,45	7295	46,15	30
Belarus	0,823	24,75	6134	44,23	47
Armenia	0,776	34,56	4315	50,00	49
Georgia	0,812	36,72	4405	76,92	56
Moldova	0,750	24,50	4268	37,98	34
Russia	0,824	35,32	9972	58,17	30
Ukraine	0,779	25,36	3425	39,90	33
On average in the region	0,789	29,09	5 688	50,48	40
On average in the sample	0,828	31,00	11 061	59,69	45

Zródło: *Human Development Index*, Wyd. UNDP 2021, źródło: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; *The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project*, Wyd. World Bank 2021, źródło: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; *Corruption Perceptions Index*, Wyd. Transparency International 2021, źródło: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/table/nzl> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; *Gini index*, Wyd. The World Bank 2021, źródło: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; *Gini Coefficient by Country 2021*, Wyd. World Population Review, źródło: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/gini-coefficient-by-country> [odczyt: 20.10.21]; *GDP per capita (current US\$)*, Wyd. The World Bank 2021, źródło: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> [odczyt: 20.10.21].

There are many manifestations of such relationships in the general theoretical and world context, because it is generally established that the crisis of public health is causing a major economic crisis as countries around the world fall into recession and millions of people lose their jobs. Consequently, the marginalized population bears the burden of both the coronavirus and its economic impact, which, among other disparities, has exacerbated and continues to exacerbate income inequality. Against this background, it was observed that, in general, countries with a larger income gap have much weaker protection of fundamental rights, suggesting that the socio-economic consequences of a pandemic could have detrimental consequences for democracy (discussed above).

In particular, our study found that a higher level of the human development index, nominal GDP per capita and the efficiency of governments and governance, as well as a lower level of inequality in the distribution of income and resources and the corruption perception index in Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern European countries is on average positive, what is pretty weird, correlates with an increase in the morbidity of COVID-19 and (excluding GDP per capita) deaths from COVID-19 (per 1 million people), as well as, in contrast and quite logically – with a decrease in the proportion of positive tests (as a percentage) and an increase in the number of vaccinations (per 100 people), but does not correlate at all with the increase in the mortality rate from COVID-19 (as a percentage) and does not partially correlate with other indicators. At the same time, all socio-economic indicators that we analyze in our article, with the exception of reducing the level of corruption perception index, on average contribute to increasing the number of tests for COVID-19 (per 1 thousand people) and the level of vaccination against COVID-19 (per 100 people). Instead, the relationship is much weaker in the case of government rigidity and the number of hospital beds (per 1,000 people), as these variables are weakly or not fully correlated with the parameters of socio-economic development in the analyzed regions of Europe, especially with the nominal GDP per capita (for details, see the comparison of data in Tables 2 and 3).

In general, the comparative analysis gives grounds to state that the majority of socio-economic indicators on the example of the countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe are relatively weakly correlated with the full array of indicators COVID-19, but correlates quite effectively, in contrast, with some of them, on the basis of which it was concluded that the studied relationship is not quite logical, specific and indirect (see Table 4)

Table 4. Verification of possible correlations of political and socio-economic factors and consequences and indicators of morbidity and counteraction of COVID-19 in the countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe (time section and comparison of data as of March 27, 2021 and October 11, 2021)

Correlation indicators	Increasing the number of cases of morbidity per 1 million people	Increasing the number of deaths, per 1 million people	Increasing the mortality rate, in%	Increasing the number of tests per 1 thousand people	Decrease in the share of positive tests, in%	Increasing the number of vaccinations, per 100 people	Increasing the level of government rigidity, in%	Increasing the number of beds per 1 thousand people
Higher level of democracy in 2020	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-
Increasing the level of democracy in 2020 compared to 2019 in dynamics	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	-
Higher level of the human development index in 2020	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+
Lower level of inequality of resource allocation in 2020	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Higher level of nominal GDP per capita in 2020	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Lower level of corruption perception index in 2020	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Lower level of corruption perception index in 2020	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-
Lower level of corruption perception index in 2020	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-

This is manifested primarily in the fact that very often relatively better and more effective socio-economic indicators lead to much worse rates and even worsening in terms of morbidity and mortality from COVID-19, but much better rates and overall improvements in terms of counteracting COVID-19 in testing and vaccination format. At the same time, it is also important in this context that the best socio-economic indicators are relatively linearly and positively correlated with the best political or socio-political indicators and a higher level of democracy / democratization (lower level of autocratization) in the Central-Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. On this basis, it can be clearly assumed that the primary and more valid is the awareness and freedom of man and citizen, along with strict government control and minor restrictions on countering COVID-19, rather than a more developed socio-economic infrastructure. Because, as is typical for periods of turbulence and cataclysms, it is the primary and purposeful actions and true information about them help much better to solve the situation than long-term and systemic indicators of socio-economic development. Although, in contrast, socio-economic factors should still be perceived as regulating the parameters and effects of morbidity and counteraction to COVID-19 in the countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, especially if we think about it primarily in sub regional categories, i.e., in samples of similar countries.

In general, and in this context, it should be noted that a relatively significant or greatest correlation is observed between the incidence and response to COVID-19 and the reduction of inequality in resource allocation and the increase in government efficiency in Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe is slightly smaller but significant correlation between the former and the human development index, and the smallest correlation is between the former and the level of democracy and democratization, the level of nominal GDP per capita and the level of the corruption perception index. However, one way or another, the socio-political and socio-economic consequences of the incidence and counteraction of COVID-19 in the countries of Central and Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe are certainly significant, and their effects will be prolonged even in the future.

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ESTRICTING FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ONLINE IN UKRAINE WITHIN THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN HYBRID WAR

Summary. The article's goal is to examine the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" and provide an international law assessment of its application as an instrument for blocking (pro)Russian websites in Ukraine in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. To accomplish the stated goal, two objectives are outlined. Firstly, to investigate the implementation of the Law "On Sanctions" for restricting access to (pro)Russian websites in the Ukrainian segment of the Internet. Secondly, to analyze the Law "On Sanctions" through the prism of three internationally accepted UN- and CoE-based criteria of permissible freedom of information limitations – legality, legitimacy, and necessity.

The article found that since 2017, the Law "On Sanctions" has been employed for wholesale blocking of (pro)Russian websites originating from Russia, Crimea, ORDLO, and Ukraine-controlled territory. These websites have been blocked either temporarily or permanently by imposing sanctions on the associated legal and natural persons. Furthermore, it was determined that the wholesale blocking of (pro)Russian websites by applying the Law "On Sanctions" arguably violates the international standards, because only one of the three required criteria of permissible freedom of information limitations has been met. The blocking fulfills the legitimacy criterion, but fails to satisfy the criteria of legality and necessity.

Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, Internet censorship, freedom of information, Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions", international law, UN, Council of Europe

OGRANICZENIE WOLNOŚCI INFORMACJI ONLINE NA UKRAINIE W RAMACH ROSYJSKO-UKRAIŃSKIEJ WOJNY HYBRYDOWEJ

Streszczenie. Celem artykułu jest zbadanie ukraińskiej Ustawy „O Sankcjach” i dokonanie oceny prawnomiedzynarodowej jej stosowania jako instrumentu blokowania (pro)rosyjskich stron internetowych na Ukrainie w kontekście rosyjsko-ukraińskiej wojny hybrydowej. Aby osiągnąć postawiony cel, nakreślono dwa punkty. Po pierwsze, zbadanie wykonanie Ustawy „O Sankcjach” jako ograniczenia dostępu do (pro)rosyjskich stron internetowych w ukraińskim segmencie Internetu. Po drugie, analiza Ustawy „O Sankcjach” przez pryzmat trzech uznanych na arenie międzynarodowej kryteriów dopuszczalnych ograniczeń wolności informacji opartych na opartych na dokumentach prawnych ONZ i Rady Europy – legalności, legitymizacji i konieczności.

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W artykule stwierdzono, że od 2017 r. Ustawa „O Sankcjach” była stosowana do hurtowego blokowania (pro)rosyjskich stron internetowych pochodzących z Rosji, Krymu, ORDLO i terytoriów kontrolowanych przez Ukrainę. Strony te zostały tymczasowo lub na stałe zablokowane przez nałożenie sankcji na powiązane osoby prawne i fizyczne. Ponadto ustalono, że hurtowe blokowanie (pro)rosyjskich stron internetowych poprzez zastosowanie Ustawy „O Sankcjach” prawdopodobnie narusza międzynarodowe standardy, ponieważ spełnione jest tylko jedno z trzech wymaganych kryteriów dopuszczalnych ograniczeń wolności informacji. Blokada spełnia kryterium legitymizacji, ale nie spełnia kryteriów legalności i konieczności.

Słowa kluczowe: Ukraina, Rosja, cenzura Internetu, wolność informacji, Ustawa Ukrainy „O Sankcjach”, prawo międzynarodowe, ONZ, Rada Europy

ОБМЕЖЕННЯ СВОБОДИ ІНФОРМАЦІЇ ОНЛАЙН В УКРАЇНІ У МЕЖАХ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ГІБРИДНОЇ ВІЙНИ

Анотація. Мета статті полягає у вивченні та наданні міжнародно-правової оцінки застосуванню Закону України «Про санкції» як нормативного інструменту для блокування (про)російських веб-сайтів в Україні у контексті російсько-української гібридної війни. Зазначена мета передбачає вирішення двох завдань. Перше завдання – це детермінувати особливості імплементації Закону України «Про санкції» для цензурування (про)російських веб-сайтів в українському сегменті Інтернету. Друге завдання – дослідити застосування Закону України «Про санкції» крізь призму міжнародно-правових критеріїв щодо допустимих обмежень свободи інформації – це критерії законності, легітимності і необхідності.

Виявлено, що внаслідок імплементації Закону України «Про санкції» з 2017 р. відбувається повномасштабне блокування доступу до (про)російських веб-сайтів походженням з Росії, Криму, ОРДЛО і підконтрольних Україні територій. Ці веб-сайти блокуються строково або безстроково шляхом накладення санкцій на пов'язаних з ними юридичних чи фізичних осіб. Також визначено, що повномасштабне блокування (про)російських веб-сайтів внаслідок застосування Закону України «Про санкції» ймовірно порушує міжнародно-правові стандарти, тому що був витриманий лише один з трьох необхідних критеріїв допустимих обмежень свободи інформації: блокування ймовірно відповідає критерію легітимності, але суперечить критеріям законності та необхідності.

Ключові слова: Україна, Росія, Інтернет-цензура, свобода інформації, Закон України «Про санкції», міжнародне право, ООН, Рада Європи

Relevance of the topic. A characteristic feature of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war is the inter-state confrontation in the information domain. More specifically, the Internet has become a significant realm for waging information warfare between Russia and Ukraine.

This article examines the issue of restricting access to (pro-)Russian information resources in the Ukrainian segment of the Internet in the context of the hybrid war between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine has been pursuing an active policy of censoring (pro-)Russian websites since 2017. The main legal instrument employed by Ukrainian authorities to implement the Russian dimension of Ukraine's Internet censorship is the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions". There is substantial evidence indicating that wholesale blocking of certain categories of (pro-)Russian websites through the application of the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" is controversial from the international law perspective.

Therefore, the relevance of this research topic is predicated on accentuating the employment of Ukraine's sanctions mechanism for blocking (pro-)Russian websites throughout 2017-2021 as a part of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. Increased emphasis is given to evaluating the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" as Ukraine's Internet censorship instrument. The evaluation is carried out in the perspective of the relevant international law standards for permissible Internet censorship as prescribed by the legal frameworks of the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe (CoE).

Presentation of research materials. As of 2021, Ukraine is implementing a controversial (from the international law perspective) policy of website blocking. It is ranked as a "partially free" country on a scale of Internet freedoms². Yet some eight years ago, there were no apparent threats to Internet freedoms in Ukraine. According to the international human rights NGO Freedom House, until 2013, Ukraine was listed among countries with "free" Internet status³. Back then, Ukraine did not have an institutionalized mechanism for introducing online restrictions and website blocking⁴.

Subsequently, however, the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war and its information component, combined with the amplification of anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian propaganda promoted by the Russian government and mass media⁵, added the issue of establishing control over the information flow online to the agenda of Ukrainian policy-makers.

During the period of armed conflicts, state authorities usually face a dilemma in the field of human rights: which restrictions of fundamental human rights and freedoms can be considered necessary to ensure national security, and which cannot be deemed as such⁶. The Russian armed aggression against Ukraine has facilitated the socio-political discourse on balancing

² Freedom on the Net 2021 - Ukraine. Freedom House. URL: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2021> [01.10.2021].

³ Freedom on the Net 2013 - Ukraine. Freedom House. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/52663acd12.html> [20.09.2021].

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Freedom on the Net 2014. Tightening the Net: Governments Expand Online Controls. Freedom House, p. 828. URL: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0.pdf [27.09.2021].

⁶ P. Dam, Y. Gorbunova. In Ukraine, taking three pro-Russia channels off the air raises complex issues. Human Rights Watch. URL: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ukraine-taking-three-pro-russia-channels-air-raises-complex-issues> [29.09.2021].

the preservation of human rights (including the right to freedom of expression) against the permissible restrictions of these rights due to the need to protect the territorial integrity and national security of Ukraine⁷. Numerous human rights organizations have repeatedly argued that fundamental human rights must be respected even in the context of an armed conflict, particularly concerning the adherence to international standards for freedom of expression⁸. At the same time, state authorities have suggested that freedom of expression should be compromised to protect Ukraine's national security⁹.

When it comes to the freedom of expression on the Internet, Russia's armed aggression has prompted a transformation of the paradigm of legal regulation of the "network of networks" in Ukraine. More explicitly, the state has moved away from the policy of "non-interference" in Internet freedoms, taking on a policy that views the protection of national security and preservation of the freedom of expression online as mutually exclusive rather than complementary concepts¹⁰.

Balancing the need to protect national security against the necessity to guarantee freedom of expression on the Internet within the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war is further complicated by at least two factors. To be more precise, there is no specialized legal framework in Ukraine that would either regulate the procedure for restricting freedom of expression online for the purposes of protecting Ukraine's national interests¹¹ or establish a general regime of legal regulation of the Internet as such¹².

It should be noted, however, that there are several legal instruments in the Ukrainian legislative field that enable the restriction of access to certain types of online content. The current Ukrainian legislation provides for the possibility of blocking access to online resources in case the websites at issue distribute child pornography¹³, grant access to gambling without a required license¹⁴, or violate copyright and related rights¹⁵. However, none of these norms can be used as a justification for blocking websites in view of protecting the national interests or information security of Ukraine¹⁶.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ О. Бурмагін, Л. Опришко, Д. Опришко. Свобода вираження поглядів під час збройного конфлікту. Огляд практики Європейського суду з прав людини. Платформа прав людини, с. 5. URL: https://www.ppl.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Draft_Chapter_on_ECHR_preview.pdf [01.10.2021].

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ О. Кирилюк. Чи слід Україні скасувати санкції проти російських інтернет-платформ? Freedom House. URL: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/policy-brief/2019/chi-slid-ukraini-skasuvati-sankcii-proti-rosiyskikh-internet-platform> [29.09.2021].

¹¹ М. Дворовий. Санкції та блокування веб-сайтів в Україні: як непомітно відкрити скриньку Пандори. Платформа прав людини, с. 14. URL: https://dslua.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Sanctions_and_Internet_UPD_2.pdf [08.07.2021].

¹² О. Бурмагін, Л. Опришко. Свобода слова в Інтернеті. Практичний посібник. Платформа прав людини, с. 7. URL: <https://www.ppl.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/СВОБОДА-СЛОВА-В-ІНТЕРНЕТІ.pdf> [02.07.2021].

¹³ Закон України «Про телесмунікації». Верховна Рада України. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1280-15#Text> [15.08.2021].

¹⁴ Закон України «Про державне регулювання діяльності щодо організації та проведення азартних ігор». Верховна Рада України. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/768-IX#Text> [28.09.2021].

¹⁵ Закон України «Про авторське право і суміжні права». Верховна Рада України. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3792-12#Text> [15.08.2021].

¹⁶ М. Дворовий. Санкції та блокування веб-сайтів в Україні, с. 14 (sec n. 11).

Nonetheless, despite the substantial shortcomings in current legislative approaches to ensuring Ukraine's information security and regulating freedom of expression on the Internet, Ukrainian officials are actively pursuing a policy of censoring (pro-)Russian websites. The Russian dimension of Internet censorship in Ukraine was made possible by the re-interpretation of existing domestic legal instruments. The main instruments are represented by the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" and certain provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, both of which are used to restrict two constitutive elements of the freedom of expression, respectively – freedom of information (gets restricted by the Law "On Sanctions") and freedom of opinion (gets restricted by certain provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). Although applying these legal instruments to implement the Russian dimension of Internet censorship in Ukraine sits uneasy with both the national and international law¹⁷, the censorship of (pro-)Russian websites does occur fairly frequently. This article sheds light on Ukraine's legislative instrument aimed at restricting freedom of information online within the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war – that is, the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions".

The Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 14 August 2014, shortly after the Russian annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Donbas¹⁸. Although the provisions of the Law *de jure* were not aimed specifically at counteracting Russia's policies, *de facto* adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" intended to introduce additional possibilities to repel the Russian Federation's armed aggression¹⁹.

The preamble of the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" stipulates that it aims to provide "*immediate and effective response to existing and potential threats to national interests and national security of Ukraine, including hostilities, armed attack by other states or non-state actors*"²⁰. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that sanctions are considered, *inter alia*, as a tool for protecting "*national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, countering terrorism*" as per paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions"²¹.

With regard to actors that may be subject to sanctions, paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Law enshrines the following list of actors: foreign states, foreign legal persons, legal persons controlled by a foreign legal person or a non-resident natural person, foreign nationals, stateless persons, and persons engaged in terrorist activities²².

Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" also contains a list of grounds, on the basis of which Ukrainian authorities may decide to introduce special economic and other restrictive

¹⁷ О. Кирилюк. Чи слід Україні скасувати санкції. (see n. 10) ; P. Micek, D. Olukotun. Ukraine's internet ban fights fire with fire: it's still censorship. Access Now. URL: <https://www.accessnow.org/ukraines-internet-ban-fights-fire-fire-still-censorship/> [26.09.2021] ; О. Бурмагін, Л. Опришко, Д. Опришко. Свобода вираження поглядів, с. 5 (see n. 8).

¹⁸ Закон України «Про санкції». Верховна Рада України. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1644-18#Text> [03.07.2021].

¹⁹ Ю. Тищенко, Ю. Каздобіна, С. Горобчишина, А. Дуда. Політика щодо Криму. Рекомендації (посібник), Київ 2018, с. 50. URL: <http://www.ucipr.org.ua/publicdocs/posibnyk.pdf> [03.07.2021].

²⁰ Закон України «Про санкції». Верховна Рада України (see n. 18).

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

measures. These grounds include the activities of foreign actors (states, legal or natural persons) and other actors that pose a threat to Ukraine's national interests, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc.; resolutions of the competent UN bodies (General Assembly and Security Council); regulations and decisions of the EU Council; and the evidence that indicates violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the UN Charter²³.

It should be noted that the Law provides an inexhaustible list of sanction types that may be imposed by the competent Ukrainian authorities. Article 4 of the Law "On Sanctions" enumerates twenty-four clearly defined types of restrictive measures, which contain no reference to the possibility of website blocking. Be that as it may, the list of sanction types also includes a provision enabling the introduction of "*other sanctions, corresponding to the principles of their application, established by this Law*"²⁴. It should be emphasized that it is the provision on the application of "other sanctions" that has been repeatedly used for blocking access to (pro-) Russian websites in Ukraine²⁵.

Increased attention should be paid to determining the sanctions procedure provided by Article 5 of the Law "On Sanctions". Sanctions are applied in the following manner: initially, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the National Bank of Ukraine, or the Security Service of Ukraine make proposals for the application of sectoral or personal sanctions²⁶. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, proposals to apply personal sanctions in the form of blocking access to certain categories of (pro-)Russian websites are usually prepared by the Security Service of Ukraine²⁷. Thereafter, decisions on the feasibility of imposing personal sanctions are made by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and enforced by relevant decrees of the President of Ukraine, while the application of sectoral sanctions or restrictive measures against a foreign state requires additional approval by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine²⁸.

Thus, despite the lack of specialized legal regulation of Internet censorship in Ukraine, the responsible Ukrainian authorities re-interpret the Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions" and apply it to restrict access to various Russian and pro-Russian Internet-based information resources as part of the hybrid war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

An active campaign of restricting the freedom of information online in Ukraine in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war dates back to 2017. On 28 April 2017, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine adopted a decision "On application of personal

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ М. Дворовий. Санкції та блокування веб-сайтів в Україні, с. 5-6 (сес. п. 11).

²⁶ Закон України «Про санкції». Верховна Рада України (сес. п. 18).

²⁷ Голова СБУ пропонує продовжити заборону російських соцмереж ще на 3 роки. Служба безпеки України. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/SecurSerUkraine/photos/a.1539443172952349/2663913550505300/?type=3&theater> [03.07.2021]; Л. Ганжа. Блокування сайтів і таємні критерії: чому СБУ уникає пояснень про підстави блокування сайтів. Платформа прав людини. URL: <https://www.ppl.org.ua/blokuvannya-sajtiv-i-tayemni-kriteri%D1%97-chomu-sbu-unikaye-poyasnen-pro-pidstavi-blokuvannya-sajtiv.html> [04.07.2021].

²⁸ Закон України «Про санкції». Верховна Рада України (сес. п. 18).

special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions)²⁹. It urged to introduce restrictive measures against a broad range of Russian legal and natural persons³⁰. The decision was made on the basis of relevant proposals of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the National Bank³¹.

On 15 May 2017, the then President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko issued a Decree №133/2017 enacting the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of 28 April 2017, on the application of restrictive measures against certain categories of Russian legal and natural persons³². Despite the fact that these restrictive measures were *de jure* classified as economic sanctions, *de facto* they entailed, *inter alia*, significant restrictions on the functioning of Russian information resources as a result of wholesale blocking of various (pro-)Russian websites³³. Among the legal persons subjected to sanctions and subsequent website blocking, there were a number of Russian-based tech companies, anti-virus software developers, and news agencies³⁴. Some of the most famous “victims” of Ukraine’s wave of online censorship in 2017 include the tech companies “Yandex”, “Mail.ru”, “Vkontakte”, and “Odnoklassniki”, websites of anti-virus software developers “Kaspersky Lab” and “Doctor Web”, and mass media, such as the websites of “Rossiya Segodnya”, “Zvezda”, “TNT”, “Pervyi kanal”, “RTR-Planeta”, “Rossiya-24”, “REN-TV” and others³⁵.

It should be noted that the list of websites subjected to sanctions has been thereafter modified and expanded by dint of adopting the relevant presidential decrees of P. Poroshenko and V. Zelensky in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions”. A total of more than 600 (pro-)Russian websites have been blocked by presidential decrees issued during 2017-2021³⁶.

Presidential decrees imposing sanctions are marked by several distinguishing characteristics:

- Firstly, sanctions lists were expanded by subjecting different categories of (pro-)Russian websites to restrictive measures. The categories of blocked websites comprised not the Russian-based websites, but also pro-Russian websites originating from the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and ORDLO, as well as pro-Russian websites based in Ukraine-controlled territory. For example, Presidential Decree № 126/2018 of 14 May 2018 expanded the sanctions lists to include, *inter alia*, the Russian news agency “RIA Novosti”, «Rossiya Segodnya», as well as the websites of occupation administrations of the so-called “DNR” (mvddnr.ru, mgb-dnr.ru,

²⁹ Указ Президента України №133/2017 від 15.05.2017 «Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 28 квітня 2017 року «Про застосування персональних спеціальних економічних та інших обмежувальних заходів (санкцій)». Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1332017-21850> [29.09.2021].

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ О. Кирилюк. Чи слід Україні скасувати санкції (сес п. 10).

³⁴ Указ Президента України №133/2017. Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України (сес п. 29).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ М. Дворовий. Санкції та блокування веб-сайтів в Україні, с. 11. (сес п. 11).

minfindnr.ru) and “LNR” (mslnr.su, mu-lnr.su, merlnr.su)³⁷. Regarding the blocking of pro-Russian Ukrainian-based websites, Presidential Decree №43/2021 of 2 February 2021 restricted access to the websites of TV channels “112”, “NewsOne” and “Zik”, which were operating in the Ukrainian domain zone (.ua)³⁸.

– Secondly, access to (pro-)Russian websites was restricted as a consequence of imposing sanctions not only on legal persons, but also on natural persons. For example, the Presidential Decree №82/2019 of 19 March 2019 applied sanctions against “Yandex”, “Roskomnadzor” and other legal persons associated with Russia³⁹. As regards sanctions imposed on natural persons, access to such websites as “tass.ru”, “voloshyna.org.ua”, “ukraine.ru” was limited due to the sanctions against the Deputy Chairman of Russia’s State Duma P. Tolstoy; websites “crimea.izbirkom.ru”, “opcrimea.ru”, “82.mvd.ru”, etc. were blocked on the basis of sanctions applied against the head of the illegal Crimean occupation administration S. Aksonov; «glava-lnr.info», «infovestnik.blogspot.com», «lug-info.com» and others were restricted because of the sanctions imposed on the head of the so-called “LNR” L. Pasichnyk; «debalcevo-dnr.ru», «ilovaisk.ugletele.com», «vsednr.ru» and others were blocked due to the sanctions applied against the head of the so-called “DNR” D. Pushylin⁴⁰.

– Thirdly, access to a considerable amount of (pro-)Russian websites was limited indefinitely. It transpired in May 2021, when the President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy issued a Decree №203/2021, whereby more than 200 websites of the occupation administrations and media resources operating in ORDLO and Crimea were blocked indefinitely – the examples of permanently blocked websites encompass “crimea-news.com”, “dnr-pravda.ru”, “gktrlnr.su”, etc.⁴¹. All websites subject to indefinite sanctions were incorporated in the sanctions lists through the application of sanctions against natural persons who were acting as heads of the occupation administrations of Crimea and the so-called “DNR” and “LNR” – S. Aksonov, D. Pushylin and L. Pasichnyk, respectively⁴².

³⁷ Указ Президента України №126/2018 від 14 травня 2018 року «Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 2 травня 2018 року «Про застосування та скасування персональних спеціальних економічних та інших обмежувальних заходів (санкцій)». Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1262018-24150> [24.09.2021].

³⁸ Указ Президента України №43/2021 від 2 лютого 2021 року «Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 2 лютого 2021 року «Про застосування персональних спеціальних економічних та інших обмежувальних заходів (санкцій)». Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/432021-36441> [24.09.2021]; Freedom on the Net. Freedom House (see p. 2).

³⁹ Указ Президента України №82/2019 від 19 березня 2019 року «Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 19 березня 2019 року «Про застосування, скасування та внесення змін до персональних спеціальних економічних та інших обмежувальних заходів (санкцій)». Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/822019-26290> [28.09.2021].

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Указ Президента України №203/2021 від 21 травня 2021 року «Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 14 травня 2021 року «Про застосування персональних спеціальних економічних та інших обмежувальних заходів (санкцій)». Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2032021-38949> [26.09.2021].

⁴² Ibid.

With that being said, it should be highlighted that the employment of the Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions” as an instrument of Internet censorship in Ukraine within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid is controversial from the perspective of Ukraine’s international human rights obligations. Among the most significant legally binding international instruments regulating the procedure for permissible Internet censorship are the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the CoE’s European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)⁴³. Having ratified the Covenant in 1973⁴⁴ and the Convention in 1997⁴⁵, Ukraine became a state-party to both agreements and the accompanying human rights obligations. Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR set out the criteria of permissible limitations of the freedom of information – these are the criteria of legality, legitimacy, and necessity⁴⁶. It is these three criteria that are further utilized to determine whether or not the sanctions mechanism prescribed by the Law “On Sanctions” complies with international law standards. To interpret the criteria of legality, legitimacy, and necessity, the given research refers to the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

Concerning the criterion of legality, any restriction of freedom of information on the Internet must be “prescribed by law”⁴⁷. A restriction is “prescribed by law” if it satisfies the following conditions: first and foremost, a restrictive measure applied by the state must be grounded in a proper domestic law basis; in addition, the domestic law basis must provide a sufficient level of “quality of the law”⁴⁸. “Quality of the law” requires that the persons concerned must be able to access well-defined and “foreseeable” legal norms in question⁴⁹. In this respect, even if we assume that the Law “On Sanctions” serves as a relevant domestic law basis for restricting freedom of information, grave concerns arise as to the “quality of the law”. There are reasonable grounds to suggest that the text of the Law is neither clearly formulated nor “foreseeable” as to its consequences.

Firstly, limiting access to certain categories of websites is a type of restrictive measures that is not enshrined in the text of the Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions” and belongs to the category of “other sanctions”. Having said that, it should be pointed out that such arbitrary application of the category “other sanctions” for justifying the application of restrictive measures not

⁴³ P. Burdiak, A. Szalai. Freedom of expression online and Internet censorship: regulatory approaches of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. [in:] European and National Dimension in Research: Electronic collected materials of XIII Junior Researchers’ Conference, ed. Yu. Holubeu [et al.], Novopolotk 2021, pp. 130-131.

⁴⁴ Міжнародний пакт про громадянські і політичні права. Генеральна Асамблея ООН. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_043#Text [01.10.2021].

⁴⁵ Конвенція про захист прав людини і основоположних свобод. Рада Європи. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_004#Text [01.10.2021].

⁴⁶ P. Burdiak, A. Szalai. Freedom of expression online and Internet censorship, pp. 130-131 (see n. 43).

⁴⁷ Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey (18 December 2012, final 18 March 2013), Application no. 3111/10, para. 57 ; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (1 December 2015, final 1 March 2016), Applications nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, para. 59 ; Ürper and Others v. Turkey (20 October 2009, final 20 January 2010), Applications nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 47245/07, 50371/07, 50372/07 and 54637/07, para. 28.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

prescribed by the Law “On Sanctions” is a manifestation of virtually unlimited discretion of the state authorities⁵⁰.

Secondly, the employment of such sanction type as “other sanctions” sits uneasy with the principles of “foreseeability” and legal certainty, considering that those subject to the Law “On Sanctions” cannot regulate their conduct properly as they are not aware of which actions may trigger the application of “other sanctions”⁵¹. Consequently, those subject to the Law cannot regulate their behavior in a manner that would help them avoid possible legal consequences of their actions.

Thirdly, the application of «other sanctions» as a means of website blocking arguably contradicts the initial purpose of the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions». Taking account of the chronology of the adoption of the Law «On Sanctions», we can state that at the time of its adoption, the initiator of the legislation did not intend to use this Law as a legal instrument for website blocking. To be more precise, the draft Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions» did include a provision enabling «*a restriction or termination of the media and other actors of information activities, including those operating on the Internet*»⁵². However, this provision was later excluded from the final text of the Law «On Sanctions» owing to the respective amendments made by the government. When announcing these amendments during the parliamentary session, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine A. Yatsenyuk stated that «*such decisions [in particular, those related to the website blocking] can be taken only by the courts of Ukraine in accordance with the laws as well as the Constitution*»⁵³.

Fourthly, the criteria used to determine the necessity of sanctions application are non-transparent. Ukrainian human rights organizations assert that the specific grounds for applying sanctions against (pro-)Russian websites are «completely confidential»⁵⁴. Furthermore, there are no publicly available documents that would outline the procedure of submitting proposals for sanctions application to the National Security and Defense Council⁵⁵.

The above-mentioned issues negatively affect the legality of sanctions imposed by the Ukrainian authorities, suggesting that the employment of the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions» for restricting access to certain categories of (pro-)Russian websites does not meet the legality criterion of permissible freedom of information limitations.

⁵⁰ Коаліція «За вільний Інтернет» та громадські організації закликають Президента України та РНБО забезпечити законність та прозорість при застосуванні санкцій до Інтернет-ресурсів. Платформа прав людини. URL: <https://www.ppl.org.ua/koaliciya-zavilnij-internet-ta-gromadski-organizaci%D1%97-zaklikayut-prezidenta-ukra%D1%97-ni-ta-rnbo-zabezpechiti-zakonnist-ta-prozorist-pri-zastosuvanni-sankcij-do-internet-resursiv.html> [15.10.2021].

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Проект Закону про санкції. Офіційний вебпортал Верховної Ради України, с. 3. URL: <http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc34?id=&pf3511=519158&pf35401=310393> [13.08.2021].

⁵³ Стенограма пленарного засідання. Засідання 71. Офіційний вебпортал Верховної Ради України. URL: <https://www.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/5685.html> [12.08.2021].

⁵⁴ Л. Ганжа. Блокування сайтів і таємні критерії. (сес. п. 27).

⁵⁵ Ю. Тищенко, Ю. Каздобіна, С. Горобчишина, А. Дуда. Політика щодо Криму, с. 53 (сес. п. 19).

Concerning the criterion of legitimacy, a restriction of freedom of information online can be considered legitimate if it is aimed at achieving at least one of the legitimate goals set out in the relevant international human rights instruments, namely Article 19 of the ICCPR and/or Article 10 of the ECHR⁵⁶. Such legitimate goals encompass, inter alia, the preservation of national security and territorial integrity, the protection of public order, etc.⁵⁷

Speaking about the legitimacy of restricting access to certain categories of (pro-)Russian websites by virtue of applying the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions», it should be emphasized that paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Law clearly stipulates that the purpose of sanctions application may rest upon the necessity to protect national security and interests of Ukraine, guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, respond to terrorist activities, etc.⁵⁸ These purposes of sanctions application are fully in line with the legitimate goals indicated in Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR, which may justify freedom of information limitations.

Yet there is no consensus among the Ukrainian authorities with regard to the interpretation of the legitimate goal of blocking (pro-)Russian websites. For instance, in the case of wholesale blocking of “Mail.ru,” “Vkontakte,” and “Odnoklassniki,” different state bodies gave varying accounts regarding the reasons for imposing sanctions on the stated websites. The Security Service of Ukraine press center reported that the Russian websites were blocked because Russian intelligence services utilized them for the purposes of conducting special information operations against Ukrainians by disseminating content calling for radical armed protests⁵⁹. The former head of the Security Service of Ukraine V. Hrytsak stated that the social media platforms “Vkontakte” and “Odnoklassniki” contained about 800 communities that distributed anti-Ukrainian content⁶⁰. Former Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council O. Turchynov noted that Russia used the restricted online platforms for the illegal collection of information, deployment of information warfare against Ukraine, as well as expansion of the network of its intelligence services⁶¹. Former President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko claimed that the reasons for blocking Russian websites derived from the employment of the blocked websites for the following purposes: conducting anti-Ukrainian special information operations on the impugned Russian websites; granting unauthorized access to personal data of Ukrainian users to the intelligence services of the Russian Federation; expanding the Russian intelligence

⁵⁶ P. Burdiak, A. Szalai. Freedom of expression online and Internet censorship, pp. 130-131 (see n. 43).

⁵⁷ Міжнародний пакт. Генеральна Асамблея ООН (see n. 44) ; Конвенція. Рада Європи (see n. 45).

⁵⁸ Закон України «Про санкції». Верховна Рада України (see n. 18).

⁵⁹ Заява СБУ щодо використання російськими спецслужбами окремих інтернет-ресурсів у спеціальних інформаційних операціях. Прес-центр СБУ. URL: <http://knt.sm.gov.ua/index.php/uk/potochna-diyalnist/vzaemodiya-organy/6468-zayava-sbu-shchodo-vikoristannya-rosijskimi-spetssluzhbam-okremikh-internet-resursiv-u-spesialnikh-informatsijnikh-operatsiyakh> [25.10.2021].

⁶⁰ СБУ виявила в «Однокласниках» та «Вконтакте» близько 800 антиукраїнських груп. Укрінформ. URL: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2234953-sbu-viavila-v-odnoklassnikah-ta-vkontakte-blizko-800-antiukrainskih-grup.html> [10.10.2021].

⁶¹ Російські соцмережі блокують через вербування та шпигунство - Турчинов. Укрінформ. URL: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/2229259-rosijski-socmerezi-blokuut-cerez-verbuвання-ta-spigunstvo-turcinov.html> [10.10.2021].

network by recruiting Ukrainian users; disseminating content calling for the commission of violent acts with a view to changing the constitutional order in the country, etc.⁶²

At the same time, notwithstanding there was no consensus among the Ukrainian authorities on the interpretation of the legitimate goal of blocking (pro-)Russian websites, there is reason to believe that there was a legitimate basis for introducing restrictive measures. To support this claim, we should recall the ECtHR case law on the restriction of freedom of expression (including the freedom of information) in times of armed conflict. The Strasbourg Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that «the sensitivity of the security situation» on a particular territory, as well as the obligation of public authorities to respond to actions that may lead to additional violence, give state authorities the right to restrict freedom of expression (including freedom of information) in an effort to guarantee national security and territorial integrity of the state, as well as preventing disorder and crime⁶³. Thus, if we were to extrapolate this ECtHR position to the realities of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, we would find that given the sensitivity of the security situation in Crimea and eastern oblast of Ukraine; considering the obligation of the Ukrainian authorities to respond to actions that may lead to additional violence in these territories; and taking into account numerous reports from the responsible Ukrainian authorities about the use of (pro-)Russian websites to propagate calls for violence⁶⁴, disseminate anti-Ukrainian content⁶⁵, expand the network of Russian intelligence services⁶⁶, threaten the information security of Ukraine⁶⁷ etc., we can assume that the introduction of censorship measures against (pro-)Russian websites (primarily, «Mail.ru», «Vkontakte», and «Odnoklassniki» as the selected case-studies in this article, but it is also true for virtually all other categories of blocked websites) pursued a legitimate goal of preserving national interests, national security and territorial integrity of the state, and/or preventing disorder and crime. Therefore, the criterion of legitimacy, albeit not clearly and unambiguously formulated, was arguably met by Ukrainian authorities when blocking (pro-)Russian websites by dint of applying the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions».

With reference to the necessity criterion, any restriction of freedom of information online must be «necessary in a democratic society»⁶⁸. In its case law, the ECtHR has addressed a number of cases concerning the necessity to impose limitations on freedom of expression (including freedom of information), particularly in the context of an armed

⁶² Відповідь Президента України на електронну петицію № 22/036543-еп «Отменить блокировку интернет-ресурса Вконтакте», розміщену на веб-сайті Офіційного інтернет-представництва Президента України 16.05.2017 громадянином А.А.Ткаченко. Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України. URL: <https://petition.president.gov.ua/petition/36543> [10.10.2021].

⁶³ *Başkaya and Okcuoğlu v Turkey* (8 July 1999), Applications nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, para. 56; *Erdođu and İnce v. Turkey* (8 July 1999), Applications nos. 25067/94 і 25068/94, para. 43.

⁶⁴ Заява СБУ. Прес-центр СБУ (see n. 59).

⁶⁵ СБУ виявила антиукраїнські групи. Укрінформ (see n. 60).

⁶⁶ Російські соцмережі блокують. Укрінформ (see n. 61).

⁶⁷ Відповідь Президента України. Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України (see n. 62).

⁶⁸ *Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey* (18 December 2012, final 18 March 2013), Application no. 3111/10, para. 56; *Cengiz and Others v. Turkey* (1 December 2015, final 1 March 2016), Applications nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, para. 58

conflict. Accordingly, the Strasbourg Court identifies three conditions under which freedom of expression and information limitations during an armed conflict may be considered «necessary in a democratic society»:

- the existence of a «pressing social need» for introducing a restrictive measure⁶⁹;
- the proportionality of the applied restrictive measure to the pursued legitimate goal⁷⁰;
- relevance and sufficiency of evidence for the application of a limitation⁷¹.

When determining the extent to which the state complies with the aforementioned three conditions for permissible freedom of information limitations, the Strasbourg Court reviews the allegedly illegal content of the impugned websites, taking into consideration the context in which the content was published and public interest in distributing allegedly illegal content⁷². Afterward, the ECtHR tries to strike a balance between the need to preserve freedom of expression and information and the necessity to protect some other right by imposing restrictive measures.

As regards the existence of a «pressing social need» to restrict access to (pro-)Russian websites in the Ukrainian segment of the Internet, it should be noted that it is not possible to assess the text, context, and public interest of the allegedly illegal content distributed at the restricted websites. This is due to the fact that the allegedly illegal content of the (pro-)Russian websites was not specified in the relevant presidential sanctions decrees or their annexes. The only publicly available documents comprise sanctions lists that enumerate (pro-)Russian websites subjected to blocking, as well as multiple varying accounts of Ukrainian officials explaining the rationale for imposing sanctions on some but not all categories of the blocked (pro-)Russian websites, without providing any reference to a specific list of allegedly illegal content disseminated on the impugned websites. Accordingly, by not revealing an adequate contextual assessment and not disclosing a list of allegedly illegal content published on the (pro-)Russian websites subjected to sanctions, the Ukrainian authorities failed to demonstrate the «pressing social need» to block the (pro-)Russian websites through the application of the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions».

Concerning the proportionality of website blocking, it should be noted that the case law of the ECtHR requires that wholesale blocking of entire websites be considered as the last resort of restricting access to illegal content⁷³. The reason for this is that the wholesale website blocking is usually a manifestation of arbitrary interference with the freedom of information because such measure *«deliberately disregards the distinction between the legal and illegal information the*

⁶⁹ Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v Turkey (8 July 1999), Applications nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, para. 61 (ii); Erdoğan and İnce v. Turkey (8 July 1999), Applications nos. 25067/94 i 25068/94, para. 47 (ii); Erdoğan v. Turkey (15 June 2000), Application no. 25723/94, para. 53; Şener v. Turkey (18 July 2000), Application no. 26680/95, para. 39 (ii)

⁷⁰ Ibid. paras. 61 (iii); 47 (iii); 60; and §39 (iii) respectively

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid. Paras. 61 (iii) – 66; 47 (iii) – 54; 60 – 72; and 39 (iii) – 46 respectively

⁷³ OOO Flavis and Others v Russia (23 June 2020, final 16 November 2020), Applications nos. 12468/15, 23489/15 and 19074/16, para. 38

website may contain», entailing a collateral restriction of legal content along with the allegedly illegal information disseminated on the blocked website⁷⁴. Consequently, a wholesale blocking of access to a wide array of information resources significantly restricts Internet users' rights⁷⁵. In view of the foregoing, wholesale blocking of the mass media is not proportionate as it goes «beyond any notion of «necessary» restraint in a democratic society»⁷⁶.

Suppose we contextualize Ukraine's blocking of (pro-)Russian websites in light of the above-mentioned ECtHR interpretation for determining the proportionality of freedom of information online limitations. In that case, it should be noted that wholesale blocking of Russian websites by virtue of adopting relevant sanctions decrees of the Presidents of Ukraine represented a disproportionate interference with freedom of information on the Internet. Apart from restricting access to allegedly illegal information, wholesale website blocking also triggered collateral blocking of a significant amount of legal information resources available on the blocked websites. Alternatively, a proportionate response to the dissemination of allegedly illegal content on (pro-)Russian websites could have been exercised in the form of blocking access to specific web-page addresses that contain impugned illegal content, rather than restricting access to entire websites. Therefore, given the disproportionate wholesale blocking of (pro-)Russian websites, considering the inability of Ukrainian authorities to demonstrate the «pressing social need» for restricting access to entire websites, it is reasonable to suggest that the condition of proportionality of a restrictive measure was not met during the wholesale blocking of (pro-)Russian websites.

With regard to the relevance and sufficiency of evidence for restricting freedom of information online by applying the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions», it should be stressed that we cannot verify the relevance and sufficiency of evidence due to the lack of a publicly available list of the specific content that raised concerns of the state authorities and prompted massive website blocking. Thus, we can claim that Ukrainian authorities failed to provide relevant and sufficient evidence for a wholesale blocking of (pro-)Russian websites.

Having examined whether or not a full-scale blocking of (pro-)Russian websites through the application of the Law «On Sanctions» was necessary in a democratic society, we determined that none of the three conditions of necessity was fulfilled at the time of introduction of freedom of information online restrictions. More precisely, Ukrainian authorities failed to demonstrate a «pressing social need» for massive blocking of (pro-)Russian websites; wholesale blocking of the impugned websites went beyond the notion of proportionate freedom of information limitation; and Ukrainian authorities did not provide relevant and sufficient grounds for

⁷⁴ Ibid. paras. 37, 38

⁷⁵ Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey (18 December 2012, final 18 March 2013), Application no. 3111/10, para. 66; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (1 December 2015, final 1 March 2016), Applications nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, para. 64

⁷⁶ Ürper and Others v. Turkey (20 October 2009, final 20 January 2010), Applications nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 47245/07, 50371/07, 50372/07 and 54637/07, paras. 43 and 44; Ölmez and Turgay v. Turkey (5 October 2010, final 5 January 2011), Applications nos. 2318/09, 12616/09, 23563/09, 26801/09, 26837/09, 26846/09, 26851/09 i 26859/09, para. 16

wholesale website blocking. Given that none of the three conditions of the necessity of a restrictive measure was met, the wholesale blocking of (pro-)Russian websites was arguably not «necessary in a democratic society».

Summing up the results of the analysis of the (pro-)Russian website blocking in Ukraine for the consistency with international criteria of permissible Internet censorship, it should be underlined that the Ukrainian authorities arguably met the legitimacy criterion, but violated the criteria of legality and necessity of freedom of information online limitations.

In view of the fact that any restriction of freedom of information online is in line with international law standards only if all three criteria of permissible Internet censorship are satisfied, it should be emphasized that wholesale blocking of (pro-)Russian websites by dint of applying the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions» arguably violates Ukraine's international obligations with respect to ensuring freedom of information online, considering that the website blocking in Ukraine did not meet the internationally accepted criteria of legality and necessity.

Conclusions. The information confrontation between Ukraine and Russia in the Internet domain constitutes a significant component of the hybrid war between the two countries. Both states are implementing a policy of Internet censorship aimed at restricting information resources that promote narratives of their respective adversary. In Ukraine, the active policy of blocking certain categories of (pro-)Russian websites has been implemented since 2017. It was in 2017 that the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions» was first applied to the Internet domain for the purposes of wholesale restriction of access to certain websites. Thereafter, the Russian dimension of Ukraine's Internet censorship has been exercised through the adoption of respective presidential decrees imposing sanctions on (pro-)Russian websites in accordance with the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions».

Having analyzed presidential sanctions decrees introducing wholesale blocking of (pro-)Russian websites in the Ukrainian segment of the Internet, the article delineated the following characteristic features of Ukraine's Internet censorship: sanctions lists provide for wholesale blocking of not only the websites originating from Russia, but also the pro-Russian websites based and functioning in Crimea, ORDLO and the Ukraine-controlled territory. Furthermore, (pro-)Russian websites are getting blocked either temporarily or permanently by virtue of imposing sanctions on both legal persons and natural persons.

The article also investigated the issue of restricting access to (pro-)Russian websites in Ukraine by applying the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions» with a view to determining the compliance of this process with international standards for permissible Internet censorship. The internationally accepted standards of the permissible freedom of information limitations include the criteria of legality, legitimacy, and necessity. Concerning the legality criterion, it was found that although sanctions against (pro-)Russian websites were based on the provisions of the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions», the text of the Law is vaguely formulated and is unforeseeable as to its consequences, which is a violation of the legality criterion. The criterion of legitimacy

of the restrictive measures was arguably met because the Ukrainian authorities blocked access to (pro-)Russian websites on the grounds of protecting the national security and interests of Ukraine and guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state in light of the unfolding Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. Finally, the necessity criterion was violated due to the fact that Ukrainian authorities failed to demonstrate a «pressing social need», ensure proportionality or provide relevant and sufficient grounds for wholesale blocking of access to certain categories of (pro-)Russian websites. Consequently, the wholesale blocking of (pro-)Russian websites through the application of the Law of Ukraine «On Sanctions» does not fall in line with Ukraine's international obligations on ensuring freedom of information online, considering that such website blocking arguably violates internationally accepted criteria of legality and necessity of restrictive measures.

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Russian-Ukrainian military conflict: terminological and discursive dimensions

The paper is devoted to terminological, typological and discursive dimension of concepts describing modern conflicts. Historical development of concept “war” is retraced including four generations of warfare. Difficulties in establishing a methodological framework for analyzing the media coverage of military conflicts are analyzed and an interdisciplinary approach to the media coverage of military conflicts is proposed. This enables the integration of different theories - international relations, conflict studies, political communication and journalism. Two dimensions of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict (physical and discursive) are described. In the physical dimension, the conflict is localized. The discursive dimension of the conflict is implemented at the global, interstate (Russian-Ukrainian) and local (intra-Ukrainian) levels. Discursive understanding of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict was investigated on local level. The object of analysis was coverage of the conflict in 4 Ukrainian online news portals. The need of new methodological approaches to analysis of the relationship between the media and security issues is emphasized.

Keywords: war, conflict, hybrid warfare, Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, media coverage, conflict dimensions, communication

Rosyjsko-ukraiński konflikt zbrojny: wymiary terminologiczne i dyskursywne

Artykuł poświęcony jest terminologicznemu, typologicznemu i dyskursywnemu wymiarowi pojęć opisujących współczesne konflikty. Prześladowano historyczny rozwój koncepcji „wojna”, w tym cztery pokolenia działań wojennych. Analizowane są trudności w ustaleniu ram metodologicznych analizy przekazu medialnego o konfliktach zbrojnych i zaproponowano interdyscyplinarne podejście do przekazu medialnego o konfliktach zbrojnych. Umożliwia to integrację różnych teorii – stosunków międzynarodowych, studiów nad konfliktami, komunikacji politycznej i dziennikarstwa. Opisano dwa wymiary konfliktu zbrojnego rosyjsko-ukraińskiego (fizyczny i dyskursywny). W wymiarze fizycznym konflikt jest zlokalizowany. Dyskursywny wymiar konfliktu realizowany jest na poziomie globalnym, międzypaństwowym (rosyjsko-ukraińskim) i lokalnym (wewnątrzukraińskim). Dyskursywne rozumienie rosyjsko-ukraińskiego konfliktu zbrojnego zostało zbadane na szczeblu lokalnym. Przedmiotem analizy była relacja z konfliktu w 4 ukraińskich internetowych portalach informacyjnych. Podkreśla się potrzebę nowych podejść metodologicznych do analizy relacji między mediami a zagadnieniami bezpieczeństwa.

Słowa kluczowe: wojna, konflikt, wojna hybrydowa, rosyjsko-ukraiński konflikt zbrojny, przekaz medialny, wymiary konfliktu, komunikacja

Російсько-український воєнний конфлікт: термінологічний та дискурсивний виміри

У статті проаналізовано термінологічні, типологічні та дискурсивні виміри понять, які описують сучасні конфлікти. Простежено зокрема історичний розвиток поняття «війна» та описано чотири покоління сучасних воєн. Проаналізовано труднощі у створенні методологічної бази та запропоновано міждисциплінарний підхід до аналізу висвітлення військових конфліктів у ЗМІ. Цей підхід дає змогу інтегрувати теорії різних дисциплін – міжнародних відносин, конфліктології, політичної комунікації та журналістики. Описано два виміри російсько-українського військового конфлікту (фізичний та дискурсивний). У фізичному вимірі цей конфлікт є локалізованим. Дискурсивний вимір конфлікту реалізується на глобальному, міждержавному (російсько-українському) та локальному (внутрішньоукраїнському) рівнях. Дискурсивне розуміння російсько-українського військового конфлікту досліджено на місцевому рівні. Об'єктом аналізу стало висвітлення цього конфлікту на 4 українських новинних порталах. Наголошено на необхідності нових методологічних підходів до аналізу взаємозв'язку ЗМІ та проблем безпеки.

Ключові слова: війна, конфлікт, гібридна війна, російсько-український військовий конфлікт, висвітлення в ЗМІ, виміри конфлікту, комунікація.

One of the current of research fields in political science is conflict studies. In publications devoted to the study of conflicts, we come across the parallel use of the terms “war”, “warfare”, “conflict”, “political conflict”, “military conflict”, “military-political conflict”, etc. In addition, there are various typologies of these phenomena and there is no established view of the conflict typology conflicts and its criteria.

As for the typology of wars, one of the simplest is based on the criterion “methods of warfare”. Accordingly there are *conventional* and *unconventional wars*. Conventional war can be described as a war which is waged by states using regular troops and conventional weapons. There are four generations of conventional war. The first is associated with the massive use of smooth-bore weapons in static battles, e.g. the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation is associated with invention of rifled weapons and strategic troop transfers by rail, e.g. the First World War. In the third generation heavy armored vehicles appeared. This enabled deep tactical and operational maneuver, e.g. World War II.

The first two generations are considered as *linear wars*, because the struggle is conducted through a direct clash of military orders, or lines. From the third generation we can talk about *nonlinear warfare*, in which superiority is achieved through maneuvering, tactical and operational skills. In this sense, all modern wars are nonlinear. Wars of the fourth generation were presented by military theorists as a futuristic phenomenon in which the leading role is played by technical innovations, such as highly effective directional weapons (lasers, electromagnetic guns, etc.), remotely controlled devices and robots, computer based networks of communication and observation¹. In this fourth generation of wars, new types of wars emerged: *network-centric and hybrid wars*. The concept of network-centric warfare appeared after the US Gulf operation in 1991. The idea of network-centric warfare is to achieve maximum adaptability of troops through the almost total use of information technologies. In this war such a war, single military units are able to act autonomously and, at the same time, to coordinate their operations with other units to achieve victory.

The second type is *unconventional war*. This category includes all wars, conducted using not “ordinary” methods. The use of armed forces in most leading countries in modern (the second half of the 20th and 21st century) military conflicts involves the limited use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons as well. Therefore, we can speak about unconventional war only if it is dominated by use of non-traditional weapons. In most cases, the term “*unconventional war*” is synonymous with «*irregular war*». The subjects of such wars are various non-state actors or entities that use methods that are not typical for regular state troops. Depending on the specific circumstances, different additional terms are used to describe the features of irregular war: “*civil war*”, “*guerrilla war*”, “*insurgent war*”.

In irregular warfare terrorist and criminal methods are used. However, the use of the terms “*terrorist war*” or “*criminal war*” is not actually terminological. Following the events of 9.11, the Bush administration formulated the doctrine of “*war on terror*.” The enemy was identified as the “axis of evil” of several rogues’ states and their sponsored terrorist networks, and the main threat was a combination of terrorist methods and high technologies. This doctrine has greatly influenced the concept of hybrid warfare and has affected of the modern understanding of war and its legal aspects².

At the same time, it should be noted that the term “*war*” is used in situations that do not involve any use of military weapons, such as “information war”, “economic war”, “political war”. In each case, we can talk about certain typical methods of action in these areas, but in the traditional sense, they are only different components of “*war*”. Their absolutization as separate types of war is controversial. As we can see, the criteria for most typologies are the methods of the

¹ W. Lind, K. Nightengale, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. *Marine Corps Gazette*, 1989, nr.73, p.23. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/7964013/The_Changing_Face_of_War_Into_the_Fourth_Generation [accessed 05.11.2021]

² W. Horbulin (Ed.). *Svitova hibrydna vijna: ukrajinskyj front*, Kyiv 2017. p.120

warfare. This criterion helps to determine the essential characteristics: the war in which a single method is used, the enemy who uses it and the threat posed by this method. At the same time, the absolutization of one or another method can distort the understanding of a particular type of war, as in the case of a hybrid, which combines several methods. In addition, there is another disadvantage of defining war through the method of waging it. It is that "... the method does not answer the question of the causes and purposes of war, moreover, the method of war as such does not reveal its strategy. Understanding the method does not answer the question of why a war is being fought, what is a victory or a loss, and what is the price of war."³

After World War II, the „war“ as a term of international law gradually gave way to the term «*armed conflict*» This is due, in particular, to the fact that from the point of view of international law, the state of war between the two states requires the formal declaration of war and allows the warring parties to apply the rules of war. This, in turn, is contrary to international law, in particular to the Geneva Convention (1949).

Analyzing recent publications by military conflict experts, they all agree that the traditional understanding of war as a military confrontation between two states or blocs with defined political goals needs to be reconsidered. In the early 21st century in American and German publications appeared a range of concepts: „4th Generation Warfare“, „political warfare“, „neue Kriege“, „asymetrische Kriegsführung“, „unkonventioneller Krieg“, „nonlinearer Krieg“, „postmoderner Krieg“, which aimed to conceptualize changes in classical approaches to war.⁴ However, the term „hybrid war“ has become the most widespread. It first appeared in the United States in the 90s. The term «*hybrid*» means a combination of different elements in a single physical object or action. The term «*war*» became widely used to mean *hybrid* only with the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The term «*hybrid warfare*» appeared in the US military, specifically in the Marine Corps. R. Walker defined it as a combination of ordinary war with special operations. He argued that the organization of the Marines was hybrid in nature.⁵ Later, the term „*hybrid warfare*“ was used by V. Nemeth in the context of the Second Chechen War (1999-2009) to describe the tactics of the Chechen insurgents, who combined the methods of traditional and guerrilla warfare⁶.

Hybrid warfare can be interpreted as a combination of traditional and irregular hostilities combined with terrorist operations in a combat zone to achieve political goals. Hybrid warfare blurs the line between state and non-state actors, changes the forms of warfare, and traditional conceptual differences between terrorism, traditional hostilities, crime, and irregular military groups lose their practical significance. In his definition, G. Russell claims: «Simultaneous

³ W. Horbulin (Ed.), *Svitova hibrydna vijna: ukrajinskyj front*, Kyiv 2017. p. 123

⁴ O.Tamminga, *Hybride Kriegsführung. Zur Einordnung einer aktuellen Erscheinungsform des Krieges*, *SWP Aktuell* 2015, nr. 27.p.2. Retrieved from https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2015A27_tga.pdf [accessed 05.11.2021]

⁵ R.G.Walker, R.G. *SPEC FI: the United States Marine Corps and Special Operations*. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 1998. Retrieved from <https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/8989/specfiunitedstat00walk.pdf?sequence=1> [accessed 04.11.2021]

⁶ W.J.Nemeth, *Future war and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare*. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2002. Retrieved from <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5865> [accessed 05.11.2021]

and coordinated use by the enemy of a set of political, military, economic, social, information means and traditional, irregular, terrorist, subversive, criminal methods of warfare involving state and non-state sub objects⁷.

In July 2014, NATO officially decided to use the term «*hybrid war*». This was due, among other things, to the nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In the case of a hybrid war, it is a question of extending hostilities to the sphere of civilian life. That is, it is about the coordinated use of diplomatic, military, humanitarian, economic, technological and information means to achieve not peaceful but military goals.⁸

However, the fundamental nature of the war has not changed. The war is politically motivated and has its own logic and purpose: to protect their own interests and force the enemy to carry out their own will. The phenomenon of hybrid warfare is neither a new nor a purely Russian phenomenon.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that there is no definition of the term «*hybrid war*» in international law.. Its participants operate outside the legal field and use hybrid means instead of traditional ones, thus avoiding responsibility to the international community. Thus, „*hybrid warfare*» is a combination of open and hidden, regular and irregular, symmetrical and asymmetrical, military and non-military means to blur the line between the concepts of «*war*» and «*peace*» enshrined in international law⁹.

In other words, it is the inverse use of various means to control the course of the conflict by «militarizing» the spheres of civilian life. According to O. Tamminga, hybrid warfare is a synthesis of military and non-military (diplomatic, economic, technological, humanitarian, information) means used by state and non-state actors for the purpose of systematic and coordinated destabilization and attack on previously identified enemy weaknesses. The aim is to control the course of the conflict by militarizing the spheres of civilian life.¹⁰ What researchers of hybrid warfare have in common is that they all consider it necessary to first study specific cases of this war, identify similarities and differences between them, and only then formulate a general concept.

Hybrid warfare is generally understood as actions that combine military, quasi-military, diplomatic, informational, economic and other means to achieve strategic political goals. The specificity of this combination is that each of the military and non-military methods of hybrid conflict is used for military purposes and used as a weapon. *Weaponization* occurs not only in

⁷ W.G. Russell, Thoughts on Hybrid Conflict, *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved from <https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf> [accessed 05.11.2021]

⁸ NATO (2014). Hybrid War – Hybrid Response. Retrieved from: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2014/07/01/hybrid-war-hybrid-response/index.html>

⁹ Schaurer, Florian: Alte Neue Kriege - Anmerkungen zur hybriden Kriegführung, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Berlin 2015, p.28.

¹⁰ O.Tamminga, Hybride Kriegführung. Zur Einordnung einer aktuellen Erscheinungsform des Krieges, SWP Aktuell 2015, nr. 27, p.2. Retrieved from https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2015A27_rga.pdf [accessed 05.11.2021]

the media sector. The war is therefore called hybrid, because it is widely used and non-military means.¹¹

The complex nature of the concept of «*hybrid war*» requires the comprehensive interdisciplinary analytical approach that would integrate the methodological and methodological achievements of various sciences: political science, sociology, communication, linguistics, jurisprudence. It should be, however, mentioned that such a task is complicated by differences in the subject area of single sciences that deal with the same object - hybrid warfare.

The two main questions to which the representatives of various sciences seek answers can be formulated as follows: 1) has the nature of modern war changed?; 2) are hybrid methods of warfare a fundamentally new form of military conflict, or is it really just a matter of applying new combinations, techniques and methods of warfare known since ancient times? There is still no final answer to this question. Some military theorists categorically deny hybrid wars their essential specificity, while others insist that such specificity exists. The term «*hybrid*» is unacceptable to many experts, as a result of which it can be used so widely that it loses its meaning. Evidence of the vagueness and uncertainty of the nature of modern military conflicts is the existence of numerous terms to denote them: *hybrid war*, «*gray zone conflicts*», «*gray wars*». Using these terms, the authors seek to distinguish modern wars from traditional ones. This terminological instability «makes some experts doubt whether it is worth talking about the emergence of new forms of warfare? Or perhaps it is more correct to consider the latest conflicts as the use of classic force and strategies, the effectiveness of which is enhanced by modern advanced technologies and combined with the conscious use of vulnerabilities in the security structures of the Western world?

Thus, we argue that modern forms of warfare create new military-legal, social, moral and ethical problems that need to be addressed.

Therefore, it is appropriate to use «*hybrid war*» as the *umbrella term*, describing the complexity of this phenomenon. This enables comprehensive analysis of methodological approaches. The role of such a term is to «find common features of hybrid warfare and ... stimulate the search for theoretically sound and effective practical solutions¹².

In addition to the search for common features, this makes it possible to categorize wars on the principle of variable sets of common features. Interpretation of the «*hybrid war*» as the *umbrella term* makes it possible to use different terms in parallel («*hybrid combat*», «*hybrid threats*», «*hybrid enemy*») as synonyms.¹³ The basis for this is a combination of traditional, non-traditional, military and non-military methods: whether as threats, or during real hostilities, or as an attribute of a potential or real aggressor. Today we can talk about the process of expanding the meaning of the concept of «*hybrid war*» as a new type of global confrontation.

¹¹ P.Pomerantsev, P. & M. Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money. 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.interpretemag.com/the-menace-of-unreality-how-the-kremlin-weaponizes-information-culture-and-money/> [accessed 06.11.2021]

¹² W.Horbulin (Ed.), *Svitova hibrydna vijna: ukrajinskyj front*, Kyiv, 2017 p.

¹³ H. Yavorska, Concept „vijna“: semantyka i pragmatyka. *Stratehichni priorytety*. Seria: *Philosophia* 2016, nr.1, p. 16

Despite the diversity of issues and disciplinary approaches, all authors emphasize that the media play a key role in understanding the phenomena of «*security*» and «*conflict*». However, there are some difficulties in establishing a methodological framework for analyzing the media coverage of military conflicts. These difficulties are due to several factors: a) the interdisciplinarity of research and the multidimensionality of the links between political actors, the media and society; b) the existing set of methodological tools approaches does not always adequately and comprehensively describe the interaction between political actors, the media and society; c) the lack of ongoing dialogue between researchers and specialists in the fields of security, military affairs, and media technologies.

One way to overcome these difficulties is to take an interdisciplinary approach to the media coverage of military and political conflicts. It allows you to integrate theories of different fields - international relations, conflict studies, political communication and journalism. For example, the application of theories of international relations makes it possible to consider a political or military conflict in a theoretical and historical-cultural context. Conflict studies provide a methodological basis for the analysis of the main parameters of the conflict. Communication and media studies theoretically substantiate changes in communication technologies, media functions and the role of journalists in covering political and military conflicts.

This diversity of approaches is certainly an advantage, but it also requires the consolidation of research efforts and the systematization of knowledge, as well as the development of methodological guidelines. The first steps in this direction were the magazine «*Media, War & Conflict*», founded in 2008, and the collective work «*Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security*», which was first published in 2017¹⁴.

If we assume that every military conflict has a cultural dimension, it will make it possible to understand how mediatized culture affects the processes of armed conflict. Recently, the attention of researchers has shifted from the problems of interstate relations, conflict, strategic planning towards the so-called «*Soft power*» or «*smart power*»: culture, identity, values¹⁵¹⁶. This was facilitated by the so-called «*cultural turn*», which strengthened the position of poststructuralist and constructivist approaches to the issue of conflict and security¹⁷¹⁸. This «*cultural turn*» means that culture in general and media in particular form a certain «*background meanings*», stressing the importance of some and diminishing the importance of other events, and in that way a significant impact on the scope of policy.¹⁹

¹⁴ P.Robinson (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security*, London 2017.

¹⁵ J.S.Nyc. *The Power to Lead: Soft, Hard and Smart Power*, New York 2008, p. 28

¹⁶ W. A. Rough, *The Case of Soft Power*, [in:] *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting US Foreign Policy*, Ed. Ph. Seib, New York 2009 p. 177

¹⁷ D. Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften*, Reinbek b. Hamburg, 2006.

¹⁸ P.Hammond, *Media, War and Postmodernity*, London, 2007.

¹⁹ J.Weldes, *Popular Culture, Science Fiction and World Politics: Exploring Intertextual Relations*, [in:] *To Seek Our New Worlds: Exploring Links Between Science Fiction and World Politics*, Ed. J.Weldes, New York 2003, p.10.

At the same time, it is fair to note that these authors, emphasizing the importance of culture for the social and political sphere, do not dwell in detail on methods that allow to analyze verbal and nonverbal means by which culture and media «produce» certain meanings other audience reactions. Since the media produce meanings through media texts (verbal and visual), placing them in a certain context («background»), the features of media texts (design, content, structure) significantly determine the processes of their interpretation and understanding by the audience.

Research on the relationship between the media and security issues is based on three principles about the nature of communication.

First, to describe media communication in general, the transport metaphor is most often used: «*news has flown around the world*», «*at the intersection of information flows*», «*speed*». If we talk about news communication, it is more accurately described by the model of the ritual. This or that news or image can be attractive to the consumer, however, and this is much more important, given the power relations and social order, the news is a daily recurring rituals of consumption of multi-layered narratives. Ritual processes of consumption and interpretation of news narratives are in the center of attention of researchers of the relationship between media and security. Repetition is important because media rituals form standardized frames for news and, consequently, stereotyped audience reactions. This in turn poses security threats.

Second, the study of the relationship between the media and security issues involves not only an analysis of several leading media, but also media culture in general, as the concept of media encompasses actors, technologies and the environment. Politicians, journalists and media consumers live in a multimodal, multinational and multilingual media environment, in which local, regional and global narratives and visions circulate, competing with each other and determining the various reactions and behavior of the audience²⁰.

Theses on communication as a ritual and media culture as a medium of interaction lead to the third foundation: the vagueness and uncertainty of the concept of «*media power*». Establishing the agenda and determining the importance of security issues is no longer the prerogative of political elites alone. Repetitive rituals that change their form are mechanisms in the process of communication, which is now also involved in social media. If some subjects skillfully use these rituals to convey «correct» messages to the target audience, which often interprets the news media in an unexpected and unpredictable way, depending on the cultural and political context. In addition, the hybrid model of communication (*one - to - many + many - to - many*) leads to the individualization of mass communication.²¹

Now let us trace the discursive understanding of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. This conflict exists in physical and discursive dimensions. In the physical dimension, it is

²⁰ M.Deuze, *Media Life*. Cambridge, 2012 p.113

²¹ M. Gillespie & B. O'Loughlin, *The Media-Security Nexus. Researching ritualized cycles of insecurity*, [in:] *Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security*, Eds. P. Robinson, R. Fröhlich, London 2017, p.55

localized (Crimea, occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions). Its discursive dimension is implemented at the global, interstate (Russian-Ukrainian) and local (intra-Ukrainian) levels. Discursive understanding of events at different levels is different. To study the relationship between the physical and discursive dimensions of the Ukrainian-Russian military conflict, it is optimal to use an interdisciplinary approach and a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. Discursive dimension of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict was investigated on local level. The object of analysis was four online news portals “ZAXID.NET”, “Lviv Portal”, “Vgolos” and “Galinfo”. The research period is May 2021. The sample consists of 400 randomly selected news texts (100 texts from each media). Most of the materials about the events in the conflict area were published by the Vgolos (11), a little less by Galinfo (9), ZAXID.NET (4), and the Lviv portal (4).

In general, the coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the news media discourse does not raise reservations. Given the specifics of this discourse, one should probably not expect the analytical component of the publication. However, if the text of the news is accompanied by a comment from a conflict expert or a military journalist, it significantly enhances the news quality.

The thematic range of publications on the military conflict is not very wide. Most of them inform about violations of ceasefire, wounding or death of Ukrainian soldiers, military “exercises” in occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, seizure of militants by Ukrainian soldiers. In addition to “militants” journalists use the terms «hostiles”, “enemy”, “occupiers”, “Russian militants”, “enemy troops of the Russian Federation”, “Russian terrorists”, “Russian mercenaries”, “armed formations of the Russian Federation”. It is worth noting that some publications in the title talk about “militants” or “terrorists”, and in the text we already have “armed formations of Russia” or “Russian troops”. We believe that journalists who report on the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict should be more careful in choosing and using a term. If the term has synonyms, then of course they should be used. For example, the terms “militant” and “terrorist” are synonymous. The authors of some publications use these terms simultaneously, mostly in the plural: “terrorist-militants”.

As for the names by which the authors of periodicals denote the territories where hostilities are taking place, they most often use the official name “Joint Forces Operations Area” (in Ukrainian «Operacija Objednanyh Syl” -OOC), which the Operational Headquarters of Ukrainian Armed Forces decided to use from the end of April 2018 instead of “Anti-terrorist Operation” (ATO), which was formally managed by the Security Service of Ukraine. In addition to this official term, journalists use other concepts: “area of operation”, «anti-terrorist operation zone”, “war zone”. As we can see, journalists, when reporting on the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict and its participants, use different terms randomly. This does not always accurately convey the essence of the event. Finally we refer to “ABC. Armed Conflict in Terms (Guidebook for Ukraine)”, which was published in 2019 at the initiative of the Ministry of the Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons and with the financial support of the

Swiss Embassy in Ukraine. This handbook contains 105 terms of international and Ukrainian law that describe various aspects of the armed conflict, as well as a list and description of regulations and legislation adopted by Ukraine since 2014 to address issues related to the armed conflict and the temporary occupied parts of Ukraine.²²

In conclusion we claim that new methodological approaches are needed to analyze the relationship between the media and security issues. They should adequately respond to changes not only in social and political reality, but also in discursive practices, visual and verbal means of communication. This interaction between the subjects of politics and media is not linear, reflecting both continuity and variability of political system. Therefore, research methods on media interaction and national or international security issues should be sensitive, flexible, iterative and reflective. They should reflect the dynamics of this interaction and new ways of communication between social and political players, the media and their audience.

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HISTORY OF FORMATION FEATURES OF EARLY CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THE FIRST PRACTICAL MANIFESTATIONS OF POPULISM: SYSTEMATIZATION AT THE BACKGROUND OF NON-EUROPEAN CONTEXT

The article is dedicated to analyzing the history of formation, features of early or primary conceptualization and manifestations of the concept of “populism” in political practice and Political Science outside Europe. To do this, the author chronicled how the concept of populism arose, how it acquired different theoretical and normative connotations, and how it relates to other categories in different non-European countries, regions and parts of the world. It is argued that non-European populism should be talked about initially and historically on the example of such countries as the United States and the Russian Empire, and later primarily on the example of Latin America and (to a lesser extent) Africa. It was found that the concept of “populism” both theoretically and practically, as well as in a negative and in a positive senses and contexts is primarily based on the appeal to antagonism along the lines of “people” (as a positive category) and “political elite/dominant ideology” (as a negative category). These antagonistic opposites are analyzed in terms of their evolution, dynamics and changes, which actually testify to and demonstrate the history of populism in the non-European world. As a result, it has been shown that populism can be “elitist” (when it is mostly a mean of gaining and retaining power) and “popular” (when it is a mean of changing power and improving the status and rights of society) ones. It has been also shown that populism under autocracy can promote pluralism, democratization and democracy, but in the case of democracy it can generate risks of “erosion” of democracy and autocratization.

Keywords: populism, politics, people, elite, political struggle, political process.

HISTORIA POWSTANIA, CECHY WCZESNEJ KONCEPTUALIZACJI I PIERWSZE PRAKTYCZNE PRZEJAWY POPULIZMU: SYSTEMATYZACJA NA TLE POZAEUROPEJSKIEGO KONTEKSTU

W artykule przeanalizowano historię powstawania i cechy wczesnej/pierwotnej konceptualizacji i przejawów pojęcia „populizmu” w praktyce politycznej i politologii poza Europą. W tym celu odnotowujemy, jak powstało pojęcie populizmu, jak nabrało ono różnych konotacji teoretycznych i normatywnych oraz jak odnosi się do innych kategorii w różnych pozaeuropejskich krajach, regionach i częściach świata. Argumentowano, że o populizmie pozaeuropejskim

належy mówić początkowo i historycznie na przykładzie takich krajów, jak Stany Zjednoczone i Imperium Rosyjskie, a później przede wszystkim na przykładzie Ameryki Łacińskiej i w mniejszym stopniu Afryki. Stwierdzono, że pojęcie „populizmu” zarówno teoretycznie i praktycznie, jak i w sensie negatywnym i pozytywnym oraz w kontekście opiera się przede wszystkim na odwołaniu się do antagonizmu na wzór „ludzi” (jako kategorii pozytywnej) – „elita polityczna / dominująca ideologia” (kategoria negatywna). Te antagonistyczne przeciwieństwa są analizowane pod kątem ich ewolucji, dynamiki i zmian, które w rzeczywistości świadczą i pokazują historię populizmu w świecie pozaeuropejskim. W rezultacie wykazano, że populizm może być „elitarny” (kiedy jest głównie środkiem do zdobycia i utrzymania władzy) i „ludowy” (kiedy jest środkiem do zmiany władzy i poprawy statusu, statusu i praw społeczeństwa). Wykazano również, że populizm w demokracji może promować pluralizm, demokratyzację i demokrację, ale w przypadku demokracji może generować ryzyko „erozji” demokracji i autokracji.

Słowa kluczowe: populizm, polityka, ludność, elita, walka polityczna, proces polityczny.

ІСТОРІЯ СТАНОВЛЕННЯ ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ РАННЬОЇ КОНЦЕПТУАЛІЗАЦІЇ І ПЕРШИХ ПРАКТИЧНИХ ВИЯВІВ ПОПУЛІЗМУ: СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦІЯ НА ТЛІ ПОЗАЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО КОНТЕКСТУ

У статті проаналізовано історію становлення й особливості ранньої/первинної концептуалізації виявів поняття “популізм” у політичній практиці та політичній науці поза межами Європи. Для цього зафіксовано те, як виникло поняття популізму, як воно набуло різних теоретичних і нормативних конотацій як воно пов’язується з іншими категоріями різних неєвропейських країнах, регіонах та частинах світу. Аргументовано, що про неєвропейський популізм потрібно ініціально й історично говорити на прикладі таких країн, як США й умовно Російська імперія, а згодом передусім наприкладі країн Латинської Америки та меншою мірою Африки. Виявлено, що поняття “популізм” і теоретично, і практично, а також і в негативному, і в позитивному сенсі та контексті передусім ґрунтується на зверненні до антагонізму по лінії “народ” (як позитивна категорія) – “політична еліта/панівна ідеологія” (негативна категорія). Ці антагоністичні протилежності проаналізовано на предмет їхньої еволюції, динаміки й видозміни, які власне й засвідчують та демонструють історію розвитку популізму у рамках неєвропейського світу. У підсумку показано, що популізм буває “елітистським” (коли він здебільшого є засобом отримання й утримання влади) і “народним” (коли він є засобом зміни влади й покращення статусу, стану та прав соціуму). Також доведено, що в умовах недемократії популізм здатний сприяти плюралізму, демократизації і демократії,

а натомість у випадку демократії він може генерувати ризики “срозії” демократії і автократизацію.

Ключові слова: популізм, політика, народ, еліта, політична боротьба, політичний процес.

The end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st centuries certainly became milestones of formation and development of the populism phenomenon, both in Europe and abroad, and therefore populism has become a global phenomenon, albeit with different national and regional attributes. However, even though populism has traditionally had non-European roots, it is currently still associated primarily with various manifestations of the political process in the Western world, although, on the contrary, it has been very successfully conceptualized and continues to do so in other parts of the world. This certainly actualizes the agenda of the history of formation and features of early conceptualization and manifestations of the concept of “populism” in various political practices and political science outside Europe.

The stated scientific subject has been very successfully studied for a very long time by a number of scientists from different countries of the world. Among them such researchers as J. Allcock¹, I. Berlin, R. Hofstadter and D. McRae², M. Canovan³, M. Conniff⁴, C. De la Torre⁵,

T. Di Tella⁶, G. Germani⁷, J. Hicks⁸, G. Ionescu and E. Gellner⁹, R. Lowitt¹⁰, J. Mansbridge and S. Macedo¹¹, C. Mudde and C. Kaltwasser¹², D. Resnick¹³, P. Taggart¹⁴, A. Van Niekerk¹⁵, K. Weyland¹⁶ and many others. Of course, they have prepared extremely relevant and meaningful works on the issue of populism or even are its theorists, conceptualizers and practitioners. Our task is to describe and structurally

¹ Allcock J., Populism: A Brief Biography, “Sociology” 1971, vol 5, nr. 3, s. 371-387.

² Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., To define populism, “Government and Opposition” 1968, vol 3, s. 137-179.

³ Canovan M., Populism, Wyd. Junction Books 1981.; Canovan M., The People, Wyd. Polity Press 2005.

⁴ Conniff M., Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective, Wyd. University of New Mexico Press 1982.

⁵ De la Torre C., Populism in Latin America, [w:] Kaltwasser C., Taggart P., Espejo P., Ostiguy P. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017, s. 195-213.

⁶ Di Tella T., Populism and Reform in Latin America, [w:] Veliz C. (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1965.; Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, “Government and Opposition” 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 187-200.

⁷ Germani G., Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism, Wyd. Transaction Books 1978.

⁸ Hicks J., The Populist Revolt. A History of Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party, Wyd. Greenwood Press 1931.

⁹ Ionescu G., Gellner E., Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969.

¹⁰ Lowitt R., Fred Harris: his journey from liberalism to populism, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002.

¹¹ Mansbridge J., Macedo S., Populism and Democratic Theory, “Annual Review of Law and Social Science” 2019, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 59-77.

¹² Mudde C., Kaltwasser C., Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017

¹³ Resnick D., Populism in Africa, [w:] Kaltwasser C., Taggart P., Espejo P., Ostiguy P. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017, s. 101-120.

¹⁴ Taggart P., Populism, Wyd. Open University Press 2000.

¹⁵ Van Niekerk A., Populism and political development in Latin America, Wyd. Rotterdam University Press 1974.

¹⁶ Weyland K., Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics, “Comparative Politics” 2001, vol 34, nr. 1, s. 1-22.

systematize the history of formation and features of conceptualization and practical manifestations of populism on a non-European basis, especially in the context of early and primary conceptualization of the studied phenomenon.

We start to solve the research task by clarifying the preconditions for the formation and history of the concept of “populism”, including in the non-European context. Today, it is quite obvious, on the one hand, that politics is a category, activity and linguistic process (because political actions, competition and acts are possible and carried out through language) and evaluative-loaded (i.e. mobilized as political means to achieve certain goals), and, on the other hand, that political categories and concepts partially constitute political beliefs, actions and practices and vice versa, including in the framework of understanding, conceptualizing and practicing the democratic political process and democracies as political regimes¹⁷. Thus, the contradictions regarding the understanding and dissemination / implantation of democracy as such in different societies and contexts inevitably reflect certain contradictions between the desired political actions and the application of these actions in practice, including through political discourse. This means that both the world in general, and the world of politics in particular, and including the world of democracy are necessarily connected with language and discourse, because they are part of them, constructed by them and modified on their basis in different contexts and so on¹⁸.

It is in this sense that the notion of “populism” acquires special significance synchronously and diachronically, especially since it is not traditionally used in isolation, but it is studied, used and is determined mainly by such linguistic and political categories as “people”, “nationhood” and “democracy”. Accordingly, it follows that the etymology and perspective of the concept of “populism”, regardless of the part of the world in which it is used, cannot simply be reduced to communication. At the same time, the specificity of the populism understanding depends on the dynamics and changes in the ways of concentrating it on social and political reality¹⁹. That is why the etymological and diachronic feature of populism, also regardless of the geography of its application, is that this category is usually used not only to describe a phenomenon, but also to assess, approve, condemn and so on.

Given all this, it should be noted that sooner or later populism should be conceptualized (which it did) in virtually every geographical area, not just in Europe. However, the most interesting thing in this context is that populism did not appear in the region,

¹⁷ FarrJ., Understanding conceptual change politically, [w:] BallT., FarrJ., Hanson R. (eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1989, s. 26-29.

¹⁸ BallT., FarrJ., Hanson R., Preface, [w:] BallT., FarrJ., Hanson R. (eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1989, s. IX.

¹⁹ FrançoisP., De convergentie tussen de Angelsaksische ideeëngeschiedenis en de Duitse/continentale begripsgeschiedenis – een status questionis, „Revue Belge de philologie et d'histoire“ 2005, vol 83-84, nr. 4, s. 1179.

but outside it, even though Europe has historically been home to other concepts – “people” and “democracy” (when the latter was understood primarily in a negative sense)²⁰, and only later, from the 19th century, but mainly from the second half of the 20th century, started to be perceived positively, in particular as people’s sovereignty and political equality²¹) – to which and / or against which often appeals populism as a kind of label of legality and legitimization of power. Perhaps the main reason for this fact is that in the socio-political process and social sciences was and remains ambiguous interpretation of the concept of “people”, whereas in one case they refer to “plebs” and “ordinary people” who, through illiteracy and absenteeism, can become a mob and disrupt the integrity of the political and social system, and in another case, the core of the so-called people’s sovereignty, which includes, first of all, the citizens of certain countries, who instead organize and consensualize the social and political system²².

Given this duality of the categories “people” and “democracy”, in particular when they came on the agenda of the political process and social discourse, at the end of the 19th century the phenomenon and concept of populism actually and initially appears not in Europe but in the United States.

It can be traced in the characterization of the American People’s Party²³, which was founded in 1892 and operated until 1909, and which was a reaction to the relative “failure” of the “Democrats” and “Republicans” (as basic and main parties) over workers’ and peasants’ protection in the country²⁴. The fact is that this political force of its time – almost for the first time in the world – opposed the unprivileged / oppressed position of ordinary people and began to appeal to the so-called “power of the people” as a whole²⁵. At the same time, one of the classics and theorists of populism J. Kicks in his work since 1931 – “Populist Uprising” commented that the terms “populists” and “pops” in the United States arose primarily as a mockery, because they, on the contrary, disqualify and criticized supporters of the People’s Party, and only later – due to the continuity of their use – became (with the exception of the term “pops”, which disappeared) self-description among populists²⁶. Although purely etymologically and historically it is recorded, that the term “populists” (as well as its negative journalistic counterpart – “Pops”) originated in the United States in order to abbreviate and name members and

²⁰ Dunn J., *Setting the People Free. The Story of Democracy*, Wyd. Atlantic Books 2005, s. 54, 60.; Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010, s. 4.; Manin B., *The Principles of Representative Government*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 1.

²¹ Hanson R., *Democracy*, [w:] Ball T., Farr J., Hanson R. (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1989, s. 69.

²² Canovan M., *The People*, Wyd. Polity Press 2005, s. 69.

²³ Mansbridge J., Macedo S., *Populism and Democratic Theory*, “Annual Review of Law and Social Science” 2019, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 59-77.

²⁴ Taggart P., *Populism*, Wyd. Open University Press 2000, s. 29.

²⁵ Hicks J., *The Populist Revolt. A History of Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party*, Wyd. Greenwood Press 1931, s. 441.

²⁶ Hicks J., *The Populist Revolt. A History of Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party*, Wyd. Greenwood Press 1931, s. 238.

supporters of the People's Party (both positively and negatively), in particular by analogy with the "Democrats" and the "Republicans"²⁷, and therefore this term was clarifying and descriptive, but not at all conceptual, as it referred to the designation of a certain political force and, in part, negatively oriented, anti-systemic tactics of its participation in the electoral process.

However, in addition, it was in the United States that the terms "populists" and "populism" later became broader, albeit more negative, as they, however, within the functioning of the People's Party, began to denote labels in the form of an asymmetric opposition to democracy and the democratic political process. Based on this, populism as a kind of anarchism and tactics of the US People's Party appears to be a controversy of democracy and begins to be conceptualized, albeit relatively weakly. This creates a construct where the mainstream political forces in the United States are defined as democratic in methods and the populist political force as anti-democratic, and in many situations and countries it becomes the rule of the political process, although it was soon challenged conceptually, theoretically, methodologically and practically. However, at the same time, another – non-partisan – understanding of populism as a label of anti-intellectual nature and democracy in the United States is being formed, as non-partisan populists increasingly advocate "returning" power to the people and denying a number of principles of representative democracy, which contradict this desire and this requirement.

Accordingly, it is since this time in the United States, and later in other countries around the world a slightly different view of populism is formed, in particular, not as a denial or alternative to any form of democracy, but as a format of opposition of the "people" (positive side of the medal) to the "political elite" (negative side of the medal), but mainly within the distinction between "true" and "false" democracies. It is due to this (as well as the actual origin of the term "populism") that some significant progression and "whitening" of the phenomenon of populism starts and it begins to be conceptualized, and later tested and mobilized in political life²⁸.

At the same time, some similar processes, although not at all in a democracy, took place in other parts of the world in the second half of the 19th century, in particular in the Russian Empire, which was not perceived as part of Europe at all. At least this can be said purely conceptually and ideologically, including the concept of "narodnik movement", which is often used in this state, although in different senses. However, the connection can be traced when "narodnik movement" is understood not as a form of agrarian socialism in the Russian Empire, but as a specific attitude towards people who

²⁷ Hicks J., *The Populist Revolt. A History of Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party*, Wyd. Greenwood Press 1931, s. 239.

²⁸ Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 21.; Koselleck R., *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 2004, s. 80.

were supporters of various radical movements against the empire or its certain policies. The fact is that the “narodniks” (as a kind of “Russian populists” for the empire) advocated a clear reality of state action, rather than an amorphous desire to achieve certain unrealistic and abstract goals through the interests of oppressed and enslaved segments of the population²⁹. It was thanks to this idea that they tried to mobilize these sections of the population for revolutionary action against the autocratic and monarchical regime and certain socio-political innovations, although nothing came of it due to the resistance of the czarism regime and bureaucratic apparatus³⁰. However, in general and purely conceptually, this format of understanding “narodnik movement” was positively oriented³¹, as it appealed to theorizing “hegemony of the masses over the educated elite” and therefore formed a form of “pragmatic theory of democratic action”³², albeit by promoting the essence of the concept of “people” as “mass” and “pebs”³³.

Although, on the contrary, Russian researchers mostly and for the most part hold a slightly different opinion, as they note that the period of “populist doctrine” we mentioned was not a form of populism at all, but rather an anti-systemic opposition to the autocratic political regime, instead, one should speak of “narodnik movement” in the format of populism, appealing to Lenin’s ideas, which gave “narodnik movement” more specific historical, political and sociological connotations as a manifestation of populist protest against capitalism and feudal forms of exploitation from the point of view of small producers³⁴. However, such ideas do not find sufficient support in the West, for it is argued that Lenin mainly used such ideas only to gain power, and only then to directly combat the manifestations of “narodnik movement”³⁵. However, in general, there is a rather interesting situation in this context, as Russian researchers used the term “narodnic movement” in the domestic arena, but translated it into Western languages, primarily into English, as “populism”, which significantly complicated the situation³⁶. But even though, neither Russian researchers nor their Western counterparts have in any way drawn parallels between the cases of American and Russian early populism, that is, between “populists” and “narodniks.” Although, in contrast, there was something common between these concepts, because some, and others, but through different

²⁹ Pipes R., *Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry*, “Slavic Review” 1964, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 441, 445; Pipes R., *Russia under the Old Regime*, Wyd. Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1974, s. 165; Taggart P., *Populism*, Wyd. Open University Press 2000, s. 47-48; Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 73.

³⁰ Taggart P., *Populism*, Wyd. Open University Press 2000, s. 53-54

³¹ Pipes R., *Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry*, “Slavic Review” 1964, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 443.

³² Pipes R., *Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry*, “Slavic Review” 1964, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 458.

³³ Lazari A., *Narod*, [w:] Lazari A. (ed.), *Idee w Rosji. Leksykon rosyjsko – polsko – angielski*. Tom 1, Wyd. Semper 1999, s. 268

³⁴ Walicki A., *Russia*, [w:] Ionescu G., Gellner E. (eds.), *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969, s. 63, 65-66.

³⁵ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., *To define populism*, “Government and Opposition” 1968, vol 3, s. 139.

³⁶ Walicki A., *Russia*, [w:] Ionescu G., Gellner E. (eds.), *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969, s. 63; Milyoukov P., *Russia*, “The Athenaeum” 1895 (July 6), nr. 3532, s. 25.

channels, tried to appeal to the phenomenon of involvement of individuals and groups of people in decision-making, and thus to nationality and even democracy (in the latter – primarily in the US, although later in Russia)³⁷. Another common feature of early American “populism” and Russian anti-imperial “narodnik movement” was: they were purely populists analytically, as in both cases they represented predominantly grass-roots or even peasant appeals and demands for a change in the “progress” of capitalism, modernization or industrialization³⁸. Finally, the fact that sometimes in imperial Russia “narodniks” or representatives of conditional “populism” considered those intellectuals who not only opposed the tsarist regime, but also denied the expediency of reforming in the direction of socialism through capitalism in particular by offering an alternative to circumventing capitalism, deserves special attention.

The following, what should be noted in the context of the early progress of populism in countries outside Europe, concerns primarily the interwar period. In this case, it is important to note that in the interwar period, the term “populism” has almost never been used in them and almost in European countries, at least in relation to existing parties and movements. Although, on the other hand, instead of this concept, some European thinkers, philosophers and scholars have appealed to such a category as “popularism”³⁹.

(in particular, to outline the ideological platform of the Italian People’s Party, founded in 1919, which in the 1990s became the basis for the formation of the “Christian Democrats” in Italy). They marked, on the one hand, the tendency of political forces to represent not the corporate and group interests of certain clusters of society, but the whole society or all members of society, as well as, on the other hand, the ideological positioning of political forces between liberalism and socialism (within the ideas of the “secular intelligentsia”) and against radical ideologies (fascism, Nazism, etc.), which was very relevant after the First World War⁴⁰. At the same time, European philosophical and political thought of the interwar period still appealed to the phenomenon and apparition of populism, in particular in the 1920s and 1930s, when describing a group of French novelists who turned to the observations and sympathies of ordinary people on the basis of populism, and when historians evaluate the participation of ordinary people in the politically important events of certain countries⁴¹.

³⁷ AllcockJ., Populism: A Brief Biography, “Sociology”1971, vol 5, nr. 3, s. 372.; PipesR., Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry, “Slavic Review”1964, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 442-443.

³⁸ Ionescu G., Gellner E., Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics, Wyd. Weidenfeld1969, s. 134-135.

³⁹ Gramsci A., Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith), Wyd. International Publishers2010, s. 62

⁴⁰ Gramsci A., Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith), Wyd. International Publishers2010, s. 62.

⁴¹ AllcockJ., Populism: A Brief Biography, “Sociology”1971, vol 5, nr. 3, s. 372.

In contrast, the issue of populism began to be addressed quite actively – both in Europe and abroad – mostly after the Second World War, in particular against the background of interpreting popular support for various totalitarian movements, especially fascism and Nazism, as well as McCarthyism, which definitely gave rise to new fears of the masses of society and, accordingly, various new interpretations of populism in the world. On this basis, for example, in the United States, populism came to be understood primarily as an opposition to “ideal” or liberal democracy, and thus gained a mostly purely negative or even derogatory connotation. With this in mind, E. Shields stated that in such view populism as a negative construction is or can be very ambiguous, in particular as the populism of Nazism, the populism of fascism, the populism of Bolshevism, the populism of McCarthyism, and thus such different manifestations of populism took place both within and outside Europe, and populism itself was mainly interpreted as taking place only in the presence of an “ideology” of popular indignation against a certain order imposed on one or another society by the “old” and rather differentiated ruling class, which by all means had or has a monopoly on power, property, culture, etc.⁴². In this context, there has been reached the view that populism and populists are or at least should be “hostile to the intelligentsia, financial powers and politicians”, as the value of the wisdom of not the latter but the “people” who are superior to any other is stated. From this it was stated that within the populist perception of the political process, everyone is “higher” than his ruler and politicians in general, and therefore politics should not be privileged and should not provide for privileged actions and provisions.

This was precisely the critique of populism at the time by mainstream politicians, as it was argued that populism delegitimizes the democratic political process and its focus on representation (that is, in other words, undermines representative democracy). Although, on the contrary, it had positive effects, for it was obvious that populism was not completely unfounded, and therefore democracy had to become more liberal or focused on the protection of individual rights and freedoms of man and citizen⁴³.

In this context, some American historians and political scientists have returned to the practice and experience of the American People’s Party (as discussed above) and stated, that it (unlike its at least partial approval before) acted mostly negatively, as it even appealed to the mobilization of irrational political and military action, that is, to elements of anti-Semitism and xenophobia, in particular in the context of migration movements and flows in the United States. And this despite the fact that it was thanks to the People’s Party in the United States at one time, in particular to prevent its possible

⁴² Shils E., *The Torment of Secrecy. The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies*, Wyd. The Free Press 1956, s. 100-101.

⁴³ Shils E., *The Torment of Secrecy. The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies*, Wyd. The Free Press 1956, s. 102.

political success in the electoral context, that democratic views and democratic participation in the political process were intensified, especially at the grassroots or popular level⁴⁴. In other words, mid-twentieth-century American theorists generally agreed that populism, whether within the People's Party or within McCarthyism (albeit at different times, of course) led to the generation and application of an "irrational ideology of protest" rather than "an ideology to protect the American people"⁴⁵. Analogues of such manifestations of populism in the United States at one time were not only the mentioned political forces and processes, but also the phenomenon of the Ku Klux Klan, especially in the 1920s, or the positions / ideas of some American fascist movements in the 1930s, in particular under the leadership of then-Louisiana Governor and Senator Hugh Long⁴⁶.

In turn, the most famous or direct analogues or homologues of such processes and phenomena in other non-European countries were the actions and positions within the political leadership of H. D. Perón as President of Argentina during 1946-1955 and J. Vargas as President of Brazil in 1930 – 1945 and 1951 – 1954. The fact is that these politicians constructed and promoted political regimes similar to populist fascism in Italy, because they had a very strong anti-parliamentary orientation, especially considering that the power of the party and / or leader in the parliamentary structure is ineffective, for it is derived directly from people who are incompetent in politics, and therefore choose ineffective and corrupt politicians⁴⁷.

Therefore, on this basis, it can be stated that in the period focused on the early 60's of the 20th century, the term "populism" was used almost always in a negative sense and should be interpreted as a way to achieve, to gain or retain power, as well as a way of largely autocratic rule and governance and, consequently, as a direct threat to liberal or even representative democracy in general.

The next stage of early development and conceptualization of populism in the non-European space began in the 60s of the 20th century and lasted until the late 80s of the 20th century. At this time, for the most part, there was a colossal shift in the categorization of populism and its perception, because populism was often talked about in terms of appeals to the existence and functioning of various reformist or revolutionary political forces and politicians, although mainly in the underdeveloped countries of the world, which were characterized by a very changeable and unstable political process, even regardless of their political regimes – democratic, hybrid or autocratic ones. As a result, many political leaders and formal leaders of different parts of the world

⁴⁴ Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 47, 50-51.

⁴⁵ Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Heinemann 1960, s. 172-173.

⁴⁶ Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Heinemann 1960, s. 169.

⁴⁷ Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Heinemann 1960, s. 173.

(especially in Latin America and Africa, not to mention Eastern Europe) were treated as populists, especially by Western scholars and politicians⁴⁸. In addition, a whole array of political parties and movements started to be formed, which, according to various interpretations, were described as populist, which did not happen in the previous stages of populism⁴⁹.

As a result, political science has for the first time begun to hold numerous and diverse seminars, academic conferences and conferences, which were focused on the topic of political populism and populism in the political discourse. At the same time, it was at this time that the world saw perhaps the most famous classical works on populism, including in countries outside Europe, in particular by such authors as G. Ionescu and E. Gellner⁵⁰, L. Shapiro, J. Allcock⁵¹, I. Berlin, R. Hofstadter, D. McRae⁵² D. Tell⁵³, G. Germani⁵⁴ and many others. But the most interesting thing is that both theoretically and practically it was found that populism has become a topic and problem primarily in the non-European space, for the European world, in contrast, by the end of the 1980s was positioned as ideologically structured and less (though definitely not absolutely) subject to populist discourse and the influence of populist politicians.

So, the bright manifestations of populism and populists in the world at that time or earlier were called various liberation movements in Africa, in particular, the African National Union of Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in the 1950s and 1960s, the Ghanaian military government in 1969, Indian activist and politician J. Narayan, Tamil separatists in southern India, Chinese leader Mao Zedong, and others⁵⁵.

In general, the main change that took place at that time was related to the fact that populism outside Europe began to be talked about not only negatively, but both negatively and positively, and thus the context of his perception changed significantly, and populism itself began to be perceived as a context-dependent. As an example, I. Berlin and his colleagues⁵⁶ stated that populism can be "false" and "true", or negatively and positively directed. At the same time, the former traditionally leads or appeals to the mobilization of certain populist sentiments, including hostility towards various social groups, on the basis of which, opposing political elites, it actually contributes to the formation of elitist political regimes (as in the case of Bonapartism, McCarthyism,

⁴⁸ Worsley P., *The Concept of Populism*, [w:] Ionescu G., Gellner E. (eds.), *Populism. Its Meanings*

⁴⁹ Ionescu G., Gellner E., *Introduction*, [w:] Ionescu G., Gellner E. (eds.), *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969, s. 5.

⁵⁰ Ionescu G., Gellner E., *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969.

⁵¹ Allcock J., *Populism: A Brief Biography*, "Sociology" 1971, vol 5, nr. 3, s. 378.

⁵² Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., *To define populism*, "Government and Opposition" 1968, vol 3, s. 137-179.

⁵³ Di Tella T., *Populism and Reform in Latin America*, [w:] Veliz C. (ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1965.

⁵⁴ Germani G., *Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism*, Wyd. Transaction Books 1978.

⁵⁵ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., *To define populism*, "Government and Opposition" 1968, vol 3, s. 138-155.

⁵⁶ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., *To define populism*, "Government and Opposition" 1968, vol 3, s. 176-177.

Pujatism, rhetoric and the activities of Egyptian President G.A. Nasser or President of Pakistan A. Khan, etc.). Instead, the latter is usually characterized by a democratic egalitarian impulse, as it protests against the aristocracy and against hierarchical systems, thereby hinting at the need to develop the liberal values of representative democracies (which is relevant in the case of most democracies of the world, both past and present)⁵⁷. But one way or another, the concept of populism – both in its positive and in its negative sense – inevitably presupposes an appeal to antagonism along the lines of “the people – the political elite / dominant ideology”⁵⁸, however, with the difference to what consequences it leads and what is populism – only a means of achieving and retaining power (in the case of autocracies and democracies) or a means of achieving power, and modernization, and a bona fide influence on improving the place of man and citizen in the political sphere (primarily in democracies, but partly in the case of modernizing authoritarianism).

The very association of populism – mostly in its positive sense – with possible modernization, both socio-economic and socio-political, has been the subject of a number of theorizations and academic research of the analyzed time period. This is evidenced by the position of T. di Tella, who once stated that populism should be understood as a socio-political movement that enjoys the support of the masses of the urban working class and the peasantry, but which is not the result of an autonomous organized force of any of these groups⁵⁹. At the same time, populism is not always focused on the working or peasant class, because it can be defended and supported by other sectors of society, which rather come from the position of changing the status quo, what at one time was manifested in the example of the ideas and activities of such politicians, statesmen and political forces as H. D. Perón and K. Menem in Argentina, J. Vargas and F. K. de Mello in Brazil, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia, L. Cardenas in Mexico, W. R. H. de la Torre and A. Fujimori in Peru, “Democratic Action” in Venezuela, H. Ibarra in Ecuador, J. Rawlings in Ghana, T. Sankara in Burkina Faso, GA Nasser in Egypt, M. Gaddafi in Libya, F. Harris, J. Wallis, J. Carter, R. Whitaker, F. Harris, and the American National Progressive Republican League in the United States, R. Muldoon in New Zealand, and many others⁶⁰.

⁵⁷ Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 172.

⁵⁸ Laclau E., *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, Wyd. New Left Books 1977, s. 165, 173.

⁵⁹ Di Tella T., *Populism and Reform in Latin America*, [w:] Veliz C. (ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1965, s. 47.

⁶⁰ Lowitt R., *Fred Harris: his journey from liberalism to populism*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002.; Mudde C., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017, s. 25-39.; De la Torre C., *Populism in Latin America*, [w:] Kaltwasser C., Taggart P., Espejo P., Ostiguy P. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017, s. 195-213.; Cowen T., *Feisty, Protectionist Populism? New Zealand Tried That*, Wyd. Bloomberg L.P. (13 February 2017).; Resnick D., *Populism in Africa*, [w:] Kaltwasser C., Taggart P., Espejo P., Ostiguy P. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017, s. 101-120.; Germani G., *Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism*, Wyd. Transaction Books 1978.; Conniff M., *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. University of New Mexico Press 1982, s. 211.; Van Niekerk A., *Populism and political development in Latin America*, Wyd. Rotterdam University Press 1974.

These examples are mostly or once were cases of underdeveloped countries, where it was relatively easy to mobilize the population with the idea of prospects for socio-economic and socio-political modernization (although the idea of the influence of populism on the mobilization of the population today is largely refuted⁶¹). After all, the population in this case is or was definitely characterized by growing expectations, against which it is possible to form or release a kind of emotional collective enthusiasm⁶². Therefore, as stated by T. di Tella, populism in the underdeveloped countries of the world has become a kind of analogue or homologue of social democracy in the developed world, since it was focused primarily on improving the level of justice and social equality, and therefore was treated as positive. Instead, the scientist continues, if populism takes place in already democratic countries of the world, it can threaten the level of their democracy and socio-economic and socio-political progress, and so on⁶³. In other words, as some researchers have briefly written⁶⁴, in a non-democracy populism can, although not the norm, promote pluralism, democratization and democracy, instead, in the case of democracy, it can generate risks of “erosion” of democracy or, conversely, autocratization. In addition, populism can contribute to the development of a certain collective identity, because it appeals to the “people” and can serve as a channel for the “political elite” to defend the right to independence of a sub political unit. It follows that already in the early and classical manifestations and theorizations of populism, in particular from its origins to the late 80s of the 20th century, it was found that populism as such is “elitist” (when it is mostly a means of gaining and retaining power, including in the format of hegemony) and “people’s” (when it is a means of changing power and improving or at least hinting at improving the socio-political and socio-economic status and condition and political rights of the population and society⁶⁵), and that, through populist discourse, politicians try to be as comprehensive or inclusive as possible, especially if those politicians are “outsiders”⁶⁶.

Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 271.

In general, the study states that the phenomenon and phenomenon of populism in countries outside Europe has gone through several stages of early development, including initially from total negation of populism to its gradual introduction into a heterogeneous (or “elitist” or

⁶¹ Weyland K., Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics, “Comparative Politics” 2001, vol 34, nr. 1, s. 10.

⁶² Di Tella T., Populism and Reform in Latin America, [w:] Veliz C. (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1965, s. 51-53.

⁶³ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, “Government and Opposition” 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 200.

⁶⁴ O’Donell G., Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy, [w:] Collier D. (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1979, s. 289-290.; Hennessy A., Latin America, [w:] Ionescu G., Gellner E. (eds.), Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969, s. 29.

⁶⁵ Laclau E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, Wyd. New Left Books 1977, s. 173.

⁶⁶ Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 271.

“popular”) category, which should be understood either as negative or as positive. Accordingly, in one case, populism is traditionally considered a policy tool aimed at gaining and retaining power (both in democracies and mainly in autocracies), and in another case, as an incentive policy aimed at expanding direct democracy and the liberality of democracy itself (and not only within already democratic regimes). However, the development of populism did not end there, but instead developed further, which certainly needs further consideration and detail in other scientific studies.

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HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF SUBJECTIVATION OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN THE CONTEXT OF BILINGUALISM IN UKRAINE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTEXTS

The article is dedicated to analyzing the problems of history and current state of subjectivation of the Russian minority in the context of bilingualism in Ukraine, in particular in theoretical and empirical contexts, especially at the background of events that took place in Ukraine after 2013-2014. It has been stated that bilingualism is really inherent in Ukraine, in particular in the format of coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian languages as the most widespread (in the same order) native languages and languages of everyday communication. At the same time, it has been observed that the language issues do not correspond to the ethnic issues and the composition of the population of Ukraine, since there are many more ethnic Ukrainians than Ukrainian language everyday speakers and users. On this basis, it has been proved that the language issue subjects and politicizes the Russian minority in Ukraine, even though the latter often denies the fact that language competition in a national space inevitably leads to a split in society on the basis of language. The main reason is that the balance between understanding the language as a symbol of identity and a means of communication is disturbed in Ukraine.

Keywords: language, Ukrainian language, Russian language, bilingualism, Russian minority, Russian-speaking population, Ukraine.

HISTORIA I OBECNY STAN SUBIEKTYWIZACJI MNIEJSZOŚCI ROSYJSKIEJ W KONTEKŚCIE BILINGWIZMU NA UKRAINIE: CZĘŚĆ TEORETYCZNA I EMPIRYCZNA

W artykule przeanalizowano problematykę historii i aktualnego stanu subiektywizacji mniejszości rosyjskiej w kontekście dwujęzyczności na Ukrainie, w szczególności w części teoretycznej i empirycznej, zwłaszcza na tle wydarzeń, które miały miejsce na Ukrainie po latach 2013-2014. Stwierdzono, że bilingwizm jest rzeczywiście nieodłączną cechą Ukrainy, w szczególności w formacie współlistnienia języków ukraińskiego i rosyjskiego jako najbardziej rozpowszechnionych (w tej samej kolejności) języków ojczystych i języków codziennego porozumiewania się. Jednocześnie zauważono, że problematyka językowa nie odpowiada problemom etnicznym i składowi ludności na Ukrainie, ponieważ etnicznych Ukraińców jest znacznie więcej niż mówiących w języku ukraińskim. Na tej podstawie udowodniono, że problematyka językowa upolitycznia mniejszość rosyjską na Ukrainie, choć ta ostatnia często zaprzecza, że

rywalizacja językowa w jednej przestrzeni narodowej nieuchronnie prowadzi do językowego podziału społeczeństwa. A głównym powodem jest to, że na Ukrainie zachwiana jest równowaga między rozumieniem języka jako symbolu tożsamości i środka komunikacji.

Słowa kluczowe: język, język ukraiński, język rosyjski, bilingwizm, mniejszość rosyjska, ludność rosyjskojęzyczna, Ukraina.

ІСТОРИЯ ТА ЧИННИЙ СТАН СУБ'ЄКТИВАЦІЇ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ МЕНШИНИ У КОНТЕКСТІ БІЛІНГВІЗМУ В УКРАЇНІ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНИЙ Й ЕМПІРИЧНИЙ РОЗРІЗИ

У статті проаналізовано проблематику історії та чинного стану суб'єктивізації російської меншини у контексті білінгвізму в Україні, зокрема в теоретичному й емпіричному розрізах, особливо на тлі подій, які відбулись в Україні після 2013–2014 рр. Констатовано, що Україні дійсно притаманний білінгвізм, зокрема у форматі співіснування української і російської мов як найрозповсюджених (в такому ж порядку) рідних мов та мов повсякденного спілкування. Разом із цим, відстежено, що мовна тематика не відповідає етнічній проблематиці і складу населення в Україні, оскільки етнічних українців значно більше, ніж її повсякденних носіїв та користувачів. На цій підставі доведено, що мовне питання суб'єктивує та політизує російську меншину в Україні, навіть попри те, що остання часто заперечує той факт, що конкуренція мов в одному національному просторі неминуче веде до розколу суспільства на мовному ґрунті. А головна причина у тому, що в Україні порушено рівновагу між розумінням мови як символу ідентичності й засобу комунікації.

Ключові слова: мова, українська мова, російська мова, білінгвізм, російська меншина, російськомовне населення, Україна.

Ukraine is an independent and sovereign state, which many theorists, politicians and practitioners, quite often mistakenly, call multinational. Although according to all official data (however, quite old and not quite relevant to the real political situation, especially as of 2014–2021) there is one dominant titular ethnic group – Ukrainians – with a share of 80 percent of the population; and the largest national minority – Russian – is or at least was (according to official data as of 2001, as there were no recent censuses and no official data) no more than 18 percent. Interestingly, compared to 1989, when the previous census was conducted – but still within the Ukrainian SSR – the share of ethnic Russians in Ukraine decreased by almost 5 percent. It is also very important that at the same time, in fact, after 2014 – the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Eastern Donbas, where

most ethnic Russians lived in Ukraine – the situation has changed even more, as the share of ethnic Russians who influence or can influence socio-political (in particular the party-electoral) process in Ukraine has decreased further and very significantly. However, the peculiarity of the processes of political subjectification of the Russian minority in Ukraine has always been not just an appeal to its number, but instead or in parallel to the issues of linguistic diversity, Russian-speaking population and the phenomenon of bilingualism in Ukraine, what in one way or another has been used before and is still used in the socio-political discourse and political process, and was also significantly used during or after the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of Eastern Donbas and after that. All these things certainly actualize the scientific problematic of the history and current state of subjectivity of the Russian minority in the context of bilingualism in Ukraine, in particular in theoretical and empirical terms, especially against the background of events that took place in Ukraine after 2013-2014.

It is noteworthy that the reference to the general theoretical literature, including the authorship of various scientists, gives all / proper reasons to note that today there is no single view on the role of language in nation-building, even in academic environment. The fact that self-identification with a particular language is in itself a subjective and therefore a psychological choice makes it difficult to determine the exact role of a language marker on the issue of citizenship and status on national / ethnic grounds. The meaning given to language in the formation of national consciousness varies from different forms of understanding the political process from one scholar to another, and therefore from situation to situation. Although some researchers emphasize the importance of language in the context of certain regions of the world, in particular for Central and Eastern Europe, others argue that the role of language should not be overestimated. In order to demonstrate the extent to which the opinions of the two opposing approaches differ, it is sufficient to give a few examples.

For example, T. Waters appeals to the American anthropological linguist E. Sapir, who emphasizes that “the fact of everyday speech is a powerful symbol for those who speak a particular language”. The psychological significance of this goes beyond the association of the nationalities’ languages, political formations and smaller social groups, but the exceptional importance of language differences for psychological symbolization compared to official groups is the intuitive feeling of the majority. In the same spirit, W. von Humboldt has long ago argued that each language has its own distinctive features and structures that significantly determine the scope of the worldview of the speaker. J. Fishman similarly notes that in his native language each nation distinguishes itself and contains the statute of its cultural history in the treasury of its language¹. By analogy, C. Hayes emphasizes the role of language as a way of connecting with the “glorious” past², and B. Schaefer notes that the spiritual wealth of a nation is preserved in its language and can be used only by those who understand it³. As a result, T. Kuzio and E. Shils are convinced that participation in a common language performs a solidifying and generative function, as a result of which the language is or can be given

¹ Rocker R., *Nationalism and Culture*, London 1997; Fishman J., *Language and Nationalism*, [w:] Wolf S. (ed.), *Nationalism in Europe: 1815 to the Present: A Reader*, Wyd. Routledge 1996, s. 158.

² Hayes C., *Essays on Nationalism*, Wyd. Russell & Russell 1966.

³ Shafer B., *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*, New York 1955, s. 122.

a kind of sacred character⁴. In contrast, another group of scientists argues that there is a need to be somewhat more skeptical to the absolute meaning given or ascribed to language in the process of forming a national identity. The same T. Kuzio believes that the importance of languages should not be overestimated⁵, and P. Pirie, in the same spirit, argues that despite the fact that the use of language is an important factor that informs about national self-identification and political relations, it should not be considered as "... Alpha and Omega of national identity"⁶.

By projecting such a scientific dilemma on Ukraine, it should be noted that almost every large national group in this country, including the ethnic Ukrainian majority, is concerned about the status and position regarding the use of their own language⁷.

Nevertheless, the debates on the status of the Russian language, however, has been and remain the most politically important in the linguistic and even socio-political issue of the entire post-communist period of Ukraine's political history; although in this context it is necessary to distinguish two periods of Ukraine's political history before and after the events of 2013-2014. One of the manifestations of this is the frequency with which this issue has been raised and is still being raised in the Ukrainian parliament. . This was especially true for the period before the annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of Eastern Donbas; as, for example, as far back as 2006, the Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine) on Culture and Spirituality considered 18 different bills on the problem of Russian language and bilingualism". And this despite the fact that the law "On language in the Ukrainian SSR" of 1989 and the current Constitution of Ukraine (in its various editions) of 1996, which regulated that still do the issue of language use in independent Ukraine, defining in the Ukrainian language the state status. In addition, the Constitution of Ukraine nominally guarantees the free development, use and protection of Russian and other minority languages in Ukraine. However, this has historically and very often outraged and outrages Russian citizens of Ukraine, as they do not always consider Russian to be a minority language. Their arguments are based on appeals to the notion of human rights and liberal values, which are clearly articulated and widespread in Ukraine, as are the arguments of their opponents⁸. On the other hand, this situation is the reason why the defenders of the constitutional status quo in the issue of languages – both before and after the events of 2013-2014 – consider the conditional but obvious privileged status of the Ukrainian language as a form of positive discrimination or a sample of positive actions aimed at strengthening and reviving the language, which was historically discriminated throughout the history of the

⁴ Shils E., *Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and a Civil Society*, „Nations and Nationalism“ 1995, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 102-103.; Kuzio T., *Ukraine: State and Nation-building*, Wyd. Routledge 1998, s. 168.

⁵ Kuzio T., *Ukraine: State and Nation-building*, Wyd. Routledge 1998, s. 168.

⁶ Pirie P., *National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine*, „Europe-Asia Studies“ 1996, vol. 48, nr. 7, s. 1081.

⁷ Kulyk V., *Constructing Common Sense: Language and Ethnicity in Ukrainian Public Discourse*, „Ethnic and Racial Studies“ 2006, vol 29, s. 281-314.; Stepanenko V., *Identities and Language Politics in Ukraine: The Challenges of Nation-State Building*, [w:] Daftary F., Grin F. (eds.), *Nation-Building and Language Politics in Transition Countries*, Wyd. Open Society Institute 2003, s. 107-137.; Janmaat J., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population*, Wyd. Royal Dutch Geographical Society, Universiteit van Amsterdam 2000.; Are D., *Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State*, [w:] Tismaneanu V. (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 1995, s. 157-188.

⁸ Stepanenko V., *Identities and Language Politics in Ukraine: The Challenges of Nation-State Building*, [w:] Daftary F., Grin F. (eds.), *Nation-Building and Language Politics in Transition Countries*, Wyd. Open Society Institute 2003, s. 107-137.

Russian Empire and the USSR. Therefore, granting a similar status to the Russian language, in their opinion, will undermine the efforts to restore the Ukrainian language and further strengthen its key competitors, which during Ukraine's independence managed to gain communicative dominance as a result of historical consequences of policies aimed even at language assimilation of the Ukrainians⁹.

With this in mind, our study consistently examines data on regional and socio-linguistic features and the nature of language use in Ukraine – both before and after 2013-2014. Leaving aside all the problems related to the clarity and truthfulness of the interpretation of the data¹⁰, there are noticeable common features of the language situation in Ukraine, which remain relatively indisputable throughout almost the entire period of its independence.

In terms of geographical distribution, Ukrainian language is predominant in the western part of the country and in rural areas in most parts of the country, while Russian one is predominant in cities outside the western and possibly central and northern parts of Ukraine – i.e. in the south-eastern part of the country. This is despite the fact that the majority of the country's population has been and remains bilingual – uses Ukrainian and Russian languages – with a much larger share among Ukrainian-speaking citizens among ethnic ukrainians than among Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Ukraine. In this regard, regular inquiries which were or are conducted by various sociological structures and researchers in Ukraine provide data that allow us to draw some conclusions about the continuity and changes in language practice or, as some scholars point out, the preferences of linguistic choice in this country¹¹.

Table 1. Definition / choice by citizens of the status of “native language” in Ukraine (1994-2021)¹²

Year	1994	1997	2001	2005	2012	2017	2020	2021
Ukrainian language	62,3	62,4	67,5	64,3	62,0	67,7	64,1	63,0
Russian language, or Russian and Ukrainian language	34,7	35,1	29,6	34,4	36,0	31,2	34,5	35,0
Other	3,0	2,5	2,9	1,3	2,0	1,1	1,4	2,0

⁹ Masenko L., *Language and Politics*, Wyd. Soniashnyk 1999.

¹⁰ Janmaat J., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population*, Wyd. Royal Dutch Geographical Society, Universiteit van Amsterdam 2000; Stepanenko V., *Identities and Language Politics in Ukraine: The Challenges of Nation-State Building*, [w:] Daftary F., Grin F. (eds.), *Nation-Building and Language Politics in Transition Countries*, Wyd. Open Society Institute 2003, s. 107-137.

¹¹ Uehling G., *The First Independent Ukrainian Census: Myths, Miscoding and Missed Opportunities*, „Ethnic and Racial Studies“ 2004, vol 27, nr. 1, s. 149-170.

¹² Panina N., *Ukrains'ke suspilstvo 1994-2005: sotsiologichni monitorynh*, Wyd. Sophia 2005.; Vyshniak O., *Movna sytuatsiia ta status mov v Ukraini: dynamika, problemy, perspektyvy (sotsiologichni analiz)*, Wyd. Instytut sotsiologii NAN Ukrainy 2009.; *Movy spilkuvannia ukrainstiv*, Wyd. Research & Branding Group (arkhivovano 4 berezen 2016), źródło: https://web.archive.org/web/20160304190106/http://www.rb.com.ua/upload/medialibrary/PR_Ry_Ukr_2012.pdf [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Dumly nasclennia Ukrainy shchodo zovnishnoi polityky ta movnoho pytannia*, Wyd. Kyivskiy mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiologii, źródło: http://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20130321_ForAff/foreign_affairs.pdf [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Etnichna ta movna identychnist*, [w:] *Osnovni zasady i shliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy. Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Kruhloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Wyd. Tsentr Razumkova 2017, s. 6, źródło: https://razumkov.org.ua/images/Material_Conference/2017_04_12_ident/2017-Identi-3.pdf [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Movna sytuatsiia Ukrainy v sotsiolinhvistychnykh vymirakh. Viina z Rosiieiu vplynula na bahatokh*, „Radio Svoboda“ 1 travnia 2020, źródło: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30586236.html> [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Ukrainska mova: shliakh u*

One of the most frequently used questions was and remains to find out the choice of Ukrainian citizens regarding their “native language” during the period after the restoration of the independence of this state (see Table 1). The answers to this question have changed and are changing in a rather narrow range. After all, mostly only data that give an answer in the form of another language or another answer tend to correlate with significant percentage differences, and in the other the Ukrainian language always predominates in the interpretation as native to Russian one. Therefore, it must be assumed that Ukraine is alternately characterized by a decrease or increase in the share of people whose native language is different from the two main languages in Ukraine – Ukrainian and Russian.

As for these two languages, the latest opinion polls first registered a slight increase and then a slight decrease in the share of people who consider Ukrainian as their mother tongue and vice versa in the case of Russian as their mother tongue. At the same time, the rates of use of Russian as a native language were relatively highest in different time periods, in particular first in the late 90s of the 20th century, then in 2005 – after the “Orange Revolution”, – later in 2012 – in the period presidency of Viktor Yanukovich – and finally in 2020-2021 – during the rule of Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Controversial and negative dynamics in these time periods were characteristic of the Ukrainian language as a native language, although, of course, it has always prevailed over the Russian language in Ukraine. Nevertheless, in general, it follows from this statistical situation that in Ukraine the predominance of Ukrainian language over Russian as native ones is much smaller than the predominance of the Ukrainian national element over the Russian national minority in Ukraine.

Table 2. Definition / choice by citizens of the status of “language of communication” in Ukraine (1994-2021)¹³

Year	1994	1997	2001	2005	2012	2017	2020	2021
Ukrainian language	36,7	38,2	36,9	41,8	44,0	55,5	46,9	49,0
Russian language	32,4	34,5	36,7	36,4	35,0	23,2	31,8	49,0
Ukrainian and Russian language	29,4	26,8	25,8	21,6	20,0	20,5	20,8	–
Other	1,5	0,5	0,6	0,2	1,0	0,8	0,5	2,0

¹³ Panina N., *Ukrains'ke suspil'stvo 1994-2005: sotsiologichnyi monitorynh*, Wyd. Sophia 2005.; Vyshniak O., *Movna sytuatsiia ta status mov v Ukraini: dynamika, problemy, perspektyvy (sotsiologichnyi analiz)*, Wyd. Instytut sotsiologii NAN Ukrainy 2009.; *Movy spilkuвання ukrainciv*, Wyd. Research & Branding Group (arkhivovano 4 berezen 2016), źródło: https://web.archive.org/web/20160304190106/http://www.rb.com.ua/upload/medialibrary/PR_Ry_Ukr_2012.pdf [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Dumky naselennia Ukrainy shchodo zovnishnoi polityky ta movnoho pytannia*, Wyd. Kyivskiy mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiologii, źródło: http://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20130321_ForAff/foreign_affairs.pdf [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Etnichna ta movna identychnist*, [w:] *Osnovni zasady i shliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy. Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Kruhloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Wyd. Tsentrazumkova 2017, s. 6, źródło: https://razumkov.org.ua/images/Material_Conference/2017_04_12_ident/2017-Identi-3.pdf [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Movna sytuatsiia Ukrainy v sotsiologichnykh vymirakh. Viina z Rosiieiu vplynula na bahatokh*, „Radio Svoboda” 1 travnia 2020, źródło: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30586236.html> [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Ukrainska mova: shliakh u nezalezhnii Ukraini*, Wyd. Demokratychni initsiatyvy, 10 veresnia 2020, źródło: <https://dif.org.ua/article/ukrainska-mova-shlyakh-u-nezalezhnii-ukraini> [odczyt: 20.10.2021].; *Doslidzhennia: movna sytuatsiia v Ukraini*, Wyd. Kantar TNS Online Track 2021, źródło: <https://tns-ua.com/news/doslidzhennya-movna-situatsiya-v-ukrayini> [odczyt: 20.10.2021].

This pattern is even more evident in the case of appeals to data and statistics on the definition and choice of citizens' status of their "language of communication" (especially at home and in the family) in Ukraine in the same time period (see Table 2). In particular, it was found that in the field of language use in the private sector the situation is not as stable as in the case of the choice of native languages.

After all, initially, in particular until 2005, there was a relatively stable increase in the share of people who used mainly either Ukrainian or Russian language in the family, in particular due to a decrease in the share of people who used two languages at the same time. As a result of various socio-political events, the situation in this direction continued in 2005–2012, but in 2012 the processes of much faster increase of the share of Ukrainian language use and reduction of the share of Russian language in everyday communication began, which peaked in 2017. In contrast, after the change in the structure of power in Ukraine in 2019, the country gradually began reverse and opposite processes – a gradual decrease in the share of Ukrainian and increase the share of Russian as a language of everyday communication, and without changing the share of the population, which in this context typically communicates simultaneously in two languages. At the same time, according to a poll conducted by Kantar TNS in 2021, which did not take into account the share of simultaneous daily use of Ukrainian language and Russian one, the ratio of their separate use was virtually identical and equal (see Table. 2). But the most important thing in this context is that the use of Ukrainian as a language of communication is much less intense than its interpretation as a native language in Ukraine, and this is typical for the entire period after the restoration of independence and this further widens the gap between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Ukraine.

Against this background, it is very important that the increase in the number of people who mostly speak Russian is latent earlier (until 2012–2013) and later (since 2013–2014 and again since 2020–2021) both latent, and openly created or still creates grounds for forming a conclusion about the growing importance of the Russian element in the process of formation of the Ukrainian state, and thus indirectly testified or still testifies to the subjectivation of the Russian national minority through the popularization of the Russian language in Ukraine and through the phenomenon of bilingualism in this country. The fact that the number of people who claimed to use mainly Ukrainian language with the highest rates (in their time periods) in 2005 or 2017, and the number of people who claimed that they mostly used Russian one – respectively in 2005, 2012 and 2021 are certainly a consequence of the increased characteristics of the definition of ethno-linguistic identities in Ukraine, what, for example, was associated or conditioned by the course and consequences of the events of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004 and "Revolution of Dignity" in 2013–2014, and also "waves" of kickbacks from them in the following years and decades. Therefore, all this once again argues that language is an important marker of identity or identities in Ukraine, because its symbolic meaning is important for both Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens of this country, especially against the background of the initial formation and subsequent destruction of more polarized than traditional, installations after certain landmark socio-political events in Ukraine.

A similar pattern, although less expressed, characterizes the respondents' answers to another question about language. The fact is that in Ukraine, surveys are often conducted on the need to give Russian the status of state

or specific official one. Moreover, the dynamics in this case is also context-dependent – primarily on significant socio-political events and crises in Ukraine. Thus, at the time – after the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 – the answers of respondents in 2005 were distributed as follows: 34.4 percent (compared to 34.1 percent on average in 1994-2005) were against the status of the Russian language as official; 16.8 per cent (compared to an average of 18.0 per cent in 1994-2005) said they found it difficult to answer; 48.6 percent (vs. 47.7 percent) responded to a desire to give Russian official status (but did not specify which one). Although in general at this time less than half of the population supported the granting of some official recognition of the Russian language. Moreover, this figure, certainly always being fluctuating, still gradually changed in favor of not giving the Russian language the status of official or state, even against the background of certain “waves” of reversals of political development. Thus, according to a poll conducted by the “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation “Ukrainian Language: The Way to Independent Ukraine” since 2020, in fact 2/3 (66 percent) of Ukrainian citizens agreed that the Russian language in Ukraine can be used freely in private life, but the only state language must be Ukrainian one. Instead, only 18 percent of respondents insisted on giving Russian official status in certain regions, and 13 percent insisted that it become the state language throughout Ukraine. Therefore, the situation gradually (including due to the annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of Eastern Donbas, as well as hostilities with pro-Russian groups) really developed in favor of the Ukrainian language in this context, because only in eastern Ukraine approximately equal number of citizens demanded either the status of the state language only in Ukrainian or the status of state languages in both Russian and Ukrainian. On the other hand, in all other parts of Ukraine, even in the South, supporters of the Russian language as the state language were in a colossal minority¹⁴.

Against this background, a rather interesting paradox has developed in Ukraine. On the one hand, the share of ethnic Ukrainians in this country is much higher than the share of ethnic Russians, and therefore Ukraine in this sense is a folk state or a state in which federalization on ethnic grounds should not take place. On the other hand, Ukraine is a country in which historically and for various reasons the share of supporters of the Ukrainian language as a native language and the share of its direct use in everyday life is significantly inconsistent with the (lower) share of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine¹⁵.

In some periods, it even manifested itself in the fact that the Russian-speaking part of Ukraine’s population, if not larger than the Ukrainian-speaking one, was at least the same, and that this ratio was determined by the fact that almost a third of Ukraine’s population was Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians rather than ethnic Russians. Moreover, in fact the share of the latter has decreased especially after 2014, although they are still citizens of this state, on the other hand, the share of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Ukraine is almost unchanged, and tends more to a fixed one, albeit due to a fairly large number of bilingual citizens of this state (for details see Tables 1 and 2). In statistical terms, this is in line with a long ago published survey that typically says that 45 percent of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, 34 percent are Russian-speaking Ukrainians, 15 percent are Russian-speaking Russians, and 6 percent are representatives of other groups typically live in Ukraine. Of special attention or caution in

¹⁴ Ukrainська мова: шлях у незалежній Україні, Wyd. Demokratychni initsiatyvy, 10 veresnia 2020, źródło: <https://dif.org.ua/article/ukrainska-mova-shlyakh-u-nezalezhniy-ukraini> [odczyt: 20.10.2021].

¹⁵ Kucherenko T., Rehionalnyi faktor u politychnomu protsesi Ukrainy: [Dys... kand. polit. nauk], Wyd. Kharkiv. nats. un-t im. V.N. Karazina 2001.

this context is the fact that the share of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine is or has been earlier, especially before the annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of Eastern Donbas, not just equal, but even higher than Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians. And it certainly follows that Ukraine has had and still has a bilingual population structure, in which the influence of the Russian language is often used “for hire” for the subjectification of the Russian minority and to politicize the language issue (this has been the norm before, especially before 2014, but recently, in particular after 2019, this political “map” and strategy is being played out again).

This problem becomes especially important in the geographical or geopolitical sense, in particular given that such linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity or so-called bilingualism is unevenly distributed throughout Ukraine. For example, in the eastern oblasts (both before and after their partial occupation) the share of the Russian-speaking population is much higher than in the western ones, and in the southern oblasts it is significantly higher than in the northern and central ones. Thus, in the “western” region, the Russian-speaking part of the population is approximately or less than 10 percent, in the “central and northern” region it is about 40 percent, in the “southern” one it is about 70-80 percent, and in the “eastern” region it is about 90 percent. Moreover, this feature of the ethno linguistic division of the territory of Ukraine started to be in usage in the political and party-electoral process almost immediately after the restoration of independence of this country. After all, after the 1994 presidential election, which for the first time geographically divided Ukraine into two parts, it became apparent that the regional distribution of votes cast for the leading candidates was close to the regional division of the Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking populations. In particular, the calculations showed that the percentage of votes received by L. Kravchuk in different oblasts was positively and closely correlated with the percentage of Ukrainian-speaking voters in them, and the percentage of votes for L. Kuchma was positively correlated with the percentage of Russian-speaking voters in the same oblasts. Accordingly, the link to this logic and issues as a sign started to be used and promoted in the next presidential (especially in the second round) and, to a lesser extent, parliamentary elections, in particular between such presidential candidates of Ukraine as L. Kuchma and P. Symonenko in 1999, V. Yushchenko and V. Yanukovich in 2004–2005, V. Yanukovich and Y. Tymoshenko in 2010. And only the well-known events of 2013-2014 partially broke this “cliche” since it did not work or partially worked during the election of P. Poroshenko as President of Ukraine in 2014 and almost did not work when in 2019 there was competition in the second round between P. Poroshenko and V. Zelenskyi. However, the current distribution of political forces in the country and opinion polls in this regard provide sufficient grounds to predict that some political forces (as well as domestic and foreign political actors in general) are persuading Ukraine and its voters to return to electoral competition in bilingualism, although not so much for politicization of the Russian minority in Ukraine (after all, this task was largely solved as a result of previous experience and the events up to 2014).

At the same time, it is appropriate to state that bilingualism, which is historically and currently inherent in Ukraine and is inherited in the socio-political discourse and partly in the electoral process in this country, and thus Russian-Ukrainian linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity are related to the

heterogeneity of national identity of Ukraine. The fact is that linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity in Ukraine for many generations was formed under the influence not only of the history of political factors (especially in the USSR), but also through interethnic marriages and the birth of children whose nationality was officially determined only unambiguously, mainly by father's nationality, but the primary or basic language was often the mother tongue. The facts show that by the time of Ukraine's independence, there were as many as a quarter of such heterogeneous marriages in Ukraine (Ukrainian SSR), which certainly had its consequences in a few decades. The manifestations of this are that: many Ukrainians by nationality sometimes consider themselves not only Ukrainians but also Russians; many ethnic Russians consider themselves Ukrainians. It follows, in particular with reference to the results of the 2001 census in Ukraine, that there are slightly less than a third of monoethnic Ukrainians, almost one-fifth of bi-ethnic Russian-Ukrainians, almost one-tenth of monoethnic Russians and almost one one-fifth of representatives of other groups and minorities in this country. At the same time, in the northern and western parts of Ukraine there are much more monoethnic Ukrainians than bi-ethnic Russian-Ukrainians and monoethnic Russians combined, and in the southern and eastern parts there are fewer monoethnic Ukrainians than the total number of Russian-Ukrainians and monoethnic Russians. Thus, in general, in the regions of Ukraine, Russian-Ukrainian linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity is associated with the prevalence of Russian-Ukrainian bi-ethnic heterogeneity. At the same time, also at the individual level, Russian-Ukrainian linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity is significantly related to Russian-Ukrainian bi-ethnic identity. As a result, the probability of Russian speaking for bi-ethnic Russian-Ukrainians is almost two and a half times higher than for monoethnic Ukrainians.

However, such indicators characterize the dependence of linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity on ethnicity not in its pure form, but together with the influence of other factors, including gender, age, level of education, ethnicity, and type of settlement and region of residence. In general, against this background, it is proved that, other things being equal, the probability of Russian-speaking Russian-Ukrainian biathletes is almost four times higher than in the case of monoethnic Ukrainians. And this is the connection between the results obtained and the electoral geography in Ukraine, in particular, first during the presidential election, starting in 1994 and ending to a lesser extent in 2014 and 2019. After all, it is the factor of bilingualism that has repeatedly streamlined and will most likely (under the relevant political factors) continue to streamline electoral preferences in Ukraine in geographical terms. At the same time, this is complemented, especially since 2013-2014, by the context of the subjectivity of the Russian national minority in Ukraine against the background of the attitude of Ukrainian citizens to Russia – it is gradually becoming more negative, especially after the annexation of the Crimea and occupation of Eastern Donbas. On the other hand, the research shows that during almost the entire history of Ukraine after the restoration of its independence, perhaps with the exception of a short period of 2014-2019, no drastic and dramatic changes in the structure of language use or language preferences in Ukraine have taken place, although today less and fewer respondents are in favor of giving Russian official or state status, but the share of people who consider Russian their mother tongue or use it in everyday communication is almost unchanged. Perhaps the main reason for this is the fact that

politicians of all levels and directions understand that any, even short-term, fluctuations in this regard can cause political contradictions and even crises. At the same time, it generates two conclusions: on the one hand, self-consciously certain representatives of the Russian minority and the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine do not identify the language issue as fundamental, and therefore there are no linguistic bases for assessing the subjectivity of the Russian national minority in Ukraine; on the other hand, these principles are created mainly artificially and provoked by political elites, and their main concept and goal is to gain power of those parts of the population and those regions that differ from other similar units by their prerogatives.

That is why, the language issue is an electoral issue, but not a national one in the domestic and geopolitical sense, and this is well understood and applied quite effectively by pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine and Russian politicians outside this country. This is evidenced by the fact that political attention to the status of the Russian language usually fades after the election, although the problem still remains on the agenda of socio-political discourse, or at least its imposition from the outside. On the other hand, the unstable implementation of the ambitious agenda for the activation of the Ukrainian language and the conscious decision of state institutions not to apply some of the administrative and constitutional norms on the use of languages in public and institutional life have become one of the main factors explaining the lack of stability in the collective political action, which are aimed at expanding the legal status of the Russian language. It is these factors that play an important role in reducing political tensions, determining the actual (informal) language regime in various social spheres, including the media and education. This was perhaps most obvious in 2014-2021, for initially (until 2019) the Ukrainian language was privileged by law, which supporters of the use of the Russian language considered to be pressure, but later (since 2019) the reverse processes began, at least in part. One way or another, but such fluctuations were perhaps the most politicized in the past, and still politicize the issue of bilingualism in Ukraine. And this despite the fact that almost immediately after the annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of Eastern Donbas, the situation developed in favor of almost undeniable progressive development of the Ukrainian language, even at the expense of Russian, but there was a lack of intensity in this direction, and therefore a certain – at least partial – reversal or “rollback” became possible.

In fact, such a construction, however, had many dangerous manifestations during the political history of Ukraine in the period up to 2013-2014. So, at one time the quintessences of the aggravation of the problems of the Russian and Russian-speaking issues were two congresses in Severodonetsk. The first one took place in November 2004 with the ideas of federalization of Ukraine and the creation of an autonomous South-Eastern Republic. And the second congress – in March 2008, on the agenda of which there was the issue of humanitarian policy, and in fact – an ultimatum to the authorities to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. And this despite the fact that between these congresses, in particular in 2006-2007, not surprisingly after the parliamentary elections in Ukraine, city and regional councils of the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine decided to give

Russian language the status of a regional one¹⁶. Such and similar circumstances have significantly destabilized and destabilize the interethnic situation in the “south-eastern region” and the whole country¹⁷. Moreover, the grounds for the formation of a kind of cartographic and electoral region within the South and East were the parliamentary elections of 2002 in Ukraine, when pro-Russian parties (in particular, the Communist Party of Ukraine and the bloc “For a United Ukraine”, which included the “Party of Regions”) for the first time won in most regions of Southern and Eastern Ukraine. The situation with the separation of the “South-East” deepened, as everyone knows, in 2004, when the candidate who was practically not supported in the region, Viktor Yushchenko, won the presidential election for the first time. This meant that for the first time since 1991, the regions of Southern and Eastern Ukraine were not in power, and therefore it was technologically concluded that for the first time the vast majority of ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine were not heard or taken into account. Similar events took place as a result of the “Euromaidan” and the “Revolution of Dignity” in 2013-2014, when a representative of the South-Eastern region, President Viktor Yanukovich was forced to flee the country.

However, this was inherited not only by the dissatisfaction of the ethnic Russian and a large part of the Russian-speaking population, especially in the East and the Crimea, but also the external / geopolitical politicization of this issue on the part of Russia, which resulted in the peak of a kind of regional separatism and even irredentism against the background of the events in Donbas in 2014, when unrecognized “referendums” were held in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and self-proclaimed “people’s republics” were created with Russia’s “assistance”. It was after that, against the background of the politicized subjectivation of the Russian minority and the Russian-speaking population of eastern and partly southern Ukraine, which was already dissatisfied with the political situation in the country; in particular through the filter of Russian-speaking and bilingualism, that the conflict between the center and the “region / periphery” has entered the open / armed phase. The format of politicization of the language situation and the phenomenon of bilingualism in Ukraine at that time was very successfully evidenced by a survey of the International Republican Institute, March 14-26, 2014 (and in fact at the time of the annexation of the Crimea), after all, at that time, only 29 percent of ethnic Russians in Ukraine expressed concern about pressure on the status and possibility of using the Russian language in Ukraine (which was often interpreted by Russia as the biggest problem of the Russian minority in Ukraine). Instead, 66 percent of ethnic Russians in Ukraine believe that no one prevents them from using Russian fluently¹⁸. Similar results were obtained in the regional context, as only 24 percent of respondents in southern Ukraine and 17 percent of respondents in eastern Ukraine expressed concern about the threat to the free use of the Russian language. Accordingly, only

¹⁶ Yunusov L., Spalek M., Chto mozno Kharkovu, to nelzia Krymu, „Kommersant“ 09.03.2006, źródło: <http://www.kommersant.ru/Doc-rss/656039> [odczyt: 20.10.2021].

¹⁷ Holenko V., Tykhonov V., Severodonetsk: tochky ne budet, Wyd. PTs „Maksym“ 2008.

¹⁸ Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine, „International Republican Institute“ 14-26.03.2014, źródło: <http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukraine%2C%20March%2014-26%2C%202014.pdf> [odczyt: 20.10.2021].

27 percent of respondents in southern Ukraine and 24 percent of respondents in eastern Ukraine supported the idea that Russia should send troops to Ukraine, but this was sufficient in political discourse. However, among ethnic Russians, the percentage of those who supported the direction of Russia's armed forces to "protect" (if necessary) the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine was much higher, as 43 percent were in favor and against it. A similar logic was evidenced by the results of surveys from April and December 2014, conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, because thanks to them it was traced that in most regions of southern and eastern Ukraine at that time there was an assessment of Russia as the organizer of separatism in Ukraine and as the culprit of the military events taking place in the Eastern Donbas. Identical opinion was expressed by the residents of the region about Russia's interference in Ukraine's internal affairs as illegal, as a result of which respondents generally believed that Russia unfairly protected the Russian-speaking population of Southeastern Ukraine, especially since there was no restriction on this population.

Nevertheless, historically (until 2014) and currently the Crimea and South-Eastern Ukraine in the context of ethno-political and territorial factors of regionalism and the phenomenon of politicization of Russians in Ukraine have been (especially the Crimea) and remain basic regions. Their isolation is historical and as of the moment of research is exhaustive, relevant and tested. This is happening at least because South-Eastern Ukraine has its own regional peculiarities, as the policy of assimilation has been and still is evident here, the language issue is an acute one, and the "Russian factor" has a tangible influence on the consciousness and orientations of the population. As a result, the significant heterogeneity of ethnic and cultural identification of the region, which primarily due to the language issue and bilingualism in Ukraine inevitably affects the subjectivity of the Russian minority and the Russian-speaking population in this country, including due to the historical orientation to Russia and the predominance of individual and specific interests of some Ukrainian (pro-Russian) politicians. This means that it is in the complex of these and other factors, i.e. in the format of the "Russian problem", which seems to have been reduced and still is reduced to the use of "language card" and the slogan to protect compatriots and Russian-speaking population and "violation of Russian rights", and it is necessary to look for the reasons of the political events that took place in Ukraine both before 2013-2014 and after this.

In general, there can be made several conclusions drawn against this background. One of them is that bilingualism is really visible in Ukraine, in particular in the format of coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian languages as the most common (in the same order) native languages and languages of daily communication. At the same time, the language issues do not correspond at all to the ethnic issues and the composition of the population in Ukraine, because there are many more ethnic Ukrainians than its everyday speakers and users. At the same time, it is stated that a characteristic feature of the linguistic factor of regionalism in Ukraine is its discrepancy with ethnicity, because, on the one hand, the share of ethnic Ukrainians in this state is much higher than the share of ethnic Russians, and therefore Ukraine is a folk state, however, on the other hand,

Ukraine is a country in which historically and for various reasons the share of supporters of the Ukrainian language as a mother tongue and the share of its direct use in everyday life is significantly inconsistent (lower), as mentioned above, the share of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine. Although the language issue in general has inevitably subjected and politicized the Russian minority in Ukraine and continues to do so, even though the latter has often denied the fact that competition between two languages in one national space inevitably leads to a linguistic split in society on linguistic grounds. It is also obvious that the post colonialism of language construction in Ukraine has led to the fact that the balance between the understanding of language as a symbol of identity and a means of communication is quite significantly disturbed in this country.

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TOWARDS THE ESSENCE, VARIETIES AND MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-PARTISM AND ANTI-PARTY SENTIMENTS IN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES

The article is dedicated to analyzing the essence, types and manifestations of anti-partism and the nature of anti-party sentiments of citizens of European representative democracies, including at the background of the phenomena of non-partism and technocracy. This is done in several contexts, including historiographical, theoretical, methodological, practical and empirical ones. It has been stated that anti-partism is one of the primary, but important manifestations of the “decline” or “crisis” of parties in Europe and democracies, although it does not necessarily lead to, but can be the cause of non-partism or technocracy. At the same time, the article proves that anti-partism in European countries is a heterogeneous rather than a monolithic and combined phenomenon, since it manifests itself in different ways and in different forms, in particular as “reactive” and “cultural” ones. Different in their origins and consequences, these forms of anti-partism are united by the fact that they are part of a general syndrome of political apathy, political discontent and the “erosion” of democracy. At the same time, the phenomenon of non-partism is facilitated primarily by “reactive” rather than “cultural” anti-partism.

Keywords: anti-partism, non-partism, representative democracy, parties, European countries.

O ISTOCIE, ODMIANACH I PRZEJAWACH ANTYPARTYJNOŚCI I ANTYPARTYJNYCH NASTROJACH W EUROPEJSKICH DEMOKRACJACH PRZEDSTAWICIELSKICH

W artykule przeanalizowano istotę, rodzaje i przejawy antypartyjności oraz charakter nastrojów antypartyjnych obywateli europejskich demokracji przedstawicielskich, w tym na tle zjawisk bezpartyjności i technokracji. Odbywa się to w kilku kontekstach, w tym historyograficznym, teoretycznym i metodologicznym oraz praktycznym i empirycznym. Stwierdzono, że antypartyjność jest jednym z podstawowych, ale ważnych przejawów „upadku” lub „kryzysu” partii w demokracjach europejskich, choć niekoniecznie prowadzi, ale może być przyczyną bezpartyjności lub technokracji. Jednocześnie w artykule udowadnia się, że antypartyjność w krajach europejskich jest zjawiskiem niejednorodnym, nie monolitycznym i niekombinowanym, gdyż przejawia się na różne sposoby i w różnych formach, w szczególności jako „reaktywna” i „kulturowa”. Zróżnicowane za swoim pochodzeniem i skutkami, te formy antypartyjności łączy fakt, że są one częścią ogólnego syndromu politycznej apatii, politycznego niezadowolenia

i „erozji” demokracji. Jednocześnie zjawisku antypartyjności sprzyja przede wszystkim antypartyjność „reaktywna”, a nie „kulturowa”.

Słowa kluczowe: antypartyjność, bezpartyjność, demokracja przedstawicielska, partie, kraje europejskie

ДО СУТНОСТІ, РІЗНОВИДІВ І ВИЯВІВ АНТИПАРТИЗМУ Й АНТИПАРТІЙНИХ НАСТРОЇВ У ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПРЕДСТАВНИЦЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ

У статті проаналізовано сутність, різновиди і вияви антипартизму й природу антипартійних настроїв громадян європейських представницьких демократій, в тому числі на тлі феноменів непартизму та технократизму. Це зроблено в кількох контекстах, зокрема історіографічному, теоретико-методологічному й практично-емпіричному. Констатовано, що антипартизм є одним з первинних, але важливих виявів “западу” або “кризи” партій у європейських демократіях, хоч він не обов’язково призводить, однак може бути причиною непартизму чи технократизму. Водночас у статті засвідчено, що антипартизм в країнах Європи є гетерогенним, а не монолітним та комбінованим феноменом, оскільки він виявляється по-різному та в різних формах, зокрема передусім як “реактивний” і “культурний”. Будучи різними за своїм походженням і наслідками, ці форми антипартизму поєднує те, що вони є частиною загального синдрому політичної апатії, політичного невдоволення та “ерозії” демократії. Водночас явищу непартизму сприяє передусім “реактивний”, а не “культурний” антипартизм.

Ключові слова: антипартизм, непартизм, представницька демократія, партії, країни Європи.

European political space for a long period of recent historical development is structured in such a way that it is defined and understood mainly as party-determined and party-oriented and this party focus is one of the main components of the European representative democracies. And in this regard, neither politicians nor ordinary citizens during the period after the Second World War actually had or had almost no doubts and comments. However, the situation has begun to change dramatically and significantly against the background of various crises that have recently, in recent decades, affected Europe, in particular as a result of the global financial crisis, which unfolded in 2008-2009, a new round of the so-called European migration crisis, starting in 2014-2015, as well as social, managerial and other manifestations of the crisis following the pandemic COVID-19, which has been going on since 2019. It is complemented by the

fact that in some European countries, trust in parties as a major factor in structuring political and administrative process and socio-political life is constantly fluctuating depending on the successes or failures of government cabinets, which are usually formed in the region on a party basis. Against this background, in recent years, the “gap of trust” has undermined public support for many institutions. Accordingly, quite often on the agenda of European representative democracies, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, there started to appear the question of so-called technocratic (instead of party) government, and thus, in general, the ideas of a kind of non-partism or anti-partism, which are manifested primarily in the anti-party sentiments of both the population and individual politicians, and so on. All these things actualize the formulation and consideration of the theme of the phenomenon and manifestations of antipartism and anti-party sentiments in European representative democracies.

The stated issues in a purely theoretical and methodological context are partially considered in the scientific works of such scientists as U. Ackay¹, E. Bryld², M. Centeno L. Wolfson³, H. Clarke and M. Stewart⁴, H. Daalder⁵, R. Dalton, I. McAllister, M. Wattenberg⁶, E. Eriksen⁷, J. Gunnell⁸, R. Katz⁹, B. Khoo¹⁰, S. Lakoff¹¹, K. Lawson and P. Merkl¹², P. Mair¹³, J. Meynaud¹⁴, E. Millstone¹⁵, S. Odugbemi¹⁶, G. Pastorella¹⁷, G. Peters¹⁸, T. Poguntke, S. Scarrow¹⁹, R. Put-

¹ Ackay U., *Technocrats in Power?*, Prepared for the conference „The State in Capitalist Society, 40 Years On“, 22 May 2009.

² Bryld E., *The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Political Problems*, „Development in Practice“ 2000, vol 10, nr. 5, s. 700-705.

³ Centeno M., *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, „Theory and Society“ 1993, vol 22, s. 307-335; Centeno M., Wolfson L., *Redefiniendo la tecnocracia*, „Desarrollo Económico“ 1997, vol 37, nr. 146, s. 215-240.

⁴ Clarke H., Stewart M., *The Decline of Parties in the Mind of Citizens*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 1998, vol 1, s. 357-378.

⁵ Daalder H., *Parties: Denied, Dismissed or Redundant?*, [w:] Gunther R., Montero J., Linz J. (eds.), *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 39-57.

⁶ Dalton R., McAllister I., Wattenberg M., *The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment*, [w:] Dalton R., Wattenberg M. (eds.), *Parties without Partisans, Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 37-63; Dalton R., Wattenberg M., *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

⁷ Eriksen E., *Democratic or technocratic governance?*, [w:] Joerges C., Mény Y., Weiler J. (eds.), *Montain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance*, „Jean Monnet Working Paper“ 2001, nr. 6/01.

⁸ Gunnell J., *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, „Technology and Culture“ 1982, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 392-416.

⁹ Katz R., *Party Government and its Alternatives*, [w:] Katz R. (ed.), *Party Governments: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1987, s. 1-26.

¹⁰ Khoo B., *No insulation: politics and technocracy's troubled trajectory*, „IDE Discussion Paper“ 2010, vol 236.

¹¹ Lakoff S., *Knowledge, Power, and Democratic Theory*, „Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science“ 1972, vol 394, s. 4-12.

¹² Lawson K., Merkl P., *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1988.

¹³ Mair P., *The Challenge to Party Government*, „EUI Working Paper SPS“ 2007, nr 9.

¹⁴ Meynaud J., *Technocracy*, New York 1968.

¹⁵ Millstone E., *Science-Based Policy Making*, [w:] Bogner A., Torgersen H. (eds.), *Wozu Experten? Ambivalenzen der Beziehung von Wissenschaft und Politik*, Wyd. VS Verlag 2005, s. 314-341.

¹⁶ Odugbemi S., *The Enduring Allurement of Technocratic Competence*, Wyd. People, Spaces, Deliberation 2011.

¹⁷ Pastorella G., *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, Presented at UACES General Conference (Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork), 2014; Pastorella G., *Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right*, „Political Studies“ 2016, vol 64, nr. 4, s. 948-965.

¹⁸ Peters G., *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, „Comparative Politics“ 1979, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 339-358.

¹⁹ Poguntke T., *Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 319-344; Poguntke T., Scarrow S., *The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: Introduction*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 257-262.

nam²⁰, A. Schedler²¹, V. Schmidt²², M. Schudson²³, D. Skelton²⁴, J. Straussman²⁵, P. Weingart²⁶, G. Wilson²⁷. Empirically, non-partisanship, anti-partisanship and anti-party sentiments of the population in European countries were once written by such scholars as O. Amorim Neto and K. Strøm²⁸, H. Brunkhorst²⁹, M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli³⁰, M. de Jong and M. Mentzel³¹, R. Fischer³², A. Harcourt and C. Radaelli³², J. Hopkin³³, E. Huskey³⁴, C. Invernizzi Accettita B³⁵. Christopher³⁶, G.-E. Isaksson³⁷, F. Marangoni L. Verzichelli³⁸, P. Marquardt³⁹, D. Mathioudakis⁴⁰, D. McDonnell and M. Valbruzzi⁴¹, G. Pasquinota M. Valbruzzi⁴², H. Reiter⁴³, G. Sani and

²⁰ Putnam R., *Elite transformation in advanced industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the theory of technocracy*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1997, vol 10, s. 388-412.

²¹ Schedler A., *Anti-political-establishment Parties*, „Party Politics“ 1996, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 291-312.

²² Schmidt V., *Can Technocratic Government Be Democratic*, Wyd. Telos 2011.

²³ Schudson M., *The Trouble with Experts and Why Democracies Need Them*, „Theory and Society“ 2006, vol 35, nr. 5, s. 491-506.

²⁴ Skelton D., *Government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, for the technocrats*, Wyd. New Statesman 2011.

²⁵ Straussman J., *The Limits of Technocratic Politics*, Wyd. Edison 1978.

²⁶ Weingart P., *Scientific expertise and political accountability: paradoxes of science in politics*, „Science and Public Policy“ 1999, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 151-161.

²⁷ Wilson G., *Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in Development Practice*, „Development and Change“ 2006, vol 37, nr. 3, s. 501-523.

²⁸ Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619-643.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“ (The Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, Denmark), August 15-17, 2002.

²⁹ Brunkhorst H., *The crisis of Europe as a Crisis of Technocratic Politics*, Unpublished lecture 2012.

³⁰ Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen*, „South European Society and Politics“ 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117-152.; Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Italy: the sunset of a partyocracy*, [w:] Blondel J., Cotta M. (eds.), *Party and government. An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996, s. 180-201.; Verzichelli L., Cotta M., *Technicians, technical government and non-partisan ministers. The Italian experience*, Presented at IPSA XXII Congress (Madrid), July 2012.

³¹ de Jong M., Mentzel M., *Policy and science: options for democratisation in European countries*, „Science and Public Policy“ 2001, vol 28, s. 403-412.

³² Fischer R., *European governance still technocratic? New modes of governance for food safety regulation in the European Union*, „EioP“ 2008, vol 12.

³³ Harcourt A., Radaelli C., *Limits to EU technocratic regulation?*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1999, vol 35, nr. 1, s. 107-122.

³⁴ Hopkin J., *Technocrats have taken over governments in Southern Europe. This is a challenge to democracy*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2012.

³⁵ Huskey E., *Elite Recruitment and State-Society Relationships in Technocratic Authoritarian Regime: The Russian Case*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies“ 2010, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 363-372.

³⁶ Invernizzi Accetti C., Christopher B., *Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements? Crisis and Representation*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2013.

³⁷ Isaksson G.-E., *From Election to Government: Principal Rules and Deviant Cases*, „Government and Opposition“ 2005, vol 40, nr. 1, s. 90-118.

³⁸ Marangoni F., *Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office*, „Bulletin of Italian Politics“ 2012, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 135-149.; Marangoni F., Verzichelli L., *Italy: from personalized polarization to technocratic co-operation?*, Presented at 2012 SISIP Congress (Roma), 13-14 September 2012.

³⁹ Marquardt P., *Deficit Reduction: Democracy, Technocracy, and Constitutionalism in The European Union*, „Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law“ 1994, vol 4, s. 265-290.

⁴⁰ Mathioudakis D., *“Who are you people?” Imported technocracy and democratic legitimacy in the EU*, Presented at the Political Science Association Annual Conference (Manchester), April 2014.

⁴¹ McDonnell D., Valbruzzi M., *Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 2014, vol 53, nr. 4, s. 654-671.

⁴² Pasquino G., Valbruzzi M., *Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability*, „Journal of Modern Italian Studies“ 2012, vol 17, nr. 5, s. 612-629.

⁴³ Reiter H., *Party Decline in the West: A Skeptic's View*, „Journal of Theoretical Politics“ 1989, vol 1, s. 325-348.

P. Segatti⁴⁴, S. Scarrow⁴⁵, V. Schmidt⁴⁶, K. Strøm and L. Svåsand⁴⁷, W. Wallace and J. Smith⁴⁸, P. Webb⁴⁹ and others.

However, they focused on non-partisan government and technocracy rather than the phenomenon of anti-partism and anti-party sentiment in European representative democracies, especially against the background of the crisis and the transformation of the essence and coverage of the concept of “party”. Therefore, the present study focuses on the components, conditions and parameters of non-partism, and on the attributes of anti-partism in the current state of development of parties and party systems in European representative democracies, both in theoretical and methodological terms, and in practical and empirical contexts.

It is well known that non-partism and anti-partism have two basic causes of formation and development, in particular: positive, it is through the prism of theorizing and testing the effects of technocracy on the replacement or in parallel with the party and party-determined competition; negative, it is through the prism of the crisis and compromising the phenomenon of political parties and party politics in general in a given state. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of non-partism can be developed both at the expense of anti-partism, on the contrary. Therefore, in this context we configure research on their relationship, but through the prism of clarifying the essence and nature of anti-party sentiments – both purely theoretically and by example of the European representative democracies, in which in the 90s of the 20th century critical images of political parties started to become very noticeable⁵⁰. The fact is that it has been since that period a number of European and non-European representative democracies began to reflect on the “crisis of parties” and this expression became very familiar to almost every theorist in the sphere of political science, for it concerned not only the parties but also the general format of interinstitutional relations and the parameters of the institutions of power functioning (first of all the government, parliament, and political elites in general), configured around the role and importance of parties as such (which was the norm for European democracies)⁵¹. The main focus of such a phrase or its derivatives use in various European countries has been the realizing that civil society has increasingly resorted to the interpretation and perception of political parties as being too selfish and aimed at their own political interests rather than at achieving goals

⁴⁴ Sani G., Segatti P., *Antiparty Politics and the Restructuring of the Italian Party System*, [w:] Diamandouros P., Gunther R. (eds.), *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001, s. 153-182.

⁴⁵ Scarrow S., *Politicians Against Parties: Anti-party Arguments as Weapons for Change in Germany*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 297-317.

⁴⁶ Schmidt V., *Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and “Throughput”*, „Political Studies” 2013, vol 61, nr. 1, s. 2-22.

⁴⁷ Strøm K., Svåsand L., *Challenges to Political Parties. The Case of Norway*, Wyd. The University of Michigan Press 1997.

⁴⁸ Wallace W., Smith J., *Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent*, „West European Politics” 1995, vol 18, nr. 3, s. 137-157.

⁴⁹ Webb P., *Are British Political Parties in Decline?*, “Party Politics” 1995, vol 1, s. 299-322.

⁵⁰ Listhaug O., Wiberg M., *Confidence in Political and Private Institutions*, [w:] Klingemann H.-D., Fuchs D. (eds.), *Citizens and the State*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1995, s. 298-322.

⁵¹ Eilfort M., *Politikverdrossenheit and the Non-voter*, “German Politics” 1995, vol 4, s. 111-119; Immerfall S., *German Party Sociology in the Nineties: On the State of a Discipline in Times of Turmoil*, “European Journal for Political Research” 1993, vol 23, s. 465-482.

of common well-being, and hence to the interpretation of parties as incapable to implement and pursue a consistent policy without a corruption component⁵². Therefore, after some time, the so-called anti-party rhetoric has become a common element of political discourse in many modern European democracies⁵³, including due the development of a cluster of anti-establishment policies and even, paradoxically, anti-establishment parties. Although, on the other hand, interest in limiting the role, importance and influence of political parties has become primarily a sphere of interest and activity of journalists, publicists, political and social scientists.

In particular, a group of political scientists began to argue that in the development of the phenomenon of parties in European representative democracies, defects began to appear primarily at the level of organizational structure, functions and membership in parties, and therefore in the context of the effectiveness of parties in various representative (especially in parliaments) and government (especially in governments) institutions of various countries. Instead, another group of political scientists focused on concerns about the growing negative attitudes of citizens or voters toward political parties.

Even though very little attention has been paid in the intelligence of these authors to the issue of declining public support for parties, instead, emphasis was placed on such topics as the development of party identification, party participation in elections, and the parties' traditional social ties with civil society, which are theoretically and previously / traditionally mandatory in the case of party-determined representative democracies in Europe. As a result, all this led to the formation of a whole array of anti-party views and even to the postulation of the hypothesis of "decline" or "crisis" of parties in the analyzed part of the world, but views not entirely homogeneous, but focused on interinstitutional relations and institutional design on one hand, and ideological, electoral and functional essence of political parties as such, on the other hand. Although, in contrast, such an array of the surveys and research turned out to be very heterogeneous, after all different scientists began to identify different components and parameters to attest to the phenomenon of anti-partism, including phenomena, concepts and processes: reduction of party identification of the parties themselves and party belonging / affiliation of citizens, and hence electoral instability of parties, including through the formation of so-called anti-systemic / anti-establishment parties⁵⁴; strengthening the phenomenon of ideological rapprochement (in the direction of a conditional party-ideological center) of previously differently ideological parties⁵⁵; weakening the ties of political parties with citizens and

⁵² Poguntke T., Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 320.

⁵³ Poguntke T., Scarrow S., The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: Introduction, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 257-262

⁵⁴ Poguntke T., Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 319-344.

⁵⁵ Webb P., Are British Political Parties in Decline?, "Party Politics" 1995, vol 1, s. 303.; Reiter H., Party Decline in the West: A Skeptic's View, "Journal of Theoretical Politics" 1989, vol 1, s. 327-328.

civil society⁵⁶. As a result, political science has a very inaccurate understanding of the “decline” or “crisis” of parties, although almost all theorists and practitioners agree that this “decline” or “crisis” of parties is valid in representative democracies in Europe.

The situation regarding the diversity of European anti-partism is due to its origins, which are also heterogeneous, as many scholars, journalists and publicists have argued and continue to do so that this phenomenon is based on different concepts and different ways of defining and measuring anti-party sentiment. Therefore, there have always been differing opinions in the research community about how widespread anti-partism is in certain countries and therefore how expressed and influential are its immediate consequences.

For example, German scholars have generally viewed and continue to view anti-party sentiment as a temporary response by citizens to the political events of the early 1990s, particularly in the context of German unification and the economic and corruption crisis of the period⁵⁷. This view was shared by Spanish researchers, who noted that during and shortly after the country's transition to democracy, particularly in the 1970s, the popular or nation-wide image of political parties was much more positive than in the mid-1980s, when attitudes toward political parties deteriorated sharply, particularly in the wake of corruption scandals in the early 1990s and beyond⁵⁸. Other scholars, on the other hand, appealed to clarify the parameters of the nature and possible causes of the formation and manifestations of the anti-partism phenomenon in certain countries, in particular depending on the peculiarities of their political culture and political history (even in the interwar period)⁵⁹. In general, it is established that the decline in support for political parties and the phenomenon of anti-partisanship necessarily relate to the specific political circumstances in each country, as well as the experience and parameters of the development of representative democracy in it⁵⁹. At the same time, the growth of anti-party sentiments in general is not a very short-term process, but rather a long-term one, due to which it is accompanied by a parallel decline in the level of trust in all representative one or another modern democracy, in particular due to the formation of a kind of gap and tension in relations between political elites, individuals and social groups, which they theoretically represent.

As for the consequences of anti-partisanship, they are also variable, because in one case we are talking about the emergence of populist, anti-establishment, anti-systemic and xenophobic parties in some countries⁶⁰, in another case it is the rejection of the main parties and the cynical attitude of either citizens to parties or party members to party leaders⁶¹, and in another

⁵⁶ Poguntke T., Scarrow S., The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: Introduction, “European Journal of Political Research” 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 259.

⁵⁷ Wiesendahl E., The Present State and Future Prospects of the German Volksparteien, “German Politics” 1998, vol 7, s. 151-175.

⁵⁸ Wert J., Sobre cultura política: legitimidad, desafección y malestar, [w:] Tusell J., Lamo de Espinosa E., Pardo R. (eds.), Entre dos siglos: reflexiones sobre la democracia española, Wyd. Alianza Editorial 1996.

⁵⁹ Sani G., Segatti P., Antiparty Politics and the Restructuring of the Italian Party System, [w:] Diamandouros P., Gunther R. (eds.), Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001, s. 153-182.

⁶⁰ Reiter H., Party Decline in the West: A Skeptic's View, “Journal of Theoretical Politics” 1989, vol 1, s. 325-348.

⁶¹ Mudde C., The Paradox of the Anti-party Party: Insights From the Extreme Right, “Party Politics” 1996, vol 2, s. 265-276.; Schedler A., Anti-political-establishment Parties, “Party Politics” 1996, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 291-312.

case it is the reduction of general support for a democratic political regime and the growth of anti-systemic behavior of political actors⁶².

As a result, the theoretical and empirical contradictions about anti-partism and public anti-party sentiment in European countries determine the different options for anti-partisanship itself in terms of its origins and behavioral consequences, including so-called “reactive anti-partism” and “cultural anti-partism.”

Thus, “reactive anti-partism” is one of the most important positions taken by citizens in response to their dissatisfaction with the activities of party elites and party-determined political institutions. This option of anti-partism is the result of a mismatch between promises and ideological labels, on the one hand, and citizens’ perceptions of the real productivity of democracy and elite, on the other. Thus, “reactive anti-partisanship” is in some sense the sensiological consequence of “excessive promises” by politicians in the context of their dependence on political discourse, which raises expectations about such promises among the public to an extent that will be difficult to achieve. In addition, this version of anti-partism is also a response to the actual failures of political parties and political elites in the context of government implementation⁶³, because many social, political and economic problems simply cannot be solved, but party leaders often ignore this, behaving irresponsibly and abusing their access to public resources and privileges, including in a corrupt format, and so on. In other words, anti-partisanship in this view is nothing more than an expression of political realism in the discourse and political rhetoric of the citizens⁶⁴, especially against the background of the fact that as political reality changes over time, one should expect changes in the scale and intensity of people’s negative attitudes towards parties in the context of changing political, economic and social developments⁶⁵. This is especially true (in the direction of growing of anti-partism) when society is made up of more educated, politically informed and interested residents who are better prepared to participate in politics, after all, among them, feelings of alienation from parties are more common due to

⁶² Taggart P., *Riding the Wave: New Populist Parties in Western Europe*, Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research (Madrid), 1994.

⁶³ Bruneau T., *Political Parties and Democracy in Portugal: Organizations, Elections and Public Opinion*, Wyd. Westview Press 1997.; Bruneau T., *Democracy: Southern European Style?*, [w:] Diamandouros P., Gunther R. (eds.), *Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001, s. 16-82.; Pradera J., *La maquinaria de la democracia. Los partidos en el sistema político español*, [w:] Tusell J., Lamo E. de Espinosa, Pardo R. (eds.), *Entre dos siglos: reflexiones sobre la democracia española*, Wyd. Alianza Editorial 1996.; Mendrinou M., Nicolacopoulos I., *Interests, Parties and Discontent in the Public Mind: Sympathy Scores for Greek Parties and Interest Groups*, Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research (Bern), 1997.

⁶⁴ Poguntke T., *Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield*, *European Journal of Political Research* 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 327.

⁶⁵ Gabriel O., *The Confidence Crisis in Germany*, Paper presented at the conference “The Erosion of Confidence in Advanced Democracies” (Society of Comparative Research and the Université Libre de Bruxelles), 1996, s. 16-17.; Noelle-Neumann E., *Left and Right as Categories for Determining the Politics Position of the Parties and the Population in Germany*, Paper presented at the symposium “Political Parties: Changing Role in Contemporary Democracies” (Madrid), 1994, s. 43-45.

a somewhat better understanding of the essence of democracy, much greater expectations of political life and greater ability to identify the machinations of politicians and parties⁶⁶.

Instead, “cultural anti-partism” is based on historical traditions and basic values of political culture, and therefore does not depend on short-term changes in the political situation in a country, but it does on long-term experience of party life in each of them. In this context, anti-partisanship is essentially dependent on the experience of democracy, pseudo-democracy, dictatorship, the history of political upheaval and development, election manipulation, the facts of negative socialization in the political process in a country and so on⁶⁷. In this sense, “cultural anti-partism” manifests itself as the citizens’ assessment of politics and the political process, as well as their personal influence, or, in other words, as a rational response, the result of historical experience that hardly encourages trust in political life under party auspices⁶⁸. This is most evident in the case of any experience of an autocratic regime in a country, as autocracies a priori instill anti-party sentiments in the population, in particular through propaganda campaigns and formal socialization in educational institutions. In this regard, it is not reasonable to expect that “cultural anti-partism” can be closely linked to other cynical or negative assessments of democratic politics, which are part of a wider syndrome of political dissatisfaction, in particular with the phenomenon of support and legitimization of democratic regimes and dissatisfaction with the activities of political institutions and officials⁶⁹. Although, in contrast, political discontent as a phenomenon includes a subjective sense of distance from politics and political institutions, cynicism and a general interest in politics, as well as low levels of political participation⁷⁰, therefore, it can be expected that this syndrome of frustration, apathy and passivity will include a negative attitude towards political parties.

From all this it follows that these two types of anti-partism – “reactive” and “cultural” ones must have very different behavioral consequences. Thus, on the one hand, “reactive anti-partisanship” is a negative assessment and, consequently, an array of criticism against the poor and ineffective work of party institutions and leaders, although it may have a positive effect on mobilizing citizens and encouraging and meeting the requirements for improving or changing elected positions⁷¹.

⁶⁶ Dalton R., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies*, Wyd. Chatham House 1996; Putnam R., Pharr S., Dalton R., Introduction: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?, [w:] Pharr S., Putnam R. (eds.), *Disaffected Democracies. What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2000, s. 3-30.

⁶⁷ Maravall J., *Regimes, Politics, and Markets. Democratization and Economic Change in Southern and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997, s. 237.; Aguilar P., *Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española*, Wyd. Alianza Editorial 1996.; Sani G., Segatti P., *Antiparty Politics and the Restructuring of the Italian Party System*, [w:] Diamandouros P., Gunther R. (eds.), *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001, s. 153-182.

⁶⁸ Burton M., Gunther R., Higley J., Introduction: *Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes*, [w:] Higley J., Gunther R. (eds.), *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 5-6.

⁶⁹ Gunther R., Montero J., *Legitimacy, Satisfaction and Disaffection in New Democracies*, Wyd. Centre for the Study of Public Policy (University of Strathclyde) 2000.; Montero J., Gunther R., Torcal M., *Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, Discontent and Disaffection*, “*Studies in Comparative International Development*” 1997, vol 32, s. 124-160.

⁷⁰ Torcal M., Montero J., *Political Disaffection in New Democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

⁷¹ Dalton R., *Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, [w:] Norris P. (ed.), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 75-76.

Instead, on the other hand, “cultural anti-partism” is a strong characteristic of subculture policies to ensure diversity, for as an important component of political discontent; “cultural anti-partism” can widen the gap between citizens and their institutions and strengthen the marginalized sector of the population in a competitive democratic regime, making the latter less effective and of lower quality.

At the same time, the “strength” of anti-party sentiments of the population can also be quite different and configured on the basis of various explanatory factors. This is especially true given the fact that the attitude of the population / citizens towards political parties is very ambivalent, if not contradictory, and therefore it manifests itself in different ways within the framework of different options of anti-partism, although it is more negative (but also more heterogeneous from country to country in Europe) in the case of “cultural anti-partism”. This is complemented by the fact that the origins of anti-party sentiment in different European representative democracies are different. But in general, there are trends according to which: the longer and cumulative anti-party sentiment, the more negative this attitude is in general in different age groups; political dissatisfaction, including with regard to parties, is systematically increasing among the older age groups⁷². At the same time, it is established that the cultural-anti-party attitude does not reflect the general or permanent elements of the political culture of a state, but instead reflects separate social experiences within different political contexts that affect in many ways different “political” generations. Quite often this is manifested in the fact that even the very successful actions of the current democratic regime as such are not able to eradicate anti-party sentiments among the older (in the age sense) population, since only its “disappearance” can be a prerequisite for reducing the level of “cultural anti-partism”. On the other hand, such correlations are not observed in the case of “reactive antipartism”, which is rather situational and serves as a format for responding to political institutional crises in the environment and as a result of interparty relations. The only thing that quite effectively links the two options of antipartism for the reasons of their origin is the attitude according to which the more conscious and rational is a citizen; the less likely it is that his views will be anti-party ones.

However, the most important thing in this case is that, in essence, party dissatisfaction or so-called anti-partisanship includes or presupposes the desire of the population for change and reveals certain advantages in relation to political goals and means. Moreover, simply dissatisfaction or almost complete satisfaction with the positions of the parties pushes the population to the desire for reform, and the position of an anti-party nature to the need for radical and systemic change.

In conclusion, this suggests that “cultural anti-partisanship” in this context is the part of a broad syndrome of political discontent, while “reactive anti-partisanship” is conceptually and empirically different, as it demonstrates an attitude that is associated with political dissatisfaction with the current government and the current political system. This relationship

⁷² Torcal M., Montero J., *Political Disaffection in New Democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

intensifies in two directions when the share of the uneducated or uneducated population is higher in one or another country. It is this result and conclusion that is compatible with the interpretation that anti-partism is a formative part of the political discontent syndrome. At the same time, the expression or non-expression of ideas and positions against parties does not necessarily correlate with the attitude of the population of certain countries to democracy, since the vast majority of the population of European countries support the logic and construction of representative democracy, even regardless of their attitude to the parties. Also noteworthy is the fact that supporters of anti-party sentiments are less interested in the domestic policies of their countries, more cynical about their politicians and are strongly influenced by the press. At most, such sentiments and correlations are exacerbated in the case of at least partial autocratization of political regimes, even though they remain representative democracies.

In general, it is found in the study that anti-party sentiments can affect the quality of democracy in a country. In addition, among the various dynamic consequences and effects of anti-partism, there is a gradual destruction of the psychological commitment of voters to parties (so-called party belonging or affiliation), change in the membership of citizens in cultural, religious, party and professional groups at parties, increase in electoral volatility, reducing the number of party members and increasing the commitment of voters to anti-systemic and anti-establishment parties⁷³. In addition, anti-partism and anti-party sentiments are the basis for the formation and development of non-traditional (especially involvement in strikes and demonstrations) and illegal (through measures to destroy property, paint graffiti in public places, etc.) forms of the citizens' participation in socio-political life representative democracy.

In general, it is stated in the research that the phenomenon of anti-partisanship is one of the primary but very important manifestations of the "decline" or "crisis" of political parties in European democracies, although it does not necessarily lead to, but can cause non-partisanship or technocracy.

In other words, this means that non-partism or technocracy is certainly a consequence of anti-party sentiments of both the politicum and the civil environment, but especially in the case of certain political or institutional crises, when political parties are unable to ensure their mission, including formation of some institutions of power in a country. At the same time, the article proves that anti-partisanship in European countries is a heterogeneous, not a monolithic and combined phenomenon, because it manifests itself in different ways and in different forms, in particular, primarily as a "reactive" one (concerning temporary political circumstances, in particular the level of satisfaction with the activities of party governments and in general by certain parties) and "cultural" one (which has been fairly stable over time and is associated with lower levels of education and political information and a widespread syndrome of political discontent in general) At the same time, "reactive anti-partism" has little effect on the election

⁷³ Poguntke T., *Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 319-344.

results and thus on party-electoral volatility, while “cultural anti-partism” has a much more significant effect to the psychological devotion to the parties and the variety of forms of traditional participation in the life of the party and the political process. What unites these forms of anti-partisanship is that they are the part of a general syndrome of political apathy, political discontent, and at least partial “erosion” of democracy, but, on the contrary, the peculiarities of anti-partism are inherent in each individual country and not in European representative democracies as a monolithic phenomenon. It follows that the phenomenon of non-partism is facilitated primarily by “reactive” rather than “cultural” anti-partism.

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Theoretical and Methodological principles of studying the party spectrum of Ukraine

The article describes key approaches to understanding the concept of a political party, points to the peculiarities of electoral parties and emphasizes the importance of studying the program positions of the party in order to identify its ideological affiliation. The main purpose of the article is to analyze the programs of political parties in Ukraine to determine the party spectrum of political parties that formed parliament in 2019. The results of the study indicate a weak ideological articulation of parliamentary parties in Ukraine, a tendency to centrism. The author of the article also concludes that on a number of formal grounds, most parliamentary parties in Ukraine can be described as electoral, and in general, the Ukrainian party system - as a system of «moderate pluralism.»

Keywords: political party, party system, electoral party, party program, ideology.

Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy badania spektrum partyjnego Ukrainy

Artykuł opisuje kluczowe podejścia do rozumienia pojęcia partii politycznej, wskazuje na specyfikę partii wyborczych oraz podkreśla wagę studiowania zapisów programowych partii w celu identyfikacji jej przynależności ideowej. Głównym celem artykułu jest analiza programów partii politycznych na Ukrainie w celu określenia spektrum partyjnego partii politycznych, które utworzyły parlament w 2019 roku. Wyniki badania wskazują na słabą artykulację ideologiczną partii parlamentarnych na Ukrainie, tendencję do centryzmu. Autor artykułu konkluduje również, że z wielu względów formalnych większość partii parlamentarnych na Ukrainie można określić jako wyborcze, a ogólnie ukraiński system partyjny jako system „umiarkowanego pluralizmu”.

Słowa kluczowe: partia polityczna, system partyjny, partia wyborcza, program partii, ideologia.

Теоретико-методологічні основи вивчення партійного спектру України

Стаття описує ключові підходи до розуміння поняття політична партія, вказує на особливість електоральних партій та акцентує увагу на важливості вивчення програмних положень партії з метою ідентифікації її ідеологічної приналежності. Основна мета статті - аналіз програм політичних партій України для визначення партійного спектру політичних партій, що сформували парламент 2019 року. Результати дослідження вказують на слабку ідеологічну артикульованість парламентських партій в Україні, тяжіння до центрizmu. Автор статті також доходить до висновку, що за рядом формальних ознак більшість парламентських партій України можна охарактеризувати як електоральні, а загалом українську партійну систему - як систему «поміркованого плюралізму».

Ключові слова: політична партія, партійна система, електоральна партія, програма партії, ідеологія.

Analyzing Ukrainian political realities, not every researcher will dare to avoid issues indirectly or directly related to the activities and evolution of Ukrainian political parties. Scientific interest in the problems of the functioning of parties and party systems in Ukraine is due to the fact that political parties remain an important political institution in Ukrainian society. However, a significant problem is the development of a theory of political parties adequate to Ukrainian realities, as Western theory does not have the necessary tools to conduct a holistic analysis of Ukrainian political parties.

The key function of Ukrainian political parties is the electoral, which allows the study of Ukrainian parties from the standpoint of the modern theoretical construct as electoral political parties. Understanding the formation of Ukrainian electoral parties remains difficult, as most of them are created only for elections, are constantly changing and acquire the features of ephemerality. Although Ukrainian parties fall under the sign of electoral parties as the dispersion of the ideological component of the party program, the ideological and programmatic factor remains significant in the exercise of electoral choice by citizens.

The programs of political parties in Western democracies are the main document on the basis of which voters prefer certain parties and thus form the main legislative body - the parliament. Each program of a political party contains an ideological component, which serves as a means of substantiating the parties' political identity. This opinion contradicts the position that modern Ukrainian parties lack ideology and points to the importance of ideological articulation and ideological positioning as components of electoral party programs. A consistent analysis of the programs of Ukrainian parties over time in terms of their ideological positioning

will make it possible to trace the evolution of party ideology, as well as the impact of ideological positioning on the cooperation and competition of parliamentary parties.

Modern research on the history and theory of political parties does not suggest a single approach to determine the nature and basic features of a political party. Therefore, it is advisable to distinguish the following approaches: structural, electoral, functional, structural-functional, ideological.

In the structural approach, the political party is considered through the prism of the peculiarities of its structure, organization and activities. The essence of the functional approach is that a political party is considered in terms of its role assignments. The ideological understanding of a political party is more related to the generalization of certain ideas expressed by organized groups of society to achieve a common goal. The electoral approach to understanding a political party begins with the development of a theoretical model of a particular type of political party - the electoral or electoral party¹.

However, the concept of "political party" should not be narrowed down to electoral functions, as parties can exist without participating in elections, achieve political power by undemocratic methods, and have specific features in autocratic political systems. Parties that prioritize the electoral function aim to influence and control the maximum number of their supporters, gain the largest number of votes. Such parties have transformed into a new type of political parties - electoral parties, which violated the traditional dichotomous classification of political parties into personnel and mass by M. Duverge².

Modern researches on the theory and history of political parties are based on the changes that have occurred to political parties as political institutions in a dominant society in the field of services, information and knowledge. Most modern electoral political parties were formed on the basis of opposition views and movements that made the transition to the ideas of program pluralism. A new trend has been set in the development and activities of the political party - the creation of the most favorable conditions for establishing ties with all social groups, as the key role to which the party's activities are directed has passed from activists to voters.

The current state of research of political parties allows us to conclude that the electoral function of a political party not only determines the full value of the party system, the level of democratization of society, but also allows a separate approach to understand the political party and to form a separate type of political parties.

Gradually, political parties lose their ideological and social activities and become parties "for all." In democratic political systems, electoral political parties serve to express the interests of the maximum number of voters as a result of competition between political and business elites. In non-democratic systems, with the help of electoral parties, the process of legitimizing the power of the ruling group takes place.

¹ Slipetska, J. Electoral parties: ideological positions of parliamentary parties in Ukraine. *Grani*. 2018. № 21 (12). p. 5-15.

² Shveda J. *Theory of political parties and party*. Lviv. Publishing house of LNU. 2003. 325 p.

Electoral political party - is a modern type of political party, characterized by blurring the boundaries of the social base, professionalization and personalization of politics, de-ideologizing the party program, as well as recognition of the leading role of the electoral function.

Thus, over the years of work of prominent theorists a significant body of theoretical provisions on electoral political parties was formed. Its features allowed to distinguish several sub-types and become a classic type of political party, supplementing the dichotomous classification created by M. Duverger. The increase in the number of electoral parties is due to the facilitation of the possibility of participating in elections, the growth of the level of political culture and consciousness of the electorate, the integration of voters to jointly solve pressing problems.

Modern research on Ukrainian political parties is taking two main directions: the study of the process of atomization of political parties and party systems, as well as the analysis of the peculiarities of the ideological positioning of Ukrainian political parties. In our opinion, it is the analysis of party and election programs of Ukrainian parties in terms of their party ideology that will allow us to understand why political parties do not represent the interests of their electorate, have leadership character, and do not have a clear strategy for governance and development. In the process of formation and development of the party system of Ukraine there were intense changes caused by the reduction of the role of the ideological component of party programs, the orientation of political parties to socio-cultural and socio-economic divisions, personalization of politics and voter professionalization, connection of political parties with civil society.

The Ukrainian party system has come a long way in becoming a multiparty system: atomized, polarized pluralism, and moderate pluralism. The number of poles of the party system varied from two (left - right) to three (left - right - center) and again to two (both centrist). The distance between political parties was constantly changing depending on their ideological positioning. The party system also tends to reduce the number of political parties in it and there is a process of entry of new political parties after the election campaign.

I. Osadchuk and V. Lytvyn on the basis of comparative verification of theoretical typologies of party systems on the example of Ukraine 1990 - 2016 emphasize that the absolute number of parliamentary political parties in Ukraine is unstable, but it is possible to determine the number of relevant parliamentary parties to a greater extent, which will allow to study the real political actors influencing political life in Ukraine³.

The problem for Ukrainian political parties remains inconsistency with the characteristics of classical political parties. Therefore, Ukrainian parties should be defined as electoral parties, as their main activity is aimed at participation and victory in elections. Well-known Ukrainian partologist Yu. Shveda noted that Ukrainian political parties operate within the unformed

³ Lytvyn V. Osadchuk I. Theoretical and methodological parameters and approaches to the typology of party systems and empirical and comparative results of their verification on the example of Ukraine (1990–2016) [Electronic resource] - Mode of access to the resource: http://filos.lnu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/LytvynOsadchuk_Parties-conf.pdf

socio-political interests of party representatives, and the electoral function is performed only by trying to gain access to power through participation in elections. Elections in such conditions turn into a fair of demands of interest groups and business before the government, instead of competition of candidates for management of the main political institutions.

According to Yu. Shveda, political parties during the election campaign appear as intermediaries - "brokers" at the fair of business requirements to the government. If such a "broker" may have different interests from the interests of "clients" in developed democracies, in Ukrainian realities they are only agencies to maximize the interests of capital before the government due to the weakness of institutionalization and party autonomy. Since businesses are not interested in constantly "funding" political parties, only during election campaigns, this turns them into "voting machines," or election projects⁴.

The results of sociological research in 2012 showed a growing trend of the influence of ideological positioning of Ukrainian political parties on the results of the will of citizens. About 45% of Ukrainians focused on the ideological positioning and election program of a political party in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Despite traditional accusations against Ukrainian political parties regarding the lack of a clear ideological positioning, electoral parties need to take into account the demand of Ukrainian society for the definition of party ideologies.

Analyzes of ideological and programmatic aspects of the activities of Ukrainian electoral parties, which went to parliament as a result of the election to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2012 by the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) and the Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Studies (UCIPR) revealed the following features of ideological positioning of Ukrainian political parties:

- de-ideologization and unification of election programs of political parties;
- a great number of populist claims;
- unclear ideological identification of most parties;
- increasing the share of ideological parties in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
- growing ideological distance from the spectrum of parliamentary parties;
- the Party of Regions, the Fatherland All-Ukrainian Union, Vitali Klitschko's BLOW, and the Front for Change can be considered poorly articulated;
- highly articulated - CPU and VO Freedom.

The ideological principles of Ukrainian political parties are formally specified in the party's program, and can also be expressed through its ideological self-determination. This study analyzes the ideological positioning and articulation of Ukrainian parliamentary parties that overcame the 5% barrier in the 2019 elections and identifies the ideological spectrum of leading Ukrainian parties based on an analysis of their programs.

⁴ Shveda Y. Political parties of Ukraine: election parties or election projects? Bulletin of Lviv National University. 2013. №13. P.176 - 180

In order to test whether Ukrainian political parties can be considered electoral, it is necessary to impose a theoretical model of an electoral political party developed in the course of studying its basic definitions on the political situation in Ukraine.

Among the main features of Ukrainian political parties are the following:

- • “fluidity” and instability of development as a political institution;
- • short-term goals in activity prevail;
- • activities aimed at participating in elections;
- • underdeveloped organizational structure in the regions;
- • spreading populist tendencies;
- • close relationship with NGOs and civil society in general;
- • “leader’s” or “personalist” nature of activity and structure;
- • updating and constant rebranding;
- • virtualization of activities;
- • low level of ideological articulation⁵.

Many researchers believe that most Ukrainian political parties are only election projects, as they do not try to implement programmatic provisions and take responsibility for the country’s political course, but only try to get a parliamentary mandate to represent certain groups by turning politics into a show or performance. However, the characteristics of Ukrainian political parties fully fall under the generalized definition of electoral parties and can be considered through the prism of their ideological and value positioning.

Although electoral political parties are characterized by weak ideological positioning, party ideology continues to play a significant role in the desire of political parties to gain and retain power. Electoral political parties use ideological positioning to mobilize the electorate in elections. For “professional” voters with a high level of political culture and consciousness, political ideology helps to express the will. Electoral political parties also try to take into account the ideological factor to detail their program positions.

The ideological positioning of political parties is embodied in the intention to govern the state and control social processes for the sake of a clearly defined idea.

The ideological principles of Ukrainian political parties are formally specified in the party’s program, and can be also expressed through its ideological self-determination. This study analyzes the ideological positioning and articulation of Ukrainian parliamentary parties that overcame the 5% barrier in the 2019 parliamentary elections and identifies the ideological range of leading Ukrainian parties based on an analysis of their programs.

According to the results of the early parliamentary elections of 2019 in the national multi-member constituency 5%, the barrier was overcome by 5 political parties, which as a result became members of the newly elected Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the IX convocation,

⁵ Slipetska, J. Electoral parties: ideological positions of parliamentary parties in Ukraine. *Grani*. 2018. № 21 (12). p. 5-15.

namely: political party “Sluga Narodu”, Political Party Opposition Platform – For life, political party All-Ukrainian Association” Batkivshchyna”, Political Party “European Solidarity “ and Political Party “Voice”. These political forces eventually received the support of 11,448,549 votes, which is 78.31% of those who took part in the vote.

The political party “Sluga Narodu” is a party project of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, which resembles a typical prototype of the ruling party in the post-Soviet space. Previously, this political force existed under the name “Party of Decisive Change”, but in 2017 there was a rebranding in the direction of borrowing the name of the eponymous Ukrainian TV series, and later the film “Sluga Narodu “ produced by the Ukrainian creative association PJSC “Studio Quarter-95”, where the main role, namely the president, was played by V. Zelensky. Until the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections, the party remained virtual and did not have a single local cell with legal personality. The phenomenon of the party’s success in the elections is explained by the specifics of forming the brand of the leader and the party through the series, which has become a collective dream for many Ukrainians. The main task of the party is to challenge the system and bring topower qualitatively new politicians.

Officially, the party identified its party ideology as libertarianism during the election campaign, and after the election it set out to combine liberal, conservative, and social democratic ideas under the general name of “Ukrainian centrism.” 2019 was the first manifestation of participation in the national elections for the “Sluga Narodu “ and eventually brought it representation in all key institutions of state power: President V. Zelensky, a majority in the Verkhovna Rada, the right to form a government and appoint representatives of regional and district administrations. The party’s website states that they are going to early parliamentary elections in order to bring decent people to power and implement the program of President of Ukraine V. Zelensky to build the “Dreamland”. The party’s election program consists of 16 blocks and covers the following areas: cleansing of power, eradication of corruption, security and defense, Ukraine’s place in the world, judiciary, law enforcement, economic strategy, business, innovation economy, energy and tariffs, infrastructure, environmental protection, education and science, medicine, national identity and social harmony.

The content analysis of the “Sluga Narodu “ election program and the definition of its ideological articulation and positioning allows us to draw the following conclusions: the party is devoid of ideological dominants, as the program presents almost equally statements about “left” and “right” ideologies, and liberalism somewhat prevails over conservatism; the election program is poorly articulated, the liberal vector has significantly increased, due to the provisions concerning the independence of the individual from the state, reducing the influence of the state in the spheres of economy, government and social policy⁶.

The pro-Russian political force - the Political Party “Opposition platform – For Life” (hereinafter “OPZZh”) took the second place in the parliamentary elections of 2019. This

⁶ Election program of the political party «Sluga Narodu». URL: showdoc2pf7171=403pid409=27 (5) (date of application: 24.03.2021).

political force was formed as a result of the renaming of the All-Ukrainian Association “Center” in 2016 to the political party “For Life” with the leader V. Rabinovych. In 2018, the political party merged with the NGO “Ukrainian Choice” (V. Medvedchuk) and part of the former party members of the Opposition Bloc, led by Yu. For a long time, the party existed as a “television”, as it actively promoted through such Ukrainian TV channels as “Inter”, “NewsOne” and “112 Ukraine”.

The ideological platform of the party has pronounced elements of social democracy, as well as in its positions there are signs of Russophilism, Euroscepticism and neutrality. The party’s election program in 2019 was called “Peace! Responsibility! Care!” and was positioned by the party as a social contract between them and the citizens. The program is divided into the following blocks: “Peace. Unity. Consolidation”, peaceful settlement of the conflict and reintegration of Donbass, Ukraine - a democratic state governed by the rule of law, effective government, policy of economic pragmatism,” No “to the policy of tariff genocide, building a welfare state, affordable medicine, foreign policy of peace, partnership and security. These program provisions became the basis for the analysis of the ideological positioning of “OPZZh”.

Thus, the election program of the political party “OPZZh” can be defined as the most articulated in the direction of “left” ideological positions, and in the socio-cultural vector of the party the number of liberal and conservative slogans is not significantly different. This ideological positioning of the political force is due to the absence of a powerful left-wing party in the electoral field. The reduction of conservative tendencies in the party’s program is due to the shift of emphasis towards the issue of “peace”⁷.

Yulia Tymoshenko’s political force, the All-Ukrainian Batkishchyna Association, has once again entered the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The political party was partly founded on the basis of the center-left Hromada party, and Yulia Tymoshenko has been the party’s political leader for 21 years. VO Batkishchyna be considered an exemplary example of an electoral political party, as it has been represented in the Verkhovna Rada since 2002, has an extensive system of branches in the regions, is characterized by a weak ideological position and traditionally focuses on the leader. In general, the political party is based on left-populist ideology and tends to centrism.

The program of the political force was formed on the basis of Yulia Tymoshenko’s election program for the 2019 presidential election under the general name “New Course of Ukraine”. The comprehensive document was reformatted into a short party program and included the following main positions: a new peace strategy, a new social doctrine, a new youth policy and a new economic strategy. The content analysis of the program of the “ party in the 2019 Verkhovna Rada elections showed a large number of social democratic ideas that correspond to the “left” political ideology and highlighted in the block a new social doctrine on social security,

⁷ Election program of the political party “Opposition Platform - For Life”. URL: showdoc2pf7171 = 403pid409 = 27 (4) (appeal date: 24.03.2021)

tax reduction and increasing social spending. As well as the growing share of “liberal” ideas in the program aimed at developing civil society, youth, the middle class and entrepreneurship

Although «Batkishchyna» took into account the demand of civil society to increase the level of ideological positioning in comparison with populist positions, it still remains a weakly articulated electoral party with a predominance of “left” ideas and a slight advantage of the political doctrine of liberalism. This result is explained by the party’s desire to become a “people’s” and efforts to build a socially oriented state while preserving Ukrainian values, but at the same time focus on building an innovative economy⁸.

The party of the ex-president of Ukraine P. Poroshenko also entered the Ukrainian parliament, but with much less representation than in 2014. Thus, the rebranding of Petro Poroshenko’s Solidarity Bloc lost the personal characteristics of a leader who had a high anti-rating in society, and the party received a new name - “European Solidarity”, which in the form of an abbreviation is consonant with the abbreviated name of the European Union, which offers a political force. In addition, the colors of the political force reproduce the national and patriotic colors of Ukraine and the European Union.

The ideological basis of the party was Christian democracy, liberal conservatism and pan-Europeanism. The new version of the EU Party Program, which contains provisions on deregulation of the economy, reduction of social benefits, changes in pensions and health care, shows the party’s transition from social democracy to center-right. Therefore, the content analysis of the party’s election program should confirm the general tendencies to change the party ideology.

The ideological positioning of the EU political party can be defined as weakly positioned right-wing liberalism. The dominant component of the election program is weakly articulated liberalism. In general, the party tried to successfully compare its ideological coordinates in order to gain the support of the national-patriotic population and all sympathizers of pro-European and pro-American values⁹.

The last political force to overcome the barrier was the «Voice» party, which was formed by the famous Ukrainian musician and performer Sviatoslav Vakarchuk in May 2019 by renaming the Platform of Initiatives party. The main resource of the party was directed to the branding of the political project and the image of its leader, namely the use of orange as a symbol of the ideals of the Orange Revolution and the activities of S. Vakarchuk during the two Maidans in 2004 and 2013-14.

The self-identification of a political force points to a center-right and pan-European ideological basis where man is at the center of public policy. The party has established its ideological position in the “Voice of Change” program, which is posted on the site and includes the

⁸ Election program of the All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna party - “Ukraine will win!” URL: showdoc2pdf7171 = 149pid409 = 27 (1) (access date: 14.03.2021)

⁹ Election program of the political party “European Solidarity”: “Let’s protect the European future of Ukraine”. URL: showdoc2pdf7171 = 335pid409 = 27 (4) (access date: 24.03.2021)

following key items: justice, justice, corruption, welfare, high-tech economy, demonopolization, financial system, state for man, quality and affordable medicine, social policy, culture, education, new methods of governance, parliament, state apparatus, European security and diplomacy, Donbass, Crimea, protection of internally displaced persons and Ukraine's place in the international arena.

The results of the study of the ideological positioning of the political party "The Voice" indicate a very weak ideological articulation of the election program, which has no dominant ideological and value vector, due to the aspirations of the political party to associate itself with civil society. The program contains almost the same ratio of connotations of all proposed vectors. The right-liberal vector, which was determined during the content analysis, indicates that the majority of the party's electorate are residents of Western Ukraine¹⁰.

The ideological positioning revealed during the analysis of the election programs of Ukrainian parliamentary parties makes it possible to build the ideological spectrum of the Ukrainian party system, which was formed as a result of the early parliamentary elections in 2019. The ideological spectrum of Ukraine's leading parties will make it possible to compare and classify the spread of ideas and values in Ukrainian society, as well as to find common and different in Ukrainian political parties that try to play a key role in the struggle for power. The construction of the ideological spectrum of leading Ukrainian parties is based on the statement that political ideologies do not exist in their pure form, and Ukrainian political parties use the positions of various political doctrines in developing party ideology, so it is possible to single out only the ideological positioning of the party. In general, Ukrainian political parties can be generally classified as left-liberal, right-liberal, left-conservative and right-conservative.

The analysis of the programs of Ukrainian parliamentary parties through the prism of their ideological positioning revealed a general tendency for them to have populist allegations and attempts to take a centrist position. The following trends were recorded for all parliamentary parties:

- the program of the presidential party "Sluga narodu" is devoid of ideological dominants, as it contained topical issues that met the most popular demands of the population;
- a study of OPZZh program documents confirmed the party's move towards a "left" ideology due to the dominance of this political doctrine in eastern Ukraine;
- Fatherland maintains tendencies towards populism, and also strengthens the block of ideas of social democracy in the program;
- Pro-European and pro-NATO statements of the EU party program, supported by a national-patriotic platform, demonstrated the party's orientation towards Western values;
- The young political force "Voice" has a weak ideological articulation, which is due to the party's desire to speak on behalf of civil society;

¹⁰ Election program of the party "Voice": "Voice of Change". URL: showdoc2pf7171 = 389pid409 = 27 (4) (access date: 24.03.2021).

- The ideological spectrum of Ukrainian parliamentary parties actually reproduced their potential for coalition, opposition and situational cooperation.

Thus, according to the results of the analysis of the programs of parliamentary parties it is possible to determine the ideological identity embodied in their ideological positioning: “EU” and “Voice” - weakly positioned right-liberal parties, “Sluga narodu” and VO “Batkivshchyna” - weakly positioned left-liberal “- positioned left-liberal. The ideological spectrum of modern parliamentary parties is devoid of strong conservative tendencies.

The analysis of the election programs of Ukrainian parliamentary parties based on the criterion of political ideology revealed the following features: parliamentary political parties have a weak ideological articulation, which means that ideological articulation correlates with the concept of relevance as of 2019; since all parliamentary parties are poorly articulated, this allows us to define the Ukrainian party system as a system of “moderate pluralism”; the vast majority of parliamentary parties tend towards centrism. Therefore, in our study, we confirmed the hypothesis of a weak ideological orientation of parliamentary parties in Ukraine, which on a number of formal grounds are essentially electoral.

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