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Keywords:

Parliamentarism, “path dependence” concept, political institution, political system, presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, system of government, Ukraine.

RETROSPECTIVES AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE CHOICE OF SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD

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Introduction

The history of Ukrainian statehood is a very complex and multifaceted process that took place especially intensively during the 20th - 21st centuries. The main reason for this lies in the fact that Ukraine, as an independent and sovereign state of Eastern and even partly Central/East-Central Europe (Foucher, 1993, p. 60; Jordan, 2005; Kłoczowski, 2004; Kłoczowski, 2005, p. 9; Linguistic/Geographical Divisions, 2022; Magocsi, 2018; Moskalewicz & Przybylski, 2017; Romaniuk & Lytvyn, 2018), did not arise and take its political, institutional, worldview and mental shape instantly, that is simply given to the act “On Declaration of Independence of Ukraine” (1991) adopted on 24 August 1991. Instead, contemporary Ukraine was largely formed as a political and historical result or even an entirety of other Ukrainian states, as well as quasi-state or proto-state entities that had existed before. They were constitutionalized on the geographical terrain of contemporary Ukraine at

various times, in particular during the 20th century. It is about such states and state entities (even with the attributes of sovereignty) in various areas (and nowadays, in various regions or throughout the entire territory) of contemporary Ukraine, as the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), the Directorate or the Directory, the Ukrainian State or the Second Hetmanate, the West Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR), Carpatho-Ukraine or Carpathian Ukraine, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) (within the framework of the Soviet Union), etc. The problem is supplemented by the presence of numerous theorizations and reflections on this issue within the development of political thought, political science, and jurisprudence in Ukraine, both historically (before 1991) and contemporarily (since 1991). Nevertheless, such theorizations were not necessarily implemented in political and institutional practice, even though the former were taken into account as projects of constitutional, inter-institutional and political designs in different periods of the history of Ukrainian statehood, i.e. from the beginning of the 20th century until today. In addition to such a retrospective view, the process of confirmation, affirmation, and protection of Ukrainian statehood after the official and formal declaration of its independence in August 1991 is still ongoing currently or for the foreseeable future, in particular especially intensively in the context of the russian-Ukrainian war, which began in March 2014 and took on a full-scale format in February 2022.

Such a continuum of Ukrainian statehood from retrospectives to perspectives is important one, since each Ukrainian (on the territories of contemporary Ukraine or even larger ones) state and state entity was historically characterized by its own political system, system of power and system of government. Therefore, it was always quite obvious and reasonable to expect the presence of a kind of interdependence or path dependence regarding the imitation of the inter-institutional design of the newer/subsequent states and state entities on the previous ones, and hence the fact that "official Kyiv" would somehow take into account the previous historical experience in political and constitutional engineering under the new reality, particularly after the restoration of Ukraine's independence in 1991. This was especially relevant when the Constitution of Ukraine (1996) was adopted on

28 June 1996, as well as during accepting its various revisions and modifications in 2004 (as a result of the so-called "Orange Revolution"), 2010 (as a result of the cancellation of the previous revision) and 2014 (as a result of the so-called "Revolution of Dignity"). In addition, this is also applicable in the context of the expected end of the russian-Ukrainian war, which began with the occupation/annexation of part of the territories of Ukraine in 2014 and took a full-scale/full-fledged shape in 2022. Especially given that almost no one in Ukraine had never officially denied and still does not deny the fact that the above-mentioned Ukrainian states and state entities were the historical forms and predecessors of contemporary Ukrainian statehood. Even the current Ukrainian Constitution (regardless of its revision) states that it was adopted "based on the centuries-old history of Ukrainian state-building" (Konstytutsiia Ukrainy, 1996).

Nevertheless, on the one hand, it seems that there was no "blind transplantation" of any of the previously existing designs of inter-institutional relations in Ukraine after the restoration of its independence in 1991. That is why a new political system and system of government in post-soviet Ukraine (within the borders of 1991 and according to the 1996 Constitution) did not completely or even mainly become a combination of its historical predecessors in other Ukrainian states and state entities (in contrast, it was a characteristic of many other new/independent states in Europe, which often used the early 20th century's experience of constitution-building). On the other hand, the choice of inter-institutional design and system of government in all Ukrainian states and state entities during the period before 1991 was limited one (in particular, instrumentally, legislatively and politically), and thus (as a result of worldview, political and institutional factors) it could not become a direct predictor (within the framework of unconditional interdependence or path dependence) of contemporary Ukrainian system of government since 1991 (after gaining independence). This actually turned out to be the fact that some historical (before 1991) states and state entities on the geographical terrain of contemporary Ukraine constitutionalized and tested inter-institutional design like a presidential system of government (presidentialism), while the other ones

turned to something like a parliamentary system of government (parliamentarism), at least using modern concepts. Instead, the newest and current inter-institutional design in Ukraine has mostly become a case of semi-presidential system of government (semi-presidentialism). At the same time, Ukrainian semi-presidentialism also turned out to be very different and heterogeneous one. Since it shifted repeatedly and “zigzag-likely” from one option to another without being able to stabilize and at least basically replicate the designs of inter-institutional relations, which were historically the characteristics of other Ukrainian states and state entities on the contemporary territory of this country.

Thus, the study, on the one hand, aims to systematize the evolution/retrospectives of the choice of political systems and systems of government within the framework of new and newest history of Ukrainian statehood (that is, in various historical states and state entities on the territories of contemporary Ukraine or even larger ones from the beginning of the 20th century until today). On the other hand, the research seeks to develop a holistic view of what are the risks and prospects of the current system of government and inter-institutional relations in Ukraine, particularly with a focus on their improvement and optimization in political and constitutional contexts in the future (including under probable consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war). This is planned to be done at the background of understanding the evolution of powers and relations between the main political institutions (the head of state, parliament and prime minister/cabinet) within the new and newest historical stages of the development of Ukrainian statehood. Accordingly, attention will be focused on the issues of succession or interdependence of political institutions (in particular, their powers, role and place in different systems of government) in the context of influence of historical milestones and entities of Ukrainian statehood on the subsequent ones or on each other, etc. This actualizes the need of adequate and retrospective delineation of a promising and optimal system of government in Ukraine for the future, particularly in terms of place of different political institutions within it.

Actually, the stated problems concerning various forms of Ukrainian statehood have

never been solved from a systemic point of view and under the “path dependence” concept. Instead, attention has traditionally been focused on the peculiarities of Ukraine’s system of government exclusively in the period after the restoration of its independence in 1991. Therefore, the study should fill this gap in answering a number of questions, the understanding of which is important for the future development of Ukrainian statehood. Given this, the research aims to achieve several goals and to solve several tasks, in particular: 1) to characterize and systematize the conditions and evolution of political systems and basic political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet – parliament”, as well as the peculiarities of relations between them in various historical states and state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine; 2) to check the extent to which the current system of government in Ukraine follows the previous inter-institutional designs (within the framework of the historical forms of Ukrainian statehood) and corresponds to the (new institutionalist) “path dependence” concept; 3) to verify the argument that the current system of government and inter-institutional relations in Ukraine need to be reformed or optimized, including in view of institutional, political and legal heritage of political institutions in Ukraine in the past, as well as given the experience of other European countries.

To achieve the goals and solve the tasks, the research is designed in such a way that it consists of five interrelated and/or consecutive (theoretical, methodological and empirical) parts. The first part of the study prepares the theoretical framework for understanding the essence and varieties of systems of government, as well as their evolution in political science with a view to their further detailing when outlining the Ukrainian specifics of these issues. The second part of the elaboration covers the essence and content of the “path dependence” concept as a methodological construction for explaining the design of political institutions, inter-institutional relations and systems of government. The third (and all subsequent ones) part of the study is empirical one and concerns the evolution, formation and multi-vector development of inter-institutional relations and systems of government in various historical states and state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine, in particular during the 1917-

1991 period. Given this, the fourth part of the research systematizes the dynamics of the development of system of government in contemporary Ukraine during the 1991-2022 period, as well as verifies its compliance with the historical institutional designs and the logics of inter-institutional relations' "path dependence" in Ukraine. Finally, the fifth and final part of the elaboration focuses on ideas about the prospects, expediency and resources for further development, reformation and optimization of system of government and design of inter-institutional relations in Ukraine. As a result, the study provides an understanding of the issues of retrospectives and perspectives of the choice of system of government in the history of Ukrainian statehood.

The Essence and Varieties of Systems of Government and Their Evolution in Political Science: The Theoretical Framework of Research to Outline Ukrainian Specifics

Before starting to solve the set research tasks, which repeatedly relate to the retrospectives and perspectives of the choice and further development of system of government within the framework of the history of Ukrainian statehood (mainly during the 1991-2022 period, as well as for the future) or generally to the delineation of the Ukrainian specifics of inter-institutional relations, it is necessary to focus on theorizing these issues, in particular regarding the definition and evolution of the essence and varieties of systems of government. This is extremely important, since the issues of choosing a system of government are ones of the fundamental and determining in the progress, functioning and development of statehood. That is why these issues, primarily within different types of republics, are actualized politically and institutionally, thus retrospectively and prospectively determining or influencing the design of inter-institutional relations in one or another country at one point in time or another. Such an assumption is confirmed in view of the understanding of system of government as formally (constitutionally or institutionally) and factually (politically or behaviorally) determined prerequisites and features of inter-institutional relations concerning formation, gaining, structuring and exercise of state power by various political institutions in

the triangle "the head of state - cabinet/prime minister - parliament" (Lytvyn, 2014c; Lytvyn, 2018a, s. 29-30). In turn, the relevance of the above-mentioned issues is enhanced by the fact that system of government is a heterogeneous category that cannot be characterized in the singular, but instead often needs to be understood as volatile from one design of inter-institutional relations to another, etc. (Lytvyn, 2014b).

It should be noted in this regard that political science is not consolidated in classification of systems of government. Therefore, there is often no consensus on what type of inter-institutional relations a particular country belongs to. Since even currently it has not been possible to generate a completely integral typology of systems of government. Instead, there are at least two basic theoretical approaches (as well as their derivatives and modifications) to distinguishing systems of government into types, in particular the so-called dichotomous and trichotomous ones (Daly, 2003; Elgie, 1998; Lijphart, 1997; Pasquino, 1997). The latter have consistently developed during several "waves" of systems of government research in political science. Moreover, the dichotomous approach absolutely prevailed in the initial "waves" of research (up to the early-mid 1990s), and the trichotomous approach became predominant one in the subsequent "waves" of research (since the mid-1990s) (Elgie, 2005b; Lytvyn, 2013). At the same time, various scholars (Daly, 2003, s. 96, 104; Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 1998, s. 227; Shugart & Carey, 1992, s. 26; Siaroff, 2003, s. 294) differentiate from two to several dozen types of systems of government.

The dichotomous theoretical approach, as evolutionarily primary and longer one, comes from the expediency of classifying all systems of government into presidential republics (presidentialism), as well as parliamentary republics and monarchies (parliamentarism). Their allocation is most often based on the predominance of the powers of, respectively, a president or parliament regarding formation and influence on the functioning of the executive or comparison the empowerment and authorization of the main institutions of state power, in general (Lytvyn, 2018a, s. 38-39). This approach arose at the end of the 19th century and gained its popularity in the middle of the 20th century, when polit-

ical science and practice initiated the search for the best/optimal, at least in constitutional and legal terms, system of government and thus the debate between supporters and opponents of presidentialism and parliamentarism (Eaton, 2002; Laski, 1944; Linz, 1994; Price, 1943; Stepan & Skach, 1993; Tsebelis, 1995). In particular, some scientists (Ackerman, 2000; Bagehot, 1872; Lijphart, 1995; Linz, 1990a; Linz, 1990b; Linz, 1994; Price, 1943; Strøm et al., 2003; Wilson, 1956) substantiated the positive institutional and political advantages of parliamentary system of government on the way to installation and consolidation of democracy. In contrast, other scholars (Cheibub & Limongi, 2002; Mainwaring, 1990; Mainwaring, 1993; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Shugart & Haggard, 2001) demonstrated that presidential system of government is not necessarily flawed, ineffective and risky one in the context of democratic choice and development, etc. Finally, other researchers (Horowitz, 1990; Laski, 1944; Linz, 1994; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Power & Gasiorowski, 1997; Sartori, 1997; Stepan & Skach, 1993) argued that it is impossible to define and choose a better and more optimal system of government between presidentialism and parliamentarism, at least purely theoretically. Since all systems of government of certain countries are undeniably context-dependent, although they differ in political and institutional consequences, particularly regarding the success or failure of democratization, as well as in socio-economic influences.

This actually reveals the weakness of the dichotomous theoretical approach to classification of systems of government. Since this approach defines presidentialism and parliamentarism quite conditionally, politically deterministically and contextually, allowing their mixing (without giving it a "pure" type) among themselves (in particular, on the basis of presence or absence of popular election of the head of state, as well as the nature of legitimacy of his or her power, etc. (Linz, 1994; Stepan & Skach, 1993)) to outline those empirical cases and designs that are politically and institutionally controversial and ambiguous ones, but are still defined by scholars either as presidential or as parliamentary countries. It is, for example, about the cases of: combining the presidential way of the executive cabinet/administration formation and collective polit-

ical responsibility of the latter (with regard to the termination of its powers) solely to parliament; a mixture of the parliamentary way of the executive cabinet formation and its collective irresponsibility (with regard to early termination of its powers) to the legislature; synthesizing the parliamentary procedures of the executive cabinet formation and responsibility with popular election of prime minister, etc. All this proves methodological and empirical insufficiency of the "presidentialism-parliamentarism" dichotomy. Since the latter is not capable of comprehensively covering all cases of inter-institutional relations in the triangle "the head of state - cabinet/prime minister - parliament" (Collier & Adcock, 1999, s. 544; Daly, 2003, s. 96; Lytvyn, 2018a, s. 39-40), although it is still used by a number of researchers.

Therefore, the trichotomous theoretical approach, as an evolutionary update, but also a much younger and significant methodological modification, is additionally composed by a type of semi-presidential republic (semi-presidentialism). Thus, this approach changes the entire logics of classification of systems of government, but also seeks answers to the questions about the best or optimal option of inter-institutional relations, including or mainly in the context of choice and consolidation of democracies, autocracies or hybrid political regimes (Elgie, 2005b; Sartori, 1997, s. 83-140). It is well known that this approach emerged only in the 1970s and 1980s (Duverger, 1980), and gained its particular popularity and transformation at the end of the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st centuries (Elgie, 1999b; Elgie, 2005a; Lijphart, 1999; Sartori, 1997; Shugart & Carey, 1992). At that time, accordingly, semi-presidential system of government was separated and initially conceptualized. Subsequently, it was reconceptualized (in particular, within the framework of such varieties as president-parliamentary (president-parliamentarism) and premier-presidential (premier-presidentialism) systems of government (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart, 2005)) and widely tested, including on the basis of both formal and actual (institutional and political) features. It is interesting that this happened in parallel with the formation, declaration/restoration of independence or transformation of a number of countries in different parts of the world in the late 1980s and 1990s,

since these countries chose a semi-presidential system of government. In addition, this theoretical approach, in particular as a separate classification branch, is sometimes even supplemented by the so-called assembly-independent (Shugart & Carey, 1992) and/or semi-parliamentary system of government (semi-parliamentarism) (Duverger, 1996; Ganghof, 2018; Ganghof, 2021). However, due to its empirical rarity, the latter is mostly interpreted as atypical one or combined with the other three "pure" types.

Theoretically, the "debut" of semi-presidentialism was followed by the transformation of the typology of systems of government into a more empirically complete and comprehensive one, but within the framework of the trichotomous approach. At the same time, the methodology for determining systems of government was also conceptually improved. Since the latter became not so much arbitrary and relational one as previously (in particular, regarding the assessment of the powers of presidents or parliaments), but began to be based on a quite clear and dispositional set of constitutional/institutional indicators for highlighting certain options of the design of inter-institutional relations. Among them, researchers (Cheibub et al., 2014; Elgie, 2004; Elgie, 2005a; Elgie, 2007; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; Shugart, 2005) most often choose such factors or indicators of the typology of systems of government (they can be formulated differently), as: 1) the subject of collective responsibility and the ability to terminate the powers of the executive cabinet/administration (it can be the head of state, the legislature, the head of state and the legislature or even no one); 2) the channel and method of replacing (including electorally or non-electorally, as well as through popular or non-popular elections) the position of the head of state. Somewhat less often, scientists (Bahro et al., 1998; Duverger, 1980; Lytvyn, 2018a, s. 40; Magni-Berton, 2013; Pasquino 1997) turn to the indicator of the structure and number of the centers of the executive, which can be monistic (with one center of the executive in the person of the head of state or the head of cabinet/prime minister) or dualistic one (when the head of state and the head of cabinet/prime minister are simultaneously the two centers of the executive), as well as to the powers of the main political institutions, primarily the head of

state. Such indicators successfully outline the concept of system of government as a complex of formally (constitutionally, institutionally) and/or factually (politically, behaviorally) determined prerequisites and features of inter-institutional relations regarding formation, gaining, legitimacy, structuring and exercise of state power by political institutions in the triangle "the head of state - cabinet/prime minister - parliament".

By superimposing these indicators (especially the primary two) and various options for their interpretation on the example of different countries of the world, the trichotomous theoretical approach provides grounds for determining such options of systems of government as presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism (sometimes semi-parliamentarism is additionally distinguished) (The semi-presidential one, 2022). Presidentialism (the USA, almost all countries of Latin America, Ghana, Indonesia, Cyprus, Korea, Singapore, Turkey, etc.) is a constitutional and/or political system of government (exceptionally in republics), which is characterized by the position of a popularly (directly or indirectly) elected for a fixed term president, as well as by the institution of president's cabinet/administration (even possibly with prime minister), whose members are collectively responsible (on the subject of early termination of the powers of this institution) exclusively to president (along with this, members of president's cabinet or administration may be individually responsible to parliament, but this does not structure the system of government). In contrast, parliamentarism (almost all European monarchies, Australia, Greece, Israel, India, Italy, Canada, Germany, Japan, etc.) is a constitutional and political system of government (possible both in republics and monarchies), where the head of state does not gain his or her powers on the basis of popular (direct or indirect) election (instead, he or she acquires them by inheritance or as a result of non-popular election, including in parliament), and the institution of the executive cabinet headed by prime minister is collectively responsible (on the subject of early termination of the powers of this institution) solely to the legislature (at the same time, members of cabinet, in addition to prime minister, can be individually responsible to the head of state and parliament, but this does not structure the system of government). As a par-

tially intermediate, but “pure” type, semi-presidentialism (Lithuania, Mongolia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Ukraine, Finland, France, Sri Lanka, etc.) is a constitutional or political system of government (exceptionally in republics), which is characterized by the position of a popularly (directly or indirectly) elected for a fixed term president, as well as by the institution of the executive cabinet headed by prime minister that are necessarily collectively responsible (on the subject of early termination of the powers of this institution) at least to parliament (however, prime minister and cabinet can be simultaneously responsible both to parliament and president; moreover, cabinet ministers can be individually responsible to parliament and/or president, but this does not structure the system of government).¹

In general, the proposed definitions and the trichotomous theoretical approach to classification of systems of government have become basic ones. Since they largely made it possible to overcome the disadvantages of the dichotomous approach and to more logically cover the array of empirical cases of inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament” in the world. In addition, such an interpretation of systems of government made it possible to distinguish presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism mostly constitutionally or institutionally, but not by referring to various relational and subjective properties of the political process, including regarding the powers of presidents, prime ministers and parliaments. Since the powers of the latter often change depending both on constitutional and political (including electoral) prerequisites, however their change in fact does not always indicate a disturbance of one or another system of government (which is especially relevant in the case of semi-presidentialism). Finally, it is precisely this theo-

riking of the types of systems of government that allows to talk about them regardless of whether a certain country is democratic, hybrid or autocratic in its political regime.

Therefore, the trichotomous theoretical approach to classification of systems of government contributes to greater institutional and political continuity of comparative analysis, as well as to clarification of retrospectives and perspectives or generally the interconnection of systems of government in certain countries, particularly in evolutionary dimension and in different contexts. This is absolutely relevant and even creates a theoretical framework for the study of system of government in the case of Ukraine during and after the restoration of its independence in 1991. Since the understanding of the given problem in this country fell on the period of active renewal of the theoretical approach to classification of systems of government from dichotomous to trichotomous one. Close attention should be paid to this, because taking into account the above-mentioned methodological feature is important while drawing conclusions about consistency or inconsistency, as well as retrospectives and perspectives of the choice of various options of systems of government within the framework of the progress of Ukrainian statehood in the past and in the future, including under the “path dependence” concept, which will be discussed in details in the next part of the study.

The “Path Dependence” Concept as a Methodological Construction for Explaining the Design of Political Institutions, Inter-Institutional Relations and Systems of Government

The issues of a design of political institutions and inter-institutional relations, in particular one or another system of government (which were detailed in the previous part of the study) in each specific country, as well as in comparative view, are definitely institutional ones. This means that they are organized and structured due to methodological principles and concepts of institutionalism or “new” institutionalism, which prevails in political science since the 1970s and 1980s. In this context, as well as in view of the subject of the study, it is appropriate to appeal to the postulate of a number of institutionalists who point out that the current

¹ This study does not raise the issue of options for defining semi-presidentialism, but instead offers the most cited and most recent among them. The complexities and invariance of semi-presidentialism’s conceptualization (from the 1970s–1980s onwards), as well as the maximalist (“Duvergerian”) and minimalist (“post-Duvergerian”) approaches to its definition can be learned from a whole array of research (Bahro et al., 1998; Boban, 2007; Brunclik & Kubat, 2016; Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 2004; Elgie, 2005a; Lytvyn, 2016a; Pasquino, 1997; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; Shugart, 2005; Steffani, 1995; Vesper, 1997).

political institutions in one or another country are definitely a modified or imitated version/reflection of those political institutions that evolutionary existed in this country or in its historical predecessors previously. Accordingly, the same should apply to design of inter-institutional relations and the format of system of government in one or another country, which hypothetically should be evolutionarily inherited and reproduced.

Purely methodologically, this position of scientists (Alexander, 2001; Arrow, 2000; Berman, 1998; Goldstone, 1998; Gorges, 2001; Greener, 2002; Greener, 2005; Fadiran & Sarr, 2016; Hall, 1998; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938; Hay & Wincott, 1998; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995; Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney, 2001; March & Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Page, 2006; Pierson, 2000; Roe, 2015; Steinmo et al., 1992; Thelen, 1999) is put forward and substantiated within the framework of the so-called historical or evolutionary institutionalism and is most often outlined by the "path dependence" concept of institutional development. The researchers (Hall & Taylor, 1996, s. 938; Roe, 2015) argue that political institutions are formal and informal procedures, organizations, routines, norms and contracts, etc., which are deeply, historically and evolutionarily rooted, promulgated and/or constitutionalized into the organizational structure of each political system, and therefore into system of government and inter-institutional relations. At the same time, the specific attributes of development of political institutions and inter-institutional relations are the fact that they are necessarily understood within the framework of a close and broad relationship with the behavior of political actors. In addition, political institutions contribute to and emphasize the asymmetry of political power, including by taking into account both the "path dependence" of political institutions' development, as well as unforeseen (not necessarily institutional and political) circumstances and consequences (Ikenberry, 1994).

It is in this context that the concept of "path dependence" of institutional development as the main attribute of historical or evolutionary institutionalism acquires special importance. According to this concept, the initial choice of political institutions and design of inter-institutional relations, including a system of government, deeply and decisively affects sub-

sequent political decisions on this matter, and therefore the nature of political institutions that appear in this system in the future. This is due to the fact that the sequence of institutions within the "path dependence" concept is determined by the fact that the important influence on the final outcome is often the result of previous significant and even minor events, which may be more probabilistic than planned and expected one (Fadiran & Sarr, 2016; Pierson, 2000, s. 252). In addition, the reason for this relationship is that political institutions and systems and generally the sphere of politics have a tendency to inertia, since historically established institutional and inter-institutional "chains" are difficult to change to a completely different course (Peters, 2001). That is why the choices made during the initial formation of political institutions and systems or during the formulation of policy goals and measures have a restraining and even preventive effect in the future (Greener, 2005; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Koelble, 1995; Peters, 2001). All this involuntarily leads to the metaphorical idea that "history matters" (Greener, 2002; Pierson, 2000).

As a result, political institutions are positioned as the most important factors in shaping the behavior of almost all political actors within the framework of one or another political system and system of government. In other words, the institutional organization of political system or even a peculiar institutional system or system of inter-institutional relations, but not social, psychological and cultural factors that do not determine the system's work, are the determining reasons in structuring of a collective political behavior. Since when a specific political institution from the triangle "the head of state - cabinet/prime minister - parliament" finds itself in a situation of choosing an alternative to its political behavior, then it appeals to all historically available, regulated and previously tested means, as well as stereotyped ideas about legitimate power and behavior (which actually make it a specific political institution within the framework of one or another system of government). At the same time, this does not mean that the historical or evolutionary "path dependence" of development of a certain political institution within the framework of a specific system of government deprives the actor of a freedom of political maneuver. Even though political institutions provide strategically useful

information that affects the identity and preferences of political actors (March & Olsen, 1989). Instead, political actors are able to consciously and deliberately abandon one or another "path dependence" trajectory of the development of political institutions and systems of government, taking into account to varying degrees the importance of the institutional legacy of the past in the context of the present and the future. Even if various trajectories of institutional development were previously chosen by these political actors or their predecessors, including within the framework of historically preceding or modern manifestations of statehood and/or state/quasi-state entities. Therefore, the "path dependence" (of development of actually any political institutions) can manifest itself in different degrees of intensity (in particular, as false, low, average or significant one, etc.) of its influence on the current political institutions and systems. Since the importance of other factors of the emergence, formation and functioning of political institutions and systems (Mahoney, 2000, s. 13; Roe, 2015), as well as political and other expenses for the maintenance and preservation of the latter (North, 1990, s. 94-95; Thelen, 1999, s. 391) are quite different.

The "path dependence" concept of institutional development is supplemented or additionally expressed by the concept of "cumulative causation". This is the idea about the irreversibility of the historical time in the context of formation and functioning of political institutions, as well as about their dependence primarily on the past "path dependence", but not on the uncertainty of the future of political institutions. In other words, the current (and final in this case) state of development of political institutions and political system depends on all previous events in this regard, because there is no immediate way out of the former, but instead it is patterned and repeated. Therefore, politics, political institutions and political system in such a case generate feedback mechanisms that cause inertia or even "block" alternative political ideas and interests (Greener, 2005). Quite similar logic is inherent in the explanation of the algorithms for choosing constructions of inter-institutional relations and designs of systems of government in certain countries that have gone through several stages of their formation and development from the historical past

to the present. This is due to the fact, on the one hand, that political institutions and systems continue to exist in one form or another, embodying the balance of collective actions, given to which political actors are able to adhere to repetitive and reliable patterns of their behavior (Calvert, 1995; Fadiran & Sarr, 2016; Shepsle, 1986). This is how stabilization of political institutions and institutionalization of political systems takes place (Alexander, 2001; Ebbinghaus, 2005; Fadiran & Sarr, 2016). On the other hand, this process is ensured by conventionalization, traditionalization and collectivization of political institutions and systems, which cease to be the objects of individual choice sooner or later, and therefore cannot or almost cannot be transformed by the actions of any individual person. In terms of systems of government, this is manifested mainly in the fact that the design of inter-institutional relations, which has its "path dependence" trajectory, is resistant to reformatting. Since any individual choice of political actors within the framework of the "path dependence" trajectory is institutionally structured in favor of not so much change as reformation of system of government (Graftstein, 1992). Although (in contrast and as noted above), political institutions in such a case are not the only causal factors in structuring of systems of government, since the latter are necessarily regulated behaviorally, even if this happens situationally and for a short time (this is especially noticeable in the case of semi-presidential system of government and is much less characteristic of presidentialism and parliamentarism).

Narrowing and directing the methodology of historical and evolutionary institutionalism, and thus the filling of the concepts of "path dependence" and "cumulative causation" to modern categories of comparative design of systems of governance and inter-institutional relations, it is quite appropriate to draw a distinction between them and highlight certain additional analytical and interpretive details. The main thing is to understand that if the system of government of a certain hypothetical country historically and stably was presidential or presidentialized one, then it should not become completely different, in particular parliamentary or parliamentarized one, after any perturbations or reforms, but instead it should either remain presidential/presidentialized (even in a different form)

or transform into at least a semi-presidential one with the elements of presidentialism (as presidentialized one), etc. It is according to these logics that presidentialism or presidentialized systems of government are successfully reproduced and preserved in the USA, Latin American countries, as well as partly in Asian and African countries. By analogy, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism or parliamentarized and even balanced systems of government are reproduced primarily in the countries of Western and Central-Eastern Europe, as well as partially in other parts of the world, etc. In addition, it is given to this that one of the basic channels and principles of institutionalization of political institutions and institutional system is provided, as a result of which the latter should function as stably and efficiently as possible. Although, this does not mean that all contemporary countries and their political elites have succeeded or are able to use such logics. However, those political institutions and forms of their interaction, including systems of government, which "survive", are considered to be effective ones, particularly theoretically. Since, conversely, inefficient political institutions decline as unprofitable and are replaced by more effective ones (Priest, 1977; Roe, 2015, s. 1). Nevertheless, it also happens that alternative political institutions and systems of inter-institutional relations "survived" due to the fact that they were the best suited for the past historical environment, which turns out to be destructive for the former currently and generally for the current conditions of political development. Given this, nothing in historical and evolutionary terms fully guarantees that an unattractive choice of institutional design and system of government in the past will not become attractive in the future, or vice versa. Since actions with a particular political system are closely related to the opportunities and solutions provided by the current institutional environment, but given its past performance (Fadiran & Sarr, 2016).

In this case, scholars (Alexander, 2001; Hay, 2002, s. 15; Roe, 2015) explain that the "path dependence" of development of political institutions and inter-institutional relations (including regarding various options of systems of government) may be disrupted due to the untheorized influence of various "exogenous shocks". The latter make it difficult to explain

the dynamics of causal relationships in the context of institutional changes in the past and currently. In addition, the "path dependence" of any system of government is characterized by and therefore may be disrupted by alternative rationality, contextual format of causal relationships and the historical contingency of various political institutions and processes in a particular political system (Greener, 2005). Finally, the structuring of political institutions and systems of government is influenced not only by institutional/constitutional, but also by behavioral and other extra-institutional factors. Since political actors are quite often positioned as "prisoners" of institutional circumstances, as a result of which certain formats of inter-institutional relations may be subject to resistance and significant modification. This is summed up by the fact that the "path dependence" concept and generally taking into account the historical heritage methodologically contribute more to explaining not so much political results in the conditions of changes, reforms and national contexts, as in the situation and regarding political and institutional stability and even the preservation of the status quo (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Alexander, 2001; Ebbinghaus, 2005; Fadiran & Sarr, 2016). Even though different institutional alternatives may provide higher total returns and dividends in the long-term and systemic perspective, although they are less attractive to political actors in the short- and medium-term (Alexander, 2001). In other words, this means that the longer political actors act in a certain institutional and systemic status quo, in particular in a certain system of government, the more unattractive and "blocked" one is the choice of any alternative to this status quo and system of government (Alexander, 2001; North, 1990; Pierson, 1993; Pierson, 2000). Especially given the fact that political actors are heterogeneous, and therefore costs and benefits are unequally distributed among them. As a result, those political actors who advocate not so much changes as the preservation of the status quo are strengthened, although this does not guarantee the preservation of the existing design of inter-institutional relations (Alexander, 2001; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). Thus, significant changes in political institutions, systems and processes occur "intermittently" and only as a result of and during "critical moments" or so-called "politics win-

dows", after which the stage of inertia and institutionalization comes again.

Nevertheless, the situation is still significantly complicated in the context of the study of the "path dependence" of institutional development of various political systems, designs of inter-institutional relations and options of systems of government. The reason is that, as stated in the previous part of the study, there are two basic theoretical approaches to classification of systems of government, in particular the dichotomous (mainly within the framework of the "presidentialism-parliamentarism" dyad) and the trichotomous (mainly within the framework of the "presidentialism-semipresidentialism-parliamentarism" triad) ones. Therefore, semi-presidentialism (as a later "invention" of inter-institutional relations within the framework of the trichotomous approach) may not be purely logically interpreted as a direct derivative of presidentialism or parliamentarism under the dichotomous approach to classification of systems of government. This is especially noticeable in the context of systematization of retrospectives and perspectives of the choice and operationalization of systems of government during very long historical periods, including in relation to various forms of Ukrainian statehood from the beginning of the 20th to the beginning of the 21st centuries. On the other hand, this problem does not exist if one uses exclusively the trichotomous classification approach in the case of certain young country or during a rather insignificant period of time in the last few decades. In other words, this purely methodologically testifies to the partial indirectness, but not a complete linearity of the "path dependence" of systems of government as such. Since the identification of the types of the latter (within the progress of political science) took place in different ways and within the framework of various approaches. This problem is helped to be solved by such a peculiarity of semi-presidentialism that it is extremely heterogeneous one (which will be detailed in the following parts of the study). In particular, semi-presidentialism can be both more presidentialized (similarly to presidentialism), as well as more parliamentarized (similarly to parliamentarism). Therefore, the choice of a specific type of semi-presidentialism may or may not confirm the "path dependence", for

example, of presidentialism or parliamentarism, etc.

All this serves as a methodological reason and a prerequisite for raising the question about the feasibility of verifying the institutional heritage and the heritability of a system of government in a certain country, particularly in contemporary Ukraine (definitely within the framework of the trichotomous theoretical approach to classification of systems of government, starting from 1991), compared to systems of government in its historical predecessors, in particular in states and state/quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine (within the framework of the dichotomous theoretical approach as the only one or the main used earlier, in particular during the 20th century and more precisely in 1917-1991). This will allow us to understand how important the institutional legacy of the past was in the case of Ukraine in the construction of the current system of power and government. In addition, it is possible to determine in this way whether the role of political institutions is overestimated within the framework of certain systems of government in the context of available options and alternatives for the behavior of individual and collective political actors. Finally, this will be the theoretical basis for obtaining knowledge about whether the "path dependence" of system of government (primarily in Ukraine) allows institutional or inter-institutional changes as opposed to stability or efficiency of governance, etc.

Theorization and Justification, Formation, Evolution and Diversity of Development of Systems of Government and Inter-Institutional Relations in Various Historical States and State/Quasi-State Entities on the Territory of Contemporary Ukraine (1917-1991)

The issues of verifying the "path dependence" and following the design of inter-institutional relations and options for choosing the system of government in Ukraine after the restoration of its independence in 1991 are necessarily retrospectively and prospectively related (or should be related) to the matters of development of Ukrainian statehood in the past. This especially applies to formation, evolution and multi-vector progress of systems of gov-

ernment and generally inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament” in various historical state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine (at least in 1917–1991). Since tracking and evaluating the hypothetical relationship between the institutional design options and choosing the design of systems of government in the past and in the future are important both politically and theoretically. They can prove or disprove the evolutionary influence of some historical milestones in the formation of Ukrainian statehood on others or subsequent ones. It is in this context that attention needs to be paid to the rubric on systematization of knowledge regarding theorizing, designing and approbation of various options of systems of government and inter-institutional relations in numerous historical state and quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine. Since the latter consistently preceded the political and institutional practices of the system of government in Ukraine in the period after the restoration of its independence. This additionally requires focusing attention on the formation and evolution, powers and role of basic political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament” (Lytvyn, 2015b; Lytvyn, 2016b) (although not all of them should take place in certain state entities), including regarding the structuring and place of these institutions in a system of government during the course of the new/pre-modern (until 1991) political history of Ukraine. In view of this, attention should be focused on such Ukrainian (on the territory of contemporary Ukraine) states and state/quasi-state entities of the past (in 1917–1991), as the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR), the Directorate or the Directory, the Ukrainian State or the Second Hetmanate, the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR), Carpatho-Ukraine or Carpathian Ukraine, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) (within the framework of the Soviet Union) and many others less known to the public, as well as on possible worldview and scientific elaborations of a whole array of thinkers and scholars of the past.

The first theoretical, political and constitutional ideas and elaborations regarding structuring of inter-institutional relations (in the formats and designs relatively close to modern ones) in various state entities on the territory of

contemporary Ukraine can be found in ideas of such Ukrainian thinkers and scientists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries as Andruzkyi (2007 [1850]), Drahomanov (1937; Vilna spilka 1884), Franko (1984), Mikhnovskyi (Osnovnyi zakon “Samostiinoi Ukrainy” [OZSU], 1997), Hrushevskyi (2001), Doroshenko (1930; 1932), as well as Dnistrianskyi (Stetsiuk, 1999), etc. These ideas were developed primarily within the framework of the dichotomous theoretical approach to classification of systems of government into presidentialism and parliamentarism, since the trichotomous approach was not even initiated in political science during this period. Their common denominator, if one can express it in modern political science categories, was the use of the logics of constructing inter-institutional relations on the territory of contemporary Ukraine within the framework of the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament” (although not all of these political institutions necessarily took place in the ideas of certain scientists and in the practice of certain state or quasi-state entities in Ukraine). At the same time, it is noteworthy that the problem of the feasibility of the introduction, implementation, formation, empowerment, role and place of the institution of presidency in the political systems of various Ukrainian state or quasi-state entities in the period from 1917 became historically significant one in this regard. This date is designated as the beginning of the countdown (including for the coverage in our research) mainly because the position and institution of president (and therefore the order of its election and entry into office, powers, place and role in political system, as well as the features of early termination of its powers, replacement and removal from office) in the history of Ukrainian statehood had never been tested before until this time. Although the presidency has already been successfully used in a number of other states, which were presidential or parliamentary republics according to their systems of government (for example, if we take into account the oldest and most famous cases in the USA, France, Switzerland, etc), and currently (including additionally in semi-presidential republics) is the most common design option for the institution of the head of state in the world.

However, purely historiographically, Ukrainian intellectuals and scholars began to

appeal to the position and institution of president (at the background of other political institutions and within the framework of inter-institutional relations) somewhat earlier than in 1917, including reflecting on options for the construction and constitutionalization of political systems for different state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine, particularly for hypothetical ones in the conditions of a long-term absence of a proper Ukrainian state (Shapoval & Holovatenko 1997). Thus, the members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood (1845–1847) created and spread the idea of the feasibility of constructing a Slavic union/federation of Christian republics in the format of parliamentarism, at least if we talk about it by modern criteria. Since these republics (including Ukraine) were to be headed by non-popularly elected in national assemblies (as if in popularly elected legislatures in separate parts of the federation) for a certain fixed term presidents (as the heads of separate parts of the federation), and the main functions of regulating the political process had to rely on the parliament (Seim), permanently operating at the level of the federation (Kyrylo-Mefodiivske Tovarystvo, 1990). Accordingly, a similar position was held by one of the members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, Andruzkyi, whose “Outlines of the Constitution of the Republic of 1850” (Andruzkyi, 2004 [1850]) insisted on the expediency of creating in Ukraine (as the center of the Slavic federation) a parliamentary republic with the office of president (simultaneously as the head of state and a member of the State Council (i.e. cabinet)) as a member of the Legislative Assembly (i.e. parliament). A similar – parliamentary – design of inter-institutional relations in Ukraine (expected as a part of the republican federation to replace the Russian empire) was advocated by Drahomanov, in particular in his “Free Union” (“Vilna spilka”, 1884). The author insisted that the non-popularly elected head of state (if it is not a monarch) should be a politically responsible (for promulgation, supervision of implementation and prosecution for violation of laws, as well as partly for the formation of the executive cabinet) institution of power. Following these logics, the idea on the expediency of introducing parliamentary republic in Ukraine (as a part of the federation) with a non-popularly elected in parliament for

a fixed term president as the head of state, who must serve his or her people, prevailed in socio-political ideas of Franko (1984), as well as in program manifestos of the first Ukrainian political parties of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Zhytnyk, 2010). This, for example, was inherent in the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists (which united the members of the Ukrainian Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Radical Party), the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party within various states, which included the territories of contemporary Ukraine. In turn, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists even insisted on the parliamentary republic, where (partially like contemporary Switzerland) the functions of president should be performed alternately (for one year each) by members of the High State Council (the executive cabinet), formed and responsible to parliament (Pakhomova, 2004: 21).

Mikhnovskyi proposed a completely controversial or opposite logic for the arrangement of inter-institutional relations and engineering the design of system of government in Ukraine at the beginning of the 20th century, in particular in his elaboration “The basic law of “Independent Ukraine” of the Union of the Ukrainian People” (1997 [1900]), which became the basis of the program of the Ukrainian People’s Party). On the one hand, the author opposed the idea of local government of the parts of decentralized Russian empire, but insisted on full independence of Ukraine. On the other hand, Mikhnovskyi focused on a presidential rather than parliamentary design of republic, since he emphasized the introduction of the position and institution of popularly elected for a fixed term (of six years) president as both the head of state and the head of the executive. In addition, the accent was placed on the assumption that president should be politically invulnerable, since political responsibility for his or her actions as the head of the executive had to be borne by individual ministers of cabinet (presidential administration), appointed directly by president without the consent of bicameral parliament. The logic of presidentialism was also evidenced by such an attribute of inter-institutional relations (in modern sense) that president was not supposed to have the right of legislative veto, but was obliged to supervise the implementation of laws, etc. In addition, bi-

cameral parliament could hold president accountable in case of violation of the constitution by the latter. This procedurally (through a special people's court made up of the representatives of the two chambers of parliament) largely resembled the logics of impeachment and could be followed by the removal of president from office and by the announcement of his or her early election.

It is noteworthy that the dichotomy of parliamentarism and presidentialism outlined above and theorized in the history of Ukrainian political thought of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (it will be also discussed further below) was clearly and unambiguously revealed (as a relationship and even an imitation) in the practice of the real political process and inter-institutional relations within the framework of the original "new" (in a new period of political history) state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine during the period since 1917 (see Table 1). In other words, the political and legal thought, as well as political practice of Ukraine in the period of the middle of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century actually focused on the choice between presidential and parliamentary models of republicanism and systems of government. Accordingly, the choice was made between the position of popularly elected for a fixed term president as both the head of state and the head of the executive (presidentialism) or the position of president exclusively as the head of state elected/appointed for a fixed term by parliament, cabinet or other institution (parliamentarism). Although the second option (as it will become clear below) significantly prevailed empirically and statistically.

On the one hand, the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), where for the first time in the history of Ukraine the institution of presidency (the ideologist of which was Hrushevsky (Pryimak, 1991)) was tested in practice (Ahafonov, 2001, s. 103), used parliamentary republic, at least within the framework of then and even modern political science categories. Since the head of state was president elected for a fixed term not popularly, but in parliament, and instead the executive belonged to cabinet of relevant ministers (Khrystiuk, 1921, s. 175; Todyka & Yavorskyi, 1999, s. 65). At the same time, that logic of inter-institutional relations was not completely regulated immediately af-

ter the creation of the UPR on November 20, 1917, and even on April 29, 1918, when the Constitution of this state was adopted (Konstytutsiia Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki, 1921; Doroshenko, 1932, s. 56–57), but instead was partially implemented later, when the UPR was functioning in exile. This primarily concerned the institution of president of the UPR, which was nominally not foreseen until 1926/1944 (Bielov & Bysaha, 2007, s. 74–75). Therefore, the opinions of some scientists regarding the naming of individual politicians of this republic as presidents of the UPR (primarily of Hrushevsky himself who was the speaker or president of the Central Council of Ukraine/first parliament of the UPR ("President du Parlement D'Ukraine") (Doroshenko, 1930, s. 35; Starkiv, 2012, s. 859)) during the period until 1926 are conventional, stylized and figurative ones. Nevertheless, this does not invalidate the conclusion that the UPR at all stages of its development and in all formats of its existence (even within the framework of other state entities) was a case of parliamentarism (see Table 1 for details). Since the highest body of state power of the UPR was initially (until April 29, 1918) the parliament (the Central Council of Ukraine), and the highest official and supreme representative of the state was the speaker, chairman or president of the parliament, but not the president of the state in modern meaning or even not the head of the executive cabinet (initially of the General Secretariat and later of the Council of National Ministers), which was collectively responsible and accountable to the Central Council of Ukraine. A similar logic was nominally regulated (but practically not implemented due to the coup d'état) by the Constitution of the UPR of April 29, 1918.

Soon, in particular during the period from December 14, 1918 to November 10, 1920 (after Skoropadskyi, the hetman and the head of another state entity (the so-called Ukrainian State or the Second Hetmanate) on the territory of contemporary Ukraine, the system of government of which will be characterized below, was removed from power), the executive committee or the so-called Directory or the Directorate was the highest body of state power of the UPR (even after its formal unification with the West Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) on January 22, 1919, the system of governing of which will also be discussed below). This executive com-

mittee was collectively responsible for its work solely to parliament. At the same time, the specificity of the period of the Directory/Directorate of the UPR (until 1920 – on the territory of contemporary Ukraine, and until 1926 – in exile) was the fact that the position of “classic” president of republic as the head of state was still not regulated. Instead, the executive Directory/Directorate itself consisted of the chairman (initially Vynnychenko and later Petliura) and 5 or 6 members. At the same time, we mostly adhere to the position that the Directory was positioned not only as the executive committee, but also as a kind of institution of collegial presidency (with the right to issue decrees with the force of laws) in terms of the powers and functions of the former. This political institution was elective, subordinated and collectively responsible to the bodies of the legislative power (that is initially to temporary Labor Congress of Ukraine and later to nominally regulated and popularly elected parliament – the Ukrainian National Council (Zakon pro tymchasove Verkhovne Upravlinnia, 1992 [1920]; Zakon pro Derzhavnu Narodnu Radu, 1920)), that actually testified to the continuation of the parliamentary nature of the UPR. It is also noteworthy that the existence of the body of the executive or the executive cabinet – the Council of People’s Ministers – headed by a chairman (as an analogue of prime minister) was foreseen in the UPR. The latter was appointed by the Directory/Directorate (as the collegial head of state in the UPR) and was accountable/responsible to parliament (that is initially to Labor Congress of Ukraine and later to the Ukrainian National Council). Nevertheless, in the conditions of martial law in the UPR during this period of time, the functions of parliament were entrusted to the executive cabinet (the Council of People’s Ministers), and the head of the Directory/Directorate (if impossible, then the head of the executive cabinet) actually played an individual role of the head of state (see Table 1 for details).

When the UPR (including initially “under the leadership” of the Directory/Directorate) began to function in exile (from November 12, 1920 to August 22, 1992, albeit with interruptions), it continued to be a case of parliamentarism. However, the republic began to be characterized by the fact that it created in 1921 the position of non-popularly elected executive Chief

Otaman (as a member of the Directory in exile until 1926 and later as an independent position) who had the role of the head of state. Soon, particularly in 1926/1944, the position of non-popularly elected president as the head of state was regulated in the UPR. Thus, Petliura (1921–1926), A. Livytskyi (1926–1948 and 1948–1954), Vytvytskyi (1954–1965), M. Livytskyi (1967–1989) and Plavyuk (1989–1992) were presidents of the republic at different times. Along with this, the institution of the Executive body (the Council of People’s Ministers), nominally formed and collectively responsible (regarding early termination of powers of this institution) to parliament (initially to the State National Council, then to the Council of the Republic and finally to the Ukrainian National Council; although the parliament of the UPR in exile actually almost did not function on a permanent basis), was foreseen (Naddniprianets, 1961). It was in this nominal and actual construction of the design of system of government and inter-institutional relations in general (see Table 1) that the UPR ceased to exist in August 1992, when it officially recognized the independent state of Ukraine as its legal successor and passed a decision to transfer the powers and attributes of state power to the latter.

In addition to the Ukrainian People’s Republic as the largest and sovereign state on the territory of contemporary Ukraine at the beginning of the 20th century, parliamentarism was defined as a preferred option for the design of inter-institutional relations and systems of government within the framework of other attempts of Ukrainian state entities in the period of the beginning – the first half of the 20th century, even often regardless of geography, as well as political and ideological contexts. In particular, parliamentarism became an option for inter-institutional relations and even constitutional design within the framework of various state or quasi-state entities (including autonomous ones) on the territory of contemporary Transcarpathian region of Ukraine and in the western border region of contemporary Ukraine. One of its initial manifestations was the so-called “Hutsul Republic”, which existed from November 8, 1918 to June 11, 1919 in the east of Transcarpathia with its center in the settlement of Yasinia (near Rakhiv) and advocated the idea of reunification of Transcarpathian Hutsulshchyna (“Hutsul Republic”) with Ukraine. In this quasi-

state entity, the highest body of legislative power was popularly elected Ukrainian People's Council (a kind of parliament), from among which a ministerial staff and the head (as the highest official in the state) of the "Council" or Supreme Board (the executive committee) were

appointed, provided that the latter were collectively responsible exclusively to the legislature (Hutsulska Respublika, 2013: 18-19; Maslianyk, 2016; Slyvka, 2004, s. 263) (see Table 1 for details).

Table 1 The design of inter-institutional relations and systems of government in historical Ukrainian states and state/quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine (1917-1991)²

State or state/quasi-state entity (years)	The highest body of the legislative power (the legislature or parliament)	The highest body of the executive power (the executive or cabinet)	The highest official in the state or state/quasi-state entity	The existence of the institution of president as the head of state	Method of president's electing (if any)	The subject of collective responsibility (termination of powers) of the executive cabinet	The system of government
UPR (Central Council of Ukraine) (1917-1918)	Central Council of Ukraine	General Secretariat / Council of National Ministers	Chairman/Speaker/ President of Parliament	Formally and actually - no	-	Parliament	Parliamentarism
UPR (Directory) (1918-1920)	Labor Congress of Ukraine / Ukrainian National Council	Directory/Directorate + Council of People's Ministers	The Head of the Directory/Directorate (actually)	Formally - no, actually - collegial presidency (Directory/Directorate)	In parliament	Parliament	Parliamentarism
UPR in exile (1920-1992)	State National Council / Council of the Republic / Ukrainian National Council	Council of People's Ministers / Executive body	Chief Otaman / President	Formally and actually - yes (individual presidency)	In parliament	Parliament	Parliamentarism
Ukrainian State / Second Hetmanate (1918)	- / Ukrainian Seim	Hetman + Council of Ministers	Hetman	Formally and actually - no	-	The head of state	Constitutional hereditary dualistic monarchy
WUPR (1918-1919)	Ukrainian National Council / National Seim	Cabinet (People's Administration or State Secretariat)	The Head of the Board of the Ukrainian National Council	Formally - no, actually - collegial presidency (Board of the Ukrainian National Council)	In parliament	Parliament	Parliamentarism
WUPR in exile (1919-1923)	Ukrainian National Council / People's (National) Chamber	State Council of Ministers	"Dictator" / President of the Republic	Formally and actually - yes (individual presidency)	Popularly	President	Presidentialism
"Hutsul Republic" (1918-1919)	Ukrainian People's Council	"Council" or Supreme Board	The Head of "Council" or Supreme Board	Formally and actually - no	-	Parliament	Parliamentarism
"Lemko-Rusyn Republic" (1918-1921)	Grybow Rusyn Council	"Rusyn Council" or Central National Council	The Head/President of "Rusyn Council" or Central National Council	Formally and actually - no	-	Parliament	Parliamentarism
"Komancza Republic" (1918-1919)	Ukrainian National County Council	County commissariat	The Head of Ukrainian National County Council	Formally and actually - no	-	Parliament	Parliamentarism
"Rus'ka Krajina" ("Ruthenian Country") (1918-1919)	Ruthenian People's Soim / County Congress of Councils	State governorship	State governor	Formally and actually - no	-	Parliament	Parliamentarism
"Subcarpathian Rus" / "Rusynia" (1919-1938)	Parliament of Czechoslovakia / National Council	Directory / Gubernatorial Council / Council of Ministers	The Head of Directory / Provincial governor / Chairman of the Council of Ministers	Formally and actually - no	-	Parliament	Parliamentarism
"Carpathian Ukraine" (1938-1939)	Soim	Council of Ministers	President	Formally and actually - yes (individual presidency)	In parliament	Parliament	Parliamentarism
Ukrainian People's Republic of Soviets (1917-1919)	All-Ukrainian congress of Soviets + All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of Soviets	People's Secretariat	Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
Odesa Soviet Republic (1918)	Councils of Workers' and Peasants'	Council of People's Commissars	Chairman of the Regional executive	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism

² The table is only minimally compiled on the basis of the existing research (Lytvyn, 2015b; Lytvyn, 2016b), but instead is made on the basis of own interpretations of institutional and political realities in various states and state/quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine.

	Deputies + Regional executive committee		committee				
Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic (1918)	Extraordinary congress of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies + Taurida Central Executive Committee	Council of People's Commissars	Chairman of the Taurida Central Executive Committee	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic (1918-1919)	Congress of Councils of Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih region + Regional executive committee	Council of People's Commissars	Chairman of Regional executive committee	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
"Free territory" or "Makhnovshchina" (1918-1921)	Military Revolutionary Council + Regional Congress of Peasants, Workers and Insurgents + free councils and communes	Council of Revolutionary Insurgents of Ukraine	Chairman of the Council of Revolutionary Insurgents of Ukraine	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Anarchism
Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic (1919)	Odesa Committee of the CP	Provisional Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government/Committee	Chairman of Provisional Revolutionary Government/Committee	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
"Bashanka Republic" (1919)	Village Council	Insurgent Committee	Insurgent headquarters	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
"Vysunsk Republic" (1919)	Village Council	Insurgent Committee	Mykolaiv Clandestine Committee	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
"Khotyn" or "Bessarabian Directory" (1919)	-	Insurgent Committee	The Head of the Directory	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Military-insurgent regime
Crimean Socialist Soviet Republic (1919)	Regional conference of councils + Regional executive committee	Provisional Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government/Committee	Chairman of Provisional Revolutionary Government/Committee	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
"Medvyn Republic" (1919-1921)	Village meetings + Volost revolutionary committee	Insurgent Committee	Otaman of the Insurgent Headquarters	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Military-insurgent regime
"Mliiv Republic" (1919-2022)	Village meetings	Insurgent Committee	Otaman of the Insurgent Headquarters	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Military-insurgent regime
"Black Forest Republic" (1919-2022)	Village meetings	Insurgent Committee	Otaman of the Insurgent Headquarters	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Military-insurgent regime
"Kholodny Yar Republic" (1919-2022)	Congress of otamans	Insurgent Committee	Chief Otaman of the Insurgent Headquarters	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Military-insurgent regime
"Kholodny Yar Republic" (1919) - constitution draft	Ukrainian Republican Council	Ukrainian State Government	The Incumbent (President)	Formally and actually - yes (individual presidency)	Popularly	President or parliament	Semi-presidentialism/Presidentialism
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (1919-1937)	All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets + All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee	Council of People's Commissars	Chairman of Revolutionary Committee (nominally) + Central Committee of the CP and its First secretary (actually)	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
Galician Socialist Soviet Republic (1920)	Galician Revolutionary Committee	Council of People's Commissars	Chairman of Galician Revolutionary Committee	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1938-1991)	Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR + Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR	Council of People's Commissars / Council of Ministers	Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (nominally) + Central Committee of the CP and its First secretary (actually)	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
Ukrainian State (1941)	National Assembly / "Council of Seniors" / Ukrainian National Council (quasi-parliaments)	Ukrainian national government / "Council of Seniors"	The Head of the Ukrainian national government	Formally and actually - no	-	Quasi-parliament	Quasi-parliamentarism
"Olevsk Republic" (1941)	-	District administration + Ukrainian Insurgent Army "Polissian Sich"	Otaman of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army "Polissian Sich"	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Insurgent republican army dictatorship
Ukrainian Independent State (1941-1944)	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists + Ukrainian	The Head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists / The	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Insurgent republican dictatorship of one party

		Insurgent Army	Head of Ukrainian State				and army
Ukrainian Independent State (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, USLC) (1944-1949)	Great Assembly of the USLC (sessionally) + Presidium of the USLC (between sessions)	General Secretariat	President of the Presidium of the USLC	Formally - no, actually - collegial presidency (Presidium of the USLC)	In parliament	Quasi-parliament (Great Assembly of the USLC)	Quasi-parliamentarism
"Kolkhy Republic" (1943)	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists + Ukrainian Insurgent Army	Head of the branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Insurgent republican dictatorship of one party and army
"Cosmach Republic" (1944-1945)	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists + Ukrainian Insurgent Army	Head of the branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Insurgent republican dictatorship of one party and army
"Zakerzonian Republic" (1945-1947)	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists + Ukrainian Insurgent Army	Head of the branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	Formally and actually - no	-	-	Insurgent republican dictatorship of one party and army
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1991)	Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR + Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR	Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR	President of the Ukrainian SSR	Formally and actually - yes (individual presidency)	Popularly	President or parliament	Semi-presidentialism

After that, an attempt was made to create a state in the form of the so-called "Lemko-Rusyn", "Rus'ka People's", "Western-Lemko Region" or "Florynka" Republics. This entity existed from December 5, 1918 to January 8, 1921 with its capital in the settlement of Florynka (present-day Poland), but adhered to the position that unification with Russia, not Ukraine, is expedient (or at least with the autonomous "Subcarpathian Rus" as part of Czechoslovakia) (Kokovskyi, 1934, s. 115-117; Magocsi, 1993). By analogy with the previous case, the so-called Grybow Rusyn Council (from the place of its creation) was a kind of the legislature in a quasi-state entity. This institution was the basis for the election of the Head/President and the composition of the executive committee - the so-called "Rusyn Council/Government" or the Central National Council in Florynka, which was responsible and accountable solely to the legislature. Another Lemko Region quasi-state formation of Ukrainians during this period (also mainly on the territory of contemporary Poland, therefore it was not considered as chronologically original) was the so-called "Komancza" or "Eastern-Lemko Region Republic". The latter, from November 4, 1918 to January 23, 1919, existed with its center in the settlement of Wislok Wielki and wanted unification with Ukraine. The legislative body of this quasi-state entity was the Ukrainian National County Council headed by its Head. From its composition, this institution formed the executive cabinet - the County Commissariat. Thus, the positions of the head of the legislature and the head of the executive cabinet were held by the

same person (Kokovskyi, 1934, s. 115-117; Shpylka, 1986) (see Table 1 for details).

A similar one was an attempt of existing of the so-called "Rus'ka Krajina" ("Ruthenian Country") in modern Transcarpathia. It was an autonomy initially in Hungary and later in Czechoslovakia (from December 24, 1918 to September 10, 1919) with the center in Mukachevo. Here the functions of the legislature were performed by popularly elected Ruthenian People's Soim (later it was to become the County Congress of Councils), and the executive body (as a kind of cabinet) was the State governorship headed by the State governor (as a kind of prime minister), which was formed and collectively responsible to the legislature. Thus, the institution of president as the head of state was not foreseen. After that, there was the quasi-state entity of "Subcarpathian Rus" or "Rusynia" (from April 23, 1919 to December 30, 1938) as autonomy in Czechoslovakia with the center in the city of Uzhgorod. From the very beginning, this quasi-state entity used the parliamentary model of inter-institutional relations of Czechoslovakia itself (with the representation of deputies from the region in the federal parliament), and the highest executive body immediately after the creation of autonomy was the Directory with its Head, but later it was the Gubernatorial Council headed by the Provincial Governor. Instead, it was only at the end of the period of existence of "Subcarpathian Rus" that it created its own legislature (the National Council), which formed the executive cabinet (Council of Ministers) headed by the chairman/prime minister, who were collectively re-

sponsible to the legislature (Pilash, 2013; Vehesh, 2004b; *Z rozporiadzhennia uriadu Chekhoslovatskoi Respubliky*, 1920). In continuation, parliamentarism in state entities on the territory of the specified region of contemporary Ukraine was actually reflected in the predominantly autonomous (from October 8, 1938 to March 15, 1939), as well as later (from March 15 to March 18 or July 7, 1939) even in the formally independent state entity "Carpathian Ukraine" (this name was officially proposed instead of the naming "Subcarpathian Rus") with its center in Uzhgorod and later in Khust. In particular, the legal acts of this autonomy and unrecognized state stipulated that: president as the highest official and the head of state must be elected by Sojm (the parliament of "Carpathian Ukraine"); the executive/cabinet (Council of Ministers), the composition of which must be chosen and approved by Sojm, is headed by prime minister who must be appointed by president (and with the consent of the latter may issue temporary degrees with the force of law); prime minister/cabinet (Council of Ministers) and president should be politically responsible only to parliament (Chekhovych, 2011, s. 318; Stercho, 1965; Vehesh, 2004a; Vehesh, 2004c) (see Table 1 for details). At the same time, according to the idea of the creators of the Constitution of "Carpathian Ukraine" adopted on March 15, 1939, it was about the format of a presidential republic with non-popularly elected for a fixed term president. However, this was true only partially and exclusively in practice, but not nominally and formally.

By analogy, the logics of parliamentarism or quasi-parliamentarism created the basis of attempts to form state or quasi-state entities in other historical territories (at the beginning of the 20th century) of present-day Ukraine, in particular on the lands of contemporary Southern and Eastern Ukraine. However, in this case it is mainly about the socialist or soviet republics that were associated or affiliated with or later became parts of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (1917–1922) and/or the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (which arose on March 10, 1919, and later became the part of the Soviet Union). From among such historical state and quasi-state entities of the period before the creation of the Soviet Union and entry of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Repub-

lic (which was later renamed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; the system of government of this state entity will be discussed later) into its composition, the following formations should be primarily singled out as: Ukrainian People's Republic of Soviets or Soviet Ukrainian People's Republic with its center in Kharkiv (December 25, 1917 – January 6, 1919), Odesa Soviet Republic (February 20 – March 15, 1918), Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic (March 21 – April 30, 1918), Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic (February 12, 1918 – February 17, 1919), Crimean Socialist Soviet Republic (April 28 – June 26, 1919), Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic (May – September 1919), "Bashtanka Republic" (September 16 – November 18, 1919), "Vysunsk Republic" (October 7 – November 21, 1919) and Galician Socialist Soviet Republic (July 15 – September 21, 1920). All of these state and quasi-state entities (except the "Bashtanka Republic" and "Vysunsk Republic", which were peasant, albeit socialist state units) had very similar quasi-parliamentary systems of government. Since the main and leading (simultaneously legislative, executive, administrative and controlling ones) bodies of these republics were mostly the executive committees at various levels of governance (Shatalina, 2003, s. 664), which were elected by congresses of councils and were responsible to them. As a result, the executive committees were empowered to govern the republics, to suspend, repeal and amend the acts of all lower authorities and administrations. Given this, the executive committees (at the same time as quasi-parliaments) typically formed and had the right to dismiss modern analogs of the executive cabinets. The latter were called people's secretariats, workers'-peasants' governments or councils of people's commissar and had their own heads (Kulchytskyi & Movchan, 2012, s. 97; Lupandin, 2010, s. 186) at different times and in different soviet republics (see Table 1).

Finally, such a scheme of the system of government and inter-institutional relations, taking into account the experience and practice of state and quasi-state entities in the form of socialist or soviet republics in 1917–1922, was almost identically applied (with gradual expansion to the entire nominal territory of contemporary Ukraine) within the framework of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (it was called the

Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic until 1937) as part of the Soviet Union – the longest-lasting state entity on the territory of Ukraine throughout the 20th century (1919/1922–1991). As in all historically preceding state and quasi-state entities of this type, its feature was the absence of the institution of president, caused (as in the Soviet Union in general) by the approval of a peculiar design of inter-institutional relations. The latter, at first glance, could not be comprehensively compared with either parliamentary nor presidential system of republican government, but it was purely nominally more inclined to parliamentarism, and therefore it was quite often (especially with regard to the idea of the authority of councils, albeit a critical attitude to political and legal theory) mentioned as quasi-parliamentarism. The fact is that the highest state authority of the Ukrainian SSR (despite its complete subordination to the Soviet Union and its political system) was initially (from March 1919 to July 1938) the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, and later (from July 1938 to August 1991) it was the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR (at least nominally). Formally, the highest legislative body of the Ukrainian SSR from 1920 to 1938 was the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, and from 1938 it became the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR was formed from the environment of the latter and was accountable to it as the highest collegial body of state power in the republic. Instead, political power was actually in the hands of the Communist Party of Ukraine as part of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, and its highest body in the Ukrainian SSR was the Central Committee and the First (in 1925–1934 – the General) Secretary of the Central Committee who was the leader of the republic. The analogues of the executive cabinets in the Ukrainian SSR at different times were the Council of People’s Commissars (1919–1946) and later the Council/Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR (1947–1991), which were responsible to the legislature. In this context, the Ukrainian SSR was nominally headed at one time (in 1919–1938) by the Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, and later (in 1938–1985) by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. Although, the state was de facto governed by the secretary of the

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukrainian SSR.

Such an idea of quasi-parliamentarism was supplemented by the fact that the logic of the institution of president was not understood and supported by the partocratic environment and the higher echelons of power. Even despite the fact that the latter made attempts to introduce the position of president into the soviet political and legal process, particularly in 1936, 1964 and 1988 (Lytvyn, 2015b; Lytvyn, 2016b). The main reason for this situation is that the institution of president is inextricably linked to the separation of powers, in particular according to classical models of the exercise of power. However, the official state ideology of the soviet period (hence in the Ukrainian SSR) generally denied the separation of powers as a way of organizing the political system and inter-institutional relations, because it considered it as a “foreign value” for the socialist model of development. On the other hand, to confirm this position, some soviet political actors even insisted that the Soviet Union was actually endowed with the office of president, and it was a collegial one. Since the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, i.e. the soviet parliament (at the level of both the Soviet Union generally and the Ukrainian SSR particularly, etc.), was often referred to as the institution of president. Finally, the situation nominally changed only in March 1990, when the Third Extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies adopted the Law “On the establishment of the post of the President of the USSR” (Pro zasnuvannia posta Prezydenta SRSR, 1990; Stryzhova, 2011). This was due to the dramatic events of that time, the crisis of soviet federalism, the beginning of socio-economic and political “Perestroika”, as well as democratization of the country. Moreover, even though the first (and the last one) election of the president of the Soviet Union (Gorbachev was elected as the president) were held directly at the Congress of People’s Deputies (the highest body of state power in the Soviet Union), direct and popular election of the head of state were expected to be held in the future. Given to this, the system of government of the state was to a large extent directed not so much in the direction of parliamentarism or quasi-parliamentarism, but semi-presidentialism (at least by modern categories). By analogy and thanks to the people popularity of the idea of

the institution of president elected for a fixed term by the people, a similar logic of inter-institutional relations was inherited and regulated in the Ukrainian SSR and other Soviet Union's republics, and after that in almost all post-soviet countries. In particular, Ukraine (but formally the Ukrainian SSR) co-opted the position of president on July 5, 1991 (Pro Prezydenta Ukrainiskoi RSR, 1991; Pro zasnuvannia posta Prezydenta Ukrainiskoi RSR, 1991; Pro vybory Prezydenta Ukrainiskoi RSR, 1991), in particular as an attempt to take into account the norms and experience of both the Soviet Union, as well as foreign legislation (Todyka & Yavorskyi, 1999, s. 72) (this will be detailed in the next part of the study). Nevertheless, at that time there was almost no appeal to political and legal ideas and practices of the institution of presidency, as well as generally inter-institutional relations in the historical and ethnic lands and state entities of Ukraine.

In this context, it should be noted that the heads of state (who were called presidents, otamans, governors, the heads of other institutions, etc.) – individual or collegial ones – were in no case popularly elected, but instead were appointed or elected by the legislatures, their counterparts or other authorities in all historical cases of states and state/quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine, where the design of inter-institutional relations similar (by modern standards) to parliamentarism was used, including quite often as a kind of quasi-parliamentarism. Nevertheless, such heads of state were sometimes positioned as the heads of the executive, and therefore they were very influential and empowered ones in practice. At least at the background of other political institutions, including parliaments, which often remained nominal and non-functional ones due to the peculiarities of the real political process of that time. This has sometimes served as the reason for the de facto delineation of systems of government, where certain real inter-institutional relations were practiced, often not so much as parliamentary, but as presidential ones. Although this did not correspond at all to the political theory of the beginning – middle of the 20th century. Moreover, the outlined logic was often inherited from one state entity to the next one, and therefore the “path dependence” of institutional development, as well as the interdependen-

ce of systems of government and inter-institutional relations as a whole were at least partially traced. Although, on the contrary, such ideas and designs of inter-institutional relations were neither formally nor actually adopted in Ukraine, starting from 1991. Since this state has never over a thirty-year period positioned itself as a parliamentary republic (this will be detailed in the next part of the study), and therefore it almost did not inherit the institutional design of its historical predecessors and did not reflect the continuation of the “path dependence” of institutional development.

Nevertheless, the design of parliamentarism or quasi-parliamentarism was far from the only one type of inter-institutional relations within the framework of historical state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine. Since there were many other manifestations of the construction of inter-institutional relations, especially in the first half of the 20th century, which do not even necessarily fit into the classical classifications of systems of government. In their conditions, the executive and the position/institution of the head of state did not come from the legislature/parliament, its analogues or other authorities, but from popular elections or other procedures, as well as were not determined and structured in any way at all, but instead were often formed chaotically and situationally, etc.

It is expedient in this context to appeal first of all to the experience (as the most historically early one) of the so-called Ukrainian State or the Second Hetmanate headed by Skoropadskyi. It was an independent Ukrainian state on the territory of contemporary northern, central, eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, as well as parts of the territories of contemporary Belarus, Moldova, Poland and Russia with its capital in Kyiv, which arose in place of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) as a result of a coup d'état and existed during April 29 – December 14, 1918. Politically and institutionally, the Second Hetmanate arose as a result of the liquidation of all institutions of power of the parliamentary republic in the UPR, but instead appealed to the Cossack traditions of state-building and partly to socio-political standards of the former Russian empire. Purely nominally, according to the “Laws on the temporary state system of Ukraine”, it was

about a constitutional hereditary (dualistic) monarchy (Zakony pro tymchasovyi derzhavnyi ustrii Ukrainy, 1998). The state was headed by a hetman (the first and the only hetman Skoropadskyi was elected at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Agrarians) who was solely responsible for the appointment and dismissal of his executive cabinet (headed by the Chief Otaman-Minister, analogous to prime minister) – the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian State – and for the entire vertical of the executive, as well as nominally headed the legislative power, having the right to approve or reject draft laws. At the same time, the hetman was temporarily declared the guarantor of order and legality until the election of the highest representative body of the legislative power – the Ukrainian Seim (Cherneha, 2012; Kovalchuk, 2002; Pyrih, 2012), – which, however, was not to be related to the formation and functioning of the executive. In other words, it was about such a form of inter-institutional relations, which can be defined as a constitutional authoritarian monarchical dictatorship, limited both by the framework of the law, as well as by the time before the convocation of the Ukrainian Seim, which was supposed to dualize the system of government.

Instead, the following cases of inter-institutional relations of a certain and close period were characterized by situationality and chaos, primarily as a result of armed actions and struggles between various internal and external political actors during the so-called “Ukrainian Revolution” or struggle for Ukrainian statehood. This can be seen when talking about such historical quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine as “Free territory” or “Makhnovshchina”, “Medvyn Republic”, “Mliiv Republic”, “Khotyn” or “Bessarabian Directory”, “Kholodny Yar Republic”, “Black Forest Republic”, etc., which were formed and functioned at different times during 1918–1922. For example, the “Free Territory” or “Makhnovshchina” (1918–1921) was a quasi-state entity (as well as an insurgent movement and territory on the terrains of contemporary southern and eastern regions of Ukraine) with its capital in Huliaipole, which was controlled by the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Nestor Makhno, free councils and even libertarian communes that were founded and operated on the principles of anarchism (Heather-Noël, 1998;

Skirda, 2004, s. 86). In view of this, this quasi-state entity was governed by the Headquarters of the Insurgent Forces, the Council of Revolutionary Insurgents of Ukraine and the Headquarters of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine, and the Military Revolutionary Council was a kind of law-making body. All other similar historical quasi-state entities of the insurgent and revolutionary type on the territory of contemporary Ukraine, in particular “Khotyn” or “Bessarabian Directory” (January – February 1919), “Medvyn Republic” (1919–2021, created during the uprising with the same name), “Mliiv Republic” (1919–2022), “Black Forest Republic” (1919–2022) and “Kholodny Yar Republic” (1919–2022), were less structured and much more localized ones. At the same time, they were mainly the supporters of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the independence of Ukraine in general, and therefore were partially organized according to the representative principle. The main reason is that there were either village meetings or the congresses of leaders and otamans, which elected the heads of state/quasi-state entities – otamans or the chief otamans.

However, it is worth noting a very interesting case in the environment of the “Kholodny Yar Republic”, where a draft constitution – the so-called “Draft of the state law for the “Ukrainian Labor Republic”” (Nacherk proektu Derzhavnoho zakonoladu, 2004 [1919]) – was developed in 1919. This project, among other things, regulated such a design of inter-institutional relations and system of government that resembled a semi-presidential republic in modern terms (although this design more closely approached presidentialism within the dichotomous theoretical approach). However, it was never implemented in practice and even adopted at the legislative level of the “Kholodny Yar Republic”. Nevertheless, the interest is due to the fact that a similar system of government was implemented at that time in only two countries in the world – the Weimar Republic in Germany and Finland since 1919, – but Ukraine started to apply to it only since 1991. The fact is that the constitutional draft provided for the division of power into representative, legislative, executive and judicial ones. The representative power was supposed to belong both to popularly elected for 6 years Incumbent (an analogue of modern president)

as the head of state and head of the executive, as well as to popularly elected for 6 years Supreme Council, which was defined as the advisory body of the former. In turn, the legislative power was attributed to popularly elected for 6 years Ukrainian Republican Council as an analogue of modern parliament. Finally, the executive power was to be the Ukrainian State Government (as an analogue of modern cabinet) consisting of the Chief State Principal and other state principals (as analogues of modern prime minister and ministers), who were appointed by the head of state, but required a vote of confidence/investiture from the legislature. Similarly, the right to resign the executive cabinet and/or its individual members was exercised either by the Incumbent/President or by the legislature. In addition, it was noted that the Incumbent/President should be responsible to the Ukrainian Republican Council only after the completion of the cabinet's activities of the former, as well as could also be terminated from office (due to early election) by the decision of this Council. Although, on the contrary, the powers of the legislature could be terminated either by it alone, or by the absolute majority of voters independently or at the request of the head of state.

Instead, the construct of formal and actual presidentialism, which was reflected in the constitutional and legislative acts of the second period of the existence of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR), turned out to be implemented at the beginning of the 20th century. Nevertheless, this state initially (as well as the prevailing number of historical state and quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine) tried out a parliamentary republic, the structure of which was proposed in October 1918 by Dnistrianskyi (a member of the Austrian Parliament and professor of Lviv University) in his elaboration "Organization of the Galician State" (Stetsiuk, 1999, s. 59–60). That design of parliamentarism largely addressed the political practice and inter-institutional relations of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). Since it outlined that the legislative power was to belong to the Ukrainian National (People's) Council (which was elected on October 18, 1918) – the legislature, – and the executive power was to go to the Cabinet (the People's Administration or the State Secretariat), which was formed and responsible solely to the

legislature. However, the Ukrainian National (People's) Council was positioned as a temporary parliament, which was supposed to be replaced by the National Seim as a permanently functioning legislature formed on the basis of proportional electoral system. This was recorded in the "Temporary Basic Law on state independence of the Ukrainian lands of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy" adopted on November 13, 1918 (Tymchasovi osnovnyi zakon, 1922 [1918], s. 45–46; Kostiv, 1964), which did not say a word about the institution of president of the WUPR. Only later (on January 4, 1919), the text of the Provisional Constitution of the WUPR was supplemented by a group of the so-called "constitutional laws" (Tyshchuk, 1995), one of which ("On the Board of the Ukrainian Council" (Zakon pro Vydil Ukrainskoi Rady, 1922 [1919])) referred to a peculiar institution of the collegial head of state. This collegial institution was supposed to exist in the composition of the President/Speaker of the Ukrainian National (People's) Council and 9 members (10 members in total) who were appointed for the term of the office of parliament. Among them, the President/Speaker had a special power, because his vote was decisive one within the decision-making of this body of power, in particular when the votes of the members of the Board of the Ukrainian Council were evenly distributed during voting. Moreover, the nomination, appointment and early termination of the members of the executive cabinet and the heads of local state authorities, as well as the promulgation of state laws deserved special attention among the powers of this institution (Lytvyn, 2015b; Lytvyn, 2016b). That is why the Board of the Ukrainian National Council in the WUPR resembled the institution of representative and collegial president under parliamentarism on the model of the Directory in the UPR (especially after The Unification Act of the UPR and WUPR in January 1919).

This system of government was preserved until June 1919, when the Ukrainian National Council (as a result of the military threat from Poland and internal disputes in the leadership of the UPR after The Unification Act with WUPR (Lytvyn & Naumenko, 1995: 149)) granted its first President/Speaker Petrushevych the special rights of a "Dictator" or "the supreme military and political superior

during the war". Such a role given to the so-called "Dictator" meant a combination of his powers both as the head of state, as well as the head of the executive/cabinet in WUPR. Therefore, actually (despite the fact that Petrushevych was not elected president based on the results of popular election), a shift in the form of system of government from parliamentary to presidential one was expected. In other words, a change was expected from positioning the president of WUPR exclusively as the head of state to his positioning as the head of state and the head of executive. A similar logic was regulated in the second draft of the "Constitution of the West Ukrainian People's Republic" by Dnistrianskyi in 1920 (Stercho, 1994: 147-150). According to the latter, WUPR was defined as a presidential republic, where the legislative power was to be concentrated in the People's (National) Chamber (parliament), and the executive power was to be in the hands of the President of the Republic (as the head of state and the head of the executive cabinet - State Council of Ministers, - which was formed, managed and responsible exclusively to president). Both bodies of state power were proposed to be formed on the basis of simultaneous and synchronous popular elections every four years (Matskevych, 2011), even despite granting the parliament the right to political accusation and resignation of the president. However, this project was destined to remain unrealized one as a result of the collapse of the "Ukrainian Revolution" and the loss of statehood attributes of the WUPR in July-November 1919. Even more, because the project of constitutional engineering in the form of presidentialism was adopted when the WUPR existed in exile, and therefore it was mainly aimed for the future, but, as it turned out, until the complete cessation of the WUPR's functioning abroad in March 1923.

The non-parliamentary logic of inter-institutional relations was later continued again on the historical terrain of the same western regions of contemporary Ukraine and again during the struggle for independence (from the Soviet Union and/or Nazi Germany) in 1941-1949. The reason is that the lands of the contemporary western regions of Ukraine (more precisely, Galicia and Northern Bukovina) were occupied by the Soviet Union and later were included into the Ukrainian SSR at the beginning

and during the Second World War, in particular in 1939-1940. However, after the beginning of the German offensive on the Soviet Union, in particular at the background of the loss of soviet control over these lands in June 1941, Ukrainian patriots and nationalists led by Bandera (including within the framework of combat battalions and legions of the Nazi army (Kalba, 1995)) managed to hold in Lviv the representative (from all over Ukraine) National Assembly and announce the Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State (Mirchuk, 1953, s. 3) (which existed from June 30 to July 12, 1941) with its capital in Lviv and expected in the future in Kyiv (thus, it was about the restoration of the Ukrainian People's Republic in its connection with the West Ukrainian People's Republic). It was the same National Assembly that elected the head of the executive cabinet - the Ukrainian National Government - of the restored Ukrainian State (it was Stetsko) who was authorized to form and then actually formed the personal composition of his cabinet. Soon, the composition of the "Council of Seniors" - an advisory body under the Ukrainian National Government - was created and elected at the relevant meeting, with the WUPR statesman Levytskyi appointed as its head. Therefore, after the arrest of the members of the Ukrainian National Government sanctioned by Hitler, the role of the temporary Ukrainian representation (although not the parliament at all) was taken over by the "Council of Seniors" on July 12, 1941. Subsequently, the latter was transformed into the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv (Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2020) with the Ukrainian Regional Committee as the working body, which was interpreted by its founders as the main national organization and successor of the Ukrainian National Council of 1918, as well as the leadership of the Ukrainian people and its representative before the Nazi authorities. Therefore, the Ukrainian State purely nominally resembled a quasi-parliamentary republic, but it was not actually completely such one, since its formation was not an act of expression of the will of the entire Ukrainian people through representative or parliamentary bodies, but instead the political action of a few people. All this nominally and partially created a legal-state dualism (versus the Ukrainian People's Republic in exile) in the Ukrainian national politics (Bulba-Borovets, 1981: 113-115). One way or an-

other, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was soon created instead of the Ukrainian State, and the former was an occupying administrative and territorial unit of the Nazi civil administration on the part of contemporary Ukraine. Although, some local authorities of the Ukrainian State continued to operate in some territories until September 1941.

In parallel with this, the business of the Ukrainian State (within the framework of the Nazi, as well as the Soviet occupation) was more widely and further implemented in the form of the so-called Ukrainian Independent State. This was the concept and attempt at state-building, for which the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists led by Bandera and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army fought for and which controlled the territories of mostly contemporary Western Ukraine and parts of Eastern Poland in 1941–1949. Although, the idea of such Ukrainian state entity was historically “born” on January 22, 1919 given to the Unification Act of the UPR and WUPR, but it remained unrealized due to the defeat of the UPR in the revolutionary struggle, being revived only within the framework of the Ukrainian State in 1941. As indicated above, it was precisely this that gave rise to a lot of criticism of the so-called Ukrainian Independent State regarding not so much the continuation of the UPR, but the creation of a new state. Since the updated logic of the Ukrainian Independent State envisaged a political system based on “strong power” and one political organization of the leading national asset, thanks to which the single-party republican dictatorship of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the leadership (or even leaderism) of its front-runner Bandera were proclaimed (Maksymets, 2017). At the same time, it was argued that the Head of the Ukrainian State (mentioned above), who would be elected in the form of popular election after the liberation of most of the Ukrainian lands and establishment of state life, should become the head of the state in the future. Because of this, it can be stated that the political dictatorship of one party was supposed to be a temporary phenomenon exclusively for the period of national struggle, since the Ukrainian Independent State planned to move to more democratic methods of governance after gaining its sovereignty and independence (Ukhach, 2011). Although this did not happen, and the Ukrainian Independent

State (in particular, within the framework of the Ukrainian State, but later also outside of it) functioned exclusively as an organization that fought for independence. Therefore, as a result of single-party system, the state was inseparable from the party (the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and the army (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), the structures of which were simultaneously the structures of the state. and the formation of the political system in 1941–1944 resembled the insurgent republican dictatorship. In other words, this state entity resembled the insurgent republican dictatorship in terms of the form of its political system in 1941–1944.

Separate military and administrative entities and parts of the Ukrainian Independent State or the so-called “Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s republics” (in particular, the “Kolky Republic” in April–November 1943, the “Cosmach Republic” in 1944–1945 and the “Zakerzonia Republic” in February 1945 – June 1947) were similar ones. Since they were the cells of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army units and fought against Nazi and Soviet occupation forces, as well as resembled republican insurgent dictatorships. As opposed to the Ukrainian State and the Ukrainian Independent State (and therefore to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), there was a local state entity the “Olevsk Republic”, which during August 21 – November 15, 1941 was located in the Olevsk district and later on the territories of contemporary Zhytomyr and Rivne regions of Ukraine. This quasi-state entity was nominally under the control of the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) in exile (but actually under the control of the Nazi occupation authorities) and fought initially against the Soviet and later the Nazi occupation. It was a republic where the functions of the executive cabinet were performed by the district administration, with which the Wehrmacht-sanctioned army with militia functions – the so-called Ukrainian Insurgent Army “Polissian Sich” – interacted effectively (Petryliak, 2010, s. 561), and the Otaman of the “Polissian Sich” acted as the conditional head of state.

However, the Constituent Great Assembly of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (USLC) was held as an all-Ukrainian national political center and the supreme body of the

Ukrainian people in its revolutionary and liberation struggle for independence in this environment in July 1944. The USLC assumed the highest political leadership of the liberation struggle for the Ukrainian Independent State and was supposed to represent this struggle to the outside (actually having the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in its organizational and ideological base that was regulated in the relevant law "USLC Platform" (Zakon Ukrainy "Platforma UHVR", 2017 [1944]) dated July 14, 1944). The Great Assembly of the USLC (which worked sessionally) was defined as the highest body of the legislative power (it was also about the Presidium of the USLC working between sessions and consisting of the president, vice-presidents and members), the executive power was concentrated in the General Secretariat, and the judicial power was given to the General Court (this was also regulated by the relevant law "On the Organization of the USLC" (Zakon Ukrainy "Pro ustrii UHVR", 2017 [1944]) dated July 13, 1944). At the same time, it is known that it was the Great Assembly – a kind of the legislature of the USLC, which had to be convened at least once a year – that was responsible for the selection and appointment of the president and seven members of the Presidium of the USLC – a kind of the institution of the collegial head of state, – the head of the General Secretariat, the Chief Judge, the General Controller, etc. Other members of the General Secretariat – a kind of the executive cabinet – were proposed by its head and approved by the President of the USLC, who (together with the Presidium of the USLC) performed the legislative functions between sessions of the Great Assembly of the USLC. At the same time, the President and the Presidium of the USLC, as well as the General Secretariat and individual general secretaries were collectively and individually responsible solely to the Great Assembly of the USLC. However, such a separation of powers was not final and had to be changed when the entire Ukrainian people would be able to participate in the process of defining the state structure and constitution of the Ukrainian Independent State (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada. Dokumenty, ofitsiini publikatsii, materialy, 1982, s. 27, 40, 396–397). Nevertheless, it should be noted that actually in 1944 (in contrast to 1941–1944) it was not about an insurgent republican dictatorship, but about some-

thing similar to parliamentary system of government, but with the institution of quasi-parliament. This was supplemented by the rejection of the logics and expediency of the single-party power structure and the autocratic ideas of leadership or even leaderism, but instead by paying attention to the principles of political democracy. After the departure of a part of the leadership and members of the USLC abroad, the Ukrainian insurgent army continued to be a political actor, around which the former was concentrated in the territories of contemporary western Ukraine. At the same time, the Ukrainian insurgent army was the force from which the USLC actually emerged, but the former recognized the subordination of its insurgent units to the latter as a single leadership and the structure with supra-party significance. However, the USLC and all its structures on the historical territory of contemporary Ukraine ceased to exist in September 1949 (partially going into exile) as a result of the soviet pressure and terror (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, 1966, s. 1954; Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada: Materialy kruhloho stolu, 2006).

Such a structured (though not always consistent) review of various states and state/quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine during the 1917–1991 period (see Table 1 for details), i.e. until the restoration of Ukraine's independence, gives grounds to state that two basic designs of systems of government (at least according to the theoretical concepts used at the relevant time), in particular parliamentarism (or quasi-parliamentarism) and presidentialism (or quasi-presidentialism), as well as their derivatives, were used in inter-institutional (political and legal) relations within the framework of the political struggle of Ukrainian lands for independence and their occupation or annexations by other (enemy) states, primarily by the Soviet Union. In particular, parliamentarism was tested in the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) during the time of the Central Council of Ukraine (1917–1918), the Directory/Directorate (1918–1920) and in exile (1920–1992), in the West Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) at the first stage of its existence (1918–1919), in the so-called "Hutsul Republic" (1918–1919), "Lemko-Rusyn Republic" (1918–1921) and "Komancza Republic" (1918–1919), as well as in the states and quasi-state entities of "Rus'ka Krajina" ("Ruthenian Coun-

try") (1918–1919), "Subcarpathian Rus" ("Rusynia") (1919–1938) and "Carpathian Ukraine" (1938–1939). This design of system of government was characterized by the fact that the position of the head of state/president (sometimes only de facto, in particular as a collegial or individual president, even without being formally regulated), even regardless of the strength of its powers, was not popularly elected (or was absent at all), but instead it was filled by and responsible to the legislature or other political institution dependent or derived from the legislature (parliament). In turn, quasi-parliamentarism characterized such, primarily annexed Soviet or Nazi, as well as some insurgent ones, states and quasi-state entities/republics as the Ukrainian People's Republic of Soviets (1917–1919), the Odesa Soviet Republic (1918), the Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic (1918), the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic (1918–1919), the Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic (1919), the Crimean Socialist Soviet Republic (1919), the "Bashtanka Republic" (1919), the "Vysunsk Republic" (1919), the Galician Socialist Soviet Republic (1920), the Ukrainian State (1941) and the Ukrainian Independent State of the period of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (1944–1949), as well as primarily the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (1919–1937) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1938–1991) as part of the Soviet Union. This design of inter-institutional relations was most often determined by the absence not only of individual or collegial presidents, but also of parliaments in their true and representative sense, although the executive/cabinets were formed, replaced and collectively responsible to quasi-parliaments or any other political institutions, dependent or derived from quasi-parliaments.

In complete contrast (both statistically and in terms of content and duration), there were several states and state/quasi-state entities or at least their projects on the historical terrain of contemporary Ukraine in the 1917–1991 period, which appealed to the institution of a popularly elected for a fixed term head of state (as the head of executive) – primarily to president or its counterpart, – as well as to the executive cabinet responsible to the head of state and/or parliament. Therefore, it was about the design of a system of government like presidentialism or even semi-presidentialism (if we consider

with modern concepts and the categories of the trichotomous theoretical approach to classification of systems of government). Among them are the West Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) in the second stage of its existence and in exile (1919–1923), the project of the so-called "Kholodny Yar Republic" (1919), as well as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the last year of its existence (1991). In addition, there were the constructs of inter-institutional relations in different historical periods on the contemporary territory of Ukraine, which were not the cases of presidentialism, but their heads of state (elected, hereditary, insurgent or revolutionary ones, etc.) simultaneously headed the executive or its counterparts that, on the contrary, were not responsible to parliaments/quasi-parliaments or the latter did not even exist. Among them, there were the so-called military-insurgent regimes led by otamans (in particular, the "Khotyn" or "Bessarabian Directory" in 1919, the "Medvyn Republic" in 1919–1921, the "Mliiv Republic" in 1919–2022, the "Black Forest Republic" in 1919–2022, the "Kholodny Yar Republic" in 1919–2022), insurgent republican dictatorships (the "Olevsk Republic" in 1941, the Ukrainian Independent State in 1941–1944, the "Kolky Republic" in 1943, the "Cosmach Republic" in 1944–1945, the "Zakerzonia Republic" in 1945–1947), constitutional hereditary dualistic monarchy (the Ukrainian State or the Second Hetmanate in 1918) and even anarchist entities (the "Free Territory" or the "Makhnovshchina" in 1918–1921).

Therefore, the model of parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary republicanism with the position of president elected in the legislature (or its counterpart) as the head of state or even without such a position prevailed in political and legal thought, theory and practice on the historical terrain of contemporary Ukraine during the 1917–1991 period (and ideologically even before). Nevertheless, two opposite designs of systems of government and inter-institutional relations – parliamentarism and presidentialism, – as well as their derivatives (and even some other constructs of the design of inter-institutional relations) were typically combined by the idea that the position of the head of state should be perceived as a kind of stabilizing factor and buffer between the opposing political actors in society, especially at the transitional stage of their development. Even despite the fact that

this conclusion was not confirmed within the framework of quasi-parliamentary entities of the socialist type, which were based on the idea of denying (as "foreign" one) the expediency of separation of powers as a way of organizing political system and inter-institutional relations. At the same time, parliamentarism or quasi-parliamentarism statistically and empirically prevailed over all other non-parliamentary systems of government within the progress of historical forms of Ukrainian statehood, primarily in view of political and military circumstances, under which these attempts were made. The reason is that it was almost unrealistic or impractical to hold popular elections of the head of state and even parliament, and therefore the best feasible design for inter-institutional relations and for at least partial representation did was parliamentarism/quasi-parliamentarism, even if it hinted at any other system of government in the future. Accordingly, the concept of the "path dependence" of institutional development of systems of government within the framework of the progress of Ukrainian statehood systematically worked rather weakly or almost not at all in 1917-1991. Although the inter-institutional "path dependence" was partially reflected in the case of various directions of development of Ukrainian statehood (including within the framework of occupation and annexation), in particular: firstly, along the line from the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) to other state entities affiliated or derivative with the former; secondly, along the line of socialist, as well as partially insurgent republics, which existed on the historical territory of Ukraine at different times.

On the one hand, this proves that the states and state/quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine during the 1917-1991 period corresponded to and, therefore, were analyzed exclusively within the dichotomous theoretical logic and tradition to classification of systems of government. In particular, given the fact that no other format of classification of systems of government was considered, or the forms of statehood were outlined very specifically within the framework of the Soviet Union, which terminally prevailed over other state entities in the analyzed time period. As well as taking into account the fact that the trichotomous approach to classification of systems of government was just beginning to emerge in political science and jurisprudence, but again did not

find its attention in the Soviet theory and practice. Therefore, on the other hand, the period of political development and progress of inter-institutional relations (in particular, systems of government) since 1991 has become a complete "novelty" for Ukraine, since European and world theory and practice have gone much further than ideologues in the Soviet Union, as well as later politicians and constitutional engineers in independent Ukraine, could talk about. The reason is primarily that the transition from dichotomy to trichotomy in the classification of system of government gradually began in political science and jurisprudence in the West. Instead, this transition became immediately practical one in Ukraine, and only later it began to be reconsidered more and more, even despite the long process of preparation for the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996 and the multivariation of its projects.

Finally, due to the fact that Ukraine did not actually have any signs of its statehood in most of the territory since 1922 and in Western Ukraine since 1945, this independent state (since 1991) could not have a single and fully consolidated idea of possible options for choosing the design of inter-institutional relations. Therefore, the almost only verification of the concept of the "path dependence" of institutional development of systems of government in the analyzed context of the progress of historical forms of Ukrainian statehood in 1917-1991 concerns the approbation of parliamentarism or even quasi-parliamentarism, the experience of which was finished precisely by the fact that Ukraine restored its statehood and independence in 1991. This is actually a paradox, because while appealing (in particular, according to the constitutional formulations) to the history of the forms of its statehood at the beginning of the 20th century, Ukraine de facto began to use completely different systems of government and inter-institutional relations than were the characteristics of its historical predecessors, including during the period the so-called "Ukrainian revolution" and the national liberation struggle of the 1917-1921 period. In particular, Ukraine partially tried presidentialism, and from parliamentarism it mainly adopted the option of collective responsibility of the executive cabinet to the legislature, the combination of which generated semi-presidentialism (it was extremely situationally and exclusively discussed in theory at

the beginning of the 20th century). Although, what is very interesting, the choice in favor of semi-presidentialism and its various options in Ukraine since 1991 was not evolutionarily empty one. Since this system of government was often used in other countries of Europe and the world (it was already known and obvious until 1996, when the Ukrainian constitution was adopted), as well as was even described in some constitutional projects in Ukraine itself at the beginning of the 20th century (as it was discussed above). As a result, this proves that the method of formation, organization, powers, place and role of various political institutions and the form of inter-institutional relations in Ukraine since 1991 do not systematically correspond to the institutional practice and historical experience that were incorporated in various state entities in the historical lands of Ukraine at the beginning – the second half of the 20th century. However, this conclusion is somewhat complicated by the transition of political science and jurisprudence from the dichotomous to trichotomous approach to classification of systems of government, where semi-presidentialism – the option Ukraine has become – is often (but not always justified) considered a combination of presidentialism and parliamentarism. This, in turn, puts on the agenda the analysis and structuring of the patterns of the current system of government and the prospects for its further development in Ukraine.

The Dynamics of the Development of System of Government in Contemporary Ukraine (1991–2022) and Its Compliance with the Historical Institutional Design and the Logics of “Path Dependence” of Inter-Institutional Relations

During and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where the principle of separation of powers into the executive, legislative and judicial ones, as well as the mechanism of ensuring inter-institutional checks and counterbalances between them was nominally and actually not or almost not tested, and therefore the system of government was very unclear one, Ukraine (like all newly formed republics that restored or gained their independence and at least partially began to democratize) revived or initiated the process of state-building, as well as constructing and selecting its system of gov-

ernment. This sometimes happened, taking into account the retrospect of these issues or, in other words, the conformity or non-conformity of the new designs of systems of government of a particular state to the historical institutional structures and even the “path dependence” logics of inter-institutional relations within them, being definitely aimed at generating maximally or at least expectedly promising and expedient models of political systems. However, each post-soviet country passed its own path of progress within its system of inter-institutional relations. Therefore, the analyzed issues cannot be reduced to a certain common denominator, but instead must be considered separately. Since this is the only way to capture a possible connection between the retrospectives and perspectives of the choice of the design of system of government in each country. This was especially evident at the background of the intensified change in the theoretical paradigm and classification approach to the definition of systems of government from previously (in particular, before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the entire “Eastern Bloc”) basic dichotomous one (presidentialism versus parliamentarism) to currently mainstream trichotomous one (which was supplemented by a wide approbation of semi-presidentialism in a number of European countries, etc.).

After restoring its independence on August 24, 1991, Ukraine did not become an exception in this context. Instead, Ukraine should be evaluated as one of the most important and conceptual cases of verification of possible relationship between dichotomous and trichotomous theoretical approaches, as well as between its current design of system of government and various retrospective constructs of inter-institutional relations in states or state/quasi-state entities on its territory in the past. This is relevant given the fact that Ukraine since 1991, but constitutionally since 1996 is almost invariably characterized as the case of semi-presidential system of government (Bialoblotskyi, 2013, s. 197, 213–214; Matsuzato, 2005) (although within the framework of the fluctuation of different types of semi-presidentialism that will be detailed below (see Table 2), due to which this case is often called one of the brightest, but at the same time the most complicated in the world). However, Ukraine retrospectively was never the case and was almost never conceived as semi-presidential

republic within the framework of various historical options of inter-institutional relations of the 1917–1991 period (see Table 1 for details). Therefore, the direct or indirect relationship between the newest and historical options of systems of government in Ukraine is quite limited and is reflected only partially, in particular in the formats of: a) the permanent use in Ukraine since 1991 the institution of popularly elected for a fixed term president (even within the framework of the forced approbation of presidentialism's design in Ukraine during the 1995–1996 period), which was historically addressed (at least nominally) in the West Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) in 1919–1923, the "Kholodny Yar Republic" in 1919 (in the draft constitution) and in the last year of the existence of the Ukrainian SSR; b) the predominant (except for the period of 1995–1996) use in Ukraine of the institution of the executive cabinet headed by prime minister as collectively responsible ones (for the matter of the premature termination of their powers) necessarily to parliament, which (provided that there was a parliament, but not a quasi-parliament, at least nominally) was historically addressed in the Ukrainian People's Republic (including in exile) in 1917–1992, the West Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918–1919, the "Hutsul Republic" in 1918–1919, the "Lemko-Rusyn Republic" in 1918–1921, the "Komancza Republic" in 1918–1919, the "Rus'ka Krajina" ("Ruthenian Country") in 1918–1919, the "Subcarpathian Rus" ("Rusynia") in 1919–1938, the "Carpathian Ukraine" in 1938–1939, etc.

Therefore, we can talk about the partial relationship of the current Ukrainian semi-presidentialism (1991–1995 and since 1996 onwards) – as a constitutional or political system of government, which is characterized by the position of popularly elected for a fixed term president, as well as by the institution of the executive cabinet headed by prime minister who are necessarily collectively responsible (for the matter of early termination of the powers of the latter) to parliament (Boban, 2007; Elgie, 2004; Shugart, 2005) – with other retrospective (mainly in 1917–1939) options of systems of government (presidentialism and mainly parliamentarianism) on the historical terrain of Ukraine. This is primarily due to the fact that semi-presidentialism is only partially – by its origin and construction, but not by its internal structure of inter-institutional relations and politi-

cal consequences – a combination of presidentialism (popular election of president for a fixed term) and parliamentarism (collective responsibility (on the matter of early termination of powers) of the executive cabinet headed by prime minister at least to parliament). Instead, semi-presidentialism, which has actually been tested in Ukraine since the creation of the office of president³, as well as its regulation (Pro vybory Prezydenta Ukrainskoi RSR, 1991) and holding its first popular election in December 1991, but nominally and finally after the adoption of Ukrainian Constitution in 1996, should be rather characterized as completely separate and "pure" design of inter-institutional relations. Since the latter is endowed with its own logics of transactional and hierarchical inter-institutional relations, as well as can be detailed and internally classified as heterogeneous one according to quite different (formal/institutional, factual/political and mixed/institutional-political) criteria (Lytvyn, 2017a; Lytvyn, 2020). These criteria and types of semi-presidentialism that fill them, being relatively independent analytical and comparative variables (Elgie & Moestrup, 2016), may even demonstrate the conditional convergence of semi-presidentialism to presidentialism or parliamentarism, as well as fluctuations between the prolongation and stabilization of inter-institutional relations, but the autocratization of political regime, on the one hand, or political and institutional destabilization along with the relative democratization of political regime, on the other hand (partially see Table 2). One of the reasons for the heterogeneity of Ukrainian semi-presidentialism is due to the way of formation, functioning and responsibility of the executive cabinet and the system of executive power in general. Since president and parliament traditionally play an important role here, but necessarily on the basis of taking into account the composition and ratio of party/political actors in the legislature and generally in political system. Another and derivative reasons are that semi-presidentialism is inevitably characterized by at least partial balancing and dualism of the executive. Since the competenc-

³ However, there were lots of political disputes regarding the role and powers of president, and therefore the optionality of possible systems of government in Ukraine, in particular regarding mainly presidentialism or parliamentarism.

es of president and prime minister always cover separate (significant or insignificant) powers in the executive, which the former share or exercise independently, and the executive cabinet headed by prime minister is not subordinate only to president, but instead is responsible to president and parliament or solely to parliament (Blondel, 1984). Therefore, the real political process under semi-presidentialism can balance or instead approach presidentialism or parliamentarism depending on political and institutional factors of structuring powers and inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament”. In turn, this is typically the consequence of various classifications of semi-presidentialism, including on the example of Ukraine since 1991.

Firstly, it is appropriate to classify semi-presidentialism institutionally, that is based on the formally regulated logics of collective responsibility (possibility of resignation) of the executive cabinet either to president and parliament or solely to parliament. As a result, semi-presidentialism is divided, respectively, into president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart, 2005; Lytvyn, 2017a; Lytvyn, 2020) (parliament-presidentialism is often called a synonym of the latter). This is very important in the political process, because if parliament under premier-presidentialism appoints a prime minister who is ideologically and party opposed to president, then the latter will have to accept such an appointment and agree to the formation of the executive cabinet. As

a result, the relationship between president and cabinet will become transactional ones, and semi-presidentialism will largely resemble parliamentarism (Lytvyn, 2021). Instead, the relationship between the head of state and prime minister are rather hierarchical ones under president-parliamentarism. Since if parliament tries to appoint an opponent of president as a prime minister, then the former risks being dissolved by president. Instead, if president tries to appoint his or her ally as a prime minister, in particular when opposing the legislature, then the latter may not support or dismiss a prime minister. In addition, it also happens that parliament can be dissolved due to its disagreement with president regarding the formation, support or responsibility of the executive cabinet (Lytvyn, 2017b), as a result of which semi-presidentialism can closely resemble presidentialism.

The above-mentioned dichotomy of institutional types of semi-presidentialism was precisely the most reflected on the example of Ukrainian case. Since Ukraine formally and actually tested president-parliamentarism in December 1991 – June 1995, June 1996 – January 2006 and October 2010 – February 2014, but instead used premier-presidentialism in January 2006 – October 2010 and starting from February 2014, in particular as a result of revisions of the constitution caused by various political events (primarily by the “Orange Revolution” and the “Revolution of Dignity”) (Lytvyn, 2014b; Lytvyn, 2018c).

Table 2 The dynamics of changes in types and logics of the operationalization of semi-presidential system of government and its correlation with the types of political regimes in independent Ukraine (1991–2022)

Time period	System of government: trichotomous approach (dichotomous logic)	Type of semi-presidential system of government			President (date in office), party / affiliation (% of deputies)	Prime minister (date in office), party / affiliation (% of deputies)	The executive cabinet composition: list of parties (% of deputies)	Political regime	
		Institutional type	Political type	Institutional and political type				“Politia” project (more => democratic)	“Freedom in the world” project (less => democratic)
August – December 1991	Parliamentary (parliamentary logic)	-	-	-	-	V. Fokin (24.08.1991 – 01.10.1992), n.p.	KPU + PDVU + n.p. (63,3)	+6	3,0
December 1991 – June 1995	Semi-presidential (changing logic – balance of presidentialism and parliamentarism)	President-parliamentarism	Divided majority system	Balanced	L. Kravchuk (05.12.1991 – 19.07.1994), n.p.	L. Kuchma (13.10.1992 – 21.09.1993), n.p.	KPU + PDVU + n.p. (63,3)	+5	4,0
			Divided majority system	Balanced		Yu. Zvyagilskyi (22.09.1993 – 15.06.1994), n.p.	KPU + PDVU + n.p. (63,3)	+7	3,5
			Divided majority system	Balanced		V. Masol (16.06.1994 – 08.06.1995),	NRU + PDVU + SDPU(o) (7,4) + n.p.	+7	3,5
			Divided minority system	Balanced					

			Divided minority system	Balanced		n.p.		+7	3,5
June 1995 – June 1996	Presidential (presidential logic)	-	-	-	L. Kuchma 1, 2 (19.07.1994 – 23.01.2005), n.p.	Ye. Marchuk (08.06.1995 – 27.05.1996), n.p.	NRU + PDVU + SDPU(o) (7,4) + n.p.	+7	3,5
			-	-		P. Lazarenko 1 (28.05.1996 – 05.07.1996), n.p.	NRU + PDVU + SDPU(O) + NDPU (7,4) + n.p.	+7	3,5
June 1996 – January 2006	Semi-presidential (presidential logic)	President-parliamentarism	Partially unified minority system	Presidentialized	L. Kuchma 1, 2 (19.07.1994 – 23.01.2005), n.p.	P. Lazarenko 2 (11.07.1996 – 02.07.1997), n.p.	NRU + PDVU + SDPU(O) + NDPU (7,4) + n.p.	+7	3,5
			Fully unified minority system	Presidentialized		V. Pustovoytenko (16.07.1997 – 22.12.1999), n.p. / NDP	NRU + NDPU (16,6) + n.p.	+7	3,5
			Partially unified minority system	Presidentialized		V. Yushchenko (30.12.1999 – 28.04.2001), n.p.	NRU + SDPU(O) + NDPU (20,4) + n.p.	+6	4,0
			Fully unified minority system	Presidentialized		A. Kinakh (29.05.2001 – 16.11.2002), n.p.	NDPU + PZU + APU + SDPU(O) + PRP + PRVU (17,5) + n.p.	+6	4,0
			Fully unified majority system	Presidentialized		V. Yanukovych 1 (21.11.2002 – 05.01.2005), n.p.	PR (ZYU) + SDPU(O) + TU (45,8) + n.p.	+6	3,5
			Partially unified minority system	Presidentialized		Yu. Tymoshenko 1 (04.02.2005 – 08.09.2005), B (5,1)	NU + B (BYT) + SPU + PPPU (36,9) + n.p.	+6	2,5
			Fully unified minority system	Presidentialized		V. Yushchenko (23.01.2005 – 25.02.2010), NU (26,4/18,0/16,0)	NU + SPU (31,3) + n.p.	+7	2,5
January 2006 – October 2010	Semi-presidential (changing logic – balance of presidentialism and parliamentarism)	Premier presidentialism	Partially unified majority system	Balanced	V. Yanukovych (25.02.2010 – 22.02.2014), PR (38,2/46,7)	V. Yanukovych 2 (04.08.2006 – 16.10.2006), PR (41,3)	PR + NU + SPU + KPU (71,3) + n.p.	+7	2,5
			Divided majority system	Balanced		V. Yanukovych 3 (17.10.2006 – 18.12.2007), PR (41,3)	PR + SPU + KPU (53,3) + n.p.	+7	2,5
			Partially unified majority system	Balanced		Yu. Tymoshenko 2 (18.12.2007 – 03.03.2010), B (34,7)	B (BYT) + NUNS (50,7) + n.p.	+7	2,5
			Divided majority system	Balanced		M. Azarov 1 (11.03.2010 – 09.12.2010), PR (38,2)	PR + BL + KPU (48,7) + n.p.	+6	3,0
October 2010 – February 2014	Semi-presidential (presidential logic)	President-parliamentarism	Fully unified majority system	Presidentialized	V. Yanukovych (25.02.2010 – 22.02.2014), PR (38,2/46,7)	M. Azarov 2 (09.12.2010 – 03.12.2012), PR (38,2)	PR + BL + KPU + YC + SU (49,3) + n.p.	+6	3,5
			Fully unified majority system	Presidentialized		M. Azarov 3 (24.12.2012 – 28.01.2014), PR (46,7)	PR + KPU + UV (53,3) + n.p.	+6	3,5
			Fully unified majority system	Presidentialized		O. Turchynov (a) (23.02.2014 – 07.06.2014), B (22,4)	A. Yatsenyuk 1 (27.02.2014 – 27.11.2014), B (22,4)	B (BYT) + U + S (39,6) + n.p.	+4
February 2014 – until now	Semi-presidential (changing logic – balance of presidentialism and parliamentarism)	Premier presidentialism	Fully unified minority system	Balanced + parliamentarized	P. Poroshenko (07.06.2014 – 20.05.2019), n.p. / BPP (29,3)	A. Yatsenyuk 2 (02.12.2014 – 01.09.2015), NF (18,4)	BPP + NF + OS + B (BYT) + RPL (66,2) + n.p.	+4	3,0
			Partially unified minority system	Balanced		A. Yatsenyuk 3 (01.09.2015 – 17.02.2016), NF (18,0)	BPP + NF + OS + B (BYT) (58,2) + n.p.	+4	3,0
			Partially unified majority system	Balanced		A. Yatsenyuk 4 (18.02.2016 – 14.04.2016), NF (18,0)	BPP + NF (48,2) + n.p.	+4	3,0
			Partially unified majority system	Balanced		V. Groysman	BPP + NF	+4	3,0
			Fully	Balanced +					

			unified majority system	presidentialized		(14.04.2016 – 29.08.2019), BPP (32,4)	(50,4) + n.p.		
			Divided majority system	Balanced				+4	3,5
			Fully unified majority system	Presidentialized	V. Zelenskyi (20.05.2019 – until now), n.p. / SN (56,4)	O. Honcharuk (29.08.2019 – 04.03.2020), n.p. / SN (56,4)	SN (56,4) + n.p.	n.a.	3,0
			Fully unified majority system	Presidentialized		D. Shmyhal (04.03.2020 – until now), n.p. / SN (56,4)	SN (56,4) + n.p.	n.a.	3,0

Legend: APU – Аграрна партія України (Agrarian Party of Ukraine); В – “Батьківщина” (“Homeland”); ВЛ – “Блок Литвина” (“Lytvyn block”); BPP – “Блок Петра Порошенка” (“Petro Poroshenko Block”); БУТ – “Блок Юлії Тимошенко” (“Yulia Tymoshenko Block”); КПУ – Комуністична партія України (Communist Party of Ukraine); NDP – Народно-демократична партія (People’s Democratic Party); NDPU – Народно-демократична партія України (People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine); NF – “Народний фронт” (“People’s Front”); NRU – “Народний рух України” (“People’s movement of Ukraine”); NU – “Наша Україна” (“Our Ukraine”); NU-NS – “Наша Україна – Народна самооборона” (“Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense”); OS – “Самопоміч” (“Samopomich”); PDVU – Партія демократичного відродження України (Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine); PPPU – Партія промисловців і підприємців України (Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine); PR – Партія регіонів (Party of Regions); PRP – Партія “Реформи і порядок” (Reforms and Order Party); PRVU – Партія регіонального відродження України (Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine); PZU – Партія зелених України (Party of Greens of Ukraine); RPL – Радикальна партія Ляшка (Radical Party of Liashko); S – “Свобода” (“Freedom”); SDPU(o) – Соціал-демократична партія України (об’єднана) (Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)); SN – “Слуга народу” (“Servant of the people”); SPU – Соціалістична партія України (Socialist Party of Ukraine); SU – “Сильна Україна” (“Strong Ukraine”); TU – “Трудова Україна” (“Labor Ukraine”); U – “Український демократичний альянс за реформи” (“Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms”); UV – “Україна – Вперед!” (“Ukraine – Forward!”); УС – “Єдиний центр” (“Single center”); ZYU – “За єдину Україну!” (“For United Ukraine!”); n.p. – non-party/non-partisan; n.a. – not available data. Used sources: Freedom in the World [Data sets] (2022); Polity 5 Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2018 (2018) [Data set]; List of prime ministers of Ukraine (2022).

At the same time, after the restoration of its independence in August 1991, Ukraine briefly tested other types of systems of government, which had been even used in various historical states or state/quasi-state entities on its contemporary territory, in particular parliamentarism in August – December 1991 (until the moment of the first popular presidential election) and presidentialism in June 1995 – June 1996, finally abandoning them in favor of various altering options of semi-presidentialism (before and after the adoption of the constitution in June 1996, as well as its various revisions later; see Table 2 for details). The latter tended more towards presidentialism (and the autocratization of political regime) in the real political process in one case, but significantly distanced themselves from presidentialism in the other case, particularly in favor of a more parliamentary-deterministic logic of collective responsibility (possibility of resignation) of the executive cabinet headed by prime minister and the democratization of political process in general.

Secondly, it is appropriate to classify semi-presidentialism politically, in particular taking into account the essence, nature and possible constructions of the executive dualism and the composition of parliament. In this way, it is possible to distinguish fully or partially unified majority systems, divided majority systems, fully or partially unified minority systems, as well as di-

vided minority systems (Lytvyn, 2019a; Lytvyn, 2019b; Lytvyn, 2020; Lytvyn & Romanyuk, 2021; Skach, 2007). This is possible due to the fact that there are various ways of distribution of powers and options (more or less conflicting ones) of relationships between president and prime minister/cabinet under the executive dualism, particularly in the context of ensuring the legitimacy, responsibility and support of president and prime minister in the legislature (Lytvyn, 2018b; Lytvyn, 2018d; Lytvyn, 2019a). For example, the unified majority system (as the least conflictual option of semi-presidentialism) outlines the situation where president is a member or supporter of a prime minister’s party, and therefore both president and prime minister heading the executive cabinet are supported by an identical party or inter-party majority in parliament. In turn, the divided majority system (as a moderately conflictual option of semi-presidentialism), often called cohabitation (Chang, 2014; Elgie, 2010; Elgie & McMenemy, 2011), assumes that president, unlike prime minister heading the executive cabinet, does not enjoy the support of a party or inter-party majority in the legislature. Separately, there is the divided minority system (as the most conflictual option of semi-presidentialism), where neither president, nor prime minister, nor anyone in this sense has the permanent support of the majority in parlia-

ment, but on the condition that president and prime minister are political opponents of each other. Finally, the unified minority system (as a less conflictual option of semi-presidentialism) is characterized by the fact that neither president, nor prime minister, nor anyone for that matter has the stable support of the majority in the legislature, but provided that president and prime minister are the same party/coalition members or political associates of each other. The peculiarity of such a logic of classification of semi-presidentialism is that it is volatile one. Since semi-presidentialism in a particular country can change from one option to another regardless of the change or stability of the constitutionalized powers of political institutions from the triangle "the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament". Instead, everything depends on the real political process and the results of presidential and parliamentary elections, the party affiliation of the centers of the executive, as well as on party or political composition of cabinets and parliaments (Lytvyn, 2019a; Lytvyn, 2019b; Skach, 2007). This is supplemented by different possible levels of conflicts (high, moderate or low ones) within the system of the executive dualism or generally within the framework of inter-institutional relations in the triangle "the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament".

In particular, the highest levels of conflicts in the system of the executive dualism in Ukraine took place at the dawn of its independence, in particular in 1991–1995 – during the presidency of Kravchuk and several successive prime ministers. At that time, semi-presidentialism was mainly implemented within the framework of such political types as the divided majority system and conditionally the divided minority system. Inter-institutional and political conflicts intensified at that time due to the fact that a constitution had not yet been drawn up and adopted in Ukraine. That is why different political actors and institutions interpreted the political process in different ways, often getting into arguments and disputes with each other. However, even after the adoption of Ukrainian constitution in 1996 and its several revisions in the future, the divided majority systems (cohabitations) still took place in Ukraine, in particular between the president Yushchenko and the prime minister Yanukovich in 2006–2007, the president Yanukovich and the prime minister

Tymoshenko in 2010, as well as provisionally between the president Zelenskyi and the prime minister Groysman (the last case took place at the beginning of the new president's term in office and before the formation of the new cabinet based on the results of the early parliamentary election in 2019 that followed the same-year presidential election). In addition, something like cohabitation and significant level of conflicts in the system of the executive dualism was largely reminiscent and provoked by the permanent confrontation between the president Yushchenko and the prime minister Tymoshenko in 2007–2010. Although the parties of these two political institutions and actors were the partners within the framework of the coalition executive cabinet, and therefore semi-presidentialism was politically a construction of the partially unified majority system (see Table 2 for details). Instead, for most of the time since the constitutionalization of Ukrainian semi-presidentialism, in particular during 1996–2006 and 2010–2022 (with the exception of the period of political turbulence at the beginning of 2014, in particular due to the consequences of the "Revolution of Dignity" and the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as during the change of power as a result of the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections), the latter has typically been implemented within the options of either fully/partially unified majority systems or conditionally fully/partially unified minority systems. It is interesting that the conditionality of any (unified or divided one) minority system under semi-presidentialism in Ukraine is mainly due to the fact that the possibility of minority cabinet's formation is not nominally regulated in this state and has never been foreseen before (even despite quite different and changing constitutional and legislative formulations on this matter). However, minority cabinets actually had a place in the real political process and inter-institutional relations in Ukraine. Since the former sometimes, especially in the situations of extremely fractionalized parliaments (primarily before 2006): a) were combined (regarding the distribution of ministerial portfolios) by parties that totally had a minority in the legislature; b) although they (at the time of their formation) were supported by the same cabinet parties, as well as by parties and/or non-party deputies who did not receive ministerial representation in the cabinets. Accordingly, this

inevitably affected the volatility of the dynamics of inter-institutional and political relations under Ukrainian semi-presidentialism. Since the latter could be closer either to presidential logic of its course, or to an altering logic, in particular in the format of a peculiar balance of presidentialism and parliamentarism (see Table 2 for details).

Thirdly and as a consequence, semi-presidentialism is different both institutionally (formally) and politically (actually), in particular depending on the characteristics of the executive dualism and the power of presidents, prime ministers and parliaments. For example, there are the cases of: a) presidentialized semi-presidentialism – with strong or omnipotent presidents around whom the entire political process takes place, and instead weak prime ministers, cabinets and parliaments; b) parliamentarized or premierized semi-presidentialism – with weak or nominal presidents, but instead much stronger prime ministers, cabinets and parliaments; c) balanced semi-presidentialism – with balanced, identical or commensurate (horizontally and vertically) powers of presidents, as well as prime ministers and their cabinets (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 1999a). Therefore, it follows that semi-presidentialism must always be defined, clarified and determined in view of its inherent heterogeneity and within the framework of certain “adjectives”. The latter necessarily refer to the institutional (at the level of constitution) and political (in practice) features of semi-presidential system of government, which may or may not resemble other systems of government (in particular, presidentialism and parliamentarism) depending on formal and actual features of the political process and inter-institutional relations.

In the case of Ukraine in the 1991–2022 period (with the exception of 1995–1996, when this state was a presidential republic – both nominally and actually), this turned out quite differently, in particular due to the fact that: a) during December 1991 – June 1995 (before the adoption of the constitution), a balanced president-parliamentarism was tested (Bialoblotskyi, 2013: 192–194; Boban, 2007, s. 164; Protsyk, 2003); b) in June 1996 – January 2006 and October 2010 – February 2014, Ukraine gained experience in the use of a presidentialized president-parliamentarism (Bialoblotskyi, 2013: 204;

Kudelia, 2013); c) during January 2006 – September 2010 and February/March 2014 – August 2019, Ukraine used a balanced premier-presidentialism (Lytvyn, 2015c; Lytvyn, 2015d; Lytvyn, 2016b), which began to be gradually presidentialized since 2019 (this obviously played a positive role in the context of a full-scale Russian aggression from February 2022). Various and volatile alternations, constructions and configurations of inter-institutional relations between presidents, prime ministers/cabinets, as well as parties and deputies (composing the majority or minority) in the legislatures (see Table 2) were the reasons for such a heterogeneity of Ukrainian semi-presidentialism. Since these reasons had different effects on the dynamics – more presidential, balanced or parliamentary ones – of semi-presidentialism, as well as on the prospects for democratization or the risks of autocratization of Ukraine (which requires separate consideration and is not the subject of the proposed study) (Lytvyn, 2015a).

In general, it can be concluded that the various stages of the development of system of government, primarily semi-presidential one, in Ukraine during the 1991–2022 period were characterized by their institutional and political attributes within the framework of the relationship in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament”. However, most often the specificity of Ukrainian semi-presidentialism, at least from the moment of its constitutionalization in 1996, was manifested in the cyclical alternation of mostly presidentialized president-parliamentarism (and more recently, premier-presidentialism) and balanced premier-presidentialism (Lytvyn, 2014b; Lytvyn, 2016c; Lytvyn, 2018c). In turn and as partially indicated above, this mainly proves the weakness of the connections of the newest system of government in Ukraine with the institutional past, as well as refutes the existence or validity of the “path dependence” logics of inter-institutional relations and the current system of government in Ukraine (semi-presidentialism) with the historically prevailing retrospectives/options of inter-institutional relations (primarily parliamentarism) in the former states or state/quasi-state entities (during the 1917–1991 period) on the territory of contemporary Ukraine. At the same time, the strong “path dependence” or even fluctuations in the development of systems of gov-

ernment within the framework of the history of the Ukrainian state can be traced in the 1991–2022 period. This makes us think about options, opportunities, prospects, expediency and resources for further progress, reformation and optimization of system of government and inter-institutional relations in Ukraine, which will be the focus of attention in the next part of the study.

The Prospects, Expediency and Resources for Further Development, Reformation and Optimization of System of Government and Inter-Institutional Relations in Ukraine (Since 2022 Onwards)

As it is evident from the previous part of the study, Ukraine is one of the most vivid, but simultaneously the most complicated examples of the institutional and political functionality, as well as volatility of system of government – primarily semi-presidential one – and generally inter-institutional relations in Europe and even possibly worldwide. The fact is that Ukraine historically (extra-constitutionally since 1991 (with the exception of the 1995–1996 period, when presidential system of government was tested (Bialoblotskyi, 2013, s. 197, 213–214; Matsuzato, 2005)) and constitutionally since 1996) is characterized by repeated fluctuations between various options of semi-presidentialism. The latter lead to the prolongation and stabilization of inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament”, but autocratization of the political regime in one case, but cause political and institutional destabilization along with relative democratization of the political regime in another case (see Table 2 for details).

In particular (as indicated in the previous part of the study), the average specificity of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine in 1991–2022 was the cyclical rotation and change of presidentialized president-parliamentarism (and recently, at the background of a full-scale war, premier-presidentialism) and balanced premier-presidentialism. The former contributed more to the centralization and monopolization of power and autocratization of the political regime in Ukraine (especially during the presidency of Kuchma and Yanukovich, when the political regime of Ukraine approached the so-called electoral or competitive authoritari-

anism). Instead, the latter contributed more to the decentralization and demonopolization of power and thus to democratization of the political regime (during the presidency of Yushchenko, as well as partially since 2014 – during the presidency of Poroshenko and Zelenskyi (even in view of the imposed martial law), when the political regime of Ukraine approached electoral democracy) (Lytvyn, 2014a; Lytvyn, 2014b; Lytvyn, 2015a) (see Table 2 for details). These two options of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine were typically outlined by various, but very volatile alternations, phases, constructions and configurations of the relations between presidents, prime ministers/cabinets, parties and deputies in parliaments. Therefore, they hindered the institutionalization of system of government in Ukraine (Lytvyn, 2018c; Sedelius, 2012) and had different effects on the parameters of political and institutional stability, governance efficiency, as well as on the prospects for democratization or autocratization in this country (Bostan, 2011; Lytvyn, 2015a; Sydorchuk, 2013). At this background, the situation became particularly specific starting from 2019, but mainly from February 2022 (from the beginning of a full-scale russian-Ukrainian war) – during the presidency of Zelenskyi. Since a noticeable presidentialization of premier-presidential semi-presidentialism began in Ukraine at this time. However, this is happening not so much formally (as a result of semi-presidential shift to president-parliamentarism, as earlier), but factually, in particular due to the approbation of the first (in the history of independent Ukraine) experience of the fully unified single-party majority system headed by a popularly elected president as the leader of this majority (see Table 2 for details).

At the same time, the change and alternation of various options of Ukrainian semi-presidentialism in 1991–2022 (with the exception of 1995–1996, when presidentialism was formally and factually approved) mostly took place at the background of clientelist, apolitical/non-party, personalistic and clan-oligarchic characteristics of post-soviet politics (and not the experience of state-building outside the framework of the soviet heritage), as well as of the mutual strengthening of relations between formal and informal political actors (D’Anieri, 2007, s. 51, 61; Kudelia, 2013; Matsuzato, 2005;

Protsyk, 2003). Since those who had factual power used it to change formal rules (and to obtain more formal power), and those who had formal power used it to acquire, concentrate and centralize factual power. This was almost the main feature of political competition between presidents and parliaments regarding control over the processes of formation, functioning and responsibility of the executive cabinets and prime ministers in Ukraine (Lytvyn, 2018c). At this background, the aspirations of presidents to dominate (in the case of president-parliamentarism – to monopolize, and in the case of premier-presidentialism – to prevail, although recently definitely to dominate) the executive and the political system of Ukraine as a whole were and still are unceasing, largely autocratizing the latter at least by this fact. Since it is presidents (not always having, but primarily having the reliable support of the majority in parliaments, as well as relying on stable or situational coalitions, clienteles and cliques) that: on the one hand, are aware of formal and informal guarantee of strengthening their empowerment (Whitmore, 2003, s. 58); on the other hand, serve as a factor in mitigating inter-institutional conflicts, but simultaneously as a threat of various defects in the horizontal logics of inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament”, as well as in vertical responsibility of the institutions of power (Chaisty & Chernykh, 2015). Thus, the problem of choosing appropriate, effective and stable institutional and political options for development, reformation and optimization of system of government (primarily the current semi-presidentialism, but possibly other designs of inter-institutional relations (which were historically used in various states and state/quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine)) still remains extremely acute for Ukraine. This is relevant even after more than 30 years since the restoration of Ukrainian independence and more than a quarter of a century after the adoption of Ukrainian constitution, but especially at the background of the russian-Ukrainian war, which took the shape of a full-scale one in February 2022.

The indicated problem is exacerbated by the fact that the recurring problem of “privatization and/or instrumentalization” of the constitutional development in the context of struggle

for power within the framework of a non-institutionalized party system has always been and still remains characteristic (although recently in a modified format) of Ukrainian politics, particularly institutionalization of system of government and inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament” in general (Dobrodumov, 2009: 27; Fisun, 2011, s. 51; Matsiievskyi, 2011, s. 51; Tyushka, 2014; Zelinska, 2015). Since immediately after certain political elites gain power, they try to adapt and construct constitutional norms and political practice in such a way that the latter provide them with a wider institutional and political range of powers, as well as more effective control over the opposition (Tyushka, 2016).

This became especially clear starting formally from 2004 and factually from 2006, when Ukrainian presidentialized president-parliamentarism (1996–2006) was transformed into balanced premier-presidentialism (2006–2010) for the first time. By analogy, this happened in September–October 2010 and February–March 2014, when the other transformations of semi-presidentialism from premier-presidentialism to president-parliamentarism and vice versa took place in Ukraine (see Table 2 for details). All these changes gradually and variably involved (rather than reformed) the constitutionalized system of inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament” in Ukraine into a kind of repetitive “institutional trap”, “game” or “struggle” (Chaban & Vernygora, 2010; Matsiievskyi, 2015) between power (president and cabinet) and opposition, when each new political elite of each type of political regime (more democratic or autocratic one) rejected the “rules of the game” it received. Instead, each political elite resorted to creating a more favorable “matrix of inter-institutional relations”, as well as updated and more beneficial formal and informal “rules of the game”, constructed on the basis of the selective application of the principles of the rule of law and political justice (Matsiievskyi, 2011, s. 51; Tyushka, 2016). In addition, such processes partly distanced the Ukrainian system of government and inter-institutional relations from a constructive dialogue between the state (power) and society, in particular regarding the development of stable, effective and comprehensive attributes of

both the current, as well as prospective and optimal system of government.

The approbation of balanced premier-presidentialism in Ukraine starting from February–March 2014 and valid at the time of the study, in particular with the horizontal dualism of the executive, is no exception. Since the specified option of system of government (and this was declared both by the executive and the opposition (Olszanski, 2014), in particular in the form of the “Constitution 2004+” concept (Kirsch, 2014; Tyushka, 2016)) required substantial reconstruction, institutional reformation or optimization. Including taking into account the negative and positive experience of policy-making and the European integration in Ukraine and other countries (Lytvyn, 2014a; Tyushka, 2015), as well as the need to overcome the “vicious circle” and “institutional trap” within the cyclical logic of “revolution – constitution – revolution – constitution”, according to which a peculiar “revolutionary constitutionalism” was a permanent form of organizing and structuring the system of government in Ukraine. This is important considering at least the fact that the experience of the divided government systems (primarily cohabitations, see Table 2) did not always have only negative trends for Ukraine. Likewise, the experience of the unified government systems (primarily the unified majority systems) did not always have only a positive effect on Ukraine. In turn, this emphasizes the priority of choosing such a system of governance and inter-institutional relations for Ukraine, where the legislature dominates and determines the inter-institutional balance. Although, on the other hand, this mostly does not deny the expediency of prolongation the logic of the current premier-presidentialism in Ukraine, which proved its effectiveness within the framework of the unified majority system, especially during the Russian-Ukrainian war, which took on a full-scale format from February 2022.

That is why the choice of an effective and reliable option for the reconstruction, optimization and/or reformation of system of government in Ukraine (which would take into account the prospects for democratization and political/institutional stabilization, as well as the real history of state-building in Ukraine), in particular after the end of the martial law regime, is at least bilateral one. On the one hand, it may re-

fer to the prolongation and correction of the current premier-presidential semi-presidentialism in Ukraine, which is able to flow from one form to another – presidentialized, parliamentarized or balanced one, – in particular, primarily depending on the results of presidential and parliamentary elections and the party-political composition of the legislature. On the other hand, the choice of system of government in Ukraine may mean the formalized introduction of parliamentarized premier-presidentialism or even parliamentarism with a weak or nominal president. This would correspond to the historical institutional experience of Ukraine and the practice of inter-institutional relations in historical states and state/quasi-state entities in its contemporary territories (in particular, at the background of the interwar political and state tradition of Ukraine) within the framework of at least a partial approbation of the “path dependence” concept. In addition, this would correlate with the essence of political and legal searches regarding systems of government and inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament”, according to which the essential and conceptual roadmap for reforming or optimizing the system of government, as well as defining the place of various political institutions should be parliamentarism or premier-presidential semi-presidentialism. In addition, this would correspond to the mainly successful, democratic and stable institutional experience of various countries in Western, Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, etc., which quite systematically and reasonably chose and tested precisely the systems of parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism (Lytvyn, 2016b). Finally, this would be an adequate response to some political institutions, actors and parties in Ukraine, which have previously advocated and still advocate a much more diverse list of possible systems of government, particularly from “pure” presidentialism to “pure” parliamentarism, at different times and even currently, but mainly with “instrumental” and private goals (Lytvyn, 2018c).

In the case of continuing the approbation of balanced (with a constitutionally moderately influential president and prime minister) premier-presidentialism, it is initially advisable to formally and as much as possible (in separate

areas) demarcate and detail the powers of the head of state and the head of cabinet (even with the institutional predominance of the latter in the system of inter-institutional relations) within the horizontal dualism of the executive. Only after that, similar procedures will have to be done or supplemented factually, in particular on the basis of reference to the already existing (in 2014 and 2019) practice and/or even legislative regulation of holding simultaneous (two within six months, and possibly synchronized) presidential and parliamentary elections (Lytvyn, 2011). As the political experience of Ukraine and some other semi-presidential countries of Europe demonstrates, it will be possible in this way to effectively shift the responsibility for the political designation of the main actor in the system of the horizontal executive dualism – a president or a prime minister – to the voter/electorate. Thus, the latter will be able to determine who specifically should dominate and enjoy greater legitimacy of power in various spheres of politics in one or another period of time (Lytvyn, 2014a; Lytvyn, 2014b). As a result, such initial formal and institutional detailing and structuring the powers of president and prime minister, as well as later the electorally conditioned logic of minimizing inter-institutional conflicts in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament” should have a positive effect on factual and political strengthening of the president’s powers. Since the party of the winner of presidential election usually becomes the winner of the simultaneous parliamentary election, significantly increasing the chances of the head of state for stable support in the legislature. The experience of the 2019 elections demonstrated this the most vividly as for the case of premier-presidentialism in Ukraine. Since following the victory of Zelenskyi in the presidential election in April 2019, the victory and an absolute majority (for the first time in a single-party format) in the legislature after the early parliamentary election in July 2019 was obtained by the recently formed (and not previously existing) pro-presidential party “Servant of the People” (see Table 2 for details). Although, such an electoral scenario of the deployment of Ukrainian semi-presidentialism (as in 2019) should still be interpreted as a very exceptional one and such

that has an extremely weak potential to be repeated in the future.

One of the main reasons for this is that it is regulated (according to the current Election Code) to change the electoral system for forming the national legislature in Ukraine from a mixed (in particular, parallel or simultaneously combined by majoritarian (plurality, FPTP) and proportional ones – as in 2012–2019, as well as earlier) to proportional one. Instead, throughout most of the history of Ukraine after the restoration of its independence (except for the 2006–2012 period), the majoritarian (two-round, TRS) or the above-mentioned mixed parallel electoral systems were used to form the composition of Ukrainian parliament. That is, the electoral system was designed with a significant influence of the majoritarian (with single-member constituencies) component (Lytvyn, 2014d), which in practice was factually used for the last time (at the time of the study) in 2019. However, the fact remains that the majoritarian component of electoral systems has largely discredited itself in Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine is preliminary (so far exclusively by the appropriate law) modified to a proportional electoral system, in particular by analogy with successful (in terms of the level of democracy and governance efficiency) examples of semi-presidentialism, primarily premier-presidentialism, in other European countries (as in Croatia, Poland, Portugal, etc.). In this case, we are talking about the party-list proportional representation in a single nationwide constituency, but in parallel with open/preferential regional lists of candidates for deputies, taking into account the electoral barrier for parties at the level of 5 percent of the valid votes throughout the whole country. If this electoral system (or its electoral formula, more precisely) favors large/larger parties (with which president and prime minister are traditionally associated within semi-presidentialism), it will have a positive effect on the balanced character of the current Ukrainian premier-presidentialism. Instead, if the former acts as a promoter of strengthening small/smaller parties in parliament, then this will affect the parliamentarization of the current system of government, in particular in the form of parliamentarized premier-presidentialism or even (hypothetically in the future) “pure” parliamentarism. Finally, if the

envisaged electoral system is not tested and Ukraine continues to use its mixed (parallel) electoral system when forming the composition of parliaments, especially in the case of simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections, then this will certainly be one of the factors for actual presidentialization, but not parliamentarization of system of government (in particular, the current premier-presidentialism, which may even become a risk of its transformation into president-parliamentarism, as happened earlier) (Lytvyn, 2018c).

One way or another (albeit depending on the type of electoral system during the formation of parliament), the mechanisms for synchronizing presidential and parliamentary elections should theoretically contribute, on the one hand, to the maximum impossibility and avoidance or at least reduction in the frequency of approbation of divided government systems (i.e., divided majority and divided minority systems discussed in the previous part of the study; see Table 2), which can have both negative and positive influence on the political processes and inter-institutional relations in the case of balanced premier-presidentialism (which Ukraine currently has institutionally and politically). On the other hand, the fact that the factually (politically) strong president will continue to have no formal (institutional) authority to independently (by his or her own decision) dismiss the executive cabinet headed by prime minister (since this authority is reserved only for parliament) will remain the specifics of balanced premier-presidentialism in the case of its prolongation in Ukraine (Lytvyn, 2014a, s. 58; Lytvyn, 2014b, s. 180). In other words, president is able to dismiss the executive cabinet in such a case only by the "hands" of the majority in the legislature, but the constitution does not guarantee the former such a majority, since it is instead determined by the results of parliamentary election and inter-party agreements. It follows that the president, who does not have a majority in parliament, but wants to change the composition or leadership of the cabinet, will be necessary obliged to agree on this with the legislature. However, this is not always politically easy and unimpeded as evidenced by the political practice of Ukraine. Since the presidential or pro-presidential party does not necessarily have the support of an absolute majority of deputies in parliament on its own or in

a coalition with other parties. As mentioned above, only the executive cabinets during the presidency of Zelenskyi in Ukraine (since 2019) were formed based on the support of single-party parliamentary majority (see Table 2). Therefore, one of the alternatives for the further development of system of government in Ukraine is possible due to the optimization of the option of the current premier-presidentialism, which (depending on the results of the simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections) can vary from presidentialized to balanced and even parliamentarized design, while at the same time effectively counteracting the possible usurpation of power by any of the political actors and institutions (Lytvyn, 2014d). However, the above-mentioned clarification and detailing of the powers of president and prime minister within the framework of the executive dualism, as well as voters' awareness of the importance of the simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections are absolutely necessary for this (including depending on one or another type of electoral system for forming the composition of parliament), particularly regarding the determination of the factual or political design of system of government.

This can be demonstrated by an example when the mechanism of simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections does not provide a president with political support by parliamentary majority for his or her (or for any "friendly" within the hypothetical coalition) candidacy for prime minister. In other words, it is about any option of semi-presidentialism, when the unified government system is not implemented. Since the formally and institutionally balanced (by the executive dualism) premier-presidential system in Ukraine will work as close as possible to the constitutional regulations (even the current ones) in this case. Therefore, the latter will be factually and politically tested through the institutionally outlined divided majority system (cohabitation) or divided minority system. It is on this basis and in this way that the horizontal and balanced executive dualism within the framework of the current premier-presidentialism will emerge in Ukraine (Lytvyn, 2014a, s. 58; Lytvyn, 2014b, s. 180). With this in mind, it is precisely the simultaneous elections of president and parliament in the conditions of semi-

presidentialism that, as evidenced by political practice in Ukraine, can limit the conflict of the executive dualism and reduce the hypothetical number of cases of divided government (Lytvyn, 2018c). Moreover, from the point of view of voters, it is quite obvious in this case that formally (institutionally) there are two important political actors/institutions in the state, i.e. president and prime minister (Lytvyn, 2014d; Lytvyn, 2015c). It is also obvious that the factual or political authority of each of these institutions significantly or mainly depends on the electorate and the results of presidential and parliamentary elections, which determine who (a president or a prime minister) still has the decisive "word" in the system of the horizontal executive dualism. For example, the president (as the leader of a certain party) is factually and politically stronger in the case when a representative of his or her party is a prime minister, even if such a construction is supported not only by the presidential/pro-presidential party alone, but also by several parties that form a coalition in parliament. On the other hand, the prime minister (as the leader of a certain party) is both formally (institutionally) and factually (politically) stronger when he or she belongs to the party opposing a president, especially if the prime minister's party is independently or in a coalition with other parties in the composition of parliamentary majority or minority that forms the executive cabinet (Lytvyn, 2014a, s. 59).

In this case, everything is mostly obvious even in the environment of political or party elites and counter-elites (opposition), which compete in the simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. Since every candidate for presidency hopes to become the most politically influential person not only within the framework of the system of the executive dualism, but also generally in the state. However, this is possible only when a prime minister is politically subordinate to a president due to the support of parliamentary majority, as stated above. This requires that the presidential candidate count on the specific candidacy of a prime minister in the context of simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. It is the easiest to do so when both officials belong to the same party or inter-party coalition. Therefore, the leader of a party or coalition in such a case should traditionally be a presidential

candidate, and the second person in a party or coalition should be a candidate for prime minister, at least taking into account the party hierarchy. Except for situations when the prime minister is the opponent of the president who is logically the first person in his or her political party. Finally, if the president does not have the support of majority in parliament, then he or she is obviously and factually (politically) not positioned as the most influential person in the system of the executive dualism and generally in the state, even if there is a historical experience and tradition of presidential dominance in the system of power and inter-institutional relations. Instead, the leading role in such a case is played by prime minister who is in opposition to president, even if the former was also a candidate for the presidency (Lytvyn, 2014a, s. 59; Lytvyn, 2014b, s. 180-181).

On the contrary, in particular in the case of consideration of the institutional and political riskiness of the current balanced premier-presidentialism in Ukraine (of course less one than in the situation of president-parliamentarism), as well as its denial and unwillingness to reform and optimize in the future, the choice of an alternative system of government should fall, as indicated above, either on parliamentarized premier-presidentialism, or even on parliamentarism. These two options are combined by common inter-institutional relations, in particular by the presence of the institution of weak or nominal president, and are quite possible at the background of the regulation of the proportional electoral system for forming the composition of Ukrainian parliament, which was discussed above. In addition, the positive of these systems of government is that they minimize inter-institutional conflicts as much as possible (albeit in different ways), as well as regulate inter-institutional relations in the triangle "the head of state - cabinet/prime minister - parliament", in particular regarding the executive dualism, implementation of a more congruent and consistent legislation, as well as domestic and foreign policy (Lytvyn, 2014a, s. 56; Lytvyn, 2014b, s. 178; Tyushka, 2016). The reason is that if conflicts do even arise, they are mostly eliminated through the procedures of parliamentary votes of no confidence in cabinet, as well as dissolution of parliament and its early election. In addition, such systems of govern-

ment outline anticipatory mechanisms for resolving the executive and inter-institutional crises before they develop into the crises of political system, political regime and/or system of government. Therefore, such systems of government are more flexible ones and better adapted to varying institutional, political and electoral circumstances. This is especially relevant for parliamentarism, where the executive cabinet has an opportunity to announce early parliamentary election to solve the problems of the so-called "blocked legislation" or "legislative gridlock" (Lytvyn, 2014a, s. 56). This is how the executive cabinet forces itself (in the context of those deputies and parties that provide it with support in parliament) and all members of parliament to make popular or unpopular, but necessary decisions.

As for the prospects for choosing and introducing parliamentarized premier-presidentialism with a weak or nominal president (compared to other options of semi-presidentialism tested in Ukraine), it is necessary to single out primarily such of them as: the limitation of the possibility of inter-institutional conflicts in the executive dualism exclusively during the periods of divided government (first of all, within the divided minority systems) and only in certain spheres of joint competence of presidents and prime ministers (mostly this is a matter of defense politics and foreign affairs); the unidirectionality of inter-institutional conflicts in the system of the executive dualism, which is manifested in the fact that president can oppose the executive cabinet and prime minister only to a limited extent; the underdevelopment of diffuse responsibility between president and prime minister, as a result of which the political, power and governance process has almost no dual and controversial meaning (even within the periods of divided government); the real and permanent (institutional and mostly political) awareness that prime minister and his or her cabinet, which must enjoy the support of parliament, are the dominant actors in the system of the executive dualism (and in the political process in general) (Lytvyn, 2014a, s. 56–57; Lytvyn, 2014b, s. 178–179).

In addition, the favor of parliamentarism and parliamentarized premier-presidentialism (in both cases with weak or nominal presidents) in Ukraine is evidenced by the fact that these systems of government (among the other op-

tions of inter-institutional relations in republics) are the most democratic ones and provide the greatest governance efficiency and quality of human development (Lytvyn, 2015a). Finally, the listed systems of government are characterized by a relatively low risk of military and other violent coups. Accordingly, they have a fairly significant potential to be tested in the future, especially at the background of the already regulated change of the electoral system for the formation of parliament in Ukraine from a mixed (parallel) to a proportional one (which is detailed above). The reason is that such a (generally proportional one) electoral system is, on average, a more reliable condition for a more proportional transfer of votes into mandates, and therefore for the formation and functioning of a stable (but not extremely fractionalized, polarized and undisciplined one) party system with the possibility of forming a stable parliamentary majority, which historically is lacking in Ukraine (possibly, but situationally with the exception of single-party majority from 2019). In turn, an effectively structured party system must certainly add weight to the institution of parliament, which will really act as a key center of the processes of formation and responsibility of the executive cabinets headed by prime ministers in the conditions of parliamentarism or parliamentarized premier-presidentialism. Otherwise, even within the considered alternatives for the development of system of government in Ukraine, the formation of unstable parliamentary coalitions and cabinets, as well as the narrow profile of the interests of political elite and opposition will remain a problem (Lytvyn, 2014a, s. 57).

This means that we must deal not simply with system of government as such (at the level of inter-institutional relations), but with constitutional and political engineering of system of government in the case of both the optimization of balanced premier-presidentialism, as well as its modification and reformation in favor of parliamentarized premier-presidentialism or even parliamentarism (as opposed to semi-presidentialism; the option of presidentialism is recorded as unacceptable in our study). The fact is that system of government depends not only on formal, legal or institutional powers of key institutions and their relations with each other, but also on factual or political causes and consequences of these pow-

ers and relationships, which are revealed within the intersection of electoral systems and formulas, party systems and inter-party competition, socio-political cleavages, traditions of the political process and governance, etc. It is also interesting that all options for optimizing or reforming system of government in Ukraine, even regardless of the power of presidents, prime ministers and parliaments, will not only to varying degrees correct the defects and problem of the repetitive "privatization and instrumentalization" of constitutional development and "revolutionary constitutionalism" in the course of struggle for power, but will also outline the special importance of the institution of parliament (and, accordingly, the institution of parliamentary election), particularly in the formation, control and responsibility (possible resignations) of the executive cabinets, as well as in determining the key political actor in the system of the executive. Therefore, the listed and considered alternatives will certainly direct and bring the political process, political regime and system of government in Ukraine closer to the already established European model of parliamentary democracy (which is especially important after Ukraine received the status of a candidate for the EU membership in 2022). In this model, the primary role is given to parliament, but not the head of state, particularly in controlling and verifying the responsibility of the executive cabinet headed by prime minister, even regardless of the rules and procedures for the formation, responsibility and possible resignation of the executive cabinet (Cheibub, Martin & Rasch, 2013; Cheibub, Martin & Rasch, 2019; Louwse, 2014; Rasch, Martin & Cheibub, 2015; Russo & Verzichelli, 2014). In addition, it will contribute to rethinking and updating the meaning and varieties of the executive cabinets in Ukraine. Since they acted exclusively as objects during the entire period after the restoration of Ukrainian independence, which were influenced by inter-institutional conflict between parliaments and presidents at various stages of the constitutional process and political relations (Lytvyn, 2014b, s. 181).

Conclusions

On the basis of the conducted study, the article achieved all goals and solved all research tasks set, particularly of a theoretical,

methodological and empirical nature. For the first, it was characterized and systematized the ideas about, conditions and evolution of political systems and basic political institutions in the triangle "the head of state - cabinet - parliament", as well as the peculiarities of relations between them in various theoretical assumptions and in historical states and state/quasi-state entities on the territory of contemporary Ukraine. It was revealed that during the period of 1917-1991, there were an extremely large number of such state or quasi-state entities and they used different systems of government and inter-institutional relations, in particular depending on the political realities at one time or another. Their review until the restoration of Ukraine's independence in 1991 gives grounds to state that two basic designs of systems of government (within theoretical concepts used at that time), in particular parliamentarism (or quasi-parliamentarism) and presidentialism (or quasi-presidentialism), as well as their derivatives and some atypical revolutionary designs, were used in inter-institutional relations within the political struggle of the Ukrainian lands for independence and their occupation or annexations by other states, primarily by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the model of parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary republic with the position of president elected in the legislature as the head of state or even without such a position prevailed (over all other non-parliamentary systems of government) in political and legal thought, as well as in theory and practice on the historical terrain of contemporary Ukraine during the 1917-1991 period, primarily in view of political and military circumstances. The reason is that it was almost unrealistic or impractical to hold popular elections of the head of state and even parliament, and therefore the best feasible design for inter-institutional relations did was parliamentarism/quasi-parliamentarism, even if it hinted at any other system of government in the future.

Nevertheless, the two opposite designs of systems of government - parliamentarism and presidentialism, - as well as their derivatives and even some other designs of inter-institutional relations were typically combined by the idea that the position of the head of state should be perceived as a kind of stabilizing factor and buffer between the opposing political actors, especially at the transitional stage of their development. At

the same time, it is noticed that Western Ukrainian thinkers and state/quasi-state entities more often appealed and tested presidentialism (or its derivatives), but Central and Eastern Ukrainian ones – parliamentarism or quasi-parliamentarism. Such a logic was throughout the history, and later it even appeared in various constitutional drafts that were developed after the restoration of Ukraine's independence in 1991. However, the peculiarity is partially noticed here that the authors and politicians who historically defended the independence of Ukraine turned more often to presidentialism (and even to ideas of semi-presidentialism) or something else, while the authors and politicians (certainly not all, but mainly anti-Ukrainian ones) who sought a federal, autonomous or subordinate status of Ukraine insisted primarily on parliamentarism or quasi-parliamentarism. Similarly, leftist and socialist scholars, thinkers, parties and politicians advocated a more parliamentary logic, while rightists and conservatives supported a more presidential construction. One way or another, parliamentarism or quasi-parliamentarism ideologically, politically, institutionally and practically dominated this period of time.

Given this and for the second, it was checked the extent to which the current system of government in Ukraine follows the previous inter-institutional designs and corresponds to the "path dependence" concept. The article demonstrates that idea and design of parliamentarism were neither formally nor actually adopted in Ukraine since 1991. Accordingly, the "path dependence" of institutional development of systems of government within the framework of the progress of Ukrainian statehood systematically worked rather weakly or almost not at all in 1917–1991. Although the inter-institutional "path dependence" was partially reflected in the case of various directions of development of Ukrainian statehood (including within the framework of occupations and annexations). Therefore, the period of political development and progress of inter-institutional relations (system of government) since 1991 has become a complete "novelty" for Ukraine, since European and world theory and practice have gone much further than ideologues in the Soviet Union, as well as politicians and constitutional engineers in independent Ukraine, could talk about. In addition, the reason was primarily the transition

from dichotomy (presidentialism versus parliamentarism) to trichotomy (plus semi-presidentialism) in the classification of systems of government, which gradually began in political science and jurisprudence in the West. Instead, this transition was immediately practical one in Ukraine, and only later it began to be reconsidered, even despite the long process of preparation and adoption the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996 and the multivariation of its projects.

Due to the fact that Ukraine did not actually have any signs of its statehood in most of the territory since 1922 and in Western Ukraine since 1945, this independent state (since 1991) could not have a single and fully consolidated idea of choosing the design of inter-institutional relations. Therefore, the denial of parliamentarism and previous "path dependence" in 1991 was actually a paradox, because while constitutionally appealing to the history of statehood at the beginning of the 20th century, Ukraine de facto began to use completely different systems of government and inter-institutional relations than it had been historically, including during the period the so-called "Ukrainian revolution" and the national liberation struggle in 1917–1921. In particular, Ukraine partially tried presidentialism, and from parliamentarism it mainly adopted the option of collective responsibility of the executive cabinet to the legislature, the combination of which generated semi-presidentialism. Although, the choice of semi-presidentialism and its various options in Ukraine since 1991 was not evolutionarily empty one, since it was often used in other countries of Europe and the world, as well as was even described in constitutional projects in Ukraine itself at the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, the method of formation, organization, powers, place and role of various political institutions in Ukraine since 1991 do not systematically correspond to institutional practice and historical experience incorporated in various state entities in the historical lands of Ukraine. This is somewhat complicated by the transition from the dichotomous to trichotomous approach to classification of systems of government, where semi-presidentialism – Ukrainian option – is often considered a combination of presidentialism and parliamentarism. In addition, it is concluded that the various stages of the development of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine during the 1991–

2022 period were characterized by their institutional and political attributes within the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament”. The specificity of Ukrainian semi-presidentialism was most often manifested in the cyclical alternation of mostly presidentialized president-parliamentarism (and more recently, premier-presidentialism) and balanced premier-presidentialism. This also proves the weakness of the connections of the newest system of government in Ukraine with the institutional past, as well as refutes the existence or validity of the “path dependence” logics of historical and current inter-institutional relations and systems of government in Ukraine. At the same time, the strong “path dependence” or even fluctuations in the development of systems of government can be traced in 1991–2022.

On this basis and for the third, this raised the question about options, opportunities, prospects, expediency and resources for further progress, reformation and optimization of system of government and inter-institutional relations in Ukraine, including in view of institutional, political and legal heritage of political institutions in Ukraine in the past, as well as given the experience of other European countries. It is argued that Ukraine is one of the most vivid, but simultaneously the most complicated examples of the institutional and political functionality, as well as volatility of system of government – primarily semi-presidential one – in Europe and even worldwide. The fact is that Ukraine historically (extra-constitutionally since 1991 (with the exception of the 1995–1996 period, when presidential system of government was tested) and constitutionally since 1996) is characterized by repeated fluctuations between various options of semi-presidentialism. The latter lead to the prolongation and stabilization of inter-institutional relations, but autocratization of the political regime in one case, or cause political and institutional destabilization along with relative democratization of the political regime in another case. Thus, the problem of choosing appropriate, effective and stable institutional and political options for development, reformation and optimization of system of government still remains extremely acute for Ukraine. This is relevant even after more than 30 years since the restoration of Ukrainian independence and more than a quarter of a century after the adoption of Ukrainian constitution, but especially at the background of

the Russian-Ukrainian war, which took the shape of a full-scale one in February 2022.

In view of this, it is proved that the choice of effective and reliable option for the reconstruction, optimization and/or reformation of system of government in Ukraine (which would take into account democratization and political/institutional stabilization, as well as the history of state-building in Ukraine) is at least bilateral one. On the one hand, it may refer to the prolongation and correction of premier-presidential semi-presidentialism in Ukraine, which is able to flow from one form to another – presidentialized, parliamentarized or balanced one, – in particular, depending on the results of presidential and parliamentary elections and the party-political composition of the legislature. On the other hand, the choice of system of government in Ukraine may mean the introduction of parliamentarized premier-presidentialism or even parliamentarism with a weak or nominal president. This would more correspond to historical institutional experience of Ukraine and the practice of inter-institutional relations in historical states and state/quasi-state entities in its contemporary territories within the “path dependence” concept. In addition, this would correlate with the essence of searches regarding systems of government, according to which the conceptual roadmap for reforming or optimizing the system of government, as well as defining the place of various political institutions should be parliamentarism or premier-presidential semi-presidentialism. Moreover, this would correspond to successful, democratic and stable institutional experience of various countries in Western, Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, etc., which chose and tested precisely the systems of parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism. Finally, this would be a response to those political institutions, actors and parties in Ukraine, which have previously advocated and still advocate a much more diverse list of possible systems of government, particularly from “pure” presidentialism to “pure” parliamentarism. Given this, the listed and considered alternatives will certainly direct the political process, political regime and system of government in Ukraine closer to the already established European model of parliamentary democracy.

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