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Contents

<i>Anatolij Romanyuk</i> THE DOMINANT MODEL OF A POLITICAL PARTY IN UKRAINE: A SPECIAL CASE.....	6
<i>Piotr Olszewski</i> PARAMETERS OF STRUCTURING AND SPECIALIZATION OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXT AND FINDINGS IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.....	20
<i>Vitaliy Lytvyn</i> "PATH DEPENDENCE" AND THE DESIGN OF SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT: CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS	41
<i>Nadia Panchak-Białobłocka</i> THE PECULIARITIES OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS' FUNCTIONING IN THE PARLIAMENTARY- LEGISLATIVE PROCESS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES	60
<i>Katarzyna Krzywińska</i> CAUSES, PATTERNS AND CONSEQUENCES OF COALITION FORMATION IN PRESIDENTIAL REPUBLICS	79
<i>Tomasz Białobłocki</i> PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE PARTY THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "CRISIS" OF PARTIES IN CONTEMPORARY REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES.....	97
<i>Oleh Fylyk</i> THE CRISIS OR "END" OF MULTICULTURALISM POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BACKDROP OF "BREXIT" AND DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	113
<i>Michał Białobłocki</i> POPULISM: WHAT IT IS AND IS NOT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PRACTICE.....	137
<i>Aneta Moszczyńska</i> POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESIDENTIALISM: ESSENCE, ATTRIBUTES, EFFECTIVENESS AND CONSEQUENCES.....	156

Magdalena Białobłocka

EFFICIENCY AND CONSEQUENCES OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS DEVELOPMENT IN THE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: ESSENCE, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND GENERALIZATION..... 175

Nadia Panchak-Białobłocka

MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN DEMOCRACIES AS A RESEARCH PROBLEM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE
OF ART AND KEY ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS..... 191

NOTA O AUTORACH 211

ZASADY PRZYGOTOWYWANIA TEKSTÓW 212

“PATH DEPENDENCE” AND THE DESIGN OF SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT: CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS

The article theoretically, systematically and methodologically examines the essence of the “path dependence” concept as one of the mechanisms for interpreting, designing and selecting systems of government and inter-institutional relations. This is done with regard to the distinction between two basic approaches in Political Science for typologizing systems of government: the dichotomous one (presidentialism versus parliamentarism) and the trichotomous one (presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism). The study demonstrates that the “path dependence” of systems of government can occur within each of these approaches as well as between them (especially when a semi-presidential system is chosen in a country). Therefore, the research serves as a basis for questioning the relevance of verifying institutional heritage and succession of systems of government in a specific country compared to systems of government in its predecessors. This helps to understand the importance of institutional heritage from the past in constructing the current system of power and government in a particular country.

Keywords: system of government, inter-institutional relations, “path dependence”.

„TRAJEKTORIA POPRZEDNIEGO ROZWOJU” I PROJEKT SYSTEMU RZĄDZENIA: RAMY KONCEPCYJNE, TEORETYCZNE I METODOLOGICZNE

W artykule Autor usystematyzował na poziomie teoretycznym i metodologicznym istotę koncepcji „trajektorii poprzedniego rozwoju” jako jednego z mechanizmów interpretacji, projektowania oraz wyboru systemu rządzenia i relacji międzyinstytucjonalnych. Dokonano tego ze względu na rozróżnienie w politologii dwóch podstawowych podejść do typologii systemu rządzenia – dychotomicznego (system prezydencki vs. parlamentarny) oraz trychotomicznego (prezydencjalizm, parlamentaryzm i semiprezydencjalizm) – a także wykazanie tego, że „trajektoria poprzedniego rozwoju” systemu rządzenia jest możliwa zarówno w ramach każdego z tych podejść, jak i pomiędzy nimi (szczególnie, jeśli w tym czy innym państwie wybrano semiprezydencjalizm). Stąd badania te są powodem do postawienia pytania o celowości weryfikacji dziedzictwa instytucjonalnego oraz ciągłości systemu rządzenia konkretnych państw w porównaniu z systemami rządzenia jego poprzedników. Dzięki tym twierdzeniom można zrozumieć, jak

i w jakim stopniu instytucjonalne dziedzictwo przeszłości jest ważne dla zbudowania obecnego systemu władzy dla systemu rządzenia w tym czy innym państwie.

Słowa kluczowe: system rządzenia, relacje międzyinstytucjonalne, „trajektoria poprzedniego rozwoju”.

«ТРАЕКТОРІЯ ПОПЕРЕДНЬОГО РОЗВИТКУ» І ДИЗАЙН СИСТЕМИ ПРАВЛІННЯ: КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНІ, ТЕОРЕТИЧНІ ТА МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНІ РАМКИ

У статті на теоретичному та методологічному рівні систематизовано сутність концепту «траєкторії попереднього розвитку» як одного із механізмів інтерпретації, дизайнування та вибору систем правління і міжінституційних відносин. Це зроблено з огляду на розрізнення у політичній науці двох базових підходів до типологізації систем правління – дихотомічного (президенталізм проти парламентаризму) та трихотомічного (президенталізм, парламентаризм і напівпрезиденталізм), – а також демонстрування, що «траєкторія попереднього розвитку» систем правління можлива як у рамках кожного з цих підходів, так і між ними (особливо, якщо в тій чи іншій державі вибрано напівпрезиденталізм). Відтак дослідження слугує приводом для постановки питання про доцільність верифікації інституційної спадщини та спадкоємності системи правління конкретної країни порівняно зі системами правління в її попередниках. Адже завдяки цьому можна зрозуміти, як і на скільки інституційна спадщина минулого важлива для побудови чинної системи влади та системи правління в тій чи іншій країні.

Ключові слова: система правління, міжінституційні відносини, «траєкторія попереднього розвитку».

Introduction

Each country is inevitably characterized by its own political institutions, system of inter-institutional relations and consequently a particular system of government (such as presidential, parliamentary, semi-presidential one, etc.), which are implemented within different types of political regimes (democratic, autocratic, hybrid ones). Meanwhile, in some countries, the systems of government are more stable (e.g. parliamentary or semi-presidential ones) and are used within similar political regimes (e.g. democratic ones), while in others countries they are highly volatile and undergo shifts from one option to another, sometimes even influencing or being influenced by different types of political regimes. Therefore, it follows that each country, along with its political

institutions and political system (including systems of government), is not detached from previous stages of political and institutional development. Instead, a particular country either replicates or challenges them, while ensuring overall political and institutional development within a specific trajectory or path. In other words, the "path dependence" inevitably emerges as a construct for explaining and designing political institutions, systems of government and inter-institutional relations (within separate countries or even entire regions), thus requiring examination and structuring, at least conceptually, theoretically and methodologically. It is precisely the subject and the purpose that the focus of this study is directed, which is designed in such a way that it consists of two interrelated and consecutive parts. The first part of the study prepares theoretical framework for understanding the essence and varieties of systems of government, as well as their evolution in Political Science with a view to their further detailing when outlining the specifics of these issues. The second part of the research covers the essence and content of the "path dependence" concept as a theoretical and methodological construction for explaining the design of political institutions, inter-institutional relations and systems of government. As a result, the study provides a conceptual, theoretical and methodological understanding of the issues of "path dependence" as a construct for explaining and designing systems of government and inter-institutional relations.

1. The Essence and Options of Systems of Government, Their Evolution and Distinction in Political Science: Conceptualization and Theoretical Framework

Before starting to solve the stated conceptual, theoretical and methodological task, it is necessary to focus on the identification and theorization of these issues and certain categories, particularly in the context of defining and evolving the essence and types of systems of government. This is important because the issues of choosing a system of government are fundamental and decisive for the progress, functioning and development of statehood. Therefore, these issues are politically and institutionally relevant, primarily through various types of republics, retrospectively and prospectively shaping or influencing the design of inter-institutional relations in a particular country at a given moment. This is supported by the understanding of system of government as formally (constitutionally or institutionally) and/or actually (politically or behaviorally) determined preconditions and peculiarities of inter-institutional relations regarding the formation, acquisition, structuring and exercise of state power by political institutions in the triangle "the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament". Thus, the relevance of the aforementioned issues is heightened by the fact that a system of government is a heterogeneous category that cannot be characterized in singular terms, but rather often needs to be understood as evolving from one design of inter-institutional relations to another, and so on¹.

¹ Lytvyn, V. (2014). Napivprezidentska systema pravlinnia u konteksti respublikanskoi formy pravlinnia: Typolohizatsiia, konstytutsiino-pravovi i politychni vyklyky ta perspektyvy reformuvannia v Ukraini. *Studium Europy Srodkowej i Wschodniej*, 2, 156–181.

In this regard, it should be noted that Political Science is not monolithic in classifying systems of government, and there is often no consensus on the categorization of inter-institutional relations in a particular country. Even today, a comprehensive typology of systems of government has not been fully elaborated, and instead, there are at least two basic theoretical approaches (along with their derivatives and modifications) to differentiate systems of government into types, namely the dichotomous and trichotomous approaches² (although different scholars identify anywhere from two to several dozen types of systems of government³). These approaches have evolved in several waves of research on systems of government, with the dichotomous approach predominating in the early waves (until the beginning to mid-1990s) and the trichotomous approach emerging in subsequent waves (from the mid-1990s)⁴.

The dichotomous theoretical approach, as an evolutionarily primary and more enduring one, is based on the rationale of classifying all systems of government into presidential republics (presidentialism) and parliamentary republics or monarchies (parliamentarism). Their differentiation is often based on the predominance of powers and authority either of president or parliament in terms of the formation and influence over the executive or the overall balance of powers among the key institutions of state authority⁵. This approach emerged in the late 19th century and gained its popularity from the mid-20th century onwards when Political Science and political practice initiated the search for a better/optimal system of government, at least in terms of constitutional and legal perspectives, thereby sparking a debate between the proponents and opponents of presidentialism and parliamentarism⁶. Therefore, some scholars⁷ have argued for the positive

² Daly, S. (2003). The ladder of abstraction: A framework for the systematic classification of democratic regime types. *Politics*, 23(2), 96–108.; Elgie, R. (1998). The classification of democratic regime types: Conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions. *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(3), 219–238.; Lijphart, A. (1997). Nomination: Trichotomy or dichotomy. *European Journal of Political Research*, 31(1), 127.; Pasquino, G. (1997). Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A political model at work. *European Journal of Political Research*, 31(1), 128–146.

³ Daly, S. (2003). The ladder of abstraction: A framework for the systematic classification of democratic regime types. *Politics*, 23(2), 96, 104.; Duverger, M. (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential government. *European Journal of Political Research*, 8(2), 165–187.; Elgie, R. (1998). The classification of democratic regime types: Conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions. *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(3), 227.; Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. (1992). Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics. Cambridge University Press, 26.; Siaroff, A. (2003). Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3), 294.

⁴ Elgie, R. (2005b). From Linz to Tsebelis: Three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies? *Democratization*, 12(1), 106–122.; Lytvyn, V. (2013). Teoretyko-metodolohichni "khvyli" doslidzhennia respublikanskykh system derzhavnogo pravlinnia: Vid V. Badzhekhota do R. Elhi. *Visnyk Lvivskoho Universytetu: Seriya Filosofsko-Politolohichni Studii*, 3, 145–155.

⁵ Lytvyn, V. (2018). Atrybuty ta riznovydy napivprezydentskoi systemy pravlinnia v Yevropi: Instytutsiino-protseualnyi i politychno-povedinkovyi aspekty. *LNU imeni Ivana Franka*, 38–39.

⁶ Linz, J. (1994). Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In J. Linz, & A. Valenzuela (Eds.), *The failure of presidential democracy: Comparative perspectives* (pp. 3–87). Johns Hopkins University Press.; Price, D. (1943). The parliamentary and presidential systems. *Public Administration Review*, 3(4), 317–334.; Laski, H. (1944). The parliamentary and presidential systems. *Public Administration Review*, 4(4), 347–359.; Stepan, A., & Skach, C. (1993). Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation. *Parliamentarism versus presidentialism*. *World Politics*, 46(1), 1–22.; Eaton, K. (2002). *Parliamentarism versus presidentialism in the policy arena*. *Comparative Politics*, 32(3), 355–376.; Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(3), 289–325.

⁷ Ackerman, B. (2000). The new separation of powers. *Harvard Law Review*, 113(3), 634–729.; Price, D. (1943). The parliamentary and presidential systems. *Public Administration Review*, 3(4), 317–334.; Linz, J. (1990a). The perils of presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy*, 1(1), 51–69.; Linz, J. (1990b). The virtues of parliamentarism. *Journal of Democracy*, 1(4), 84–91.; Lijphart, A. (1995). The virtues of parliamentarism: But which kind of parliamentarism? In H. Chehabi, & A. Stepan (Eds.), *Politics, society and democracy: Comparative studies* (pp. 363–373). Westview Press.; Ström, K., Müller, W., & Bergman, T. (2003). *Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies*. Oxford University Press.

institutional and political advantages of a parliamentary system of government in the path of installing and consolidating democracy. In contrast, other scholars⁸ have demonstrated that presidentialism is not necessarily flawed, ineffective or risky one in the context of democratic choice and development. Finally, there are scholars⁹ who assert that it is not possible to determine and choose a better and more optimal system of government between presidentialism and parliamentarism, at least in a general theoretical sense, as systems of government in different countries are undoubtedly context-dependent, as well as vary in their institutional and political consequences, particularly regarding the success or failure of democratization and socio-economic influences.

This also reveals the weakness of the dichotomous theoretical approach to the classification of systems of government, as it defines presidentialism and parliamentarism quite conditionally, politically determined and contextually, allowing for their blending (without assigning it a separate type) with each other (in particular, based on factors such as the presence or absence of popular elections for the head of state, the nature of the legitimacy of the head of state power, etc.¹⁰) to define those empirical cases and designs that are politically and institutionally contradictory and ambiguous ones, yet still categorized by scholars as either presidential or parliamentary countries. For example, this includes: the combination of the presidential method of cabinet/administration formation and its collective political responsibility (regarding the termination of powers) solely to parliament; the combination of the parliamentary method of cabinet formation and its collective non-responsibility (regarding premature termination of powers) to the legislature; the synthesis of parliamentary procedures for forming and holding the cabinet responsible with nationwide/popular elections for the prime minister, and so on. All of this demonstrates the methodological and empirical inadequacy of the "presidentialism-parliamentarism" dichotomy, since it is unable to comprehensively encompass all the cases of inter-institutional relations in the triangle "the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament"¹¹, even though it continues to be applied by lots of researchers.

⁸ Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2002). Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5, 151–179.; Mainwaring, S., & Shugart, M. S. (1997). Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge University Press.; Mainwaring, S. (1990). Presidentialism in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 25(1), 157–179.; Mainwaring, S. (1993). Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy: The difficult combination. *Comparative Political Studies*, 26(2), 198–228.; Shugart, M. S., & Haggard, S. (2001). Institutions and public policy in presidential systems. In S. Haggard, & M. McCubbins (Eds.), *Presidents, parliaments, and policy* (pp. 64–104). Cambridge University Press.

⁹ Laski, H. (1944). The parliamentary and presidential systems. *Public Administration Review*, 4(4), 347–359.; Horowitz, D. (1990). Presidents vs. parliaments: Comparing democratic systems. *Journal of Democracy*, 1(4), 73–79.; Mainwaring, S., & Shugart, M. S. (1997). Juan Linz, presidentialism and democracy: A critical appraisal. *Comparative Politics*, 29(4), 449–471.; Power, T., & Gasiorowski, M. (1997). Institutional design and democratic consolidation in the third world. *Comparative Political Studies*, 30(2), 123–155.; Linz, J. (1994). Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In J. Linz, & A. Valenzuela (Eds.), *The failure of presidential democracy: Comparative perspectives* (pp. 3–87). Johns Hopkins University Press.; Sartori, G. (1997). *Comparative constitutional engineering. An inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes*. Macmillan.; Stepan, A., & Skach, C. (1993). *Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation. Parliamentarism versus presidentialism*. *World Politics*, 46(1), 1–22.

¹⁰ Linz, J. (1994). Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In J. Linz, & A. Valenzuela (Eds.), *The failure of presidential democracy: Comparative perspectives* (pp. 3–87). Johns Hopkins University Press.; Stepan, A., & Skach, C. (1993). *Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation. Parliamentarism versus presidentialism*. *World Politics*, 46(1), 1–22.

¹¹ Collier, D., & Adcock, R. (1999). Democracy and dichotomies: A pragmatic approach to choices about concepts. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 537–565.; Daly, S. (2003). The ladder of abstraction: A framework for the systematic classification of democratic regime types. *Politics*, 23(2), 96.; Lyrwyn, V. (2018). Atrybuty ta riznovydy napivprezidentskoi systemy pravlinnia v Yevropi: Instyutysii-no-protsesualnyi i politychno-povedinkovy aspekty. *LNU imeni Ivana Franka*, 39–40.

Therefore, as an evolutionary update, but also a significantly younger and substantial methodological modification, the trichotomous approach additionally encompasses a variety of semi-presidential republics (semi-presidentialism), thereby changing the entire logics of classifying systems of government, while also seeking answers to questions regarding the best or optimal option for inter-institutional relations (including their role in the establishment and consolidation of democracies, autocracies or hybrid political regimes)¹². This approach emerged only in the 1970s-1980s¹³, but gained particular popularity and transformation in the late 20th and early 21st centuries¹⁴. During this time, semi-presidential system of government was initially identified and conceptualized, but later reconceptualized (including within such options as president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism¹⁵) and widely tested, including based on both formal and actual institutional and political characteristics. This development occurred in parallel with the emergence, proclamation or restoration of independence or the transformation of numerous countries around the world in the late 1980s to the 1990s, many of which adopted semi-presidential system of government. Additionally, as a separate classification branch, this theoretical approach sometimes even extended to what is known as semi-parliamentary or assembly-independent system of government (semi-parliamentarism)¹⁶. However, due to its limited empirical prevalence, the latter is mostly interpreted as atypical one or combined with the other three “pure” types of systems of government.

Thus, the emergence of semi-presidentialism as a theoretical concept was accompanied by the transformation of the typology of systems of government into a more empirically comprehensive and complex framework, albeit within the trichotomous approach. Conceptually, the methodology for defining systems of government was also improved, as it became less arbitrary and relational compared to the dichotomous approach (particularly in terms of assessing the powers of presidents and parliaments). Instead, it started to rely on a distinct and dispositional set of constitutional/institutional indicators to identify different designs of inter-institutional relations. Among these indicators, researchers¹⁷ commonly select factors such as: 1) the subject of collective

¹² Elgie, R. (2005b). From Linz to Tsebelis: Three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies? *Democratization*, 12(1), 106–122.; Sartori, G. (1997). *Comparative constitutional engineering. An inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes*. Macmillan, 83–140.

¹³ Duverger, M. (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential government. *European Journal of Political Research*, 8(2), 165–187.

¹⁴ Elgie, R. (Ed.) (1999). *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford University Press.; Elgie, R. (2005a). A fresh look at semi-presidentialism: Variations on a theme. *Journal of Democracy*, 16(3), 98–112.; Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. Yale University Press.; Sartori, G. (1997). *Comparative constitutional engineering. An inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes*. Macmillan.; Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. (1992). *Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁵ Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. (1992). *Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics*. Cambridge University Press.; Shugart, M. S. (2005). Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns. *French Politics*, 3(3), 323–351.

¹⁶ Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. (1992). *Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics*. Cambridge University Press, 26.

¹⁷ Elgie, R. (2007). What is semi-presidentialism and where is it found. In R. Elgie, & S. Moestrup (Eds.), *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A comparative study* (pp. 1–13); Elgie, R. (2005a). A fresh look at semi-presidentialism: Variations on a theme. *Journal of Democracy*, 16(3), 98–112.; Elgie, R. (2004). Semi-presidentialism: Concepts, consequences and contesting explanations. *Political Studies Review*, 2(3), 314–330.; Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z., & Ginsburg, T. (2014). Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3), 515–544.; Shugart, M. S. (2005). Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns. *French Politics*, 3(3), 323–351.; Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009). Citizens, presidents and assemblies: The study of semi-presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(4), 871–992.

responsibility and ability to terminate the mandate of the executive/cabinet (which can be the head of state, the legislature, both the head of state and the legislature or even no one); 2) the channel and method of appointment of the head of state (including elected or non-elected, through popular or non-popular elections). Less frequently, scholars¹⁸ refer to the indicator such as the structure and number of centers of the executive, which can be monistic (with a single center of the executive, either in the form of the head of state or the head of cabinet/prime minister) or dualistic (when the head of state and the head of cabinet/prime minister simultaneously serve as two centers of the executive). They also consider the power allocation of key institutions of state authority, primarily the head of state. It is precisely these typological indicators that effectively delineate the concept of system of government as a comprehensive complex of formally (constitutionally or institutionally) and/or actually (politically or behaviorally) determined preconditions and characteristics of inter-institutional relations regarding the formation, acquisition, legitimacy, structuring and exercise of state power by political institutions within the triangle "the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament".

By applying these indicators (especially the first two) and different interpretations of them to various countries around the world, the trichotomous theoretical approach provides a basis for defining the following options of systems of government – presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism (occasionally including semi-parliamentarism as well). Presidentialism (the USA, most countries in Latin America, Ghana, Indonesia, Cyprus, Korea, Singapore, Turkey, etc.) is a constitutional and/or political system of government (principally in republics) characterized by a popularly (directly or indirectly) elected president serving a fixed term, as well as by the existence of a cabinet/president's administration (and possibly a prime minister) whose members are collectively responsible solely to president (although cabinet/president's administration members may individually be accountable to parliament, though it does not structure the system of government). In contrast, parliamentarism (most of European monarchies, Australia, Greece, Israel, India, Italy, Canada, Germany, Japan, etc.) is a constitutional and/or political system of government (possible both in republics and monarchies), where the head of state does not acquire his or her powers through popular (direct or indirect) elections, but inherit position or is appointed through non-popular elections (including within the legislature). In addition, the cabinet led by prime minister is collectively responsible (regarding the termination of its powers) solely to the legislature (however, cabinet members, other than the prime minister, may also be individually accountable to the head of state and parliament, but it does not structure the system of government). As a partially intermediate, but "pure" type, semi-presidentialism (Lithuania, Mongolia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Ukraine, Finland,

¹⁸ Duverger, M. (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential government. *European Journal of Political Research*, 8(2), 165–187.; Bahro, H., Bayerlein, B., & Veser, E. (1998). Duverger's concept: Semi-presidential government revisited. *European Journal of Political Research*, 34, 201–224.; Pasquino, G. (1997). Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A political model at work. *European Journal of Political Research*, 31(1), 128–146.; Magni-Berton, R. (2013). Reassessing Duvergerian semi-presidentialism: An electoral perspective. *Comparative European Politics*, 11(2), 222–248.; Lytvyn, V. (2018). Atrybuty ta riznovydy napivprezydentskoi systemy pravlinnia v Yevropi: Instyutsiino-protsesualnyi i politychno-povedinkovyi aspekty. LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 40.

France, Sri Lanka, etc.) is a constitutional and/or political system of government (exclusively in republics) characterized by the presence of a popularly (directly or indirectly) elected president serving a fixed term. However, unlike presidentialism, semi-presidentialism includes the institution of cabinet led by prime minister, which is collectively responsible (regarding the premature termination of its powers) at least to parliament. Nevertheless, prime minister and cabinet may be collectively responsible both to parliament and president simultaneously. Furthermore, cabinet ministers may be individually accountable to parliament and/or president, but it does not structure this system of government¹⁹.

Overall, the proposed definitions and the trichotomous theoretical approach to classifying systems of government have become foundational ones, since they largely overcome the limitations of the dichotomous approach and provide a more logical framework for capturing the array of empirical cases within the inter-institutional relationships in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet/prime minister – parliament” worldwide. Moreover, such an interpretation of systems of government allows for their identification primarily on constitutional or institutional grounds, rather than relying on various relational and subjective properties of the political process, including the question of power distribution among presidents, prime ministers and parliaments. Since the powers of the latter often change depending on both constitutional and political, including electoral, circumstances. However, such changes do not necessarily indicate a disruption of a particular system of government (especially in the case of semi-presidentialism). Additionally, such a theorization of types of systems of government allows for discussing them independently of whether a particular country is democratic, hybrid or autocratic in terms of its political regime.

Therefore, the trichotomous theoretical approach to classifying systems of government contributes to greater institutional and political continuity in comparative analysis. It also helps to elucidate retrospectives and perspectives, as well as the overall inter-relationships of systems of government in a particular country within an evolutionary framework and various contexts. This is particularly relevant and even provides a theoretical framework for studying the system of government in each country, especially when the understanding of these issues coincides with a period of active revision of the theoretical approach to classifying systems of government from

¹⁹ This study does not delve into the issues of defining semi-presidentialism, but relies on the most cited and recent among them. For information about the complexities and invariance of conceptualizing this system of government since the 1970s-1980s and beyond, as well as the maximalist (“Duvergerian”) and minimalist (“post-Duvergerian” or “Elgian”) approaches to its definition, one can refer to the following studies: Brunclik, M., & Kubat, M. (2016). Contradictory approaches: Discussing semi-presidentialism in Central Europe. *Analele Universitatii Bucuresti. Seria Stiinte Politice*, 18(1), 67–79.; Boban, D. (2007). “Minimalist” concepts of semi-presidentialism: Are Ukraine and Slovenia semi-presidential states. *Politička Misao: Časopis za Politologiju*, 44(5), 155–177.; Duverger, M. (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential government. *European Journal of Political Research*, 8(2), 165–187.; Bahro, H., Bayerlein, B., & Veser, E. (1998). Duverger’s concept: Semi-presidential government revisited. *European Journal of Political Research*, 34, 201–224.; Elgie, R. (2004). Semi-presidentialism: Concepts, consequences and contesting explanations. *Political Studies Review*, 2(3), 314–330.; Elgie, R. (2005a). A fresh look at semi-presidentialism: Variations on a theme. *Journal of Democracy*, 16(3), 98–112.; Pasquino, G. (1997). Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A political model at work. *European Journal of Political Research*, 31(1), 128–146.; Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009). Citizens, presidents and assemblies: The study of semi-presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(4), 871–992.; Shugart, M. S. (2005). Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns. *French Politics*, 3(3), 323–351.; Steffani, W. (1995). Semi-Präsidentalismus: Ein eigenständiger Systemtyp? Zur Unterscheidung von Legislative und Parlament. *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 26(4), 621–641.; Veser, E. (1997). Semi-presidentialism – Duverger’s concept: A new political system model. *Journal for Humanities and Social Sciences*, 11(1), 39–60.

dichotomous to trichotomous one. This aspect deserves close attention, because considering this methodological peculiarity is crucial for drawing conclusions regarding the consistency or inconsistency, as well as the retrospectives and perspectives of choosing different options of systems of government within the progress of a particular country institutional design in the past and future. This includes within the framework of the "path dependence" concept, which will be discussed in more detail in the following part of the study.

2. The "Path Dependence" Concept as a Methodological Framework for Designing Inter-Institutional Relations and Systems of Government

The issues of the design of political institutions and inter-institutional relations, including various systems of government (as discussed theoretically in the previous part of the study), in a particular country, as well as in a comparative perspective are undoubtedly institutional ones. This means that these issues are structured according to the methodological principles and concepts of institutionalism, in particular new institutionalism, which has prevailed in Political Science since the 1970s-1980s. In this context, it is appropriate to appeal to the postulate of several institutionalists, stating that current (up-to-date) political institutions in a particular country are the modified or inherited versions/reflections of the political institutions that had earlier existed in that country or its historical predecessors. Similarly, this would also apply to the form of inter-institutional relations and the design of system of government in a particular country, which are expected to evolve and be inherited/reproduced accordingly.

Purely methodologically, such a position of scholars is put forward and substantiated within the framework of the so-called historical or evolutionary institutionalism and is most often outlined by the "path dependence" concept of institutional development²⁰. Some researchers²¹

²⁰ Hall, P., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, 44(5), 938.; March, J., & Olsen, J. (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. *American Political Science Review*, 78(3), 734–749.; North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press.; Roe, M. J. (2015). Path dependence, political options, and governance systems. In K. J. Hopt, & E. Wymeersch (Eds.), *Comparative corporate governance: Essays and Materials* (pp. 165–184). De Gruyter.; Fadiran, D., & Sarr, M. (2016). Path dependence and interdependence between institutions and development. *Economic Research Southern Africa Working Papers*, 637.; Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E. (1995). Path dependence, lock-in, and history. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 11(1), 205–226.; Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 251–267.; Page, S. (2006). Path dependence. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1(1), 87–115.; Alexander, G. (2001). Institutions, path dependence, and democratic consolidation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(3), 249–270.; Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 369–404.; Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., & Longstreth, F. (Eds.) *Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge University Press.; Greener, I. (2005). State of the art. The potential of path dependence in political studies. *Politics*, 25(1), 62–72.; Goldstone, J. (1998). Initial conditions, general laws, path-dependence, and explanation in historical sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 104(3), 829–845.; Gorges, M. (2001). New institutionalist explanations for institutional change: A note of caution. *Politics*, 21(2), 137–145.; Arrow, K. (2000). Increasing returns: Historiographic issues and path dependence. *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 7(2), 171–180.; Berman, S. (1998). Path dependency and political action: Re-examining responses to the depression. *Comparative Politics*, 30(4), 379–400.; Greener, I. (2002). Theorising path-dependency: How does history come to matter in organisations? *Management Decision*, 40(6), 614–619.; Mahoney, J. (2001). Path-dependent explanations of regime change: Central America in comparative perspective. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 36(1), 111–141.; Hall, P. (1998). The potential of historical institutionalism: A reply to Hay and Wincott. *Political Studies*, 46(5), 958–962.; Hay, C., & Wincott, D. (1998). Structure, agency and historical institutionalism. *Political Studies*, 46(5), 951–957.

²¹ Hall, P., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, 44(5), 938.; Roe, M. J. (2015). Path dependence, political options, and governance systems. In K. J. Hopt, & E. Wymeersch (Eds.), *Comparative corporate governance: Essays and Materials* (pp. 165–184). De Gruyter.

argue that political institutions are formal and informal procedures, organizations, routines, norms, agreements, etc., which are deeply rooted, historically and evolutionarily embedded, institutionalized and constitutionalized in the organizational structure of each political system, including systems of government and systems of inter-institutional relations. Moreover, specific attributes of the development of political institutions and inter-institutional relations are that they are inevitably realized within the close and broad interplay with the behavior of political actors, as well as contribute to highlighting the asymmetry of political and state power. This is achieved by considering both the “path dependence” of institutional development, as well as unexpected (not necessarily institutional and political) circumstances and consequences²².

In this context, the “path dependence” concept of institutional development assumes particular importance as a key attribute of historical or evolutionary institutionalism. According to this concept, the initial choice of political institutions and the design of inter-institutional relations, including systems of government, deeply and decisively influence the subsequent political decisions on the matter and, consequently, the nature of political institutions that emerge in the current and future systems of government. This is because the sequence of political institutions within the “path dependence” of institutional development is shaped by the significant and even minor events that may be even more probabilistic rather than planned, but still exert a significant influence on the ultimate outcome²³. Furthermore, the reason for this interconnection lies in the tendency of political institutions, systems and the overall political sphere to exhibit inertia, since historically established institutional and inter-institutional “chains” are resistant to transitioning onto an entirely different course²⁴. Therefore, the choices made during the initial formation of political institutions and systems or during the formulation of policy goals and measures have a constraining effect on the future²⁵, leading to the metaphorical notion that “history matters”²⁶. As a result, the “path dependence” concept of institutional development emphasizes the significance of historical continuity and the recognition that past choices and events shape the present and future political landscapes.

Taking all of these into account, political institutions are positioned as the most crucial factors in shaping the behavior of virtually all political actors within a given political system and system of government. In other words, the determining factor in the structuring of collective

²² Ikenberry, G. J. (1994, October 1). History's heavy hand: Institutions and the politics of the state [Conference presentation]. Conference on “What is institutionalism now?”, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, United States.

²³ Fadiran, D., & Sarr, M. (2016). Path dependence and interdependence between institutions and development. *Economic Research Southern Africa Working Papers*, 637.; Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 252.

²⁴ Peters, B. G. (2001). Institutional theory in political science. *Continuum*.

²⁵ Hall, P., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, 44(5), 936–957.; Koelble, T. (1995). The new institutionalism in political science and sociology. *Comparative Politics*, 27(2), 231–243.; Peters, B. G. (2001). Institutional theory in political science. *Continuum*.; Greener, I. (2005). State of the art. The potential of path dependence in political studies. *Politics*, 25(1), 62–72.

²⁶ Greener, I. (2002). Theorising path-dependency: How does history come to matter in organisations? *Management Decision*, 40(6), 614–619.; Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 251–267.

political behavior is an institutional organization of political system or even a distinct institutional system or system of inter-institutional relations, rather than social, psychological and cultural factors that do not determine the functioning of a system. Since when a specific political institution within the triangle "the head of state – cabinet – parliament" finds itself in the situation, when it must choose an alternative political behavior, then it appeals to all historically existing, regulated and previously approved means, as well as stereotyped notions of legitimate power and behavior (which essentially define the former as a specific political institution within a particular system of government). However, this does not mean that the historical or evolutionary "path dependence" of a particular political institution within a specific system of government deprives the actor of political maneuvering freedom. Even though political institutions provide strategically valuable information that influences the identity and advantages of political actors²⁷. It is rather the opposite, because political actors are capable of consciously and deliberately deviating from a particular "path" development of political institutions and systems of government that were previously chosen by these political actors or their predecessors, taking into account to varying degrees the importance of institutional heritage from the past in the present context. Thus, the "path dependence" (of actually every institution) may exhibit different degrees of intensity, such as erroneous, low, moderate, significant, etc., in terms of its impact on current political institutions and systems, since the significance of other factors in the emergence, formation and functioning of these institutions varies²⁸, as well as political and other costs of their maintenance and preservation also differ²⁹.

The "path dependence" concept is complemented or accentuated by the concept of cumulative causality, that is the idea of the irreversibility of historical time in the context of the formation and functioning of political institutions and their dependence primarily on the past "path" of development, rather than uncertainty of the future of political institutions. In other words, the current (and in this case, final) state of development of political institutions and political system is dependent on all previous events in this regard, as there is no instantaneous exit from it, but rather it is reproduced and repeated in a patterned manner. Consequently, politics, political institutions and political system in such a scenario generate feedback mechanisms that create inertia or even "block" alternative political ideas and interests³⁰.

Similar logics apply to explaining the algorithms for selecting inter-institutional relations and designing systems of government in various countries that have gone through multiple stages of their development from historical past to the present. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that political institutions and systems continue to exist in one form or another, embodying

²⁷ March, J., & Olsen, J. (1989). *Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics*. Free.

²⁸ Roe, M. J. (2015). Path dependence, political options, and governance systems. In K. J. Hopt, & E. Wymeersch (Eds.), *Comparative corporate governance: Essays and Materials* (pp. 165–184). De Gruyter.

²⁹ North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press, 94-95.; Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., & Longstrech, F. (Eds.) (1992). *Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge University Press.; Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 369–404.

³⁰ Greener, I. (2005). State of the art. The potential of path dependence in political studies. *Politics*, 25(1), 62–72.

a balance of collective actions that allow political actors to adhere to repetitive and reliable patterns of their behavior³¹. This is how the stabilization of political institutions and the institutionalization of political systems occur³². On the other hand, this is achieved through the conventionalization, traditionalization and collectivization of political institutions and systems, which sooner or later cease to be objects of individual choice and therefore cannot or can hardly be transformed through the actions of any individual. In the context of systems of government, this is primarily manifested in the fact that the design of inter-institutional relations, which has the “path dependence”, is resistant to reformatting. Since any individual choice made by political actors within the framework of political institutions is institutionally structured in favor of not so much change, but reform of a particular system of government³³. However, as noted above, political institutions are not the sole causal factors in structuring of systems of government, since the latter are necessarily organized behaviorally, even if this occurs situationally and on a short-term basis (this is especially noticeable in the case of semi-presidential system of government, but is less characteristic of presidentialism and parliamentarism).

By narrowing down and directing the methodology of historical and evolutionary institutionalism and thus enriching the concepts of “path dependence” and cumulative causality with contemporary categories of comparative design of systems of government and inter-institutional relations, it is entirely appropriate to differentiate between them and highlight certain additional analytical and interpretative nuances. The key one among them is the understanding that if the system of government of a certain country has historically and consistently been presidential or presidentialized, then it should not become fundamentally different, such as parliamentary or parliamentarized one, after any perturbations or reforms. Instead, it should either remain presidential/presidentialized (even in a different format) or transform into at least a semi-presidential system of government with the elements of presidentialism (thus still being presidentialized system of government). Following this logic, presidentialism or presidentialized systems of government are successfully reproduced and maintained in the USA, Latin American countries and partially in Asian and African countries, while parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism or parliamentarized and partially balanced systems of government are prevalent in Western and Central-Eastern European countries and partially in other parts of the world, and so on.

Moreover, it is precisely given this that one of the fundamental channels and principles of institutionalizing political institutions and institutional systems is ensured, whereby they should operate with maximum stability and efficiency. However, this does not imply that

³¹ Shepsle, K. A. (1986). Institutional equilibrium and equilibrium institutions. In H. F. Weisberg (Ed.), *Political science: The science of politics* (pp. 51–81). Agathon.; Fadiran, D., & Sarr, M. (2016). Path dependence and interdependence between institutions and development. Economic Research Southern Africa Working Papers, 637.

³² Fadiran, D., & Sarr, M. (2016). Path dependence and interdependence between institutions and development. Economic Research Southern Africa Working Papers, 637.; Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). Can path dependence explain institutional change? Two approaches applied to welfare state reform. MPIfG Discussion Paper, 05/2.; Alexander, G. (2001). Institutions, path dependence, and democratic consolidation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(3), 249–270.

³³ Graftstein, R. (1992). *Institutional realism: Social and political constraints on rational actors*. Yale University Press.

all contemporary countries and their political elites have been able to adopt or take advantage of this logic. Nevertheless, purely theoretically, political institutions and forms of their interaction, including systems of government, are considered effective ones if they “survive.” In reverse, inefficient political institutions decline as they become disadvantageous and are replaced by more effective ones³⁴. Nonetheless, there were the cases where alternative political institutions and inter-institutional systems “survive” because they were best suited for the past historical environment, which ultimately proves to be destructive for the former presently and overall for the prevailing conditions of political development. In light of this, nothing in the historical and evolutionary context can guarantee with absolute certainty that an unattractive choice of institutional design and system of government in the past will not become attractive in the future, and vice versa. Since actions within a particular political system are closely linked to the possibilities and decisions provided by the current institutional environment, taking into account their past outcomes³⁵.

In this case, scholars do explain that the “path dependence” of political institutions and inter-institutional relations’ development (including regarding different options of systems of government) can be disrupted due to the untheorized impact of various “exogenous shocks”, which hinder the explanation of causal relationships in the context of institutional changes in the past and present³⁶. Additionally, the “path dependence” of any system of government is characterized by and therefore can be disrupted by alternative rationality, the contextual format of causal relationships and the historical contingency of different political institutions and processes within a given political system³⁷. Finally, the structuring of political institutions and systems of government is influenced not only by institutional or constitutional factors, but also by behavioral and other non-institutional factors. Since political actors do often position themselves as “captives” of institutional circumstances, which can lead to resistance and significant modifications in the designs of inter-institutional relations. This leads to the conclusion that the “path dependence” and the consideration of historical heritage methodologically contribute more to explaining not so much political outcomes in the context of changes, reforms and national contexts, but rather political and institutional stability and even the preservation of the status quo³⁸. This is even the case despite the fact that different institutional alternatives may provide higher overall

³⁴ Roe, M. J. (2015). Path dependence, political options, and governance systems. In K. J. Hopt, & E. Wymeersch (Eds.), *Comparative corporate governance: Essays and Materials* (pp. 165–184). De Gruyter.

³⁵ Fadiran, D., & Sarr, M. (2016). Path dependence and interdependence between institutions and development. *Economic Research Southern Africa Working Papers*, 637.

³⁶ Roe, M. J. (2015). Path dependence, political options, and governance systems. In K. J. Hopt, & E. Wymeersch (Eds.), *Comparative corporate governance: Essays and Materials* (pp. 165–184). De Gruyter; Alexander, G. (2001). Institutions, path dependence, and democratic consolidation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(3), 249–270.

³⁷ Greener, I. (2005). State of the art. The potential of path dependence in political studies. *Politics*, 25(1), 62–72.

³⁸ Fadiran, D., & Sarr, M. (2016). Path dependence and interdependence between institutions and development. *Economic Research Southern Africa Working Papers*, 637.; Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). Can path dependence explain institutional change? Two approaches applied to welfare state reform. MPlfG Discussion Paper, 05/2.; Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *The American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369–1401.; Alexander, G. (2001). Institutions, path dependence, and democratic consolidation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(3), 249–270.

long-term benefits and systemic dividends, although they may be less attractive to political actors in the short and medium term³⁹. In other words, the longer political actors operate within a certain institutional and systemic status quo, particularly within a specific system of government, the less attractive and “locked” the choice of any alternative to that status quo and system of government becomes⁴⁰. Moreover, political actors are heterogeneous, and costs or benefits are unevenly distributed among them, thereby strengthening those political actors who advocate not so much for change, but for the preservation of the status quo, even though this does not guarantee the preservation of the existing inter-institutional design⁴¹. Consequently, as the representatives of historical or evolutionary institutionalism often emphasize, significant changes in political institutions, systems and processes occur intermittently and only during “critical moments” or the so-called “politics windows,” after which a phase of inertia and institutionalization follows once again.

However, the situation becomes significantly more complicated when studying the “path dependence” of different political systems, designs of inter-institutional relations, as well as options of systems of government. As mentioned in the previous part of the study, there are two basic theoretical approaches to classifying systems of government: the dichotomous approach (primarily within the framework of the presidentialism–parliamentarism dyad) and the trichotomous approach (mostly within the framework of the presidentialism–semi-presidentialism–parliamentarism triad). Therefore, it is logically reasonable that semi-presidentialism, as a more recent “invention” of inter-institutional relations within the trichotomous approach, may not be interpreted as a direct derivative of either presidentialism or parliamentarism within the dichotomous approach to classifying systems of government. This is particularly noticeable in the context of systematizing the retrospectives and perspectives of choice and operationalization of various systems of government over very long historical periods, including from the beginning of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century. While this problem does not arise if exclusively employing the trichotomous classification approach in the case of a young country or over a relatively short period in the last few decades. In other words, purely methodologically, this attests to the partial mediated nature rather than the complete linearity of the “path dependence” of systems of government themselves, since their typology (within the advancement of Political Science) has been approached differently under different frameworks. This issue is addressed by the particularity of semi-presidentialism, which is highly heterogeneous and can be either more presidentialized (resembling presidentialism) or more parliamentarized (resembling parliamentarism).

³⁹ Alexander, G. (2001). Institutions, path dependence, and democratic consolidation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(3), 249–270.

⁴⁰ Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 251–267.; Alexander, G. (2001). Institutions, path dependence, and democratic consolidation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(3), 249–270.; North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press.; Pierson, P. (1993). When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change. *World Politics*, 45(4), 595–628.

⁴¹ Alexander, G. (2001). Institutions, path dependence, and democratic consolidation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(3), 249–270.; Dimitrakopoulos, D. (2001). Incrementalism and path dependence: European integration and institutional change in national parliaments. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(3), 405–422.

Consequently, the choice of a specific type of semi-presidentialism may or may not confirm the "path dependence", for example, of presidentialism or parliamentarism, and so on.

Conclusion

The conducted research serves as a conceptual, theoretical and methodological reason and prerequisite for raising the question of the feasibility of verifying institutional heritage and the continuity of a particular country's system of government (undoubtedly within the framework of the modern trichotomous theoretical approach to classifying systems of government) compared to the systems of government in its historical predecessors, particularly in states or quasi-state entities that existed in the past within its territory (including within the trichotomous theoretical approach, as well as the previously used dichotomous theoretical approach). This will help understand to what extent the institutional heritage from the past is important in constructing the current system of power and system of government in a given country, as well as also determine whether the role of political institutions themselves within specific systems of government is overestimated in the context of available options and alternative behaviors of individual and collective political actors. Theoretically, this will be the basis for acquiring knowledge about whether the "path dependence" of a particular country's system of government allows for institutional or inter-institutional changes in contrast to stability or governance effectiveness, and so on.

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