



Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie

NR 12 GRUDZIEŃ 2019

PÓŁROCZNIK

STUDIUM EUROPY ŚRODKOWEJ I WSCHODNIEJ

ISSN 2353-8392

KUTNO 2019



Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie Wydział Studiów Europejskich

Rada Programowo-Naukowa

Przewodniczący Rady:

prof. dr hab. Anatolij Romanyuk, Uniwersytet Narodowy im. I. Franko we Lwowie

Zastępca Przewodniczącego:

dr hab. Zbigniew Białobłocki, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie

Członkowie:

prof. dr hab. Wiera Burdiak, Uniwersytet Narodowy im. Jurija Fedkowycza w Czerniowcach

prof. dr hab. Walerij Bebyk, Narodowy Uniwersytet Kijowski im. Tarasa Szewczenki

prof. dr hab. Markijan Malski, Uniwersytet Narodowy im. I. Franko we Lwowie

prof. zw. dr hab. Lucjan Ciamaga, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie

dr hab. Krzysztof Hajder, Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

prof. dr hab. Walenty Baluk, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie prof. nadzw.

dr hab. Vitalij Lytvin, Uniwersytet Narodowy im. I. Franko we Lwowie

prof. Pavel Pavlov, PhD, Prorektor ds. Badań i Nauki Wolnego Uniwersytetu Warnerńskiego

prof. Galya Gercheva D.Sc, Wolny Uniwersytet Warnerński,

ks. dr hab. Kazimierz Pierzchała, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II

Recenzenci zewnętrzni:

prof. dr hab. Nataliya Antonyuk, Uniwersytet Opolski

prof. zw. dr hab. Bogdan Koszel, Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

prof. dr hab. Janusz Soboń, Akademia Morska w Szczecinie

prof. dr hab. Wasyl Klimonczuk, Narodowy Uniwersytet Przykarpcki im. Wasyla Stefanyka w Iwano Frankowsku

prof. dr hab. Swietłana Naumkina, Narodowy Juhnoukraiński Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. K. D. Uszynskiego w Odessie

prof. dr hab. Galina Zelenjno, Instytut Etnopolitologii im. I. Kurasa w Kijowie

dr hab. Krystyna Leszczyńska- Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie

Redaktor naczelny:

dr hab. Zbigniew Białobłocki

Redaktor tematyczny:

dr hab. Bohdan Hud, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (Europa Wschodnia, historia najnowsza, stosunki międzynarodowe, ukrainoznanstwo)

prof. dr hab. Ihor Hrabynskyy, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie (międzynarodowe stosunki gospodarcze, europeistyka)

prof. dr hab. Jan Zbigniew Lewandowski, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (dzieje najnowsze, historia najnowsza)

prof. dr hab. Prof. dr hab. Joanna Rogozińska-Mitrut, Akademia im. Jakuba z Paradyża w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim, (Regionalna współpraca transgraniczna)

dr hab. Białobłocka Sławomira, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (globalizacja, Ekonomia, międzynarodowe stosunki gospodarcze)

dr hab. inż. Lewandowski Piotr Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie (ekonomia, finanse)

dr Krzywińska Katarzyna, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (europeistyka, systemy ustrojowe Europy Zachodniej, politologia)

dr Kubicki Tomasz, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (prawo konstytucyjne porównawcze)

dr Olszewski Piotr, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (sprawy międzynarodowe, administracja państw członkowskich UE)

dr Radosław Grodzki, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (bezpieczeństwo narodowe, sprawy międzynarodowe, polityka zagraniczna)

dr hab. Nadija Panczak-Białobłocka, prof. w WSGK (europeistyka, politologia, ukraioznawstwo)
dr Rogala-Lewicki Adam, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (integracja europejska, bezpieczeństwo narodowe, politologia)
dr Suski Tomasz, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (prawo, administracja)
dr Ziółkowski Henryk, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (zarządzanie, logistyka)

Redaktorzy językowi:

dr Irena Gałka, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (język angielski)
dr hab. Nadija Panczak-Białobłocka, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, (język ukraiński)

Redaktor statystyczny:

dr inż. Białobłocki Tomasz

Sekretarz redakcji:

Aneta Moszczyńska

Redakcja techniczna:

Łukasz Różyński

Projekt okładki i opracowanie techniczne:

Łukasz Różyński

Czasopismo indeksowane w bazach referencyjnych Index Copernicus, Bazhum

Adres Wydawcy:

99-300 Kutno, ul. Lelewela 7,
tel. 24 355 83 40, e-mail: wydawnictwo@wsgk.com.pl

Druk i oprawa:

Mazowieckie Centrum Poligrafii
Nakład: 250 egz.

Contents

Zbigniew Białobłocki

POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT STABILITY: A THEORETICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 6

Vira Burdiak

NEW MESSAGES OF THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ELECTORAL
PREFERENCES OF THE SOCIETY 18

Vitaliy Lytvyn

THE FRAMEWORK, WAY OF ELECTION, LEGITIMACY AND POWERS OF PRESIDENTS AS INSTITUTIONAL,
PROCEDURAL, POLITICAL AND BEHAVIOURAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE EUROPEAN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM 29

Tomasz Białobłocki

THE HISTORY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL FORMS OF SUBJECTIVATION AND POLITICIZATION OF THE
RUSSIAN ETHNIC COMMUNITY IN CRIMEA BEFORE ITS ANNEXATION BY RUSSIA (1989–2013) 62

Haponenko Vira Anatoliyivna

THE PECULIARITIES OF HYBRID INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION OF
POLITICAL SYSTEM OF UKRAINE 78

Nadia Panchak-Białobłocka

THE FEATURES OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THE PRISM OF PARTY SYSTEMS OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES 91

Julia Slipetska

ANALIZA PORÓWNAWCZA SPOŁECZNO-POLITYCZNYCH PODZIAŁÓW W KRAJACH EUROPY
ŚRODKOWEJ I WSCHODNIEJ 110

Sławomira Białobłocka

THE MODELS OF FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND COOPERATION OF THEIR
PARTICIPANTS IN MULTIPARTY CONDITIONS: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL MANIFESTATIONS 122

Oleg Volskyi

DECENTRALIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE AS A PROBLEM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE:
THEORETICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY, NORMATIVE-LEGAL BASIS AND INFLUENCE OF
OTHER COUNTRIES EXPERIENCE 136

<i>Witalij Diakiw</i> ETAPY FORMACJI I CECHY SYSTEMU ADMINISTRACYJNEGO I TERYTORIALNEGO PODZIAŁU ORAZ ZNACZENIE PROCESU DECENTRALIZACJI WŁADZY WE FRANCJI	150
<i>Krzysztof Białobłocki</i> THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF EMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES: A CROSS-REGIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS	164
<i>Tetiana Fedorchak</i> ACTIVITIES OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC	180
<i>Aneta Moszczyńska</i> THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STUDY OF MINISTERIAL STABILITY, RESHUFFLES AND TURNOVER	193
<i>Tamara Kozak</i> LANGUAGE, POLITICS AND POWER: THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, PRACTICAL AND EMPIRICAL PARAMETERS OF RELATIONSHIP	206
<i>Magdalena Białobłocka</i> FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT PRECONDITIONS AND FEATURES OF DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF TRANSPORT LOGISTICS, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SYSTEM IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES	221
<i>Zbigniew Bartosiak</i> BEFORE THE STATE POLICE. FORMATION GENESIS.	237
NOTA O AUTORACH	256
ZASADY PRZYGOTOWYWANIA TEKSTÓW	258

POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT STABILITY: A THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological analyzing political, social and economic dimensions of government stability. It is stated that being determined politically and institutionally the stability of governments is theorized and constructed from the concept of the paradigm of quality and effective governance in society, and therefore it affects various spheres of public life. Generally, it has been proven that government stability is a category that depends on both political and non-political factors. The researcher found that government stability is a complex problem, which is defined as a multidimensional and multifactorial interrelation of the activities of governmental cabinets and economic, social, legal, cultural, political and other factors of public life. Moreover, the influence of such factors can be traced either in the form of institutional levers, or in the form of contextual features of social, economic and political system of a particular state.

Keywords: government, governmental cabinet, stability of governments, politics, economy, society, taxes, social dialogue, political participation.

ПОЛІТИЧНІ, СОЦІАЛЬНІ ТА ЕКОНОМІЧНІ ВИМІРИ СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ УРЯДІВ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ РАКУРС

У теоретико-методологічному ракурсі проаналізовано політичні, соціальні та економічні виміри стабільності урядів. Констатовано, що, будучи детермінованою політично й інституційно, стабільність урядів теоретизується і вибудовується з концепту парадигми якісного й ефективного управління в суспільстві, а відтак вона зачіпає різні сфери суспільного життя. Загалом доведено, що стабільність урядів є категорією, яка залежить і від політичних, і від неполітичних чинників. Виявлено, що стабільність урядів є комплексною проблемою, яка визначається як багатовимірний і багатofакторний взаємозв'язок діяльності урядових кабінетів й економічних, соціальних, правових, культурних, політичних та інших чинників суспільного життя. Причому вплив таких чинників може прослідковуватись то в формі інституційних важелів, то у вигляді контекстуальних особливостей соціальної, економічної і політичної системи конкретної держави.

Ключові слова: уряд, урядовий кабінет, стабільність урядів, політика, економіка, суспільство, податки, соціальний діалог, політична участь.

Government stability is among the crucial factors and outcomes of inter-institutional relations within different types of government forms and systems. For this reason, government stability has traditionally been defined as a political, in particular institutional, category, for it affects primarily the political process parameters, as well as the entire political system as a whole. However, being determined politically and institutionally, the stability of governments originates and results from the notion of quality and effective governance in society, thus affecting various spheres of public life. In view of this, it is advisable to discuss government stability in both a narrow (institutionally determined) and broad sense (socially determined). The point is that, on the one hand, government stability concerns mainly the political institutions that form the relationship between citizens and authorities, parties, the media and civil society, serving as a channel for understanding citizens' viewpoints. On the other hand, government stability regulates the functionality of public hubs, determining the public action of different state order and priority: long-term economic growth, social policy, public service, etc. These are peculiar dimensions of government stability, which not only condition its social consequences, but help reveal its depth and essence in theoretical and practical terms. Accordingly, their identification, delineation, and exploration are quite topical both from theoretical and practical perspectives, for it would enable clarifying the nature and role of government stability as such.

The abovementioned issues have received ample research attention of various scholars, such as: F. Carmignani¹, J. Citron and G. Nickelsburg², A. Cukierman, S. Edwards and G. Tabellini³, I. Kiiianka⁴, D. Mayes and M. Viren⁵, M. Paldam⁶, N. Roubini and J. Sachs⁷, B. Volkerink and J. De Haan⁸, M. Tujula and G. Wolswijk⁹, and many others. Their findings allow to conclude that apart from political, economic and social dimensions of government stability should be regarded as its indicators. These issues as well as their differentiation are the focus of the proposed study.

Political dimension of government stability is undoubtedly the major one. In this light, government stability is both a purely institutional category and a much broader political category. Certainly, political participation is frequently considered an indispensable element

¹ Carmignani F., *Measures of political instability in multiparty governments: a new data set with econometric applications*, Wyd. University of Glasgow 1999.

² Citron J., Nickelsburg G., Country risk and political instability, *Journal of Development Economics* 1987, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 385–392.

³ Cukierman A., Edwards S., Tabellini G., Seigniorage and Political Instability, *American Economic Review* 1992, vol 82, nr. 3, s. 537–555.

⁴ Kiiianka I., Ideja serednoho klasu yak haranta stabilnoho rozvytku, *Politychnyi menedzhment* 2006, vol 1, s. 37–43.

⁵ Mayes D., Viren M., Pressures on the Stability and Growth Pact from Asymmetry in Policy, *Bank of Finland Discussion Paper* 2000, vol 11.

⁶ Paldam M., Inflation and Political Instability in Eight Latin American Countries 1946–83, *Public Choice* 1987, vol 52, s. 143–168.

⁷ Roubini N., Sachs J., Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries, *Economic Policy* 1989, vol 8, s. 99–132.

⁸ Volkerink B., De Haan J., Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence, *Public Choice* 2001, vol 109, s. 221–242.

⁹ Tujula M., Wolswijk G., What determines fiscal balances? An empirical investigation in determinants of changes in OECD budget balances, *ECB Working Paper* 2004, vol 422.

to better understand government stability. Therefore, governments are often contemplated for the sake of understanding the level of securing fundamental rights and interests of citizens. However, the sense of this dimension needs substantial and qualitative augmenting, since the rights and interests of citizens, relevant to government stability are reflected in close interaction with understanding of political activity and political participation.

Political activity is an objective basis of political activity and embodies the axiological dimension of political culture. Exactly this angle of activity-behaviour balance, employed by some researchers who believe that political activity is a valuable way of modeling, structuring and carrying out personal activity, communication and behaviour, by means of which such personality independently preserves the quality of the individually functioning system in the interpersonal space¹⁰. In the light of such an approach, the value-based nature of political activity refers to its deep personal foundations, because it is precisely by the criteria and parameters that are valuable to the individual that political activity organizes life in the political environment and activities to manage society, so as to meet the needs of the individual. Political activity is a dynamic quality that integrates and regulates the integral structure of the individual as a subject of politics. Hence, political activity is an indicator of government and political stability in general, provided there is a deep understanding of the purpose of political activity itself.

In its turn, the political system regulates the political behaviour of the individual. Therefore, the individual is forced to match his behaviour to his demands and mobilize his political activity in the necessary forms at a certain point. Accordingly, political activity is a functional manifestation of the personality in their political behaviour and performance, controlled directly by the individual. To deprive such a person of such possibilities means to condemn the political system to crisis. The inability to provide and display free and unrestrained self-interest is accompanied by a lack of confidence in political institutions, in particular the government, which leads to its destabilization or, worse, to destabilization of the entire political system.

In this context, the notion of involvement in social and political life is a significant element of interdependence between government stability and the individual¹¹. The forms of such involvement represent the continuum «active participation – complete alienation». The first form should be analysed through prism of a person's understanding of politics as their main sphere of activities. This idea contrasts with complete political incompetence and passivity. Involvement of the individual in politics is the political orientation of the subject on the following axes: «individual – civil society», «individual – power» and «individual – state». The flip side of the coin of involvement is intensifying autonomy and the individual's isolation from politics. Therefore, these concepts are contiguous with the stability and crisis of political institutions, particularly governments.

¹⁰ Abulhanova-Slavskaya K., *Aktivnost i soznanie lichnosti kak sub'ekta deyatelnosti*, [w:] *Psichologiya lichnosti v sotsialisticheskom obschestve: Aktivnost i razvitie lichnosti*, Wyd. Nauka 1989, s. 110–134.

¹¹ Diligenskiy G., *Sotsialno-politicheskaya psichologiya*, Wyd. Nauka 1994.

Interestingly, political participation is always a process of communicating, establishing and maintaining relationships between the subjects of the political process. Therefore, it is fair to consider the individual's political participation through the prism of «conflict – cooperation» with political authorities and institutions. As researchers claim, political participation becomes crisis-oriented in the absence of a rational perception of power and power relations, and therefore manifests itself in the refusal those involved in the conflict to constructively cooperate with the existing institutions and structures of government. This process interprets institutional stability through interrelated vectors of understanding political change and the world outlooks of individuals¹².

Therefore, accounting for government stability, two types of political participation are generally differentiated: instrumental and value-oriented. The first type is typical of societies, where the monopoly for political performance belongs to the authorities, whereas guarantees of a certain social status, adequate income and working conditions, or belonging to political power are normally the individual's motives for political participation. Instead, value-oriented involvement is peculiar for countries with advanced civil society. The main motives here are the values «produced by different social groups in the process of realizing their interests and advantages»¹³. It is noteworthy that in most cases, the first type of political participation is characteristic of permanently unstable states, while the second type of political participation – for stable societies.

The functioning and stability of governments are also greatly affected by political motives. In this light it is worth considering the types of executive power through the prism of the predominant types of individual political motives. Scientists emphasize that individuals' motives can be classified into value-based, interest-based and coercion-based, corresponding to three basic manifestations of the exercise of power by governments¹⁴. The first manifestation touches upon the power of a legitimate government, based on the value motivation of citizens (internal belief in the expediency of power, a sense of duty, belief in the effectiveness and fairness of decisions, as well as confidence that existing political institutions and ideas are best suited to the needs of particular society). Such kind of values and motivations is typical of democratic regimes with stable governments. The second manifestation comes down to government power through remuneration based on instrumental motives, when the subordination of citizens to power occurs in exchange for benefits, advantages and privileges. This type of value orientation is based on viewing government stability as a countervailing priority. Finally, the third manifestation concerns the government coercive power, with underlying motives, such as prudence and condescension of citizens, cowardice under the pressure of bans and violence. Government stability in this case is of a narrow nature, with stability being the absence of sharp political

¹² Goncharov D., Goptareva I., *Vvedenie v politicheskiy nauku*, Wyd. Yurist 1996, s. 205.

¹³ Dembytska N., *Sotsialno-psykholohichnyi vymir demokratychnykh peretvoren v Ukraini. Do rozrobky poniatimoho aparatu teorii politychnoi sotsializatsii*, Wyd. Ukrainnyi tsentr politychnoho menedzhmentu 2003, s. 145–158.

¹⁴ Kramnik V., *Sotsialno-psykholohichesky mehanizm politycheskoy vlasti*, [w:] *Psyhologiya i psyhohanaliz vlasti*, Wyd. Bahrah 1999, vol 1, s. 248–334.

changes and the reaction of individuals to the change of the main priorities in the government's course. However, in this case, government stability is not based on democratic values and norms and is sharply negative.

Another dimension of government stability is social. Thus, in the late 20th century, the idea that it is the middle class that ensures governmental and political stability in democratic societies began to spread¹⁵. The notion of dialogue is also a sociocentric parameter to understand governments' stability. Social dialogue is the essence of social partnership policy in developed democratic countries. It provides for a civilized and effective regulation of relations, facilitates prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts and crises. In view of this, any state, represented by the government, should model social dialogue as one of the pillars of stability. As the experience of Western Europe illustrates, the pillars of governmental stability and social dialogue are the following: the widespread use of various, yet already successfully verified forms of social democracy, i.e. democracy in the main spheres of social and economic life. From a procedural point of view, it is about participatory democracy, and from the point of view of values and results of the democratic process – consensual democracy¹⁶. The essence of participatory democracy is increasingly the focus on involving citizens in political and economic decision-making and monitoring their implementation in important areas of political activity of governmental institutions. This holds the person responsible for ensuring the stability of the main institutions of the state, including the government.

Simultaneously, social dialogue is linked to the concept of economic and social well-being of citizens. The rationality of the economic process is modified by social factors, leading to understanding political peace and stability as the most desirable state of relations in the country, whereas negotiation, compromise and treaties are considered the best means of guaranteeing this condition. Back in the 1920's some scholars, substantiated and proved that institutional stability depends on two main factors: the standard of living of the population and the degree of income differentiation. The lower the standard of living and greater the difference between the rich and the poor, the higher the level of political tensions and the louder the calls for the overthrow of power and the redistribution of property and the creation of protection organizations¹⁷. Therefore, social dialogue is based on the individual interests of citizens, which directly helps avert the political system instability. W. Beveridge made a significant contribution to understanding the stability of governments in this area. His ideas laid foundations for the «welfare state» programme, according to which «a person should be cared for from cradle to grave». As a result, A. Shulamit noted: «In terms of this idea, all citizens should first of all enjoy equal opportunities; secondly, socio-political and personal problems are more determined

¹⁵ Kiianka I, Ideia serednoho klasu yak haranta stabilnoho rozvytku, "Politychnyi menedzhment" 2006, vol 1, s. 37–43.

¹⁶ *Sotsialne partnerstvo – sbliakh do zlabody*, Wyd. Proekt Mizhnarodnoi orhanizatsii pratsi „Ukraina: spryannia realizatsii osnovnykh pryntsyypiv ta prav u sviti pratsi” 2003, s. 144

¹⁷ *Sotsialne partnerstvo – sbliakh do zlabody*, Wyd. Proekt Mizhnarodnoi orhanizatsii pratsi „Ukraina: spryannia realizatsii osnovnykh pryntsyypiv ta prav u sviti pratsi” 2003, s. 41.

by socio-economic conditions of existence than by individual characteristics of their carriers; thirdly, society is responsible for all its citizens, particularly those becoming for some reason more vulnerable»¹⁸. Therefore, government stability depends on how much institutions of the executive power are ready to fulfill their social functions before the community. Historically, such trends have been taken into account in Western countries, since in mid-1940s, all Western European countries began to improve their social regulation systems¹⁹. Hence, government stability is a process proportional to securing a citizen's social priorities. Such ideas emerged in the late 20th century. Thus, in the study «Stages of Economic Growth: The Non-Communist Manifesto» (1960), D. Rustow identified five major stages of development and stabilization, the logical end of which was proclaimed «mass consumption society», where the economic structure shifts to the sphere of services. Subsequently, the scientist also pointed out the sixth stage, i.e. «search for quality of social life»²⁰.

Government stability is also determined by social security. A person should be well-to-do enough to not even entertain the idea to criticize the executive power and the political system as a whole. An analysis of various aspects of social security allows to single out a common view, i.e. the idea of protecting the right to work, social security, membership in trade unions, family protection and a sufficient standard of living of the individual, and even of the social security content and purpose. Simultaneously, Sweden is considered an example of the positive impact of the social policy and the quality social dialogue on government stability. Since 1930s, when it became the first in Europe to institutionalize social dialogue in the form of a tripartite process (government – confederation – organization), coordinating the basic parameters of social and economic policy, it has remained the backbone of the country's socio-economic order, a guarantee of institutional stability and efficiency. In this country, every public policy project, first and foremost a draft budget, has been publicly discussed in the widest possible circles before receiving approval of the government and afterwards parliament, including the structures of administration, political parties and self-government bodies. However, the Swedish experience has never been considered outside the European context. In general, Western Europe, or the most effective approach to implementing the principles of social dialogue, understanding it as containing the scale of maturing government stabilization policies, and other institutions of public authority²¹.

Last but not least, economic dimension is certain to be crucial in understanding government stability. Thus, facing up against obscure re-election prospects, political actors have yet another motive to participate in short-term economic policy. This leads to inefficient public spending, deficits and debt accumulation, distorting investment decisions and ultimately leading to low

¹⁸ Spiker P., *Sotsialna polityka: tenty ta pidkhoty*. Wyd. Feniks 2000, s. 9–10.

¹⁹ Davydenko V., Imperatyvy formuvannya i rozvytku instytutu sotsialnoho dialohu, «Politychnyi menedzhment» 2005, vol 6, s. 89–102.

²⁰ Davydenko V., Imperatyvy formuvannya i rozvytku instytutu sotsialnoho dialohu, «Politychnyi menedzhment» 2005, vol 6, s. 89–102.

²¹ Davydenko V., Imperatyvy formuvannya i rozvytku instytutu sotsialnoho dialohu, «Politychnyi menedzhment» 2005, vol 6, s. 89–102.

economic growth²²]. Besides, economic policy is generally outlined by governments, hence depending on the stability of the latter. For this reason, government performance is constantly under the influence of various financial, as well as credit and accounting relationships in the country, thus affecting government efficiency and duration, being the subject of various econometric studies.

In this regard, numerous speculations and observations arise. In particular, economists believe that a rapid rise in inflation causes government inefficiency, in turn reducing welfare and economic growth of society. Alternatively, higher levels of government stability are associated with proportionally low inflation. The theory also stresses a significant role of government policy for the optimal elaboration of inflation and institutions stabilization programmes, contributing to price stability. In this regard R. Chelliah, H. Baas and M. Kelly remark that one of the previous attempts to answer the question of the inflation and stability relations was based on the idea that structural peculiarities of the economy determine the ability of the government to collect taxes within its stable activity, i.e., in the conditions of maintaining governmental stability²³. A. Cukierman, S. Edwards, and G. Tabellini elaborated a theoretical model, in terms of which governmental stability and political polarization determine the efficiency of the tax system balance, the combination of tax revenues and application of government duties. The measure of stability, according to the model, accounts for the likelihood or unlikelihood of some current government remaining in power. In the empirical analysis, alternative principles of governmental stability relating to tariffs and inflation can also be applied. In particular, one can use variables, calculating the exact number of changing cabinets and changes within cabinets over a specific periods of time²⁴. Frequent cabinet reshuffles shorten the horizon of government members, for the latter are unsure of holding office for the entire term. The higher the likelihood of a minister's replacement, the greater the desire to achieve short term goals. Therefore, it complicates keeping inflation at a low level. Similarly, M. Paldam argues, that the main link between inflation and government stability is related to the cost of inflation and the liability hypothesis, lying in the fact that citizens hold governments responsible for economic performance. The causal tie between government policy and inflation is primarily linked to the demand for public spending (which weak governments seldom resist). In case inflation rises to a high level, it is much harder for weak and unstable governments to withstand political pressure²⁵.

A plethora of scientific studies describe the effects of government stability on the economy. For instance, J. Lothian and M. Melvin²⁶ explore the importance of political risks for investment

²² Carmignani F., *Measures of political instability in multiparty governments: a new data set with econometric applications*, Wyd. University of Glasgow 1999.

²³ Chelliah R., Baas H., Kelly M., Tax Ratios and Tax Effort in Developing Countries 1969–71, "Staff Papers" 1975, vol 22, s. 187–205.

²⁴ Cukierman A., Edwards S., Tabellini G., Seigniorage and Political Instability, "American Economic Review" 1992, vol 82, nr. 3, s. 537–555.

²⁵ Paldam M., Inflation and Political Instability in Eight Latin American Countries 1946–83, "Public Choice" 1987, vol 52, s. 143–168.

²⁶ Lothian J., Melvin M., Political influences in international economic models, "Journal of International Money and Finance" 1991, vol 10, nr. 1.

decisions. Individual studies are also high quality, for example, J.Citron and G.Nickelsburg²⁷, having elaborated the country's risk model based on foreign borrowing, taking into account governmental stability. J.Cherien and E.Perotti²⁸ develop a theoretical model of political risks of capital investment in conditions of government instability. Moreover, interdependence between government stability and asset and investment markets has been explored from various perspectives in the comparative scientific literature. Some authors emphasize the importance of political risk in emerging markets, while others argue that political risk is a more important determinant of asset return in emerging markets than in developed ones²⁹. Another important aspect of research is the link between government stability and the behaviour of stock exchanges on the assumption that the latter is a good investor reflection on governmental stability. Respectively, S.Ketkar and K.Ketkar³⁰ reached a conclusion that in this context government stability is a key factor in different countries and regions.

It is also worth mentioning that government stability through the lens of electoral cycles depends on the tax policy of the state³¹. Statistics prove that tax policy typically becomes more expansionary in case the election date is due not at the beginning but in the middle of the year. However, if the election date moves to the end of the year relevant to the current budget balance, there appears a stronger motive to reduce election-driven short-term borrowing. Starting with N.Roubini and J.Sachs³², researchers have put in focus governments' actions on the results of the state tax policy. Scholars insist that the basic idea is that coalition governments are weaker than single-party governments, and therefore end up with higher deficits in case the country is hit by a negative economic blow. N. Roubini and J. Sachs substantiate this hypothesis, yet many researchers oppose it. In general, scientists state that governmental fractioning, measured by the number of political parties or the number of cabinet ministers, affects tax policy. A more fragmented government, i.e. the one with a high representation of parties, or number or ministers, provokes a higher budget deficit. B. Volkerink and J. de Haan support this approach and believe that the number of political parties in government, as well as the number of ministers in government, should be separately included in government regression models and schemes³³.

Since contemporary political and economic studies, in particular the ideas of R. Franzese, reflected in his work «Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes», suggest that the political colouring of the government affects the results of tax policy³⁴, the impact of the government's position in the left-right ideological spectrum is also of utter

²⁷ Citron J., Nickelsburg G., Country risk and political instability, *Journal of Development Economics* 1987, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 385–392.

²⁸ Cherian J., Perotti E., Option pricing and foreign investment under political risk, *Journal of International Economics* 2001, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 359–377.

²⁹ Robin L., Liew J., Stevens R., Political risk in emerging and developed markets, *Financial Analysis Journal* 1996, vol 52, s. 71–76.

³⁰ Ketkar S., Ketkar K., Determinants of capital flight from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, *Contemporary Policy Issues* 1989, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 11–29.

³¹ Roubini N., Sachs J., Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries, *Economic Policy* 1989, vol 8, s. 99–132.

³² Roubini N., Sachs J., Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries, *Economic Policy* 1989, vol 8, s. 99–132.

³³ Volkerink B., De Haan J., Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence, *Public Choice* 2001, vol 109, s. 221–242.

³⁴ Franzese R., Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes, *Annual Review of Political Science* 2002, vol 5, s. 369–421.

importance. However, this influence should not be exaggerated. Interestingly enough, some comparative studies suggest that asymmetries in financial responses to economic downturns may occur. For example, D. Mayes and M. Viren in their study argue that, during recession periods, governments pursue expansionary tax policies to combat recessions, while during economic upturns, revenue is used to cut taxes and increase costs, but not for further consolidation³⁵. In addition, the interdependence of government stability and tax policy is influenced by the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product, as M. Tujula and G. Wolswijk believe that this approach embraces the issue of fiscal policy sustainability³⁶. As a result, from the perspective of sustainability through increased debt relations, we must improve the budget balance. J. Melitz points out that higher levels of debt can lead to more financial reactions to government policy stabilization processes³⁷. However, higher debt obligations also stir an increase in interest payments, resulting in a financial balance deterioration. In general, this argues that the instability of governments leads to a reduction in the tax policy efficiency.

Thus, government stability indicators are crucial in explaining tax policy. J. de Haan, and J.-E. Sturm³⁸ believe that the high frequency of cabinet reshuffles leads to faster growth in the amount of economic debt. R. Perotti and Y. Kontopoulos³⁹, as well as B. Volkerink and J. de Haan⁴⁰ attribute the fragmentation and high effective number of parties in governments and parliaments along with the number of reshuffles in ministries to high public spending and deficits. In this regard N. Roubini and J. Sachs⁴¹, as well as G. Korsetti⁴² systematically link state tax policies to political variables, including the formation and effectiveness of coalitions and government teams. They developed an indicator of power dispersion within cabinets, yielding the lowest result for single-party majority governments, the intermediate result for majority coalition governments, the highest result for minority governments. The indicator accounts for differences between debt and cost policies. It is intuitively argued that majority and minority governments exhibit different levels of government stability. P.-A. Edin and H. Ohlsson⁴³ through the lens of minority governments argued that negotiations in parliament, not in the government cabinet, can pose a major obstacle to reducing budget deficits. The fact is that at the stage of

³⁵ Mayes D., Viren M., Pressures on the Stability and Growth Pact from Asymmetry in Policy, "Bank of Finland Discussion Paper" 2000, vol 11.

³⁶ Tujula M., Wolswijk G., What determines fiscal balances? An empirical investigation in determinants of changes in OECD budget balances, "ECB Working Paper" 2004, vol 422.

³⁷ Melitz J., Some Cross-Country Evidence about Fiscal Policy Behavior and Consequences for EMU, "European Economy" 2000, vol 2, s. 3–21.

³⁸ De Haan J., Sturm J.-E., Political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the European Community, "Public Choice" 1994, vol 80, s. 157–172.

³⁹ Perotti R., Kontopoulos Y., *Fragmented fiscal policy*, [w:] Poterba J., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1999.

⁴⁰ Volkerink B., De Haan J., Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence, "Public Choice" 2001, vol 109, s. 221–242.

⁴¹ Roubini N., Sachs J., Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries, "Economic Policy" 1989, vol 8, s. 99–132.

⁴² Corsetti G., Roubini N., *The design of optimal fiscal rules in Europe after 1992*, [w:] Torres F., Giavazzi F. (eds.), *Adjustment and growth in the European monetary system*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993, s. 46–92.

⁴³ Edin P.-A., Ohlsson H., Political determinants of budget deficits: Coalition effects versus minority effects, "European Economic Review" 1991, vol 35, s. 1597–1603.

government formation political actors are developing expectations about the future outcomes, that are further either achieved or not achieved in the budget formation game. After all, the latter must be separately approved both in the cabinet, and in the parliament. Accordingly, K.Strom⁴⁴ explains that in countries with minority governments formed on a regular basis there are institutions, having a strong influence on opposition parties, for example through parliamentary committees. If the electoral benefits of joining a particular minority government are doubtful, the party will support the cabinet without being a part of it. If the party gains additional benefits by joining a government cabinet, it makes the government (as an organizational form of the political process) not only more desirable but also more stable. Therefore, the main idea is that governments, including minorities, dissolve when most of the available benefits are considered consumed. This hypothesis was verified by D.Diermeier and R.Stevenson⁴⁵, insisting that that the size of the «pie» in a government cabinet is the key determinant of government stability.

On the whole, the study finds that government stability is a category that depends on both political and non-political factors. Government stability appeared to be a complex problem, defined as a multidimensional and multifactorial interrelation of government cabinet activities and economic, social, legal, cultural, political and other factors of public life. The impact of such factors can frequently be observed either in the form of institutional levers, or in the form of contextual features of the social, economic and political system of a certain state.

References

1. Abulhanova-Slavskaya K., *Aktivnost i soznanie lichnosti kak sub'ekta deyatelnosti*, [w:] *Psibologiya lichnosti v sotsialisticheskom obschestve: Aktivnost i razvitie lichnosti*, Wyd. Nauka 1989, s. 110–134.
2. Carmignani F., *Measures of political instability in multiparty governments: a new data set with econometric applications*, Wyd. University of Glasgow 1999.
3. Chelliah R., Baas H., Kelly M., Tax Ratios and Tax Effort in Developing Countries 1969–71, “*Staff Papers*” 1975, vol 22, s. 187–205.
4. Cherian J., Perotti E., Option pricing and foreign investment under political risk, “*Journal of International Economics*” 2001, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 359–377.
5. Citron J., Nickelsburg G., Country risk and political instability, “*Journal of Development Economics*” 1987, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 385–392.
6. Corsetti G., Roubini N., *The design of optimal fiscal rules in Europe after 1992*, [w:] Torres F., Giavazzi F. (eds.), *Adjustment and growth in the European monetary system*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993, s. 46–92.
7. Cukierman A., Edwards S., Tabellini G., Seigniorage and Political Instability, “*American Economic Review*” 1992, vol 82, nr. 3, s. 537–555.

⁴⁴ Strom K., *Minority governments and majority rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

⁴⁵ Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet terminations and critical events, “*American Political Science Review*” 2000, vol 94, s. 627–640.

8. Davydenko V., Imperatyvy formuvannya i rozvytku instytutu sotsialnoho dialohu, *“Politychnyi menedzhment”* 2005, vol 6, s. 89–102.
9. De Haan J., Sturm J.-E., Political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the European Community, *“Public Choice”* 1994, vol 80, s. 157–172.
10. Dembytska N., *Sotsialno-psykholohichni vymir demokratychnykh peretvoren v Ukraini. Do rozrobky poniatiinoho aparatu teorii politychnoi sotsializatsii*, Wyd. Ukrainskyi tsentr politychnoho menedzhmentu 2003, s. 145–158.
11. Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet terminations and critical events, *“American Political Science Review”* 2000, vol 94, s. 627–640.
12. Diligenskiy G., *Sotsialno-politicheskaya psihologiya*, Wyd. Nauka 1994.
13. Edin P.-A., Ohlsson H., Political determinants of budget deficits: Coalition effects versus minority effects, *“European Economic Review”* 1991, vol 35, s. 1597–1603.
14. Franzese R., Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes, *“Annual Review of Political Science”* 2002, vol 5, s. 369–421.
15. Goncharov D., Goptareva I., *Vvedenie v politicheskuyu nauku*, Wyd. Yurist 1996.
16. Ketkar S., Ketkar K., Determinants of capital flight from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, *“Contemporary Policy Issues”* 1989, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 11–29.
17. Kiianka I., Ideia serednoho klasu yak haranta stabilnoho rozvytku, *“Politychnyi menedzhment”* 2006, vol 1, s. 37–43.
18. Kramnik V., *Sotsialno-psihologicheskii mehanizm politicheskoy vlasti*, [w:] *Psihologiya i psihoanaliz vlasti*, Wyd. Bahrah 1999, vol 1, s. 248–334.
19. Lothian J., Melvin M., Political influences in international economic models, *“Journal of International Money and Finance”* 1991, vol 10, nr. 1.
20. Mayes D., Viren M., Pressures on the Stability and Growth Pact from Asymmetry in Policy, *“Bank of Finland Discussion Paper”* 2000, vol 11.
21. Melitz J., Some Cross-Country Evidence about Fiscal Policy Behavior and Consequences for EMU, *“European Economy”* 2000, vol 2, s. 3–21.
22. Paldam M., Inflation and Political Instability in Eight Latin American Countries 1946–83, *“Public Choice”* 1987, vol 52, s. 143–168.
23. Perotti R., Kontopoulos Y., *Fragmented fiscal policy*, [w:] Poterba J., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1999.
24. Robin L., Liew J., Stevens R., Political risk in emerging and developed markets, *“Financial Analysis Journal”* 1996, vol 52, s. 71–76.
25. Roubini N., Sachs J., Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries, *“Economic Policy”* 1989, vol 8, s. 99–132.
26. *Sotsialne partnerstvo – sbliakh do zlahody*, Wyd. Proekt Mizhnarodnoi orhanizatsii pratsi „Ukraina: spryannia realizatsii osnovnykh pryntsyviv ta prav u sviti pratsi“ 2003.
27. Spiker P., *Sotsialna polityka: temy ta pidkhody*, Wyd. Feniks 2000.

28. Strom K., *Minority governments and majority rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.
29. Tujula M., Wolswijk G., What determines fiscal balances? An empirical investigation in determinants of changes in OECD budget balances, *“ECB Working Paper”* 2004, vol 422.
30. Volkerink B., De Haan J., Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence, *“Public Choice”* 2001, vol 109, s. 221–242.

NEW MESSAGES OF THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ELECTORAL PREFERENCES OF THE SOCIETY

Abstract. The functioning of a modern democratic state is impossible without observing certain electoral cycles, holding free elections, maintaining carefully thought-out electoral procedures, and sending new messages to voters that affect the formation of public electoral moods. The most important trend in this process is the search for electoral systems that fully take into account the will of citizens and ensure adequate representation of their interests in state bodies. The author proves that during the recent presidential and parliamentary election campaigns that took place in the Republic of Bulgaria, new electoral preferences were quite unexpected for the state. The Bulgarian Parliament quickly shifted to a new paradigm of political rhetoric without changing its structure. “Pro-Euro-Atlantic” parties (the Reformist Bloc, DOST) did not enter the Parliament, and those that are represented in the National Assembly (GERB, BSP, DPS) quite painlessly reoriented to “patriotic” or “state-oriented” messages. The nationalist parties with their new messages that most correspond to the desired new situation, managed to understand the situation in time: they united and were able to get seats in the Government in a new form. They said goodbye to their previous role in Bulgarian politics and became a part of the respectable participants in the political process.

Keywords: Republic of Bulgaria, presidential and parliamentary elections, political parties, new political messages.

Vira Burdiak¹

НОВІ МЕСЕДЖІ БОЛГАРСЬКИХ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ПАРТІЙ ТА ЇХ ВПЛИВ НА СУСПІЛЬНІ ЕЛЕКТОРАЛЬНІ НАСТРОЇ

Анотація. Функціонування сучасної демократичної держави неможливе без дотримання певних електоральних циклів, проведення вільних виборів, ретельно продуманих виборчих процедур та спрямування нових меседжів до виборців, які впливають на формування суспільних електоральних настроїв. Найважливішою тенденцією цього процесу є пошук таких виборчих систем, які в повній мірі враховують волю громадян

¹ Доктор політичних наук, професор, професор кафедри політології та державного управління Чернівецького національного університету імені Юрія Федьковича; e-mail: vira.burdjak@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0037-2173>

та її адекватне представництво у державних органах. Автор доводить, що в ході останніх президентської та парламентської виборчої кампаній, які відбулися в Республіці Болгарія, виявилися досить несподівані для держави нові електоральні переваги. Болгарський парламент швидко перебудувався на нову парадигму політичної риторики, практично не змінивши структури. «Проєвроатлантичні» партії (Реформаторський блок, ДВСТ) не пройшли до парламенту, а ті, що представлені в Народних зборах (ГЕРБ, БСП, РПС) доволі безболісно переорієнтувалися на «патріотичні» чи «державницькі» меседжі. Націоналістичні партії, нові меседжі яких найбільше відповідають бажаному новому положенню, зуміли вчасно розібратися в ситуації: вони об'єдналися і в новому вигляді змогли отримати місця в уряді. Також вони зробили заявку на те, щоб попрощатися з минулою своєю роллю в болгарській політиці і ввійти до складу респектабельних учасників політичного процесу.

Ключові слова: Республіка Болгарія, президентські та парламентські вибори, політичні партії, нові політичні меседжі.

Statement of the scientific problem and its significance. Every modern democratic state periodically holds presidential and parliamentary elections and adheres to the developed electoral procedures, according to its legislation. These procedures are sometimes changed and improved in order to fully take the will of citizens into account and to provide adequate representation of their interests in public authorities².

Recognition of the importance of the electoral system in a democratic state is due to the fact that this element of the political system undergoes changes the most often. Researchers G. Taagepera and M. Shugart note that “comparing with the other elements of the political system, electoral rules are the easiest to manipulate for political purposes. This does not mean that the electoral system is easy to change, but that the other elements of the system are even more difficult to change”³.

Presentation of the main material. In a democracy, it is difficult for the ruling elite to make significant changes to the institutions of Legislative and Executive power, since they are usually well constitutionally protected and it takes a lot of effort from the elites to carry out such changes without violating democratic norms and procedures. But the ruling elites do not always choose and change the electoral system in order to optimize the functioning of democracy. Just like any other subject of the political process, they pursue their own interests, trying to consolidate their dominant position in the state power system, creating additional obstacles for the political opposition on its way to gain power.

² Иванченко А.В., Кынев А.В., Любарев А.Е. (2005). Пропорциональная избирательная система в России: История, современное состояние, перспективы. М.: Аспект Пресс. С. 7.

³ Таагепера Р., Шугарт М. С. (1997). Описание избирательных систем. Полис. № 3. С. 115.

Bulgaria held regular presidential elections in November 2016. The political parties hoped that the elections would give them the expected opportunity to correct the balance of power that had developed at that time in the Parliament. However, whether or not such changes were possible was questionable. After all, since 2014, governmental power in Bulgaria has been concentrated in the hands of the GERB party (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), since one of the founders of this party – Boyko Borisov – was the Prime Minister at that time; and the party’s nominee Rosen Plevneliev was the President of the Bulgarian state. For a long time, GERB was ruling the state in a coalition with the former right-wing forces of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) (it was headed by former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov). Sometimes they were occasionally supported by the Vilen Siderov’s radical party “Attack”. The other parties represented the opposition, led by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) with its leader Sergei Stanishev, in coalition with the ethnic Turkish party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) and the National Movement Simeon II led by Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (NDSV – party, which was formed in 2001 by the son of the last Bulgarian Tsar Boris. Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha became the first Republican Prime Minister in the beginning of the XXI century).

In 2009 the GERB party won the elections for the first time, and until 2016 it consistently won all election races⁴. The only serious rival of the GERB party could be considered a spontaneous expression of discontent of citizens who came out to hold protest actions on the streets of many cities of the state. The leaders of the GERB party managed to build such a tactic and strategy where none of the existing parties in Bulgaria, and there are more than 240 of them, could seriously claim the role of the opposition.

Seven other parties joined the National Assembly – Parliament of Bulgaria – in 2014⁵. The Bulgarian press wrote that each political movement was represented by two parliamentary forces⁶. The right-liberal spectrum in addition to GERB was represented by the Reformist Bloc (RB). From the parties of the nationalist spectrum – the Attack Party and its competitor, the Patriotic Front, entered the Parliament. The left-wing forces were represented by the BSP and by Georgi Parvanov’s “The Alternative for Bulgarian Revival” (ABV) party, which had moved away from the socialists. This list of parliamentary political forces is completed by the ethnic party “Movement for Rights and Freedoms”, which split at the end of 2015 and two Turkish parties fought for the seats in the National Assembly in 2017: the DPS and the “Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity and Tolerance” (DOST).

So, each parliamentary party had its own rival who claimed the same electorate (with the possible exception of the ruling GERB party, the voters of which support the personality of

⁴ *Граждани за европейско развитие на България* (ГЕРБ). URL: http://www.gerb.bg/bg/news/spisyk-stanovishta_i_pozicii-3.html

⁵ The political party “Bulgaria Uncensored”, which also entered the Parliament, broke apart soon after the National Assembly started functioning.

⁶ Симеонов П. (2017). ГЕРБ и Обединените патриоти по-скоро имат условия в 44-ото Народно събрание да изпънят заявените политики. URL: <http://www.focus-news.net/opinion/2017/04/18/42635/parvan-simeonov-politolog-gerb-i-obedinenite-patrioti-po-skoro-imat-usloviya-v-44-oto-narodno-sabranie-da-izpalnyat-za-yavenite-politiki.html>

its leader Boyko Borisov rather than the program or ideology). BSP – the main opposition force, which traditionally challenged the GERB – according to G. Parvanov, was not in the opposition to the government, but to its main competitor on the left wing – the ABV party. GERB's potential rival in the fight for the right-wing electorate, the Reformist Bloc, fit into the role of its junior partner and dutifully accepted the resignations of its Ministers, which B. Borisov deliberately appointed to the most problematic Ministries⁷. Other parties (the ethnic Turkish DPS and the nationalist “Patriotic front” and the “Attack” party) were engaged in an inter-party struggle, and therefore did not so much criticize GERB as hoped for its support.

In the end, there was a system that was effective enough for the leadership of the party, in which B. Borisov – the leader of the GERB – kept all potential rivals under control. In almost every decision, the ruling party could create a majority in the Parliament, playing on the contradictions of its younger partners. Weakened rivals did not even try to challenge the party's rights, being content with their own place in the system that B. Borisov had created.

At the beginning of 2016 most analysts believed that the system of political relations built by the Prime Minister would allow his party to easily lead its candidate for the post of President, while maintaining its dominant position. However, subsequent events contradicted these forecasts.

It is known that Bulgaria is a parliamentary Republic in which the powers of the head of state are quite limited, but despite this, the President of the Republic is elected in general elections. The main contenders in the 2016 presidential election were Tsetska Tsacheva, representing GERB⁸, and BSP candidate Rumen Radev⁹. At the time of the election, T. Tsacheva was the speaker of the National Assembly of Bulgaria (this is the first female speaker in the history of Bulgaria)¹⁰. R. Radev is a professional military pilot who once headed the state air force.

What added to the significance and intrigue of these elections was the fact that the current Prime Minister of Bulgaria and the leader of the GERB party B. Borisov before the election said that if T. Tsacheva was defeated, the Parliament would be dissolved. In fact, he decided to turn the election into a referendum on the assessment of his policy, linking its results to the future fate of the working Government and the National Assembly.

Such political statements and dispositions are not a new phenomenon in modern politics. Quite often, politicians link the future of the government to the results of voting by citizens in elections or referendums, trying to ensure the desired result for themselves. However, this combination of the future fate of a politician and the results of the voting is a double-edged weapon. It is difficult to predict whether or not the voters will support a functioning government. But

⁷ Георгиев В. (2014). Заявка за програмиран провал. URL: <http://pogled.info/avtorski/Valentin-Georgiev/zayavka-za-pogramiran-portal.59572>

⁸ Антонова Д. (2016). Цецка Цачева, вече официално, кандидатът на ГЕРБ за президент. News.bg, 2 октомври.

⁹ БСП отрязва АБВ от преговорите за обща коалиция за президентските избори. От столетницата не са съгласни с предложения от партията на Гърванов проект за коалиционно споразумение. Blitz.bg, 2016, 23 август.

¹⁰ Борисов обяви официално Цецка Цачева за кандидат-президент на ГЕРБ: Нацията има нужда и от майка (допълнена). Дневник. bg, 2016, 2 октомври.

the defeat of the current government will inevitably lead to a resignation. In this regard, it is appropriate to recall two recent examples from the development of the electoral process and its results in the UK and Italy.

In the UK, the day before a referendum on the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, Prime Minister James Cameron said that if a majority of voters voted for the state's exit from the EU, he would resign¹¹. As you know, the majority of the voters voted for Brexit, which forced J. Cameron to keep his own promises and thus end his political career. At the end of 2016 the same move was made by Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who said he would resign if a majority of voters voted in a referendum against his proposed radical reform of the Constitution¹². The voters did not support the changes proposed by the Prime Minister and M. Renzi's political career was also sadly interrupted.

In Bulgaria B. Borisov followed the same slippery path, linking the fate of his Government with the results of the presidential elections, which in this case proved to be as disappointing as in cases of his Western European colleagues. In the very first round, on November 6, 2016, the Prime Minister's protege Tsacheva took only second place, gaining 3% less votes than R. Radev. Before the second round of elections, all government forces were activated to ensure Tsacheva's victory, who received mixed feelings from the Bulgarian society. That is because "T. Tsacheva, who was not that charismatic, failed to come out from B. Borisov's shadow, which is why she gave the impression of a weak candidate devoid of independence"¹³.

During the election campaign, R. Radev was believed to have "special ties with the Kremlin", because the BSP is considered a pro-Russian party. However, R. Radev responded to these accusations by saying that not only is he not a member of the BSP, but moreover, he is the first Bulgarian military officer who received military education in the United States. The moment of truth came on November 13, when in the second round, R. Radev won, receiving a convincing 59.37% of the votes and became the President of Bulgaria¹⁴. The next day, November 14, B. Borisov, following this word, resigned¹⁵. Therefore, an urgent need to hold snap parliamentary elections emerged in Bulgaria.

The reasons for the Prime Minister's resignation have been repeatedly discussed in the Bulgarian press and look obvious. The ruling party overestimated its resources by nominating a presidential candidate who lacked unique charisma, but was loyal and manageable. This caused public annoyance: seemed like no one asked the voters anymore, and the President was appointed as an ordinary official. The opposition quickly these public protests took into

¹¹ Почему британский премьер ушел в отставку? URL: <https://inosmi.ru/politic/20160627/236990095.html>; Дэвид Кэмерон освобождает для Терезы Мэй пост и квартиру. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-36781539>

¹² Итальянцы отклонили конституционную реформу, премьер-министр Маттео Ренци уходит. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3840538>

¹³ Час на політичні зміни в Болгарії. URL: <http://www.global-analyt.com/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%>

¹⁴ Резултати от избори за президент и вице-президент на републиката 2016 (II тур) // Централната избирателна комисия на Република България. URL: <https://www.cik.bg/>

¹⁵ *Bulgarian PM Borisov tenders his government resignation*. Reuters. 2016. Nov 14.

account and proposed a candidate who was the complete opposite of the GERB candidate¹⁶. R. Radev is a general officer, a flying ace, independent candidate, and therefore not responsible for the problems faced by the state in recent years, respectable, well-educated and intelligent. In the end, R. Radev was supported by representatives of almost all political parties, while the GERB candidate failed to mobilize even the electorate of her own party.

If the GERB's defeat was transparent enough to explain it, then the much deeper changes that occurred during the presidential elections – changes in political rhetoric – are undeniably more difficult to track. Before the elections, the only absolute and universally recognized reference point of Bulgarian politics were the “Euro-Atlantic values”, which meant a wide range of concepts, both geopolitical and purely domestic. During the election campaign, there was a transition to a new paradigm in which “national interests” were recognized as a reference point.

So, the future President, the opposition candidate general officer R. Radev surprised the Bulgarian public with statements about the need to recognize the reunification of Crimea with the Russian Federation. According to him, the denial of this fact does not help to protect the interests of Bulgarian citizens. He interpreted the relationships with the European Union and NATO in such a way that they turned from an ideological principle into a tool for protecting national interests: in his opinion, the state is interested in a more active participation in these institutions¹⁷.

It should be noted that out of the seven leading candidates, five other candidates, including his main competitor, the GERB candidate, expressed similar ideas. All of them tried to present themselves as pragmatists whose main goal is to protect public interests.

At the same time, the success of R. Radev showed the scale of the public need to replace the political elite and undermined the dominance of GERB. B. Borisov's team is trying to lead the protest electorate, hence the sudden support for the introduction of a plurality voting system, which allowed GERB to take its place in the vanguard of political changes. The victory of R. Radev, although he was formally a non-party candidate, gave the left-wing parties a chance to restore political positions weakened by numerous corruption scandals and the lack of reliable leaders. The socialists are trying to develop a new rhetoric, and have also supported the introduction of a plurality voting system. At this stage, it is difficult to assess the prospects for changes in the electoral law, but it is unlikely that the left-wing parties will be able to quickly develop a comprehensive reform that would respond to the requests of the citizens regarding the need for changes that exist in society¹⁸.

The new rhetoric of politicians has become news for post-Communist Bulgaria. Some journalists made hasty conclusions that the state was moving away from the Euro-Atlantic course and was almost preparing to leave the EU and NATO. However, this does not look like

¹⁶ България: выборы, до которых не дотянулась вездесущая «рука Москвы». URL: <http://izbircom.com/2017/04/23/%D0%B1%>

¹⁷ «Маркет линкс»: Цецка Цачева и генерал Румен Радев отиват на тежък балотаж». БТВ Новините». 2016. 4 октябрия.

¹⁸ Час на политични зміни в Болгарії. URL: <http://www.global-analytik.com/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%>

it, because in the last election, none of the leading candidates could be called fully eurosceptic or at least anti-NATO. If some of them allowed themselves to criticize the Euro-Atlantic structures, it was more directed against the sluggish position of the current Bulgarian politicians than against these organizations themselves. Therefore, we are not talking about the changes in the geopolitical orientations, but about a more mature attitude of the elite and society when determining policy priorities.

It is interesting that during the election campaign, the ruling GERB party tried to avoid direct criticism of Russia. Even the party leader and former Prime Minister B. Borisov said that EU sanctions are not directed against the Russian state, but only against those responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Donbass. Opponents of the BSP actively elaborated upon the topic of lifting anti-Russian sanctions, promising to block their extension in June.

Just before the election, the Wall Street Journal published a document intercepted by the Bulgarian security services, which contained a detailed strategy developed by Russian political strategists that may have helped R. Radev win the presidential election. It is not known whether the publication of the document affected the distribution of the electorate's sympathies. But in the elections on March 26th, the center-right party GERB significantly surpassed the Moscow socialist-followers, receiving 32.65% of the vote against 27.2% of the BSP. Although throughout the entire election campaign, the opponents kept apace¹⁹.

This trend, which emerged in the presidential elections, was further developed in the snap parliamentary elections in 2017. After the defeat of his candidate, B. Borisov resigned. The new Cabinet could not be formed under the old Parliament, so, in the end, parliamentary elections were scheduled for 2017. Bulgarian journalists noted the unprecedented intensity of patriotic rhetoric during these elections²⁰. Political parties changed their names so that the word "Bulgaria" or "Bulgarian" was there; they came up with new slogans that sounded patriotic; they accused each other of not paying enough attention to national interests and of "kowtowing" to representatives of the European Union and NATO.

Following the results of the parliamentary elections, deputies from five political parties were elected to the National Assembly. Bulgarian analysts note that the new Parliament is a simplified version of the previous one: each political direction is now represented by only one party, that is, the "duplicate" parties have disappeared from the Parliament²¹. After the victory of R. Radev, the BSP gained great popularity and became a worthy rival of the ruling party (which is still the GERB). The second left-wing party – ABV, failed to overcome the 4% barrier this time

¹⁹ Выбори в Болгарии: тиха поразка симпатиків Кремля. URL: <https://politeka.net/ua/reading/analytics/420336-vybory-v-bolgarii-tihoe-porazhenie-simpatikov-kremlya/>

²⁰ Бойчева М. (2017). Конкуренция по родолюбие в имената на партиите. URL: <https://trud.bg/>

²¹ Симеонов П. (2017). ГЕРБ и Обединените патриоти по-скоро имат условия в 44-ото Народно събрание да изпълнят заявените политики. URL: <http://www.focus-news.net/opinion/2017/04/18/42635/parvan-simeonov-politolog-gerb-i-obedinenite-patrioti-po-skoro-imat-usloviya-v-44-oto-narodno-sabranie-da-izpalnyat-za-yavenite-politiki.html>

and did not enter the Parliament. A similar situation has developed for the “duplicate” parties from the right sector (the Reformist Bloc broke up into small movements that also failed to overcome the electoral barrier) and among the representatives of the ethnic Turkish minority (the DOST party did not enter the National Assembly and the DPS was the only representative of this direction). Only one movement from the nationalist spectrum remained in the Parliament: the “Attack” party united with the Patriotic Front, creating the coalition party of “United Patriots”. The eurosceptic party “Attack” is campaigning for Bulgaria to leave NATO and renegotiate the terms of its membership in the European Union. The “Attack” also stands in solidarity with Putin’s policy, supports the annexation of Crimea and the revoking of anti-Russian sanctions. V. Siderov is in contact with the leader of the French ultra-right party “National front” Marine Le Pen, and their views are similar about the need for rapprochement with Russia and the intensification of the migration regime²².

A political debutant, liberal party Volya, which does not have a clear political identity, also entered the Parliament. This is a personal project of businessman Veselin Mareski. He was a candidate for the post of President in the 2016 elections, and then more than 400 thousand Bulgarian citizens voted for him. In the parliamentary elections, Volya’s achievements were more modest, as just over 140,000 people voted for the party²³.

The results of the parliamentary elections confirmed the presence of a new trend in Bulgarian politics. For one reason or another, the most loyal followers of the previous Euro-Atlantic paradigm—former members of the Reformist bloc—found themselves outside of the National Assembly. Two of the parties that remain in Parliament—GERB and the new party Volya—are built around the personality of the Prime Minister and easily adapt to new conditions. For these parties, ideological issues are not a priority. GERB, for example, took the United patriots party instead of the Reformist Bloc as a partner in the ruling coalition. Analysts believe that this choice of the GERB in these conditions can be regarded almost as a symbol of the changes taking place in Bulgarian society.

Thanks to the political power of the United Patriots, nationalist parties got seats in the Government for the first time in recent Bulgarian history. BSP, whose popularity has increased after the victory of R. Radev in the presidential elections, is trying not to lose its ratings and continues the course of patriotism and pragmatic policy initiated by the President. After the events of December 2015, DST party, when the DOST broke away from it, resolutely refused to play the role of a conductor of Turkey’s interests and declared the security and prosperity of Bulgaria as its main priority. Since that time, its political rhetoric often seems even more patriotic than that of nationalist parties.

²² Выборы в Болгарии: Кто здесь «тройанский конь» Кремля? URL: <https://112.ua/statji/vybory-v-bolgarii-kto-zdes-troyanskiy-kon-kremlya-379909.html>

²³ Новый болгарский парламент будет состоять из представителей пяти партий. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4128450>

Conclusion. Thus, the victory of R. Radev significantly affects new alliances in the political arena. Prior to the election, GERB collaborated with the Reformist Bloc, which had a dispute over whether to continue working with the B. Borisov. The Turkish minority and nationalist parties that provided partial support to GERB in Parliament until recently are likely to develop cooperation with the left-wing parties, and their electorate strongly supported R. Radev in the presidential election.

The Bulgarian Parliament has quickly changed to a new paradigm of political rhetoric, while practically not changing its structure (GERB still heads the government coalition, BSP and DPS are still in opposition, and the nationalists support GERB). “Pro-Euro-Atlantic” parties (the Reformist Bloc, the DOST) failed to get into Parliament, and those that are represented in the National Assembly (GERB, BSP, DPS) quickly and painlessly reoriented themselves to “patriotic” or “state-oriented” rhetoric. The nationalist parties that best fit the new situation managed to figure out the situation in time: they united and were able to get seats in the Government in a new form. Therefore, the nationalist political forces said goodbye to their previous role in Bulgarian politics and became a part of the respectable participants in the political process.

Sources of Literature:

1. Антова Д. (2016). Цецка Цачева, вече официално, кандидатът на ГЕРБ за президент. News.bg. 2 октябрия.
2. Бойчева М. (2017). Конкуренция по родолюбие в имената на партиите. URL: <https://trud.bg/>
3. Болгария: выборы, до которых не дотянулась вездесущая «рука Москвы». URL: <http://izbircom.com/2017/04/23/%D0%B1%>
4. Борисов обяви официално Цецка Цачева за кандидат-президент на ГЕРБ: Нацията има нужда и от майка. *Дневник.bg*. 2016. 2 октябрия.
5. БСП отрязва АБВ от преговорите за обща коалиция за президентските избори. От столетницата не са съгласни с предложения от партията на Първанов проект за коалиционно споразумение. *Blitz.bg*. 2016. 23 августа.
6. Выборы в Болгарии: тиха поразка симпатиков Кремля. URL: <https://politeka.net/ua/reading/analytics/420336-vybory-v-bolgarii-tihoe-porazhenie-simpatikov-kremlya/>
7. Выборы в Болгарии: Кто здесь «троянский конь» Кремля? URL: <https://112.ua/statji/vybory-v-bolgarii-kto-zdes-troyanskiy-kon-kremlya-379909>.
8. Георгиев В. (2014). Заявка за програмиран провал. URL: <http://pogled.info/avtorski/Valentin-Georgiev/zayavka-za-programiran-portal.59572>
9. Граждани за европейско развитие на България (ГЕРБ). URL: http://www.gerb.bg/bg/news/spisyk-stanovishta_i_pozicii-3.html
10. Дэвид Кэмерон освобождает для Терезы Мэй пост и квартиру. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-36781539>

32. Ivanchenko A.V., Kynev A. V., Ljubarev A.E. (2005). *Proporcional'naja izbiratel'naja sistema v Rossii: Istorija, sovremennoe sostojanie, perspektivy*. M.: Aspekt Press. 140 s.
33. *Ital'jancy otklonili konstitucionnuju reformu, prem'er-ministr Matteo Renci uhodit*. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3840538>
34. «Marketlinks»: Cecka Cacheva i general Rumen Radev otivat na tezh#k balotazh». BTV Novinite. 2016. 4 oktjabrja.
35. *Novyj bolgarskij parlament budet sostojat' iz predstavitelej pjati partij*. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4128450>
36. *Pochemu britans'kij prem'er ushej v otstavku?* URL: <https://inosmi.ru/politic/20160627/236990095.html>
37. *Rezultati ot izbori za prezident i viceprezident na republikata 2016 (II tur)*. Centralnata izbiratelna komisija na Republika Bylgarija. URL: <https://www.cik.bg/>
38. Simeonov P. (2017). *GERB i Obedinenite patrioti po-skoro imat usloviya v 44-oto Narodno sybranie da izpylnjat zajavenite politiki*. 18 aprelja. URL: <http://www.focus-news.net/opinion/2017/04/18/42635/parvan-simeonov-politolog-gerb-i-obedinenite-patrioti-po-skoro-imat-usloviya-v-44-oto-narodno-Sabranie-da-izpalnyat-zayavenite-politiki.html>
39. Taagepera R., Shugart M. S. (1997). *Opisanie izbiratel'nyh sistem*. Polis. № 3. S. 114-137.
40. *Chasna politychnizmirnyv Bolgarii*. URL: <http://www.global-analitik.com/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%>
41. *Bulgarian PM Borisov tenders his government resignation*. Reuters. 2016. November 14.

THE FRAMEWORK, WAY OF ELECTION, LEGITIMACY AND POWERS OF PRESIDENTS AS INSTITUTIONAL, PROCEDURAL, POLITICAL AND BEHAVIOURAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE EUROPEAN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM

The article is dedicated to analysing and comparing the president's institution under the European semi-presidentialism, in particular in theoretical and empirical contexts. Based on the methodology of new institutionalism and behaviourism, the author researched the arbitrary nature and framework of the president's institution in the European semi-presidentialism, in particular in historical, theoretical and methodological cuts. Special attention was paid to the problems of ways, features and consequences of presidential elections under the European semi-presidentialism. The study is also devoted to the issues of electoral and institutional specifics and logics of popular presidential legitimacy under the European semi-presidentialism. Finally, the article appeals to institutional, procedural, political and behavioural parameters of formal and actual powers and activism of presidents in the European semi-presidentialism. Generally, the scientist developed a complete and systematic view of the president's institution under the European semi-presidentialism and argued the constant feasibility of the typology of the latter.

Keywords: semi-presidentialism, president, elections, legitimacy, European countries.

Віталій Литвин

ПРИРОДА, СПОСІБ ОБРАННЯ, ЛЕГІТИМНІСТЬ І ПОВНОВАЖЕННЯ ПРЕЗИДЕНТІВ ЯК ІНСТИТУЦІЙНО-ПРОЦЕСУАЛЬНІ ТА ПОЛІТИЧНО-ПОВЕДІНКОВІ АТРИБУТИ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО НАПІВПРЕЗИДЕНТАЛІЗМУ

У теоретичному й емпіричному контексті проаналізовано і порівняно інститут президента в умовах європейського напівпрезиденталізму. Ґрунтуючись на методології неінституціоналізму і біхевіоралізму досліджено арбітражну природу та рамки інституту президента в європейському напівпрезиденталізмі, зокрема в історичному, теоретичному і методологічному розрізі. Особливу увагу приділено проблематиці способів, особливостей та наслідків виборів президентів в умовах європейського напівпрезиденталізму. Дослідження також присвячено питанням інституціональної і виборчої специфіки та логіки всенародної легітимності президентів в умовах європейського напівпрезиденталізму. Врешті, стаття

звернута до інституційно-процесуальних і політично-поведінкових параметрів формальних та фактичних повноважень й активізму президентів у європейському напівпрезиденталізмі. Загалом розроблено комплексний та систематичний погляд на інститут президента в рамках напівпрезиденталізму й аргументовано постійну доцільність типологізації останнього.

Ключові слова: напівпрезиденталізм, президент, вибори, легітимність, країни Європи.

Introduction

Different (Duvergerian and post-Duvergerian) variants of defining semi-presidentialism typically give an opportunity to state that the framework, way of election, legitimacy and powers of presidents and the executive, on the one hand, and the peculiarities of the formation and responsibility of cabinets and the possibility of the dissolution of legislatures, on the other hand, are the main patterns, around which the problem of semi-presidentialism turns around formally (i.e. institutionally and procedurally) and actually (i.e. politically and behaviourally). These factors generate a holistic view of semi-presidentialism and give the opportunity to produce a multi-factor typology of this system of government, including the example of European countries. At the same time, following Political Science literature, the determination of the president's institution in the conditions of inter-institutional relations, which outline semi-presidentialism, has a primary significance in this context. It is the institution of president and its positioning often plays a major role in the outline of semi-presidentialism.

Accordingly, the article is devoted to analysing and comparing the framework, legitimacy, way of election and powers of presidents as institutional, procedural, political and behavioural attributes and factors of semi-presidentialism, in particular generally and in the case of European countries. The first part of the article deals with the issues of the arbitrary nature and framework of the president's institution in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. The second part of the article appeals to the questions of the way, features and consequences of elections of presidents in the conditions of the European semi-presidentialism. The third part of the article addresses the issues of the specifics and logics of popular presidential legitimacy under the conditions of the European semi-presidentialism. The fourth part of the research is focused on the problems of formal powers of presidents under the conditions of the European semi-presidentialism, in particular in institutional and procedural cuts. Finally, the fifth part of the article is devoted to the issues of actual powers and activism of presidents under the European semi-presidentialism, in particular in political and behavioural cuts.

The Arbitrary Nature and Framework of the President's Institution in the Conditions of Semi-Presidentialism: Historical, Theoretical and Methodological Cuts

Political theory and practice show that the president's institution in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is a kind of an "arbiter" among the three branches of government, if not the fourth branch

of government. The “arbitrary nature” of the powers of the head of state in the conditions of semi-presidentialism conceptually (within the framework of the idea of the “president-arbiter”) has found a primary and initial reflection in the theory and practice of French constitutionalism, in particular in an attempt to determine the problematic nature of the personalisation of power in political systems (Dobry 1992: 261). The point is that the political arbitration of the head of state has been speculated before and during the formation of the Third Republic in France, that is in the 1970s. At that time, the content of the concept of “the presidential arbitration” was associated with the inadmissibility of the appropriation by a president (“arbiter” or “neutral force”, from French *“pouvoir neutre”*) the role of the leader of parliamentary majority and the head of cabinet (Bahro, Bayerlein and Veser 1998). The role of the “president-arbiter” was likened to the functions of a sports referee, who should not interfere in the activities of the state mechanism and its separate parts, but instead should do it in the exceptional cases when the crisis situation arose and deepened. Therefore, the “arbitrary nature” of semi-presidentialism was explained by the desire of constitutionalists to limit the power of a strong president under the conditions of presidentialism and to displace the constitutional system of government in the direction of parliamentarism. As a result, semi-presidentialism has become a very widespread constitutional choice and type in many countries of Europe and the world, in particular against the background of acute confrontation between the supporters of various “classical” systems of government (i.e. presidentialism and parliamentarism), actually becoming their “golden mean”.

With the passage of time and as a consequence of various inter-institutional relations, a different understanding of the head of state as an institution, which provides the normal functioning of public authorities, appears as a “mediator” among the branches of state power, the state and society, guarantees the functioning of various political institutions, ensures succession and interaction of public authorities, organises the normal functioning of legislative, executive and judicial powers, realises the coordinated functioning of all spheres of state power and the responsibility of the authorities to the people (regardless of the “strength” of presidents’ powers), became the political and legal consequence and reflection of the concept of “the presidential arbitration” in semi-presidentialism. This was due to the fact that president’s power was based on popular elections, and therefore a president had to have a much higher degree of legitimacy (arranging various controversial social interests) than a parliament and parliamentary parties, on the contrary (Bahro, Bayerlein and Veser 1998). Therefore, the president, even in spite of the risks of Bonapartism (Bayerlein 1996), had to “counter-balance” and “neutralise” socio-political and inter-institutional contradictions in the conditions of semi-presidentialism (Bahro 1996). At the same time, the understanding of “the presidential arbitration” was initially very categorical and ambiguous, since, on the one hand, it was predetermined by the position of the “strong enough” head of state, although, on the other hand, the institution of a “strong enough” president is not available in all semi-presidential countries. Only in the course of time there were grounds to argue that “the presidential arbitration” is not a measure of the strength of presidential powers, but rather the presidential opportunity to be “over” other institutions and branches of power.

This means that the “arbitrary nature” and attributability of the president’s institution is a systematic feature of semi-presidentialism, even regardless of the approach (classical or Duvergerian and post-classical/modern or post-Duvergerian) of its defining. Although, on the other hand, “the presidential arbitration” is not distinctively a function of only semi-presidentialism, since it is also inherent in other systems of government and does not claim to be an exhaustive indicator of a certain constitutional and political type. However, the feature of “the presidential arbitration” under semi-presidentialism (for example, unlike presidentialism) is that the head of state is not a formalised branch of government or belongs to it (in particular, to the executive vertical) only partially. As a result, the doctrine, according to which president as the head of state is taken out of the classical “legislature – executive – judiciary” triad and instead acts as an “arbiter” that “flouts above” all political institutions and thus ensures the stable implementation of inter-institutional relations in accordance with the law, constitutes the theoretical basis of “the presidential arbitration” in semi-presidentialism (Chernov 2008). In essence, it is about the emergence of a new, that is the fourth, branch of power, i.e. arbitral, presidential or protective one, which is inherent only for semi-presidentialism. Consequently, all countries with semi-presidential system of government have adopted the concept of the arbitration functions of presidents as the head of states in one or another interpretation. However, the definition of semi-presidentialism based on the designs of “the presidential arbitration” is not entirely appropriate, since externally similar cases of semi-presidentialism can fundamentally and critically differ by many specific attributes and characteristics.

In addition, the understanding of a president as an “arbiter” or “neutral force” does not give any grounds to state that semi-presidentialism is a form of parliamentarism (Veser 1997). A president in parliamentarism is often endowed with the so-called “reserve powers”, which can be used in the event of a deadlock or conflict situation between the institutions of parliament and cabinet. Such powers are based on the assumption that political institutions usually operate without the need for intervention of the head of state. Thus “the presidential arbitration” under parliamentarism is conditional, because a president, being elected in parliament and not popularly, to a greater extent serves as a tool for supporting the executive, which is also delegated by parliament. This reveals the main difference between parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism, since presidents in the conditions of semi-presidentialism are independent political actors, and therefore they can play an active role not only in the case of inter-institutional crises, but also in the process of cabinet formation. Moreover, “the arbitration” of presidents in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is manifested in the fact that they are popularly elected, represent the “entire nation”, are empowered to regulate conflicting public interests, and therefore concentrate one of the most important functions of any state.

At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that a president under semi-presidentialism may not use his or her ability to be a representative of all citizens, and instead acts in disintegrative and polarisation manner primarily for personal political purposes and not

taking into account the social structure of the population of a state. Consequently, the “arbitrary nature” of a popularly elected president theoretically should be, but practically is not a mandatory characteristic of semi-presidentialism: on the one hand, a president must make decisions that are neutral, universal and positive; on the other hand, a president can make decisions that are primarily advantageous to him or her and his or her political party, and therefore that are specific and even negative. This means that the understanding of a president as an “arbiter” or “neutral force” theoretically is not a definitive, but rather an individual one, since it happens that a president for some reason ceases or begins to act as an “arbiter”, but such a function is not inherent for him or her traditionally. All in all, this does not make it possible to contend that “the presidential arbitration” is inherent for semi-presidentialism a priori (Veser 1997). Instead, it is often only an “illusion”, since a president in semi-presidentialism can be a political institution with its own political goals and interests, which are primarily used to protect a personal mandate. Accordingly, “the presidential arbitration” and its presence or absence depend on the directly predetermined factors, in particular the powers of presidents, and the indirectly determined factors, in particular political traditions, political culture, peculiarities of the political regime, institutional design, party and electoral system, etc. In this context, special consideration is given to the nature and way of popular election and the powers and the nature of the legitimacy of presidents, in particular in European countries, since they can additionally testify “the presidential arbitration” in the conditions of semi-presidentialism.

The Way, Features and Consequences of Elections of Presidents in the Conditions of the European Semi-Presidentialism: Empirical Cut in Majority and Minority Systems

Regardless of the approach of explanation, semi-presidentialism is defined and determined by the position of a popularly elected president whose powers are or may be one of the criteria for the typology of semi-presidentialism. However, the fact of popular election of a president does not mean that all presidents in semi-presidential republics are elected identically. There are several varieties and ways of popular election of presidents under semi-presidentialism, but not all of them hypothetically guarantee that the winner of presidential election receives an absolute rather than relative majority of votes (Lytvyn 2015). Consequently, the simplest method of classifying the popular methods of presidential elections under semi-presidentialism is to divide them into the systems of absolute and relative majority and, in turn, to take into account the peculiarities of holding elections and/or counting their results in one, two or more rounds. On the other hand, it is theoretically and methodologically important that any system of absolute majority does not necessarily have to be implemented in two rounds and instead that the system of elections in one round cannot guarantee the victory of a presidential candidate by an absolute majority of votes. This is extremely important in view of the fact that the systems of popular election of presidents under semi-presidentialism have different consequences on how

they implement and interpret the majority principle peculiar to republicanism that obviously determines the legitimacy of presidents (see table 1 for details).

Table 1. The types of electoral systems and the examples of their application for popular election of presidents in the current/ongoing cases of the European semi-presidentialism (as of December 2018)¹

The electoral systems for popular election of presidents under semi-presidentialism	The examples of the European semi-presidentialism, where the electoral systems are operationalised, verified and institutionalised (the brackets contain the information on the term of office of a president)
Two-Round System (TRS) with an absolute majority of votes. Type 1 (more than 50 percent of the valid votes of all registered voters for a candidate in the first round, otherwise the second round)	Macedonia (5), Romania (5)
Two-Round System (TRS) with an absolute majority of votes. Type 2 (more than 50 percent of the valid votes of more than 50 percent of all registered voters for a candidate in the first round, otherwise the second round)	Belarus (5), Bulgaria (5)
Two-Round System (TRS) with an absolute majority of votes. Type 3 (more than 50 percent of the valid votes of the registered voters who took part in the election for a candidate in the first round, otherwise the second round)	Austria (6), Azerbaijan (7), Croatia (5), Czech Republic (5), Finland (6), France (5), Georgia (5), Moldova (4), Montenegro (5), Poland (5), Portugal (5), Russia (6), Serbia (5), Slovakia (5), Slovenia (5), Ukraine (5)
Two-Round System (TRS) with a weakened absolute majority of votes (less than or equal to 50 percent of the valid or all registered voters, but more than any other candidate and a fixed barrier for a candidate in the first round, otherwise the second round)	Lithuania (5)
Single-Round/Plurality "First-past-the-post" (FPTP) System with a relative majority of votes (less than 50 percent of the valid votes of the registered voters for a candidate in the first and the only round, but more than any other candidate)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (4)
Single-Round/Plurality "First-past-the-post" (FPTP) System with a weakened relative majority of votes (less than 50 percent of the valid votes of the registered voters for a candidate in the first and the only round, but more than any other candidate and taking into account some additional qualification simplifications)	Iceland (4)
Preferential/Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) System (more than 50 percent of the valid preferential votes of the registered voters for a candidate in the last and decisive round of calculations)	Ireland (7)

Źródło: The table is compiled on the basis of the analysis of national constitutions and laws on presidential elections in the European semi-presidential countries (as of December 2018).

The data in Table 1 demonstrate that the two-round system (TRS) with an absolute majority of votes was used in most cases of the European semi-presidentialism for the elections

¹ As of 2018, Armenia and Turkey should no longer be treated as semi-presidential systems, in particular as a result of changing the structure of inter-institutional relations. In addition, it was known about the regulations of the change of system of government from semi-presidential to parliamentary one and of the change in the way (from popular to unpopular one) of election of a president in Georgia, but this country actually remained semi-presidential one, since the office of unpopularly elected president has not been replaced at the time of the analysis. For more information, see: Lytvyn 2015; Lytvyn 2017.

of presidents, but it has several options and can be implemented with certain complications or simplifications, that is it can acquire the format and system of a strengthened or weakened absolute majority of votes. As of December 2018, the first format of the TRS with an absolute majority of votes was a characteristic of Macedonia and Romania. It predicted that the victory in the first round of presidential elections could be given only to the candidate, who managed to get more than 50 percent of the valid votes of all registered voters. Otherwise, the second round of presidential election would be mandatory. The second format of the TRS with an absolute majority of votes is typical for Belarus and Bulgaria and suggests that the victory in the first round of presidential elections can be given only to the candidate who manages to get more than 50 percent of the valid votes of more than 50 percent of all registered voters (in other words, on condition of an electoral turnout at the level higher than 50 percent). Otherwise, the second round of election would be mandatory. Finally, the third format of the TRS with an absolute majority of votes is typical for Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine, and suggests that the victory in the first round of presidential elections can be given only to the candidate, who manages to get more than 50 percent of the valid votes of the registered voters. Otherwise, the second round of election would be mandatory. A somewhat complicated TRS with an absolute majority of votes (according to our position, the TRS with a strengthened absolute majority of votes) has been peculiar to Azerbaijan before 2002. In order to win, the candidate had to receive at least $2/3$ of the valid votes of the registered voters who took part in the election in the first round, otherwise the second round of election was mandatory (today the candidate must receive a majority from more than half of the valid votes of the registered voters in the first round of election). On the other hand, a simplified TRS with a weakened absolute majority of votes is typical for Lithuania and it simultaneously provides for two options of determining the winner of presidential election on the results of the first round: first, if at least half of all registered voters in the country take part in election, their winner should receive more than 50 percent of the valid votes; second, if less than half of all registered voters in the country take part in election, the winner should receive more votes than any other candidate, but not less than $1/3$ of all registered voters. Otherwise, the second round of election is foreseen. Another feature of the TRSs in the conditions of the European semi-presidentialism lies in the attributes of conducting and determining the results of the elections following the consequences of the second rounds. The most stringent requirements for determining the winner following the results of the second round of presidential election are in Macedonia: the winner is considered to be the person who is able to receive more than 50 percent of the valid votes of more than 50 percent of all registered voters. Much simpler rules are in Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, France, Portugal and Slovenia, where the winners of the second rounds of presidential elections must receive more than 50 percent of the valid votes. Finally, the simplest rules are in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Georgia, Lithuania,

Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine, where the winners of the second rounds of elections are obliged to get the highest number of valid votes.

Significantly simpler (at the demand of victory, turnout of voters and financially) electoral systems for popular elections of presidents are used in such semi-presidential countries as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland and Ireland. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a collective (triple) institution of presidency, which is due to a specific ethnic situation in the country (there are three large ethnic groups). Each member of the collective presidency is elected popularly on the basis of the plurality / “first-past-the-post” (FPTP) system with a relative majority of votes in the constituency, which corresponds to each ethnic group (Bochsler 2012). In Iceland, the law formally regulates the use of the FPTP system with a relative majority of votes or the so-called plurality voting system (Piolatto 2009), when the winner of presidential election needs the support of a relative majority of valid votes. However, there are several qualifying simplifications that weaken the classical FPTP system with a relative majority of votes (we tend to call it a single-round / plurality system with a weakened relative majority of votes): first, in order to run for a president, a candidate must receive the support of not less than 1,5 thousand and not more than 3 thousand voters; second, if only one candidate takes part in presidential election, then the voting procedure for this candidate is not formally foreseen and this candidate automatically becomes the head of state². This is despite the fact that the President of Iceland formally has the right to dismiss the cabinet. Finally, in Ireland, there is used the system of preferential / alternative (instant-runoff) voting in the form of a single transferable vote for popular election of president (Van der Brug, Van der Eijk and Marsh 2000). This means that voters vote exclusively in one and the only round of election, giving their preferences to different candidates. However, the calculation of the preferences of voters can take place in several stages, not necessarily guaranteeing the victory of the candidate on the basis of the majority of the first preferences for this candidate.

In general, it is noted that among all the cases of the European semi-presidentialism, taking into account the specifics of popular election of presidents, the principle of the majority (in particular, in the first round of voting or counting the votes) hypothetically or “ideally” (provided that the minimum requirements of different types of electoral systems are met) can be realised in such formats as: a) real constructions of an absolute majority when there are used electoral systems, which provide the winners of presidential elections the support of more than 50 percent of all registered voters (these usually are some TRSs with an absolute majority of votes); b) simplified constructions of an absolute majority when there are used electoral systems, which provide the winners of presidential elections the support of more than 50 percent of the valid votes, but not necessarily more than 50 percent of all registered voters (these usually are the most of the TRSs with an absolute majority of votes); c) classical constructions of a relative majority, negative majority or absolute minority when there are used electoral systems, which do not necessarily provide the winners of presidential elections the support of more than 50 percent of the valid votes and, accordingly, of more than 50 percent of all registered voters (these usually are single-round and plurality FPTP system with a relative majority of votes) (see table 2 for details).

² A similar practice in the case of nomination of a single presidential candidate is inherent in Finland and Ireland.

Table 2. The majority and minority constructions (in terms of meeting the minimum set of requirements) in the systems of popular presidential elections in the current/ongoing cases of the European semi-presidentialism (as of December 2018)

The types of constructions	The examples of the European semi-presidentialism, where the types of constructions are operationalised, verified and institutionalised
Real constructions of an absolute majority	Macedonia, Romania
Simplified constructions of an absolute majority	Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine
Classical constructions of a relative majority	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Ireland

Źródło: The table is compiled on the basis of author's own logical considerations.

In empirical terms, semi-presidential states with simplified constructions of an absolute majority are the most represented in Europe. At the same time, there is no a direct correlation between the constructions of majority and minority in the context of popular elections of presidents and the type of political regimes, since various constructions are inherent in democratic, autocratic and hybrid political regimes (Lytvyn 2015). However, it is theoretically clear that electoral systems with the constructions of majority are somewhat more effective in ensuring the democratic principle of the republican majority. Nevertheless, even they are not always able to fully ensure the principle of majority, which is traditional for semi-presidentialism and for republicanism in general. An example of the problems in the constructions of majority was demonstrated in France in the cut of the 2002 popular presidential election, when the eight centre-right parties and presidential candidates together gained over 66 percent of the valid votes in the first round of election, but none of them could get even 20 percent of the valid votes on their own, since the centre-right electorate was very fragmented. As a result, the nationalist and anti-immigrant candidate Le Pen received significant levers of influence (in particular, the right to participate in the second round of election) (Chastain 2006; Laver, Benoit and Sauger 2006), although the centre-right candidate Chirac eventually received more than 82 percent of the valid votes in the second round of election and Le Pen gained the support of less than 18 percent of the valid votes. The other side is reflected by various electoral systems, both with majority and minority constructions, which theoretically are more effective in the parallel provision of such democratic principles of republicanism as majority and consensus, although at the same time they are more problematic in the context of the political representation of voters. The fact is that such electoral systems often lead to the election of presidents who do not have the support of an absolute majority of the valid votes (the phrase “spoiler effect” is used to refer to such cases), and therefore such presidents are extremely limited in their legitimacy and do not reflect, but even violate the will of majority.

The Specifics and Logics of Popular Presidential Legitimacy Under the Conditions of the European Semi-Presidentialism: Electoral and Institutional Cuts

Accordingly, not only popular election of president, but also the way (electoral system) to elect a president are critically important for semi-presidentialism. In sum, they are able to demonstrate the level of presidential legitimacy and the influence of his or her popularly elected mandate on the system of inter-institutional relations under the conditions of semi-presidentialism. There is no doubt that the highest level of presidential legitimacy can be traced in the countries where the head of state is elected not only popularly, but directly, and this contributes to maximising the republican principle of majority (Elgie 2014). A slightly lower level of presidential legitimacy is peculiar to the countries where the head of state is elected on the basis of direct popular suffrage, but the electoral system incorporates to a lesser extent the republican principle of majority, while it appeals at the same time to the principle of consensus. This is especially true in such countries as Iceland and Ireland, where presidents are elected popularly, but political parties often, if not regularly, agree to offer the only one agreed presidential candidate, for which the popular voting procedure is constitutionally unrequired or even unregulated. For example, in Iceland, which uses FPTP system with a weakened relative majority of votes. In this country, in particular from 1944 when the current constitution was adopted (actually since 1945 (Kristjánsson 2004)) and by 2018, 19 presidential elections were held, and 11 of them were consensual and non-alternative. A similar situation arose in Ireland, which uses the system of a single transferable vote for popular election of president. In this country, in particular from 1937 when the current constitution was adopted (Gallagher 2011; Harris 2009) and by 2018, 14 presidential elections were held, and 6 of them were non-alternative or uncontested (Elgie 2011) (see table 3 for details).

Finally, the commensurate or the lowest level of presidential legitimacy hypothetically can be peculiar to semi-presidential countries (as yet, historically only) where the head of state is elected as a result of “direct-like” (“quasi-direct”) popular election, that is through a popularly/directly elected college of electors (electoral college). Previously, but versatilely and therefore with different influence on the legitimacy of the head of state, such practice was used in Finland (Arter and Widfeldt 2010; Nousiainen 2001). Two “direct-like” schemes of popular presidential elections were used in this country throughout 1919–1991 (Paloheimo 2003; Raunio 2011). Initially, in 1919–1987, the head of state was elected by a 300-mandate electoral college that was directly elected by the people (voters). Subsequently, in 1987–1991, voters directly elected the head of state and the representatives of the electoral college, but the functions of the latter were reduced (as in 1988) to the election of a president (conditionally in the second round) only in the event that none of presidential candidates received more than 50 percent of the valid votes on the basis of direct elections (conditionally in the first round). Finally, only since 1991 (and actually since 1994), voters began to elect the president of Finland within the framework of the

TRS with an absolute majority of votes. This gives all grounds to argue that the legitimacy of Finnish president, regardless of his or her powers, has grown historically (see table 3 for details).

Table 3. The institutional and procedural variability of legitimacy and the constitutional and political consequences of popular presidential elections in the current/ongoing cases of the European semi-presidentialism (as of December 2018)³

Country	The year of the first popular presidential election	The number of popular presidential elections	The average number of candidates in the first/the only round of elections	The average effective number of candidates in the first/the only round of elections	The number of elections with the only one candidate
Austria (since 1945)	1951	13	3,3	2,3	0
Azerbaijan (since 1995)	1998	5	7,8	1,5	0
Belarus (since 1996)	2001	4	5,3	1,3	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995) ⁴	1996	7	6,5	2,6	0
Bulgaria (since 1991)	1992	6	14,1	3,5	0
Croatia (since 1991)	1992	6	8,2	3,4	0
Czech Republic (since 2012)	2013	2	9,0	5,7	0
Finland (since 1919)	1925	18	6,2	3,2	0
France (since 1962)	1965	10	10,2	4,8	0
Georgia (since 2004)	2004	4	15,3	2,2	0
Iceland (since 1944)	1945	19	2,3	1,6	11
Ireland (since 1937)	1938	14	2,4	1,9	6
Lithuania (since 1992)	1993	6	7,5	3,5	0
Macedonia (since 1991)	1994	5	4,4	3,3	0
Moldova (1994–2000, since 2016)	1996	2	9,0	3,3	0
Montenegro (since 2006)	2008	3	4,3	2,2	0
Poland (since 1990)	1990	6	10,7	3,5	0
Portugal (since 1976)	1976	9	5,2	2,5	0
Romania (since 1991)	1992	6	12,0	3,7	0
Russia (since 1993)	1996	6	7,5	2,2	0
Serbia (since 2006)	2008	3	10,7	4,1	0
Slovakia (since 1999)	1999	4	10,8	3,7	0
Slovenia (since 1991)	1992	6	7,3	3,0	0
Ukraine (since 1996)	1999	4	19,0	3,5	0

Źródło: The table is compiled on the basis of own calculations. Also, the table is partially composed on the basis of Elgie's (2014) data.

Such a variation in the understanding of the legitimacy of popularly elected presidents is important, firstly, in the context of the choice of a particular institution of president and the way

³ As of 2018, it was known about the regulations of the change of system of government from semi-presidential to parliamentary one and of the change in the way (from popular to unpopular one) of election of a president in Georgia, but this country actually remained semi-presidential one, since the office of unpopularly elected president has not been replaced at the time of the analysis.

⁴ In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the data are analysed on the average for the three presidents at the same time, since there is the office of collegiate president, i.e. from the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian ethnic groups.

of its election and powers, and, secondly, in the context of choosing the system of government in general in one or another country. For example, there were lively and passionate discussions about the nature of the institution of the head of state and the model of inter-institutional relations in most of the post-communist countries of Europe. In particular, this was true for Bulgaria (Ganev 1999) and Poland (van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 1999) during the “round-table” talks and the debates on the nature of new constitutions, for Lithuania in the form of a referendum in 1992, during the presidential election in 1997 and during the procedure of impeachment of the president Paksas in 2004 (Protsyk 2005), for Moldova (in 2000 and 2016), Slovakia (in 1999) and Czechia (2012) when changing the way of electing a president (from popular to parliamentary and vice versa) (Roper 2002), for Romania as a result of excessive duties of the president, the use of the tactics of delay in the appointment of civil servants and the declaration of foreign policy statements that went against the interests of the cabinet in 2007, etc. Similar processes occurred in the countries of Western Europe. For example: in Finland, which gradually changed the ways of popular elections of presidents and led to lengthy discussions about the complete abolition of this office (Arter 1999); in Austria, which experimented with the institutions of popularly and parliamentary elected presidents (Müller 1999); in Iceland, which initially introduced the institution of indirect presidential elections, but subsequently and under pressure from the public changed it to the institution of direct elections of the head of state (Kristinsson 1999); in Ireland, which was characterised by lengthy discussions about determining the nature of presidential elections (Casey 2000). Moreover, such a variation in the dependence of the method of election and legitimacy of president politically, empirically and actually shows that the institution of popularly elected head of state necessarily is a feature of semi-presidentialism, which is able to distinguish it from presidentialism and parliamentarism (Almeida and Cho 2003; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2005). Even in the conditions of the executive dualism, that is provided that there are institutions of prime minister and cabinet (in line or in opposition to president) who are necessarily collectively responsible to legislature.

At the same time, the constitutional and political legitimisation of presidents by their popular elections in the conditions of semi-presidentialism sets an agenda of the impact of popular elections of the heads of state on political and institutional stability and the prospects for the development of democracy under the conditions of a semi-presidentialism. From the theoretical point of view, the institution of popular (especially direct) presidential elections promotes democracy and democratic institutions, since it is broadcasted through the will of the people, which is the source of legitimacy and authority of various centres of power (Schmitter and Karl ¹⁹⁹¹). But from the empirical point of view, the importance of popular elections of the heads of state is not always high, since it is operationalised within the framework of the theory of the legitimacy of power, which is not finalised by social factors (DiPalma 1990). As a result, the researchers note that the nature and framework of legitimacy are one of the least studied aspects of the dynamics of society, and therefore the actual lack of empirical studies of

legitimacy makes the institutional theory extremely vulnerable (McEwen and Maiman 1984: 258). That is why popularly (directly) elected, but officially not very powerful president can actually be much more influential on the basis of the fact that his or her powers are justified by democratic legitimacy (Lijphart 1999: 141). Moreover, a popularly elected president may significantly (actually or politically) change the formal or constitutional system of government (Tavits 2009b) and substantiate the requirements for more active participation in the issues of political process and the executive (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Baylis 1996; Metcalf 2002).

In total, this means that the institution of popularly (especially directly) elected president, specifically in the case of semi-presidentialism, inevitably leads to an increase in its political activity or presidentialisation, and the number and strength of the conflicts between the institutions and branches of government in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet / prime minister – parliament”. This is due to the fact that popularly elected heads of state are used to believe that their constitutional powers do not correspond to their nationwide mandate (Frye 1997; Hellman 1996). This fact, in turn, represents a significant danger of challenging the powers of other institutions of government (as in the cases of Ireland during the presidency of Robinson and the premiership of Haughey (Ward 1994: 316), and Bulgaria during the presidency of Zhelev who declined to nominate a candidate for prime minister from the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party, but insisted on holding an early parliamentary election in 1997 (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2005)), reducing the effectiveness of governance (as in the cases of Poland during the presidency of Walesa (Jasiewicz 1997), Lithuania during the presidency of Adamkus (Urbanavicius 1999), Romania during the presidencies of Iliescu and Băsescu (Verheijen 1999)) and/or authoritarianisation of political regime (as in the cases of Tudjman presidency in Croatia, Yanukovych presidency in Ukraine, Lukashenko presidency in Belarus, Putin presidency in Russia, Aliyev presidency in Azerbaijan, etc.). On the other hand, sometimes there are the cases of almost completely “inactive”, but popularly elected presidents in semi-presidential countries, especially in Austria, Iceland and Ireland. For example, the president of Iceland Finnbogadóttir at one time even refused to give interviews on political topics, but was almost always ready to discuss Icelandic saga or French literature (Kristinsson 1999: 92). This is despite the fact that she was elected by almost 95 per cent of the valid votes of the Icelandic voters and was also empowered to veto the controversial acts of the parliament, largely due to the fact that presidential elections in Iceland from 1952 are usually outside of the field of interests and support of major political parties, but are the sphere of competition of situational (ad hoc) interest groups (Kristinsson 1999: 99). A similar situation of presidential under-legitimisation is often traced in Austria, even though its head of state formally has rather significant constitutional powers (Müller 1999).

Accordingly, the analytical result is the fact that popularly elected president in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is a priori endowed with considerable formal legitimacy, but it can actually be embodied in a very different way. Moreover, the popular type of the president’s mandate quite often creates additional advantages and disadvantages of the political process

under semi-presidentialism. Firstly, a presidential candidate during the popular election can resort to a populist rhetoric and violate the established patterns of inter-party competition. In addition, direct presidential election often leads to the choice of a non-party person as the head of state (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). Secondly, popular presidential election is an instrument to increase the visibility and popularity of parties and generally to increase the importance of party system. Thirdly, the fact of popular presidential election can lead to an increase in the level of confrontation and generally of political or inter-institutional conflicts (Tavits 2009b: 33). Fourthly, the popular nature of presidential election, especially such an attribute as competition, can undermine the role of a president as a symbol of national unity and the leader of the nation. Fifthly, the nation-wide character of the election of president, even not a very influential one, is an additional lever for strengthening democratic practices and increasing the voters' involvement and confidence in politics (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Newton and Norris 2000), although it does not overcome the problems of majoritarianism, that is the presence of winners and losers, and is not a game with a "zero sum" (Van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh 1996).

Therefore, one can confirm the scientific position (Fruhstorfer 2016; Samuels and Shugart 2010; Tavits 2009b: 31) that the institution of popularly elected president in the conditions of the European semi-presidentialism (as of 2018, it is exclusively the institution of directly elected president) always generates the perception of the head of state as a legitimate representative of the civic will, which is reinforced by the non-collegial nature of the presidency. This, though sometimes unreasonably, forces one group of scientists (Linz 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996; Skach 2007) to notice the deadlock, riskiness and ineffectiveness of the law-making process in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, explaining this by the fact that direct presidential election is an important indicator of the dysfunctionality of political system. The second group of scholars (Tavits 2009a; Tavits 2009b) appeals to the opposite view and notes that it is difficult to find the evidence that the way of presidential election (including a popular and unpopular ones in different systems of government) systematically influences the distension of presidential activism and presidentialisation under semi-presidentialism, at least from the point of view of initiating or blocking (by the heads of the states) the legislative process, the exercise of the appointment powers, participation in external and defence policies and stimulating a "symbolic policy". Finally, the third group of researchers (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006: 643; Cheibub and Chernykh 2009: 214) points out that the phenomenon of a popularly determined presidential legitimacy under semi-presidentialism can affect only some political institutions and some inter-institutional relations, in particular the stability of cabinets and the increase in the proportion of non-party ministers in cabinets, as well as generally the number and frequency of non-party/technocratic cabinets, which contribute primarily to the implementation of political and electoral goals of the heads of states (this is especially true in the cases of semi-presidentialism with very strong presidents (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006)). However, even such

a limited sample of political institutions that are subjected to the legitimacy of popularly elected presidents is quite critical under the conditions of semi-presidentialism. Since the system of government can begin to critically influence the political process and socio-political life, especially when such a situation concerns the revision or rejection of the principles of mainly party cabinets' parliamentary accountability. The scientists who agree that the proximity of presidential election does not have any independent influence on the parliamentary and party system, nor the influence that depends on other institutional variables, adhere to this conclusion (Elgie et al. 2014: 475). Instead, it is crucial to take into account the strength and list of powers of popularly elected presidents in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. Since, these are the presidential powers that structurally determines the presidential elections' campaigns and the risks of losing mandates by the heads of states (Fruhstorfer 2016), and which are crucial for structuring the inter-institutional relations in the triangle "the head of state – cabinet / prime minister – parliament".

The Formal Powers of Presidents Under the Conditions of the European Semi-Presidentialism: Institutional and Procedural Cuts

The scientists (Elgie 1999b; Elgie 2004; Elgie 2016) note that a set of presidential powers (in particular, their variability) can have a significant effect on the formal and actual perception and positioning of semi-presidential system of government, including in the countries of Europe. Accordingly, the variability and dispersion of presidential powers and activities can certify the variability and typology of semi-presidential system of government (Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg 2014: 539; Fruhstorfer 2016). The proposed analytical logics corresponds to a theoretical and methodological observation that it is more appropriate to know about inter-institutional relations on the basis of information about the century and the region when the constitution is written rather than on the basis of the fact that certain countries have the same type of system (Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg 2014: 537). In addition, such logics is justified in view of the observation that the presidentialisation of political system under the conditions of semi-presidentialism is not a static one, but rather changes over time, in particular due to the variability in the powers of the heads of states placed in the plane between the types of hegemonic and limited presidents (Duverger 1996).

This conclusion led most scholars to take into account the three main variables of the powers of the heads of states in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, that is the constitutional powers of presidents, the constitutional context of the systems of government, the relations of presidents with parliamentary majority, and to allocate the two sets of presidential powers, i.e. constitutional (formal, institutional and procedural) and political (actual, political and behavioural) ones (Cheibub 2009a; Cheibub 2009b; Choudhry and Stacey 2013; Elgie 2009; Elgie and Passarelli 2018). However, these sets of presidential powers often are subjective and relational, because researchers are different in their categorisation, operationalisation and distinguishing between the more or less important presidential powers. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the relevant set of constitutional and

political powers of presidents, their filling and systematisation with real content in the conditions of semi-presidentialism.

Speaking about the constitutional powers of presidents under semi-presidentialism, we are guided by the remark that they are traditionally divided into several groups, in particular the allocative/nominating, terminating/discretionary, rule-making, political, defensive, foreign, symbolic, etc. However, some powers of presidents in the conditions of semi-presidentialism are the main ones, since they, being at the intersection of inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – cabinet / prime minister – parliament”, can reflect the dynamics and even the nature of the system of government, and may theoretically/hypothetically lead to the typology of semi-presidentialism. Among them are the powers that verify the president’s possibility or impossibility to: officially nominate the head of cabinet/prime minister; officially initiate or confirm the resignation of the head of cabinet/prime minister; officially nominate or approve the composition of cabinet; dismiss certain members of cabinet; independently dismiss the entire composition of cabinet; dissolve parliament (its chamber) and appoint early parliamentary elections; independently convene extraordinary sessions of parliament; have the right of legislative initiative; issue decrees with the force of law; promulgate, veto and verify the constitutionality of parliamentary acts; independently initiate a referendum; to represent state in foreign policy; be commander in chief of the armed forces; be subjected to the procedure of impeachment from the parliament side.

As evidenced by the legal documents (primarily by the constitutions) of the European semi-presidential countries (in particular, as of December 2018, see table 4 for details), the requirement of official nomination of the head of cabinet/prime minister by a president is peculiar to all countries with the exception of Finland. Instead, the president’s ability to officially initiate the resignation of the head of cabinet is inherent in such semi-presidential countries as Belarus, Finland, Czechia, Iceland, Lithuania, Portugal, and the president’s ability to confirm the resignation of the head of cabinet is peculiar to Austria, Azerbaijan, Ireland, Poland and Russia. The presidents of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Iceland, Poland and Portugal are authorised to nominate the composition of cabinets, and the presidents of Austria, Czechia, Finland, France, Lithuania, Romania, Russia and Slovakia have the right to approve the composition of cabinets. Thus, the presidents of almost half of the European semi-presidential countries, in particular of Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czechia, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Russia and Slovakia, may unilaterally dismiss certain members of cabinet offices. Regarding the presidential possibility to resign the entire composition of cabinets, these powers are currently peculiar to such European semi-presidential countries as Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Iceland and Russia, although historically they were typical for other ongoing cases of semi-presidentialism in the region, in particular for Croatia (until 2000), Georgia (until 2013), Portugal (until 1982), Ukraine (in 1996–2006 and 2010–2014) and partially for Finland (until 1999). The possibility of the head of state to dissolve parliament and appoint early parliamentary elections is unlikely

only for the cases of semi-presidentialism in Macedonia and Finland. Instead, the possibility of the head of state to independently convene extraordinary parliamentary sessions is not specific only to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, France, Georgia, Macedonia, Poland, Serbia and Slovakia. Presidents have no the right of legislative initiative in all the European cases of semi-presidentialism with the exception of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Instead, presidents are obliged to promulgate laws and have the right to veto parliamentary acts in all cases of the European semi-presidentialism with the exception of Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, and partly Bulgaria and Macedonia. In the Czech Republic, such procedures are carried out simultaneously by the president and the head of cabinet. In turn, presidents can initiate the verification of the constitutionality of parliamentary acts in all semi-presidential countries of Europe with the exception of Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia.

However, it is noteworthy that the way of overcoming the presidential veto of the acts of parliament is quite different. The rule “1/2 of the legislature + 1 MP” is currently used in Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Georgia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Portugal (along with the rule “2/3 of the legislature”), Serbia and Slovakia. The rule “3/5 of the legislature” is currently operated exclusively in Poland (by 2013 this rule was also used in Georgia). The rule “2/3 of the legislature” is used in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine (until 1997 the rule was also acted in Poland). The specificity of Montenegro is that the presidential veto generates the need for the adoption of a parliamentary act repeatedly. Finally, the presidential veto cannot be overcome in Croatia, France and Ireland. Regarding the presidents’ possibility to issue decrees with the force of law, these powers are not specific to Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czechia, Ireland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. Instead, there is no opportunity for the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Georgia, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia to initiate referendums on their own. Presidents are the representatives of foreign policy actually in all cases of the European semi-presidentialism with the exception of Ireland, where these functions are given exclusively for cabinet, and Finland and Georgia, where these functions are simultaneously assigned to presidents and the heads of cabinets or cabinets in general. Almost identically, presidents are the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces in all semi-presidential countries of Europe with the exception of Iceland. Presidents are not authorised to sign international treaties in such semi-presidential countries of Europe as Ireland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Serbia and Slovenia. On the other hand, the international treaties signed by the presidents do not require ratification in Czechia, France, Macedonia and Poland. Finally, the presidential impeachment is not regulated only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although in general this procedure is highly differentiated (it may require 1/3, 1/2, 3/5, 2/3 or 3/4 of the parliament, the leading chamber of parliament, two chambers of parliament, referendum or just a court decision) (Choudhry and Stacey 2013).

Table 4. A set of main constitutional powers of popularly elected presidents and their descriptors in the current/ongoing cases of the European semi-presidentialism (as of December 2018)⁵

Country (the year of introduction of semi-presidentialism)	The requirement for the official nomination of the head of cabinet by the president	The possibility of initiation / confirmation of the resignation of the head of cabinet by the president	The possibility of official nomination / approval of the composition of the cabinet by the president	The ability of the president to dismiss certain members of cabinet	The ability of the president to independently dismiss the entire cabinet	The president's ability to dissolve the parliament and appoint its election	The possibility of the president to convene extraordinary parliamentary sessions independently	Authorisation of the president by the law of legislative initiative	The way and the part of the legislature to overcome the legislative veto of the president	The president's ability to issue decrees with the force of law	The president's ability to initiate a referendum independently	The possibility of impeachment of the president
Austria (1945)	Yes (70)	No / Yes (70.1)	No / Yes (70.1)	Yes (70.1, 74.1)	Yes	Yes (29)	Yes (28.2)	No (41)	There is no veto	No	Yes (46, 49)	Yes (60, 6)
Azerbaijan (1995)	Yes (118.1)	No / Yes (95.114, 109.4, 109.5)	Yes / No (95.114, 109.5, 114.1)	Yes (109.5)	Yes	Yes (98.1)	Yes (88.2)	Yes (96.1)	2/3 (110.2, 94.2)	Yes (113, 120)	Yes (95.1.18, 109.18)	Yes (107)
Belarus (1996)	Yes (106)	Yes / No (84, 106)	Yes / No (84.7)	Yes (106)	Yes	Yes (94, 106)	Yes (95)	Yes (99)	2/3 (100)	Yes (85)	Yes (74)	Yes (88)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995)	Yes (5.4)	No / No (5.4.C)	No / No (5.4)	No (5.4.C)	No	Yes (29)	Not specified	Not specified	There is no veto	No	No	No
Bulgaria (1991)	Yes (84.6, 99.1)	No / No (89.1, 112)	No / No (84, 99, 108)	No (84, 89, 111, 112)	No	Yes (99.5, 99.7)	Yes (78)	No (87.1)	1/2 + 1 MP (101)	Yes (102, 114)	No (84.5, 98.1)	Yes (97, 103, 149)
Croatia (1991)	Yes (109)	No / No (115)	Yes / No (109)	No	No	Yes (77, 103)	Yes (78)	No (84)	Cannot be overcome	Yes (87, 102)	Yes (80, 86, 97)	Yes (104)
Czech Republic (2012)	Yes (68.2)	Yes / No (62.A, 72, 73)	No / Yes (62.A, 68.2)	Yes (62, 72, 74)	No	Yes (35.1)	Yes (34, 62.B)	No (41.2)	1/2 + 1 MP (50.2)	No (78)	Yes (10A, 62.1)	Yes (65.2)
Finland (1919)	No (61)	Yes / No (64, 43, 44)	No / Yes (61)	Yes (64)	No	No	No (33)	No (70)	1/2 + 1 MP (78)	Yes (80)	No (53)	Yes (55, 113)
France (1962)	Yes (8)	No / No (49)	No / Yes (8)	No	No	Yes (12)	No (29)	No (39)	Cannot be overcome	Yes (16, 38)	No (11)	Yes (68)
Georgia (2004)	Yes (73.1, 80.2)	No / No	No / No (78.3, 79.5, 80.8)	No (79.5, 81)	No	Yes (50.3, 51, 73.4)	No (61)	No (67)	1/2 + 1 MP (68.4)	Yes (73)	No (74)	Yes (63, 75)
Iceland (1944)	Yes (17)	Yes / No	Yes / No (14, 15)	Yes (14, 15)	Yes	Yes (24)	Yes (23)	No (38)	Not specified	Yes (28)	No	Yes (11)

⁵ The brackets contain the articles of the constitutions regulating the designated powers of popularly elected presidents in semi-presidential countries of Europe.

Ireland (1937)	Yes (13.1.1)	No / Yes (28.10)	No / No	No	No	Yes (13.2.1)	Yes (13.2.3)	No (20)	Cannot be overcome	No	No (27.1)	Yes (12.10)
Lithuania (1992)	Yes (92, 84.4)	Yes / No (67.9, 84.5, 101)	No / Yes (92)	Yes (84.9, 101)	No	Yes (58, 84.20, 87)	Yes (64, 84.19)	Yes (68)	1/2 + 1 MP (72)	Yes (85, 142, 144)	No (9, 67, 69)	Yes (74, 86-88)
Macedonia (1991)	Yes (90)	No / No (92)	No / No (90)	No (92, 94)	No	No (63)	Not specified	No (71)	1/2 + 1 MP (75)	No (126)	No (68, 73)	Yes (87)
Moldova (2016)	Yes (98.1)	No / No (106)	No / No (98.2, 98.3)	Yes (98.6, 103.2, 106.1)	No	Yes (85)	Yes (67.2)	Yes (73)	Not specified	Yes (94, 106.2)	Yes (66, 72, 88)	Yes (81.3, 89)
Montenegro (2006)	Yes (82.12, 95.5, 103)	No / No (82.12, 91, 106, 107)	No / No (82.12, 91, 103)	No (82.12, 91, 105, 107)	No	Yes (92)	Yes (90)	No (93)	The adoption of an act retroactively (94)	No (101)	Yes (93)	Yes (98)
Poland (1990/1997)	Yes (154)	No / Yes (158.1)	Yes / No (154.1)	No (156.2, 159)	No	Yes (98.4, 98.5, 144.3.3, 225)	Not specified	Yes (118.1, 118.2)	3/5 (122.5, 121.3)	No	Yes (125.2)	Yes (145)
Portugal (1976)	Yes (187.1)	Yes / No (186.4, 192-195)	Yes / No	Yes (133H, 133G, 195.2G)	No	Yes (133.E)	Yes (174.2, 174.3)	No (167.1)	1/2 + 1 MP and 2/3 (136.2, 136.3)	Yes (122.4, 136.4, 169, 198.1, 200.1)	Yes (115.1, 156.2, 240)	Yes (130)
Romania (1991)	Yes (103)	No / No (113)	No / Yes (85)	Yes (85, 113)	No	Yes (89)	Yes (66.2)	No (74)	Not specified	Yes (100)	Yes (90)	Yes (95)
Russia (1993)	Yes (111.1)	No / Yes (117.3)	No / Yes (112.2)	Yes (83.E, 117)	Yes	Yes (84.B, 109)	Yes (99.2)	Yes (104.1)	2/3 (107.3)	Yes (90.1)	Yes (84.3, 135.3)	Yes (93.1)
Serbia (2006)	Yes (112.3, 127)	No / No (130, 131)	No / No (127)	No (130)	No	Yes (109)	No (106, 200)	No (107, 123.4)	1/2 + 1 MP (113)	No	No (108)	Yes (118)
Slovakia (1999)	Yes (102.1.G, 110.1)	No / No (114.1, 115, 116)	No / Yes (109, 111)	Yes (102.1.G, 116)	No	Yes (102.1.E)	No (82)	No (87)	1/2 + 1 MP (84.3, 87)	No (120)	No (96)	Yes (106)
Slovenia (1991)	Yes (111)	No / No (116, 119)	No / No (112)	No (112)	No	Yes (111, 117)	Yes (85)	No (88)	There is no veto	Yes (108)	No (90)	Yes (109)
Ukraine (1996)	Yes (114)	No / No (115)	No / No (114)	No (87, 115)	No	Yes (90, 106.8)	Yes (83)	Yes (93)	2/3 (94)	No	Yes (72)	Yes (111)

Źródło: The table is composed on the basis of constitutions and own considerations.

However, the mere separation and comparison of the constitutional powers of the heads of states in the European semi-presidential countries is not informative in the context of a systematic and comprehensive explanation of presidential powers as an attribute and feature of semi-presidentialism. In particular, some semi-presidential countries in Europe are characterised by an institution of a formally weak, strong or intermediate head of state, and therefore their systems of inter-institutional relations intuitively tend to shift to parliamentarism (when the main role is played not by the executive headed by president, but by the parliament, which election defines the “face” of the system of government) or presidentialism (when the election and powers of parliament, according to their legitimacy, are not compared with the election and powers of president, which actually concentrates the entire political process), or are positioned as semi-presidential ones (when the balance and dualism of the executive and the institutions of president, parliament and prime minister are common) (Zaznaev 2007: 160–161; Zaznaev 2014a). However, these features of the intuitive perception of semi-presidentialism are hard to formulate in a finalised and reasoned way. In order to remedy the situation, Political Science uses an index (quantitative) analysis of the powers of presidents (Zaznaev 2014b; Zaznaev 2015), which we systematically extrapolate exclusively to semi-presidential countries of Europe. The need to systematise the quantitative calculations of the powers of presidents is due to the fact that there are lots of methods for this (Armingeon and Careja 2008; Baylis 1996; Duverger 1980; Fortin 2013; Fruhstorfer 2016; Frye 1997; Johannsen and Norgaard 2003; Krouwel 2003; McGregor 1994; Metcalf 2000; Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003; Taghiyev 2006; Zaznaev 2007), but all of them are characterised by diverse theoretical, methodological and empirical “drawbacks” in counting and comparability, as well as by unsystematic and incomplete empirical results (partly see table 5 for details).

Even though some of these methods analyse institutional and procedural attributes, and some of them are focused on political and behavioural attributes of the constitutional powers of presidents (Magni-Berton 2013), they are subjected to such a disadvantage as too weak correlation (Elgie 2009), resulting in being over-subjective. The situation is complicated by the intuitive perception of the powers of popularly elected heads of states in specific semi-presidential countries. Since it often happens, especially during the periods of political crises and inter-institutional contradictions, that presidents or prime ministers (depending on the case) are positioned as being more responsible for the socio-economic situation, and therefore their election and appointment are economically determined (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2000; Magalhaes and Fortes 2005). In order to correct the above-mentioned defects (Fortin 2013) and to complement existing approaches to comparative analysis of presidential powers, it is proposed to use the synthetic methodology by Doyle and Elgie (2016), which represents two normalised methods of averaged measure of presidential powers based on the techniques of other scholars (see table 5 for details).

Table 5. Comparative analysis of constitutional powers of presidents in the current/ongoing cases of the European semi-presidentialism (as of December 2018)

Country	Technique by Frye (1997). Max = 27 points	Technique by Siaroff (2003). Max = 9 points	Technique by Zaznaev (2007). Max = 10 points	Technique by Armingeon and Careja (2008). Max = 29 points	Synthetic technique by Doyle and Elgie (2015). Method 1. Max = 1 point	Synthetic technique by Doyle and Elgie (2015). Method 2. Max = 1 point	Own technique (2018). Max = 18 points
Austria	Not analysed	1	3,0	Not analysed	0,092	0,346	9,5
Azerbaijan	Not analysed	Not analysed	8,0	20,0	0,699	0,882	15,5
Belarus	15,0	7	8,5	22,5	0,615	1,000	15,5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	0,284	0,375	6,5
Bulgaria	10,0	3	3,5	12,0	0,183	0,293	9,5
Croatia	14,5	4	2,5	10,5	0,291	0,372	10,5
Czech Republic	4,75	1	Not analysed	11,0	0,257	0,270	10
Finland	Not analysed	2	2,0	Not analysed	0,050	0,269	7,5
France	Not analysed	7	5,0	Not analysed	0,131	0,465	10,5
Georgia	16,0	7	7,5	17,0	0,557	0,366	8,5
Iceland	Not analysed	1	1,5	Not analysed	0,325	0,846	10,5
Ireland	Not analysed	3	1,5	Not analysed	0,062	0,293	7,5
Lithuania	12,0	4	4,0	13,5	0,282	0,380	11,5
Macedonia	6,5	4	2,5	8,0	0,116	0,156	5
Moldova	13,0	2	Not analysed	12,5	0,288	0,341	11
Montenegro	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	8
Poland	13,0	3	4,5	13,5	0,241	0,443	11
Portugal	Not analysed	3	3,5	Not analysed	0,197	0,543	12,5
Romania	14,0	5	2,5	13,0	0,250	0,463	12
Russia	18,0	7	9,0	20,5	0,561	0,784	15,5
Serbia	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	Not analysed	6
Slovakia	5,0	2	3,0	12,0	0,189	0,314	9,5
Slovenia	5,5	1	2,0	4,5	0,118	0,169	7,5
Ukraine	15,0	7	5,0	16,5	0,329	0,350	11,5

Źródło: The table is compiled on the basis of existing data from several studies and own calculations. For more details see: Armingeon and Careja 2008; Doyle and Elgie 2016; Frye 1997; Siaroff 2003.

Applying several methods of systematic and comprehensive study of the powers of presidents in the cases of the European semi-presidentialism (see table 5 for details), as well as appealing to principal and systematic powers of the heads of states in the sample of countries (see table 4 for details), it was found (as of December 2018) that the strongest presidents were a characteristic of Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, and somewhat weaker president was inherent to Ukraine. In turn, constitutionally the weakest presidents were typical for Finland, Ireland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, and somewhat stronger (but generally weak) presidents were the norm for Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czechia, Iceland and Slovakia. Finally, the presidents of Croatia, France, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal and Romania were endowed with interim constitutional powers. On the basis of the results obtained from the terms of presidential offices in the European semi-presidential countries (see table 1 for details), it is quite obvious that the constitutional powers of presidents are improving (i.e. the constitutional powers of the heads of states increase due to their prolongation) in Austria, Finland, Russia (elections for six years), Azerbaijan and Ireland (elections for seven years), but are worsening (i.e. the constitutional powers of the heads of states decrease due to their terminal reduction) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland and Moldova (elections for four years). In sum, this allows to argue that even with a set of purely constitutional powers of presidents, the European semi-presidentialism is extremely heterogeneous and variational, ranging from the situations of similarity to parliamentarism to the situations of similarity to presidentialism (Elgie 2009), etc.

The Actual Powers and Activism of Presidents Under the Conditions of the European Semi-Presidentialism: Political and Behavioural Cuts

However, the comparative analysis of the formal (constitutional) powers of the heads of states in the conditions of the European semi-presidentialism and the imposition of this analysis's consequences on the peculiarities of political practice in different parts of the region certify that constitutional features of semi-presidentialism are not sufficient for outlining inter-institutional relations in the triangle "the head of state – cabinet / prime minister – parliament" and for explanation of the real political and behavioural state of affairs (Cheibub 2009a). A similar conclusion is observed by researchers (Rogov and Snegovaya 2009) who point out that the analysis of the real political weight of party and parliamentary systems, which can be evaluated both by formal and informal criteria (among which the presence or absence of counter-balances in the form of a parliament is more important than a set of formal and informal powers of presidents), is more productive in determining the real powers of presidents in the conditions of semi-presidentialism than taking account the volume of presidential constitutional prerogatives (since the latter are often supplemented by personal and informal institutions and practices). This is especially true when constitutions and laws (in particular, the provisions that regulate inter-institutional relations) of some countries are very similar if not identical ones, but political

practice is not the same if not controversial one. The reverse situation (however, occasionally) occurs when constitutional norms refer to one particular set of powers of heads of states or other political institutions, but political practice testifies to a completely different set of powers. All this gives rise to the need to supplement and compare the constitutional (formal) powers of presidents with their political (actual) powers under the conditions of semi-presidentialism.

It is noteworthy that the political powers of presidents under semi-presidentialism are more determined “from the outside”, because they depend on the constitutional powers of the heads of states, constituent context and historical traditions of the systems of government, as well as on the relations between presidents and parliaments (parliamentary majority or minority). If the first two are more or less clear and unambiguous, then the inter-institutional relations between presidents and legislatures are not so clear and unified (Duverger 1996: 511). Since inter-institutional relations in political process are determined primarily by political means, that is on the basis of party and political configuration of relations between the heads of states, prime ministers and parliaments/the leading chambers of parliaments, thus determining the political influences and powers of each of these institutions. In this regard, the political powers of president in the conditions of semi-presidentialism depend on the synthesis, on the one hand, of presidential formal powers and historical traditions of rule, and, on the other hand, on the relations between the head of state and political parties, which combine or do not combine the parliamentary majority while guaranteeing or not guaranteeing the support to cabinet. Such logics forces scientists to distinguish among three basic scenarios of presidential political behaviour in the conditions of semi-presidentialism: 1) when president is the leader of parliamentary majority; 2) when president acts against the parliamentary majority headed by prime minister; 3) when president is a disciplined member of parliamentary majority and combine his or her leadership potential with the potential of prime minister. These three baseline scenarios are outlined by three indicative angles of inter-institutional relations (Elgie 2009): 1) president and prime minister (with cabinet) are supported by an identical majority or minority in legislature; 2) president and prime minister belong to different parties, but the representatives of the president’s party are not the part of the composition of cabinet; 3) president and prime minister belong to different parties that are partners of the cabinet coalition.

Consequently, the political structuring of the powers of presidents and other political actors in the framework of semi-presidentialism is a function of party system and inter-party competition. That is why the degree of political influence of the head of state on political system/system of government and political power of president are variational, since they depend on the presence or absence and the design/composition of parliamentary majority. This means that political powers of the heads of states and the peculiarities and constructions of their relations with other institutions under semi-presidentialism may also be determined by the absence of parliamentary majority, but rather by the formation of minority cabinets and their situational or formal support in legislatures. The fact is that the situations of parliamentary

minority substantially change the formats and variants of inter-institutional relations and the potential for leadership of certain political institutions. In particular, there is a possible option when the head of state, given the formation of a minority cabinet, is endowed with the largest leadership potential among other political institutions (albeit with smaller leadership potential than in the case of majority cabinets) (Skach 2005: 17). Since the head of state is able to receive large dividends from a situation where neither a president, nor a prime minister, nor any party or coalition has a significant majority in legislature, because the probability of political and institutional destabilisation and the intervention of the head of state or any other actor into political process increases on the basis of these institutions' reserve powers (Skach 2005: 17–18) (as in Georgia in the early 1990s). Instead, political powers of presidents in the conditions of absence of parliamentary majority and presence of minority cabinets are more often weaker than their constitutional prerogatives, since the heads of states are under pressure to find themselves beyond the framework of constitutionality (Duverger 1996: 515) (as in Ukraine in the late 1990s and in the mid-2000s).

Similarly, the opposition of popularly elected president to the parliamentary majority commonly headed by prime minister does not mean that the head of state is always weaker than the head of cabinet. In addition, the combination of the leadership potential of the head of state and prime minister in a situation, when the head of state is a disciplined member of parliamentary majority, does not mean that president cannot act against the will of prime minister and cabinet as a whole (Elgie 2009). Moreover, the powers of presidents may be weaker than the powers of prime ministers, even when the former relies on parliamentary majority, which guarantees the support of the latter and its cabinet from the same party. The fact is that a prime minister but not a president from the same party can be the leader of the party of parliamentary majority and vice versa (as in Russia during the presidency of Medvedev and the premiership of Putin). All this regulates that taking into account the positions of presidents and other institutions in party (intraparty) hierarchy is essential in determining their political powers in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. Moreover, the hypothetical consideration of the possibility that neither president nor prime minister is the head of parliamentary majority's party is also a significant factor in the structuring of inter-institutional relations in this regard (as in Poland during the presidency of Duda and the premiership of Szydło who were the representatives of PiS). Since political leadership in such system of government is informalised "from the outside", in particular by the first person in the party hierarchy, even though this person does not necessarily have to be endowed with any official position (as Kaczyński as the leader of PiS at the same time). The situation is diversified by the fact that not all presidents and not all prime ministers are affiliated or related to certain political (especially parliamentary) parties.

In sum, this argues that the contours of political powers of presidents under the conditions of semi-presidentialism are located at the inter-section of formal and informal inter-institutional relations of political actors, which are conditioned by the attributes of inter-party,

intra-party and non-party competition within legislatures and which need to be imposed on the formal powers of political actors and the historical traditions of the rule of each of them. In other words, political powers of the heads of states and other political actors in the conditions of semi-presidentialism are simultaneously determined formally (constitutionally), institutionally, procedurally, politically (actually), behaviourally, partyly, electorally, personally and so on, and cannot be defined as statically established and exclusively normatively determined (Cheibub 2009a; Cheibub 2009b). Such a conclusion is particularly relevant in the case when constitutional powers of president and other political institutions in semi-presidentialism are maximally balanced and even dualised or when certain powers of political institutions are very weakly constitutionally and legally regulated. Although it is also the case that the actual problem may be manifested even in the case of clearly and constitutionally structured powers of political institutions, which in practice, taking into account political tradition and multi-directional personalisation of power (not only in non-democratic regimes), function completely inappropriately to legislative norms. As a result, the real powers of political institutions are often established and operationalised exclusively or mainly in political practice, which is the reason for raising the question of presidential activism or presidentialisation (as a difference of practice from the norm) under the conditions of semi-presidentialism.

As scientists point out (Hlousek 2013: 252–255; Poguntke and Webb 2005; Tavits 2009b), presidential activism can acquire different forms, but it is generally understood as the intensive use by a president of his or her discretionary powers. These powers vary according to national legislation and political practice, but often focus on the authorities of presidents to approve or veto parliamentary acts, to discuss political issues with the executive or foreign leaders, to interfere in the process of cabinet formation, etc. The specificity of semi-presidential countries is also that their constitutions and other normative acts often leave a room for interpretation in the regulation of powers of the heads of states (Poguntke and Webb 2005). As a result, presidents often try to exercise their discretionary powers in situations that are not directly regulated by law. Presidential activism is complemented by the fact that the heads of states can influence the system of inter-institutional relations on the basis of informal ability to stand out in politics, in particular through certain statements and positions on various socio-political processes that draw attention to certain problems in society and thus establish a political agenda. Moreover, presidential activism is multifaceted, since the heads of states can influence both internal public opinion and international impressions of the country. It is supplemented by the fact that the heads of states often use greater (or popular) legitimacy in the structure of the executive dualism compared to prime ministers, and therefore presidents try to substantiate their demands for active participation in political process. On the other hand, this does not necessarily imply an increase in the effectiveness of political process, since the popularly determined mandate of the head of state is only a guarantee of a specific constitutional mandate and tasks of president and presidential independence from legislature, rather than a guarantee of free governance and

reducing the conflict in the system of the executive dualism (Samuels and Shugart 2006). This suggests that the degree of consensus between president and other institutions takes into account the significant differences between the nominal and actual powers of the former (Tavits 2009a; Tavits 2009b). This is important, because the presidential ability to intensify in the conditions of semi-presidentialism depends on the limits of political process, which are the direct result of structuring the political capacities of different institutions. Depending on the change in the latter, the scope of political process can be compressed or expanded, influencing changes in the incentives of presidential activism.

In total, the active use of constitutional powers with support in legislatures and informal influence by presidents can significantly change the dynamics of political process (Stepan and Suleiman 1995). However, presidents are completely free “agents” in pursuing personal interests and political preferences under the conditions of semi-presidentialism. Therefore, the heads of states in semi-presidentialism are more likely to act within the existing realities of institutional and party structures (especially with regard to formation, support and types of cabinets), which restrict or extend the behaviour and choice of the former (Hlousek 2013: 252–255). For example, presidential activism increases when other political institutions (primarily cabinets) are relatively weak (and their relations are weakly interconnected) or when they have relatively weak party and parliamentary support. It is mainly about the situations of the formation and functioning of minority cabinets, which are oppositional to the heads of states, and the situations of excessively fragmented legislatures, which help presidents to effectively use their discretionary and reserve powers. In particular, when presidents feel “hostility” to other political institutions and their party and parliamentary support, and thus firstly try to pursue their political goals. Instead, if a president who does not have the support of parliamentary majority (regardless of its fragmentation) is opposed by a prime minister and cabinet who have consistent support of the majority of deputies of legislature, then the former (even with significant constitutional powers) remains a significantly weaker figure in political process and inter-institutional relations (Movchan and Rabotyagova 2010). Finally, even such a position is not perfect, since presidential (not necessarily reserve, but rather stationary) powers are often activated within the conditions of single-party or coalition majority cabinets loyal to the heads of states. These conditions are the resources for autocratisation, personalisation and presidentialisation of political regimes (Lukavenko 2003: 45–46). Accordingly, taking into account the popular nature of powers of the heads of states who can use it extremely versatile and even situationally is the main thing in presidential activism in the conditions of semi-presidentialism.

Nonetheless, popular presidential election in semi-presidentialism does not necessarily mean that the head of state must presidentialise political process and the system of inter-institutional relations. Since the head of state, especially when his or her constitutional powers are extremely insignificant, can act in full compliance with the rules of law and the mandate or even can actually be “weaker”. This corresponds to the observation of the researchers (Almeida and

Cho 2003; Elgie 1999a; Elgie 1999b) that there can be the with a significant or insignificant relationship between *de jure* and *de facto* powers of presidents in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. The point is that informal institutions in some systems of government impede or enhance the real influence of the heads of states, but formal institutions in other systems of government unilaterally indicate a certain dynamic of relations between political actors, thus defining the place of the president's institution. Therefore, the comparison of political institutions in the conditions of semi-presidentialism should be not only formal (or legal), but also actual (or political), since political institutions acquire the perfect form under the influence of the "political game", in which they are co-opted, and under the influence of those actors (individuals), which operationalise the duties, powers, tasks and goals of the former (Frison-Roche 2005: 383). Although it is clear that any political system actually has an attribute of executive domination and personification in the person of one (individual or collective/collegial) leader, which is mostly the centre of political life (Farrell 1971: 10). However, with the difference that such a leader may be a president and a prime minister or anyone else in this sense. Accordingly, semi-presidentialism can be characterised by the institution of decision-making, regulatory or symbolic president (Frison-Roche 2007), and therefore may or may not be determined by the pattern of presidentialisation of political system. This argues that the analysed system of government is heterogeneous and variable institutionally, procedurally, politically and behaviourally (Movchan and Rabotyagova 2010). Instead, the fact that president is not an "agent" of parliament in the structure of the executive dualism is determinative and systemic feature of semi-presidentialism (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Magni-Berton 2013; Samuels and Shugart 2010; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009a; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009c). Since president is elected directly by voters and is determined by distinctive legitimacy.

Conclusion

In general, the article demonstrated that the way of election, legitimacy and powers of presidents are one of the main attributes, which outline the problem of semi-presidentialism. It is revealed that president under semi-presidentialist is usually positioned or at least theorised as a peculiar ("true" or "illusory") "referee", "neutral force" and "mediator" between or over the branches of power, state and society, but is not or only partly is a formalised branch of government. At the same time, it is recorded that the ways of popular elections and the nature of legitimacy of presidents within the framework of the European semi-presidentialism are variational, since not all rules and conditions guarantee that the winners of presidential election receive an absolute rather than relative majority of votes. Therefore, it is substantiated that not only the fact that president is elected popularly, but also the way of presidential election are important for semi-presidentialism, since they are able to certify the level of presidential legitimacy and the influence of presidential mandate on the system of inter-institutional relations. Accordingly, it is analytically stated that popularly elected president is *a priori* endowed with formal

legitimacy under semi-presidentialism, but the latter actually can be incorporated in different ways. On this basis, it is discovered that presidential powers in the framework of the European semi-presidentialism are variational. As a result, it is argued that semi-presidentialism is a diverse and heterogeneous system of government, and should be subjected to comprehensive typologies and taxonomies. This is important because different types of semi-presidentialism, having advantages and disadvantages and generating various risks and prospects, may differently affect inter-institutional relations, political process, dynamics of political regime change, political stability and socio-economic efficiency, etc.

References

1. Almeida, A. and Cho, S.-J., 2003. *Presidential Power and Cabinet Membership Under Semi-Presidentialism*. Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Chicago, 3–6 April 2003).
2. Amorim Neto, O. and Strøm, K. 2006. Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 36(4): 619–643.
3. Anderson, C. and Guillory, C., 1997. Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems. *American Political Science Review*, 91(1): 66–81.
4. Armingeon, K. and Careja, R., 2008. *Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989–2007*. Bern: Institute of Political Science. Available at: <http://www.cps-data.org/index.php/data> [accessed 25 April 2019].
5. Arter, D., 1999. Finland. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 48–66.
6. Arter, D. and Widfeldt, A., 2010. What Sort of Semi-presidentialism do Finns Want? An Intra-Systemic Comparative Analysis. *West European Politics*, 33(6): 1278–1298.
7. Bahro, H., 1996. A Influência de Max Weber na Constituição de Weimar e o Semipresidencialismo Português Como Sistema Político de Transição. *Análise Social*, 31(4): 777–802.
8. Bahro, H., Bayerlein, B. and Vesper, E., 1998. Duverger's Concept: Semi-Presidential Government Revisited. *European Journal of Political Research*, 34(2): 201–224.
9. Bayerlein, B., 1996. Sobre a Origem Bonapartista do Regime Político Semi-Presidencial em Portugal. *Análise Social*, 31(4): 803–830.
10. Baylis, T., 1996. Presidents Versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe. *World Politics*, 48(3): 297–323.
11. Bochsler, D., 2012. Non-Discriminatory Rules and Ethnic Representation: The Election of the Bosnian State Presidency. *Ethnopolitics*, 11(1): 66–84.
12. Casey, J., 2000. *Constitutional Law in Ireland*. Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell.

13. Chastain, J., 2006. Where Did They Vote For Le Pen? Globalisation and the National Front. *Middle States Geographer*, 39: 101–110.
14. Cheibub, J. A., 2009a. Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work. *Texas Law Review*, 87(7): 1375–1407.
15. Cheibub, J. A., 2009b. *Reforming Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies*. IDEA.
16. Cheibub, J. A. and Chernykh, S., 2009. Are Semi-Presidential Constitutions Bad for Democratic Performance?. *Constitutional Political Economy*, 20(3–4): 202–229.
17. Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z. and Ginsburg, T., 2014. Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3): 515–544.
18. Chernov, V., 2008. Sistemy Pravleniya v Evrope: Klassifikatsiya i Sravnitelnyy Analiz na Primere Stran Evrosoyuza. *Politiya*, 1(48): 142–159.
19. Choudhry, S. and Stacey, R., 2013. *Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia*. NYU Law Working Papers.
20. DiPalma, G., 1990. *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
21. Dobry, M., 1992. Le Président en Cohabitation – Modes des Pensées Préconstitués et Logiques Sectorielles. In: Lacroix, B. and Lagroye, J., eds. *La Président de la République – Usages et Genèses D'une Institution*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. pp. 251–279.
22. Doyle, D. and Elgie, R., 2016. Maximising the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of Presidential Power. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(1): 731–741.
23. Duverger, M., 1980. A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government. *European Journal of Political Research*, 8(2): 165–187.
24. Duverger, M., 1996. *Le Systeme Politique Français: Droit Constitutionnel et Science Politique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
25. Elgie, R., 1999a. Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 281–299.
26. Elgie, R., 1999b. The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–21.
27. Elgie, R., 2004. Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations. *Political Studies Review*, 2(3): 314–330.
28. Elgie, R., 2009. Duverger, Semi-Presidentialism and the Supposed French Archetype. *West European Politics*, 32(2): 248–267.
29. Elgie, R., 2011. Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe. In: Elgie, R., Moestrup, S. and Wu, Y.-S., eds. *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*. London: Palgrave. pp. 81–97.
30. Elgie, R., 2014. Types of Head of State in European Politics. In: Magone, J., ed. *Handbook of European Politics*. Routledge. pp. 311–327.
31. Elgie, R., 2016. Three Waves of Semi-Presidential Studies. *Democratisation*, 23(1): 49–70.

32. Elgie, R., Bucur, C., Dolez, B. and Laurent, A., 2014. Proximity, Candidates, and Presidential Power: How Directly Elected Presidents Shape the Legislative Party System. *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(3): 467–477.
33. Elgie, R. and Passarelli, G., 2018. Presidentialisation: One Term, Two Uses Between Deductive Exercise and Grand Historical Narrative. *Political Studies Review*, 17(2): 115–123.
34. Farrell, B., 1971. *Chairman or Chief? The Role of the Taoiseach in Irish Government*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.
35. Fortin, J., 2013. Measuring Presidential Powers: Some Pitfalls of Aggregate Measurement. *International Political Science Review*, 34(1): 91–112.
36. Frison-Roche, F., 2005. Le “Modèle Semi-Présidentiel” Comme Instrument de la Transition en Europe Post-Communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovénie. Bruylant.
37. Frison-Roche, F., 2007. Semi-Presidentialism in a Post-Communist Context. In: Elgie, R. and Moestrup, S., eds. *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*. Routledge. pp. 56–77.
38. Fruhstorfer, A., 2016. Recent Debates and Advances in the Scholarly Examination of Presidential Institutions. *French Politics*, 14(2): 254–271.
39. Frye, T., 1997. A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 30(5): 523–552.
40. Gallagher, M., 2011. Parties and Referendums in Ireland 1937–2011. *Irish Political Studies*, 26(4): 535–544.
41. Ganev, V., 1999. Bulgaria. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford University Press. pp. 124–149.
42. Harris, B., 2009. The Irish President, the New Zealand Governor-General and the Head of State in a Future New Zealand Republic. *New Zealand Law Review*, 4: 605–658.
43. Hellman, J., 1996. Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist Transitions. *East European Constitutional Review*, 5(1): 46–56.
44. Hlousek, V., 2013. *Presidents Above Parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, Their Formal Competences and Informal Power*. Brno: International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University.
45. Jasiewicz, K., 1997. Poland: Walesa’s Legacy to the Presidency. In: Taras, R., ed. *Postcommunist Presidents*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 130–167.
46. Johannsen, L. and Norgaard, O., 2003. *IPA: The Index of Presidential Authority. Explorations into the Measurement and Impact of a Political Institution*. Paper Prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops (Edinburgh, 28 March – 4 April 2003).
47. Kristinsson, G. H., 1999. Iceland. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 86–103.
48. Kristjánsson, S., 2004. Iceland: Searching for Democracy along Three Dimensions of Citizen Control. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 27(2): 153–174.
49. Krouwel, A., 2003. Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries. *Acta Politica*, 38(4): 333–364.

50. Laver, M., Benoit, K. and Sauger, N., 2006. Policy Competition in the 2002 French Legislative and Presidential Elections. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(4): 669–699.
51. Lewis-Beck, M. and Nadeau, R., 2000. French Electoral Institutions and the Economic Vote. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2–3): 171–182.
52. Lijphart, A., 1999. *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
53. Linz, J., 1994. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?. In: Linz, J. and Valenzuela, A., eds. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*. Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 3–87.
54. Linz, J. and Stepan, A., 1996. Towards Consolidated Democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2): 4–33.
55. Lukavenko, S., 2003. Institutionalny Dizayn Prezidentskikh i Poluprezidentskikh Modeley Politicheskikh Rezhimov. *Oykumena: Almanakh Sravnitelnykh Issledovaniy Politicheskikh Institutov, Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskikh Sistem i Tsivilizatsiy*, 1: 42–49.
56. Lytvyn, V., 2015. Konstruktsii Bilshosti ta Menshosti u Suchasnykh Systemakh Vsenarodnykh Prezydentskykh Vyboriv: Porivnialnyi Analiz. *Osvita Rebiomu: Politolohiia, Psykholohiia, Komunikatsii*, 2(39): 19–35.
57. Lytvyn, V., 2017. Pryroda, Sposib Obrannia i Lehitymnist Instytutu Prezydenta yak Atrybuty Napivprezidentalizmu: Porivniannia ta Uzahalnennia na Prykladi Krain Yevropy. *Visnyk Dnipropetrovskoho Universytetu: Filosofiia, Sotsiolohiia, Politolohiia*, 2(36): 30–46.
58. Magalhaes, P. and Fortes, B., 2005. As Eleicoes Presidenciais em Sistemas Semipresidenciais: Participacao Eleitoral e Punicao dos Governos. *Analise Social*, 40(177): 891–922.
59. Magni-Berton, R., 2013. Reassessing Duvergerian Semi-Presidentialism: An Electoral Perspective. *Comparative European Politics*, 11(2): 222–248.
60. McEwen, C. and Maiman, R., 1984. Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent. *Law and Society Review*, 18: 257–274.
61. McGregor, J., 1994. The Presidency in East Central Europe. *RFL/RL Research Report*. 3(2).
62. Metcalf, L. K., 2000. Measuring Presidential Power. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(5): 660–685.
63. Metcalf, L. K., 2002. *Sailing Between Scylla and Charybdis: Presidential Power in East Central Europe*. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the APSA (Boston, 28 August 2002).
64. Movchan, U. and Rabotyagova, I., Statusno-Rolovi Osoblyvosti Instytutu Prezydenta na Rynku Vlady. *Visnyk Kharkivskoho Natsionalnogo Universytetu Imeni V. N. Karazina: Pytannia politolohii*, 16(885): 89–97.
65. Müller, W., 1999. Austria. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford University Press. pp. 22–47.
66. Newton, K. and Norris, P., 2000. Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance?. In: Pharr, S. and Putnam, R., eds. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 52–73.
67. Nousiainen, J., 2001. From Semi-Presidentialism to Parliamentary Government: Political and Constitutional Developments in Finland. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 24(1): 95–109.

68. Paloheimo, H., 2003. The Rising Power of the Prime Minister in Finland. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 26(3): 219–243.
69. Piolatto, A., 2009. *Plurality Versus Proportional Electoral Rule: Which is Most Representative of Voters?*. Job Market Paper.
70. Poguntke, T. and Webb, P., 2005. The Presidentialisation of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis. In: Poguntke, T. and Webb, P., eds. *The Presidentialisation of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–25.
71. Protsyk, O., 2005. Prime Ministers' Identity in semi-Presidential Regimes: Constitutional Norms and Cabinet Formation Outcomes. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(5): 721–748.
72. Raunio, T., 2011. Semi-Presidentialism and European Integration: Lessons from Finland for Constitutional Design. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(4): 567–584.
73. Rogov, K. and Snegovaya, M., 2009. Sroki Imeyut Znacheniyu. *Ekonomicheskaya Politika*, 5: 75–92.
74. Roper, S., 2002. Are All Semi-Presidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes. *Comparative Politics*, 34(3): 253–272.
75. Samuels, D. and Shugart, M., 2006. *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: A Neo-Madisonian Theory of Party Organisation and Behaviour*. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Philadelphia).
76. Samuels, D. and Shugart, M., 2010. *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organisation and Behaviour*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
77. Schleiter, P. and Morgan-Jones, E., 2005. *Semi-Presidential Regimes: Providing Flexibility or Generating Representation and Governance Problems?*. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the APSA (Washington, 1–4 September 2005).
78. Schleiter, P. and Morgan-Jones, E., 2009a. Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(4): 871–992.
79. Schleiter, P. and Morgan-Jones, E., 2009b. Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets. *American Political Science Review*, 103(3): 496–512.
80. Schleiter, P. and Morgan-Jones, E., 2009c. Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(5): 665–693.
81. Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. L., 1991. What Democracy Is ... and Is Not. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(1): 75–88.
82. Shugart, M. and Carey, J., 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge University Press.
83. Siaroff, A., 2003. Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3): 287–312.
84. Skach, C., 2005. *Borrowing Constitutional Designs. Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
85. Skach, C., 2007. The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 5(1): 93–121.

86. Stepan, A. and Suleiman, E., 1995. The French Fifth Republic: A Model for Import? Reflections on Poland and Brazil. In: Chehabi, H. and Stepan, A., eds. *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Studies*. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 393–414.
87. Taghiyev, E., 2006. Measuring Presidential Power in Post-Soviet Countries. *CEU Political Science Journal*, 3: 11–21.
88. Tavits, M., 2009a. Direct Presidential Elections and Turnout in Parliamentary Contests. *Political Research Quarterly*, 62(1): 42–54.
89. Tavits, M., 2009b. *Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
90. Urbanavicius, D., 1999. Lithuania. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford University Press. pp. 150–169.
91. Van der Brug, W., Van der Eijk, C. and Marsh, M., 2000. Exploring Uncharted Territory: The Irish Presidential Election 1997. *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(4): 631–650.
92. Van der Eijk, C., Franklin, M. and Marsh, M., 1996. What Voters Teach Us About Europe-Wide Elections: What Europe-Wide Elections Teach Us About Voters. *Electoral Studies*, 15(2): 149–166.
93. Van der Meer Krok-Paszowska, A., 1999. Poland. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford University Press. pp. 171–192.
94. Verheijen, T., 1999. Romania. In: Elgie, R., ed. *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford University Press. pp. 193–215.
95. Vesper, E., 1997. Semi-Presidentialism – Duverger’s Concept: A New Political System Model. *Journal for Humanities and Social Sciences*, 11(1): 39–60.
96. Ward, A., 1994. *The Irish Constitutional Tradition: Responsible Government and Modern Ireland, 1782–1992*. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.
97. Zaznaev, O., 2007. The Index Analysis of Semi-Presidential States of Europe and the Post-Soviet Space. *Polis (Political Studies)*, 2: 146–164.
98. Zaznaev, O., 2014a. Measuring Presidential Power: A Review of Contemporary Methods. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(14): 569–573.
99. Zaznaev, O., 2014b. Understanding Semi-Presidentialism in Political Science: A Review of the Latest Debate. *World Applied Sciences Journal*, 30(2): 195–198.
100. Zaznaev, O., 2015. Measuring Presidential Power in Post-Communist Countries: Rectification of Mistakes. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 6(1): 443–449.

THE HISTORY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL FORMS OF SUBJECTIVATION AND POLITICIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ETHNIC COMMUNITY IN CRIMEA BEFORE ITS ANNEXATION BY RUSSIA (1989–2013)

The article is dedicated to analyzing the history, prerequisites and peculiarities of socio-political forms of subjectivation and politicization of the Russian ethnic community in Crimea before its annexation by Russia, in particular in the period of 1989–2013. The author found that the dawning of the subjectivation and politicization of the Russian ethnic community in Crimea and consequently the peculiar preparation for annexation of the peninsula were noticeable throughout the “twilight” period of the USSR and the post-Soviet development of Ukraine. They were mainly manifested in socio-political form, in particular in the design and development of public (non-governmental) organizations, which were engaged not only in social, historical, cultural and human rights character, but also in politics, and thus formed certain strategies for the attitude of a large part of the Crimean population (and in some places of the official institutions of Crimea) to the state authorities in Ukraine. It was revealed that Russian organizations of Crimea used a wide range of different approaches in cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities during the period up to 2013. On the one hand, almost all organizations remained in the legal field of Ukraine. Nevertheless, on the other hand, by 2013 and even earlier in Crimea there was a process of politicization of Russian ethnicity, even in the programs of activities of Russian organizations and communities of Crimea, since political motives prevailed over national and cultural ones. Therefore, different parties and organizations ideologically were ready to change the status of Crimea and received support for this in 2013–2014.

Keywords: Russian ethnic community, Crimea, Ukraine, Russia, the annexation of Crimea, public and political organizations, the politicization of ethnicity.

Томаш Бялоблочки

ІСТОРІЯ ГРОМАДСЬКО-ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ФОРМ СУБ'ЄКТИВАЦІЇ І ПОЛІТИЗАЦІЇ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ЕТНІЧНОЇ СПІЛЬНОТИ В КРИМУ ПЕРЕД ЙОГО АНЕКСІЄЮ РОСІЄЮ (1989–2013)

Проаналізовано історію, передумови й особливості громадсько-політичних форм суб'єктивації та політизації російської етнічної спільноти в Криму перед його анексією

Росією, зокрема в період 1989–2013 рр. Встановлено, що паростки суб'єктивзації і політизації російської етнічної спільноти в Криму, а відтак і своєрідної підготовки до анексії півострова були помітними впродовж усього періоду «сумерків» СРСР і пострадянського розвитку України. Вони головно виявлялись у громадсько-політичній формі, а зокрема в оформленні та розвитку громадських (неурядових) організацій, які були зайняті діяльністю не лише соціального, історично-культурного та правозахисного характеру, але й політикою, а відтак формували певні стратегії ставлення значної частини населення Криму, а подекуди й офіційних інститутів Криму до державної влади в Україні. Виявлено, що впродовж періоду до 2013 р. російські організації Криму, взаємодіючи з українською владою, використовували широкий спектр різноманітних підходів. З однієї сторони, майже всі організації залишались у правовому полі України. Але з іншої сторони, вже до 2013 р. і навіть раніше в Криму відбувся процес політизації російської етнічності, причому в програмах діяльності російських організацій та громад Криму, оскільки політичні мотиви переважували над національно-культурними. Відтак суто ідеологічно різні партії та організації були готовими до зміни статусу Криму й отримали на це підтримку в 2013–2014 рр.

Ключові слова: російська етнічна спільнота, Крим, Україна, Росія, анексія Криму, громадсько-політична організації, політизація етнічності.

Russian annexation of the Crimea and its unlawful, in terms of the international law, proclamation a part of Russian territory in 2014 have become an unprecedented phenomenon in the novel political history of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the germs of subjectivization and politicization of the Russian ethnic community in the Crimea, along with the so-called preparations for annexation of the peninsula, were noticeable throughout the «twilight» in the USSR and post-Soviet development of Ukraine, at least embracing the period of 1988–2013. They manifested themselves mainly in the socio-political plane, more specifically in the design and development of public (non-governmental) organizations, involved in various activities not only of social, historical, cultural and human rights nature, but also of politics, but consequently, certain strategies for the evolution of the Crimean population, and at times attitude of the official institutions of the Crimea towards the state authorities in Ukraine appeared. Respectively, the socio-political subjectivisation and politicization of the Russian ethnic community in the Crimea became a kind of bridgehead, leading to quite a simple and effective annexation of the Crimea in 2014. From such a perspective, an analysis of the socio-political activities of the «Russian» Crimean organizations over the period 1988–2013, especially given the fact that Russians in the Crimea (mainly ethnic and cultural) have constituted a relative majority of the population, hence their organizations typically advocated rapprochement with Russia, poses a topical research issue in the context of the present-day complication of the international environment,

accompanied by the intensifying militarization of the Ukrainian-Russian contradictions. This is utterly relevant against the background that it is the socio-political subjectivation of the Russians in the Crimea that primarily contributed to the creation of the appropriate ideological settings, having become both a prerequisite and basis for the annexation of the peninsula.

Historically the Crimea is known to have reached the turning point of the independent public-political organizations formation at the turn of the 1980s - 1990s, like most regions of the former USSR. The crucial task of various organizations from the very beginning of their formation was the protection of national-cultural, historical and linguistic identity, as in the case of protection of the Russian population of the Crimea. For instance, in 1989, a department of the All-Union Society «Memorial» was officially registered in the Crimea, with participation of prominent politicians, including the future President of the Crimea, Y. Meshkov. At the same time, the organization «Democratic Tavrida», which put forward the slogan of the creation of the Republic of Crimea within the USSR, insisting on of the state language status of the Russian language on its territory. The growing disintegration of the Soviet Union further contributed to the activation of socio-political organizations among the Crimean Russians, since it was the Russians in the Crimea who constituted the relative majority of the population. Particularly politicized was the fact that even in disregard of the January 1991 referendum, the Crimea was granted the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine, not the USSR. Thus, with the participation of the Democratic Taurida, a completely new structure was created, specifically «The Republican Movement of Crimea» to transform into a political organization, the Republican Party of Crimea (RPC), in 1993.

In defense of their own social interests, the leaders of the Republican Party of Crimea have put forward a number of slogans of a very radical nature. It was a course on bringing the Crimean autonomy closer to Russia, up to the format of full annexation by Russia, entering into a military-political union with Russia, granting Russian citizenship to the inhabitants of the peninsula, etc. In January 1994, a pro-Russian social and political figure, Y. Meshkov, was elected President of the Crimea, with the RPC-supported bloc «Russia» obtaining a majority in the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of the autonomy. In fact, according to L. Grach, «... the early 1990s elections ... actually put to life the slogan about the return of the Crimea to Russia»¹. Тим не менше, ситуація, що склалася після виборів у 1994 р., була, по суті, найбільшим успіхом проросійського руху в Криму упродовж періоду 1988–2013 рр. However, following the 1994 elections the situation proved, in fact, the greatest success of the pro-Russian movement in the Crimea over the period 1988-2013, for soon afterwards this movement brought up grave problems. First of all, it was found, that despite the triumphant upheaval of the pro-Russian forces in the elections, the Crimean leaders did not really have a significant financial and economic base to secure real autonomy on the peninsula. The fate of Crimean autonomy

¹ *Партия регионов опять будет дурить украинский народ своей любовью к России: Интервью Леонида Грача информационному агентству КБвМиМ, Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/846818.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].*

was also adversely affected by the lack of managerial experience among its leaders and the predominance of «rallying» and «street» type politicians in their environment, a characteristic feature of the early 1990s. Ultimately, almost complete lack of support on the part of Russia, this movement was oriented to, played the utterly negative role in the fate of the pro-Russian movement in the Crimea. The leadership of Russia at that time focused on rapprochement with the West, the soonest possible integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, and therefore viewed the speeches of pro-Russian figures abroad as a vexing obstacle that could «resurrect» suspicions of «eradicating the imperial ambitions» of Russia in the West. In such circumstances, Ukrainian leaders, exercising pressure, as well as manipulation of Crimean politicians (or so-called «civic nationalism» representatives), already in 1995 managed to change the constitution of the Crimean autonomy as well as eliminate the post of President of the republic.

Consequently, the 1994-1995 events appeared to be a severe blow to the organizations of the Russian population of Crimea. Once finding themselves in smouldering ruins, the pro-Russian socio-political forces of the peninsula were suspended, having lost the 1998 elections to the parliament of autonomy. For some time the pro-Russian organizations put the political component on a back burner, so issues of language, religion, culture, historical identity and maintaining ties with the historical homeland, being Russia, as they thought, began to play a more important role. The revival of political activity became noticeable only since 2002, when with the participation of the RCP such organizations as «Russian Community of the Crimea» and the party «Russian Bloc» were created, having been able to obtain seats to in the Crimean parliaments. The most important «irritant» the socio-political organizations of the Russian Crimea faced up against turned out to be the 2004 «Orange Revolution» in Ukraine, whose slogans were perceived as absolutely hostile by a large part of the peninsula's population (similarly to 2013-2014 events). The situation was further aggravated in 2008 by the events on the international arena, i.e. the declaration of independence of the province of Kosovo, the beginning of the international financial and economic crisis, as well as the conflict in the Caucasus and the subsequent recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia (this was also emphasised on the eve of the annexation of the Crimea in 2013-2014).

The self-consciousness of the Russian population of Crimea, as well as the ideological programs of pro-Russian socio-political organizations over the period 1988-2013 were marked by a deep-rooted sense of alienation from the outside world, outer political organizations and power structures. Moreover, the «own» Crimean authorities shared this feeling. The sharp dissatisfaction with the official Kyiv policy in the domains of language, culture and education was attended by a pragmatic desire to survive in the socio-economic chaos, caused by a continual and painful formation of market economy structures in Ukraine, and subsequently by the events of the Orange Revolution (likewise, Revolution of Dignity and Euromaidan in 2013-2014). For this reason loyalty to Russia, naturally perceived as the historical homeland, was aggravated by dissatisfaction with its overly passive policy towards Ukraine, its mistrustful and suspicious

attitude towards Russia's «official allies» in Ukraine, as previously to the Party of Regions. In the long run, the issues of the Russian population of the Crimea and its historical identity remained unsettled, because, contrary to a popular belief, the Soviet period, when the peninsula was transferred to Ukraine, in the eyes of indigenous Crimean population was far from the «gold age». With similar ideological and cultural-psychological luggage, «Russian» socio-political organizations of Crimea entered all elections in Ukraine and the Crimea².

In the course of 1988–2013, there was an entire array of socio-political organizations in the Crimea, declaring their pro-Russian stance and claiming to voice the interests of the Russian population. In our study we analyzed the position of the two of them, namely the People's Front «Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia», as well as the organization «Russian Community of Crimea». The former, established in August 2005, in the wake of political instability following the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine and uniting 14 pro-Russian organizations in 8 Crimean cities (the Russian People's Viche / Chamber of Sevastopol, the Russian Community of Evpatoria, the Yalta Voter Club, Russian community of Kerch, and the like). The latter, being one of the most influential organizations of the Russian population, originated from the Republican Movement of Crimea. Politically, the «Russian Bloc» Party was also closely associated with the Russian Community of Crimea. Therefore, to clarify certain aspects of the views of the Russian population of the Crimea, we have referred to the statements of recognised politicians with a pronounced pro-Russian orientation, as well as the materials of pro-Russian Crimean periodicals and Internet agencies.

2008 became a turning point for the political development of the Crimea, coinciding in time with the declaration of independence of Kosovo and its subsequent recognition by some of the leading Western countries. It provoked a sharp response on the peninsula and directly influenced the stance of Russian organizations along with expression of sentiments of politicians and the media. The events in the Serbian Region stirred up a wave of separatist, patriotic and nationalist outcries about the right to self-determination both in Ukraine and the Crimea. Thus, one of the the RPC leaders, L. Grach, stated that the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence yet again gave the pro-Russian forces stimulus to question the legitimacy of «presenting Ukraine with Crimea in 1954». For Crimean Tatars leaders, this event stipulated discussing the need to transform autonomy from the one with a territorial status to national (Tatar) status, whereas the organization of Ukrainian National Democrats demanded instead to deprive the Crimea of autonomous rights³.

The Crimea passed another serious test, being the international financial and economic crisis since 2008, whose painful course compelled pro-Russian organizations to discuss the inability of the Ukrainian state to ensure stable economic development and protect the social

² Волкогонова О., Подунов А., Политизация этничности в современной Украине: русская диаспора и межнациональные отношения в Крыму, «Россия и современный мир» 2008, nr. 2, S. 144–163.

³ На Украине есть пороховая бочка, у которой много фитилей и нетрезвая охрана: Крым за неделю, Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/966564.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].

rights of its citizens. However, the events in South Ossetia in August 2008, followed by the proclamation of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had the most profound impact on the moods of the Russian population of Crimea. On September 17, 2008, the Crimean Parliament adopted an appeal to the Parliament of Ukraine, initiated by the Russian Community of Crimea in support of «the peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in their right for self-determination» and «the Russian Federation's actions to ensure their security.» The appeal was backed by representatives of the Crimean branches of the Party of Regions, the Russian Bloc Party, the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, a number of city councils and «the general public of Crimea». Thus, in the address of the Russian Community of the Crimea to the participants of the 7th World Congress of the Ossetian People, sent in June 2009, it was stated that «the Crimeans stand in solidarity with the brotherly Ossetian people, wishing them unity, freedom, success in restoring the destroyed economy.»

Further on, triggered by the 2008 perturbations, the activation of the official Kyiv policy was regarded by the Russian population of Crimea as entirely hostile measures, provoking a predominantly sharp reaction. A particularly negative response was evoked by signing the Strategic Partnership Charter in December 2008 by the Heads of Foreign Ministries of Ukraine and the United States, envisaging the opening of a US diplomatic mission in Simferopol with its respective status and functions. Meeting with the US Ambassador to Ukraine W.Taylor in January 2009, Sergei Tsekov, the leader of the Russian community, accentuated that the opening of a «US presence» post in the Crimea would become a source of constant conflict and tension. In the words of S.Tsekov, a large part of the Crimean population, does not trust the US because of their anti-Russian policy towards Russia and the course of unconditional support for the Kyiv government. «In the Crimea, 60 percent of Russians live by nationality and 80 percent by language: you have to take these reality into account!», said the Russian community leader to the ambassador, adding that «You should know that Russia is our motherland and we will not betray it»⁴.

The measures, undertaken by the official Kyiv to establish closer ties with the NATO faced rigorous protests by pro-Russian Crimean organizations. For instance, President Viktor Yushchenko's appeal to the bloc's leadership to include Ukraine in the NATO Membership Action Plan was met with severe protests against the launch of Sea Breeze exercises together with NATO troops in the peninsula. In January 2008, the city of Sevastopol unanimously declared the city a «NATO-free territory». In addition, the deputies stressed that «they reserve the right to invite the people of Sevastopol to mass protest actions in case of continuation of the course of Ukraine to join NATO». The aggravation of the political situation has prompted numerous Ukrainian political as well as public organizations (especially from the western regions of

⁴ *Сколько крымчан планируют убить США при добыче нефти на Черноморском шельфе?*, «Крым за неделю», źródło: <http://vlasti.net/news/36051> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

Ukraine) to raise the issue of deprivation of Sevastopol of its special status, limitation and even elimination of the Crimean autonomy. Naturally, this caused a very negative reaction in Crimea.

Against this background, the urgent question was how representatives of pro-Russian organizations saw the future of Crimea, estimated the prospects for its development within the Ukrainian state, as well as its relationship with Russia. To answer this question, it should be emphasized that the feeling of alienation from a large part of Ukraine (especially from the western regions) and the policy of the official Kyiv was at any rate typical of any politically active representatives of the Russian minority. Thus, according to A. Nikiforov, speaking on the «Russian Tuesdays», initiated by the Russian community in February 2009, the Crimean and East Ukrainian elites «should not focus on winning an opposite part of Ukraine, but on sparing a decent niche in their political project» as an alternative to its own wishes». According to the Russian Community leader S. Tsekov, the only salvation of Ukraine as a state was the federalization and proclamation of the Russian language as the second state language. He noted that «these are the two main points that, if implemented, will lead Ukraine to a peaceful and normal life.» The Crimea was expected to establish relations with Kiev on an agreed basis, being the only strong guarantee of the republic's autonomy.

Simultaneously, against the background of the widespread pro-Russian moods, the reactions of organizations of Crimea were quite varied⁵. Thus, the most radically-minded representatives of the Russian population, the leaders of the People's Front «Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia», believed that the transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine by the Khrushchev, without taking into consideration of the Crimean population opinion, was «deportation» for the Russian population of the Crimea, whereas Ukrainization policy, implemented by the official Kyiv, should be seen as an «ethnocide.» In the light of such views, the ultimate goal of the pro-Russian movement was to declare «a decisive end to the violent deportation of 1954 and, following the example of other repatriated peoples, to return to their homeland, Russia, with a long-ago torn away Crimean peninsula as soon as possible.» According to the leaders of the People's Front, «the inhabitants of the Crimea and Sevastopol» «turned out to be beyond their homeland» «by the will of fools, traitors and obvious enemies.» Upon the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine unilaterally extended its sovereignty to the Crimea and Sevastopol» or «illegally annexed Crimea», the consequences of which were to be eliminated on the basis of the principles of international law. As stipulated by the documents of the People's Front, Ukraine like all states certainly had the right to sovereignty and independence, but «without the lands stolen from Russia, together with millions of Russians, living there compactly»⁶.

The socio-political instability, having intensified since the events of 2008, has contributed to growing sentiment. «Today's Crimea is a rebellious territory, which Ukraine has lost control

⁵ *Крымчане отметили день республики Крым*, Портал русского народа Крыма, źródło: <http://www.ruscimea.ru/news.php?point=289> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

⁶ *Из резолюции митинга в Севастополе 24 августа 2005г. и Декларации о провозглашении Народного фронта „Севастополь-Крым-Россия“*, Сайт Народного фронта «Севастополь-Крым-Россия», źródło: <http://sevrus.narod.ru/#v25> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

over», stated the materials of the independent informational resource «Unconquered Crimea», supported by the People's Front. Three months later, the site's authors informed readers that the Ukrainian project in Crimea had long ago failed, and «independence will be unilaterally declared as soon as the collapse of Ukraine begins.» According to the authors of the site, the movement for autonomy, let alone independence had to cover not only Crimea but also other regions - Subcarpathian Rus, Bukovina, Donbass, etc. «The broke Ukraine will soon have to part with all these territories and pull out its miserable existence in already a broken state,» the resource noted. Interestingly, back in 2006 the leadership of the People's Front sent Y. Meshkov (the former President of the Crimea) an invitation to return to Crimea as the legitimate president of the autonomy (he moved to Russia in the 1990s)⁷.

However, not all representatives of the politically active part of the Russian population of Crimea were so negatively-minded towards the Ukrainian state. Many were open to finding a compromise with the official Kyiv. «We are not against Ukraine, but we are against the policy, pursued by the independent Ukraine over the past 17 years,» O. Slyusarenko, the chairman of the executive committee of the Russian Community of Crimea, said on the day of the in Simferopol march to celebrate the 55th anniversary of the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR (February 19, 2009). In general, the desire to compromise with the official Kyiv was characteristic of the organizations and politicians most integrated in Ukraine's political structures, in particular the organization of the Russian Community of Crimea and the Russian Bloc Party, cooperating with the Party of Regions. These political forces sought to develop formulas, to suit different social forces, and spoke about the status of the Crimea in the context of common integration processes in the post-Soviet space. In an interview with «Rosbalt» in June 2008, O. Radivilov stated, «We are integrationists. And reunification with Russia is a historical process. We, the Crimean Russians, would like to do it legally through parliamentary activities. ... If Crimea wants to be a subject of the Union Treaty, it does not mean that it wants to withdraw from Ukraine. It can simply be a subject of the Customs Union, or some other association»⁸.

According to the Russian Community leaders, in the course of their activities organizations of the Russian population of Crimea were called to «strengthen the eastern geopolitical vector of the modern Ukraine development» and «to turn the Ukrainian state» ... «towards restoring the allied political relations with Russia», namely they were to implement tasks, the formulation of which nevertheless provided for the existence of an independent Ukrainian state. The main thing, according to O. Slyusarenko, was that «in the foreseeable future on the world arena and in the negotiations with Russia» Ukraine must not be represented by politicians, expressing

⁷ Пригула В., *Чи повернуться экс-президент Криму Юрій Мешков?*, Радіо «Свобода», *зródlo*: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/946672.html> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

⁸ «Жареный петух» для русских крымчан: *Интервью О. Родивилова*, Росбалт, *зródlo*: <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/06/22/649201.html> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

views «far from the interests of Russia and the Slavic-Russian world as a whole»⁹. Also common were the «moderate» wing arguments that the preservation of the Crimea in the composition of Ukraine should encourage this country to maintain close ties with Russia. The peninsula, as Crimean Communist leader L. Grach emphasized, «has a complex mission, - an anchor mission to keep Ukraine near the coast of Russia»¹⁰. These and similar speculations provoked a sharply negative reaction from the radical organizations of the Russian population of the Crimea¹¹.

Curiously, the differences between the organizations of the Russian population in Crimea and the politicians, claiming to express Crimean interests were caused not only by disputes about the fate of the peninsula, but also by deep differences in the social nature and programmatic materials of these organizations. Thus, for L. Grach, the Party of Regions was positioned as a bureaucratic, liberal-bourgeois party of large oligarchic capital, which was under American control, serving as a lever of party manipulation by the United States. Not surprisingly, the Crimean Communist leader described the Party of Regions (Ukraine's largest pro-Russian party) as «the most sinister deception in all post-Soviet history.» In turn, the Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia People's Front, perceived L. Grach himself as a «tough Ukrainian statesman», yet a supporter of the Marxism-Leninism ideology, alien to the leadership of the People's Front. The latter called on L. Grach to break with the Communist Party of Ukraine, and then comfortably integrate into Ukrainian political structures, «to part with the bankrupt and corrupt communist ideology, as well as to begin activities for the good of the peninsula. Therefore, the Crimean Russians utterly differed above all due to the stances of all-Ukrainian political forces there, e.g. the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, being simultaneously perceived in Ukraine as pro-Russian.

Representatives of the «moderate» wing of the pro-Russian movement - the «Russian Community of Crimea» - generally praised the activities of the Party of Regions. Thus, according to the head of the Russian Community S. Tsekov, the union with the Party of Regions was generally seen as positive for the Crimea. In a number of cases, not criticizing even the official Kyiv policy, but defending the status quo, the Russian community and its allies effectively defended the interests of the diaspora. By itself, the Party of Regions' moderate and compromise policies played a special role in this context. «It is really good,» said S. Tsekov, «when one political force (in this case the Party of Regions) acts cautiously and sensibly, and the other, that is, the Russian Community of Crimea or the Russian Bloc, is more radical. As a result, we are able to make deliberate decisions, beneficial to the Crimea and Crimeans». The leadership of the People's Front «Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia» (as well as L. Grach) had a severely negative

⁹ Слюсаренко О., *Украина в контексте российской цивилизации*, Портал русского народа Крыма, źródło: <http://www.ruscimea.ru/cms/?go=mon&cin=view&cid=12> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

¹⁰ *Партия регионов опять будет душить украинский народ своей любовью к России: Интервью Леонида Грача информационному агентству КБвМиМ*, Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/846818.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].

¹¹ *Лидера крымских коммунистов раскритиковали за нежелание упразднить Конституцию Крыма (Украина)*, Regnum, źródło: <http://www.regnum.ru/news/1086245.html> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

reaction, regarding the inconsistent policy of the Party of Regions towards NATO, as well as protection of the Russian language. Beyond doubt, The Party of Regions, represented by V. Yanukovich, has reneged on its major election promises,» said the coordinator of the People's Front V. Podyachi. It comes as no surprise, for the party representatives had long ago expressed the desire to sell voters' support in exchange for portfolios¹².

The impending consequence of this situation was irreconcilable differences of the pro-Russian organizations of the Crimea in 1991-2013 and, as a result, the ineffectiveness of their undertakings. «In the Crimea, we (representatives of the Russian population) comprise 80 percent, and, unfortunately, we cannot say that we are acting very effectively» , S.Tsekov had to acknowledge in an interview with the agency «New Region». Even more strongly, such sentiments were expressed by more radically-minded politicians. «The pro-Russian political forces of the Crimea are fragmented and, in fact, have embarked on a path of financial misery. They oppose each other and thus play directly into the hands of anti-Crimean forces,» said L. Grach. The differences in the center of the pro-Russian movement of Crimea also mirrored in the conflicts, dividing the representatives of the Russian community and the Communist Party of Ukraine in the Crimean parliament, the departure of some officials from the pro-Russian slogans with which they went to the elections. Yet another serious factor made a negative impact upon the activities of the pro-Russian organizations in Crimea was the lack of a clear policy and support from the state, on the convergence with which the activities of these organizations are oriented (quite the opposite logic was observed in 2013-2014, leading to the annexation).

Discussing the attitudes of the pro-Russian organizations of Crimea towards Russia, it is worth mentioning that the course of unity with the historical homeland, preservation of historical memory and a sense of belonging to a common culture were crucial factors of their activities. Organizations of the Russian ethnic community in Crimea regularly held events, to commemorate the significant milestones in Russian history (of pre-revolutionary and Soviet period), with a particular attention to the need for unity with the historical homeland. Thus, during the demonstrations in Simferopol on May 1 and 9, 2009, participants carried Russian flags, portraits of D. Medvedev and V. Putin, as well as chanted slogans «Glory to Great Russia!», «Glory to the Russian Winner People!». Moreover, aimed at preserving the historical memory were the anniversary of the alignment of the Crimea with the Russian Empire and the birthday of Queen Catherine II, the erection of memorials in honour of the Romanov dynasty in Crimea. This attested to the fact that the Russian sentiment had been actively present in the Crimea regardless of the political circumstances. At the same time, specific aspects of Russia's behavior on the international arena, as well as its policy towards the Crimea have caused controversy among representatives of pro-Russian organizations.

¹² Виктор Янукович защищает только интересы олигархического клана: организация «Севастополь-Крым-Россия», Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/685803.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].

Those pro-Russian claims regarding Russia's policy towards Crimea could be divided into two categories. Some of them concerned the inept and weak defense of Russia's cultural and ideological interests in Ukraine, especially noticeable against the backdrop of energetic activities of Western countries in Ukraine, primarily the United States. According to L. Grach, Russia demonstrated a «harmful and unacceptable delicacy» pertaining to the Crimean problem. In the words of O. Slyusarenko, Russia in its attitude towards Ukraine found itself in the position of a «deceived investor». It has for years subsidized the Ukrainian budget at the expense of low gas prices, without paying attention to the ideological, spiritual, cultural and educational support of pro-Russian forces in Ukraine. Western states, first and foremost the United States, acted in quite an opposite manner: cautious about investing in the unstable economy of Ukraine, yet they paid special attention to the influence on the consciousness of the Ukrainian elite through funds, grant programs, exchange programs.

Much of the discontent also concerned the Russian diplomatic actions, their foreign policy towards the Ukrainian state. Claims of such a kind were voiced first of all by the proponents of radical socio-political organizations. They were dissatisfied by the absence of diplomatic demarches of Moscow in response to the dissent of Sevastopol's internal affairs bodies regarding the Black Sea Fleet sailors, the Russian Embassy's in Ukraine condemnation of statements by Moscow Mayor J. Luzhkov on the status of Sevastopol, the Moscow continuation of the so-called «Great Treaty between Ukraine since 1997». Extending the treaty, the Kremlin formally recognized the amicable state that participated in the recent Caucasus war against Russia, conducting anti-Russian activities inside the GUAM bloc, and actively involved in the information war against Moscow, supporting the international anti-Russian action, celebrating Nazi henchmen and historic enemies of Russia»¹³, as Crimean Russians were convinced.

Most interestingly, the opted for tactics in such environment and circumstances is worth looking into. Some of the pro-Russian organisations preferred to focus on ideological advocacy, cultural and educational activities, issues of education and historical awareness. Such activities, peculiar for the «moderate» wing of Russian community organizations, frequently received considerable resonance and played a prominent role in the life of the Russian population of the peninsula. For instance, in 2008-2009 mass rallies were organized by the Russian Community of the Crimea and other pro-Russian organizations in protest against commemoration of historic heroes, proclaimed by the official Kyiv, namely I. Mazepa and R. Shukhevych; as well as demonstrations against the decision on Ukrainisation of the film distribution, actions «a Russian flag in every window!»; a rally in honor of the March 17, 1991 referendum on the preservation of the USSR; a run in honor of the Defender of the Motherland Day (February 23,

¹³ Независимая республика Крым: Редакционный комментарий [Электронный ресурс] // Опубликовано 2 октября 2008 г. – Сайт „Непокоренного Крыма“. – Режим доступа: <http://www.freecrimea.org/independant.html>

unlike December, 6, as in the entire Ukraine)¹⁴. «Moderate wing' organizations also focused on defending the interests of the Russian population through parliamentary activities, especially since the 2006 elections, the Russian Community of the Crimea and the Russian Bloc Party held strong positions in the Crimean Parliament (in 2010 they were the only bloc together with the Party of Regions and again obtained the majority of votes: 48.93 percent (party lists) and 48 seats (single-member voting districts), ultimately ending up with 80 seats out of 100. On the initiative of pro-Russian organizations, in 2009 the Crimean Parliament adopted a decree «On measures to support the Russian language in the field of education in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea» and a decree «On the prevention of fascism and racial intolerance, rehabilitation and heroization of fascist collaborators», for Kyiv had previously begun to launch new historical and cultural symbols (re-evaluation of the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army). The parliament objected to the attempt of Kyiv authorities to stop broadcasting Russian television programmes on the territory of Crimea, as well as and to the reduction (and in the future - the termination) of Russian-language instruction in secondary and higher education institutions of the Crimea, etc.

A number of cultural and educational events, organized by pro-Russian structures were large in scale and received loud resonance. These include, first of all, the International Festival «The Great Russian Word» organized with the active participation of the Russian Community of the Crimea and held in a number of cities of the autonomy from June, 6 to June 12, 2009 (the date of birth of O. Pushkin - the Day of Russia). A number of Russian politicians and high officials attended the festival, with the President of Russia sending greetings. Within the framework of the festival there were a number of large-scale events, such as the conference «Russian language in the multicultural world» and round tables «Ukraine and Russia - spiritual and cultural-historical community», «Mass media of Ukraine and Russia - steps to meet». Hence, following the festival outcomes, it was decided to create an organization «Russian-speaking Ukraine», called to engage in human rights activities. According to the festival initiators, the events marked a new stage of the pro-Russian movement of the peninsula, having wide prospects. However, not all representatives of the pro-Russian movement of the Crimea considered this course of action sufficient to effectively safeguard the interests of the Russian community.

As the leaders of the pro-Russian radical wing were convinced, the People's Front «Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia», the implementation of cultural and educational actions failed to significantly alter the situation on the peninsula, moreover serving only as a mere screen for the further deployment of actions hostile to Russia¹⁵. In such a situation, the leaders of the People's Front may have considered it sensible to raise the question of the state self-determination of

¹⁴ *Защитникам Отечества посвящается: Резолюция митинга патриотических сил Крыма, посвященного Дню защитника Отечества г. Симферополь*, Портал русского народа Крыма, źródło: <http://www.ruscimea.ru/news.php?point=327> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

¹⁵ *Закончилась досудебное следствие по делу о призывах крымских общественников к воссоединению Крыма с Россией*, Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/1106066.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].

the Crimea and Sevastopol, seeking to attract attention and not being afraid of repressions (perhaps even subconsciously counting on them). Thus, in January 2008, the People's Front Coordinator V. Podyachiy stated at a press conference the need to implement the results of the January 20, 1991 referendum on the autonomy of Crimea (within the USSR, not Ukraine) and the adoption of the Declaration of Reunification of the Crimea with Russia. Subsequently, the Security Service of Ukraine launched a criminal prosecution of V. Podyach and other front activists on charges of undermining sovereignty and violating Ukraine's territorial integrity. This enabled the activists of the front to appeal to the judicial authorities of different instances, demanding the termination of the prosecution, that is, the court was used here as a tribune. In the meantime, activists of the front began to file lawsuits against the Crimean Parliament, demanding to repeal its decision on annulment of the 1992 Crimean constitution and adoption of the 1998 the constitution (Ukraine without Crimea)¹⁶. It should be noted that the leaders of the Russian Community of Crimea have found it necessary to support the activists of the People's Front during the trial, even despite sharp criticism on their address¹⁷.

It is worth mentioning, that with all the radicality of the slogans, representatives of pro-Russian organizations in the Crimea, including its more radical wing, sought to adhere to legal methods in their activities. According to the head of the human rights organization «Faith» S. Kompaniets, Russian non-governmental organizations of the Crimea have acted exclusively in the constitutional field of Ukraine throughout the years upon the Orange Revolution. The campaign «Ukraine without the Crimea» was conducted in the form of lawsuits, with the fight exclusively within the judicial bodies. In the course of this struggle, its participants emphasized that they wanted to fulfill their demands solely by nonviolent methods, relied on the will of the people (the results of the Crimean referendum of January 20, 1991). Accusations of «separatism» were dismissed, whereas spreading separatist sentiments was accounted for as a response to the policy, pursued by Kyiv, as well as violation of human rights in the Crimea¹⁸.

Human rights arguments and activities in the human rights field generally played a significant role in the programmatic materials and practical activities of organizations of the Russian population of the Crimea. The leaders of the pro-Russian movement in the Crimea sought to draw the attention of the world community to these problems. Hence, in September 2008 L. Grach, heading the Public Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Powers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, addressed his statement «On flagrant violation of the basic constitutional powers in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the ruling regime of Ukraine» to the UN, Council of Europe, OSCE and the governments of Russia and the US. The listed violations included restrictions on the scope of the Russian language use, conducting NATO exercises on the peninsula, violations of budgetary autonomy, and others. In the speeches of

¹⁶ В Крыму набирает обороты акция «Украина без Крыма», Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/985450.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].

¹⁷ Сергей Цехов: Крым «твоей силой» не возьмем, Росбалт, źródło: <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/04/03/631054.html> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

¹⁸ Все это мы уже слышали от товарища Сталина, Портал русского народа Крыма, źródło: <http://www.ruscrimea.ru/news.php?point=353> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

representatives of Russian organizations and members of the Crimean Parliament, protests against the official Kyiv's linguistic, educational and cultural-ideological policies were justified by references to international legal acts and laws of Ukraine. The reference to the current legislation served as a basis for bringing actions before the courts of various instances, up to the Constitutional Court. It is noteworthy that the organization «Russian-speaking Ukraine» was established in 2009 and had primarily human rights character.

However, by acting mainly in the human rights mainstream, organizations of the Russian population of Crimea encountered a serious problem, it being that, according to numerous statements by the pro-Russian movement, international human rights organizations refused to acknowledge the gravity of problems of the Russian population of Crimea. According to S. Tsekov, the only ethnic group that has attracted the attention of Western human rights activists are the Crimean Tatars, having suffered from Stalin's repression in due time. Representatives of international organizations and ambassadors of Western countries, seldom coming in contact with representatives of the aforementioned organizations, met the Tatar movements leaders on a regular basis. Western journalists and human rights activists, according to the leader of the Russian Community of the Crimea, took delight in discussing the return of Tatars and their plight. They generally ignored the proposals to compare the well-being of the Tatar and Slavic people.

Accordingly, the protest sentiment («separatism») in the Russian population mainly related to «outside incitement.» Claims that such sentiment is primarily linked to the policy, pursued by Kyiv, have aroused discontent among Western observers. As the leaders of the Russian organizations argued, it occurred due to the preservation of a wide field of Russian language use and the memory of the common Russian (or Soviet) past were interpreted in the West as a «vestige of Russian imperial claims» and were therefore excluded from the scope of activities of human rights organizations. Notable in this regard is the question that Western journalists and diplomats have often asked representatives of the Russian population in the Crimea: «Why do you love Russia so much?» S.Tsekov¹⁹ considered that such an approach defied the principle of the rule of human rights as a universal value and therefore should not be reflected in the activities of international organizations. According to the Russian community in the Crimea, this was a policy of double standards.

Representatives of the Russian population were convinced that tensions in the Crimea were also aggravated by the unequal attitude of Kyiv to different ethnic communities in the Crimea (primarily Slavic and Crimean Tatar population). Quite frequent were the accusations against the authorities of ignoring the land self-capture on the part of the Tatars, the activities of officially unregistered organizations (such as the Majlis of the Crimean Tatar People). The principles of recognition of Kosovo's independence by a number of Majlis figures as well as their demands for

¹⁹ Сергей Цехов: *Мы уже почувствовали свою силу*, «Крымское эхо», źródło: <http://kr-cho.info/index.php?name=News&cop=article&sid=1977> [odczyt 01.11.2014].

the transformation of the Crimean autonomy from territorial to national-territorial were also subversive, from the perspective of the Russian population. The estimation and interpretation of certain events in history, most notably the Great Patriotic War also was a subject of sharp discrepancies. On the whole, the state of the Russian population in the Crimea at that time was characterized by a widespread discontent, and even a direct protest, which needed serious measures by both the authorities of autonomy, Ukraine and Russia.

To conclude, it is reasonable to argue that over the period up to 2013, Russian organizations of the Crimea, in cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities, were governed by a wide range of different approaches. On the one hand, almost all organizations, seeking to remain in the legal field of Ukraine, resorted first and foremost to legal measures, addressing the protection of the cultural, linguistic and historical identity of the Russian population and referring their activities to the human rights protection. Therefore, most pro-Russian organizations and politicians were convinced proponents of the Crimea as part of Ukraine. Even those, objecting to such a state of affairs, were mostly acting within the legal scope. Instead, the protest methods, employed by various socio-political organizations included rallies, demonstrations, and peaceful marches. On the other hand, by 2013, and even prior to that a process of politicization of Russian ethnicity had taken place in the Crimea, with political motives prevailing over those national and cultural ones. Therefore, ideologically different parties and organizations were ready to change the status of the Crimea. The only thing is that they did not have the sufficient strength, resources and support, emerging only in 2013-2014. Therefore, it was be apparent a few years before the annexation of the Crimea that the radicalization of the organizations of the Russian population of the Crimea would be increase, lest there should be changes in the policy of the Ukrainian authorities and normalization of relations between Ukraine and Russia.

References

1. Виктор Янукович защищает только интересы олигархического клана: организация «Севастополь-Крым-Россия», Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/685803.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].
2. В Крыму набирает обороты акция «Украина без Крыма», Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/985450.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].
3. Волкогонева О., Полунов А., Политизация этничности в современной Украине: русская диаспора и межнациональные отношения в Крыму, «Россия и современный мир» 2008, nr. 2, S. 144–163.
4. Все это мы уже слышали от товарища Сталина, Портал русского народа Крыма, źródło: <http://www.ruscimea.ru/news.php?point=353> [odczyt 01.11.2019].
5. „Жареный петух“ для русских крымчан: Интервью О. Родивилова, Росбалт, źródło: <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/06/22/649201.html> [odczyt 01.11.2019].
6. Закончилось досудебное следствие по делу о призывах крымских общественников к воссоединению Крыма с Россией, Regnum, źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/1106066.html [odczyt 01.11.2019].

7. *Защитникам Отечества посвящается: Резолюция митинга патриотических сил Крыма, посвященного Дню защитника Отечества г. Симферополь*, Портал русского народа Крыма, [źródło: http://www.ruscrimea.ru/news.php?point=327](http://www.ruscrimea.ru/news.php?point=327) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
8. *Из резолюции митинга в Севастополе 24 августа 2005 г. и Декларации о провозглашении Народного фронта „Севастополь-Крым-Россия“*, Сайт Народного фронта «Севастополь-Крым-Россия», [źródło: http://sevrus.narod.ru/#v25](http://sevrus.narod.ru/#v25) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
9. *Крымчане отпраздновали день республики Крым*, Портал русского народа Крыма, [źródło: http://www.ruscrimea.ru/news.php?point=289](http://www.ruscrimea.ru/news.php?point=289) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
10. *Лидера крымских коммунистов раскритиковали за нежелание упразднить Конституцию Крыма (Украина)*, Regnum, [źródło: http://www.regnum.ru/news/1086245.html](http://www.regnum.ru/news/1086245.html) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
11. *На Украине есть пороховая бочка, у которой много фитилей и нетрезвая охрана: Крым за неделю*, Regnum, [źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/966564.html](http://www.regnum.ru/news/966564.html) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
12. *Партия регионов опять будет душить украинский народ своей любовью к России: Интервью Леонида Грача информационному агентству КБвМиМ*, Regnum, [źródło: www.regnum.ru/news/846818.html](http://www.regnum.ru/news/846818.html) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
13. *Притула В., Чи повернется экс-президент Криму Юрій Мєшков?*, Радио «Свобода», [źródło: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/946672.html](https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/946672.html) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
14. *Сергей Цеков: Крым «тупой силой» не возьмешь*, Росбалт, [źródło: http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/04/03/631054.html](http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/04/03/631054.html) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
15. *Сергей Цеков: Мы уже почувствовали свою силу, „Крымское эхо“*, [źródło: http://kr-eho.info/index.php?name=News&op=article&sid=1977](http://kr-eho.info/index.php?name=News&op=article&sid=1977) [odczyt 01.11.2014].
16. *Сколько крымчан планируют убить США при добыче нефти на Черноморском шельфе?*, «Крым за неделю», [źródło: http://vlasti.net/news/36051](http://vlasti.net/news/36051) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
17. *Слюсаренко О., Украина в контексте российской цивилизации*, Портал русского народа Крыма, [źródło: http://www.ruscrimea.ru/cms/?go=mon&in=view&id=12](http://www.ruscrimea.ru/cms/?go=mon&in=view&id=12) [odczyt 01.11.2019].
18. *Султин А., Чем пахнет свобода. К двадцатилетию создания общественно-политических организаций Крыма*, «Крымское время», [źródło: http://time4news.org/content/chem-pakhnet-svoboda-k-dvadsatiletiju-sozdaniya-obshchestvenno-politicheskikh-organizatsii](http://time4news.org/content/chem-pakhnet-svoboda-k-dvadsatiletiju-sozdaniya-obshchestvenno-politicheskikh-organizatsii) [odczyt 01.11.2019].

THE PECULIARITIES OF HYBRID INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION OF POLITICAL SYSTEM OF UKRAINE

Summary

The aim of this research is to study the peculiarities of hybrid institutionalization in the context of prospects for further democratization of political system in Ukraine.

The tasks of the research are to clarify the concept of democratization, to distinguish it from such terms as institutionalization and transformation; to establish the criteria for differentiating between hybrid and democratic institutionalization; to define the opportunities for the Ukrainian political system to get out of the institutional trap.

The results of the research testify to the hybrid nature of the political regime and institutional changes, contradictions between formal and informal institutions that obstruct democratization of the political system, highlight the prospects for institutionalization of democratic institutions by providing alternatives or assigning formal characteristics to authoritarian practices.

Keywords: political institute, democratization, political system, institutionalization of democracy, transformation of the political system, hybrid regime.

SZCZEGÓLNOŚCI INSTYTUCJONALIZACJI HYBRYDOWEJ I PERSPEKTYWY DEMOKRATYZACJI SYSTEMU POLITYCZNEGO UKRAINY

Streszczenie

Celem tych badań jest zbadanie osobliwości hybrydowej instytucjonalizacji w kontekście perspektyw dalszej demokratyzacji systemu politycznego na Ukrainie.

Do *zadań* badawczych należy wyjaśnienie pojęcia demokratyzacji, odróżnienie go od takich terminów, jak instytucjonalizacja i transformacja; ustanowienie kryteriów rozróżnienia między hybrydową i demokratyczną instytucjonalizacją; określić możliwości wyjścia ukraińskiego systemu politycznego z instytucjonalnej pułapki.

Wyniki badań świadczą o hybrydowym charakterze reżimu politycznego i zmianach instytucjonalnych, sprzeczności między instytucjami formalnymi i nieformalnymi, które utrudniają demokratyzację systemu politycznego, podkreślają perspektywy instytucjonalizacji

instytucji demokratycznych poprzez zapewnienie alternatyw lub przypisanie formalnych cech praktykom autorytarnym.

Słowa kluczowe: instytucja polityczna, demokratyzacja, system polityczny, instytucjonalizacja demokracji, transformacja systemu politycznego, reżim hybrydowy.

The peculiarities of transition processes in the post-Soviet states have posed a number of new challenges to researchers. One of the most urgent among them is to find ways to avoid regime hybridity and consolidate democracy in the current state of affairs. At the same time, application of the traditional transitological methodology is not effective enough to explain the tendencies, directions and features of institutional changes in the countries of Eastern Europe, since the transitional nature of the political system is becoming sustainable. This makes it necessary to consider a political regime that combines the features of authoritarianism and democracy not as a temporary form, but as a new specific variety.

Some contradictions in the democratization of the political institutions of the post-Soviet states may be explained applying the theoretical tenets of neo-institutionalism. In particular, the problems of dynamics and peculiarities of institutional changes have been studied by S. Levitsky, W. Merkel., and A. Croissant¹, R. Putnam², and G. Helmke³. They describe the mechanism for affirming the hybrid nature of the political regime by stabilizing the combination of formal democratic institutions and informal authoritarian practices.

The phenomenon of stabilization of the hybrid regime, which prevents political institutions from further democratization, has not bypassed Ukraine. Its mechanism and peculiarities have been described in details by Ukrainian researchers, namely K. Lavrenova⁴, Y. Matsievsky⁵, O. Stoyko⁶ and other.

However, the issue of effective interaction and co-operation between the formal and informal institutions in the process of democratization of the political system remains open to discussion, which makes the topic of this paper relevant to the current state of affairs.

First of all, it is necessary to identify and clarify the basic concepts of the study in order to avoid terminological ambiguity. Thus, the notions of institutionalization, democratization, transformation, transit, and transition of the political system are used simultaneously to refer to the process of institutional changes. However, it is necessary to mention that the term 'transformation' encompasses the whole process of social movement, changes of various character⁷. The notion of

¹ Merkel' V., Croissant A. *Formal'nyye i neformal'nyye instituty v defektnykh demokratiyakh* (I) 'Polis'. 2002. № 1. s. 6–17.

² Putnam R. *Tvorenniya demokratiyi: Triaditsiyi bromadyans'koyi aktyvnosti v suchasniy Italii*, 2001. 348 s.

³ Helmke G., Levitsky S. *Neformal'nyye instituty i sravnitel'naya politika: osnovnyye napravleniya issledovaniy*. 'Prognosis'. 2007. № 2. S. 188–211.

⁴ Lavrenova K.O. *Osoblyvosti rozvytku hibrydnobo politychnobo rezhymu v umovakh demokratyzatsiyi*. 2017. 279s.

⁵ Matsiyevskyy YU.V. *U pastsi hibrydnosti: zlyzbahy transformatsiyi politychnobo rezhymu v Ukraini (1991–2014): monografiya*, 2016. 345 s.

⁶ Stoiko O. M. *Transformatsiya politychnykh institutiv u suchasnykh perekhidnykh suspil'stvakh*, 2016. 416 s.

⁷ Novakova O. V. *Politychna modernizatsiya ta rozvytok demokratychnykh protsesiv v suchasniy Ukraini*, 2006. 216 s.

‘transit’ or ‘transition’ contains the connotation of ‘final destination’⁸. The term ‘institutionalization’ encompasses establishment of both democratic and authoritarian or mixed institutions. Whereas democratization is a continuous and endless process of improving democratic institutions that takes place not only in the transitional states but also in the countries with traditional democracy.

As a consequence, researchers of democratic transitional processes face the problem of differentiating dynamics of hybrid and stable institutions, as well as incomplete democratic institutionalization and a stable mixed political regime.

We are convinced that the difference between hybrid and democratic dynamics of political institutions lies in the facade nature of the former and the ability of the latter to reproduce itself, to adapt to new challenges by gradually changing particular functions of political institutions, while preserving characteristics and peculiarities of a system as a whole. The main criterion for differentiation between democratic and hybrid institutionalization is the unity or controversy of formal norms and informal attitudes (‘rules of the game’).

The theoretical substantiation for the *first* thesis is the methodology of neo-institutionalism. Thus, J. March and J. Olsen define an institution as a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are invariant to individuals and at the same time resilient to changing external circumstances as well as to preferences and expectations of citizens, or, in other words, “a collection of norms, rules and patterns of behavior that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations, possess a certain repertoire of procedures”⁹.

Summarizing various definitions, we can conclude that a political institution is an organization, a norm, a rule, and a mechanism for its implementation at the same time. In fact, all of these components describe the structure of a political institution, which is important for understanding the efficiency of political institutions. Thus, all its structural elements have to work in complex and increase the influence of each other. Otherwise, even the most democratic political institutions are not able to implement the principles of democracy into political practice or to shape democratic beliefs, values and norms of citizens’ behavior. It is absolutely clear that similar political institutions differ significantly depending on the form of government.

Therefore, in our opinion, it is appropriate to define a political institution as a system of organizations, rules and incentives that are intended to regulate political life and shape the behavior of political subjects.

In conditions of democracy, political stability is rather volatile because of a change in configurations of actors and their strategies. However, due to the established formal institutions and procedures and the consent of all policy makers to abide by the ‘rules of the game’ they have set,

⁸ Kolodiy A. F. *Na shlyakhu do bromadyans’koho suspilstva: Teoretychni zasady y sotsiokulturni peredumovy demokratychnoyi transformatsiyi v Ukraini*, 2002. - s. 85, Romanyuk O. I. «Kinets> tranzytolohiyi» chy kryza yiyi pervynnoyi paradyhmy? *Polit. Menedzhment*. 2007. № 2. S. 9.

⁹ Olson, V. 2000. *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist dictatorships*. - New York: Basic books. p. 21–22

the political system is capable of self-regulation. It is the ability to reproduce a political system applying democratic methods that promotes successful transition to democracy.

At the same time, a hybrid political system is not able to ensure adaptation to external challenges. It becomes significant in times of crisis in society. The system begins to gravitate towards authoritarianism, leading to aggravation of the situation, escalation of social conflicts, and social explosion in the form of mass actions of civil disobedience.

The differences between hybrid and democratic institutionalization stem from the peculiarities of the hybrid political regime. Representatives of neo-institutionalism believe that a democratic system is characterized by dominance of formal institutions and indicates readiness of major society groups to follow universal norms and rules that are common to all. On the contrary, predominance of informal institutions based on particularistic norms and rules, most often such as clientelism and corruption, testifies to democratic deficit.

In the field of political life, both formal and informal institutions are essential, especially under the conditions of transitional political regime. This is due to their peculiarities and functions. *Formal* institutions are based on clear principles (legal acts, laws, decrees, regulations, instructions), perform managerial and supervisory functions on the basis of sanctions related to promotion and punishment (administrative and criminal). Such institutions include the state and its bodies, the army, etc.

Informal institutions operate on the basis of norms consolidated in public opinion, traditions, and customs. These include various cultural and social foundations, interest groups, etc. Informal institutions are quite enduring and change gradually and slowly. They may be created in the process of evolution on the basis of interaction between major policy makers. G. Helmke and S. Levitsky define informal institutions as accepted in society, usually unwritten rules that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels¹⁰.

However, in the context of a transitional political system, attention should be paid to the fact that adoption of informal practices leads to formation of a hybrid regime, since informal institutions are mostly authoritarian. They emerged due to the inefficiency of official democratic institutions resulting from evolution of institutions under undemocratic regime, and become a kind of alternative to formal structures compensating for their weakness. In this regard, old informal institutions conflict with the newly created institutions reducing their efficiency. As a consequence, the process of institutional adaptation is complicated, institutions are partially destroyed immediately after their establishment, and institutional reforms fail. "A large group of such countries is characterized by a dense interweaving of clientelist and personalist networks, corruption and lobbying within the state system"¹¹.

Similar substitution of formal and democratically legitimized institutions with informal rules of political activity can be performed both from above and from below in a society. Deformalization of institutions develops from above, when the executive elected in a democratic way extends

¹⁰ Helmke G., Levitsky S. *Neformal'nyye instituty i sravnitel'naya politika : osnovnyye napravleniya issledovaniy*. Prognosis. 2007. № 2. S. 28.

¹¹ Lavrenova K.O. *Osoblyvosti rozvytku hibrydnoho politychnoho rezhymu v umovakh demokratyzatsiyi*. 2017. 279 s.

its prerogatives as a result of constitutional restraints and balances. If a weak civil society with insufficiently accumulated 'social capital' but with a high potential for conflict, mutual mistrust and systematic spread of corruption and traditions of clientelism neglects the institutional rules, deprives the institutions of their influence or 'colonizes' them in its private or corporate interests, the process develops from below. Moreover, lack of social and political trust, which is manifested primarily in the decline of real electoral participation, extends to other institutions of civil society, such as parties, trade unions, and public organizations. It leads to mutual distrust among citizens (mostly in case of their belonging to different social and cultural layers), etc.

This political and institutional differentiation is not only theoretical. In practice, informal restrictions from above are often interwoven with those that appear from below and vice versa. This interweaving may result in various types of defective democratic regimes in which ruling class groups co-exist with segments of society through informal but enduring clientelist relations. Constitutionally defined mechanisms of representation become exhausted and partially or temporarily decline. In this case, deformation of political decision-making deprives people of their sovereignty guaranteed by civic representation.

According to G. O'Donnell, widespread corruption in any state system is a consequence of integrating informal, often clientelist structures of elite groups into formal institutions of executive, legislative and judicial power¹². As a result of this incorporation of informal principles into formal rules, constitutionally legitimized institutions are either limited in favor of profit maximization strategies for individuals or elite cartels, or become completely powerless. In this case, political leaders are exempted from both horizontal democratic and legal constitutional control.

W. Merkel and A. Croissant suggest that in the medium and long term, such survival at the expense of informal institutionalization promoting corruption and personal abuse of power has a negative impact on consolidation of new democracies and the ability to reform hybrid regimes¹³. Moreover, such practices restrain the fundamental democratic principles of formally equal chances for political representation of social interests, since the actors who possess the extralegal resources necessary to stabilize informal mechanisms and networks, gain a privileged access to political power and formal institutions.

However, we agree with K. Lavrenova's conclusion that hybrid regimes operate not contrary to, but due to a combination of democratic and authoritarian institutions and a combination of both formal and informal incentives and restrictions of their interaction¹⁴. In this context, the concept of dual institutionalization, suggested by E. Golovakha and N. Panina, is worth attention. According to it, co-existence of old and new institutions is a stabilizing factor in a transitional society¹⁵.

¹² O'Donnell G. *Delegativnaya demokratiya*. 'Predely vlasti', 1997. №2-3. 28-34.

¹³ Merkel' V., Croissant A. *Formal'nyye i neformal'nyye instituty v defektnykh demokratiyakh* (1) 'Polis', 2002. № 1. s. 25.

¹⁴ Lavrenova K.O. *Osoblyvosti rozvytku hibrydnoho politychnoho rezhymu v umovakh demokratyzatsiyi*. 2017. 279 s.

¹⁵ Holovakha YE., Panina N. *Ukrayins'ke suspil'stvo 1992-2008: Sotsiolohichnyy monitoryng*, 2008. 580 s.

E. Golovakha also points out that old institutions may not be involved for a long time and acquire legitimacy only when legalized new institutions become ineffective. A striking example of this process is the Ukrainian reality, where the institutions of the Soviet society have lost their legal status but have not lost their traditional legitimacy – people’s support of the ideology of state paternalism, preservation of state ownership of large enterprises, socialist benefits for the population, and privileges for the ruling elite, etc. At the same time, the illegal (shadow) institutions of the Soviet society – shadow market, ‘backstairs influence’ and corruption, organized crime, double morality – were transformed into legal institutions of a transitional society, but did not acquire proper legitimacy due to their mass perception as ‘legalized lawlessness.’ Thus, the source of reproduction of informal authoritarian institutions is legitimacy in the mass consciousness.

In addition, informal institutions are difficult to unambiguously separate and differentiate from formal institutions, since they may be state-formed and not always related to political culture, may develop as parallel structures, or function within official bodies.

We are also convinced that informal institutions are able to positively influence the processes of democratization of transitional political systems. Thus, “informal institutions (coalition presidentialism, public disobedience) may improve the quality of democracy by serving as a functional equivalent of formal channels of participation”¹⁶.

This thesis may be proved by such distinctive features of informal institutions as lack of coercion in regulation of social relations, and natural character of their formation. Due to these features, informal institutions become a mechanism for overcoming inefficiency of formal institutions in a state, regulatory inflation, and a deficit of national values.

To some extent, existence of informal rules is objective, since legal norms cannot describe all possible variants of social and political practice.

Also, it is often the informal institutions that are the basis of democratic transformations, the bearer of progressive actions that require changes of official institutions. Thus, most revolutionary actions begin with the activities of underground organizations, for example, the foundations of Soviet authoritarianism were shaken by the activities of the Sixtiers, human rights activists, and civil disobedience actions that had no official status.

Countries with the so-called ‘unwritten’ constitutions may be a good example of positive influence of informal institutions on the democratization process. Formation of their political systems was based on informal institutions – customary law, political traditions, court precedents, and arrangements that subsequently acquired official status.

It is necessary to mention the fact that many informal institutions are created on the basis of traditions, customs, and developed from actual political practice, therefore having a natural character. This is how transition to democracy in Western Europe took place. However, the values of democracy in Western European countries have been formed for centuries. That is why it is obvious that they cannot be established in a transitional state for a short period of time.

¹⁶ Stoiko O. M. *Transformatsiya politychnykh institutiv u suchasnykh perekhidnykh suspil'stvakh*, 2016. S. 344.

Finally, despite the length and complexity of informal institutionalization in comparison to formal establishment of democracy, informal rules and institutions are more enduring. They ensure the continuity of political development, transform democratic methods and rules of political play into the internal set of beliefs of all participants in the political process, that is considered as one of possible options for achieving the goals. Therefore, it takes time and the will of the political elite to establish democratic informal institutions that will yield results, but in the long run.

In other words, it is absolutely wrong to identify informal institutions with authoritarianism or an obstruction of democratization. This may be explained by their objective nature, flexibility and the ability to influence the behavior of major political actors in a mild, subconscious way.

At the same time, the practice of the post-Soviet states is based on the contradiction between formal and informal institutions. In transitional political systems, institutional uncertainty leads to a lack of citizens' confidence in new institutions, and discredits democratic values. It is "firstly, the authoritarian legacy of informal practices and, secondly, accumulation of economic and political problems of the post-undemocratic system transferred from the authoritarian phase"¹⁷ that deepen the process of delegitimizing the institutions of democracy.

We suggest that the nature of the influence of informal institutions on the process of democratization is also considerably dependent on their interaction with the formal ones, as well as on the extent to which the areas of influence exerted by formal and informal institutions overlap. As some researchers believe, "informal structures influence the performance of formal institutions in a significant and often unexpected way"¹⁸. Thus, the informal rules of interaction between the legislative and executive power often encourage the president to exceed his or her powers. However, there are cases where the head of state in a presidential republic, due to unwritten rules, does not apply all the levers of influence determined by the constitution (the USA, Chile).

To analyze the nature of interaction between formal and informal institutions, it is advisable to use typologization suggested by G. Helmke and S. Levitsky, where four types of informal institutions are identified: complementary, accommodative, competing and substitutive¹⁹. Complementary institutions exist where formal institutions are not available or used in someone's personal interests. They often increase the effectiveness of formal institutions by enhancing motivation for subordination. An example of this is templates and working instructions interacting with bureaucratic structures.

Substitutive institutions compensate for the inefficiency or weakness of formal institutions, allowing them to overcome regulatory inflation.

¹⁷ Lavrenova K.O. *Osoblyvosti rozvytku hibrydnogo politychnoho rezhymu v umovakh demokratyzatsiyi*. 2017. 279 s.

¹⁸ Stoiko O. M. *Transformatsiya politychnykh institutiv u suchasnykh perekhidnykh suspil'stvakh*, 2016. S. 344.

¹⁹ Helmke G., Levitsky S. *Neformal'nyye instituty i sravnitel'naya politika: osnovnyye napravleniya issledovaniy*. 'Prognosis'. 2007. № 2. S. 28.

Accommodative informal institutions change the consequences of complying with official rules without openly violating them. They do not contribute to the effectiveness of formal institutions, but stabilize them because they prevent demands for changes in formal institutions.

Competing informal rules co-exist with the formal ones allowing to bend or ignore the latter. The main obstruction of democratization in the post-Soviet political systems is, for the most part, competing informal institutions such as corruption, patrimonialism, and clientelism. Their positive role is that they testify to the systemic crisis of certain official institutions and indicate the need for their reform.

The classification mentioned above has been introduced into this research due to the necessity to identify the role of various informal institutions in democratization of the Ukrainian political system. Such an analysis will help outline the ways of institutional reform (granting formal status to informal institutions, improving formal institutions, or creating an alternative to destructive informal rules).

The best way of interaction between formal and informal institutions is when the latter create or enhance the motivation for subordination to the former. Ultimately, the contradictions between formal and informal institutions facilitate creation of new formal institutions that are more related to informal practices and the interests of significant actors²⁰.

Let us illustrate the obtained results with some examples from the Ukrainian political practice. Political stability in Ukraine is situational in nature (e.g. formation of majority coalitions). Instead, dynamics of political institutions are only superficial in nature and do not affect real changes in the political system.

There has been a fluctuation between authoritarianism and democracy throughout the years of independence. At the same time, formal demonstrative intensification of democratic transformations took place under the public pressure and was accompanied by actions of civil disobedience. But introduction of new amendments to the legislation on behalf or at the initiative of the people was aimed at introducing additional restrictions for 'weak' players in order to reduce the risk of losing elections and increase electoral victory. It destabilizes the institutional system of collective management and legitimization of the government.

Under such conditions, authoritarian informal rules exert considerable influence both outside the formal institutions (financial industrial groups) and inside them ('party of power'). As a consequence, formal institutions simply become the facade of informal institutions, legitimizing power. In this way, a hybrid type of political regime is approved and stabilized.

The conflict potential of Ukrainian society also proves the controversy of formal and informal institutions, since in the broader context they represent a confrontation between old and new values, a gap between the formally proclaimed rights and the possibilities for their realization.

²⁰ Merkel V., Croissan A. *Formal'nyye i neformal'nyye instituty v defektnykh demokratiyakh* (I) 'Polis'. 2002. № 1. s. 25.

Dominance of authoritarian informal institutionalization, that contradicts the principles of democratic institutions and promotes their inefficiency, may be revealed by a lack of stable majority in the parliament, constant changes in the structure of the governing coalition and electoral legislation, as well as inefficient party structuring that results only in changing party names, but not in substituting their members.

Thus, following the constitutional reforms, the status of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has been repeatedly changed in order to find an optimal model of interest representation. There are some cases in the history of Ukraine, when creation of parliamentary coalitions distorted the will of voters, and the coalitions themselves were situational in their nature and quickly disintegrated.

However, prevalence of informal authoritarian practices has always led to gradual decline of democratic reforms. Institutionalization of a political system may pass through the following cycles. The 1st cycle may be called neo-patrimonial. Its beginning may be traced back to the collapse of the Soviet authoritarianism following students' actions. It is connected with population's disappointment in the democratic values caused by deterioration of the social and economic situation, dishonest privatization, concentration of power in the President's hands.

The 2nd, oligarchic, cycle relates to 'Ukraine without Kuchma' actions, attempts to carry out constitutional reforms that were never implemented and gradual subsidence of revolutionary sentiment.

The 3rd, clientelist, cycle began with Kuchma's authoritarianism losing its power after 'the Orange Revolution.' The ideals of 'the Orange Revolution' were never implemented because of the lack of consensus among the ruling elites and the struggle for power that led to V. Yanukovich's victory in the presidential election. The parliamentary majority was formed by the pro-presidential political force.

Finally, the 4th, populist, cycle began with the events connected with 'the Revolution of Dignity' in 2013-2014. Currently, as well as it has been for the last years, informal political institutions are competitive with formal ones. Thus, the institution of separation of powers is inefficient because of the dualism of the executive branch, and is leveled by the clientelist method of interaction among the political elites. People's power is degenerating into populism. Parliamentarism is facing destructive actions by the opposition (the latter still has no formal status in Ukraine). Political participation is facing the problem of state paternalism. Pluralism leads only to disintegration and conflict. That is, the distance between formal and informal institutions remains. It is characterized by interaction of 'public' and 'shadow', declared and hidden interests, as well as formal and informal functional manifestations.

The new government did not demonstrate a tendency to adhere to formal democratic rules and procedures, first of all, in restoring the parliamentary-presidential form of republic according to the Law of the Verkhovna Rada on declaring the Constitutional Court decision of 2010 invalid and reinstating the Constitution adopted in 2004. After all, neither the Constitution of Ukraine,

nor the constitutional practice presumes any instructions for such mechanisms for amending the Basic Law. This provides reasons to consider the constitutional process incomplete and the Constitution – illegitimate, giving ground to further disputes over its validity.

At the same time, restoration of the parliamentary-presidential form of government does not exclude the dualism of the executive power. As before, constitutional norms enable the head of state and the parliament to ‘share’ the executive power, leaving just a few administrative tools for the government. In such circumstances, it becomes a problem to maintain stability and efficiency of the executive branch, in particular, and the state as a whole. There are constant disputes over further amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine. Since a consolidated version of the Constitution was not drafted, the Constitutional reform was delayed for an indefinite period of time. Till present, a situational balance has been reached to satisfy the major political actors, but this has not ruled out the threat of reproducing conflict environment in the relationships between the president, parliament and government. Therefore, the issue of amendments to the Constitution will be raised again in the course of election rhetoric and the struggle for influence on the government.

The elections in 2019 showed nihilism of the citizens regarding the whole system of government brought to absurdity. Weariness of institutional uncertainty in Ukraine leads to increase in the role of populism as a mechanism for legitimizing and exercising political power. Rapid development of the media, mostly their networks, intensifies the populist tendencies in modern politics. M. Rozumny fairly points out: “As a consequence of such approaches, new political projects emerge on the basis of network, ‘viral’ and other mobilization technologies, financed by the alternative, including external, sources. Advertisements of party brands are becoming more aggressive, figures of party leaders – more effective, and the environment of ‘party activists’ – more professional, acquiring signs of corporate secrecy”²¹.

In general, the obtained conclusions outline possible strategies for getting out of the institutional trap and promoting further democratization. First of all, it is advisable to search for the strategies of replacing competing informal institutions with their formal alternatives, to institutionalize by dislodging informal institutions, and to change institutional character from authoritarian to democratic.

According to G. Helmke and S. Levitsky, the factors of evolution of informal institutions are the following:

- firstly, changes in the structure of formal institutions that will help overcome regulatory uncertainty in case of complementary informal institutions, increase the efficiency of formal institutions in case of competing informal institutions that aren’t able to survive competition, and subordination to them is becoming disadvantageous to policy makers;
- secondly, weakening of actors who defend certain informal institutions, for instance, increasing the number of middle class electorate, destroys the basis of clientelism by reducing voters’ dependence on material goods;

²¹ Rozumny M. M. *Vskykyky natsional'noho samovyznachenmya*. 2016. – S. 87.

- thirdly, gradual decay of authoritarian informal institutions will be intensified by the change in values of the vast majority of population, which is explained by the lack of loyalty to the old authoritarian practices²².

In the context of Ukrainian realities, the first factor can be realized through introducing details and their regulatory approval in many democratic procedures, including distribution of powers between representative and executive bodies, the right of legislative initiative, dissolution of the parliament, exercising the right to veto, the structure and size of presidential administration as well as other advisory bodies, formation of parliamentary coalitions and interaction between parliamentary groups, reaching coalition agreements, defining the operation rules for the parliament of certain convocation, holding debates, discipline within party factions, achieving parity between professionalism and periodic changing, party representation of state employees. The key issues of creating an alternative to authoritarian practices are development of local self-government institutions, sanctioned lobbying, and independent media.

Also, important foundations for democratization include the ability of civil society institutions to decentralize powers, facilitate exercising managerial functions and ensure interrelation between public authorities and the public, public control, and conventional forms of political participation.

The need for Ukrainians to change their value orientations is manifested by the fact that the efficiency of political institutions is based on the consent of people to live in such an institutional space, where both old and new institutions operate, providing, due to their contradictory co-existence, with all the institutionalization attributes that are necessary for social integration and stability. This thesis is supported by the results of various studies. For example, in 2019, 44% of the citizens partially or fully justify corruption. 25.5% of the citizens admitted to giving a bribe for the last year. The reasons for such actions, mentioned by the respondents, included both hints from representatives of certain structures and their own initiative, driven by their confidence in achieving results faster and easier²³.

That is, a high level of corruption is caused by a loyal attitude to this phenomenon, a habit, or even misunderstanding of what exactly should be considered a bribe. As a result, the fight against corruption is reduced to claims and scrutiny of small-scale officials, neglecting its real scope. Undoubtedly, in such circumstances, any institutional methods of dealing with this phenomenon are doomed to fail. However, setting up alternative private administrative service centers can turn bribery into a costly and pointless procedure.

Another effective strategy for further democratization is the process of isomorphism, which requires intensification of interaction among organizations, emergence of inter-organizational structures (unions, associations of organizations), increase in the level of information load on

²² Helmke G., Levitsky S. *Neformal'nyye instituty i sravnitel'naya politika: osnovnyye napravleniya issledovaniya*. 'Prognosis'. 2007. № 2. S. 28.

²³ *Doslidzhennya u sferi koruptsiyi: osnovni rezul'taty i rekomendatsiyi*. TSPPR. 2019. <http://www.pravo.org.ua/ua/news/20873580-doslidzheniya-u-sferi-koruptsiyi-osnovni-rezultati-i-rekomendatsiyi>

organizations, identification of organization itself as part of organizational field, which promotes their active interaction with other organizations. At the same time, isomorphism can be carried out either by pressure from other institutions-organizations or by problems with legitimacy, as well as by following the models of successful institutions, by professionalization, when, in order to increase their efficiency, institutions-organizations prefer to increase specialization in a certain field.

Conclusions

Thus, the notion of transformation should be distinguished from the notions of democratization and institutionalization, since their identification leads to wrong evaluation of the current state of affairs in a political system. Transformation involves some completion of the process of institutional change, and institutionalization does not always entail establishment of democratic institutions. Democratization, on the other hand, is a continuous process of development of political institutions in order to establish theoretical principles and values of democracy in the process of adapting the political system to new circumstances and challenges of the external environment. That is why, we believe that Ukrainian political system is in urgent need of democratization, but hybrid institutionalization is a major obstacle on its way. Analysis of Ukrainian contemporary history reveals establishment of a hybrid regime characterized by a combination of formal democratic institutions and informal ones.

Institutionalization in Ukraine has already been completed, but it has a non-democratic hybrid character, as informal institutionalization of authoritarian practices prevails, and institutions that have become sustainable do not meet the requirements of the dynamic type of stability of the political system, do not facilitate its adaptation and do not change the conditions for the society's existence.

Nowadays, informal institutions and relations prevail over formal ones and affirm authoritarian practices obstructing democratization of political system in Ukraine. This may be explained by weakness of democratic institutions, instability of legislation, regulatory deficit, inability of ordinary citizens to comprehend the essence and values of democracy. In general, informal institutions arise objectively as a result of interaction between policy-makers, so, it is worth searching for ways of their constructive interrelation with formal rules.

Therefore, political research should involve such an important aspect as the search for mechanisms of purposeful influence on the transformation of political institutions to ensure dynamic stability, constant self-development and self-improvement of democratic institutions in terms of their informal procedures, to provide official status for democratic informal institutions and create a legal alternative to authoritarian informal practices that will make the latter decay.

The peculiarity of hybrid institutionalization is the constant change in the formal characteristics of political institutions, which creates the likelihood of transformational processes, but does not change the fundamentally mixed nature of the political regime. It is carried out in

favour of stronger actors who seek to consolidate their position or legitimize specific political decisions. At the same time, hybrid institutionalization is capable of ensuring only the situational balance of the political system, but does not ensure the natural evolution of relations and processes.

It is also important to adhere to a broad definition of a political institution that allows understanding it as an organization, norm and process of its implementation at the same time. This approach proves that it is impossible to establish democratic values and patterns of behavior under the conditions of hybrid institutionalization.

The issue of further democratization of the political system in Ukraine implies its removal from the state of hybrid stability, characterized by a constant change in the formal characteristics and characteristics of the political system maintaining the leading role of informal institutions and procedures that do not lead to real institutional changes, despite the inefficiency of the whole institutional system.

Thus, the priority of the current institutionalization of democracy is the implementation of reforms aimed at ensuring co-operation between formal and informal institutions. In other words, it is necessary to create conditions under which existing informal institutions will have to act in the legal field and use democratic methods of influence on the government. In this regard, perspective measures to be taken should encompass adoption of laws "On Lobbyism" and "On Opposition", establishing effective communication links between the elite and the masses, awareness-raising activities to enhance the political culture of citizens, officials and political elite.

THE FEATURES OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THE PRISM OF PARTY SYSTEMS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

The article is dedicated to analyzing the peculiarities of minority governments through the prism of the party systems of the European parliamentary democracies. The researcher noted that it is exactly the characteristics of party systems in the vast majority of the European parliamentary democracies that are decisive factors that influence the government-formation process and the functioning and accountability of governments, including minority governments. It was determined that of all the characteristics of party systems that influence the structuring of minority governments in parliamentary democracies, it is advisable to distinguish between different quantitative and ideological dimensions of explanations. The author found that it is the quantitative and ideological determinants that influence the particularities of the formation, functioning and responsibility of minority governments, in particular at the example of the European parliamentary democracies.

Keywords: government, minority government, governmental cabinet, party system, parties, parliamentary democracies, European countries.

Надія Панчак-Бялоблoцка

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ УРЯДІВ МЕНШОСТІ КРІЗЬ ПРИЗМУ ПАРТІЙНИХ СИСТЕМ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЙ

Проаналізовано особливості урядів меншості крізь призму партійних систем європейських парламентських демократій. Констатовано, що саме характеристики партійних систем у переважній більшості європейських парламентських демократій є вирішальними чинниками, які впливають на урядово-формотворчий процес і функціонування та відповідальність урядів, у тому числі й урядів меншості. Детерміновано, що з усіх характеристик партійних систем, які впливають на структурування урядів меншості у парламентських демократіях головно доцільно виокремлювати різні кількісні й ідеологічні виміри пояснень. Виявлено, що саме означенні кількісні й ідеологічні чинники впливають на особливості формування, функціонування та відповідальності урядів меншості, зокрема на прикладі європейських парламентських демократій.

Ключові слова: уряд, уряд меншості, урядовий кабінет, партійна система, партії, парламентська демократія, країни Європи.

The formation of minority governments, as well as peculiarities of their performance and responsibility, depend on numerous factors, such as rational (rational-logical), partological and institutional. It is apparent in cases when minority governments are typical of parliamentary democracies, as the majority of European democracies (regardless of the form and system of government), because it is in parliamentary democracies that governments are regarded as institutions structured through parties and elections, party and electoral systems, party politics, party ideology, power and opposition. Respectively, the features of party systems in various European countries play a key role in pointing out inherent characteristics of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies (particularly their formation frequency and performance parameters). The point is that the peculiarities of party systems in the vast majority of European parliamentary democracies are decisive factors, affecting the government-forming process, as well as government performance and accountability, including minority governments. Therefore, systematizing and elaborating new scientific knowledge about the features of minority governments through the lens of European parliamentary democracies party systems is a topical and urgent task for comparative political science, especially given that minority governments occur in nearly all European countries, becoming more widespread nowadays.

In this regard, political science is represented by ample amount of research concerning the influence of party systems on the definition and structuring of minority governments in particular and governments on the whole. Among the most distinguished scholars to contribute to the study of minority governments the following authors should be named: K. Benoit and M. Laver¹, I. Budge and M. Laver², R. Dalton³, J. Huber and R. Inglehart⁴, W. Müller, T. Bergman and K. Strøm⁵, F. Mueller-Rommel⁶, G. Sartori⁷, M. Taylor and V. Herman⁸, N. Schofield⁹

¹ Benoit K., Laver M., *Party policy in modern democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2006.

² Budge I., Laver M., *Coalition Theory, Government Policy and Party Policy*, [w:] Laver M., Budge I. (eds.), *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1992, s. 1–14; Budge I., Laver M., *The Relationship Between Party and Coalition Policy in Europe: An Empirical Synthesis*, [w:] Laver M., Budge I. (eds.), *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1992, s. 409–430; Budge I., Robertson D., Heard D., *Ideology, strategy and party change*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1987.; Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.

³ Dalton R., The quantity and the quality of party systems: Party system polarization, its measurement, and its consequences, *Comparative Political Studies* 2008, vol 41, nr. 7, s. 899–920.

⁴ Huber J., Inglehart R., Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies, *Party Politics* 1995, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 73–111.

⁵ Müller W., Bergman T., Strøm K., *Coalition theory and cabinet governance: an introduction*, [w:] Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T., (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 1–50; Müller W., Strøm K., *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.; Müller W., Strøm K., *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

⁶ Müller-Rommel F., Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 2008, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 810–831.

⁷ Sartori G., *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2005.

⁸ Taylor M., Herman V., Party Systems and Government Stability, *American Political Science Review* 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28–37.

⁹ Schofield N., Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments, *European Journal of Political Research* 1993, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 1–35.

and the like. Based on explorations, it is worth stating that, among all the peculiarities of party systems, affecting the structuring of governments, including minority governments, in parliamentary democracies, the so-called quantitative and ideological analysis dimensions should be outlined. The quantitative dimension mainly refers to the share (percentage) of seats of the largest and the two runner-up parliamentary parties, as well as the level of fragmentation or fractionation of the parliament. Alternatively, the ideological dimension of the analysis focuses on either the presence or absence of the largest ideologically centrist party, as well as distribution of ideological, extremist parties in party systems. Respectively, the key research and analytical objective of the proposed article lies in systematizing and updating information on the effect of quantitative and ideological factors on the peculiarities of minority governments' formation, performance and accountability, based on the experience of European parliamentary democracies.

A number of scientific papers have attempted to testify that in minority situations (when no party in the parliament has an absolute majority), the minority governments formation typically occurs when proportions of the largest parties are as high as possible, making up approximately 50% of the nominal composition of the parliament. As a result, such major parliamentary parties are most likely to form minority government cabinets (including coalition and single-party governments), with opposition parties being in such a case considerably weakened¹⁰. The correlation of the minority governments formation frequency to the share (percentage) of the seats of the two largest parliamentary parties also requires rigorous verification. In this regard we share the idea, proposed by K. Strom¹¹, in terms of which minority cabinets whose governmental parties are supported and represented in the legislature should be classified into «near-winning» and «non-winning», based on a percentage correlation of the deputy seats of government parties. In view of this, the scientist proposes to point out the following varieties of minority governments: those enjoying the support and representation in parliaments at the level of 45% or more of their nominal composition; enjoying the 35-45% support and parliament representation of their nominal composition; enjoying support and representation in parliaments at less than 35% of their composition. Having slightly modified K. Strom's approach, by adding an indicator of the percentage of the largest parliamentary party's seats, we further distinguish political systems in which minority governments are formed in case the percentage of seats of the largest parliamentary party is as follows: a) more than 50% ($a > 50.0\%$); b) higher than or equal to 45%, yet less than or equal to 50% ($45.0\% \leq a \leq 50.0\%$); c) higher than or equal to 35% but less than 45% ($35.0\% \leq a \leq 44.9\%$); d) less than 35% ($a < 35.0\%$ or $a \leq 34.9\%$). We apply it to the European countries (Table 1)

¹⁰ Herman V. Pope J., *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1973, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 197.

¹¹ Strom K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199–226.

Table 1. Average national and regional quantitative and ideological parameters of party systems as well as the minority governments formation frequency (to all party governments) in European parliamentary democracies (as of December 2015)¹²

Country	LPSS, %	IPLP	TLPSS, %	ANPP	ENEP	ENPP	ACPLP	PIPS	SSEP %	MGFF
Positive parliamentarism systems in Western Europe										
Belgium (since 1946)	29,6	5,5	52,9	9,5	6,6	5,8	+/-	0,38	4,8	0,152
Greece (since 1974)	52,3	5,5	84,7	5,4	3,3	2,6	-	0,43	7,1	0,095
Ireland (since 1944)	48,3	6,1	78,9	5,4	3,4	2,9	+	0,32	1,2	0,462
Spain (since 1977)	48,5	5,6	83,4	11,3	3,8	2,8	-	0,43	0,4	0,692
Italy (since 1945)	38,7	5,5	64,4	11,9	4,7	4,2	+	0,45	22,5	0,419
Malta (since 1962)	52,5	5,1	100,0	2,0	2,1	2,0	+	0,17	0,0	0,067
Germany (since 1949)	40,1	4,5	74,0	5,4	3,8	3,4	-	0,35	3,4	0,000
Finland (since 2000)	24,9	6,2	47,8	8,8	6,2	5,4	+	0,34	0,0	0,000
France (1945–1958)	27,3	4,1	51,1	5,8	5,1	4,9	-	0,58	26,3	0,115
Average in the group	40,2	5,3	70,8	7,3	4,3	3,8	+/-	0,38	7,3	0,222
Systems of positive parliamentarism in Central and Eastern Europe										
Bulgaria (since 1990)	45,4	5,9	71,4	5,3	4,6	3,4	-	0,37	1,5	0,556
Estonia (since 1992)	31,1	6,6	57,1	6,4	6,0	4,7	-	0,40	1,1	0,267
Latvia (since 1990)	31,1	6,6	57,1	6,4	6,0	4,7	-	0,40	1,1	0,391
Lithuania (since 1990)	37,2	5,3	58,1	10,1	6,6	4,7	-	0,37	7,3	0,333
Poland (since 1989)	39,0	5,2	67,4	7,2	6,3	4,2	-	0,35	7,0	0,286
Romania (since 1990)	40,4	3,8	61,1	8,3	4,4	4,3	+	0,28	1,6	0,667
Slovakia (since 1990)	38,1	4,5	56,7	6,8	5,9	4,4	+/-	0,37	3,5	0,333
Slovenia (since 1990)	29,9	4,5	51,9	7,6	6,3	5,4	+/-	0,38	1,6	0,250

¹² *Conventions:* LPSS – largest party share of seats; IPLP – Ideological positioning of the largest party; TLPSS – two largest parties share of seats; ANPP – absolute number of parliamentary parties; ENEP – effective number of electoral parties; ENPP – effective number of parliamentary parties; ACPLP – availability of the Centrist (left-centrist or right-centrist), as the largest party; PIPS – polarisation index of party systems (Dalton); SSEP – share of seats by extremist (radical) parties; MGFF – minority governments formation frequency.

Hungary (since 1990)	49,7	5,0	74,8	6,1	4,0	2,9	–	0,45	7,8	0,182
Croatia (since 2000)	38,2	6,3	66,7	12,4	4,5	4,1	–	0,43	5,7	0,444
Czech Republic (since 1992)	37,0	5,0	63,4	6,1	5,5	4,1	–	0,50	16,9	0,357
Average in the group	37,9	5,3	62,3	7,5	5,5	4,3	–	0,39	5,0	0,370
The systems of negative parliamentarism in Western Europe										
Austria (since 1945)	44,3	4,8	83,5	3,9	3,0	2,8	+	0,37	11,2	0,061
Denmark (since 1945)	34,4	4,3	55,9	10,2	4,9	4,9	+	0,43	6,7	0,921
Iceland (since 1946)	37,2	7,3	64,8	4,9	4,1	3,8	–	0,45	6,0	0,187
Luxembourg (since 1945)	39,8	6,2	69,3	5,1	4,0	3,5	+	0,41	7,4	0,000
Netherlands (since 1946)	30,2	5,2	57,2	9,8	5,2	4,9	+/-	0,38	10,9	0,250
Norway (since 1945)	43,4	3,4	64,7	6,7	4,3	3,7	–	0,43	11,6	0,645
Portugal (since 1975)	45,1	5,2	76,9	6,1	3,4	3,1	+	0,43	2,3	0,500
United Kingdom. (since 1945)	54,1	6,0	93,0	7,7	2,9	2,2	+/-	0,35	0,3	0,120
Finland (1945–2000)	27,1	3,9	50,5	8,9	5,6	5,1	–	0,38	0,2	0,237
France (since 1958)	46,5	6,2	71,0	8,1	5,4	3,2	–	0,47	7,8	0,216
Sweedeen (since 1944)	44,3	3,4	66,0	6,0	3,8	3,6	–	0,40	6,3	0,742
Average in the group	40,6	5,1	68,4	7,0	4,2	3,7	+/-	0,41	6,4	0,353
All European parliamentary democracies										
Average	39,6	5,2	67,2	7,3	4,7	3,9	+/-	0,39	6,2	0,315

Zródło: Döring H., Manow P., *Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.01.2019].; Ieraci G., Poropat G., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, źródło: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DSPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf [odczyt: 01.01.2019].; Armingeon K., Weisstanner D., Knöpel L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Universität Bern 2014, źródło: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html [odczyt: 01.01.2019].; Andersson S., Bergman T., Ersson S., *The European Representative Democracy Data Archive: Release 3 (Main sponsor: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond)*, źródło: <http://www.erdda.se/index.php/projects/erd/data-archive> [odczyt: 01.01.2019].

As average empirical calculations prove (see Tables 1 and 2), minority governments are most frequently formed in European parliamentary democracies (except for systems of positive parliamentarism in Central and Eastern Europe), with the highest percentage of the largest parliamentary party being 45% or more, but less than or equal to 50%. This has been the case for such European parliamentary democracies as Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Norway, the United Kingdom and Sweden, and not typically or hardly ever for Austria, Luxembourg and Germany. Less frequently in European parliamentary democracies (except for the positive parliamentarism systems in Central and Eastern Europe) minority governments are formed when the percentage of the largest party's seats is greater than or equals 35%, but is less than 45%. This has been peculiar for such countries as Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Czech Republic, Sweden, and is not in the least typical or almost uncharacteristic of Austria, Iceland, Luxembourg, Germany, Slovenia, Hungary and France. Even less often (with the exception of European negative parliamentarism systems), minority governments are formed in countries where the percentage of seats of the largest party in parliament is less than 35%. On numerous occasions, such a party rule for the minority governments formation and performance has worked in countries that represent systems of negative parliamentarism (for instance, Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland, especially in 1948-1962), or in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Latvia and Slovenia), and most seldom in countries that are Western European examples of positive parliamentarism (particularly Belgium and Italy).

Regarding the correlation of the frequency of minority governments formation with the share (or percentage) of the seats of the two largest parliamentary parties (see Tables 1 and 2), in the European parliamentary democracies, we can point out the following features: a) minority governments are most frequently formed and further exist in countries with the two largest parliamentary parties obtaining 50-70% (especially in Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Romania, the Czech Republic and Sweden, but not in Austria, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Finland), or 70-90% of seats (particularly in Ireland, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Sweden, but not in Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Germany, the United Kingdom and Central and Eastern European countries); b) apart from Western European systems of positive parliamentarism, high is the frequency of minority government cabinets formation and performance in European parliamentary democracies, where the share of seats of the two largest parties in parliament is at a level of less than / equal to 50% (for instance, several times in Denmark, Lithuania, and Slovenia, especially before 2000), etc.); c) the lowest frequency of minority governments formation is typical of the European parliamentary democracies, with the seats of the two largest parties exceeding 90% (this was the case in Austria before 1986, Greece, Malta and the United Kingdom until 1997, etc.).

In the context of minority governments, in a quantitative dimension of the party systems analysis such a variable matters as the level of fractionation or fragmentation of parliaments, along with the number and size of parliamentary parties, at least, given that it may indicate

the availability or lack of information and confidence of individual parties about different government alternatives in the government-forming (especially coalition-forming) process¹³. In fact, quantitative dimension of the political parties positions analysis (in particular based on determining the absolute and / or effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties, as well as the fractionation of parliaments) within national party systems is of utter importance, given that different types of party systems facilitate formation of different types of government cabinets. For example, G. Sartori¹⁴ suggested that that it is primarily party systems of moderate pluralism that facilitate the minority governments formation. More recent studies, however, argue that minority governments are inherent in both systems of both moderate and polarized pluralism, and are sometimes observed in bipartisan and two-and-a-half party systems. This clearly stipulates that formation and / or performance of minority governments is directly dependent on the fractionation or fragmentation of party systems, that is, on the function of the number and size of parliamentary parties.

Against this background, scientists have proposed several approaches to accounting for the relationship between the fractionation or fragmentation of party systems and the frequency with which minority governments (and other types of government cabinets) are formed and function. Hence, I. Budge and V. Herman,¹⁵ as well as D. Rae¹⁶ claim that there is a positive correlation between a party system fractionation or fragmentation, the statistics of minority governments formation. Since the more parties in parliament, the more theoretically complex it is to simultaneously form a parliamentary and a governmental majority. For this reason, a minority government is more likely to be formed. In contrast, the number of minority governments decreases when the party system becomes less fractionalized, being closer to bipartisanship. Further on, L. Dodd¹⁷ emphasised that the party system fractionation leads to informational uncertainty among party leaders, and therefore there is a logical correlation between the fractionation of party systems and government cabinets, not determined by the government majority, albeit dependent on a permanent or situational parliamentary or parliamentary majority. However, in L. Dodd's studies, parliamentary fractionation or fragmentation poses an indispensable, yet insufficient condition for forming a minority government. Of additional importance is the level of ideological conflict / polarization between parliamentary parties. Factually, information inaccuracy is characteristic not only of fractionation or fragmentation, but also of the party system instability, as well as the interaction of the former and the latter. Therefore, the the

¹³ Sartori G., *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2005.; Ström K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 12–14.; Ström K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–226.

¹⁴ Sartori G., *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2005.

¹⁵ Budge I., Herman V., *Coalitions and Government: An Empirically Relevant Theory*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1978, vol 8, nr. 4, s. 459–477.

¹⁶ Rae D., *An estimate for the decisiveness of election outcomes*, [w:] Lieberman B. (ed.), *Social Choice (Routledge Revivals)*, Wyd. Gordon and Breach, 1971, s. 379–392.; Rae D., *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1971.

¹⁷ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976, s. 62–70.

researcher's hypothesis focuses on the importance of a gradual rather than absolute fractionation of party systems, serving as a prerequisite for minority governments formation. Respectively, M. Taylor, V. Herman¹⁸ and B. Powell¹⁹ point out that forming a minority government is the most expedient and likely solution in case of a sudden party system fractionation.

It is clearly illustrated by the findings of calculations in European parliamentary democracies (see Tables 1 and 2), designed to correlate the minority governments formation frequency and such parameters of party systems as the absolute number of parliamentary parties and the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties. No doubt, it is statistically proven and obvious that, above all, minority governments are more often formed in European parliamentary democracies with a larger absolute number of parliamentary parties. Mostly, minority governments are peculiar for European parliamentary democracies with the absolute number of parties larger than 5. This is an average indicator for both positive and negative parliamentary systems, the only exception being that in Central and Eastern Europe (it represents systems of positive parliamentarism) government cabinets typically occur when the absolute number of parties ranges from 3 to 5.

Secondly, it is argued that minority governments are more likely to form and function in European parliamentary democracies, where the effective number of electoral parties ranges from 3 to 7, and at least in systems with the effective number of electoral parties being less than 3 or more. It may serve as a proof that a pluralistic system of party-electoral competition normally favours minority governments. Western European systems of positive and negative parliamentarism make a partial exception: in the former minority governments are seldom formed when the effective number of electoral parties ranges from 5-7 (as both in the case of very low, and even more effective number of electoral parties). Whereas in the latter minority governments on numerous occasions occur even when the effective number of election parties exceeds 7, the competition being very pluralistic.

Thirdly, confirmed is the previously substantiated view, claiming that minority governments are most often formed in those European parliamentary democracies, where the effective number of parliamentary parties ranges from 3 to 5²⁰, i.e. in countries with limited (moderate or polarized) pluralism of party systems.

¹⁸ Taylor M., Herman V., Party Systems and Government Stability, *"American Political Science Review"* 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28–37.

¹⁹ Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Cambridge 1982.

²⁰ Laakso M., Taagepera R., Effective number of parties: Measure with application to West Europe, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 1979, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 3–27.

Table 2. Correlation between the minority cabinets frequency and the quantitative and ideological parameters of the European parliamentary democracies party systems (1944–2015)²¹

Party system parameter	PPS (WE)		PPS (CEE)		NPS (E)		EPD	
	MGF, %	MGF, %	MGF, %	MGF, %	MGF, %	MGF, %	MGF, %	MGF, %
1. SEATS OF THE LARGEST PARLIAMENTARY PARTY (a), %								
$a > 50,0 \%$	0,00	0,06	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01
$45,0 \% \leq a \leq 50,0 \%$	0,53	0,30	0,49	0,50	0,50	0,50	0,50	0,50
$35,0 \% \leq a \leq 44,9 \%$	0,26	0,46	0,35	0,41	0,41	0,38	0,38	0,38
$a < 35,0 \%$	0,11	0,28	0,21	0,39	0,39	0,29	0,29	0,29
2. SEATS OF THE TWO LARGEST PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES (a + b), %								
$a + b > 90,0 \%$	0,14	0,00	0,14	0,13	0,13	0,13	0,13	0,13
$70,0 \% < a + b \leq 90,0 \%$	0,30	0,24	0,28	0,24	0,24	0,27	0,27	0,27
$50,0 \% < a + b \leq 70,0 \%$	0,22	0,33	0,29	0,44	0,44	0,38	0,38	0,38
$a + b \leq 50,0 \%$	0,13	0,38	0,25	0,39	0,39	0,30	0,30	0,30
3. ABSOLUTE NUMBER / SUM OF PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES (s), №								
$s \leq 3$ parties	0,06	0,17	0,07	0,10	0,10	0,08	0,08	0,08
3 parties $< s \leq 5$ parties	0,10	0,41	0,21	0,26	0,26	0,24	0,24	0,24
5 parties $1 < s \leq 8$ parties	0,30	0,25	0,27	0,38	0,38	0,34	0,34	0,34
$s > 8$ parties	0,32	0,35	0,33	0,37	0,37	0,35	0,35	0,35
4. EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTION PARTIES (ENEP), №								
$ENEP < 3$ parties	0,16	0,17	0,17	0,09	0,09	0,15	0,15	0,15
3 parties $\leq ENEP \leq 5$ parties	0,31	0,29	0,31	0,37	0,37	0,34	0,34	0,34
5 parties $1 < ENEP \leq 7$ parties	0,12	0,39	0,29	0,37	0,37	0,33	0,33	0,33
$ENEP > 7$ parties	0,11	0,18	0,15	0,75	0,75	0,19	0,19	0,19
4. EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTION PARTIES (ENPP), №								
$ENPP < 2,5$ parties (bipartisan system)	0,12	0,08	0,11	0,10	0,10	0,11	0,11	0,11
$2,5 \text{ parties} \leq ENPP < 3$ parties (two- and a two-and-a-half system)	0,37	0,15	0,31	0,13	0,13	0,26	0,26	0,26
$3 \text{ parties} \leq ENPP \leq 5$ parties (limited pluralism)	0,25	0,35	0,30	0,41	0,41	0,37	0,37	0,37

²¹ *Conventions:* PPS – positive parliamentarism systems; NPS – negative parliamentarism systems; EPD – European parliamentary democracies; WE – Western Europe; CEE – Central and Eastern Europe; MGF – minority governments frequency. The average minority governments frequency for each parameter was calculated by the arithmetic frequency of formation, rather than the number of minority governments during each parliamentary cadence in each European parliamentary democracy.

5 naprti < ENPP ≤ 7 parties (excessive pluralism)	0,16	0,29	0,24	0,48	0,33
ENPP > 7 parties (atomised system)	0,15	0,42	0,22	–	0,22
5. THE IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING OF THE LARGEST PARLIAMENTARY PARTY (la) (FROM „0“ - MOST LEFT TO „10“ - HIGHEST RIGHT)					
$I_a > 7,5$	0,28	0,30	0,29	0,00	0,21
$5,0 < I_a \leq 7,5$	0,27	0,33	0,29	0,18	0,24
$2,5 < I_a \leq 5,0$	0,14	0,30	0,23	0,49	0,39
$I_a \leq 2,5$	0,17	0,50	0,21	0,67	0,26
6. THE AVAILABILITY OF AN IDEOLOGICAL CENTRIST (LEFT-CENTRIST OR RIGHT-CENTRIST) OR MEDIUM PARTY AS THE LARGEST PARLIAMENT					
Yes	0,25	0,35	0,28	0,32	0,30
No	0,21	0,30	0,25	0,38	0,32
7. PARTY SYSTEM POLARIZATION INDEX (BY DALTON) (IPPS)					
IPPS > 0,45	0,26	0,37	0,31	0,36	0,34
$0,30 < IPPS \leq 0,45$	0,24	0,28	0,25	0,36	0,31
$IPPS \leq 0,30$	0,17	0,36	0,24	0,00	0,22
8. SEATS OF EXTREMIST (RADICAL) PARTIES (e), %					
$e > 20,0\%$	0,34	0,22	0,30	0,38	0,33
$10,0\% < e \leq 20,0\%$	0,15	0,27	0,21	0,41	0,32
$5,0\% < e \leq 10,0\%$	0,15	0,41	0,27	0,36	0,33
$e \leq 5,0\%$	0,23	0,30	0,26	0,32	0,28

Źródlo: Döring H., Manow P., *Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, Źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.01.2019].; Ieraci G., Poropat G., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, Źródło: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf [odczyt: 01.01.2019].; Amingeon K., Weisstaener D., Knöpfel L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Universität Bern 2014, Źródło: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/Maus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html [odczyt: 01.01.2019].; Andersson S., Bergman T., Ersson S., *The European Representative Democracy Data Archive: Release 3 (Main sponsor: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond)*, Źródło: <http://www.erdda.se/index.php/projects/erd/data-archive> [odczyt: 01.01.2019].

At the same time, the average data analysis illustrates that minority governments are also often formed and functioning in European parliamentary democracies, where the effective number of parliamentary parties is 5-7, i.e. in countries with party systems of inherent excessive (moderate or polarized) pluralism. However, the systems of positive parliamentarism in Western and Central-Eastern Europe and the systems of negative parliamentarism in Western Europe somewhat differ. In the former, minority governments are primarily typical of systems where the effective number of parties ranges from 2.5 to 5, i.e. in bipartisan and two- and-a-half-party systems, as well as in systems of limited (moderate or polarized) pluralism. For the latter peculiar are the systems where the effective number of parties fluctuates at the level larger than 3 parties, i.e., in systems of limited and excessive (moderate or polarized) pluralism, as well as in atomized systems. In the third group of countries, in systems where the effective number of parties fluctuates at the level of 3–7 parties, therefore in systems of limited and excessive (moderate or polarized) pluralism. In all European parliamentary democracies, minority governments are hardly inherent in bipartisan systems, i.e. systems with the effective number of parliamentary parties being less than 2.5.

However, the increasing fractionation or fragmentation of party systems (at least to a level of limited or excessive pluralism) is not yet a direct «harbinger» of minority governments. In the words of P. Mitchell and B. Nyblade²², high levels of fractionation or fragmentation of party systems lead to a general uncertainty of parties, negotiating each other's benefits in the government-forming process. As a result, minority governments and surplus majorities are frequently formed, typically countries with systems of positive parliamentarism in Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe. With the sole observation that minority governments are increasingly formed in systems where an effective number of parliamentary parties does not exceed of 3-5 (systems, referred to as limited or moderately fragmented by G. Sartori²³), whereas the surplus majority coalitions are typical of systems with an effective number of parties above 5 (i.e., systems, defined by G. Sartori as excessively fragmented and atomized)²⁴. Although, in most cases, in all the aforementioned types of party systems (based on party system fractionation or fragmentation indicators), it is not the minority governments or the surplus majority coalitions, but minimum-winning coalitions are normally formed, so the drawn conclusions are relative.

In its turn, the ideological dimension of party systems analysis revolves around such variables / parameters as the presence of an ideologically centrist (left-centrist or right-centrist) or median party, being the largest in parliament, and ideological preferences distribution, party polarization and the percentage of extremist party seats. It has been scientifically established that the more

²² Mitchell P., Nyblade B., *Government formation and cabinet type*, [w:] Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T., (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 216.

²³ Sartori G., *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2005.

²⁴ Nikolenyi C., *Minority Governments in India: The Puzzle of Elusive Majorities*, Routledge 2009.; Grotz F., *Stabile Regierungsbündnisse? Determinanten der Koalitionspolitik in Ostmitteleuropa, "Osteuropa"* 2007, vol 57, nr. 4, s. 109–122.; Grotz F., Müller-Rommel F., *Regierungssysteme in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Die neuen EU-Staaten im Vergleich*, Wyd. VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften 2011.

ideologically polarized and divided the party system, the more likely minority governments are to be formed.²⁵ In this regard, L.Dodd argues that that the ideological-political cleavage or polarization of party systems negatively affect the unconditional willingness of parties to negotiate participation in the government cabinet, that is, in government-forming processes. Accordingly, the less reluctant parties are to negotiate the formation of majority governments, the greater the likelihood that they will end up in minority governments²⁶. This is especially true in case the ideological polarization of party systems coincides with the fragmentation and instability of party systems. However, from the perspective of B. Powell, ideological polarization within party systems can be a grounded reason for the minority governments formation, since extremely large ideological polarization will lead to the formation of minority governments in multi-party parliamentary systems. Ultimately, parliamentary parties will not recognize or agree on a coalition majority, even on condition of reliable information availability²⁷. Even so, ideological polarization within party systems is only among prerequisites and reasons for the minority governments formation, merely stipulating a certain type of minority governments. On numerous occasions it is unlikely to occur even in those hypothetical situations when minority governments should have been formed. K.Strom²⁸ proves that one ought not to put forward a solely correct idea that the increasing ideological polarization of party systems leads to a mandatory minority governments formation; single-party minority governments have traditionally been associated with lower ideological polarization of party systems than minority coalition governments. In order to clearly observe how the ideological dimension of the party systems analysis affects formation and performance of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies, as well as to test the conclusions drawn from the experience of Western and Central and Eastern Europe, we appeal to such ideological parameters of party systems as ideological parliamentary position, the presence of an ideologically centrist or median party as the largest parliamentary party, the polarization index of the party system, and the percentage of seats of extremist (radical) parties in the party system (primarily in parliament, see Tables 1 and 2). For instance, on the basis of such a criterion of ideological dimension of party systems analysis as ideological positioning of the largest parliamentary party (not always simultaneously governmental party), which is calculated in the left-right ideological spectrum on a scale from «0» to «10» points in the direction from radical left-wing parties to radical right-wing parties (methodology, proposed by F.Castles, P. Mair, J.Huber, R. Inglehart, K.Benoit., M.Laver²⁹), It is apparent that, in European parliamentary

²⁵ Sartori G., *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2005, s. 135.; Putnam R., Leonardi R., Nanetti R., *Devolution as a Political Process: The Case of Italy*, "Publius" 1981, vol 11, nr. 1, s. 95–117.

²⁶ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976, s. 57–68.

²⁷ Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Cambridge 1982, s. 142.

²⁸ Strom K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199–226.

²⁹ Castles F., Mair P., *Left-right political scales: Some expert judgments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1984, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 73–88.; Huber J., Inglehart R., *Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies*, "Party Politics" 1995, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 73–111.; Benoit K., Laver M., *Party policy in modern democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2006.

democracies, minority government cabinets are often formed when the largest parliamentary parties are ideologically fluctuate within the range from «2.5» to «7.5» points, i.e. when they are not necessarily defined as radical left-wing or radical rights, changing, instead, from left to right and vice versa. However, this trend is generalized, not unified. In fact, in European parliamentary democracies, minority governments often occur as the radical left-wing and right-wing political parties, as well as parties ideologically close to them, are the largest. In addition, in systems of positive parliamentarism in Western Europe, minority governments are more typical when the largest parliamentary parties are right-wing, centrist, or right-centrist, i.e., with party systems ideologically gravitating towards the right rather than the left side of the spectrum. The opposite is true for negative parliamentary systems in Western Europe, where minority governments are more often formed in case the largest parliamentary parties are centrist, left-centrist, or left-wing, that is, when party systems ideologically gravitate toward the left rather than the right side of the spectrum. Only in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are minority cabinets formed with almost the same frequency, irrespective of the ideology of the largest parliamentary parties.

The controversial statement confirms such an ideological dimension of the party systems analysis as the presence of an ideologically centrist (left-centrist) or right-centrist party as the largest in parliament. The fact is that in European parliamentary democracies, minority governments are (irrespective of the region and variety of parliamentary democracy) formed and functioning with the same frequency in systems where the largest parliamentary party is or not centrist (left-centrist) or right-centrist. The only exception being that in systems of positive parliamentarism, minority governments are more likely to occur when the largest parliamentary parties are centrist or median (or those ideologically close), and in systems of negative parliamentarianism, when the largest parliamentary parties are not centrist or median (or ideologically close). This partially refutes the established idea that the party, located in the ideological center (it has a «central / median» position in the context of political decision-making), has strategic government-forming advantages. In fact, not every party of such a type plays a decisive role in the government formation process. Thus, not every party is a member of a government cabinet, in particular a government cabinet without controlling most parliamentary seats. This serves as a proof of another argument that ideological analysis of party systems cannot independently and sufficiently determine and interpret the minority governments formation peculiarities. Eventually, the party may be positioned as centrist / median, yet not influential (though perhaps most influential) in terms of parliamentary seats allocation³⁰.

³⁰ Crombez C., Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems, *European Journal of Political Research* 1996, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 16.; Schofield N., Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments, *European Journal of Political Research* 1993, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 1–35.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.; Mitchell P., Nyblade B., *Government formation and cabinet type*, [w:] Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T., (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 218.

The ideological dimension of party systems analysis regarding the frequency of formation and performance of minority government cabinets should be additionally specified by such a parameter as the polarization of party systems³¹. In order to fulfill this, we employ the party system polarization index by R. Dalton³², that, when applied on the party systems of European parliamentary democracies (see Tables 1 and 2), testifies that minority governments are more often formed when party systems are more polarized. Such a conclusion is relevant for all groups and types of European parliamentary democracies, with the only exception being Central and Eastern European countries, where minority governments are equally common in both strongly and poorly polarized party systems. In such a context, we observe that minority governments are more typical in conditions of significant ideological differentiation and polarization of party systems, precisely at a level of traditional opposition parties, who are either unable or reluctant to initiate and actualize government cabinets, potentially seen as minority cabinets «worthy replacements»³³. In the words of K. Strom, L. Kurini and L. Punto, it means that political differences and contradictions between opposition parties can be applied by minority government cabinets, in particular those, functioning on resolution of issues upon issues³⁴. Alternatively, P. Warwick claims the following: if parliamentary parties are ideologically divided / distant, the expected / hypothetical majority governments will be ideologically heterogeneous, yet ideologically diverse governments are less valuable, as a rule. Зрештою, апелювання до такого параметра ідеологічного виміру пояснення партійних систем як відсоток мандатів екстремістських (радикальних) партій у партійних системах, також не має уніфікованого безпосереднього ефекту на частоті формування і функціонування урядів меншості. Despite the arguments, put forward by G. Sartori³⁵, M. Laver and N. Schofield³⁶, L. Martin and R. Stevenson³⁷, F. Grotz, F. Müller-Rommel³⁸, according to which, with increasing percentage of seats, obtained by extremist (radical) parties, the number of potential government cabinets decreases, since extremist parties are not usually regarded as government-forming. As a matter of fact, minority governments in European parliamentary democracies are almost equally typical of both systems with a very high share of extremist party seats (more than 20%), and of systems where the share of extremist parliamentary party seats is either average (5-20 %), or low (less

³¹ Martin L., Stevenson R., Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 33–50; Warwick P., Policy Distance and Parliamentary Government, *"Legislative Studies Quarterly"* 1998, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 319–345

³² Dalton R., The quantity and the quality of party systems: Party system polarization, its measurement, and its consequences, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 2008, vol 41, nr. 7, s. 899–920.

³³ Warwick P., Policy Distance and Parliamentary Government, *"Legislative Studies Quarterly"* 1998, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 231.; Budge I., Laver M., *Coalition Theory, Government Policy and Party Policy*, [w:] Laver M., Budge I. (eds.), *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1992, s. 1–14.; Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998, s. 79–80.

³⁴ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

³⁵ Sartori G., *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2005.

³⁶ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.

³⁷ Martin L., Stevenson R., Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 37.

³⁸ Grotz F., Müller-Rommel F., *Regierungssysteme in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Die neuen EU-Staaten im Vergleich*, Wyd. VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften 2011.

than 5%). Nevertheless, we can observe some regional and systemic differences: a) in Western European systems of positive parliamentarism, minority governments most frequently occur in those party systems where extremist parties obtain a large percentage of the seats; b) in Central and Eastern European systems of positive parliamentarism, minority governments are peculiar for party systems with insubstantial share of seats of extremist parties; c) in Western European systems of negative parliamentarism, the minority governments formation frequency is independent of the share of mandates of extremist parties. This stipulates the scientific view that in positive parliamentarism systems the formation of minority governments is equally strongly affected by institutional and party-electoral factors and determinants, while in contrast, negative parliamentarism systems are more often influenced by institutional factors, only slightly modified by party-electoral determinants.

Generally, it comes as no surprise that the correlation of quantitative and ideological parameters of party systems, their impact upon the frequency of minority governments formation and performance in European parliamentary democracies, fits into the logical construction of the nature of relationships between parliamentary parties. Such a conclusion follows observations by M. Laver and N. Schofield that, through the lens of party-electoral prerequisites, minority governments occur in conditions of competitive relations between parliamentary parties that can hypothetically form a parliamentary majority³⁹. As a result, delegation of the right to form a minority government to one or more parties will be less «evil» for the rest of parties, thus they will be interested in maintaining an inter-party status quo that will serve as a factor that will make minority governments «fully viable» and stable. This is especially true when a centrist party (or parties) is entitled to form a minority government, with a majority in parliament, held by polar parts of the left-right ideology spectrum⁴⁰. Beyond all doubt, forming a minority government is a natural way out, provided there is a confrontation between ideologically-minded parties in a moderately or excessively fractionalized parliament. The same applies to the minority government performance, which can undergo severe criticism for its activities on both sides of the fragmented political spectrum, although ideological opposition will be prevent opposition parties' representatives from uniting in order to dismiss the government⁴¹. However, even so, quantitative and ideological dimensions of the party systems analysis concern minority governments, their formation and performance only in a broad and general sense, and hence indirectly, regardless of their varieties. The point is that, as empirical evidence suggests, the theoretical link between minority governments and the quantitative and ideological dimensions of party system analysis is employed in case of minority coalitions, in the context of which fractionation and polarisation increase to a limited or excessive degree. However, such a link is not always relevant in the context of single-party minority governments,

³⁹ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.

⁴⁰ Strom K., Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions, "Comparative Political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199–226.

⁴¹ Gallaher M., Laver M., Mair P., *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 192.

normally formed in situations of moderate and even lesser fractionation and polarization of party systems than majority governments (including coalition ones). Therefore, differences in the correlation of minority governments, their types, features and frequencies of formation and performance, as well as quantitative and ideological dimensions of party systems, should get sufficient amount of attention.

C.Nikolenyi⁴², K.von Beyme⁴³, M.Taylor and V.Herman⁴⁴ are convinced that it is especially peculiar for the European negative parliamentarism systems in Scandinavia (primarily Norway and Sweden, where single-party minority governments are quite a widespread phenomenon) and for new parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (with prevailing coalitional minority governments). For instance, minority governments previously have resulted from unpredictable, unique events or crises, as well as situations that are not inherent or, on the contrary, are characterized by impeded course and dynamics of negotiation and bargaining in government-forming processes. This was especially true in the aftermath of the first post-communist parliamentary elections, which often resulted in coming to power by those parties in Central and Eastern European parliaments that had no experience in the environment of institutional uncertainty and unpredictability. In addition, the party systems of the countries of the region were unformed and uninstitutionalized, as well as electorally changing, thus complicating government formation. Therefore, minority governments were typical of the region during this period, following the example of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Only upon the party systems stabilization in most countries of the region, except Romania (where minority governments are even more frequent than majority governments), and Latvia (where minority governments are formed frequently, yet being crisis and short-lived), majority governments (except for certain periods) began to prevail. This presupposes that party-electoral factors and determinants of minority governments in the region's parliamentary democracies are drastically differ from similar factors and determinants in Western European countries. Accordingly, in Western European countries, party systems have evolved and institutionalized in the direction of increasing the frequency of formation and duration of minority governments, whereas in Central and Eastern European countries have shifted toward reducing the frequency of formation and duration of minority governments.

In general, considering the impact of party systems on the peculiarities of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies, we argue that the former may have a twofold effect on the formation and functioning of the latter. On the one hand, minority governments can be operationalized when parties, on the basis of their election expectations and results, do not consciously/ subjectively wish to participate in their formation / operation. On the other hand, minority government cabinets can theoretically be an objective consequence of

⁴² Nikolenyi C., Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe, *"Party Politics"* 2004, vol 10, nr. 2, s. 123–150.

⁴³ von Beyme K., *Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa*, Wyd. Piper 1970.

⁴⁴ Taylor M., Herman V., Party Systems and Government Stability, *"American Political Science Review"* 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28–37.

the systemic features of the party and electoral systems development in European parliamentary democracies. For this reason, apprehensible is the statement that «the art of minority governments is engineering of defeat on the most favourable terms.»

References

1. Andersson S., Bergman T., Ersson S., *The European Representative Democracy Data Archive: Release 3 (Main sponsor: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond)*, źródło: <http://www.erdda.se/index.php/projects/erd/data-archive> [odczyt: 01.01.2019].
2. Armingeon K., Weisstanner D., Knöpfel L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Universität Bern 2014, źródło: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html [odczyt: 01.01.2019].
3. Benoit K., Laver M., *Party policy in modern democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2006.
4. Budge I., Herman V., Coalitions and Government: An Empirically Relevant Theory, “*British Journal of Political Science*” 1978, vol 8, nr. 4, s. 459–477.
5. Budge I., Laver M., *Coalition Theory, Government Policy and Party Policy*, [w:] Laver M., Budge I. (eds.), *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, Wyd. St. Martin’s Press 1992, s. 1–14.
6. Budge I., Laver M., *The Relationship Between Party and Coalition Policy in Europe: An Empirical Synthesis*, [w:] Laver M., Budge I. (eds.), *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, Wyd. St. Martin’s Press 1992, s. 409–430.
7. Budge I., Robertson D., Hearl D., *Ideology, strategy and party change*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1987.
8. Castles F., Mair P., Left-right political scales: Some expert judgments, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1984, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 73–88.
9. Crombez C., Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1996, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 1–29.
10. Dalton R., The quantity and the quality of party systems: Party system polarization, its measurement, and its consequences, “*Comparative Political Studies*” 2008, vol 41, nr. 7, s. 899–920.
11. Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.
12. Döring H., Manow P., *Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.01.2019].
13. Gallaher M., Laver M., Mair P., *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992.
14. Grotz F., Müller-Rommel F., *Regierungssysteme in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Die neuen EU-Staaten im Vergleich*, Wyd. VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften 2011.
15. Grotz F., Stabile Regierungsbündnisse? Determinanten der Koalitionspolitik in Ostmitteleuropa, “*Osteuropa*” 2007, vol 57, nr. 4, s. 109–122.

16. Herman V., Pope J., Minority Governments in Western Democracies, *“British Journal of Political Science”* 1973, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 191–212.
17. Huber J., Inglehart R., Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies, *“Party Politics”* 1995, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 73–111.
18. Ieraci G., Poropat G., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, źródło: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013_full-text.pdf [odczyt: 01.01.2019].
19. Laakso M., Taagepera R., Effective number of parties: Measure with application to West Europe, *“Comparative Political Studies”* 1979, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 3–27.
20. Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.
21. Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.
22. Martin L., Stevenson R., Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, *“American Journal of Political Science”* 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 33–50.
23. Mitchell P., Nyblade B., *Government formation and cabinet type*, [w:] Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T., (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 201–235.
24. Muller W., Bergman T., Strøm K., *Coalition theory and cabinet governance: an introduction*, [w:] Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T., (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 1–50.
25. Muller W., Strøm K., *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.
26. Muller W., Strøm K., *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.
27. Müller-Rommel F., Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008, *“Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen”* 2008, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 810–831.
28. Nikolenyi C., Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe, *“Party Politics”* 2004, vol 10, nr. 2, s. 123–150.
29. Nikolenyi C., *Minority Governments in India: The Puzzle of Elusive Majorities*, Routledge 2009.
30. Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Cambridge 1982.
31. Putnam R., Leonardi R., Nanetti R., Devolution as a Political Process: The Case of Italy, *“Publius”* 1981, vol 11, nr. 1, s. 95–117.
32. Rae D., *An estimate for the decisiveness of election outcomes*, [w:] Lieberman B. (ed.), *Social Choice (Routledge Revivals)*, Wyd. Gordon and Breach, 1971, s. 379–392.
33. Rae D., *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1971.
34. Sartori G., *Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2005.
35. Schofield N., Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1993, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 1–35.

36. Strøm K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.
37. Strøm K., Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions, “*Comparative Political Studies*” 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199–226.
38. Taylor M., Herman V., Party Systems and Government Stability, “*American Political Science Review*” 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28–37.
39. von Beyme K., *Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa*, Wyd. Piper 1970.
40. Warwick P., Policy Distance and Parliamentary Government, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1998, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 319–345.

Julia Slipetska

ANALIZA PORÓWNAWCZA SPOŁECZNO-POLITYCZNYCH PODZIAŁÓW W KRAJACH EUROPY ŚRODKOWEJ I WSCHODNIEJ

Ten artykuł przedstawia konkretne społeczno-polityczne podziały w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej, skupia się na nowych liniach podziału, którzy tworzą strukturę przestrzeni politycznej. Ponadto przedstawia podstawowe teoretyczne i metodologiczne podejścia do analizy społeczno-politycznych podziałów. Autor analizuje również cechy społeczno-polityczne podziałów w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej na przykładzie Węgier, Rumunii, Słowacji, Polski i Litwy.

Słowa kluczowe: społeczno-polityczny podział, przejściowe demokracje, system partyjny, Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia.

Julia Slipetska

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL CLEAVAGES IN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPE

In this article specific of political cleavages in the countries of East and Central Europe was defined, the main accent made on new lines of political cleavages, that structurize political sphere. Moreover, main theory-methodological approaches to the analyses of political cleavages are provided. Also, the author analyses peculiarities of political cleavages in the East and Central Europe on the examples Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania.

Keywords: political cleavage, transit democracies, party system, East and Central Europe.

Fala demokratyzacji, szerząca się po świecie w środku lat 70. spowodowała potrzebę przeglądu tradycyjnych podziałów socjalnych na podstawie lewicowo-prawicowego spektrum ideologicznego. Badacze coraz bardziej są zainteresowani nowymi kierunkami rozgraniczeń, kwestią tego, na podstawie których cenności zostały te kierunki ukształtowane oraz w jaki sposób są one emitowane do systemów partyjnych krajów postsocjalistycznych.

Ukryte konfrontacje w społeczeństwie okresu postkomunistycznego nie tylko wyraźnie różnią się od typowych dla poprzednich autorytarnych reżimów, a tworzenie nowego systemu wartości przyczynia się do powstawania nowych podziałów, charakterystycznych dla państw postindustrialnych, prowadząc społeczeństwo do postmaterializmu. Właśnie

system podziałów socjalno-politycznych w dużej mierze determinuje specyfikę konfiguracji systemu politycznego społeczeństwa, zmieniając się wraz ze zmianami ogólnych orientacji społeczeństwa i rodzajów reżimów.

Według A. Moreno „demokracje przejściowe” w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej charakteryzuje obecność trzech podstawowych rozgraniczeń wartościowych: wartości pro- oraz antyreformatorskie, wartości liberalno-fundamentalistyczne oraz wartości demokratycznie-autorytarne.

Pierwszy podział wartości (wartości pro- i antyreformatorskie) obejmuje stosunek do reform gospodarczych – rząd przeciwko własności prywatnej oraz indywidualizm gospodarczy, stosunek do reform politycznych i zmian społecznych, do aborcji, nacjonalizmu i religii. Zalety tego podziału są z jednej strony definiowane jako liberalne, demokratyczne i rynkowe preferencje, z drugiej – konserwatywne, autorytarne i statyczne preferencje. Ta linia konfliktu nazywana jest podziałem reform.

Co dotyczy rozgraniczeń na podstawie liberalnych wartości fundamentalistycznych, obejmują one stosunek różnych krajów do religii, autorytaryzmu i aborcji. Podział liberalno-fundamentalistyczny obejmuje wartości kulturowe, takie jak religijność i nacjonalizm, oraz kontrastuje z bardziej liberalnymi poglądami, które przejawiają się w analizie stosunku do aborcji.

Trzecim rozgraniczeniem jest stosunek do autorytaryzmu i bardziej otwartego rządu demokratycznego. Ten podział jest jedynym podziałem, który jest obecny we wszystkich społeczeństwach postkomunistycznych. Należy zauważyć, że właśnie wokół dominujących wartości politycznych toczy się główna walka sił politycznych krajów postkomunistycznych, która określa odpowiednią konfigurację systemu partyjnego¹.

Z drugiej strony nie można zaprzeczyć faktu, iż klasyczne rozgraniczenia właściwe krajom Europy Zachodniej są także w pewnym stopniu ukonstytuowane w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, a mianowicie podziały na podstawie społeczno-ekonomicznej, etniczno-językowej, religijnej oraz terytorialnej. Jednocześnie otwartym pozostaje kwestia tego, dlaczego w krajach o podobnych podziałach społecznych powstają różne według konfiguracji systemy partyjne?

A. Kulyk uważa, że wśród innych kluczowych czynników-wydarzeń, które wpłynęły na tworzenie podziałów społeczno-politycznych, jest upadek autorytarnych reżimów w Europie Południowej, pokojowa rewolucja w krajach Europy Wschodniej pod koniec lat 80., upadek Związku Radzieckiego i pojawienie się na jego miejscu 15 republik posocjalistycznych w 1991 r., powszechne rozprzestrzenianie się demokracji neoliberalnej w krajach trzeciej fali, globalizacja politycznego i gospodarczego obrazu świata, który zmienił tradycyjne pojęcie państwa narodowego i jego suwerenności, wzmocnienie Unii Europejskiej jako zjawiska ponadnarodowego z własnym parlamentem, wyborami i europejskimi partiami

¹ Moreno A., *Political Cleavages. Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy*, Westview Press, 1999, s. 205.

ponadnarodowymi oraz dołączenie do niego krajów postkomunistycznych Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, rewolucja informacyjna w społeczeństwach postindustrialnych, która zmienia sposoby mobilizacji politycznej oraz modele udziału politycznego, stosunki państwa z obywatelami i wyborców z partiami, „amerykanizacja” polityki w krajach Europy, komplikacje struktury społecznej i systemu podziałów, a także stopniowa ewolucja demokracji przedstawicielskiej od modelu większościowego, w którym partie odgrywają główną rolę w reprezentacji podziałów, do pluralistycznego, gdzie partie coraz częściej ustępują tę rolę grupom interesów, kryzys tradycyjnych instytucji demokracji przedstawicielskiej, który wyrażał się w zmniejszeniu zaufania do wyborów, partii i państwa, wzrost absenteizmu i anonii, a na koniec – transformacja międzynarodowego terroryzmu w czynnik polityki wewnętrznej, który ogranicza prawa i wolności obywateli.

Kształtowanie przestrzeni politycznej w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej pod wpływem globalizacji, integracji międzynarodowej i regionalizacji niezmiennie zwiększa znaczenie całego spektrum zagadnień dotyczących społeczno-politycznego podziału. Jednakże, szczególnie ważnego znaczenia ta problematyka nabywa w krajach postkomunistycznych, gdzie tylko tworzą się stabilne systemy polityczne. Trudno nie zauważyć szczególne znaczenie tych badań dla Ukrainy, która wciąż stoi ryzykiem podziału.

Dlatego celem niniejszego artykułu jest opracowanie odpowiednich narzędzi teoretycznych i metodologicznych dla stosowania koncepcji społeczno-politycznego podziału w celu badania krajów post-komunistycznych Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej.

Niewątpliwie badania rozróżnienia społeczno-politycznego musi zaczynać się od analizy prac naukowych S. Lipseta i St. Rokkana, którzy zidentyfikowali cztery klasyczne rozróżnienie, a mianowicie: między centrum a peryferiami, kościołem i państwem, miastem i wsią, właścicielami i pracownikami². Ten model społeczno-politycznych podziałów znajduje szerokie zastosowanie i akceptację w kręgach akademickich, dając podstawową ideę podziału i ich wpływów na kształtowanie systemów partyjnych.

Jednak pomimo faktu, że od czasu wprowadzenia tego terminu społeczno-polityczny podział w teorii politycznej przez S. Lipseta i St. Rokkana minęło prawie pół wieku i jeszcze nie osiągnięto jednolitego zdefiniowania. Często pod tym względem rozumiemy 1) wszystkie sprzeczności, które pojawiają się w społeczeństwie z powodu zróżnicowania społecznego, różnic kulturowych, regionalnych i innych, oraz 2) wyłącznie ich zinstytucjonalizowane formy w systemach partyjnych.

Naszym zdaniem, najbardziej celowym jest wskazanie trzech grup podejść do zrozumienia społeczno-politycznego rozróżnienia, a mianowicie: konfliktowy, instytucjonalny, socjalny i kulturowy. Podejście konfliktowe odwołuje się do tego, że w podstawie rozróżnień leżą różnego rodzaju konflikty – zarówno strukturalnie zakorzenione oraz potencjalne. Podejście socjalne i kulturowe wskazuje, że struktura społeczna określa społeczno-polityczny podział

² Lipset S., *Struktury podziałów, systemy partyjne i preferencje wyborców. Uwagi wstępne*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 204-234.

w kraju. Instytucjonalne podejście zmniejsza polityczny podział wyłącznie instytucjonalnego konfliktu w społeczeństwie³. Pod względem społeczno-politycznego podziału należy rozumieć względnie stabilne różnice istniejące między przedstawicielami grup, którzy mają swoją własną tożsamość i reprezentacje instytucjonalną.

Bez względu na fakt, że klasyczne rozróżnienie związane z państwami Europy Zachodniej, w różnym stopniu, także są charakterystyczne dla krajów postkomunistycznych Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, a mianowicie podziały na społecznej, ekonomicznej, językowej, religijnej i terytorialnej podstawie. W tym samym czasie otwartym pozostaje pytanie – dlaczego w krajach o podobnych społecznych separacjach są tworzone różne systemy partyjne? Tak więc, E. Meleshkina zwraca uwagę na znaczenie instytucjonalnych progów, odnoszących się do społeczno-politycznych podziałów, czyli progów legitymizacji, integracji, reprezentacji, rządów większości⁴. Naukowiec wskazuje, że obecność wysokich progów ogranicza możliwości instytucjonalizacji separacji, podczas gdy niski próg przeciwnie stymuluje ten proces.

Według S. Elisejewa, na proces konsolidacji systemów partyjnych w krajach postkomunistycznych wpływa kilka czynników, a mianowicie:

1. instytucjonalne dziedzictwo autorytarnego reżimu oraz w pierwszej kolejności: a) tradycje instytucjonalne i normy, b) partii-spadkobiorcy ideologicznych pozycji współczesnych reżimów, c) partie, które stworzone są na podstawie ruchów masowych i demokratycznych,
2. struktura instytucjonalna nowych demokracji, która obejmuje: a) formy rządów, b) format systemu wyborczego, c) wzmocnienie granic politycznych i prawnych⁵.

Ogólnie należy zauważyć, że cechy społeczno-polityczne podziałów w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej wynikają przede wszystkim przez historyczne cechy rozwoju regionu, doświadczenia reżimów autorytarnych, specyfikę przemian demokratycznych. Szczególnie jasne jest to, że socjalistyczna przeszłość pozostawiła głębokie piętno na społecznej strukturze, politycznych kierunkach, a także na tradycjach organizacji politycznej w większości krajów postkomunistycznych.

Jak zauważył K. Lawson, wyraźną cechą istniejących podziałów społeczno-politycznych w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej jest podział między mniejszością, „która rozwija się w procesie postkomunistycznej transformacji” i „większością tych, którzy żyją nieszczęśliwie”, próbując zwolnić i zachować przedrewolucyjną sytuację. Partii dążą do wspierania nadziei większości, ale po osiągnięciu władzy, zazwyczaj stosują się do woli mniejszości⁶.

³ Romaniuk A., *Od zjednoczenia do niepodległości: stan i dynamika integracji społeczeństwa ukraińskiego w ramach europejskich procesów*, Lwów, CPD, 2009, s. 10-12.

⁴ Meleshkina E., *Koncepcja podziałów społeczno-politycznych: problem uniwersalności*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 11-29.

⁵ Elisejew S., *Społeczne i polityczne podziały, uwarunkowania instytucjonalne i warunki konsolidacji systemów partyjnych w przejściu do demokracji*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 64 – 89.

⁶ Lawson K., *Podziały, partie i wybory*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 51-55.

Koncentrując się na specyficznych podziałach społeczno-politycznych w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, A. Rommele wnioskuje, że klasyczna teoria podziałów nie wytrzymuje sprawdzenia przez rzeczywistości post-totalitarne. On wskazuje na cztery główne różnice w politycznych podziałach w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej, w przeciwieństwie do Europy Zachodniej.

Jest to, po pierwsze, *przebieg i trudność tranzytu*. Postkomunistyczna Europa rzeczywiście przeżywa potrójny tranzyt, który oferuje nie tylko demokratyzację, ale również na dużą skalę przejście do gospodarki rynkowej oraz budowy państwa. Fakt, że w Europie Zachodniej zajęło to kilka wieków (od stworzenia państwa narodowego do kapitalizmu, a ostatecznie do demokracji), kraje postkomunistyczne muszą wypełnić to jednocześnie w najkrótszym czasie.

Po drugie, *różnica elektoratu*. Chociaż zachodnie systemy partyjne, prawdopodobnie już nie są więcej zamrożone i zachodnie sojusze wyborcze wskazują na coraz większą niestabilność w systemie partyjnym, która rozwinęła się na Zachodzie pozostaje silna tendencja do następstwa oraz inercji. Z drugiej strony, w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej elektorat jest znacznie bardziej otwarty oraz poddaje się wpływowi, znacznie bardziej niestabilny i niepewny.

Po trzecie, *różnice w rodzaju partii*. W formie, w jakiej one powstały, partie Europy Zachodniej były w stanie zmobilizować zbiorowe tożsamości polityczne. Gdy zaczęły one tymczasowe relacje z tymi, które znajdowały się po jakiejś stronie ważnych rozróżnień, były w stanie wykorzystywać potencjał już istniejące sieci organizacyjne. Elektorat w ten sposób został skutecznie podzielony na bloki względnie stabilne i zamknięte. Okoliczności zniszczenia komunizmu, które spowodowały dużą rezygnację z już istniejących wcześniej tożsamości i sieci oraz nie potrafiły dać tym nowym partiom w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej takich zalet. Nowe strony stały się bardziej charyzmatycznymi i konsumenckimi, a niż programowymi.

Po czwarte, *rola mediów*. W krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej media podlegały ścisłej cenzurze i kontroli przez reżimy komunistyczne. Służyły one jako narzędzie elit rządzących, dzięki którym polityka państwowa oraz ideologia panująca stała się bardziej popularną⁷.

D.-L. Sale, z kolei, uważa, że główna różnica między krajami post-komunistycznymi oraz krajami zachodnimi, opiera się na doświadczeniu tych państw w "rewolucji międzynarodowej". Zgodnie z tym pojęciem rozumie on przejście od kapitalizmu do kapitalizmu ponownie przez socjalizm, który osiągnięty został przez byłe państwa komunistyczne⁸.

Z kolei według A. Moreno, przejściowe demokracje krajów postkomunistycznych Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej charakteryzują się obecnością trzech głównych podziałów wartości: wartości reformatorskich oraz antyreformatorskich, wartości liberalno-demokratycznych, liberalnych i fundamentalnych oraz demokratycznych i autorytarnych.

Pierwszy podział wartościowy obejmuje stosunek do reform gospodarczych – rząd przeciw własności prywatnej i indywidualizmu gospodarczego, stosunek wobec reform

⁷ Remmele A., *Struktura podziałów i systemy partyjne w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 30-45.

⁸ Sale D., *Czy można stosować podziały Rokkana w Europie Środkowej?*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 56-63.

politycznych i przemian społecznych oraz wobec aborcji, nacjonalizmu i religii. Bieguny tego podziału określone są jako liberalne, demokratyczne oraz rynkowe z jednej strony, a także konserwatywne, autorytarne i statyczne preferancje z drugiej strony. Ta linia konfliktu określana jest jako podział reform.

Jeśli chodzi o rozróżnienie na podstawie wartości liberalnych i fundamentalistycznych, to zawiera ono stosunek wobec religii, autorytaryzmu oraz aborcji w różnych krajach. Liberalny i fundamentalistyczny podział przyciąga wartości kulturowe, takie, jak religia i nacjonalizm oraz kontrastuje z bardziej liberalnymi poglądami, które pojawiły się w analizie postaw wobec aborcji.

Trzeci rozróżnienie – jest to postawa wobec autorytaryzmu, a także bardziej otwartego i demokratycznego rządu. Ten podział jest tylko obecny we wszystkich społeczeństwach postkomunistycznych. Zauważyliśmy to, że wokół dominujących wartości politycznych i toczy się główna walka sił politycznych w krajach postkomunistycznych, która określa również odpowiednią konfigurację systemu partyjnego⁹.

Należy podkreślić, że w latach 90-tych powstały dwa punkty widzenia na temat wpływu podziałów na kształtowanie przestrzeni politycznej w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. W pierwszym podejściu – pojęcie „czysta deska” (R. Markowska, P. Mayer) – przestrzeń polityczna charakteryzuje się brakiem struktury i chaotycznością oraz podziały społeczno-polityczne powstały tylko po upływie okresu przejściowego¹⁰.

W drugim podejściu, reprezentowanym przez G. Kitchelta – podziały społeczno-polityczne powstają pod wpływem czynników (ekonomicznych, społecznych, kulturowych, wartościowych, ideologicznych, itp.), tak zwanej „linii przyczynowości”¹¹.

G. Koks przedstawia założenie, że rozdrobnienie systemów partyjnych w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej może być postrzegane, jako problem koordynacji działań elit politycznych, a mianowicie systemy partyjne stabilizują się i „zamrażają” się według strukturyzacji propozycji partyjnej. Tak więc, proces instytucjonalizacji podziałów wygląda w następujący sposób: partie określają swoje założenia programowe w zależności od społecznych, wartościowych, ideologicznych oraz behawioralnych cech swego elektoratu, a następnie przekazują ich do systemu partyjnego. Po formułowaniu propozycji partyjnej i upolitycznieniu głównych kierunków podziałów, następuje kształtowanie przestrzeni politycznej i „zamrożenie” systemu partyjnego¹².

Jednak O. Donowa odrzuca taką koncepcję, przedstawiając argumenty przeciw „zamrożeniu” systemu partyjnego w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, a mianowicie:

⁹ Moreno A., *Political Cleavages. Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy*, Westview Press, 1999, s. 205.

¹⁰ Mair P. *Party system change: approaches and interpretations*. – Oxford, 1997.

¹¹ Kitschelt H., *Post-communist party systems: competition, representation and interparty cooperation*, Cambridge studies in comparative politics, N. Y., 1999, s. 112-143.

¹² Donowa E., *Społeczno-polityczne rozmrażania i ich transformacja w system polityczny w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s.101-125.

1. Podczas tranzytu instytucjonalny obraz jest bardzo niestabilny i prowadzi do powstania względnie niestabilnych zasad gry.
2. Demokracja występuje w warunkach niedojrzałości społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, które gromadzi interesy i przesyła je do systemu politycznego; struktury gospodarcze nie ułatwiają rozwój niezależnych organizacji społecznych lub tożsamości zbiorowych.
3. Przez to, że partie nie zostały ustalone w ramach rozszerzonego prawa wyborczego na nowe grupy społeczne (jak w Europie Zachodniej), a w warunkach wyborów powszechnych, relacje między elektoratem i elitą od początku były bardzo słabe. W warunkach reżimu komunistycznego nie istniało konkurujących partii politycznych, które mogłyby służyć jako obiekty przyciągania wyborców, oraz w nowych demokracjach przez brak świadomości na temat grup społecznych i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, partie były tworzone nie z dołu go góry, tylko z góry do dołu.

Według Donowoi, struktury społeczne i polityczne podziały w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej są bardzo odmienne od podziałów, które istnieją w Europie Zachodniej. A przede wszystkim odzwierciedla się to w umysłowych cechach wyborców, zwłaszcza w wartościowych instytucjach silnego państwa i silnego lidera. Określa to również podstawowy konflikt między komunistycznym elektoratem i demokratycznie zorientowanymi wyborcami lub konflikt pokoleń. Doprowadziło to do powstania wielu „kolorowych” rewolucji, które przetoczyły się w byłych republikach radzieckich – młodymi tranzytowymi demokracjami.

Przed tym jak przejść bezpośrednio do rozpatrzenia funkcji społeczno-politycznych podziałów w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, należy zauważyć, że klasyczne podziały, które tworzą strukturę przestrzeni politycznej i promują tworzenie odpowiedniej konfiguracji systemów partyjnych są tu również korzystne¹³. Rozważmy krótko cztery klasyczne rozróżnienie Lipseta-Rokkana w odniesieniu do praktyki politycznej w krajach postkomunistycznych.

Pierwsza różnica jest między centrum, który ustanawia narodową kulturę oraz zbuntowanymi mieszkańcami podbitych prowincji, które różnią się cechami etnicznymi, religijnymi i językowymi. Socjalizm sprzycał umocnieniu podziału, dając początek nowym partiom, które wyraziły zainteresowanie centrum i peryferii.

Po upadku reżimów radzieckich w wielu krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej pojawiły się nacjonalistyczne organizacje, które wyrażały interesy centrum (zwykle największej grupy etnicznej), a także wielu partii peryferyjnych, które chroniły interesy mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych (jak na przykład partia węgierska w Słowacji).

Druga różnica jest między państwem narodowym oraz przywilejami kościoła. Przed wojną w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej było wiele partii chrześcijańskich

¹³ Romaniuk A., *Analiza porównawcza instytucji politycznych w Europie Zachodniej*: Monografia, Centrum publikacji LNU imienia Iwana Franki, 2007, s. 391.

demokratów. Po upadku reżimów komunistycznych konflikty między kościołem a państwem często występowały odnośnie własności, która została skonfiskowana przez rządy komunistyczne.

Trzeci konflikt interesów był między mieszkańcami wsi, przemysłowcami oraz przedsiębiorcami, który umocnił się pod czas rewolucji przemysłowej.

Jednakże, zgodnie D.-L. Sale, oddzielenie się miasta od wsi w krajach postkomunistycznych jest przede wszystkim spowodowane ekonomicznymi podstawami. Najlepiej to jest widoczne na Węgrach, gdzie i teraz ten podział na tej że podstawie istnieje w systemie partyjnym.

Czwarty konflikt był to konflikt pomiędzy właścicielami a pracownikami lub konflikt na podstawie społeczno-gospodarczej. Jeśli w Europie Zachodniej z rozwojem stosunków kapitalistycznych, ze szczególnym naciskiem na rozwój prywatnej przedsiębiorczości on miał wyraźnie określony charakter, to w Europie Wschodniej 40 lat reżimu komunistycznego miały największy wpływ szczególnie na tą konfrontację. Kolektywizacja produkcji, wywłaszczenie kapitału zniszczyły ten podział. Jednak redystrybucja majątku została przeprowadzona w interesie rządu, partyjnej nomenklatury, wielu biurokratów. Przed dołączeniem do reżimu komunistycznego, większość krajów Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej nie posiadały wystarczająco rozwiniętego systemu kapitalistycznego, aby opierając się na konflikt pomiędzy dwoma podstawowymi klasami, tworzyć partie¹⁴.

Wyraźne zróżnicowanie w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej można zobaczyć na konkretnych przykładach Węgier, Rumunii, Słowacji, Polski i Litwy.

W ten sposób przykład Rumunii pokazuje, że na zamiast tradycyjnemu podziału komuniści oraz antykomuniści pojawiły się kwestii kompetencji i korupcji. Pogarszająca się sytuacja gospodarcza doprowadziła również do powstania podziałów na podstawach społeczno-gospodarczych.

Jeśli chodzi o Węgry, badania empiryczne wskazują na to, że najbardziej stabilnymi czynnikami, które mają wpływ na wybór partyjny, są religia, przynależność do partii komunistycznej, miejsce zamieszkania (miasto czy wieś), a także wiek. Obecny system partyjny na Węgrach koncentruje się na społeczno-ekonomicznych podstawach zróżnicowania. Jest wyraźnie przedstawiony podział Wschód-Zachód, gdzie Zachód bardziej koncentruje się na spektrum partii prawicowych oraz uprzemysłowionych Wschód – na lewice.

Geografia wyborcza Litwy wskazuje na główny podział prawica i lewica. Gospodarczo stabilne południe wspiera większość partii prawicowych, ze względu na fakt historyczny, ponieważ w okresie między wojnami światowymi tutaj znajdowała się stolica oraz również mała liczba mniejszości etnicznych. Środkowa i wschodnia części kraju preferowały lewicę, pod wpływem tradycyjnego wsparcia socjalistycznych i radykalnych ideologii, zacofania gospodarczego.

¹⁴ Sale D., *Czy można stosować podziały Rokkana w Europie Środkowej?*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 56-63.

W kategoriach geopolitycznych główne linie działań w Republice Czeskiej istniały pomiędzy centrum (duże miasta przemysłowe) i peryferią (reszta kraju). W Czechach jest duża liczba emigrantów i imigrantów (zwłaszcza z Rumunii), którzy przeprowadzili się tu w poszukiwaniu pracy. Ponadto, w oparciu podziałów w Czechach jest religia, a Morawia zawsze występowała, jako konserwatywny katolicki region, wsparcie chrześcijańskich demokratów. W rezultacie, określona jako konfesjonalna i partyjna strona linii podziału – między regionami katolickimi i innych regionami.

Słowacja charakteryzuje się wyraźnym podziałem na bazie etnicznej między Słowacką większością i mniejszością etniczną Węgier. Istnieje wyraźna różnica między Bratysławą, regionami południowymi oraz niektórymi północnymi prowincjami, co zbiega się z podziałem centrum-peryferie. Trzeci podział jest na osi wschód-zachód¹⁵.

Biorąc pod uwagę podziały społeczno-polityczne w Polsce w ramach podejścia G. Kitchettiego, można stwierdzić, że na początku lat 90. ubiegłego wieku w systemie politycznym polskiego społeczeństwa został wyodrębniony podział autorytarno-liberalny. Potwierdzają to w szczególności wyniki wyborów z 1989 r., w których Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza otrzymała 37,6% głosów, Solidarność – 35%. Utworzony w ten sposób podział autorytarno-liberalny przyczynił się do demokratyzacji systemu politycznego i późniejszego ustanowienia pluralizmu politycznego.

Można go było również obserwować na wyborach parlamentarnych w 1991 r., kiedy w warunkach nieobecności bariery wyborczej do Sejmu weszło 29 partii politycznych. W pierwszych latach po obaleniu reżimu komunistycznego wpływ byłych elit rządzących, przekształconych oraz dostosowanych do reżimu demokratycznego, był dość duży, ale autorytarno-liberalny podział społeczno-polityczny wyczerpał się wraz z ostatecznym zakończeniem procesu tranzytu i konsolidacji demokratycznego reżimu w Polsce.

Zachowanie wyborcze po ustanowieniu tego podziału stało się chaotycznym, ponieważ wolność wyboru długo nie charakteryzowała polski system polityczny, w ramach którego system partyjny można by uznać za hegemoniczny. Jednocześnie być może najważniejszą opozycją wobec początku okresu tranzytowego była opozycja między elitą autorytarną starego reżimu a demokratycznymi siłami politycznymi.

Można zatem z pewnością powiedzieć, że głównym przełomem charakterystycznym dla końca XX wieku w Polsce była konfrontacja elity autorytarnej a demokratycznie nastawionej. Jednak na początku XXI wieku podział ten staje się mniej zauważalny z powodu udanego przejścia demokratycznego tranzytu. Wpływ byłych elit politycznych pozostaje nadal zauważalny w ciągu pierwszych lat po obaleniu reżimu komunistycznego, jednak dla Polski współczesnej sytuacja ta jest mniej charakterystyczna niż pod koniec ubiegłego wieku. Dawne siły komunistyczne się zmieniły, dostosowując się do nowych demokratycznych „reguł gry”, a zatem

¹⁵ Dunajewa J., *Spoleczno-polityczne podziały w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 93-96.

autorytarno-liberalny podział prawie całkowicie został zamieniony na lewicowo-prawicowy społeczno-ekonomiczny.

Kolejnym podziałem społeczno-politycznym, charakterystycznym dla Polski, jest podział terytorialny, który był wyraźnie widoczny w wyniku wyborów parlamentarnych w 2011 roku. Północne i zachodnie województwa podczas głosowania w Senacie w większości wspierały przedstawicieli Platformy Obywatelskiej, południowe oraz wschodnie – kandydatów od Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Można więc powiedzieć, że konserwatywne postawy ludności rosną na wschodzie i południu.

Podział między kościołem a państwem jest mniej więcej tak samo ważny dla polskiego społeczeństwa. Pomimo świeckiego charakteru Polski religia odgrywa znaczącą rolę w kształtowaniu socjalno-politycznej doktryny wielu sił politycznych. Na przykład dla konserwatystów właściwe są działania przeciwko legalizacji stosunków homoseksualnych, aborcji i eutanazji, zabronionych przez kościół katolicki. Siły polityczne liberalnych i socjaldemokratycznych kierunków władzy są bardziej spokojne w rozwiązaniu podobnych kwestii. Modernizowany jest podział społeczno-polityczny między kościołem a państwem, powrót do kluczowych problemów postmaterializmu w tym kontekście przewodzi publiczność, według R. Ingleharta, do warunków rozwoju społeczeństwa postmodernistycznego.

Patrząc na kształtowanie się podziałów socjalno-politycznych w Polsce pod względem pojęcia „czystej tablicy”, zaczynają się one kształtować pod koniec XX wieku, to znaczy, że nie odgrywają roli klasyczne podziały, wyodrębnione przez Lipseta i Rokkana. W tym przypadku podstawą są właśnie podziały społeczno-polityczne, oparte na wartościach postmaterialistycznych, rozgraniczenie cennych systemów postmodernizmu i społeczeństwa przemysłowego. Jednak ich powstawanie zajmuje dość długi okres czasowy, a zatem do tych czas na system polityczny Polski nie miały żadnego wpływu żadne podziały społeczno-polityczne.

Instytucjonalizacja podziałów społeczno-politycznych, zgodnie z paradygmatem „czystej tablicy”, odbyła się w polskim społeczeństwie dopiero niedawno. Zgodnie z wynikami wyborów do Sejmu w 2007 r. można stwierdzić, że w kraju został ostatecznie zinstytucjonalizowany lewicowo-prawicowy podział, co również miało wpływ na kolejne wybory parlamentarne. Tak więc Wschód i Południe Polski tradycyjnie oddały swój głos partii Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Zachód i Południe poparły Platformę Obywatelską. Jeśli w wyborach 2007 r. wyniki tych partii wyniosły odpowiednio 39 i 60 przedstawicieli, w 2011 r. liczby te były: 31 i 63 senatorów. Dlatego właśnie można stwierdzać, że główną konfrontacją w społeczeństwie, która jest przekazywana do systemu politycznego Polski w Senacie, jest rozgraniczenie między konserwatystami a liberałami.

Na obecnym etapie ta konfrontacja jest osłabiana przez trzy partie, które weszły do parlamentu, jednak w ostatnich wyborach „Platforma Obywatelska” i „Prawo i Sprawiedliwość” razem wyniosły 69, 07% głosów, co nadal stanowi znaczący udział w systemie wielopartyjnym. Można więc powiedzieć, że liberalno-konserwatywny podział w Polsce został zinstytucjonalizowany i będzie aktualny w ciągu kilku kolejnych kampanii wyborczych.

Table 1. Zmiany zachowań wyborczych obywateli Polski

Rok	Liderzy na wyborach do Senatu	Liderzy na wyborczej do Sejmu	Dominujące podziały socjalnopolityczne
1989	Solidarność – 99 Bezpartyjni – 1	PZPR – 37, 6% Solidarność – 35%	Autorytarno-liberalny
1991	Unia Demokratyczna – 21 Solidarność – 11	Unia Demokratyczna – 12, 32% Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – 11, 99%	Autorytarno-liberalny, jednak zachowanie wyborców staje się chaotyczne
1993	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – 37 Polska Partia Narodowa – 36	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – 20, 4% Polska Partia Narodowa – 15, 4%	Autorytarno-liberalny
1997	Solidarność – 51 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – 28	Solidarność – 33, 8% Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – 27, 1%	Autorytarno-liberalny
2001	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Unia Pracy – 75 Koalicja «Senat 2001» – 15	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Unia Pracy – 41% Platforma Obywatelska – 12, 7%	Autorytarno-liberalny, zaczyna się kształtowanie lewicowo-prawicowego podziału починається формування ліво-правого поділу
2005	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – 49 Platforma Obywatelska – 34	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – 27% Platforma Obywatelska – 24, 1%	Lewicowo-prawicowy
2007	Platforma Obywatelska – 60 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – 39	Platforma Obywatelska – 41, 51% Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – 32, 11%	Lewicowo-prawicowy
2011	Platforma Obywatelska – 63 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – 31	Platforma Obywatelska – 39, 18% Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – 29, 89%	Lewicowo-prawicowy
2015	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – 61 Platforma Obywatelska – 34	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – 37, 58% Platforma Obywatelska – 24, 09%	Lewicowo-prawicowy

Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej powstał po rozwiązaniu PZPR i faktycznie był zreorganizowaną partią polityczną elity autorytarnej, która zmieniając swoją formę, starała się zachować władzę i po wynikach wyborów widać, że do początku XXI wieku to jej się udawało. Dlatego właśnie do 2001 r. należy mówić o dominacji autorytarno-liberalnego podziału socjalnopolitycznego w Polsce.

Na początku trzeciego tysiąclecia rozpoczyna się tworzenie lewicowo-prawicowego podziału socjalnopolitycznego, który ma raczej charakter ekonomiczny oraz aspekt wartości moralnych. We współczesnym systemie politycznym Polski to on jest dominujący i, biorąc pod uwagę wyniki ostatnich wyborów, pozostanie taki przez co najmniej dwie – trzy kampanie wyborcze.

Polska wykazała obecność dwóch klasycznych podziałów: centrum-peryferie, lewica-prawica. Istnieje zależność wyników głosowania wobec zatrudnienia w sektorze przemysłowym. Tradycyjne konserwatywne przemysłowo rozwinięte regiony na wschodzie Polski głosują w większości na prawicę oraz centrum i północ – na lewicę.

Podsumowując, możemy zauważyć, że schemat struktury poznawczej podziałów bardzo skomplikowany: historyczne linie podziałów na społeczno-ekonomicznych, językowych, terytorialnych, religijnych podstawach oparte są na wartościach obywateli państw post-komunistycznych i uporządkowane są, jako nowoczesna konfiguracja systemów partyjnych. Naszym

zdaniem, te dwie teorie wpływu społeczno-politycznych podziałów na strukturę przestrzeni politycznej – „czystej deski” oraz współzależności od przeszłości historycznej, ta ostatnia zasługuje na większą uwagę naukowców.

Głównym podziałem w krajach postkomunistycznych ze względu na przeszłość historyczną i cechy umysłowe wyborców pozostaje konflikt między postkomunistami, minimalistami i zwolennikami gospodarki społecznej z jednej strony oraz demokratami i maksymalistami i ultraliberałami – z drugiej, co często prowadzi do konfliktu pokoleń.

Bezsporny jest fakt, że społeczno-polityczny podział w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej nosi piętno historycznej retrospektywy oraz wpływu przeszłości komunistycznej, również określają cechy struktury instytucjonalnej, systemu partyjnego, tradycji i norm, które rozwinęły się, formą rządów, rodzajem systemu wyborczego, w szczególności rolą mediów, a co najważniejsze, specyfiką przemian demokratycznych.

Referencje

1. Donova E., *Społeczno-polityczne rozmrażania i ich transformacja w system polityczny w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr 4, s. 101-125.
2. Dunajewa J., *Społeczno-polityczne podziały w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr 4, s. 93-96.
3. Elisejew S., *Społeczne i polityczne podziały, uwarunkowania instytucjonalne i warunki konsolidacji systemów partyjnych w przejściu do demokracji*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr 4, s. 64 – 89.
4. Kitschelt H., *Post-communist party systems: competition, representation and interparty cooperation*, Cambridge studies in comparative politics, N. Y., 1999. – s. 112-143.
5. Lawson K., *Podziały, partie i wyborcy*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 51-55.
6. Lipset S., *Struktury podziałów, systemy partyjne i preferencje wyborców. Uwagi wstępne*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 204-234.
7. Mair P., *Party system change: approaches and interpretations*, Oxford, 1997.
8. Meleszkina E., *Koncepcja podziałów społeczno-politycznych: problem uniwersalności*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 11-29.
9. Moreno A., *Political Cleavages. Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy*, Westview Press, 1999, s. 205.
10. Remmele A., *Struktura podziałów i systemy partyjne w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 30-45.
11. Romaniuk A., *Analiza porównawcza instytucji politycznych w Europie Zachodniej*: Monografia, Centrum publikacji LNU imienia Iwana Franki, 2007, s. 391.
12. Romaniuk A., *Od zjednoczenia do niepodległości: stan i dynamika integracji społeczeństwa ukraińskiego w ramach europejskich procesów*, Lwów, CPD, 2009, s. 140.
13. Sale D., *Czy można stosować podziały Rokkana w Europie Środkowej?*, Nauka polityczna, 2004, nr. 4, s. 56-63.

THE MODELS OF FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND COOPERATION OF THEIR PARTICIPANTS IN MULTIPARTY CONDITIONS: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL MANIFESTATIONS

The article is dedicated to theoretical and practical analyzing the models of formation of coalition governments and cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions. This was based on the pre-assumption that the rules and traditions served by coalitions'/protocoalitions' partners in negotiating coalition governments are quite similar or organized under similar schemes and principles. And this is true in functional and macroscopic terms. However, in the course of the analysis it was stated that institutionally and non-institutionally coalition governments differ microscopically, in particular on the basis of the use of different models of formation and different mechanisms of cooperation of the participants. Thus, it was generalized that coalition governments need to be talked about in a diversified way, in particular through different approaches to explaining them and taking into account the different national specificities of their practical approbation. In one case, such governments are more predetermined by nominal rules and institutions, and in the other case they are predominantly dependent on party-determined factors.

Keywords: government, governmental cabinet, coalition government, multi-party system, formation of a coalition government, distribution of ministerial posts.

Славоміра Бялоблoцка

МОДЕЛІ ФОРМУВАННЯ КОАЛІЦІЙНИХ УРЯДІВ І СПІВПРАЦІ ЇХНІХ УЧАСНИКІВ В УМОВАХ БАГАТОПАРТІЙНОСТІ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНІ Й ПРАКТИЧНІ ВИЯВИ

У теоретичному та практичному розрізі проаналізовано моделі формування коаліційних урядів і співпраці їхніх учасників в умовах багатопартійності. Це здійснено з огляду на попереднє припущення, згідно з яким правила та традиції, якими послуговуються гіпотетичні партнери коаліцій/протокоаліцій при веденні переговорів про формування коаліційних урядів, доволі схожі або організуються за подібними схемами і принципами. І це вірно у функціональному й макроскопічному розрізі. Однак в ході аналізу констатовано, що інституційно та позаінституційно коаліційні уряди різняться мікроскопічно, зокрема

на підставі застосування різних моделей формування та різних механізмів співпраці учасників. Відтак узагальнено, що про коаліційні уряди треба говорити диверсифіковано, зокрема в рамках різних підходів до їхнього пояснення та в рамках врахування різної національної специфіки їхньої апробації на практиці. В одному випадку уряди більше зумовлені номінальними правилами й інститутами, а в іншому випадку переважно залежать від партійно дестермінованих чинників.

Ключові слова: уряд, урядовий кабінет, коаліційний уряд, багатопартійна система, формування коаліційного уряду, розподіл міністерських посад.

Among the most striking peculiarities of coalitional governments forming in countries with multi-party systems is an almost absolute lack of serious and systematic differences between them. Despite varying from country to country, are different in each country, the rules and traditions of government-forming, applied by the hypothetical coalition / proto-coalition partners in negotiating coalitional government cabinets are extremely resembling or rather governed by similar schemes and principles. It can be regarded as a theoretical prerequisite for pointing out several models, or even theories of coalitional governments forming and the cooperation of their members in multiparty conditions. However, this process cannot be boiled down to a single scheme, unilaterally allowing to verify different options for coalition governments forming. The point is that virtually all the empirical calculations and considerations regarding the formation of government coalitions are represented by either special studies of coalition bargaining or by mere comparisons of the number of coalition governments formed on the basis different models and theories. In addition, political comparative studies do not always use reliable statistical material to identify a valid set of variables and indicators that undoubtedly determine the formation of different types of coalition governments. Therefore, the proposed study argues that it is advisable to follow some of the most tested and valid theories of coalition governments formation as well as the cooperation of their members in multiparty environments, instead of limiting them to a single synthetic one.

These arguments come as no surprise in view of a wide array of research in this domain. The fact is that owing to explorations of such scientists, as R. Andeweg¹, A. De Swaan², W. Gamson³, M. Hallerberg⁴, D.-H. Kim and G. Loewenberg⁵, M. Laver⁶, L. Martin, R. Stevenson and G.

¹ Andeweg R., Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers, "European Journal of Political Research" 2000, vol 37, s. 377–395.

² De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973.

³ Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, "American Sociological Review" 1981, vol 26, s. 373–382.

⁴ Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106.

⁵ Kim D.-H., Loewenberg G., The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, "Comparative Political Studies" 2005, vol 38, s. 1104–1129.

⁶ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

Vanberg⁷, W. Müller and K. Strøm⁸, W. Riker⁹, M. Thies¹⁰, I. von Neumann i O. Morgenstern¹¹, etc, it is apparent that all the existing theories and models of forming coalition governments and their participants cooperation in multiparty conditions are largely heterogeneous, and therefore unlikely to be synthesized, being based on different theoretical and methodological principles and focusing on diverse expectations and assumptions about coalition governments.

An overview of the scientific legacy of comparative political studies suggests that it is expedient to identify at least two groups of theoretical and methodological approaches, outlining the issues of coalition governments forming and cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions. The first group of approaches is referred to as the non-institutional or “without institutions” approach, while the second is regarded as the institutional or “within-institutions-and-with institutions” approach. Therefore, the constant competition of the two groups of approaches has largely determined the elaboration of various theoretical models of coalition government formation and the cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions, even though the former (non-institutional approach) evolved earlier than the latter.

It goes without saying that proponents of the non-institutional approach have traditionally sought to explain and foresee the process of forming coalition governments solely through application of analytical perspectives and models, claiming that political parties, motivated by their short or long-term goals are the determining agents of this process. Accordingly, followers of the non-institutional approach assume that any model of coalition government formation can always be applied to any specific case of coalition-forming, which, in their opinion, allows to interpret any hypothetical agreement about the formation and performance of a coalition government irrespective of the historically established circumstances. One of the most well-known outcomes of the non-institutional approach appears to be a minimum victory hypothesis, initially proposed by I. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern in “*Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*”¹², and later revised and slightly modified by W. Riker in his work “*The Theory of Political Coalitions*”¹³. Afterwards W. Gamson successfully applied this hypothesis to explain coalition government forming processes in the treatise “*A Theory of Coalition Formation*”¹⁴. This hypothesis claims that providing parties form a coalition cabinet in order to obtain the maximum number

⁷ Martin L., Stevenson R., *An Empirical Model of Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. University of Rochester 1996; Martin L., Vanberg G., Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review, “*American Political Science Review*” 2004, vol 99, s. 93–106.

⁸ Müller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000; Müller W., Strøm K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 1–31; Müller W., Strøm K., *Schlu.: Koalitionsregierungen und die Praxis des Regierens in Westeuropa*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Koalitionsregierungen in Westeuropa*, Wyd. Signum 1997, s. 705–750; Müller W., Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2000, vol 37, s. 309–333.

⁹ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁰ Thies M., Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, “*American Journal of Political Science*” 2001, vol 45, s. 580–598.

¹¹ von Neumann I., Morgenstern O., *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1953.

¹² von Neumann I., Morgenstern O., *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1953.

¹³ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁴ Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, “*American Sociological Review*” 1981, vol 26, s. 373–382.

of political preferences, they typically resort to the option of forming a government coalition with a triumphant status (having obtained the majority of seats in the legislature) and the least number of potential participants¹⁵. This criterion ensures that individual members of governmental coalitions get the best possible political benefits and roles. Instead, the more parliamentary support exceeds the required minimum of a triumphant status (50% plus one MP in the Legislature), the shorter the term of a government coalition is, and therefore political actors tend to consider this option less important¹⁶. A slightly modified version of the minimal victory hypothesis was proposed by R. Axelrod, who in the study «Conflict of Interest»¹⁷ began to simultaneously investigate the level of the ideological conflicts, typical of various governmental coalitions. Based on his findings, the scientist argued that politicians and parties, attracted by governmental positions, were interested not only in maximizing their political benefits, but also in reducing the operating costs of forming and supporting government coalitions. Thus, R. Axelrod suggested that politicians and parties should form exclusively minimum-winning and ideologically-linked government coalitions, i.e. coalitions composed exclusively of ideologically related and close political forces. Another theorist expressed the same idea within the framework of a non-institutional approach, that is A. DeSwaan., who in the study «*Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation*»¹⁸ argued that political parties, like other political actors, are making an attempt to form minimum-winning governmental coalitions with the lowest ideological range and the ideological distance between the parties. In general, this presupposes that a non-institutional approach to explaining peculiarities of forming coalition governments and the cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions leads to several figurative assumptions that: potential coalition government cabinets are likely to be formed, being formed as minimally as possible; potential coalition governments are likely to form when they are constituted as minimum-winning and ideologically-linked government coalitions; potential coalition governments are likely to form if they are expected to be ideologically compact, minimum-winning coalitions; potential coalition governments are likely to occur when they centre around a party or parties with centrist / middle ideological positioning.

In contrast, proponents of the institutional approach have traditionally claimed that the outcomes of the forming government coalitions process are largely a function of certain norms, circumstances, and institutions, determine a peculiar ability to form certain types of coalition governments. Accordingly, some scientists, in particular M. Laver and N. Schofield¹⁹, argue that in forming coalition governments political institutions need to be regarded as constraining factors in coalition bargaining. Others claim instead that political institutions are not only

¹⁵ Marradi A., *Italy: from Centrism to Crisis of the Center-Left Coalitions*, [w:] Browne E., Dreijmanis J. (eds.), *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Longman 1982, s. 49.

¹⁶ Norpoth H., *The German Federal Republic*, [w:] Browne E., Dreijmanis J. (eds.), *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Longman 1982.

¹⁷ Axelrod R., *Conflict of Interest*, Wyd. Markham 1970.

¹⁸ De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973.

¹⁹ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

limiting but also directive, thus affecting the entire chain of processes of formation, performance and responsibility. On the whole, such an institutionally determined approach states that the coalition governments formation and the cooperation of their members in multiparty conditions and within the specific environment parameters are necessarily caused by a direct impact of certain norms and institutions. In addition, researchers mention that if political actors (political figures, parties, election coalitions, and voters) are motivated by the posts and pursuit of their own political goals, the influence of certain norms and institutions on the political behaviour of those political actors should be similar to the nature of such norms and institutes. Thus, given the variability of different norms and political institutions structuring, it is necessary to discuss the variability of the structuring of different institutionally determined theories and models of forming coalition governments and the cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions. However, even irrespective of the absence of a peculiar systemic institutional theory, and in the context of their variability, it can be argued that, in one way or another, it is certain institutional factors that determine consequences of different processes of forming coalition governments.

In this regard K. Strom, J. Budge and M. Laver in the study “*Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*”²⁰, and similarly M. Laver and N. Schofield in the work “*Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*”²¹ claim that from the perspective of the institutional approach, several theories and models of forming coalition governments and their participants in multiparty environments should be pointed out. According to one theory, institutional rules can assist members of a particular coalition government in status quo situations while negotiating a particular coalition government formation and prolongation, thus making certain coalition governments more credible and stable in the event of reforms. Consequently, it is not institutionally excluded that at the time of a new coalition government negotiating it is more effective to retain the previous coalition government as acting, since it is impossible to predict the outcomes of how the process of a new coalition government forming. According to K. Strom, it stipulates that it is the institutional factors that add market importance to governments that are no longer supported by the Legislature, yet political actors cannot be certain whether new options for governmental coalition will arise. In terms of another theory, applying rules of coalition governments early termination in particular political systems is of great institutional importance. M. Laver and N. Schofield²² state that ruling / dominant parties often have considerable control over the timing of the coalition government cabinet «termination» and may therefore determine the appropriateness of forming a new coalition government. This idea is supplemented by the fact that exactly the ruling or dominant party is able to take advantage of institutional rules, enabling it to affect the coalition government

²⁰ Strom K., Budge J., Laver M., Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, “*American Journal of Political Science*” 1994, vol 38, s. 303–335.

²¹ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

²² Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990, s. 213.

performance and thus its responsibility. This is of utter importance when such a party is capable of influencing ministerial reshuffles in a coalition government or, most interestingly, initiating dissolution of parliament and announcing early parliamentary elections (which is inherent in some multi-party democracies). In this context, it is apparent that the institutional approach to the issue of forming coalition governments and the cooperation of their participants in multiparty conditions leads to several figurative assumptions, in particular that: a coalition government, formed by certain parties, yet for some reason having terminated its powers, is most likely to preserve its party composition and to be re-formed under the conditions of the current composition of the parliament; a coalition government formed as an interim parliament in the face of a crisis of the previous coalition government and unchanged composition of the Legislature is most likely to transform into a permanent coalition government, rather than an interim government; the proto-coalition, expected to contain an antisystemic political party, is hardly unlikely to transform into a coalition government; a proto-coalition, which contains a formateur or informant of government forming is highly likely to transform into a coalition government; the likelihood of forming a coalition government increases due to simplifying rules for the introduction of governments into office, that is, the rules on parliamentary investiture vote for the new government.

In this respect L. Martin and R. Stevenson in the study “*A Unified Model of Cabinet Formation and Survival*”²³ argued that the likelihood of coalition government formation increases together with the rising confidence of political actors in the institutional stability of such a government, this fact presupposing that political actors tend to prefer long-awaited governmental coalitions or relatively long-surviving instances of governmental coalitions. In addition, the abovementioned concludes that government coalitions, expected to be formed by ideologically close parties rather than distant parties, that is, coalitions that are thought to be more ideologically compact rather than divisive, are regarded as more long-standing. On the other hand, in the words of the institutional approach advocates, party or non-institutional determinants are less relevant, since being absolutely identical for each expected coalition option in any hypothetical composition of parliament, the effective number of parties or the degree of parliament polarization is obviously not a decisive factor in predicting coalition governments. Respectively this stipulates generalizations according to which the following is theoretically possible: coalition governments are more likely to be formed in case of ideological distance reduction as well as diminishing differences between their members; minority coalitions are more likely to cause ideological divisions in parliamentary opposition; coalition governments are more likely to be formed if their potential participants control the majority in the parliament; coalition governments are highly unlikely to be formed, but such a possibility still exists provided one party itself controls the majority in the legislature²⁴.

²³ Martin L., Stevenson R., *A Unified Model of Cabinet Formation and Survival*, Unpublished manuscript 1995.

²⁴ Martin L., Stevenson R., *An Empirical Model of Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. University of Rochester 1996.

As a result, the conclusion arises that the two groups of approaches to the issue of forming coalition governments in multiparty conditions generates a lot of controversy and mutual exceptions. Therefore, it is justified not to contemplate different models of coalition governments formation in opposition to each other, but rather identify the most significant and even common peculiarities of negotiating coalition governments process. It requires appealing to the common formal features of the process of coalition governments negotiation and separation of different models of cabinet portfolio allocation between governmental coalition partners (in addition, at times it is appropriate to resort to variable methods of maintaining coalition government stability in multiparty environments, both in the so-called open (if parties do not belong to the extreme parts of the ideological spectrum) and closed (if the parties belong to the left or right extremity of the ideological spectrum) coalitions.

In virtually all countries with a multiparty system, and coalition governments model, the negotiation process involves the same steps and stages from the very point of announcing the results of parliamentary (rarely presidential and parliamentary) elections up to the stage of nominating and approving a new coalitional cabinet. These steps, with minor modifications, follow a linear sequence: deciding on forming a government coalition; approval of a government coalition political programme; allocation of cabinet offices among government coalition partners; the selection of candidates for the posts of Prime Minister (if this has not been done in advance), Vice Prime Ministers, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, junior ministers and other senior government officials on the quotas of the forming parties.

Although parties informally negotiate and have certain arrangements before the parliamentary and / or presidential elections (even in the form of proto-coalitions or electoral coalitions), whereas formally, the process of coalition government formation begins only following the election results announcement. After the votes are counted and the number of party seats in the parliament is known, serious coalition negotiations on government formation can begin. In addition, the previous informal negotiations between party leaders generally do not concern either the portfolio allocation among coalition partners or the specific content of a government coalition political programme. Hence, the first step following the election results is a decision on government coalition formation. The main purpose of such a step is to identify potential partners to form an effective government coalition, capable of obtaining (at best) the majority in parliament and forming a new government cabinet. The next step is to negotiate a government coalition political programme. In most cases, members of a government coalition may differ in important programmatic issues. Therefore, after declaring an intention to form a government coalition, the next mandatory step is to select a political platform that is acceptable to all government coalition partners. The process of political reconciliation is complex and often does not meet all its participants' expectations, requiring compromises and concessions in debates. However, this stage is extremely important for the formation of a new viable coalition government and its effective further cooperation with the parliament. The third

step in forming a coalition government involves allocating cabinet portfolios between coalition partners. At this stage of the negotiations, important key posts in the government cabinet are allocated. Negotiations on key government positions are often held after the established models that help fairly allocate cabinet offices among government coalition members (see below). After the key posts in the coalition government are allocated among the coalition partners, the final stage of the process coalition government formation begins, i.e. the selection of candidates for these positions from parties. Frequently, individual parties are free to choose candidates for certain posts. In other cases, the choice of individual ministers is agreed with the coalition partners. Really seldom, such appointments are made by the central executive authority. However, M.Laver and K.Shepsle²⁵ point out, that irrespective of specific selection procedures, ministers are almost always elected from the politicians or administrators, having a lot of weight in the respective parties.

The four steps discussed above constitute the basic coalition government formation model in any multiparty democracy. They are often regarded as independent processes, predominantly occurring in a linear sequence. However, some analysts, including T. Bergman, have warned that the process of forming a government may not always proceed linearly²⁶, because various stages can overlap or merge, complicating a seemingly simplified four-stage model. Undoubtedly, the first stage, being intention to create a government coalition in practice often coincides with the second stage of elaborating a government coalition political programme²⁷. This is obvious because the coherence of the political parties' programmes is a weighty determinant of viability and effectiveness of both the government coalition and the cabinet. Moreover, the second stage can often combine with the stage of allocation of portfolios. In some cases a coalition partner is more interested in ensuring his fellow party members obtain portfolios than in the content of the government's political agenda. This partner can later «exchange» some of his political influence, lying in achieving certain political goals by governmental means, for a better allocation of offices in a government coalition.

Of equal research interest is the problem of the fundamentals of portfolio allocation and ministerial management in coalition cabinets in multiparty conditions. However, while party coalitions can easily agree on the principles and compromise of coalition policy, they are typically unable to trust each other's ministers, in particular to pursue a common coalition policy as practical as possible. For example, if the efforts of ministers from a particular coalition party significantly affect the efficiency of government policy through jurisdiction of such ministers, delegation of ministerial posts and their allocation among coalition parties becomes a problematic issue. The scientific literature typically identifies three ways how government

²⁵ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996, s. 249.

²⁶ Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–230.

²⁷ De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 300–355.

coalition partners can control each other to reduce the so-called «loss of agency» problem when each coalition member is at risk of being over-delegated by any other coalition member. L. Martin and G. Vanberg²⁸ are convinced, that the first way is that government coalition partners are to use the political process on the parliamentary arena as a tool to increase knowledge about each other. W. Müller, K. Strom²⁹ and M. Thies³⁰ argue that the second way is boiled down to the situation when junior ministers from one party can help to watch coalition cabinet members from another party. Finally, according to M. Hallerberg³¹, D.-H. Kim and G. Loewenberg³², the third strategy suggests parliamentary committees and political parties to control coalition governments ministers in order to influence their stability results. In this regard M. Laver and K. Shepsle³³ claim, that when each particular coalition government party exactly knows the perfect political stance of its partner, the «mutual control» can lead to more stable results of government performance.

Against this backdrop, it is advisable to single out several common and most important principles of the portfolio allocation in coalition governments. According to the first principle, the prime minister's post typically goes to a political party with the most votes, not necessarily in the parliament, but among all government parties. The most common practice of coalition government formation is to assign the prime minister's post to the strongest government coalition partner, since the party leader with the most electoral support is usually appointed by the prime minister of the new coalition government. W. Müller points out that this is rather an informal arrangement than a formal rule, being nevertheless observed in most countries with a multi-party system³⁴. The second principle suggests that the second-largest government coalition partner is given the post of deputy prime minister or speaker of the lower house of parliament. Therefore, the appointment of a prime minister, being the representative of the strongest coalition partner does not mean that the party receives absolute power in the administrative process. The second or third-strongest party in the coalition government usually receives a quota for the position of Vice Prime Minister or Speaker of Parliament / lower house of parliament. This makes it impossible to concentrate power in the hands of one political force. The third principle states that the most important positions are allocated among the strongest partners in the government coalition. In particular, allocation of such important positions as the Minister of Finance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior Affairs and

²⁸ Martin L., Vanberg G., Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review, *"American Political Science Review"* 2004, vol 99, s. 93–106.

²⁹ Müller W., Strom K., *Schl.: Koalitionsregierungen und die Praxis des Regierens in Westeuropa*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Koalitionsregierungen in Westeuropa*, Wyd. Signum 1997, s. 736.

³⁰ Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 2001, vol 45, s. 580–598.

³¹ Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106.

³² Kim D.-H., Loewenberg G., The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 2005, vol 38, s. 1104–1129.

³³ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

³⁴ Müller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

the Minister of Defense get special attention³⁵. In most cases each office is negotiated separately. However, in some countries, there are no clear patterns of government portfolio allocation. The fourth principle determines that less important portfolios are distributed in proportion to the electoral support of government parties, and weaker government coalition partners typically receive slightly more representation. Respectively, the allocation of less important portfolios would encourage smaller parties to cooperate with the new coalition government. This is especially evident given that since most (if not all) of the top government positions are taken by members of the strongest parties, smaller coalition parties typically receive a larger share of «second tier» positions³⁶, which, in words of P. Mitchell³⁷, ensures them even more representation than they can count on based on the number of votes in the election³⁸. This model is normally referred to as the «relative weakness effect» and is quite popular with small governmental parties. The fifth principle typically boils down to the fact that the portfolio allocation in government coalitions is usually in line with party interests. In this regard, T. Saalfeld points out that, apart from proportionality, the portfolio allocation traditionally takes into account the specific political interests of coalition-forming parties³⁹. As a result, if a party is interested in a particular policy area, representatives of that party often get appointed to a particular ministry. E. Damgaard believes that, in practice, quite widespread is the portfolio allocation by political importance to parties represented in government, as it is expected to make governments more stable and efficient⁴⁰. Finally, the sixth principle states that portfolio allocation reflects the desire to balance power and representation between government coalition partners. In the end, this means that the process of allocation of ministerial posts is based on the principle of balancing or equality of government coalition parties. It is the natural desire of any governmental coalition that wants to maintain unity in its ranks. In addition, government coalition members should see that their contribution is appreciated and they play a role in the policy-making process.

In addition, there exist numerous mechanisms to achieve balance between coalition parties in the coalition government. These are mechanisms, applied by coalition governments to balance power and representation between government coalition members in government, which is certainly a factor of increasing the coalition government stability. Despite splitting government portfolios between different parties in a governmental coalition being one of the

³⁵ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

³⁶ Muller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

³⁷ Mitchell P., *Ireland: From Single-Party to Coalition Rule*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

³⁸ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 231–263.

³⁹ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

⁴⁰ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 231–263.

most logical ways to balance governmental power, this method has obvious limitations. The main point is that the number of ministerial posts in the government is limited, and therefore this tool is not always appropriate to achieve a representative balance. In contrast, political science and practice have elaborated some more sophisticated methods of delegating powers within coalition governments, involving sharing control over government positions, either by creating additional positions within existing portfolios, or by dividing traditional areas of responsibility into narrower segments of government activity, where no coalition government partner has exclusive control over a particular area⁴¹.

The toolkit for creating additional positions within existing portfolios can usually be implemented through appointment of junior ministers, the appointment of ministers without portfolios, or through creation of new ministries and hence new posts. One of the most common mechanisms for ensuring balance between coalition parties is the appointment of junior ministers (secretaries of state, deputy ministers with broad powers) to important ministries. So, if the Ministry of Finance is headed by a party A representative, then the junior ministers within that ministry may be from party B and party C. Some junior ministers may have their own areas of responsibility and perform broad supervision, while others are assigned to specific policy areas within the ministry that they significantly influence. In addition, the procedure for appointing junior ministers varies from country to country. For example, in some cases junior ministers are only appointed to certain important ministries. However, in other cases, each minister receives several junior ministers (one post for each coalition party in each ministry)⁴². In any case, junior ministers, acting as a counterbalance, has several advantages. In his study, Muller argues that not only does it help to balance the government representation distribution between coalition parties, but provides «an important mechanism to ensure execution of coalition agreements»⁴³. Another mechanism of balancing power between government coalition members is creation of ministerial positions without portfolios. For instance, this method is widespread in Sweden, where ministers are often responsible for a particular policy area but do not have control over a particular institutional apparatus⁴⁴. Among the advantages of this approach is the fact that negotiators get more freedom to satisfy the coalition parties' interests in the course of the coalition government formation. However, the visible disadvantage of this method is that portfolio-less ministers often face considerable difficulty in implementing their initiatives as they do not have the same institutional support as ministers as such. Finally, another mechanism of balance within coalition governments is to create new ministries and new government positions.

⁴¹ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

⁴² Muller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 108–109; De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 325–326.

⁴³ Muller W., Strom K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 24–25.

⁴⁴ Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–230.

In Denmark, for example, the number and jurisdiction of major government ministries is not fixed. They may be modified to take into account the interests of government parties. Therefore, during the formation of a government coalition, the structure of the cabinet can be bargained, which considerably increases the flexibility of the government-forming process⁴⁵. Less a radical example is Ireland, where the number and jurisdiction of government ministries is constitutionally enshrined. However, during negotiations to form a government coalition in 1994, an office of «senior junior minister» was created specifically for a small coalition party that required two ministerial posts, though the coalition could de jure allocate only one office⁴⁶.

In contrast, the tools for dividing traditional areas of responsibility into narrower segments of government activity traditionally occur due to the mechanisms of joint control over certain ministries as well as application of the so-called system of grades. Coordinating ministerial posts is an important way of allocating key positions among coalition members within the coalition government. For example, in Sweden, where junior ministers do not perform the counterbalancing function, some important ministerial positions are held by several full ministers. T. Bergman points out that this was the case, for example, with the Ministry of Finance and Budget in the coalition governments of Sweden in 1976 and 1979⁴⁷. Belgium yields another interesting example: there are no junior ministers whatsoever, yet two ministers from different parties are often appointed for «major ministries». J. Nousiainen states in this regard that «each of these ministers receives jurisdiction within the relevant ministry, but there is no clear hierarchical relationship between the ministers.» After all, some states have developed fairly sophisticated scoring systems that allow each coalition party to be properly represented in the new coalition government. Such a system, for example, was used in Romania, where coalition partners agreed on a kind of «exchange rate» in 2004. According to this system, one full ministerial position corresponded to three secretaries of state (equivalent to junior ministers), and so on. A much more complicated example is Belgium, where the rule of thumb for the allocation of government posts has been in use since 1980. Under this rule, each government office receives a specific weight: three points for the prime minister, two for a ministerial office, as well as for the posts of speakers of Lower House and Senate, one point respectively for Secretary of State (junior minister)⁴⁸. Accordingly, while negotiating, coalition parties first of all set the same number of points for the Flemish and French-speaking communities, and then distribute points between each party based on its electoral support, later party leaders take turns selecting the desired portfolios (the strongest party enjoys the right of first choice,

⁴⁵ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 250.

⁴⁶ Mitchell P., *Ireland: From Single-Party to Coalition Rule*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 143.

⁴⁷ Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 217.

⁴⁸ De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 333.

whereas a party with the fewest votes is the last to choose). At the end of the selection process, a second round of negotiations begins, during which parties can «exchange» their portfolios.

On the whole, the study found that coalition governments, being the norm for a country with multiparty systems, are at first glance a fairly unified phenomenon. And this is true in functional and macroscopic terms. However, institutionally and non-institutionally, coalition governments differ microscopically, in particular on the basis of the use of different formation models and different mechanisms of their members' cooperation. This generally presupposes that coalition governments still need diversified discussing, particularly through different approaches to explaining them given various national peculiarities of their practical implementation. In some cases, governments are more predetermined by nominal rules and institutions, whereas in other cases they are predominantly depend on party-determined factors.

References

1. Andeweg R., Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 2000, vol 37, s. 377–395.
2. Axelrod R., *Conflict of Interest*, Wyd. Markham 1970.
3. Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–230.
4. Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 231–263.
5. De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973.
6. De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 300–355.
7. Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, *“American Sociological Review”* 1981, vol 26, s. 373–382.
8. Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106.
9. Kim D.-H., Loewenberg G., The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, *“Comparative Political Studies”* 2005, vol 38, s. 1104–1129.
10. Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.
11. Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.
12. Marradi A., *Italy: from Centrism to Crisis of the Center-Left Coalitions*, [w:] Browne E., Dreijmanis J. (eds.), *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Longman 1982.

13. Martin L., Stevenson R., *An Empirical Model of Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. University of Rochester 1996.
14. Martin L., Stevenson R., *A Unified Model of Cabinet Formation and Survival*, Unpublished manuscript 1995.
15. Martin L., Vanberg G., Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review, *American Political Science Review* 2004, vol 99, s. 93–106.
16. Mitchell P., *Ireland: From Single-Party to Coalition Rule*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.
17. Muller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.
18. Muller W., Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work, *European Journal of Political Research* 2000, vol 37, s. 309–333.
19. Muller W., Strom K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 1–31.
20. Muller W., Strom K., *Schlu.: Koalitionsregierungen und die Praxis des Regierens in Westeuropa*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Koalitionsregierungen in Westeuropa*, Wyd. Signum 1997, s. 705–750.
21. Norpoth H., *The German Federal Republic*, [w:] Browne E., Dreijmanis J. (eds.), *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Longman 1982.
22. Nousiainen J., *Finland: The Consolidation of Parliamentary Governance*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.
23. Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.
24. Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.
25. Strom K., Budge J., Laver M., Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 1994, vol 38, s. 303–335.
26. Thies M., Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, *American Journal of Political Science* 2001, vol 45, s. 580–598.
27. von Neumann I., Morgenstern O., *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1953.

ДЕЦЕНТРАЛІЗАЦІЯ МІСЦЕВОГО САМОВРЯДУВАННЯ В УКРАЇНІ ЯК ПРОБЛЕМА ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ НАУКИ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНІ ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ, НОРМАТИВНО-ПРАВОВА БАЗА ТА ВПЛИВ ДОСВІДУ ІНШИХ КРАЇН

У статті досліджено теоретико-методологічні та нормативні засади формування місцевої політики в Україні, розкрито концептуальні підходи щодо визначення сутності понять і еволюції місцевого самоврядування. Окрему увагу приділено окресленню нормативно-правових джерелу галузі місцевого самоврядування. Визначено процес децентралізації влади як основний чинник змін у системі органів місцевого самоврядування України. Встановлено, що Україні властивий і європейський досвід, і досвід інших країн у децентралізації публічної влади, зумовлений процесами реформування і нормативно-правової регламентації системи місцевого самоврядування різних державах ЄС. Доведено, що важливим ключем для успіху реформи децентралізації в Україні є наявна база та створення нових доктринальних напрацювань.

Ключові слова: місцеве самоврядування, децентралізація, місцева політика, об'єднана територіальна громада, Україна.

DECENTRALIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE AS A PROBLEM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: THEORETICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY, NORMATIVE-LEGAL BASIS AND INFLUENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES EXPERIENCE

The article deals with the theoretical, methodological and normative principles of the formation of local politics in Ukraine. Conceptual approaches to the definition of the essence of concepts and evolution of local government are revealed. Particular attention is paid to the development of normative and legal sources in the field of local government. The process of decentralization of power as the main factor of changes in the system of local government bodies of Ukraine is determined. It is established that Ukraine has European experience and experience of other countries in the decentralization of the public power due to the processes of reforming and regulatory legal regulation of the system of local government in different EU

states. It has been proved that an important key to the success of the decentralization reform in Ukraine is the existing base and the creation of new doctrinal developments.

Keywords: *local government, decentralization, local politics, united territorial community, Ukraine.*

The process of democratization began in Ukraine simultaneously with the emergence of statehood, thereby stipulating the need for decentralization of state power and increasing the role of local government bodies. The main role of local government is to maximize the interaction of citizens in the realization of their own civil rights and the activation of civic initiatives. Many scientists have paid attention to this problem. Thus, on the one hand, local government is an institution of civil society, an effective form of organization of people and a movement towards human solidarity¹. However, on the other hand, local government is seen as a public institution of the political system². Accordingly, there is still no single point of view on choosing a basic approach to understanding the role of local government, and this is especially noticeable in the case of political realities and political theory in Ukraine. For this reason, the given paper focuses on decentralization in the field of local governance in Ukraine as an important issue of political science, in particular through the prism of the theoretical peculiarities of its research and the regulatory framework of local politics in Ukraine.

In this context, it is important to note that local government, without being an element of state power and at the same time lacking full autonomy in relation to state power, is considered in the political system as an independent form of public power, with which the latter adapts to new social demands³. The modern concept of local government is based on the ideas and theoretical approaches that have historically been developed and revised in the light of the latest realities.

One of the first theories of local government is the theory of a free community based on the norms of French and Belgian law of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, based on the idea of the natural right of communities to independently manage the processes of solving their own problems. According to this theory, local government bodies are not public authorities, but public bodies and institutions chosen by society (or communities). Interaction between the authorities takes place in the following way: state bodies ensure that the community and its bodies do not cross the limits of their competence, and the state authorities do not interfere with the competence of the community and its bodies.

In replacement of the theory of a free community came the public theory of government, which largely rests on the provisions of the first. However, the foreground is not the natural and

¹ Chuvardinskij O., *Gromadyanske suspilstvo v Ukraïni: stanovlennya, funkcionuvannya, perspektivi rozvittka*, Wyd. Lviv 2008.

² Yevtushenko O., *Misceve samovryaduvannya – institut gromadyanskogo suspilstva ta demokratichnoyi politichnoyi sistemi*, «Ukrayinska nacionalna ideya: realiyi ta perspektivi rozvittku» 2009, nr 21.

³ Andriyash V., *Misceve samovryaduvannya v politichnyi sistemi suspilstva*, «Suchasna ukrayinska politika. Politiki i politologi pro neyi», Wyd. MDGU im. P. Mogili 2007, vol 11, s. 148-157.

inalienable right of the community, but the non-state nature of the activities of local government bodies, first of all its material nature⁴. The basic of the theory was the provision according to which society as a regulating territorial team is as independent as the state itself, especially since it arose before the state. According to A. Vasylychikova, a supporter of public theory, the autonomy of local communities is determined by the nature of the cases they are caring for and which in their nature are different from those of state administration. That is why governance (government) is a special form of organization of the population⁵.

However, early attempts to define local government as an activity that in its essence differs from the administrative activity of the state, did not succeed. Indeed, the historical situation has confirmed that the theoretical views of adherents of the model of a free community and a public government theory, which believed that local government initiatives arise and are formed «from below» and are kept solely on the consciousness and will of the population, do not correspond to reality. Due to the fact that the possibilities of the state apparatus have their own borders in resolving local issues, the state authorities need support from the population, and therefore there is a cooperation between state authorities and local government in order to jointly address specific local tasks.

This position has influenced the development of the state government theory, which was most widespread in Europe. Its main provisions were developed by the German scientists L. Stein and R. Gneist⁶. According to this theory, local government bodies should be fully subordinated to the state. They are a link of government that does not have its own rights and competences. So, according to L. Stein, the independence of local government is that they are not direct bodies of the state, but the bodies of the local community, which the state entrusts with the fulfillment of the corresponding tasks of the state administration. The supporters of the theory act only for the determined legal, organizational and financial autonomy of local government bodies in the relations of central and local authorities. Also, in state theory, the independence of local government bodies is manifested in their independence from the instructions of the central government (within their own competence), in equal relations and in the division of responsibilities for the management of state affairs between local and central authorities. The dependence of the local government on the state is manifested in the state supervision over the implementation of the state functions entrusted to them by local authorities. In addition, according to state theory, local government is primarily one of the forms of organization of public administration at the local level, being part of the state and political system as a whole. Local affairs in this context are state affairs, transferred to local government bodies that are better informed about the interests of local communities and can more fully meet them. Therefore, based on this theory, local government bodies are specific bodies of state power, organized on the principles of government. Thus, if state bodies express the will of the

⁴ Sahanenko S., *Organizatsionno-pravoviy mekhanizm publichnogo upravlinnya na teritorialnomu rivni*, 2003.

⁵ Vasilchikov A., *Sravnitelnyy obzor russkikh i inostrannykh zemskikh i obshchestvennykh uchrezhdenij*, SPb 1870.

⁶ Gneist R., *Istoriya gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenij Anglii*, Moskva 1885.

state and are completely subordinate to the management, then local government bodies have a fundamentally different status, since they are legal entities that enter into legal relations with the state and have corresponding rights and obligations.

In the XX century the community-state theory or the theory of municipal dualism, which proceeded from the dual nature of municipal activity, that is, the independent decision of local issues and the implementation of certain public functions at the local level, was extended. In parallel, the theory of social services appeared, where attention was focused on the implementation of tasks and functions of local government bodies related to the organization of public services and provision of social services⁷. The content of the theory of dualism consists in recognizing the dual nature of the activities of local government bodies. On the one hand, they are independent in internal public affairs, and on the other hand, they carry out state functions that are transferred to the central government at the local level. In accordance with the theory of municipal dualism, local government bodies, acting in their respective administrative functions and beyond the scope of local affairs, should act as an instrument of public administration. Strengthening the legal regulation of local government is increasingly integrating local authorities into the state machinery, since some of the rights are their duties, which are carried out under the control of state bodies. The use of the provisions of this theory in practice and the equalization of local affairs in the nation-state reinforce the state nature of local government bodies. Such a model is quite interesting and useful, especially for Ukraine, because: firstly, it ensures the formation of a system of local government as an institution of civil society; and secondly, it promotes the active involvement of local government bodies in the realization of the functions and tasks of public administration⁸.

The greatest influence on the practice of local government at the present stage of development of the state is the theory of social functions of the municipal government. Where local government bodies are social services that are capable of satisfying the interests of all segments of the population. As representatives of the publicly useful and non-political activities of the state, local governments are partnered with them on a mutually beneficial basis and receive financial resources in return. Accordingly, local government is directly dependent on the state, which in fact acts as the directing and controlling authority.

It is generally and theoretically clear that local government, as to some extent an independent civil society institution, is a necessary element of the «smoothing» mechanism of political discrepancies between the legislative and executive branches of government. Its further development is a prerequisite for the process of democratization of the system of governance and functioning of the political system, which forms the basis of a full-fledged development of the state. Indeed, developed local government demonstrates democratic state administration and observance of the constitutional principle of accountability Government-to-Citizen. Moreover,

⁷ Emelyanov N., *Mestnoe samoupravlenie: problemy, poiski, resheniya*, Moskva 1997.

⁸ Kirichenko L., *Narodovladydya i misceve samovryaduvannya v Ukraini*, «Pravo Ukraini» 2001, nr. 6.

based on the study of European experience, it is clear that the main goal of local government is the formation of viable territorial communities that ensure high quality of life of citizens through the proper use of local resources.

Hence, the multiplicity of theoretical approaches to local government determines the multivariability of its models. Among the main models of local government are Anglo-Saxon, Continental, Iberian, Soviet, and mixed. Anglo-Saxon or as it is called the «English» model is spread in the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia. It is characterized by the autonomy of representative bodies of local government within the limits of their powers, as well as the lack of authorized representatives of the central government on the ground⁹. The continental or «french» model is common in Europe, Franco-speaking Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Its essence lies in the combination of direct government governance at the local level with local government¹⁰. The Iberian model is inherent in Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America and Brazil. Its content is that the local level management is carried out by the elected representatives of the local authorities and officials of local government appointed by the state authorities¹¹. A mixed or hybrid model operates in Austria, the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany. It combines Anglo-Saxon and Continental models¹². In the end, the Soviet model was / is inherent to the countries of the former USSR, Cuba, the People's Republic of China. Its essence is that all bodies and councils are bodies of state power, and for the model as a whole, alternative or autonomous sources of financing of all local governments are not intrinsic. Theoreticians of this model developed the idea that councils and municipalities should combine functions of local government bodies and local government functions. Due to the lack of independence, and first of all, the material and financial base, councils and their executive committees should remain the branches of the centralized control apparatus and can not serve as functions of local government¹³.

However, modern conditions put forward new tasks for local governments, for which the latter must meet the expectations of society, be representative, representing its interests. According to the concept of «good governance»¹⁴, «good» local government should be based on a combination of principles such as: broad involvement of the population (represented by business organizations, business associations and individual qualified citizens) in the process of direct resolution of local issues; the maximum possible approximation of local government

⁹ Hriplivec D., Teoretichni zasadi modelej misceвого samovryaduvannya, «Derzhavne upravlinnya: udoskonalennya ta rozvitok» 2010, nr. 9.

¹⁰ Hriplivec D., Teoretichni zasadi modelej misceвого samovryaduvannya, «Derzhavne upravlinnya: udoskonalennya ta rozvitok» 2010, nr. 9.

¹¹ Hriplivec D., Teoretichni zasadi modelej misceвого samovryaduvannya, «Derzhavne upravlinnya: udoskonalennya ta rozvitok» 2010, nr. 9.

¹² Hriplivec D., Teoretichni zasadi modelej misceвого samovryaduvannya, «Derzhavne upravlinnya: udoskonalennya ta rozvitok» 2010, nr. 9.

¹³ Hriplivec D., Teoretichni zasadi modelej misceвого samovryaduvannya, «Derzhavne upravlinnya: udoskonalennya ta rozvitok» 2010, nr. 9.

¹⁴ *The Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance at Local Level*, źródło: http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/strategy_innovation/Strategy_Brochure_E.pdf.

bodies to users of services provided by these bodies to the population; formation of a mechanism of partnership between state authorities and government, based on the introduction of processes of preliminary consultations on key issues of state policy in the field of local government and regional development; a clear division of powers and competences between the territorial community and its governing bodies, local government bodies of the district and region, state authorities, etc; formation of the population system control of the quality of implementation of their responsibilities of local government bodies regarding the provision of rights and legitimate needs of citizens; control and accountability of local government bodies to state authorities in the part of implementation of the state authorities delegated by local government bodies. For any young state, including Ukraine, these principles are of particular importance. Among them, the most relevant issue is the involvement of the public in decision-making processes and, as a result, the achievement of the representativeness and transparency of public authorities.

In this regard, we turn to theoretical and methodological comprehension of the basic categories that refer to the phenomenon of local government. It should be noted that researchers typically define local government as solving local issues within the administrative-territorial units through the organization of representative bodies that are independent from the state¹⁵. In its turn, decentralization (Latin *de* - negation and *centralis* - central) is the delegation of certain powers to the local level by the central government. B. Kaminskyi considers decentralization as a managerial political system designed to make meaningful practical decisions that are geographically or organizationally outside the direct influence of the central government; as a political process involving the delegation of certain powers by the central government to the local level in order to optimize the practical solution of issues of national importance, as well as the implementation of specific regional-local programs¹⁶. As a result, local government appears as a political-legal institution, within which local affairs in grass-roots administrative-territorial units (communities) are managed through organization of local residents, with the consent and with the support of the state¹⁷. In the end, local politics should be considered as a political activity at the local level, which is different from national politics¹⁸.

As a result, this means that local government is a political subdivision of a national or regional government that performs functions that are defined as local in nature and which, in almost all cases, derive their powers from the national or regional government, but have some discretion in decision-making and, as a rule, have certain economic powers. Therefore, local policy is based not only on local events relating to national political issues, but also involves a mechanism within the local administrative unit on the election of officials and the conduct and implementation of state policy. And this is because these decisions are not necessarily

¹⁵ Pogorelyj D., Fesenko V., Filippov K., *Politologicheskij slovar-spravochnik*, Wyd. Nauka-Spektr 2008.

¹⁶ Kaminskyj B., *Slovník politologických terminů*, Wyd. Odesa 2007.

¹⁷ Kaminskyj B., *Slovník politologických terminů*, Wyd. Odesa 2007.

¹⁸ *Anglický slovník «Collins»*, zdroj: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/local-politics>.

taken unilaterally through the local political system and its institutions. Often decisions are taken jointly with governments, and local political institutions and processes are often interwoven with neighboring local and regional political systems. In this perspective, S. Bula and V. Hnatyuk outline the local level of democracy (local democracy) as a fundamental spatial sphere, in which the principles and mechanisms for organizing the political life of society in a democratic, universal form are implemented directly and effectively. This is a miniature trivial copy of world democracy at the local level¹⁹. On condition that local democracy is an important element of democracy itself, regardless of the state system. Accordingly, political stability requires the formation of stable institutions through the establishment and consolidation of local democracy.

Along with this, the definition of the phenomenon and framework of regional political actors are important. Regional actors are considered to be certain segments of local political elites and those groups that influence the adoption of political decisions in a particular region of a particular country. As stated on the official page of the EU program "Central Europe"²⁰, regional actors are all the key stakeholders who work at the regional level in a specific thematic area, regardless of their legal status, thus covering the public and the private sector. These sectors include different types of entities, such as public administrations, interest groups, non-governmental organizations, research centers, educational institutions, enterprises. According to N. Rotar, regional actors convey identity into a political agenda, and therefore they should be considered as the most active agents in the formation of regional identities²¹.

The outlined theoretical logic of interpretation of decentralization and local government is in essence also inherent in Ukrainian political science, but they are not always relevant to political realities. So, today in the Ukrainian political and legal sphere there are more than 3 thousand normative legal acts, which use the term «local government» and more than 600 current legislative acts that directly relate to the system of public authority at the regional and local levels. All of them, as well as the works of Ukrainian researchers, violate a number of issues related to the implementation of the constitutional right of communities to local government as a basis and an important component of regional development²². Nevertheless, the main problem of the current state of local and regional development in Ukraine is the lack of a clear division of powers between different branches of government at the regional and local levels, which should be defined in national legislation. Accordingly, in order to justify the delineation of functions between the center, regions and areas, it is necessary to determine the existing state

¹⁹ Bula S., Gnatyuk V., *Lokalna demokratsiya yak fundamentalna kategoriya v aktualizatsiyi proyaviv institucionalno-pravovih modusiv miscevogogo samovryaduvannya: korelyatsiya, formalizatsiya ta shematizatsiya osnovnih ponyat*, «Visnik Lvivskogo universitetu» 2015, vol 6, s. 76-88.

²⁰ *Oficijna storinka programi Yevropejskogo Soyuzu «Centralna Yevropa»*, zródlo: <http://www.central2013.eu/glossary/>.

²¹ Rotar N., *Evolyuciya geostrukturi elektoralnoyi uchasti gromadyan Ukrainy. Elektoralni procesi Ukrainy v region Iahnomu vimiri: Bukovina i Zakarpattya*, Uzhgorod 2014.

²² Babinova O., *Okremi aspekti normativno-pravovogo zabezpechennya regionalnogo rozviku v Ukraini*, «Visnik Nacionalnoyi akademiyi derzhavnogo upravlinnya pri Prezidentovi Ukrainy» 2010, nr. 3, s. 156-164.

of the intermediate administrative-territorial units of Ukraine (which is the region and district), as well as what it should be for the country in the future²³.

The adoption of the Law of Ukraine «On Local Councils of People's Deputies and Local and Regional Government» in 1992 was adopted as a ground zero for the beginning of the formation of the modern Ukrainian legal and regulatory framework for local government. Since then, the term «regional government» has been introduced in political and legal practice. The law first established the principles of local and regional government - the basis of the democratic system of power in Ukraine, the legal status of local councils of people's deputies, as well as other forms of territorial organization of citizens. It became the basis for asserting the completeness of democracy in the respective administrative territories²⁴.

In Art. 1 of the Law of Ukraine «On Local Councils of People's Deputies and Local and Regional Government» the concept of «local government in Ukraine» is defined as the territorial organization of citizens for independent decisions' making directly or through the bodies they elect, all issues of local life within the Constitution of Ukraine, laws of Ukraine and its own financial and economic base²⁵. At one time, the law defined: the legal, economic and financial foundations of local and regional government; the procedure for the formation, function and competence of village, town and city councils of people's deputies and their bodies; system, order of formation and structure of representative bodies of regional government; other forms of territorial organization of citizens. Representative bodies of regional government were regional and district councils²⁶. However, in 1997, the Law of Ukraine «On Local Councils of People's Deputies and Local and Regional Government» expired on the basis of the adoption of the Law of Ukraine «On Local Government in Ukraine» (in force as of April 25, 2018).

It is of vital importance that on June 28, 1996 the Constitution of Ukraine was adopted, which became the basis of the normative and legal basis for the formation and functioning of local government bodies. An important point in the Basic Law is the definition of the peculiarities of the state territorial structure in accordance with which local political processes take place in the future. Indeed, Art. 132 states that the territorial structure of Ukraine is based on the principles of unity and integrity of the state territory, the combination of centralization and decentralization in the exercise of state power, the balance and socio-economic development of the regions, taking into account their historical, economic, ecological, geographical and demographic features, ethnic and cultural traditions According to Art. 133 of the Constitution,

²³ Golikova T., *Derzhavne upravlinnyia teritorialnim ekonomichnim rozvitkom: teoriya i praktyka*, Wyd. NADU 2007.

²⁴ *Zakon Ukrainyini «Pro miscevi Radi narodnih deputativ ta misceve i regionalne samovryaduvannya»*, źródło: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/533-12>.

²⁵ *Zakon Ukrainyini «Pro miscevi Radi narodnih deputativ ta misceve i regionalne samovryaduvannya»*, źródło: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/533-12>.

²⁶ *Zakon Ukrainyini «Pro miscevi Radi narodnih deputativ ta misceve i regionalne samovryaduvannya»*, źródło: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/533-12>.

the system of administrative-territorial structure of Ukraine consists of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regions, districts, cities, districts in cities, of urban-type villages and villages²⁷.

A separate section of the Constitution of Ukraine is devoted to issues of local government. According to Art. 140, local government is the right of a territorial community - residents of a village or a voluntary association in a rural community of residents of several villages, towns and cities - to independently solve issues of local importance within the constitution and laws. Local government is carried out by the territorial community in the manner prescribed by the law, both directly and through local government bodies - rural, urban-type villages, city councils and their executive bodies²⁸. Article 141 of the Constitution defines the composition of local government bodies. Deputies elected by the residents of the village, urban-type village, city, district, region, on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage by secret ballot. The term of powers of a village, urban-type village, city, district, regional council, whose deputies are elected at the scheduled election, is five years. Territorial communities on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage shall be elected by secret ballot, respectively, village, town, city mayor, who heads the executive body of the council and presides at its meetings. The term of powers of the village, town, city mayor, elected at the scheduled election, is five years. The chairman of the district and the chairman of the regional council are elected by the relevant council and rule the executive board of the council²⁹.

Important is the issue of financial cooperation between local governments and the state. Art. 142 of the Constitution states that the state participates in the formation of revenues of local government budgets and financially supports local government. Expenditures of local government bodies, which arose as a result of decisions of state authorities, are compensated by the state. According to Art. 143, territorial communities of villages, urban-type villages, cities directly or through the bodies of local government established by them: manage the property that is in communal ownership; approve programs of socio-economic and cultural development and control their implementation; approve the budgets of the respective administrative-territorial units and control their implementation; establish local taxes and fees in accordance with the law; ensure the conduct of local referendums and the implementation of their results; set up, reorganize and liquidate communal enterprises, organizations and institutions, as well as control their activities; deal with other issues of local importance, assigned by law to their competence. Regional and district councils: approve programs of socio-economic and cultural development of the respective regions and districts and control their implementation; approve district and region budgets, which are formed from the state budget funds for their respective distribution between territorial communities or for implementation of joint projects and employ

²⁷ *Konstituciya Ukrainy: priinyata na p'yatij sesiyi Verhovnoyi Radi Ukrainy 28 chervnya 1996 r.*, źródlo: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254k/96-pp>.

²⁸ *Konstituciya Ukrainy: priinyata na p'yatij sesiyi Verhovnoyi Radi Ukrainy 28 chervnya 1996 r.*, źródlo: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254k/96-pp>.

²⁹ *Konstituciya Ukrainy: priinyata na p'yatij sesiyi Verhovnoyi Radi Ukrainy 28 chervnya 1996 r.*, źródlo: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254k/96-pp>.

funds on a contractual basis from local budgets for implementation of joint socio-economic and cultural programs, and control their implementation; deal with other issues assigned by law to their competence³⁰. In general, bodies of local government on issues related to the exercise of their powers by the executive authorities are controlled by the relevant executive authorities.

After the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine, on May 21, 1997, the Law of Ukraine «On Local Government in Ukraine» was adopted, which is in force as of April 25, 2018. This Law defines the system and guarantees of local government in Ukraine, the principles of organization and activities, as well as the legal status and responsibility of local government bodies and officials³¹. The law guarantees that citizens should hold the right to participate in local government and defines the basic principles of local government. In addition, the law regulates a special and new notion used in the Ukrainian local politics, in particular the phenomenon of «territorial community». According to Art. 6 of the law, the primary subject of local government, the main carrier of its functions and powers is the territorial community of the village, town, city. Territorial communities in accordance with the procedure established by law may unite in one rural, urban-type village, urban territorial community, form unified local government bodies and choose, respectively, the rural, town, city mayor³².

It is established that representative bodies of local government are councils. According to Art. 10 of the Law, village, town and city councils are local government bodies representing the respective territorial communities and exercising functions and powers of local government on their behalf and in their interests. Regional and district councils are local government bodies representing the common interests of territorial communities of villages, urban-type villages, cities, within the limits of the powers determined by the law, as well as powers transferred to them by village, urban-type village, city councils³³. The executive bodies of the councils have their executive committees, departments, management. Art. 11 of the law states that the executive bodies of village, village of urban type, city, district councils are controlled and accountable to relevant councils, and on the implementation of powers delegated to them by executive authorities also under the control of the relevant executive authorities³⁴. Also, the law prescribes the possibility of voluntary association of local government bodies. According to Art. 15 of the law, bodies of local government can be united in associations of local government and their voluntary associations in order to exercise their powers more effectively, protect the rights and interests of territorial communities, which are subject to registration³⁵.

³⁰ *Konstituciya Ukrainy: priyniyata na p'yatij sesiyi Verhovnoyi Radi Ukrainy 28 chervnya 1996 r.*, źródlo: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254k/96-bsp>.

³¹ *Zakon Ukrainy «Pro misceve samovryaduvannya v Ukrainy»*, źródlo: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/280/97-bsp>.

³² *Zakon Ukrainy «Pro misceve samovryaduvannya v Ukrainy»*, źródlo: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/280/97-bsp>.

³³ *Zakon Ukrainy «Pro misceve samovryaduvannya v Ukrainy»*, źródlo: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/280/97-bsp>.

³⁴ *Zakon Ukrainy «Pro misceve samovryaduvannya v Ukrainy»*, źródlo: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/280/97-bsp>.

³⁵ *Zakon Ukrainy «Pro misceve samovryaduvannya v Ukrainy»*, źródlo: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/280/97-bsp>.

One of the most important contemporary legal acts in the area of local policy formation in Ukraine is the Law of Ukraine «On Voluntary Association of Territorial Communities», adopted on 05.02.2015 (as now and hereafter in effect 01.01.2018), which regulates relations arising in the process of voluntary association of territorial communities of villages, villages of urban type, cities, as well as voluntary adherence to the united territorial communities³⁶.

On the other hand, decentralization processes within the framework of local government in Ukraine depend to a large extent on similar, but mostly completed processes in a number of other countries of the world. This means that global experience has a significant impact on decentralization practices in Ukraine and can be crucial in the process of reforming the regulatory framework of the local government system. Moreover, global experience may be useful for the success of the decentralization reform in Ukraine and the generation of new doctrinal developments in this direction. On this occasion, it should be noted that in different countries of the world there are two most widespread approaches to the organization of local government, in particular the approach of local autonomy and the approach of decentralization. An example of the first approach is Spain and Italy, the second is France and Poland, and so on.

For example, in Spain, according to Art. 137 of the Constitution of 1978, the basic principle of the organization of local government is the principle of autonomy, which provides that all territorial units - municipalities, provinces and autonomous territories - are endowed with autonomy when considering their own affairs. Also, the state is delegated by the functions of delegation of individual powers to autonomous territories in its composition and control over the activities of autonomous territories³⁷. Like in Italy, according to Art. 114 of the Constitution of 1947, communes, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions - as territorial units - are autonomous entities with their own status, powers and functions. When differentiating powers between all territorial units, the state is guided by the principles of subsidiarity, differentiation and proportionality³⁸.

By contrast, in France, the process of decentralization began in the 1980s. By this time, the state was rather centralized. In the period 1982-1986, the French adopted more than 40 laws related to decentralization. In addition, the processes in this direction continue today. The main objective of the reform was the modernization of the administrative system, which was implemented in accordance with the needs of the inhabitants of administrative territories, implementing relevant projects of local economic development. The key to this issue was the Law «On the rights and freedoms of communes, departments and regions», adopted in 1982. The reform continues to this day, because the last stage is considered not to be completed yet. For example, in 2003 amendments were made to the Constitution of 1958, according to which the main subject of local government is defined as territorial communities - communes, departments, regions, teams with a special status and overseas teams. It is important, therefore,

³⁶ *Zakon Ukrainyini «Pro dobrovibne ob'yednuannya teritorialnih grumad»*, izródlo: <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/157-19>.

³⁷ Borislavska O., *Decentralizaciya publichnoyi vladi: dosvid yevropejskib krizym ta perspektivi Ukrainyini*. Kyiv 2012.

³⁸ Borislavska O., *Decentralizaciya publichnoyi vladi: dosvid yevropejskib krizym ta perspektivi Ukrainyini*. Kyiv 2012.

that the current legislation - the «Administrative Code» or, as it is called «the constitution of local government - completely regulates the organization and activities of local government in France³⁹, although it introduces situational or systemic amendments and changes (even in the last decade). Finally, in Poland, which is rather similar in conceptual terms to Ukraine, since 1989 administrative and administrative-territorial reforms with four stages took place. According to Art. 15 of the Constitution of 1997, the territorial structure of this state ensures the decentralization of public authority. The reforms ensured the decentralization of local public authorities and gave the territorial communities the opportunity to resolve local issues independently⁴⁰.

In this context, in particular against the background of different countries of the world, it is established that the ultimate goal of decentralization processes in Ukraine should be the creation of a safe and comfortable environment for human life by building an effective system of government. Among the strategic goals of these processes: the creation of an effective system of government; creation of conditions for dynamic, balanced development of Ukraine and its regions; providing high quality and affordable services⁴¹. Instead, among the operational objectives of such processes: the division of powers between local governments and state authorities; creation of proper material, financial and organizational conditions for the activities of local government bodies; ensuring openness and transparency in solving local issues; creation of a system of responsibility; raising the competitiveness of the regions; territorial socio-economic integration and spatial development; effective public administration in the field of regional development; state standards of service provision; the ability to provide services⁴². Finally, among the tasks of these processes: the creation of a spatial territorial basis for the activities of local government; sectoral separation of powers; formation of the structure and powers of local government bodies; formation of territorial bodies of general jurisdiction; decentralization of financial resources and fiscal decentralization; effective management of financial resources at the local level; management of land resources, natural resources and communal infrastructure; providing mechanisms for citizens to exercise constitutional rights to participate in solving local issues; creation of a system of state control over the activities of local government bodies, the system of coordination of activities of territorial executive authorities, and the system of public control over the activities of the authorities; increasing the role and functionality of cities in the further development of regions; creation of conditions for the spread of positive processes of development of cities to other territories, development of rural areas; increase of the efficiency of use of internal factors of development in the region; providing a comfortable and safe living environment for a person regardless of place

³⁹ Borislavska O., *Decentralizaciya publichnoyi vladi: dosvid yevropejskih krajini ta perspektivi Ukraini*, Kyiv 2012.

⁴⁰ Borislavska O., *Decentralizaciya publichnoyi vladi: dosvid yevropejskih krajini ta perspektivi Ukraini*, Kyiv 2012.

⁴¹ *Prezentaciya Kabinetu Ministriv Ukraini. Pasport reform: decentralizaciya vladi ta regionalnij rozvitok*, źródlo: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/media/reforms/57-pasport-reformi-decentralizatsiya-zagalnyy.pdf>.

⁴² *Prezentaciya Kabinetu Ministriv Ukraini. Pasport reform: decentralizaciya vladi ta regionalnij rozvitok*, źródlo: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/media/reforms/57-pasport-reformi-decentralizatsiya-zagalnyy.pdf>.

of residence; development of interregional cooperation; improvement of the system of strategic planning of regional development at the national and regional level; improving the quality of public administration by regional development; strengthening inter-sectoral coordination in the process of planning and implementing state regional policy; institutional support for regional development; updating state standards of service quality; development and implementation of the system of financing state standards of service quality; development of control system for providing services; provision of adequate infrastructure for the provision of services; providing professionalism in service rendering; implementation of organizational and institutional capacity⁴³.

Consequently, the main role of local politics is to maximize the interaction of citizens in the realization of their own civil rights and the activation of civic initiatives. Thus, local government, not being an element of state power and at the same time, lacking full autonomy in relation to state power, is considered in the political system as an independent form of public power, with which the latter adapts to new social demands. The issue of public involvement in decision-making processes and, as a result, the achievement of representativeness and transparency of the activities of public authorities are extremely important. Thus, local government is a political subdivision of a national or regional government that accomplish functions that are defined as local in nature and which in almost all cases derive their authority from a national or regional government but have some freedom of action in making decisions and, as a rule, have certain economic powers. Therefore, local policies are not limited to local activities relating to national political issues, but also provide for a mechanism within the local administrative unit regarding the selection of officials, as well as the execution and implementation of public policy. In this respect, for Ukraine the world and first of all European experience of the decentralization of public power in this context is undeniably relevant, which is determined by the processes of reforming and regulatory legal regulation of the system of local government. Moreover, an important key to the success of the decentralization reform in Ukraine is the existing base and the creation of new doctrinal developments in this direction in the future.

References:

1. Andriyash V., *Misceve samovryaduvannya v politichnyi sistemi suspilstva*, «Suchasna ukrayinska politika. Politiki i politologi pro neyi», Wyd. MDGU im. P. Mogili 2007, vol 11, s. 148-157.
2. *Anglijskij slovník «Collins»*, źródło: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/local-politics>.
3. Babinova O., *Okremi aspekti normativno-pravovogo zabezpechennya regionalnogo rozvitku v Ukrayini*, «Visnik Nacionalnoyi akademiyi derzhavnogo upravlinnya pri Prezidentovi Ukrayini» 2010, nr. 3, s. 156-164.
4. Borislavska O., *Decentralizaciya publichnoyi vladi: dosvid yevropejskih krayin ta perspektivi Ukrayini*, Kyiv 2012.

⁴³ *Prezentaciya Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrayini. Pasport reform: decentralizaciya vladi ta regionalnij rozvitok*, źródło: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/media/reforms/57-pasport-reformi-decentralizatsiya-zagalniy.pdf>.

5. Bula S., Gnatyuk V., Lokalna demokratiya yak fundamentalna kategoriya v aktualizaciji proyaviv institucionalno-pravovih modusiv miscevoغو samovyryaduvannya: korelyaciya, formalizaciya ta shematizaciya osnovnih ponyat, «Visnik Lvivskogo universitetu» 2015, vol 6, s. 76-88.
6. Chuvardinskij O., *Gromadyanske suspilstvo v Ukraini: stanovlennya, funkcionuvannya, perspektivi rozvitku*, Wyd. Lviv 2008.
7. Emelyanov N., *Mestnoe samoupravlenie: problemy, poiski, resheniya*, Moskva 1997.
8. Gnejst R., *Istoriya gosudarstvennyh uchrezhdenij Anglii*, Moskva 1885.
9. Golikova T., *Derzhavne upravlinnya teritorialnim ekonomichnim rozvitkom: teoriya i praktyka*, Wyd. NADU 2007.
10. Hriplivec D., Teoretichni zasadi modelej miscevoغو samovyryaduvannya, «Derzhavne upravlinnya: udoskonalennya ta rozvitok» 2010, nr. 9.
11. Kaminskij B., *Slovník politologichnih terminiv*, Odesa 2007.
12. Kirichenko L., Narodovladdya i misceve samovyryaduvannya v Ukraini, «Pravo Ukraini» 2001, nr. 6.
13. *Konstituciya Ukraini: priinyata na p'yatij sesiyi Verhovnoyi Radi Ukraini 28 chervnya 1996 r.*, źródło: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254k/96-ьp>.
14. *Oficijna storinka programi Yevropejskogo Soyuzu «Centralna Yevropa»*, źródło: <http://www.central2013.eu/glossary/>.
15. Pogorelyj D., Fesenko V., Filippov K., *Politologicheskij slovar-spravochnik*, Wyd. Nauka-Spektr 2008.
16. *Prezentaciya Kabinetu Ministriv Ukraini. Pasport reform: decentralizaciya vladi ta regionalnij rozvitok*, źródło: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/media/reforms/57-pasport-reformi-decentralizatsiya-zagalniypdf>.
17. *Pro reformu – Decentralizaciya. Derzhavna politika, zakonodavchi napracyuvannya, promizhni rezultati pershogo etapu decentralizaciji vladi v Ukraini*, źródło: <https://decentralization.gov.ua/about>.
18. Rotar N., *Evolyuuciya geostrukturi elektoralnoyi uchasti gromadyan Ukraini. Elektoralni procesi Ukraini v regionalnomu vimiri: Bukovina i Zakarpattya*, Uzhgorod 2014.
19. *The Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance at Local Level*, źródło: http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/strategy_innovation/Strategy_Brochure_E.pdf.
20. Sahanenko S., *Organizacijno-pravovij mehanizm publichnogo upravlinnya na teritorialnomu rivni*, 2003.
21. Vasilchikov A., *Sravnitelnyj obzor ruskikh i inostrannyh zemskih i obshestvennyh uchrezhdenij*, SPb 1870.
22. Yevtushenko O., Misceve samovyryaduvannya – institut gromadyanskogo suspilstva ta demokratichnoyi politichnoyi sistemi, «Ukrayinska nacionalna ideya: realiyi ta perspektivi rozvitku» 2009, nr 21.
23. *Zakon Ukraini «Pro dobrovilne ob'yednannya teritorialnih gromad»*, źródło: <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/157-19>.
24. *Zakon Ukraini «Pro misceve samovyryaduvannya v Ukraini»*, źródło: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/280/97-ьp>.
25. *Zakon Ukraini «Pro miscevi Radi narodnih deputativ ta misceve i regionalne samovyryaduvannya»*, źródło: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/533-12>.

ETAPY FORMACJI I CECHY SYSTEMU ADMINISTRACYJNEGO I TERYTORIALNEGO PODZIAŁU ORAZ ZNACZENIE PROCESU DECENTRALIZACJI WŁADZY WE FRANCJI

Artykuł dotyczy problemów podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego i procesów decentralizacji we Francji. Autor zbadał system podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego we Francji na różnych etapach jej rozwoju, w szczególności od momentu formacji do terażniejszości. Równoległe w artykule analizuje się znaczenie i wpływ procesów decentralizacji władzy na ogólny podział administracyjny i terytorialny kraju, a także na reformy administracyjne. W rezultacie twierdzi się, że system podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego we Francji jest dojrzały i stabilny, podczas gdy jest zdolny do dynamicznych zmian w systemie, takich jak zmiana liczby jego jednostek itp.

Słowa kluczowe: podział administracyjny i terytorialny, decentralizacja, system administracji państwowej, samorząd terytorialny, Francja.

THE STAGES OF FORMATION AND FEATURES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL SYSTEM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER IN FRANCE

The article deals with the problems of administrative and territorial system and the processes of decentralization in France. The author examined the system of administrative and territorial structure of France at various stages of its development, in particular from the moment of its formation to the present. In parallel, the article analyzes the significance and influence of the processes of decentralization of power on the administrative and territorial system of the country in general and on administrative reforms in particular. As a result, it is argued that the system of administrative and territorial organization in France is mature and stable, while it is capable of dynamic changes within the system, such as changing the number of its units, etc.

Keywords: administrative and territorial system, decentralization, state administration system, local government, France.

Francja jest jednym z największych państw w Europie: pod względem powierzchni zajmuje drugie miejsce po Ukrainie, a pod względem ludności jest druga po Niemczech. Dlatego często porównuje się ją z Ukrainą, ponieważ oba kraje są dużymi państwami jednolitymi z podobnymi systemami administracji państwowej i podobnym podziałem administracyjnym i terytorialnym. Jednak podział administracyjny i terytorialny Francji, który dziś wygląda monolitycznie, nie zawsze był taka. W tym artykule przedstawimy etapy tworzenia podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego Francji oraz jego obecne cechy szczególnie i zarysy, a także rozważymy rolę procesów decentralizacji na wszystkich etapach tworzenia nowoczesnej mapy państwa francuskiego, która może być niezwykle przydatna dla dalszego rozwoju podobnego systemu na Ukrainie oraz innych państwach unitarnych świata.

Biorąc pod uwagę historię państwowości we Francji, możemy wyróżnić kilka etapów tworzenia jej podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego. Pierwszy lub tak zwany „absolutystyczny” etap obejmuje okres od powstania Imperium Franków (IX wiek) do Wielkiej Rewolucji Francuskiej w 1789 r. Od zakończenia formowania się Francji jako państwa, a mianowicie utworzenia Imperium Franków, całe terytorium państwa zostało podzielone na hrabstwa, które z kolei tworzyły księstwa iarchie. W rzeczywistości taki podział okazał się prototypem przyszłych dwu- i trójwarstwowych systemów podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego. Na czele tych jednostek znajdowały się osoby wyznaczone przez samego króla, które posiadały całą moc pola. Dlatego, oczywiście, podział władzy nie mógł i być językiem. Po upadku imperium frankijskiego i powstaniu królestwa francuskiego zachowano system podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego, ale zamiast urzędników od króla przybyli jego wasale – ci samihrabiowie, książęta itp. W rzeczywistości większość funkcji państwa na szczeblu regionalnym i lokalnym została przekazana panom feudalnym, podczas gdy centralna władza królewska była słaba aż do momentu konsolidacji absolutyzmu i zjednoczenia wszystkich ziem pod domeną królewską¹. Jednocześnie rodzi się samorząd lokalny w państwie. Jego instytucjonalnym wyrazem było tworzenie tak zwanych stanów prowincjonalnych lub prowincji, które łączyły tożsamości historyczne, kulturowe i mentalne, autonomiczne, prawne i finansowe. Takimi prowincjami były na przykład Tuluza, Langwedocja, Owernia i inne. Dobrze znane wyrażenie „*L'état c'est moi*” (przetłumaczone z francuskiego „Państwo to ja”), należące do francuskiego króla Ludwika XIV, najlepiej pokazało okres centralizacji władzy we Francji. Cechy centralizacji władzy to: wzrost i sieć oddziałów urzędników królewskich, mianowanie królowych na prowincji, zniesienie dziedzictwa stanowiska gubernatora królewskiego w prowincji, stopniowa centralizacja systemu finansowego.

Wielu monarchów, zwłaszcza Ludwik XIV, próbowało ograniczyć znaczenie prowincji w procesie budowania państwa. Oprócz ograniczenia autonomii finansowej lub raczej pełnej centralizacji finansowej, powstały nowe pokolenia – generalitaty – kontrolowane przez króla

¹ *Territoires du royaume de France*, Wikipedia, źródło: https://fr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territoires_du_royaume_de_France (odczyt: 01.06.2019).

i utworzone na podstawie prowincji, chociaż czasami na terenie jednej prowincji tworzyły dwa generalitaty, aby osłabić prowincję. Na przykład prowincja Langwedocja była podzielona na Dolną Langwedocję i Górną Langwedocję, a aby osłabić ekonomicznie potężną Tuluzę, zrobiono wszystko, aby rozwinąć konkurencyjne centrum gospodarcze Montpellier. W końcu obie skorzystały z takiej konkurencji, ale tożsamość regionalna, oparta na poziomie prowincji, uległa dramatycznym zmianom. Jedynie cechy umysłowo-kulturowe każdej prowincji zostały pozbawione byłego samorządu, ponieważ systemy prawne i finansowe były podporządkowane centrum². Jeśli chodzi o samorząd lokalny, a raczej jego kielki, istniały na poziomie poszczególnych gmin i miast w całej Francji.

Drugi etap rozpoczął się od Wielkiej Rewolucji Francuskiej, która doprowadziła do wyeliminowania starej struktury terytorialnej państwa. Osiągnięto to dzięki ostatecznemu rozwiązaniu prowincji i utworzeniu departamentów w ich miejscu. Tworzenie departamentów odbywało się zgodnie ze składnikami terytorialnymi i społecznymi, tzn. wszystkie departamenty były w przybliżeniu takie same pod względem populacji i wielkości (z wyjątkiem kilku). Podział ten z kolei miał nie tylko tworzyć nowe jednostki administracyjne i terytorialne w państwie, które mogłyby zastąpić stare, ale zniszczyć wszelkie procesy separatystyczne i irredentystyczne, niszcząc tożsamość regionalną. Rzeczywiście, w tym czasie wielu feudalnych panów, na czele z rojalistami, starało się przywrócić monarchię, jeśli nie na terytorium całego państwa, to przynajmniej na terytorium jednego z dawnych hrabstw lub księstw. W sumie utworzono 83 departamenty zamiast 39 istniejących wcześniej prowincji. Jeśli chodzi o samorząd lokalny, istniał on tylko na najniższym poziomie – w gminach – i dopiero powstawało. Pierwsze próby decentralizacji administracji państwowej podjęły Girondins, ale bez dobrze przemyślanego mechanizmu zarządzania zawiodły i przyczyniły się jedynie do stworzenia jeszcze większego chaosu w kraju, dlatego ich następcy – jakobini – przeszli na ścieżkę sztywnej centralizacji. W rzeczywistości podjęto wszelkie wysiłki w celu zachowania jedności kraju, a tym samym centralizacji, a zatem nie nastąpiło wzmocnienie roli samorządu lokalnego, ale pozostało ono na tym samym poziomie, co w czasach absolutyzmu, to znaczy na poziomie gminy. Ojcem nowej struktury administracyjno-terytorialnej Francji jest cesarz Napoleon³. Począwszy od jego panowania, na czele każdego wydziału był prefekt lub, jak powiedział Napoleon, „prefekt jako mały cesarz”. Został mianowany przez cesarza (Napoleona), a jego mocą było śledzenie i promowanie wdrażania ustaw, dekretów i ogólnej polityki państwa w terenie, a także wypełnianie woli cesarza. Taki nowy system administracyjny został zbudowany zgodnie z jasnymi i ścisłymi zasadami centralizacji⁴ państwa i faktycznie nie zmienił się aż do lat 80. XX wieku.

Trzeci etap tworzenia podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego Francji – nowoczesny. Zaczął się po II wojnie światowej, wraz z przyjęciem nowej konstytucji Francji. Warto zwrócić

² Zink A., *Pays ou circonscriptions. Les collectives territoriales de la France du Sud-Ouest sous l'Ancien Regime*, Paris 2000, s.44.

³ Grimoż., *Organizacja władzy administracyjnej we Francji*, Moskwa 1994, s. 179.

⁴ *Voir texte du Senatus-Consulte*, Histoire Empire, źródło: http://www.histoire-empire.org/docs/bulletin_des_lois/organisation_empire/annexion_piemont_11_09_1802.htm#_edn3 (odczyt: 01.06.2019).

uwagę na reformę decentralizacji władzy, a także nową reformę administracyjną z 1982 r. Reformy te rozpoczęły łagodne przejście Francji ze scentralizowanego państwa do zdecentralizowanego. W szczególności na podstawie departamentów utworzono Radę Generalną jako organ samorządu lokalnego. Innowacją było tworzenie regionów – najwyższego poziomu w podziale administracyjnym i terytorialnym państwa. W momencie utworzenia było ich 27. Jeśli chodzi o decentralizację władzy we Francji, warto zauważyć, że proces ten jest tam trwały i do czasu jego zakończenia jest jeszcze daleko.

Biorąc pod uwagę podział administracyjny i terytorialny Francji do 2019 r., możemy stwierdzić, że Francja jest klasycznym państwem unitarnym z wielopoziomowym systemem zarządzania: gmina jest pierwszym i najniższym poziomem. Kilka gmin tworzy dzielnicę, a te z kolei są częścią departamentu. Dzielnice z departamentami stanowią drugi poziom zarządzania. Trzeci poziom to regiony utworzone przez kilka departamentów. Istnieje jednak pewien wyjątek: we Francji kilka departamentów ma jednocześnie status i regionu (są to departamenty zamorskie). Po reformie administracyjnej w 2016 r. we Francji jest 18 regionów, z których 12 regionów w metropolii (kontynentalna Francja), 1 region o oficjalnej nazwie „Wspólnota terytorialna Korsyki”⁵, a także 5 regionów zamorskich (Gwadelupa, Gujana, Martynika, Reunion i Majotta); 101 departamentów, w tym 96 w metropolii i 5 za granicą; 4 terytoria zamorskie – Nowa Kaledonia (ze specjalnym statusem konstytucyjnym), Polinezja Francuska, Wyspy Wallis i Futuna, a także utworzenie o statusie specjalnym – wyspy Saint-Pierre i Miquelon. Jednocześnie duże miasta mają specjalny status: stolica Paryż, Lyon i Marsylia, w tym niezależne dzielnice (20 w Paryżu, 16 w Lyonie i 9 w Marsylii). Wyspa Korsyka ma również specjalny status⁶. Prawo stanowi, że ma status regionu, aczkolwiek o nazwie „Wspólnota terytorialna Korsyki”, a także posiada szereg zalet. W przeciwieństwie do innych regionów na Korsyce istnieje Rada Wykonawcza Korsyki, która jest szczególnym samorządem lokalnym. A jako organ ustawodawczy działa Zgromadzenie Korsyki i Korsykańska Rada Kulturalna i Gospodarcza, która pełni rolę doradcy przy podejmowaniu tych lub innych decyzji. Należy zauważyć, że w regionie Korsyki są dwa wydziały, które zostały zaproszone do przyłączenia się do lokalnego referendum, ale mieszkańcy wyspy tego nie chcieli.

Według E. Durana, system organizacji władzy w jednostkach terytorialnych Francji jest przykładem modelu kontynentalnego, który łączy funkcje samorządu lokalnego w samorządach, a także funkcje władzy państwowej⁷. Oprócz powyższych funkcji konieczne jest przydzielenie trzeciej funkcji, która jest powierzona departamentom, wyborcom. Każdy z departamentów jest zasadniczo oddzielnym okręgiem wyborczym w wyborach krajowych.

Podstawowym ogniwem w systemie państwowym Republiki Francuskiej jest gmina. Gmina jest najniższym i zarazem najstarszym elementem (lub poziomem) samorządu lokalnego

⁵ Corse, Wikipedia, źródło: <https://fr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corse> (odczyt: 01.06.2019).

⁶ Duran E., *Władze lokalne we Francji*, Moskwa 1996, s. 98.

⁷ Duran E., *Władze lokalne we Francji*, Moskwa 1996, s.98.

we Francji. Pewne autonomiczne prawa gminy uzyskano dopiero po przyjęciu odpowiedniej ustawy z dnia 5 kwietnia 1884 r.⁸. Dziś we Francji jest ponad 36 000 gmin, od kilkudziesięciu mieszkańców do milionów. Ciekawe są doświadczenia Francji w odniesieniu do uprawnień każdej z gmin, ponieważ niezależnie lub w gminie liczącej 100 mieszkańców, czyli milion, wszystkie mają te same moce. Władzami samorządowymi w gminach są rady miejskie, które są wybierane w wyborach bezpośrednich w systemie proporcjonalnym w dwóch rundach (możliwe jest przeprowadzenie tylko jednej rundy, jeśli jedna ze stron otrzyma 50% + 1 głos), a także burmistrz i jego zastępcy, którzy razem tworzą gminę. Jednocześnie burmistrz łączy funkcje szefa gminy, szefa władzy wykonawczej, a także urzędnika państwowego. Sam burmistrz jest wybierany z rady w tajnym głosowaniu przez większościowy system absolutnej większości w dwóch rundach. Ponieważ jest urzędnikiem państwowym, burmistrz publikuje i egzekwuje prawa i akty wydane przez członków wyższej kadry kierowniczej. Burmistrz uczestniczy także w organizacji wyborów i pełni szereg innych funkcji, w tym posiada uprawnienia policji. Pewna część funkcji burmistrza jest prowadzona pod kierownictwem prokuratora. Dotyczy to na przykład rejestracji małżeństw, aktów urodzenia i zgonu. Inne, takie jak przeprowadzanie wyborów, wydawanie w imieniu państwa różnych licencji (na przykład pozwolenie na polowanie, łowienie ryb, sprzedawanie napojów itp.), udział w organizacji spisu ludności itp., odbywa się pod kierownictwem (kontrolą) przedstawiciela państwa w departamencie – prefekta⁹. Działając jako organ władzy wykonawczy gminy, burmistrz wykonuje (wdraża) decyzje swojej rady. Jest również kierownikiem ds. pożyczek i zarządza usługami komunalnymi w danej gminie. Burmistrz jest odpowiedzialny za własność komunalną, w szczególności upoważnia do korzystania z niego, zarządza pracami publicznymi, przygotowuje i prowadzi posiedzenie rady miejskiej, a także wykonuje inne uprawnienia, w tym te, które przekazuje mu rada. W szczególności rada może przekazać burmistrzowi następujące uprawnienia: zmienić i ustanowić cel własności komunalnej; ustalić rozmiar niektórych rodzajów podatków, które trafiają do lokalnego budżetu; otrzymywać pożyczki na finansowanie inwestycji gminy, które są dostarczane z budżetu wspólnotowego.

Jeśli chodzi o uprawnienia samej rady, są one również jasno określone przez prawo i są podzielone na kilka rodzajów: 1. Uprawnienia finansowe. Przede wszystkim chodzi o przyjęcie budżetu, a także ustalenie stawek dla różnych podatków lokalnych. Również tutaj są uprawnienia do tworzenia (lub eliminowania) narzędzi, ich finansowania i innych. 2. Uprawnienia w dziedzinie własności komunalnej. Zgodnie z prawem francuskim gmina ma dwa rodzaje nieruchomości: publiczny i prywatny. Mienie publiczne obejmuje drogi, rzeki, cmentarze, niektóre obiekty obronne i inne. Ta nieruchomość nie podlega sprzedaży ani przekazaniu innym osobom w żadnych warunkach. Do prywatnych należą budynki, pola, las itp. To samorząd lokalny decyduje o sprzedaży, zakupie i wynajmie nieruchomości. 3. Władze w dziedzinie kształtowania krajobrazu i urbanistyki. Rada decyduje, czy opracować planowanie miasta, nowe terytoria

⁸ *Commune*, INSEE, źródło: <https://www.insee.fr/fr/metadonnees/definition/c1468>(odczyt: 01.06.2019).

⁹ AntonowA., *Samorząd terytorialny i rozwój terytoriów*, Perm 2014, s. 483.

i może wspólnie z władzami departamentu lub regionu rozpocząć proces planowania obiektów regionalnych lub krajowych.

Kolejnym poziomem podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego są departamenty, które francuscy naukowcy nazywają podstawowym poziomem. Departament to główna jednostka samorządu terytorialnego Francji i powstała w 1789 roku. Składający się z gmin, z kolei jest częścią regionów (departamenty zamorskie są jednocześnie regionami). Na poziomie departamentów Rada Generalna jest organem przedstawicielskim¹⁰. Aby zrozumieć powstanie składu Rady Generalnej, musimy rozważyć strukturę terytorialną departamentu. Departament składa się z gmin. Istnieje jednak podział na okręgi i kantony. Kanton to połączenie kilku gmin, kanton nie ma znaczenia w podziale administracyjnym i terytorialnym, ale jest okręgiem wyborczym. To właśnie Rada Generalna utworzona przez przeprowadzenie wyborów większościowych, gdzie każdy z kantonów reprezentuje dwóch posłów. Jednak nie wszystko jest takie proste. Kadencja posła Rady Generalnej trwa 6 lat, ale wybory odbywają się co trzy lata tylko w połowie posłów. To znaczy, jeśli w 2015 r. (a w tym roku zasada ta została wprowadzona) wybierzesz posła A ze swojego kantonu, to następnie w 2018 r. wybierzesz kandydata B, a w 2021 r. możesz ponownie wybrać kandydata A lub inną osobę. Zasada ta umożliwia aktualizację połowy Rady Generalnej, co z kolei jest interpretowane jako poprawa obiegu elit i możliwość zmiany równowagi sił na poziomie departamentu co trzy lata zamiast poprzednich sześciu.

Zgodnie z ustawą z 02.03.1982 r. władza wykonawcza departamentu, która wcześniej należała do prefekta – przedstawiciela państwa w departamencie – została przekazana przewodniczącemu Rady Generalnej. Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, kwestii organizacji władzy na poziomie departamentu poświęcona jest prawie jedna trzecia Kodeksu o zespolach terytorialnych (formacjach). Władza wykonawcza w departamentach realizuje się stałą komisją Rady Generalnej, w skład której wchodzi przewodniczący Rady Generalnej, a także jego zastępcy. Stały Komitet składa się z 4 do 15 zastępców przewodniczącego (z jedynym wymogiem, aby ich liczba nie przekraczała 30% całkowitej liczby członków rady). Ponadto, jeśli to konieczne, może być kilku członków Rady Generalnej. Przewodniczący i jego zastępcy tworzą biuro¹¹. Przewodniczący rady prowadzi przygotowywanie i wykonywanie decyzji rady, jest kierownikiem kredytów (jeśli chodzi o finanse) i szefem departamentów publicznych, a czasem pełni obowiązki policji w zachowaniu uprawnień burmistrzów w swoim obszarze zaufania. W wykonywaniu swojej władzy przewodniczący jest wspomagany przez część służb, które są do dyspozycji prefekta. Ponadto przewodniczący rady ma prawo korzystać z jednostek organów państwowych znajdujących się na terenie departamentu. Deleguje część swoich uprawnień na swoich zastępców. W związku z tym przewodniczący rady pełni jednocześnie dwie główne funkcje: 1) jest przewodniczącym rady (tj. organu przedstawicielskiego); 2) jest jednocześnie jedynym organem zarządzającym o ogólnych kompetencjach, który wykonuje go za pośrednictwem Stałego Komitetu.

¹⁰ *Code général des collectivités territoriales*, Legifrance, źródło: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr> (odczyt: 01.06.2019).

¹¹ *Code général des collectivités territoriales*, Legifrance, źródło: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr> (odczyt: 01.06.2019).

W ciągu ostatnich kilku lat miały miejsce dyskusje na temat zmiany równowagi sił departamentów. Niektórzy oferują przeniesienie części władzy z departamentów na regiony i gminy, podczas gdy inni proponują wzmocnienie roli departamentów jako podstawowych jednostek w podziale administracyjnym i terytorialnym Francji. W szczególności w czasach prezydenta Nicolasa Sarkozy'ego zaproponowano przeprowadzenie reformy¹² w celu optymalizacji pracy departamentów i regionów, a mianowicie decyzji o wyraźnym nakreśleniu ich kompetencji i szeregu innych wyjaśnień. Zgodnie ze zmianami, uprawnienia stowarzyszenia terytorialnego każdego z poziomów są określone wyłącznie przez prawo, a wszelkie wyjątki mogą być opisane tylko w tej ustawie. Oznacza to, że ustawodawcy chronili władze lokalne przed własną interpretacją takich przepisów jak „coś innego” itp. Jednocześnie prawo zabrania ingerencji jakiegokolwiek stowarzyszenia terytorialnego w pracę innego stowarzyszenia, niezależnie od poziomów takiego stowarzyszenia.

W rezultacie od 2015 r. departamenty i regiony nie posiadają tak zwanej „uniwersalnej” kompetencji, ale przeciwnie, każdy poziom otrzymał tak zwaną „wylączną” kompetencję. Jednocześnie taka decyzja ograniczyła stowarzyszenie we wspólnym rozwoju, ponieważ od 2015 r. żaden z międzykomunalnych czy nawet komunalnych projektów nie może uzyskać współfinansowania z poziomu departamentu lub regionu. Prawodawca przewidział jednak wyjątek od tej zasady. W ten sposób nowo utworzeni „doradcy terytorialni” mają prawo do tworzenia pewnych wspólnych projektów wśród stowarzyszeń w celu uzyskania współfinansowania nie z budżetu państwa, ale z budżetów lokalnych różnych poziomów. W takich projektach stowarzyszenia terytorialne rozdzielają między siebie obowiązki w zakresie rozwoju gospodarczego w danym obszarze, szkolenia zawodowego, budowy i obsługi liceów i szkół wyższych, rozwoju infrastruktury transportowej i drogowej oraz szeregu kwestii środowiskowych. Taki plan powinien być omawiany na szczeblu regionalnym, a następnie na poziomie odpowiednich służb. Jego celem jest wyraźne podzielenie nie tylko kompetencji, ale także finansowania. Na przykład w regionie Akwitanii istnieje możliwość budowy nowego budynku szkolnego. Po omówieniu z kierownictwem departamentu Gironde decydują się na budowę nowego budynku w jednej z gmin. Zadaniem, a zarazem kompetencją gminy jest oferowanie lokalizacji tego budynku, władz departamentu – znaleźć wykonawcę, a także stworzenie projektu budynku edukacyjnego, jednocześnie władze regionu zachowują funkcję kontrolną i zatwierdzają projekt korpusu i kontrolują jego budowę. Jeśli chodzi o finansowanie, możliwa jest każda opcja (jako 60% region – 40% departament i odwrotnie itd.). Ale oprócz tego wyjątku ustawodawca dopuszcza współfinansowanie wydarzeń i obiektów związanych ze sportem, turystyką i sztuką. Oznacza to, że organizowanie turniejów sportowych, koncertów i wystaw tematycznych jest dozwolone po otrzymaniu finansowania z różnych źródeł. Ponadto proponuje się utworzenie instytutu „doradców terytorialnych”¹³. W rezultacie autorzy ustawy postanowili zmniejszyć liczbę przed-

¹² *Projet De Loi de réforme des collectivités territoriales*, Gouvernement France, źródło: <http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/reforme-des-collectivites-territoriales-0>(odczyt: 01.06.2019).

¹³ *En quoi va-t-elle consister?*, Interieur, źródło: <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-sous-sites/Reforme-des-collectivites-territoriales/La-reforme/En-quoi-va-t-elle-consister>(odczyt: 01.06.2019).

stawili rad regionalnych, sprowadzając delegatów z departamentów do przedstawicieli rad regionalnych. Oznacza to, że proponuje się wprowadzenie podwójnego mandatu.

Najwyższym poziomem podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego Francji są regiony. Ich liczba od samego początku formacji jest tematem żywych dyskusji. Po ostatnich zmianach uwzględniających cechy historyczne i kulturowe Francji, pozostało 18 regionów, z których 15 są w metropolii¹⁴. Regiony powstają na podstawie zasad geograficznych, politycznych, gospodarczych i historycznych. Można przypuszczać, że przywrócenie regionów w podziale administracyjnym i terytorialnym Francji jest przywróceniem sprawiedliwości historycznej. Nowe regiony przypominają stare przedrewolucyjne prowincje i odpowiadają na fakt, że „siły odśrodkowe” starały się odnowić regiony w ciągu całego XX wieku. Oczywiście, tworząc nowe regiony, nie chodziło w ogóle o przywracanie historycznych granic, ale uwzględniono osobliwości regionalne, a zatem stworzono wiele regionów o historycznych nazwach, które były w takich granicach dla ich historycznych poprzedników (na przykład Akwitania, Bretania, Lotaryngia, Pikardia, Limousin, Burgundia itp.). Po reformie rządu M. Walta i prezydenta F. Hollande przeprowadzono konsolidację regionów, co doprowadziło do kontrowersyjnych dyskusji w kręgach politycznych. Główną przeszkodą były regiony, które zaoferowały zjednoczenie się z sąsiednimi regionami dzięki transferowi kapitału, niszcząc w ten sposób cechy regionalne i dziedzictwo historyczne niektórych miast i terytoriów. W szczególności połączenie regionu Burgundii i Franche-Comté w nowym regionie Burgundia-Franche-Comte wywołało ożywione dyskusje na temat wykonalności takiego połączenia. Z drugiej strony, w wielu regionach, dzięki rozszerzeniu, granice regionów były bliższe historycznym granicom prowincji. W szczególności połączenie regionów Dolnej Normandii i Górnej Normandii w nowy region o lakonicznej nazwie Normandia zostało pozytywnie odebrane przez polityczny establishment regionu. Głównym celem reformy na lata 2014–2016 było jednak nie tylko powiększenie regionów i przywrócenie granic niektórych prowincji, ale także ich przerobienie, przy jednoczesnym ograniczeniu wydatków publicznych i oszczędności rządu 10 mld euro¹⁵.

Jednocześnie, aby lepiej zrozumieć rolę regionu w strukturze administracyjno-terytorialnej Francji, należy szczegółowo rozważyć jego strukturę. W związku z tym na szczeblu regionalnym istnieją rady regionalne. Rada Regionalna składa się z proporcjonalnego systemu głosowania, w którym $\frac{3}{4}$ miejsca są przydzielane w zależności od liczby głosów oddanych w wyborach lokalnych, a $\frac{1}{4}$ miejsc w Radzie Regionalnej staje się rodzajem nagrody / premii dla partii, która uzyskała największą liczbę głosów. To głosowanie w jednej lub dwóch rundach. Głosowanie w jednej rundzie jest możliwe tylko wtedy, gdy jedna z partii politycznych biorących udział w wyborach uzyska co najmniej 50% + 1 głos. Jeśli nie ma takiej sytuacji, następuje druga tura głosowania, w której biorą udział tylko te partie, które pokonały barierę w 10% głosów. Na czele rady regionalnej stoi przewodniczący, którego posły wybierają między sobą. Ponadto

¹⁴ *Département*, INSEE, źródło: <https://www.insee.fr/fr/metadata/definition/c1762>(odczyt: 01.06.2019).

¹⁵ *Pourquoi une réforme des collectivités territoriales?*, Intérieur, źródło: <http://www.interieur.gouv.fr>(odczyt: 01.06.2019).

przewodniczy on organowi wykonawczemu Rady, w czym pomagają mu wiceprzewodniczący i inni członkowie Prezydium Rady. Przewodniczący Rady Regionalnej jest szefem służb regionalnych, przygotowuje i wykonuje decyzję rady, a także jego kolegów z niższych szczebli, zarządza funduszami i zarządza majątkiem regionu.

Na szczególną uwagę zasługuje Paryż – stolica Francji. To miasto o bardzo złożonym systemie organizacji samorządów lokalnych. Zgodnie ze specjalną ustawą nr 82-1169 z 31 grudnia 1982 r.¹⁶ w Paryżu (a także w Lyonie i Marsylii) istnieje dwustopniowy system kontroli. Zgodnie ze swoim statusem Paryż jest jednocześnie gminą i departamentem, a rada miasta Paryża jest organem jednej lub innej grupy terytorialnej, w zależności od decyzji, którą rozważa. Jednocześnie władza wykonawcza w mieście należy do burmistrza wybranego przez posłów. W tym samym czasie miasto jest podzielone na kilka dzielnic (okręgów), z których każda działa jako rada i ma własnego burmistrza. Jeśli chodzi o sam Paryż, wielu urzędników przedstawiło swoją wizję rozwoju stolicy i jej roli w podziale administracyjnym i terytorialnym państwa. Idea utworzenia Wielkiego Paryża została ogłoszona przez prezydenta N. Sarkozy'ego w 2007 r. Po kilku przesłuchaniach, dyskusjach i konsultacjach w latach 2009-2010 zaproponowano kilka opcji realizacji tego zadania, z których jedno znalazło odzwierciedlenie w odpowiednim prawie. Początkowym pomysłem było utworzenie stowarzyszenia w Paryżu i departamentów Saint-Sat-Denny, Val de Marne i Ot de Saint. Przypuszczano, że przed samym stworzeniem będą przeprowadzone prace z różnymi grupami społecznymi, w szczególności z biznesem. To właśnie Paryż i trzy wyżej wymienione departamenty tzw. „Małej korony” liczą łącznie około 6 milionów mieszkańców. Każdy z tych departamentów ma ścisły związek ze stolicą, która jest centrum politycznej, finansowej i kulturalnej sfery życia całego kraju. Zasugerowano, że po wszystkich konsultacjach w 2014 r. powstanie nowa metropolia – „Grand Paris”. W związku z tym wiele organów (tj. same departamenty, jak również syndykaty itp.) powinno zostać zastąpionych przez jeden wspólny organ, który otrzymałby wszystkie uprawnienia poprzednich. A same gminy wchodzące na granicę „Wielkiego Paryża” zachowałyby swoje funkcje władz lokalnych i istniejący system wyborów. W tym samym czasie doradcy (tj. posły) „Wielkiego Paryża” zostaną wybrani w istniejących okręgach wyborczych, w których zastali wybrani doradcy departamentów. Zaproponowano wybory do Wielkiej Rady Paryskiej w dwóch rundach przy użyciu mieszanego systemu wyborczego. Kandydaci, którzy znaleźli się pierwsi na liście, byłiby przedstawicielami rady regionu, a następni na liście – w radzie „Wielkiego Paryża”. Dlatego głównym zadaniem „Wielkiego Paryża” było realizować skuteczne zarządzanie, a także koordynować i zapewnić zrównoważony rozwój wszystkich regionów „Wielkiego Paryża”. Jednak w 2013 r. Utworzono odrębną ustawę o utworzeniu „Wielkiego Paryża”, aw lipcu 2013 r. Zgromadzenie Narodowe zatwierdziło ją¹⁷.

¹⁶ *Loi n°82-1169 du 31 décembre 1982 Relative A L'organisation Administrative De Paris, Marseille, Lyon Et Des Etablissements Publics De Cooperation Intercommunale*. Legifrance, źródło: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=56826ACEBCB15D0093E9CF20C9815A60.tpdjo05v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00000880033&dateTexte=19830101

¹⁷ *L'Assemblée nationale vote la création d'une métropole du Grand Paris*, Le Point, źródło: http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/l-assemblee-nationale-vote-la-creation-d-une-metropole-du-grand-paris-19-07-2013-1706424_20.php (odczyt: 01.06.2019).

Zgodnie z tą ustawą metropolia „Grand Paris” („Wielki Paryż”) zaczęła funkcjonować od 1 stycznia 2016 r., ale ze względu na aktywny opór architektów i ekologów projekt „Wielki Paryż” zostaje odłożony na czas poprawy i nie został jeszcze wdrożony.

Opisując podział administracyjny Francji, a także system administracyjny i terytorialny tego kraju, należy zauważyć, że choć w wielu państwach Europy, w szczególności na Ukrainie, wprowadzenie decentralizacji władzy zwykle zmienia podział administracyjny i terytorialny (tj. mapę administracyjną) państwa, to we Francji zmiana praktycznie nie nastąpiła. Tak więc od 1982 r. Wszystkie trzy poziomy systemy terytorialnego, a mianowicie gminy, departamenty i regiony, stały się zdecentralizowanymi poziomami zarządzania z własnymi lokalnymi organami samorządowymi¹⁸.

Jednocześnie we Francji zmieniły się parametry tzw. „administracyjnej opieki” państwa nad funkcjonowaniem lokalnych organów samorządowych. W rzeczywistości państwo zastąpiło tę funkcję nową – administracyjną kontrolą nad działalnością organów samorządu lokalnego, które są wykonywane przez prefektów. Jednocześnie sami prefektowie otrzymali znacznie mniej praw i uprawnień niż mieli. W związku z tym nowy i zmodyfikowany system administracji publicznej Republiki Francuskiej pozostał jednym z najbardziej rozdrobnionych w całej Unii Europejskiej. Wynika to z faktu, że funkcje administracyjne zostały rozproszone wśród lokalnych organów samorządowych ponad 36 tys. gmin. Tak duża liczba gmin była hołdem dla czynników historycznych, kulturowych i gospodarczych. Ogromna większość tych gmin powstała w czasach Napoleona¹⁹ i praktycznie nie zmieniała się w ciągu ostatnich stuleci.

W wyniku reformy decentralizacji władzy we Francji gminy otrzymały szereg uprawnień, w tym świadczenie różnych usług socjalnych, napraw drogowych, policji miejskiej itp. Jednocześnie wiele gmin było zbyt małych, aby skutecznie radzić sobie z nowymi obowiązkami i uprawnieniami, co spowodowało szereg problemów. W tym czasie po raz pierwszy we francuskiej polityce i społeczeństwie dyskutowano o celowości, a co najważniejsze, skuteczności istnienia małych i nielicznych gmin. Z 36 565 gmin istniejących we Francji 27 793 (tj. około 80%) miało mniej niż 1000 osób, co doprowadziło do niemożności spełnienia funkcji, uprawnień i obowiązków gminy. Takie gminy po prostu nie mogły poradzić sobie finansowo z ilością zasobów, których potrzebowały do swojego istnienia. Ciężar takich gmin spoczął przede wszystkim na barkach państwa.

Jednocześnie duże miasta dysponują niezbędnym potencjałem i ilością zasobów finansowych i ludzkich, skutecznym systemem administracyjnym, a także mają rzeczywistą autonomię w powierzonych im obszarach rządowych (np. policja, edukacja itp.). We Francji można wyróżnić trzy rodzaje miejscowości: 1) małe miasta (mniej niż 20 tys. mieszkańców); 2) miasta „bazarowe” (1-15 tys. osób); 3) małe miasta lub „wioski” (do 1 tys. osób). Mniejsze miasta są najbardziej podatne na zagrożenia, ponieważ, jak już zauważyliśmy, nie dysponują odpowiednią

¹⁸ Moskalenko O., *Decentralizacja władzy publicznej: doświadczenia krajów europejskich i perspektywy Ukrainy*, Kijów 2012, s.212.

¹⁹ Grimo Z., *Organizacja władzy administracyjnej we Francji*, Moskwa 1994.

ilością zasobów finansowych i ludzkich do wykonywania powierzonych im uprawnień. Ten problem można rozwiązać tylko na dwa sposoby. Pierwszy sposób: szeroką gamę usług dla mieszkańców takich miast zapewniają inne społeczności. Oznacza to, że dzieci uczęszczają do szkoły w sąsiednim mieście, mieszkańcy otrzymują pomoc medyczną w pobliskim centrum itp. Sama społeczność nie wydaje pieniędzy na utrzymanie takich instytucji, które mogą zaoszczędzić trochę pieniędzy, a tym samym być autonomicznym finansowo, o ile to możliwe. Drugi sposób: państwo pomaga dotować lub subsydiować te same szkoły, szpitale itp. w takich małych miastach²⁰. W tym świetle wydawało się, że rozpocznie się konsolidacja gmin, ale tak się nie stało. Zamiast tego państwo zaczęło stymulować finansowo współpracę między gminami, co doprowadziło do utworzenia we Francji tak zwanych „gmin gmin”, których liczba wzrosła z 139 w 1993 r. do 1349 w 1999 r. Formacje takie miały szeroki zakres form i statusu prawnego, a zatem były potrzebne pewne zjednoczenie. Dlatego w 1999 r. Przyjęto odpowiednią ustawę, która jasno określiła formy współpracy między gminami, z których każda ma inny status prawny i specjalną podstawę opodatkowania. Od 1 stycznia 2002 r. utworzono 14 regionów metropolitalnych, 120 obszarów metropolitalnych i 2033 gmin (lub syndykatów). Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, takie stowarzyszenia obejmują około 80% populacji Francji.

Jednocześnie ważną rolę we francuskim systemie samorządności lokalnej odgrywa prefekt. Prefekt jest przedstawicielem władzy wykonawczej w departamencie i na terytorium odpowiedzialnym za interesy narodowe, kontrolę administracyjną i egzekwowanie prawa²¹. Pierwsi prefektowie zostali stworzeni przez Napoleona w 1800 r. i mieli za zadanie kontrolować jedno lub inne powierzone im terytorium (departament), a także zapewnić realizację woli cesarza. Napoleon, jako zwolennik idei scentralizowanego zarządzania państwem, powierzył prefektom kontrolę administracyjną nad władzami lokalnymi, a także upoważnił prefektów do działania w imieniu cesarza w sytuacjach kryzysowych (takich jak na przykład działania wojskowe) i przejęcia pełnej władzy od lokalnych administracji.

Z czasem rola prefekta znacznie się zmieniła. W 1982 r. stanowisko zostało całkowicie zniesione, zastępując stanowisko „Komisarza Republiki”, ale w 1989 r. rządowy dekret został przywrócony do używania terminu „prefekt” i do dziś instytut prefekta zyskał jasne ramy. Mianowanie prefekta odbywa się poprzez nominację wybranego kandydata przez rząd prezydenta, wydając niezbędny dekret, który jest mianowany przez prefekta. We Francji z prefektami stosowana jest zasada „ad nutum”, czyli „bez ostrzeżenia”, ponieważ prefekt może zostać zwolniony w dowolnym momencie²². Ze względu na fakt, że nominacja prefekta jest przedstawiana przez rząd, często może być fałszywe wrażenie, że prefekt nie jest „osobą prezydenta”, ale raczej

²⁰ Charles André J., *Przegląd władz lokalnych we Francji*, 1994.

²¹ Texte intégral de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 en vigueur, Conseil Constitutionnel, źródło: <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958/texte-integral-de-la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958-en-vigueur/5074.html#titre12>(odczyt: 01.06.2019).

²² HanuszczaKju., Czyżenko L., *Prefektowie: lekcje Francji dla Ukrainy*, Kijów 2015, s. 44.

„stworzeniem rządu”. Jednak tak nie jest, ponieważ Francja jest republiką półprezydencką,²³ chociaż instytucja prezydencka ma znacznie większy wpływ na historię niż w wielu innych krajach półprezydenckich. Na przykład dodatkowym atrybutem półprezydencji we Francji jest to, że kandydaturę premiera oferuje prezydent, niektórzy członkowie urzędu rządowego, jak również jego kandydatura, a jeśli chodzi o parlament, większość prezydentów Republiki Francuskiej ma tam swoją większość, w skutku czego byli bardzo silni. Po wyborach prezydenckich nowy prezydent może przeprowadzić wybory parlamentarne. Co więcej: aby rozwiązać parlament, nie potrzebuje żadnych ważnych powodów, ponieważ może to zrobić z własnych powodów, ale nie częściej niż raz w roku. Dlatego rząd zazwyczaj popiera każdego kandydata z prezydentem, a ten ostatni, w większości, popiera wszystkie kandydatury, ponieważ tylko jeden z najlepszych kandydatów może ubiegać się o tak ważne stanowisko, a zatem prezydent nie ma wątpliwości co do ich zdolności do zakwalifikowania się. Otóż prefekt kieruje departamentem, który ma podrzędny aparat administracyjny. Ponadto podlega mu pewne lokalne jednostki centralnych władz wykonawczych. W szczególności pod jego kierownictwem są służby państwowe w departamencie – policja, służby drogowe itp. Z kolei prefekt jest kontrolowany przez suprefekty, które funkcjonują w okręgach. Sam okręg to niższy poziom podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego, a do 2014 r. granice dzielnicy zbiegły się z granicami okręgów wyborczych przed wyborami parlamentarnymi²⁴. Często dzielnicą jest nazywana suprefekturą, ponieważ dzielnicą nie ma ani okręgu wyborczego, ani głowy. Głównym zadaniem okręgu jako jednostki administracyjnej i terytorialnej jest promowanie bardziej efektywnej pracy pionu władzy państwowej.

Należy zauważyć, że oprócz prefektów w klasycznym znaczeniu, nadal istnieją prefektowie policji w Paryżu i Marsylii, którym jest podporządkowana policja i których celem jest zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa ulic konkretnego miasta. W rzeczywistości prefektowie policji są niezależni od prefektów, ale ściśle z nimi współpracują. Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, głównym zadaniem prefekta jest kontrolowanie działań władz lokalnych i kierowanie pracą organów terytorialnych departamentów centralnych. Ponieważ prefekt według stanowiska jest przedstawicielem rządu w departamencie, jest on zobowiązany do informowania rządu o stanie spraw w departamencie, a także do wprowadzenia polityki rządu do lokalnych organów wybieranych i przyczynienia się w każdy sposób do realizacji tej polityki. Nie mniej istotną czynnością prefektów jest odwołanie się do sądu administracyjnego od decyzji właściwego organu lokalnego, jeżeli jego zdaniem taka decyzja jest sprzeczna z prawem republiki. Dlatego prefekt jest stanowiskiem, który często musi zamykać oczy na pewne naruszenia prawa, jeśli władze lokalne mogą udowodnić ekonomiczną lub społeczną celowość decyzji, chociaż jest to również sprzeczne z prawem. W razie sytuacji kryzysowej prefekt sam przyjmuje pełną władzę w regionie. A jeśli jedna z lokalnych rad podjęła

²³ *La Vème république: régime présidentiel ou parlementaire?*, Cours De Droit, źródło: <http://www.cours-de-droit.net/la-ve-me-republique-regime-presidentiel-ou-parlementaire-a127025260> (odczyt: 01.06.2019).

²⁴ *Arrondissement français*, Wikipedia, źródło: https://fr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrondissement_français (odczyt: 01.06.2019).

decyzję, która zagroziłaby suwerenności Francji, prefekt natychmiast przyprowadziłby wojska do tej rady i przy pomocy siły rozproszył ją, na co ma pełne prawo.

Zgodnie z prawem francuskim prefektowie mają następujące uprawnienia: reprezentują państwo w sprawach dotyczących wykonywania wszystkich aktów prawnych na poziomie departamentu; podpisywać umowy w imieniu państwa; nadzorować wdrażanie przez rady miejskie ustaw, dekretów i rozporządzeń rządu i poszczególnych ministrów; koordynować działania policji i żandarmerii, zapewniać porządek publiczny w regionie; podejmować decyzje o charakterze normatywnym; sprawować kontrolę administracyjną nad działaniami departamentu i jego gmin oraz przekazują na rozpatrzenie sądowi administracyjnemu nielegalne, ich zdaniem, decyzje rad gmin, mogą zakwestionować rezygnację burmistrzów; są administratorami wydatków państwowych w departamencie, a także są odpowiedzialni za zarządzanie nieruchomościami i inną własnością państwową należącą do państwa w departamencie; zarządzać pracą wszystkich lokalnych służb państwowych centralnych władz wykonawczych i działać jako pośrednicy w stosunkach między tymi służbami, innymi władzami lokalnymi i siłami politycznymi, w tym z władzami centralnymi²⁵.

Do tej pory we Francji jest 256 prefektów, z których tylko 126 jest na stanowisku prefekta, a reszta pracuje na różnych stanowiskach w organach wykonawczych. Ta rozbieżność istnieje, ponieważ we Francji koncepcja prefekta jest nieco dwuznaczna. Z jednej strony prefekt to stanowisko i przedstawiciel państwa w regionie lub departamencie, z drugiej strony jest to biurokratyczna ranga, w której istnieje kilka klas: urzędnik o randze prefekta jest członkiem organu prefektów, pewnego rodzaju elitarnej instytucji urzędników służby cywilnej i może być mianowany na różne stanowiska od ministerstwa po zarządzanie przedsiębiorstwami państwowymi. Jeśli chodzi o hierarchię, wszyscy prefektowie są równi, nawet prefekt departamentu i regionu, i odpowiadają tylko przed rządem. Ich uwolnienie następuje tylko na mocy dekretu prezydenckiego po złożeniu przez rząd. Interesująca jest praktyka zwolnionych prefektów we Francji: otrzymują oni inną pracę, a jeśli jej nie znaleźli, państwo płaci wynagrodzenie byłemu prefektowi co miesiąc. Średni wiek prefekta we Francji wynosi 49 lat, a wymóg wieku dla tego stanowiska wynosi 67 lat, więc na stanowisku prefekta pracują zazwyczaj 3-6 lat, i nie więcej²⁶.

Otóż, pomimo jasno określonych konturów podziału terytorialnego i administracyjnego Republiki Francuskiej, wciąż trwa poszukiwanie najbardziej optymalnego modelu pod względem równowagi sił między wszystkimi szczeblami władzy. Oprócz znalezienia równowagi sił, prowadzone są dyskusje na temat konsolidacji nie tylko regionów, ale także departamentów i gmin. W świetle powyższego możemy stwierdzić, że we Francji istnieje silny system podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego charakteryzujący się monolitycznością z przejawami trendów dośrodkowych w dziedzinie kultury i tożsamości regionalnej. Jednocześnie system ten jest dynamiczny i gotowy na zmiany w stosunku do wymogów czasowych, które potwierdzają

²⁵ *Code général des collectivités territoriales*, Legifrance, źródło: <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ihhskk/dut23>(odczyt: 01.06.2019).

²⁶ Hanuszczałju., Czipenko I., *Prefektowie: lekcje Francji dla Ukrainy*, Kijów 2015, s. 44.

reformy konsolidacji regionów, zmiany systemu wyborczego na poziomie departamentów i debaty na temat konsolidacji gmin. Więc ważne są kroki podejmowane przez władze francuskie w celu zminimalizowania powielania funkcji różnych władz lokalnych i centralnych oraz znalezienia nowej formuły równowagi między trzema poziomami podziału administracyjnego i terytorialnego państwa. Oznacza to, że formuły mogą zachować pewne skupienie na kwestiach ekonomii, bezpieczeństwa i energii, ale jednocześnie wprowadzić procesy decentralizacji w innych obszarach.

Lista używanych źródeł:

1. Zink A., *Pays ou circonscriptions. Les collectives territoriales de la France du Sud-Ouest sous l'Ancien Regime*, Paris 2000.
2. Antonow A., *Samorząd terytorialny i rozwój terytoriów*, Perm 2014.
3. Hanuszczak Ju., Czypenko I., *Prefektowie: lekcje Francji dla Ukrainy*, Kijów 2015.
4. Grimo Ž., *Organizacja władzy administracyjnej we Francji*, Moskwa 1994.
5. Duran E., *Władze lokalne we Francji*, Moskwa 1996.
6. Jean François D., Władze lokalne we Francji, „Kolekcja prac naukowych UADU” 2000, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 77–82.
7. Moskalenko O., *Decentralizacja władzy publicznej: doświadczenia krajów europejskich i perspektywy Ukrainy*, Kijów 2012.
8. Charles André J., *Przegląd władz lokalnych we Francji*, 1994.

THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF EMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES: A CROSS-REGIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The article deals with the causes and consequences of emigration and emigration processes in the Visegrad Group countries at different stages of their development after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, in particular on the basis of a cross-regional comparative analysis. The author stated that the causes and consequences of emigration in the Visegrad Group countries are interrelated. The researcher argued that emigration from the Visegrad Group countries is socio-economically determined, as the movement of emigrants from the region is mainly directed to the countries of Western Europe and North America. At the same time, it was found that emigration from the Visegrad Group countries is socio-economically advantageous for the countries of Western Europe, but not for the analyzed region. Thus, it was generally argued that the causes and consequences of emigration from Visegrad Group countries are predominantly internal and socio-economic.

Keywords: migration, emigration, socio-economic development, region, the Visegrad group.

ПРИЧИНИ І НАСЛІДКИ ЕМІГРАЦІЇ ТА ЕМІГРАЦІЙНИХ ПРОЦЕСІВ У КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ: КРОС-РЕГІОНАЛЬНИЙ ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ

Виявлено та проаналізовано причини і наслідки еміграції та еміграційних процесів у країнах Вишеградської групи на різних етапах розвитку після колапсу системи Варшавського договору, зокрема на підставі здійснення крос-регіонального порівняльного аналізу. Констатовано, що причини і наслідки еміграції в країнах Вишеградської групи є взаємозумовленими. Встановлено, що еміграція з країн Вишеградської групи є соціально-економічно детермінованою, оскільки рух емігрантів з регіону головно спрямований до країн Західної Європи і Північної Америки. Водночас виявлено, що еміграція з країн Вишеградської групи соціально-економічно вигідна передусім для країн Західної Європи, а не аналізованого регіону. Загалом аргументовано, що причини і наслідки еміграції з країн Вишеградської групи є переважно внутрішніми та соціально-економічними.

Ключові слова: міграція, еміграція, соціально-економічний розвиток, регіон, Вишеградська група.

The main peculiarity of emigration processes in the modern Visegrad countries lies in the fact that defined themselves only in the early 1990. Instead, historically, they were dramatically diversified and fragmented. In particular, in the late 19th - early 20th century the countries of the region were characterized by quite a significant emigration level and spatial mobility, however, in the mid-twentieth century the situation has changed, because within «closed societies» and regimes of totalitarian and authoritarian types, emigration processes have become rather an exception and the violation of the law. Therefore, east-west migration became a major problem for the Visegrad countries upon the crucial political and socio-economic changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Following the first signs of significant emigration from the former communist region, Western European countries have adopted restrictive rules. At the same time, and simultaneously with the rise of emigration processes from the Visegrad countries, they themselves became destinations for immigration flows from the east. Yet, most interestingly the EU's rigorous prescriptions in regard of the Visegrad countries (especially before their accession to the EU) soon became an example of the intended rules for regulating migration from novel democratic states, and therefore affected their migration policy development¹. As a consequence, emigration from the Visegrad countries (especially in the early 1990s) proved to be much lower than the estimated numbers, as migration processes began occur in different directions, not just in the «east-west vector», as well as being both short and long term, legal and illegal². All of the abovementioned factors have determined the need for scientific (theoretical and empirical) identification of the causes and consequences of emigration / emigration processes in the Visegrad countries.

The stated issues have been in the scientific focus of many a scientist, such as: Alvarez-Plata, H. Brücker and B. Silverstovs³, T. Bauer and K. Zimmermann⁴, Bodnar K. and L. Szabo⁵, T. Boeri and H. Brücker⁶, G. Borjas⁷, C. Dustmann⁸, M. Fertig i C Schmidt⁹, T. Hatton i J. Williamson¹⁰,

¹ Wallace C., Stola D., *Patterns of migration in Central Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 2001.

² Jazwinska E., Okolski M., *Causes and consequences of migration in central and eastern Europe*, Wyd. University of Warsaw 1996.

³ Alvarez-Plata P., Brücker H., Silverstovs B., *Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU-15 – An Update*, Wyd. DIW Berlin 2003.

⁴ Bauer T., Zimmermann K., An Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, *IZA Research Report* 1999, vol 3.

⁵ Bodnar K., Szabo L., The Effect of Emigration on the Hungarian Labour Market, *MNB Occasional Paper* 2014, vol 114.

⁶ Boeri T., Brücker H., Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labour-Markets: Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities, *IZA Discussion Papers* 2001, vol 256.

⁷ Borjas G., Immigration and Welfare Magnets, *Journal of Labor Economics* 1999, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 607–637.

⁸ Dustmann C., Casanova M., Fertig M., Preston I., Schmidt C., *The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows*, Wyd. Home Office Online Report Research Development and Statistics Directorate 2003; Dustmann C., Frattini T., Rosso A., The Effect of Emigration from Poland on Polish Wages, *CREAM Discussion Paper* 2012, vol 29/12.

⁹ Fertig M., Schmidt C., Aggregate-Level Migration Studies as a Tool for Forecasting Future Migration Streams, *IZA Discussion Paper* 2000, vol 183.

¹⁰ Hatton T., Williamson J., What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?, *NBER Working Paper* 2002, vol 9159.

A. Hars¹¹, G. Epstein¹², S. Haug¹³, E. Jazwinska and M. Okolski¹⁴, M. Leon-Ledesma and M. Piracha¹⁵, F. Ortega and G. Peri¹⁶, P. Pedersen, M. Pytlikova and N. Smith¹⁷, R. Stefancik¹⁸, A. Zaicева¹⁹, and many others, analyzing both general theoretical empiric, socio-economic, legal, political, psychological, ecologic, cultural, religious and other short-term and long-term emigration factors and consequences. However, they have insufficiently elucidated the very Visegrad region (especially against other European countries), which presents a sample of the this study, its first part dealing primarily with the causes of emigration in the region, with its second part focusing mainly on the effects of emigration in the region.

Accounting for the determination and causality of emigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad Group (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic), we start with the fact that following more than forty years of the communist regime, having brought emigration to a halt, the «iron curtain» has fallen, enabling people to move abroad. possibility of moving abroad²⁰. A decade following the collapse of the USSR and post-communist changes led to a further weakening of migration pressure on the countries of the Visegrad Group. However, the issue of migration flux from the countries of the region occurred mostly due to the EU eastward enlargement, for it was differently associated with the free movement of citizens of the new EU Member States, which could have caused and eventually led to a large-scale emigration²¹. Therefore, the emigration processes in the Visegrad countries, mainly through the prism of assessing their causes, should be discussed in three stages, namely: pre-accession to the EU accession, while accession to the EUn, and post-accession to the EU. Although, it is worth remembering that emigrants from the Visegrad countries are moving not only towards the EU, but also to other countries, such as Australia, Canada and the USA, as well as to the countries of the Middle East or Southeast, etc.

¹¹ Hárs Á., The alien population and its presence in the workforce, *“Europa Forum”* 1995, s. 84–97.

¹² Epstein G., Informational Cascades and Decision to Migrate, *“IZA Discussion Paper”* 2002, vol 445.

¹³ Haug S., Klassische und neuere Theorien der Migration, *“Arbeitspapiere Working Paper”* 2000, vol 30.

¹⁴ Jazwinska E., Okolski M., *Causes and consequences of migration in central and eastern Europe*, Wyd. University of Warsaw 1996.

¹⁵ Leon-Ledesma M., Piracha M., International Migration and the Role of Remittances in Eastern Europe, *“International Migration”* 2004, vol 42, nr. 4, s. 65–83.

¹⁶ Ortega F., Peri G., Openness and Income: The Roles of Trade and Migration, *“Journal of International Economics”* 2014, vol 92, nr. 2, s. 231–251.

¹⁷ Pedersen P., Pytlikova M., Smith N., Selection or Network Effects? Migration Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990–2000, *“IZA Discussion Paper”* 2004, vol 1104; Pytlikova M., *Where Did Central and Eastern European Emigrants Go and Why?*, SOLE/EALE world conference, San Francisco 2005, s. 77–114.

¹⁸ Stefancik R., Ekonomicke a socialne priciny medzinarodnej migracie v teoretickej reflexii, *“Slovenska politologicka revue”* 2010, vol 4, nr. 10, s. 51–72.

¹⁹ Zaicева A., Implications of EU accession for international migration: and assessment of potential migration pressure, *“CESIFO Working paper”* 2004, vol 1184; Zaicева A., Zimmermann K., Returning home at times of trouble? Return migration of EU enlargement migrants during the crisis, *“IZA Discussion Paper”* 2012, vol 7111.

²⁰ Pytlikova M., *Where Did Central and Eastern European Emigrants Go and Why?*, SOLE/EALE world conference, San Francisco 2005, s. 77–114.

²¹ Dustmann C., Casanova M., Fertig M., Preston I., Schmidt C., *The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows*, Wyd. Home Office Online Report Research Development and Statistics Directorate 2003; Boenigk T., Brückner H., Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labour-Markets: Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities, *“IZA Discussion Papers”* 2001, vol 256; Zaicева A., Implications of EU accession for international migration: and assessment of potential migration pressure, *“CESIFO Working paper”* 2004, vol 1184; Burda M., The consequences of EU enlargement for central and east European labour markets, *“CEPR Discussion Papers”* 1998, vol 1881.

Analyzing the causes of emigration / emigration processes from the Visegrad countries prior to and during their integration into the EU (in particular until the early 2000s), it is worth mentioning that they were caused primarily by socio-economic differences (particularly, GDP per capita) in the region and the EU (Western Europe). According to the data, presented in Tables 1 and 2 it is apparent that Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were still less socio-economically advanced than their counterparts out of the «old» EU Member States and Western Europe.

Table 1. Annual GDP per capita by purchasing power in the Visegrad countries and Western Europe (1990–2016), in dollars

Country	GDP per capita (\$), 1990	GDP per capita (\$), 2000	GDP per capita (\$), 2010	GDP per capita (\$), 2016
Countries of the Visegrad Group				
Hungary	8283,03037 (1991 p.)	11843,462	21466,5742	26680,5941
Poland	6175,230105	10644,71385	21089,01108	27810,51663
Slovakia	7131,25198 (1992 p.)	11347,91207	25010,54458	30631,95391
Czech Republic	12608,51034	16132,36975	27659,26524	34711,28294
Average	8549,505699	12492,11442	23806,34878	29958,5869
Countries of Western Europe				
Austria	19394,23375	29301,08698	41906,72959	50077,83261
Belgium	18757,80522	27966,9388	40129,42633	46383,23696
Greece	13290,18183	19503,87943	28202,83336	26783,02457
Denmark	18214,33344	28640,06243	43082,75554	49695,96751
Ireland	13734,53487	30155,26932	43221,45984	68882,87834
Iceland	22129,16802	29497,91123	38410,6693	51398,92651
Spain	13626,44585	21517,32964	31984,15525	36309,8443
Italy	18546,22739	27006,39772	35075,7532	38160,67359
Luxembourg	30955,18371	55306,30735	85779,0824	105881,7605
Malta	9337,889418	19410,77635	27862,85075	37899,21063
Netherlands	18899,8206	31572,67803	44585,52623	50898,08869
Norway	18431,31229	36927,96013	57995,86019	59301,67024
Portugal	11762,11007	18872,37901	27360,96112	30624,17469
United Kingdom	16739,14676	26030,72882	35740,7372	42608,91939
Finland	18148,28541	26732,30607	38812,31889	43052,7268
France	17640,66127	26192,6532	36026,98256	41466,26571
Germany	19421,76614	27277,11033	39263,18779	48729,59042
Switzerland	27523,7644	35675,09453	52935,80414	62881,46051
Sweden	20096,18657	29257,98526	41667,83209	49174,86379
Average	18244,68721	28781,30814	41581,31188	49484,79557

Źródło: *GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)*, World Bank, źródło: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD> [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

The only exception is the situation in Greece (and only after 2010), which has never been the destination-country for immigrants from the Visegrad countries. This can be accounted for both by annual GDP per capita (purchasing power) and to annual GDP growth in the analyzed countries (except for the financial and economic crisis period that began in 2008). Even despite the fact that some countries, e.g. the Czech Republic, which by the year 2000 had reached 50-60 percent of socio-economic development in Western Europe, at present nearly all Visegrad countries account for 60 percent of GDP per capita in Western Europe, with its growth rates even higher in the former (especially after their accession to the EU) than in the latter. Thus, even upon the collapse of the USSR and drastic changes in the labour markets of the post-communist countries of the Visegrad Group, they tend to remain economically and socially dependent on the countries of Western Europe, and therefore key emigration processes have been directed specifically to them²². Initially, this was caused by the restructuring of the economies of the countries of the region, and subsequently by the socio-economic problems of their population. Later this came as a result of their labour markets reorientation to Western Europe, and consequently the need to adjust the salaries of different strata of the population (especially blue-collar workers).

Table 2. Annual GDP growth in the Visegrad Group and Western Europe (1990–2016), in per cent

Country	Annual GDP growth (%) (1990)	Annual GDP growth BBП (%) (2000)	Annual GDP growth BBП (%) (2010)	Annual GDP growth (%) (2016)
Countries of the Visegrad Group				
Hungary	-3,06418035 (1992 p.)	4,202333971	0,677098149	1,95436933
Poland	-7,0155788 (1991 p.)	4,559571179	3,606960459	2,678677124
Slovakia	1,901327059 (1993 p.)	1,210173376	5,041716665	3,285149716
Czech Republic	-11,6149424 (1991 p.)	4,294136059	2,295089687	2,426033011
Average	-4,948343623	3,566553646	2,90521624	2,586057295
Countries of Western Europe				
Austria	4,345641565	3,368407715	1,928673056	1,480730721
Belgium	3,137402456	3,633841364	2,695144611	1,19297884
Greece	0	3,919770772	-5,47903711	0,011752059
Denmark	1,475244726	3,746900212	1,870992639	1,287563494
Ireland	8,466527969	9,912390825	2,033546407	5,213744704
Iceland	1,16937033	4,680514158	-3,55986488	7,199684474
Spain	3,781393447	5,289093179	0,013786544	3,235753073
Italy	1,985774909	3,710107987	1,686523279	0,879890549
Luxembourg	5,319932182	8,239799112	4,86496856	4,180493009
Malta	6,291390958	6,770193911	3,542683214	5,041457164
Netherlands	4,183222799	4,238763069	1,402662177	2,141808733
Norway	1,932438873	3,205285075	0,601886135	1,077979021

²² Bauer T., Zimmermann K., An Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, *IZA Research Report* 1999, vol 3.

Portugal	3,950523301	3,787494022	1,898691753	1,398561546
United Kingdom	0,716882963	3,744962443	1,915161833	1,80601839
Finland	0,675783494	5,634847452	2,992337502	1,387299924
France	2,914009701	3,875162259	1,965657375	1,187650382
Germany	5,255006086	2,962045368	4,079933305	1,8672582
Switzerland	3,674625648	3,946102508	2,953816768	1,287450828
Sweden	0,754674751	4,735287133	5,988926547	3,177734937
Average	3,159465587	4,705314135	1,757709985	2,371358424

Źródło: *GDP per capita growth*, World Bank, Źródło: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG> [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

The current socio-economic indicators, such as unemployment and fertility rates in the Visegrad countries and in Western Europe (see Tables 3 and 4) illustrate and exemplify the situation of the 1990s, but to a much lesser extent. Therefore, on the whole it comes as no surprise that the above socio-economic incentives / factors of influence in the form of higher GDP and sharply rising unemployment rates in the EU Member States (in Western Europe up to 2004), are simultaneously with the sudden international mobility freedom (compared to that up to 1989) offered a strong inducement for the emigration from the Visegrad countries, where unemployment rates were also high, yet wages were considerably lower.

Table 3. Annual unemployment rate in the countries of the Visegrad Group and the countries of Western Europe (1991-2016), in per cent

Country	Annual unemployment rate (%), 1991	Annual unemployment rate (%), 2000	Annual unemployment rate (%), 2010	Annual unemployment rate (%), 2016
Countries of the Visegrad Group				
Hungary	10,1350002	6,5630002	11,1719999	5,16800022
Poland	11,9659996	16,3129997	9,63700008	6,18300009
Slovakia	12,3290005	19,0620003	14,3789997	9,99100018
Czech Republic	2,26999998	8,76200008	7,27899981	4,04500008
Average	9,17500007	12,67500007	10,61674987	6,346750143
Countries of Western Europe				
Austria	3,4000001	4,6869998	4,82000017	6,10900021
Belgium	6,98600006	6,58599997	8,29199982	8,25599957
Greece	7,65600014	11,2480001	12,7130003	23,9090004
Denmark	9,09899998	4,47599983	7,46400023	6,05100012
Ireland	15,7749996	4,31799984	13,8540001	8,08899975
Iceland	2,5480001	1,93599999	7,56400013	3,75999999
Spain	15,9280005	13,7849998	19,8600006	19,4470005
Italy	10,1029997	10,8420000	8,36200047	11,5410004
Luxembourg	1,48199999	2,34500003	4,36100006	5,94199991
Malta	7,64300013	6,32299995	6,84700012	5,31699991
Netherlands	7,28399992	2,7249999	4,44999981	6,16599989

Norway	5,40700006	3,45799994	3,52099991	4,80600023
Portugal	3,91899991	3,81999993	10,7700005	11,1599998
United Kingdom	8,55200005	5,5619998	7,78700018	4,84899998
Finland	6,50299978	11,1350002	8,39400005	8,99699974
France	9,13399982	10,7430000	9,3039999	9,96500015
Germany	5,31699991	7,91699982	6,96600008	4,31099987
Switzerland	1,77699995	2,66599989	4,54400015	4,58300018
Sweedeen	3,24300003	5,46600008	8,60999966	7,09299994
Average	6,934526302	6,317789414	8,341210644	8,439526344

Źródło: *Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)*, World Bank, źródło: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS> [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

In turn, it was also noted that in the Visegrad countries, except for Slovakia, in 1990–2016 (see Table 4) there was a peculiar socio-demographic structure of the population, manifested in the reduction of fertility levels and therefore played an important role from the perspective of emigration potential. Thus, it is mentioned that the reduction of the birth rate to a level lower than that of Western Europe, led to an additional outflow of population from the Visegrad countries. As a consequence, the anticipation that emigration processes from countries in the region over the next decades will or may lead to a labour shortage²³.

Table 4. Birth rates in the Visegrad countries and Western Europe (1990-2015), number of children

Country	Birth rate (‰), 1990	Birth rate (‰), 2000	Birth rate (‰), 2010	Birth rate (‰), 2015
Countries of the Visegrad Group				
Hungary	1,87	1,32	1,25	1,44
Poland	2,06	1,37	1,41	1,32
Slovakia	2,09	1,30	1,43	1,37
Czech Republic	1,90	1,15	1,51	1,53
Average	1,98	1,29	1,40	1,42
Countries of Western Europe				
Austria	1,46	1,36	1,44	1,47
Belgium	1,62	1,67	1,86	1,74
Greece	1,39	1,25	1,48	1,30
Denmark	1,67	1,77	1,87	1,69
Ireland	2,11	1,89	2,05	1,94
Iceland	2,30	2,08	2,20	1,93
Spain	1,36	1,22	1,37	1,32
Italy	1,33	1,26	1,46	1,37
Luxembourg	1,60	1,76	1,63	1,50
Malta	2,04	1,70	1,36	1,42
Netherlands	1,62	1,72	1,79	1,71

²³ Pytlikova M., *Where Did Central and Eastern European Emigrants Go and Why?*, SOLE/EALE world conference, San Francisco 2005, s. 77–114.

Norway	1,93	1,85	1,95	1,75
Portugal	1,56	1,55	1,39	1,23
United Kingdom	1,83	1,64	1,92	1,81
Finland	1,78	1,73	1,87	1,71
France	1,77	1,89	2,03	2,01
Germany	1,45	1,38	1,39	1,50
Switzerland	1,58	1,50	1,52	1,54
Sweedden	2,13	1,54	1,98	1,88
Average	1,71	1,62	1,71	1,62

Źródło: Fertility rate, total (births per woman), World Bank, źródło: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN> [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

Such a situation seems threatening, especially given the fact that immigrants from the Visegrad countries are traditionally highly-skilled and well-trained professionals with a culture and traditions close to those of Western European population. Moreover, apt to emigration are mostly young and educated people, earning a significantly higher income from emigration than from permanent residence in their homeland. This is compounded by the fact that most young people from the Visegrad countries are fluent in foreign languages. This further helps them make emigration decisions. Language fluency is one of the key factors in transferring human capital to another country and therefore helps immigrants (in the destination country) to be successful in the labour market²⁴. Since the key foreign languages spoken by the inhabitants of the Visegrad countries are English and German (especially in the countries that are geographically close to Germany and Austria, primarily in Slovakia and the Czech Republic). This corresponds to the statistics, showing that more than 80 percent of young people in the Central and Eastern European countries consider foreign language skills to be an important skill that contributes to finding a proper job in their own countries. The percentage of such people exceeds 40 percent of youngsters in «old» Europe. Therefore, foreign language proficiency is regarded as an important part of human capital in the Visegrad Group labour markets, due to this fact potential expatriates prefer to choose a destination country with a multilanguage environment. The ability to speak certain foreign languages increases the chances of a potential expatriate's success in the foreign labour market and reduces the cost of emigration. Consequently, learning, practicing, and improving «spoken» language in «home» countries is a key factor for temporary immigrants, complemented by the factor expansion of emigration networks, created by educated professionals, which considerably simplifies the emigration processes from the countries of the region.

Summarizing the socio-economic conditionality of the emigration processes from the Visegrad countries, it is worth mentioning that it largely corresponds to the Roy model or the

²⁴ Chiswick B., Miller P., Immigrant Earnings: Language Skills, Linguistic Concentrations, and the Business Cycle, *Journal of Population Economics* 2002, vol 15, nr 1, s. 31–57; Chiswick B., Miller P., Language Skills and Immigrant Adjustment: What Immigration Policy Can Do!, *TZA Discussion Paper* 2004, vol 1419; Dustmann C., Casanova M., Fertig M., Preston L., Schmidt C., *The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows*, Wyd. Home Office Online Report Research Development and Statistics Directorate 2003.

Borjas welfare magnet hypothesis²⁵, i.e. being generally caused by welfare-oriented and attractive factors. The situation is attended by considerably higher unemployment rates in the Visegrad countries, it posing difficulties in financing the cost of emigration²⁶, and hence partly corresponding to the so-called «wage curve»²⁷. This presupposes that the more educated the population of a country is, the higher the emigration flow, which correlates with the theoretical expectations of human capital growth. This identifies with the migrant networks impact and the foreign language / languages proficiency factor and is exemplified above all by the US and Canada, with fewer immigrants from the Visegrad countries, yet more socialized and integrated into their respective societies. Therefore, this leads to the conclusion that when it comes to emigration, the Visegrad countries are very similar, if not identical, and therefore may constitute a unified pattern against the background of other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In their entirety the abovementioned factors confirm the previous theoretical assumptions and empirically illustrate the causes of emigration from the Visegrad countries should be differentiated as cyclical and structural ones. Among the cyclical ones it is necessary to mention unemployment rates and differences in employment opportunities in countries of origin and destination. The point is that job opportunities play a key role in emigration decisions, for unemployment rises during an economic crisis, which, as a repulsive factor, increases the likelihood of emigration. The distribution of emigrants by employment sector may or may not coincide with the distribution inherent in the indigenous population of the destination country²⁸. In their turn structural reasons are as follows: a) wage differentials (reflecting differences between the relative amount of capital and labour and hence their productivity in home and destination countries; b) the similarity of languages and the number of persons of identical origin in the destination country of (yet to a certain level of «saturation»²⁹); c) administrative obstacles; d) differences in the social security and education systems costs in home and destination countries (affecting the length and type of emigration - short or long terme) cultural environment, political climate and socialization. If most of the reasons live up to immigrants' expectations, they stay in destination countries for as long as possible. Otherwise, which is typical of Hungary and Poland within the entire region, they are more likely to return to their homeland as re-immigrants³⁰. Interestingly, such a trend has been observable prior to and upon the accession of the Visegrad countries to the EU (recently

²⁵ Borjas G., Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants, "American Economic Review" 1987, vol 77, s. 531–553.; Borjas G., Immigration and Welfare Magnets, "Journal of Labor Economics" 1999, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 607–637.

²⁶ Hatton T., Williamson J., What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?, "NBER Working Paper" 2002, vol 9159.; Pedersen P., Pydikova M., Smith N., Selection or Network Effects? Migration Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990–2000, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2004, vol 1104.

²⁷ Blanchflower D., Oswald A., *The Wage Curve*, Wyd. MIT Press 1994.

²⁸ Alcobendas M., Rodriguez-Planas N., Immigrants' Assimilation Process in a Segmented Labor Market, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2009, vol 4394.; Bratsberg B., Raaum O., Røed K., Immigrants, Labor Market Performance and Social Insurance, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2014, vol 8292.; Kahaneč M., Kureková L., Did Post-Enlargement Labor Mobility Help the EU to Adjust During the Great Recession? The Case of Slovakia, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2014, vol 8249.

²⁹ Massey D., Arango J., Hugo G., Kouaouci A., Pellegrino A., Taylor J., Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal, "Population and development review" 1993, vol 19, nr. 3, s. 431–466.

³⁰ *Coping with Emigration in Baltic and East European Countries*, Wyd. OECD 2013.

this is especially noticeable in Hungary and Slovakia).³¹ In addition, re-emigrants returning with more professional expertise still face employment problems³². Finally, this conclusion is further elaborated by researchers, believing that immigrants returning to the Visegrad countries are more likely to emigrate again than the rest of the population³³.

In this light, it is important to assess and compare the emigration processes effects in the Visegrad countries, they being the reverse of their causality and attesting to the fact that emigration has traditionally been economic and personal choice-driven³⁴. The point is that, moving abroad, expatriates seek to improve their own well-being and the well-being of their families³⁵. However, emigration, especially of highly-skilled people, has traditionally been beneficial to the main destination countries (being, as noted above, mostly Western European country), since greater economic integration leads to higher incomes, although there are some negative effects on the growth and income growth rates of the Visegrad countries групи³⁶ (however, it can facilitate the flow of money transfers and investments to countries in the region³⁷). To sum up, this means that emigration has both positive and negative effects on the socio-economic development indicators of the investigated region (see Table 5). This is determined by the fact that emigration affects socio-economic processes in two ways: on the one hand, it changes the size and composition of the population in terms of activity and education, experience, age, productivity and consumer behaviour, in its turn making an impact upon the size and structure of the available labour force, productivity and aggregate consumption, and hence budget revenues; on the other hand, it can change the behaviour of non-immigrant population and businesses, etc.

It is also noteworthy that due to emigration processes in the Visegrad countries the following phenomena occur: a) decrease in the unemployment rate (thus the unemployment rate will be higher and respectively the employment rate lower than that without emigration); b) reduction in the amount of aggregate savings (in particular, due to the emigration of highly productive and therefore highly paid workers); c) intensifying the problem of stability of social security systems (especially in case of emigration of young population); d) reduction of social expenditures (in particular, against the background of lower unemployment and higher

³¹ Kahanec M., Kureková L., Did Post-Enlargement Labor Mobility Help the EU to Adjust During the Great Recession? The Case of Slovakia, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2014, vol 8249.

³² *Coping with Emigration in Baltic and East European Countries*, Wyd. OECD 2013.; Kahanec M., Kureková L., Did Post-Enlargement Labor Mobility Help the EU to Adjust During the Great Recession? The Case of Slovakia, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2014, vol 8249.

³³ Zaiceva A., Zimmermann K., Returning home at times of trouble? Return migration of EU enlargement migrants during the crisis, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2012, vol 7111.

³⁴ Atoyan R., Christiansen L., Dizioli A., Ebeke C., Ilahi N., Ilyina A., Mehrez G., Qu H., Raci F., Rhee A., Zakharova D., *Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe*, Wyd. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2016.

³⁵ Aiyar S., Barkbu B., Batini N., Berger H., Detragiache E., Dizioli A., Ebeke C., Lin H., Kaltani L., Sosa S., Spilimbergo A., Topalova P., *The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges*, Wyd. International Monetary Fund 2016, źródło: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1602.pdf> [odczyt 01.11.2019].

³⁶ Giovanni J., Levchenko A., Ortega F., A Global View of Cross-Border Migration, "Journal of the European Economic Association" 2015, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 68–202.; Ozgen C., Nijkamp P., Poot J., The Effect of Migration on Income Growth and Convergence: Meta-Analytical Evidence, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2009, vol 4522.

³⁷ Leon-Ledesma M., Piracha M., International Migration and the Role of Remittances in Eastern Europe, "International Migration" 2004, vol 42, nr. 4, s. 65–83.; Chami R., Fullenkamp C., Jahjah S., Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?, "IMF Working Paper" 2003, nr. WP/03/189.

employment rates)³⁸; e) increase in economic processes competitiveness; (e) change in trade relations (on the one hand, expatriates contribute to the elimination of linguistic, cultural, institutional and other obstacles to international trade, but on the other hand, producers or suppliers of goods and services may, through their mobility, replace or reduce foreign trade). In contrast, emigration alone can restrict the competitiveness of the economies of the Visegrad countries, in particular as a result of: shortage of the labour force and a low level of interchange between skilled and unskilled workers; b) workers' remittances that might increase reserved wages and reduce labour supply; c) workers' remittances that can lead to a real appreciation of the destination country's currency, which has a negative impact on the trading sector³⁹.

Table 5. Positive and negative socio-economic consequences and effects of emigration processes in the Visegrad countries

Consequences and effects indicators	Positive effects and consequences	Negative effects and consequences
Decrease in the total population and the share of active population	1) Lower unemployment due to labour demand and reduced labour supply through emigration; 2) Reduction of social expenditures	1) Negative demographic consequences (emigration of young people, lack of regional unity); 2) A threat to the sustainability of social security systems; 3) Wage pressures due to tougher labour market conditions; 4) Reduced tax revenues
Selective emigration	1) Average labour productivity improves when the least productive workers seek work abroad; 2) Labour disparity is improved if overtime workers leave the country in light of significant labour supply	1) Average labour productivity deteriorates if the most productive workers seek work abroad; 2) Labour disparity is exacerbated if workers leave the country in conditions of excess labour demand
Money transfers/ Workers' remittances	Money transfers can improve the domestic life standard and can be used to finance investment projects and educational development	Money transfers can impair internal productivity
The human capital movement	Workers Abroad Can Transfer Their Experience and Knowledge ("Brain Revenue")	"Brain drain" (loss of resources invested in education and training, reducing competitiveness)
Other factors	Strengthening trade relations	1) Movement of people can replace the movement of goods; 2) Emigration can lead to a decrease in foreign trade

Źródło: Le T., Trade, Remittances, Institutions, and Economic Growth, *"International Economic Journal"* 2009, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 391–408.; Ziesemer T., Worker remittances, migration, accumulation and growth in poor developing countries: Survey and analysis of direct and indirect effects, *"Economic Modelling"* 2012, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 103–118.; Budnik K., Do those who stay work less? On the impact of emigration on the measured TFP in Poland, *"NBP Working Paper"* 2012, vol 113.; Dustmann C., Frattini T., Rosso A., The Effect of Emigration from Poland on Polish Wages, *"CREAM Discussion Paper"* 2012, vol 29/12.

³⁸ Burns A., Mohapatra S., International Migration and Technological Progress, *"Migration and Development Brief"* 2008, vol 4.; Amuedo-Dorantes C., Pozo S., Worker's Remittances and the Real Exchange Rate: A Paradox of Gifts, *"World Development"* 2004, vol 32, nr. 8, s. 1407–1417.; Demirgüç-Kunt A., Córdova E. L., Martínez Peria M. S., Woodruff C., Remittances and Banking Sector Breadth and Depth: Evidence from Mexico, *"Journal of Development Economics"* 2011, vol 95, nr. 2, s. 229–241.; Aggarwal R., Demirgüç-Kunt A., Martínez Peria M., Do Remittances Promote Financial Development?, *"Journal of Development Economics"* 2011, vol 11, s. 255–264.

³⁹ Barajas A., Chami R., Hakura D., Montiel P., Workers' Remittances and the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate: Theory and Evidence, *"Economía"* 2001, vol 11, nr. 2, s. 45–94.; Acosta P., Lartey E., Mandelman F., Remittances and the Dutch Disease, *"Journal of International Economics"* 2009, vol 79, nr. 1, s. 102–116.

At the same time, Visegrad countries emigration processes normally: a) promote further emigration (especially if they reduce production growth); b) help increase wages, despite worsening labour productivity; c) slow down economic growth, albeit slowing down income convergence⁴⁰; d) making indirect and a short term effect on the fiscal processes and positions in the region, albeit adjusting the structure of national budgets and social security systems⁴¹. Each of the stated factors determines that emigration from the Visegrad countries primarily influences and in the near future will affect the per capita GDP growth of the recipient countries rather than the emigrants' countries of origin.⁴² In this regard, policies of both the countries of the region and the EU need adjustments, capable of cumulatively changing the structure of economic and emigration processes, both at the level of individual countries and at the level of the European Union.

Therefore, given the lack of a coordinated and coherent migration policy in the Visegrad countries and in the EU as a whole, there is a risk that emigration and slow income convergence may prove to be complementary⁴³. Therefore, migration policies in the Visegrad countries should primarily focus on: a) strengthening institutions and socio-economic policies to create a stimulating environment that encourages people to stay (rather than migrate), facilitate the return of migrants and attract highly-skilled professionals from other countries; b) making better use of excessive labour force by increasing its participation and productivity; c) making better use of workers' remittances to encourage investment rather than consumption; d) mitigating the adverse financial effects of emigration. On the other hand, the EU migration policy must identify with the adjustment of the Structural Funds allocation method to take into account the negative effects of emigration on economic growth and convergence, as well as the sustainable development needs. In turn, tools to improve the emigration situation in the Visegrad Group countries could be as follows: 1) creating a more attractive environment (in particular by improving institutions, maintaining socio-economic stability, increasing employment rates, modernizing the education and science system); 2) establishing closer ties with the Diaspora, facilitating the return of immigrants and attracting highly-skilled immigrants; 3) more efficient use of emigrants' remittances (in particular by creating a more competitive and less taxable business environment); 4) better use of excess labour (in particular by improving labour quality and mitigating adverse fiscal impact); 5) generation and continuous improvement of a pan-European migration initiative that would benefit both the individual countries and the EU as a whole⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ Amuedo-Dorantes C., Pozo S., Worker's Remittances and the Real Exchange Rate: A Paradox of Gifts, *World Development* 2004, vol 32, nr. 8, s. 1407–1417.

⁴¹ Arnold J., Do Tax Structures Affect Aggregate Economic Growth? Empirical Evidence from a Panel of OCED Countries, *OECD Economics Department Working Paper* 2008, vol 643.

⁴² Ortega F., Peri G., Openness and Income: The Roles of Trade and Migration, *Journal of International Economics* 2014, vol 92, nr. 2, s. 231–251.

⁴³ Atoyán R., Christiansen L., Dizioli A., Ebeke C., Ilahi N., Ilyina A., Mehrez G., Qu H., Raci F., Rhee A., Zakharova D., *Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe*, Wyd. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2016.

⁴⁴ Banerji A., Saksonovs S., Lin H., Blavy R., *Youth Unemployment in Advanced Economies in Europe: Searching for Solutions*, Wyd. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2014.

In general, the present study argues that emigration from the Visegrad countries, since 1990 (upon the collapse of «real socialism» regimes), has been unique in several respects. Firstly, it has been determined and by the fact that the emigrants from the Visegrad countries are mostly composed of young and highly-skilled people (their average age is lower and their education level is higher than that of the population, staying in their home country⁴⁵). Thus, the so-called «brain drain» coincided with the aging of the population in the Visegrad countries, which had a far-reaching impact on their efficiency and productivity. Secondly, emigration from the countries of the region seems more permanent than emigration from the other world countries⁴⁶. On the one hand, this was mainly caused by economic emigration that is peculiar for the Visegrad region, whereas on the other hand immigrant movement from the Visegrad countries is traditionally directed to Western Europe and North America. It occurs for various reasons, namely the difference in per capita income levels, the quality of institutions, and employment prospects. Thirdly, emigration from the Visegrad countries is socio-economically advantageous for the countries of Western Europe, not for Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic themselves, thus requiring a comprehensive and holistic response at national and regional political levels.

References

1. Acosta P., Lartey E., Mandelman F., Remittances and the Dutch Disease, *Journal of International Economics* 2009, vol 79, nr. 1, s. 102–116.
2. Aggarwal R., Demirgüç-Kunt A., Martinez Peria M., Do Remittances Promote Financial Development?, *Journal of Development Economics* 2011, vol 11, s. 255–264.
3. Aiyar S., Barkbu B., Batini N., Berger H., Detragiache E., Dizioli A., Ebeke C., Lin H., Kaltani L., Sosa S., Spilimbergo A., Topalova P., *The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges*, Wyd. International Monetary Fund 2016, źródło: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1602.pdf> [odczyt 01.11.2019].
4. Alcobendas M., Rodríguez-Planas N., Immigrants' Assimilation Process in a Segmented Labor Market, *IZA Discussion Paper* 2009, vol 4394.
5. Alvarez-Plata P., Brücker H., Silverstovs B., *Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU-15 – An Update*, Wyd. DIW Berlin 2003.
6. Amuedo-Dorantes C., Pozo S., Worker's Remittances and the Real Exchange Rate: A Paradox of Gifts, *World Development* 2004, vol 32, nr. 8, s. 1407–1417.
7. Ariu A., Squicciarini P., The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration, *TRES Discussion Paper* 2013, vol 010.
8. Arnold J., Do Tax Structures Affect Aggregate Economic Growth? Empirical Evidence from a Panel of OECD Countries, *OECD Economics Department Working Paper* 2008, vol 643.

⁴⁵ Ariu A., Squicciarini P., The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration, *TRES Discussion Paper* 2013, vol 010.

⁴⁶ Atoyan R., Christiansen L., Dizioli A., Ebeke C., Ilahi N., Ilyina A., Mehrez G., Qu H., Raci F., Rhee A., Zakharova D., *Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe*, Wyd. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2016.

9. Atoyan R., Christiansen L., Dizioli A., Ebeke C., Ilahi N., Ilyina A., Mehrez G., Qu H., Raci F., Rhee A., Zakharova D., *Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe*, Wyd. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2016.
10. Banerji A., Saksonovs S., Lin H., Blavy R., *Youth Unemployment in Advanced Economies in Europe: Searching for Solutions*, Wyd. IMF Staff Discussion Note 2014.
11. Barajas A., Chami R., Hakura D., Montiel P., Workers' Remittances and the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate: Theory and Evidence, *"Economia"* 2001, vol 11, nr. 2, s. 45–94.
12. Bauer T., Zimmermann K., An Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, *"IZA Research Report"* 1999, vol 3.
13. Blanchflower D., Oswald A., *The Wage Curve*, Wyd. MIT Press 1994.
14. Bodnar K., Szabo L., The Effect of Emigration on the Hungarian Labour Market, *"MNB Occasional Paper"* 2014, vol 114.
15. Boeri T., Brücker H., Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labour-Markets: Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities, *"IZA Discussion Papers"* 2001, vol 256.
16. Borjas G., Immigration and Welfare Magnets, *"Journal of Labor Economics"* 1999, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 607–637.
17. Borjas G., Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants, *"American Economic Review"* 1987, vol 77, s. 531–553.
18. Bratsberg B., Raaum O., Røed K., Immigrants, Labor Market Performance and Social Insurance, *"IZA Discussion Paper"* 2014, vol 8292.
19. Budnik K., Do those who stay work less? On the impact of emigration on the measured TFP in Poland, *"NBP Working Paper"* 2012, vol 113.
20. Burda M., The consequences of EU enlargement for central and east European labour markets, *"CEPR Discussion Papers"* 1998, vol 1881.
21. Burns A., Mohapatra S., International Migration and Technological Progress, *"Migration and Development Brief"* 2008, vol 4.
22. Chami R., Fullenkamp C., Jahjah S., Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?, *"IMF Working Paper"* 2003, nr. WP/03/189.
23. Chiswick B., Miller P., Immigrant Earnings: Language Skills, Linguistic Concentrations, and the Business Cycle, *"Journal of Population Economics"* 2002, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 31–57.
24. Chiswick B., Miller P., Language Skills and Immigrant Adjustment: What Immigration Policy Can Do!, *"IZA Discussion Paper"* 2004, vol 1419.
25. *Coping with Emigration in Baltic and East European Countries*, Wyd. OECD 2013.
26. Demirgüç-Kunt A., Córdova E. L., Martínez Peria M. S., Woodruff C., Remittances and Banking Sector Breadth and Depth: Evidence from Mexico, *"Journal of Development Economics"* 2011, vol 95, nr. 2, s. 229–241.
27. Giovanni J., Levchenko A., Ortega F., A Global View of Cross-Border Migration, *"Journal of the European Economic Association"* 2015, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 68–202.

28. Docquier F., Özden Ç., Peri G., The Labour Market Effects of Immigration and Emigration in OECD Countries, *"Economic Journal"* 2014, vol 124, nr. 579, s. 1106–1145.
29. Dustmann C., Casanova M., Fertig M., Preston I., Schmidt C., *The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows*, Wyd. Home Office Online Report Research Development and Statistics Directorate 2003.
30. Dustmann C., Frattini T., Rosso A., The Effect of Emigration from Poland on Polish Wages, *"CREAM Discussion Paper"* 2012, vol 29/12.
31. Epstein G., Informational Cascades and Decision to Migrate, *"IZA Discussion Paper"* 2002, vol 445.
32. Fertig M., Schmidt C., Aggregate-Level Migration Studies as a Tool for Forecasting Future Migration Streams, *"IZA Discussion Paper"* 2000, vol 183.
33. Hárs Á., The alien population and its presence in the workforce, *"Europa Forum"* 1995, s. 84–97.
34. Haug S., Klassische und neuere Theorien der Migration, *"Arbeitspapiere Working Paper"* 2000, vol 30.
35. Hatton T., Williamson J., What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?, *"NBER Working Paper"* 2002, vol 9159.
36. Jazwinska E., Okolski M., *Causes and consequences of migration in central and eastern Europe*, Wyd. University of Warsaw 1996.
37. Kahanec M., Kureková L., Did Post-Enlargement Labor Mobility Help the EU to Adjust During the Great Recession? The Case of Slovakia, *"IZA Discussion Paper"* 2014, vol 8249.
38. Le T., Trade, Remittances, Institutions, and Economic Growth, *"International Economic Journal"* 2009, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 391–408.
39. Leon-Ledesma M., Piracha M., International Migration and the Role of Remittances in Eastern Europe, *"International Migration"* 2004, vol 42, nr. 4, s. 65–83.
40. Massey D., Arango J., Hugo G., Kouaouci A., Pellegrino A., Taylor J., Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal, *"Population and development review"* 1993, vol 19, nr. 3, s. 431–466.
41. Ortega F., Peri G., Openness and Income: The Roles of Trade and Migration, *"Journal of International Economics"* 2014, vol 92, nr. 2, s. 231–251.
42. Ozgen C., Nijkamp P., Poot J., The Effect of Migration on Income Growth and Convergence: Meta-Analytical Evidence, *"IZA Discussion Paper"* 2009, vol 4522.
43. Pedersen P., Pytlikova M., Smith N., Selection or Network Effects? Migration Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990–2000, *"IZA Discussion Paper"* 2004, vol 1104.
44. Pytlikova M., *Where Did Central and Eastern European Emigrants Go and Why?*, SOLE/EALE world conference, San Francisco 2005, s. 77–114.
45. Stefancik R., Ekonomické a sociálne príčiny medzinarodnej migrácie v teoretickej reflexii, *"Slovenska politologická revue"* 2010, vol 4, nr. 10, s. 51–72.
46. Wallace C., Stola D., *Patterns of migration in Central Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 2001.
47. Zaiceva A., Implications of EU accession for international migration: and assessment of potential migration pressure, *"CESIFO Working paper"* 2004, vol 1184.

48. Zaiceva A., Zimmermann K., Returning home at times of trouble? Return migration of EU enlargement migrants during the crisis, *IZA Discussion Paper* 2012, vol 7111.
49. Ziesemer T., Worker remittances, migration, accumulation and growth in poor developing countries: Survey and analysis of direct and indirect effects, *Economic Modelling* 2012, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 103–118.

ACTIVITIES OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Abstract

The article analyzes the development of civil society in the Czech Republic on the basis of a large number of empirical materials. The author notes that civil society organizations operate within a broad legal framework in the state. It is proved that the Czechs are actively involved in the activities of civil society organizations that are established in various areas of life. The article examines two main types of non-governmental organizations – advocacy groups and service organizations. Legal regulation of the organizational form of non-governmental organizations allows us to study groups and organizations of civil society. Through the civil society organizations the citizens of the Czech Republic show their views and political positions, provide various services to other members of society. Civil society organizations are structured and separated from the state, usually they are not profitable and they have their own autonomy. The author argues that civil society in the Czech Republic is based not only on the activities of formally registered organizations, but also creates a number of informal groups and initiatives that do not always require legal registration. However, they function successfully and bring great benefits to society.

Keywords: Czech Republic, civil society, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, advocacy and service organizations.

Тетяна Федорчак¹

ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ ГРОМАДЯНСЬКОГО СУСПІЛЬСТВА В ЧЕСЬКІЙ РЕСПУБЛІЦІ

Анотація. У статті на основі значної кількості емпіричних матеріалів проаналізовано розвиток громадянського суспільства у Чеській Республіці. Автор наголошує, що в державі організації громадянського суспільства функціонують на основі широкої законодавчої бази. Доведено, що чехи активно включаються у діяльність громадських організацій, які створено

¹ Доктор політичних наук, професор кафедри суспільних наук Івано-Франківського національного технічного університету нафти і газу. E-mail: tetiana.fedorchak@gmail.com; <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8404-5526>

у різних сферах суспільства. У статті досліджено два основних типи недержавних організацій – адвокатські та сервісні. Правове регулювання організаційної форми неурядових організацій, дає змогу дослідити групи і організації громадянського суспільства. Через громадські організації громадяни Чехії виявляють свої погляди і політичні позиції, надають різні послуги іншим членам суспільства. Громадські організації структуровані, відділені від держави, зазвичай вони не прибуткові, мають своє самоуправління. Правове регулювання організаційної форми неурядових організацій, підводить до аналізу груп і організацій громадянського суспільства. Автор доводить, що в Чеській Республіці громадянське суспільство ґрунтується не лише на діяльності формально зареєстрованих організацій, а й створює низку неофіційних груп і ініціатив, які не завжди вимагають юридичної реєстрації. Втім, вони успішно функціонують і приносять велику користь суспільству.

Ключові слова: Чеська Республіка, громадянське суспільство, громадські організації, неурядові організації, адвокатські та сервісні організації.

Statement of the scientific problem and its significance

The origins of the concept of “civil society” originate from ancient Greek policies. Modern interest in civil society appeared in the late 1980s – early 1990s. It was then that the concept of “civil society” began to be widely used in political speeches and statements by some influential politicians and organizations – those in particular who sought to support the stability of democratic regimes in various countries of the world. In modern political science, there are three different approaches to civil society, linked to three historical traditions: neoliberal, conservative and social-liberal.

Supporters of neoliberalism believe that the core of civil society is the market; that it is created by individuals who are interested in their personal goals, and therefore civil society counters the state. According to the conservative approach, civil society is formed by traditional public institutions, and their center of attraction is in the family and the Church. Following the third, now dominant approach, both in terms of discussions about civil society and in support policies, the structure of civil society is formed by various organizations that should not be identified with the family, market, or state. It is simply an environment in which various groups of interests, independent organizations and associations interact, through which citizens express their aspirations, and which help them meet their own needs.

Analysis of research on the problem

In both old and new democracies, the debates about the role of civil society on the one hand, and the state on the other – are ongoing. Opposite positions on this issue are presented in two published books by foreign scientists: “To Empower People: From State to Civil Society”

by American authors P. L. Berger and R. J. Neuhaus (1996) and “The State and the Rule of Law” by the French scientist B. Kriegel (1995). Berger and Neuhaus celebrate the revival of civil society at the end of the XX century and the diminishing role of the state. B. Kriegel, on the contrary, warns the supporters of civil society about the dangers of too active public participation and points to the role of the constitutional democratic state as an irreplaceable guarantor of human rights and dignity.

Presentation of the main material

The growth of interest in civil society in the 1980s developed in two different regions at once – in Latin America, where civil society experienced oppression from authoritarian authorities; and in CEE, where the idea of civil society was strongly developed by opponents of Communist regimes. When in Latin America civil society was considered an alternative to political parties that discredited themselves and to populist mass movements typical for this region, in CEE this concept expressed the idea of developing parallel political structures that should provide a space for political activity for some part of citizens. Until the 1970s, there were no official independent associations of citizens, and the existing ones had been formed only with the sanction of the state, which used them to control the people.

However, soon in the 1970s, independent public initiatives appeared which criticized the regime and acted in parallel with official structures. Hence their name – “parallel polis” or “islands of positive deviation”. Some dissidents and the future President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel, declared the immorality of the Communist system, and saw civil society as “life in truth” and the source of “power of powerless”. So, civil society is an alternative to the official policy of the Communist state. Supporters of democracy around the world have come to understand that civil society organizations that emerged in the 1980s in socialist countries (“Charter 77” in the CSSR and “Solidarity” in Poland) were the harbingers of the inevitable fall of Communist regimes².

The experience of the opposition in the CEE, as it was called in the 1980s, aggravated civil society in the 1990s. The collapse of socialism and democratization that emerged in the CEE region proved that “civil society works” and the new task for the countries was to build a civil society that would help stabilize transformational regimes. This was in line with the results of research by scientists of 1990s that explained the positive relationship between the functioning structure of civil society and democracy.

Some democratic theorists have argued that the network of associations and organizations that form the basis of civil society is as important to democracy as investing capital in the economy. R. D. Putnam, R. Leonardi and R. Y. Nanetti stated that civil

² Гражданское общество в период третьей волны демократии: его значение для гражданского образования[w] Гражданское образование: содержание и активные методы обучения / Под ред. С.Шехтера, Н.Воскресенской. М.: Межрегиональная ассоциация «За гражданское образование», 1997. С. 57.

society is characterized by an active and public-oriented position of citizens, egalitarian political relations based on trust, cooperation and social communications.

R. D. Putnam calls all this “social capital”. Citizens who acquire social capital through participation in civil society organizations can then use it to strengthen democratic principles in government. On the basis of this argument the scientists believed that without trust between people, which arises exactly as a result of active participation in civil society, it is impossible to imagine a stable democratic regime³.

The rapid growth of non-governmental organizations in post-Communist countries has shown that these countries have a huge potential for a dynamic civil society. In Poland, for example, there are more than 15,000 active associations, foundations and groups that advocate for the interests of certain groups of the citizens. The same situation can be observed in Russia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Even in Romania, where the process of democratization is somewhat slower, there are hundreds of independent non-governmental organizations that have the appreciation of the state. S. Schachter believes that a state with a viable civil society has a real chance of becoming and remaining a democracy⁴.

Active participation of Czech civil society organizations in the development of the democratic political process, in the creation of state policy in the 1990s became one of the tools in the fight against corruption and promoting the interests of certain circles. Openness, access to information and communication had become a prerequisite for controlling state and public institutions. Involving civil society organizations in public administration and self-government in the first decades of the XXI century has developed into a tool for increasing the responsibility of their representatives in relation to the public in favor of which these representatives should act. Therefore, civil society has been an important part of the program for stabilizing democracy in the Czech Republic ever since the 1990s. All the important organizations focused on supporting democracy have adopted the civil society development program as their own. The ideas of civil society in the programs of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) organizations, private funds of the United States, European funds and programs of the European Union have become a real component of the political events of Czech Republic and are being practically implemented in life⁵.

Over the past three decades the civil society in the political life of the Czech Republic is understood as a sphere of association of citizens that exists between the state

³ Патнам Р. Д., Леоначи Р., Нанетти Р. И. (2001). Творения демократии: Традиции гражданского активизма в современной Италии / Пер. з англ. В. Ющенко. Київ: Основи. С. 17.

⁴ Гражданское общество в период третьей волны демократии: его значение для гражданского образования [w] Гражданское образование: содержание и активные методы обучения / Под ред. С. Шехтера, Н. Воскресенской. М.: Межрегиональная ассоциация «За гражданское образование», 1997. С. 59.

⁵ Cisaf O. (2004). *Transnacionální politické síte. Jak mezidrodni instituce ovlivňuji činnost nevládních organizací*. Brno: UPS.S.12.

and the family, and is relatively independent from them. Civil society allows voluntary organizations of citizens to manifest themselves in various forms. Such organizations are structured, separated from the state, not profitable, and have their own self-government. Within the Czech civil society, there are various non-governmental organizations through which citizens can express their views and political positions and provide a number of services. There are two main types of non-governmental organizations in the Czech Republic – advocacy groups and service organizations. Associations of the first type protect the rights of certain groups of the population, influence politics and public opinion; while the latter provide social and educational services, work in the field of sports, leisure, and health care⁶. Some advocacy organizations (trade unions) protect the socio-economic interests of certain groups of the population, while others protect the so-called public interest, although it is difficult to clearly indicate the group of people who such activities are beneficial for. In particular, non-governmental organizations that fight for a clean environment, for human rights or against corruption are not interested in the material factor and at the same time they defend the general principles and values of the entire Czech society.

There is special group of civil society organizations in the Czech Republic that create expert knowledge – the so-called “think tanks” – institutions that research various policy areas, analyze them and form practical recommendations. There are academic, contractor, advocacy and party “think tanks”. Academic and contractor think tanks are similar: highly qualified people are working there, conduct accurate scientific and social research, and seek to act as objective non-party organizations. They differ in funding methods, in terms of who decides what these organizations will do, and in the final product of their activities. The goals and activities of academic “think tanks” are usually produced in an organization, although there is a noticeable impact of the funding sources. On the other hand, the contract “think tanks” are largely financed from public funds that they receive for performing various orders. Therefore, the state bodies decide on the content of their activities. “Think tanks” are assigned specific projects that they carry out for the customer in forms of research reports⁷.

Other types – advocacy groups and party “think tanks” – also have some features in common. The advocacy type, although formally independent, is still associated with a certain ideology, ideological groups, or interest. Instead of non-party research, these organizations rely on the desire to win in the “ideological struggle” and convince the target group (politicians, officials, general public) of their rightness. Therefore, in their analyses, they often rely on information sources provided to them by groups whose

⁶ Dvofakova V. (2002). *Civil Society in the Czech Republic*[w]Uncivil Society. Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe / Eds. P. Kopecky a C. Mudde. London, New York: Routledge. S. 136.

⁷ Dvofakova V. (2002). *Civil Society in the Czech Republic*[w]Uncivil Society. Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe / Eds. P. Kopecky a C. Mudde. London, New York: Routledge.S. 137.

interests they protect (firms, trade unions, etc.). In such organizations there are more people from government agencies, interest groups, and political parties than scientists. Commitment to party membership is an inherent characteristic of these “think tanks” that are connected to specific political parties and protect their ideological and program goals. Their activities and platform are dictated by the “parent” political party⁸.

Civil society in the Czech Republic consists of two main components – politically oriented advocacy groups and service organizations. Specific organizations often perform both functions. For example, those civil society organizations that protect women rights simultaneously provide services (professional development courses for unemployed women) and participate in the legislative process when they seek to implement measures to help women. A separate group of civil society organizations consists of “think tanks”, focused on creating expert opinions and materials for all other civil society organizations, government agencies and politicians. However, no matter what organizations we are talking about – service, advocacy or “think tank”, each civil society organization is influenced by the broad community, where it operates, decides on its status, seeks to get a stable source of funding and present itself in a way that is familiar to the general perception⁹.

A favorable climate of legislative regulation in a democratic environment has been created for current civil society in the Czech Republic. First, basic civil rights are guaranteed, and above all, the right to freely unite in civil society organizations. Secondly, civil society organizations and their activities are separated from the state, that is, there are conditions in the country for creating associations in the citizens’ interests, and not in the interests of the state. The existence of civil society organizations does not depend on the state. Every non-governmental organization, the actions of which do not contradict the laws, has the right to operate. The regulation procedure that determines the creation of a civil society organization is transparent, simple and fast. After all, a slow, blurred and complex procedure creates obstacles for individuals who want to express themselves in civil society.

The legal forms of non-governmental organizations in the Czech Republic are also clear and transparent. There are special legal regulations functioning in the activities of the church and trade unions as specific forms of civil society. In this regard important regulations have been created regarding the rules for the foundation activities and the conditions for fund raising to support civil society. The conditions for non-governmental organizations to receive funds from their own activities are clearly defined¹⁰.

It is clear that civil society can only act effectively if state institutions want to interact with it. Formal conditions for the existence of civil society organizations are not

⁸ Cisaf O. (2004). *Transnacionální politické síle. Jak mezivládní instituce ovlivňují činnost nevládních organizací*. Brno: UPS. S. 19.

⁹ Vrablková K. (2007). *Jak zkoumat sociální hnutí? Aktivismus ženských skupin v ČR*. Politologický časopis. № 14 (3). S. 239.

¹⁰ Vrablková K. (2007). *Jak zkoumat sociální hnutí? Aktivismus ženských skupin v ČR*. Politologický časopis. № 14 (3). S. 227.

enough, so within the Czech political system they have access to various consulting and advisory bodies, public hearings, etc. At the same time, communication between state institutions and civil society organizations is clearly regulated, which ensures its transparency and protects it from corruption, inherent to the non-transparent actions of lobbyists. Thus, thanks to the clear rules, civil society organizations in the Czech Republic have become effective actors in the fight against corruption and contribute to the transparency of public administration and self-government decisions¹¹.

An important indicator of civil society activity in the Czech Republic is the external political environment (legal context, institutional framework), organizational factors, and funding. Before the 1989 “velvet revolution”, citizens of the CSSR could only unite within the framework of mass organizations founded by the state. Participation in at least one official public organization was considered almost mandatory. There were no independent organizations until 1989 that would unite citizens on a voluntary basis and act as representatives of their needs, since these organizations were associated with the state or the Communist party of CSSR and operated under its leadership. Despite the regime’s control over the entire public space, unofficial initiatives that were not controlled by the state gradually appeared in the CSSR, which criticized the regime and advocated the creation of an independent environment for free communication of those who knew about this activity. Dissidents, as they were called at that time, sought to defend civil liberties and human rights. The regime considered these initiatives illegal and hunted them down. Until the end of the 80’s, the activity of such groups increased and significantly helped or was one of the levers that caused the collapse of socialism. The vast majority of these groups united with other critics of the regime in the fall of 1989 in so-called Civic Forum, which had different ideological vectors and proposed different goals. In November 1989, the Civic Forum was an effective anti-regime phenomenon that led to protests by almost three-quarters of the country’s adult population.

The “velvet revolution” of 1989 had been a dramatic turn in the development of Czech civil society, in which active protest groups swept away the current regime. After the fall of socialism, conditions were created for independent public initiative, primarily in the form of respect for civil and political rights. The status of civil society organizations was reflected in the declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (December 1992), which guaranteed “right to freely associate together with others in clubs, societies, and other associations”. The new civil society has moved to the broad democratic platform of the Civic Forum¹². Its activists formed political parties and thus

¹¹ Cisaf O. (2008). *Politický aktivismus v České republice: Občanská společnost a sociální hmůti v období transferu mace a evropeizace*. Brno: CDK. S. 71.

¹² Бурдяк В.І., Бутирська І.В., Герман М.Г., Федорчак Т.П. (2015). *Громадянське суспільство і соціальний капітал у нових країнах-членах Європейського Союзу*. Монографія. Чернівці: Технодрук. С. 271.

became new political actors or remained in the non-governmental sector and developed civil society organizations.

The next type of social groups that to some extent continued the activities that had begun before November 1989 were organizations that were gradually transforming from the National Front (trade unions, sports clubs, unions of hunters, volunteer firefighters, and the like, which were previously under the state). After the abolition of state supervision of churches, they separated and began social work in charitable institutions. Many new organizations in different fields and with different goals have appeared.

The Czech political elite played an important role in the development of civil society, which, in addition to the legal and institutional aspects, actively created new legal and institutional frameworks necessary for the functioning of civil society. The post-Communist Czech Republic considered two main interpretations of civil society, presented by prominent Czech politicians Vaclav Havel (speaker of the Civic Forum and President of the Czech Republic in 1989-2003) and Vaclav Klaus (Prime Minister in 1992-1997, later President). V. Klaus, the architect of the Czech economic transformation strategy, actualized his “economic” approach to the transformation, which had no place for civil society. He probably understood civil society in a completely different way than most of those who sought to create it. V. Klaus inclined to the neoliberal interpretation of civil society, that is, he saw it as a set of individuals pursuing their interests in the market. And these interests, according to Klaus, should have become the driving force of post-Communist social change in the Czech Republic. Klaus believed that liberalizing the economy would create an environment for independent individual initiative that would accelerate the country’s movement toward a functioning market system. In other words, in his views, he connects civil society exclusively with private initiative and the functioning of the market¹³.

President V. Havel had a different idea of civil society. He believed that civil society is not formed from a set of individuals, but from their association; that civil society should not be identified with the market, because it is a special public sphere, different from both the market and the state. In the sphere of civil society, citizens, as holders of civil and political rights, unite and take part in the country’s public life. In other words, V. Havel symbolized the prevailing social-liberal interpretation of civil society. In Klaus’s opinion, a citizen’s role was limited to participation in regular elections, and Havel wanted the citizen to be more politically active. He believed that citizens not only participate in elections and choose political parties with their electoral programs, but also found non-governmental civil society organizations themselves and influence the public sphere through them. Non-governmental organizations act as a tool through

¹³ Fagin A. (2000). *Environmental Protest in the Czech Republic: Three Stages of Post-Communist Development*. Czech Sociological Review. No 8 (2). S.144.

which citizens take part in politics and control the decision-making process of the elected political representatives. V. Havel considered the activities of the non-governmental organizations as an important tool for a functioning liberal democracy, rather a viable “alternative semblance of democracy” that should be based not on the competition of political parties, but on the mobilization of the population in the sphere of civil society¹⁴.

Public discussion on civil society in the Czech Republic in the 1990s was also defined by these two approaches. The positions of V. Havel and V. Klaus were supported by opposite social camps, with their own views on the nature and functions of civil society. Usually, both approaches have merged and shaped political institutions in different ways during the period of changes in the Czech Republic.

The attitude of various governments to the non-profit sector has often changed. After the first free elections in 1990, there was a government that consisted of some politicians had a positive view of civil society, because they had come out of the Civil Forum organizations themselves. The results of research by Johns Hopkins University scientists show that the government supported the activities of the non-governmental organizations and their role in the democratization process and considered it necessary. Experts from the non-profitable sector consulted civil society activists when preparing new policy development concepts, so they had influenced their content. P. Fric defines this period as a “warming” period of relations between government and the civil society¹⁵.

After the 1992 elections, when the government was headed by V. Klaus, there was a “cooling off” period, with a restrained attitude to civil society. The amount of budget expenditures to support civil society activities grew up until 1997. The study concluded that the real reason was that the government pushed civil society to the periphery of its interests and refused to recognize that civil society could perform certain political functions. The government, therefore, supported non-political service organizations that were not profitable, and rejected advocacy groups which had certain political views¹⁶.

The first problem arose from a narrow economic attitude to post-Communist transformation, which was typical for the Czech Republic in the 1990s. Klaus Government “underestimated the moral scale of the transformation and the role of non-profit organizations as producers of a certain moral climate, trust and civic culture”, the existence of which is mandatory for the operation of market mechanisms¹⁷. When the state relegated civil society to the background, it destroyed its transformation efforts and lost

¹⁴ Fagin A. (2000). *Environmental Protest in the Czech Republic: Three Stages of Post-Communist Development*. Czech Sociological Review. № 8 (2). S.145-146.

¹⁵ Fric P., Rochdi G., eds. (2001). *Neziskovy sektor v Ceske republice. Vysledky mezizdrodniho srovnacivho projektu Johns Hopkins University*. Praha: Eurolex Bohemia. S. 23.

¹⁶ Fric P., Rochdi G., eds. (2001). *Neziskovy sektor v Ceske republice. Vysledky mezizdrodniho srovnacivho projektu Johns Hopkins University*. Praha: Eurolex Bohemia. S. 27.

¹⁷ Ibid. S. 31.

the ability to receive information that public organizations carried. The government was not consulted on policy decisions before they were made. Non-governmental organizations in the Czech Republic entered the center of the events “only sporadically, when unexpected crises arose that the state administration could not cope with.”¹⁸ The government’s unwillingness to recognize the non-governmental organizations as a relevant political voice is related to this problem. The government, following a centrist approach, did not want to listen to the opinions of citizens, because this attitude was symbolized by the Prime Minister of that time V. Klaus. He believed that any politically oriented associations of citizens are a threat to parliamentary democracy¹⁹.

However, this is how the government treated only certain politically oriented advocacy organizations, revealing a differentiated approach to them. Since the early 90’s, Czech Executive bodies have clearly tended to communicate with the leading advocacy organizations formed before 1989, primarily with the trade unions. Thanks to the extensive consultations of the government within a tripartite system (a 3-party body consisting of state representatives, employers and workers), the Czech Republic managed to avoid the negative consequences of the transformation that took place in other post-Communist countries. Consultations with the trade unions ensured high-quality political decisions from the first government of V. Klaus (1992-1996). Problems arose when this order was violated in the second half of the 1990s²⁰.

It should be noted that the provision on the political system isolation in relation to non-governmental organizations during V. Klaus premiership (1992-1997), concerned only the following advocacy organizations: environmental, human rights, women rights groups, etc. And these non-governmental organizations were most eager to participate in politics within the new democratic system, trying to counter the clan interests of political parties and political class (professional politicians).

With the emergence of social democracy governments since 1998 and the beginning of the Czech Republic’s accession process to the European Union, its attitude to the civil society has changed. Governments of social democracy were more open in their cooperation with non-governmental organizations, thanks to the influence of the European Union, which identified a number of requirements that coincided in certain areas with the requests of organizations, and were a part of the consultations that were held before the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU. A specific EU influence was expressed in different ways: in the harmonization of the Czech legal field with EU norms; in the same EU requirements with those proposed by non-governmental organizations, in particular in the law to ban discrimination based on sexual orientation, which was introduced only after the pressure from the EU – even though some public organizations

¹⁸ Ibid. S. 34.

¹⁹ Mansfeldova Z., Kroupa A., eds. (2005). *Participace a zdjmovne organizace v Ceske republice*. Praha: SLONS. 75.

²⁰ *USAID 2006. The 2006 NGO Sustainability Index*. Washington: USAID, 2007. P. 39.

fought for it for a long time; in the EU pressure on the government, which was first forced to address the gender issue and recognize it as worthy of political debate; in the EU demand for some form of partnership between government and civil society in which the state must prove its open cooperation with non-governmental organizations; in the demand to create a number of advisory bodies with representatives of public organizations along with politicians and employees. The main body that now coordinates state policy on non-governmental organizations is the Government Council for Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organizations. This body was created in 1992, but it had been operating since 1998, consisting of representatives of a number of ministries and non-governmental organizations.

Since 1991, the Law “On Freedom of Religion and the Status of the Church and Religious Organizations” came in effect, although only 35% of the Czech population is members of different churches, and 60% of the population, according to statistics, consider themselves atheists²¹. The state supports registered churches. In the Czech Republic, there are also churches that are not recognized by the state. If they comply with the law, the state does not interfere with their activities, but does not support them. Churches create their own educational institutions and organizations that provide social services and operate as non-profitable entities.

In 1992 the Law “On Funds and Charitable Organizations” was adopted. But it did not sufficiently regulate their activities, so in 1997 it was amended. As a result of the change in the law, the number of funds in the Czech Republic has abruptly decreased – most of them were unable to meet the conditions of the new Law. Funds are special property associations that operate for a socially useful purpose: the development of spiritual values, the protection of human rights or other humane causes, the protection of the environment, cultural monuments, and traditions, development of science, education, and sports. A fund provides financial support from the profit from the authorized capital (the minimum amount is 500,000 CZK, or almost \$ 30,000) and other property of the fund. The fund’s authorized capital cannot be used to perform its tasks, but only the income from its property. A charitable organization differs from a fund in that it is not required to divide its property into authorized capital and other property. Therefore, the minimum deposit amount is not set. However, you need to make a contribution. To achieve this goal, the charitable organization uses all its property and profits from it. In 1996 the Law “On Socially Useful Organizations” has come in effect – it provides services to society, on an equal basis to everybody.

Conclusion

Thus, civil society organizations are successfully developing in the Czech Republic on the basis of the established legal framework. Czechs actively participate in public organizations

²¹ *Zakon o svobode nabozenске vıry a postavenı cirkvi a nabozenських, spolecnosti*308/1991 Sb.URL: <http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/surveys/fs/10.html>

operating in various spheres of society. There are two main types of non-governmental organizations – advocacy groups (which protect the rights of certain groups of the citizens and impact policy and public opinion) and service organizations (providing social and educational services operating in the field of sport, leisure, health), Citizens express their views and political positions through public organizations, providing various services to other members of society. Public organizations are structured, separated from the state, not-profitable, and have their own self-government. Legal regulation of the organizational form of non-governmental organizations allows analyzing the activities of civil society groups and organizations. Along with the legal forms above, we should note that civil society is based not only on the activities of formally registered organizations, but also creates a number of informal groups and initiatives that do not always require legal registration.

Sources of Literature:

1. Бурдяк В.І., Бутирська І.В., Герман М.Г., Федорчак Т.П. (2015). Громадянське суспільство і соціальний капітал у нових країнах-членах Європейського Союзу. Монографія. Чернівці: Технодрук. 336 с.
2. Гражданское общество в период третьей волны демократии: его значение для гражданского образования. [в] Гражданское образование: содержание и активные методы обучения / Под ред. С. Шехтера, Н. Воскресенской. М.: Межрегиональная ассоциация «За гражданское образование», 1997. 684 с.
3. Патнам Р.Д., Леонарді Р., Нанетті Р.Й. (2001). Творення демократії: Традиції громадянської активності в сучасній Італії / Пер. з англ. В.Ющенко. Київ: Основи. 302 с.
4. Císaf O. (2008). *Politický aktivismus v České republice: Občanská společnost a sociální hnutí v období transferu moci a evropské integrace*. Brno: CDK. 128s.
5. Císaf O. (2004). *Transnacionální politické síťi. Jak mezinárodní instituce ovlivňují činnost nevládních organizací*. Brno: UPS. 98 s.
6. Dvofáková V. (2002). *Civil Society in the Czech Republic*. [в] *Uncivil Society. Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe* / Eds. P. Kopecký a C. Mudde. London, New York: Routledge. S. 134-156.
7. Fagin A. (2000). *Environmental Protest in the Czech Republic: Three Stages of Post-Communist Development*. *Czech Sociological Review*. № 8 (2). S.139-156.
8. Fric P., Rochdi G., eds. (2001). *Neziskový sektor v České republice. Výsledky mezinárodního srovnávacího projektu Johns Hopkins University*. Praha: Eurolex Bohemia. 72 s.
9. Mansfeldová Z., Kroupa A., eds. (2005). *Participace a zdejmové organizace v České republice*. Praha: SLON. 184 s.
10. *USAID 2006. The 2006 NGO Sustainability Index*. Washington: USAID, 2007. 224 p.
11. Vrablková K. (2007). *Jak zkoumat sociální hnutí? Aktivismus ženských skupin v ČR*. *Politologický časopis*. № 14 (3). S.224-246.

12. *Zakon o svobode nabozenkse viry a postaveni cirkvi a nabozenksykh, spolecnosti*308/1991 Sb. URL: <http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/surveys/fs/10.html>

References

1. Burdiak V.I., Butyrskaya I.V., German M.G., Fedorchak T.P. (2015). *Gromadyanskesuspilstvo i sotsialnyy kapital unovykh krainakh-chlenakh Evropeiskogo Soyuzu*. Monografiya. Chernivtzi: Tekhnodruk. 336 s.
2. *Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo v period treteivolny demokrati: ego znachenie dlya grazhdanskogo obrazovaniya*. [w] *Grazhdanskoe obrazovanie: sodержanie i aktivnyye metody obucheniya* / Podred. S. Shekhtera, N. Voskresenskoj. M.: Mezhtseionalnaya assotsiatsiya «Za grazhdanskoe obrazovanie», 1997. 684 s.
3. Patnam R.D., Leonard R., Nanetti R.J. (2001). *Tvoreniya demokrati: Traditsiya gromadyanskoj aktyvnosti v sучasnoy Italii* / Per. z angl. V. Yustchenko. Kyiv: Osnovy. 302 s.
4. Cisaf O. (2008). *Politicky aktivismus v Ceske republice: Obcanská spolecnost a socialni hnutí v období transferu moci a evropeizace*. Brno: CDK. 128 s.
5. Cisaf O. (2004). *Transnacionalni politické site. Jak mezindrodni instituce ovlivnui cinnost nevládních organizací*. Brno: UPS. 98 s.
6. Dvofakova V. (2002). *Civil Society in the Czech Republic*. [B] *Uncivil Society. Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe* / Eds. P. Kopecky a C. Mudde. London, New York: Routledge. S. 134-156.
7. Fagin A. (2000). *Environmental Protest in the Czech Republic: Three Stages of Post-Communist Development* // *Czech Sociological Review*. № 8 (2). S. 139-156.
8. Fric P., Rochdi G., eds. (2001). *Neziskovy sektor v Ceske republice. Vysledky mezindrodniho srovnávacího projektu Johns Hopkins University*. Praha: Eurolex Bohemia. 72 s.
9. Mansfeldova Z., Kroupa A., eds. (2005). *Participace a zdjmove organizace v Ceske republice*. Praha: SLON. 184 s.
10. *USAID 2006. The 2006 NGO Sustainability Index*. Washington: USAID, 2007. 224 p.
11. Vrablkova K. (2007). *Jak zkoumat socialni hnutí? Aktivismus zenskykh skupin v CR* // *Politologicky casopis*. № 14 (3). S. 224-246.
12. *Zakon o svobode nabozenkse viry a postaveni cirkvi a nabozenksykh, spolecnosti*308/1991 Sb. URL: <http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/surveys/fs/10.html>

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STUDY OF MINISTERIAL STABILITY, RESHUFFLES AND TURNOVER

The article is devoted to analyzing the content, nature and features of the concept of “ministerial stability”. The author considered the ways of influencing and interconnecting between ministerial and cabinet stability and highlighted the ways of analyzing ministerial stability. It was stated that ministerial reshuffles, ministerial turnover and ministerial stability explain and clarify cabinet stability, although they are directly dependent on the factors that determine cabinet stability. The study also noted that ministerial stability can be positioned as an independent factor in the study of cabinet activity, as it can independently answer the questions concerning the peculiarities of formation, functioning and responsibility of cabinets. Thus, the researcher found out that ministerial stability and ministerial reshuffles depend on such factors as the level of uncertainty in the choice of a potential official of a cabinet, the importance of political and technical expert skills of the future official, the degree of inter-ministerial trust in a cabinet, restrictions for appointments and dismissals of cabinet’s ministers. At the same time, ministerial stability is largely determined by the importance of different ministerial positions, which is crucial for both parties and individual politicians.

Keywords: government, cabinet, ministerial stability, cabinet stability, ministerial reshuffles, ministerial volatility, ministerial alternation.

ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНІ ЗАСАДИ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ МІНІСТЕРСЬКОЇ СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ, ПЕРЕСТАНОВОК Й ОБІГУ МІНІСТРІВ

Проаналізовано зміст, сутність і особливості поняття «міністерська стабільність». Розглянуто способи впливу та взаємозв'язку міністерської й урядової стабільності, а на цій підставі виділено способи аналізу міністерської стабільності. Констатовано, що міністерські перестановки, міністерський обіг і міністерська стабільність пояснюють та уточнюють урядову стабільність, хоча й безпосередньо залежать від чинників, які зумовляють урядову стабільність. Також у дослідженні зауважено, що міністерська стабільність може позиціонуватись і як самостійний чинник дослідження урядової

діяльності, адже вона самостійно може відповісти на питання, які стосуються особливостей формування, функціонування та відповідальності урядів. На цьому тлі з'ясовано, що міністерська стабільність і міністерські перестановки залежать від таких чинників, як рівень невпевненості у виборі потенційного посадовця урядового кабінету, важливість політичних і технічних експертних навиків майбутнього посадовця, ступінь міжміністерської довіри в уряді, обмеження призначень і звільнень міністрів урядового кабінету. Водночас міністерська стабільність значною мірою детермінована врахуванням важливості різних міністерських посад, яка визначальна як для партій, так і для окремих політиків тощо.

Ключові слова: уряд, урядовий кабінет, міністерська стабільність, урядова стабільність, перестановки міністрів, міністерська мінливість, міністерське чергування.

Comparative political scientists have long expressed interest in the issue of government stability in regard of change and reshuffle of individual cabinet members. Since unstable government offices tend to form unstable political regimes, while political instability leads to the transfer of power from elected political actors to unelected bureaucrats, it prevents political actors from responding to the challenges of political change. For such a reason the issues of reshuffles and individual ministers stability are of utmost relevance, their operationalization putting extra emphasis on the notion of government stability, which received ample exploration in modern comparative political science. Even given the fact that resignation of an individual minister, as well as the redistribution of government portfolios or new ministerial appointments, which can often require special and additional approval always serves as an indicator of government stability. The point is that a minister's resignation typically occurs by decision and / or consent of the prime minister, or as a result of a loss of parliamentarians' confidence, and is carried out either by the head of state or (really seldom) by the head of government. Despite his broad constitutional powers, the Prime Minister cannot take a dictatorial stance in a democratic country. The internal structures of the largest political parties are created in such a manner that even powerful prime ministers can be easily dismissed as a result of losing support of most party members. Further on, the controversy of the abovementioned processes is aggravated by the fact that the Prime Minister, who traditionally defines the government's course and identifies with a cabinet stability, has only one voice, likewise other cabinet members. As a result, in his or her activities, the Prime Minister should take into account the situation within the government, as a result ministerial reshuffles and ministerial stability serve as additional indicators of the government stability as such.

Respectively, the objective of the proposed study is primarily to understand the theoretical and methodological principles, peculiarities and dimensions of governmental stability through internal government offices processes, including the reshuffle and ministerial turnover. The

stated objective stipulates carrying out the following general and specific research tasks as: defining the very notions of «government stability» and «ministerial stability»; contemplating the factors that determine the dependency of government and ministerial stability; defining theoretical and methodological content of the following notions: e.g. ministerial shift, ministerial reshuffle and turnover, as well as ministerial volatility. The stated issues were explored in scientific treatises of numerous researchers, such as як D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks¹, D. Baron², D. Diermeier and A. Merlo³, L. Dodd⁴, D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran⁵, K. Strom⁶, M. Laver, N. Schofield and K. Shepsle⁷, J. Huber and C. Martinez-Gallardo⁸, and the like. We aim at generalizing and structuring, and a certain update of the existing scientific information, regarding the issues of ministerial reshuffles and turnover as well as ministerial stability.

In order to carry out these research tasks it is worth mentioning that government stability should be understood in the following ways: in a broad sense it is the ability of the government to remain in the line of duty, whereas in a narrow sense it is a steady state of government operation, characterized by its ability to last for a long time, pertaining to it defining internal and external parameters. Such a definition requires that to better understand government activities and stability, it is expedient to employ the term «ministerial stability», once proposed by J. Ziller along with the notion of «governmental stability» and presupposing alternation (turnover) of governments with different leadership and composition⁹. In this light it is apparent that ministerial stability is the «longevity» of individuals, holding respective offices in government cabinets¹⁰. With this in mind it is worth mentioning that the study of government cabinets stability or instability above all focuses on the analysis of boundary indicators (events and institutes). For this reason for «termination» of government cabinets the following criteria

¹ Austen-Smith D., Banks J., Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes, *"American Political Science Review"* 1988, vol 82, s. 405–422.

² Baron D., A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems, *"American Political Science Review"* 1998, vol 92, s. 137–164; Baron D., Government Formation and Endogenous Parties, *"American Political Science Review"* 1993, vol 87, s. 34–47; Baron D., Ferejohn J., Bargaining in Legislatures, *"American Political Science Review"* 1989, Vol 83, s. 1181–1206.

³ Diermeier D., Merlo A., Government turnover in parliamentary democracies, *"Journal of Economic Theory"* 2000, vol 94, s. 46–79; Merlo A., Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment, *"Journal of Political Economy"* 1997, vol 105, s. 101–131.

⁴ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

⁵ Epstein D., O'Halloran S., *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

⁶ Strom K. *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; Strom K. Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Political Science Review"* 1984, vol 79, s. 738–754.

⁷ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government: A Research Agenda*, [w:] *Developing Democracy. Comparative Research in Honor of J. F. Blondel*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994; Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, *"American Political Science Review"* 1990, vol 84, s. 873–889; Laver M., Shepsle K., Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1998, vol 42, s. 28–55; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996; Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

⁸ Huber J., How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Political Science Review"* 1998, vol 92, s. 577–591; Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., Cabinet Instability and Experience in the Cabinet: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective, *"British Journal of Political Science"* 2004, vol 34, s. 27–48; Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

⁹ Ziller Z., *Politiko-administrativni sistemy krayin ES. Porivnyalnyi analiz*, Wyd. Osnovy 1996.

¹⁰ Ziller Z., *Politiko-administrativni sistemy krayin ES. Porivnyalnyi analiz*, Wyd. Osnovy 1996, c. 203.

should be distinguished: formal and voluntary resignations, parliamentary confidence votes, changes in the party composition of government cabinets, interventions of the head of state, and regular or early elections (parliamentary or presidential). Respectively, the government stability, manifested in their duration, is the amount of time between certain boundary indicators (events and institutes), the data and metering results of which are used to test various arguments about variables, either affecting or not affecting the likelihood of boundary events and institutes. The application of the boundary events and institutes approach reflects significant aspects of coalition politics and governance in political systems with government stability, largely dependent on the legislature. In this regard, the key determining indicators of government stability metering are the direct aspects and characteristics of coalitions (the number of parties, majority or minority status in relation to the legislative composition, as well as ideological diversity of parties), institutional rules and regulations (vote on introduction to the office (investiture vote), termination of duties (censure vote), as well as election laws that outline the formation of different types of party systems), expected and real (primarily socio-economic, less political) i) outcomes of the government performance, and additional dynamic factors (e.g., the number of days until the next election). Therefore, the link between theory, empirical evidence and complex methods of assessing ministerial stability demonstrates that the stated issues are among the most topical areas of exploration and clarification of governmental stability.

Based on institutional factors, it is apparent that theoretical assumptions on ministerial stability, ministerial reshuffle, and ministerial turnover must be contemplated in line with normative and institutional arguments, which are less than slightly related to the types of parliamentary democracies (i.e., systems of parliamentary democracies with governments accountable either to parliaments or to both parliaments and heads of state). This originated from the interest of scholars, identifying varieties of democracies (majority or consensus), leading to an increase in government stability, and, consequently, the stability of the government ministerial composition. In addition, outlining different types of systems questions which of the abovementioned types generate not only longer, but more efficient and «fair» (in the context of representation) government cabinets¹¹. The situation is further altered by the fact that government stability depends not only on boundary events and institutes, but on a number of other factors, as well. For instance, it frequently happens that upon the resignation of government cabinets (as executive power institutions), the same parties, even politicians receive an opportunity to preserve the previous ministerial portfolios. Therefore, while looking into government stability, comparative political scientists need to be particularly vigilant when pointing out differences between the government cabinets stability and ministerial stability. The key to defining ministerial stability in this context is the continuity of ministerial staff, suggesting the necessary experience for effective governance and can be viewed as a characteristic feature even in conditions of high thresholds of government instability. Moreover, one should

¹¹ Powell B., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000.

be aware that the boundary events and institutes approach is virtually incapable of accounting for reshuffles in government cabinets that occur between border fields. This is crucial given that actual changes and reshuffles of government portfolios can be utterly significant and topical. For example, J. Huber and S. Martinez-Gallardo argue that, for example, Italy with extremely low government stability, is characterized by a quite high stability of the personal ministerial composition of successive government cabinets. Alternatively, the United Kingdom, demonstrating high levels of government stability, is characterised by a significant level of ministerial reshuffles in each cabinet and in the sequence of government cabinets. It presupposes that a country can rank better in ministerial stability, even demonstrating worse government stability indices. Therefore the implications of assessing a correlation between government and ministerial stability can vary. To sum up, it is obvious that reshuffles and turnover of individual cabinet ministers may considerably differ from the turnover and duration of government cabinets¹².

Consequently, one should be aware that it is appropriate to analyze ministerial stability as an independent variable beyond government cabinets versus the stability of governments as such. Hence, one of the research tasks is to analyze factors, affecting individual shifts and reshuffles of ministers within government cabinets, and especially the way the latter as well as the ministerial turnover differ from governmental stability. In this context, perhaps the most effective research perspective is an assumption, according to which ministerial reshuffle should be interpreted primarily as the result of appointing politicians to key government offices and search for talent among those in the running for ministerial offices. However, even in this context, the interpretation of ministerial stability largely depends on the interpretation of governmental stability. undoubtedly, the termination of government cabinets occurs due to the loss and imbalance of the indicators, determining either government or coalition agreement whatsoever. This fact links the study of the government stability with the study of government cabinets formation along with the appointment of individual ministers to various offices¹³. In this context, L.Dodd put forward an idea to define «disorder or change in the party coalition within the government cabinet as any alternation in the ministerial portfolios allocation among parties» or merely as «considerable changes in allocation of portfolios»¹⁴. This definition is based on the interest in the ministerial posts allocation through the prism of policy and political goals of government parties. However, any change in the allocation of ministerial portfolios equals to a change in «the so-called payments» over political expectations of the parties concerned, since a policy is managed through close / direct association with the ministries of

¹² Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., Cabinet Instability and Experience in the Cabinet: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective, *British Journal of Political Science* 2004, vol 34, s. 27–48.

¹³ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.; Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.; Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.; Riker W., *Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁴ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976, s. 122.

the government cabinet. Yet the question is whether a particular minister exercises a complete control over the policies of his office if, for example, a government cabinet is intended to be a team, or if changes in ministerial composition of a government cabinet do not lead to changes in the political process.

In this regard M.Laver and K.Shepsle¹⁵ elaborated a model of a stable portfolio allocation and attributed to the notion of government cabinets «termination» the status of peculiar exogenous factors and even «strikes» on the posits and political preferences of parties and government cabinets they formed. Likewise A.Lupia and K.Strom¹⁶ argued, that a decision about government cabinets «termination» and formation of new governments is bound to depend on the dynamic processes of ministerial formation in certain countries, since the government composition determines the operational capacity of governments¹⁷. In addition, M. Laver and K. Shepsle emphasize the importance of ministerial voting in government cabinets. Scientists suggest that it is mostly about voting when the government decisions require the consent of most ministers. However, in the case of a coalition government cabinet, voting can facilitate the formation of micro-ministerial groups within the cabinet that are able to significantly influence government stability and effectiveness. Such peculiarities suggest that the decision to form a government always comes as the result of an equilibrium due to the conclusion of an agreement among political actors with various political advantages, and instead the decision to dismiss a cabinet always violates such equilibrium due to the impact of exogenous factors or exogenous shocks. Under the analyzed conditions, the most important is that it is the exogenous factors and shocks, responsible for government resignations, are obviously the central categories of ministerial reshuffles and ministerial turnover investigation. Certainly, the change in portfolios and posts in the government cabinet is inevitably the result of the distribution of preferences and resources of political actors and party leaders.

As a matter of fact, party leaders cannot be absolutely certain of reliability and efficiency of candidates for ministerial posts. This peculiarity is accompanied by a component of trust in particular ministers. Therefore, the research task is to identify political variables that affect the process of ministerial appointments. Thus, as a rule, four relevant factors are pointed out: the level of uncertainty in the selection of a potential government official; the importance of political and technical expertise of a future official; the degree of inter-ministerial trust in government; restriction of appointments and dismissals of cabinet ministers¹⁸. In case of a high level of the party leaders' uncertainty about their party representatives in the cabinet, they are likely to appoint less competent people. However, since a low competence level is an

¹⁵ Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, *"American Political Science Review"* 1990, vol 84, s. 873–889.

¹⁶ Lupia A., Strom K., Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections, *"American Political Science Review"* 1995, vol 89, s. 648–665.

¹⁷ Diermeier D., Merlo A., Government turnover in parliamentary democracies, *"Journal of Economic Theory"* 2000, vol 94, s. 46–79.; Merlo A., Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment, *"Journal of Political Economy"* 1997, vol 105, s. 101–131.

¹⁸ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

indicator of inefficient performance, the appointed officials will be replaced, the fact leading to a ministerial reshuffle. In general, uncertainty who will make successful ministers is reducing on condition of successful parties and effective processes within the parties attend each other, or when the political system enables them to better identify themselves. Apart from that, the variables related to the uncertainty level include the following: firstly, experience of a democratic system. Office insecurity is the highest in the earliest years of democracy. Therefore, when the cabinet forming experience is too low, it will not only lead to a lack of people with the needed management skills and expertise, but to a lack of trustworthy information on successful leadership and effective ministries requirements; secondly, political competition. The fact is that by appointing people who are the least suitable for ministerial posts, political competition diminishes uncertainty levels about uniting government officials. It is therefore obvious that major government parties and parliaments should attempt to reduce the frequency of ministerial reshuffles, mitigating uncertainty about the most qualified candidates¹⁹. Moreover, the presence of experienced officials reduces the frequency of ministerial reshuffles in a government cabinet, especially when such reshuffles have a significant impact on the political process²⁰.

The impact of talent and professionalism upon ministerial reshuffles and ministerial turnover is determined by the process of peculiar monitoring and «screening» that precedes the any government cabinet formation. Screening (monitoring) of people should be most cautious in situations of significant exogenous and political influences. If, for example, the Minister of Energy and Environmental Protection is solely responsible for creating and implementing aeronautical legislation, then the Minister of the Environment will have a considerably larger influence on the policy outcomes than jointly brought in aeronautical legislation, decided on in a government cabinet and implemented through an open administrative process, providing all cabinet ministers with significant political influence. Therefore, in such a case political actors are expected to be particularly cautious about appointing all relevant ministers. This means that effective screening for ministerial posts should increase the likelihood of identifying expert officials. This means that ministerial reshuffles and turnover reduces whereas ministerial stability increases under the circumstances of ministers' significant influence on government policy²¹. On the other hand, the political influence of sectoral ministers varies depending on both the political systems and the ministerial portfolios allocation in the government cabinet. The point is that, just as some political systems create more opportunities for ministerial influence on politics than other political systems, so do some ministerial portfolios, providing plentiful opportunities for influencing the political process outcomes, as they are based on a greater technical and political experience. In this light, it is not surprising that senior and high-ranking

¹⁹ Strom K. *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

²⁰ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

²¹ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

political figures typically hold key ministerial posts in foreign affairs and finance, which are certainly subject to the most intense monitoring and screening.

The intensity of ministerial reshuffles and ministerial selection is also linked to confidence. The point is that a government official can be very experienced, but if he or she pursues a policy other than vision of other cabinet members and the general government's course, his or her experience is not welcomed by officials. Researchers therefore believe that conditions provoking mistrust in ministerial appointments should undergo more rigorous screening²². It should be borne in mind that there are several variables of inter-ministerial distrust. Among those is the existence of a coalition government. Thus, if hypothetical parties A and B are to share ministerial portfolios, then they will seek to ensure that portfolios, assigned to the other party are given to credible people in the sense that they will have a moderate advantage, not resulting in the loss of delegation. Respectively, ministers in coalition governments are more likely to be more resilient than in single-party, majority or minority governments, and technocratic government cabinets.

However, it is important not only to explore the stimuli and ability of party leaders to identify who has more potential to be an effective minister. We must also contemplate the ability of party leaders to make the intended changes, that is, to explore how the political context constrains party leaders on the whole, and prime ministers in particular to promote the desired changes in government cabinet composition. For instance, if forming a coalition government involves inter-party negotiations on ministerial portfolios allocation, it poses difficulties for the prime minister to replace an official, than in single-party majority governments. It is also important that restrictions on ministerial shift should, hypothetically, be stricter in minimum-win coalitions than in excess-win coalitions, as ministers of the so-called «untypical» cabinets can be dismissed without the entire government resignation. For this reason, single-party majority governments, considered the most stable in comparative-political studies, are apt to relatively high levels of ministerial reshuffle, as in such cabinets prime ministers are free to resort to political uncertainty, inherent in personnel decision-making. Instead, less stable coalition governments are reducing the ability of party leaders to re-appoint or dismiss people from ministerial posts. It is noteworthy that the rules of government formation affect the political actors' political expenses, involved in the reallocation of ministerial portfolios. In countries whose legislation requires an investiture vote, party leaders not only agree on the details of government forming, but also face greater operational costs over ministerial reshuffles, as the latter require a new investiture vote. Respectively, it is reasonable to expect that the relationship of the individual minister's party towards the Prime Minister's party will inevitably affect the reshuffle of government portfolios. In particular, it is obvious that restrictions are binding on all members of the Prime Minister's party. For example, if Christian Democrats and Liberals

²² Epstein D., O'Halloran S., *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

form a government coalition led by a Liberal prime minister, then the latter has much more power to make reshuffles of portfolios, held by Liberal ministers than those, held by Democratic ministers. Thus, if ministerial stability is influenced by uncertainty about portfolio allocation and in case appointment constraints reduce the frequency of desirable reshuffles, the members of the prime minister's party have more influence than members of other government parties²³. Further on, restriction on portfolio reshuffles should additionally affect the change of ministers within government cabinets. For instance, in some parties, including the British Conservatives, inner rules provide their leaders with considerable autonomy. Instead, other parties, including the British Labour Party, have far fewer powers, respectively restricting government cabinet ministers²⁴.

Another ministerial stability analysis indicator is the so-called ministerial turnover. According to K. Strom, it is defined as a sum of the share of parliamentary seats, held by parties leaving the cabinet and the share of parliamentary seats of those, forming the cabinet²⁵. In cases when general elections occur between two successive government cabinets, such calculations should be based on the post-election parliament composition. Therefore, ministerial turnover is the index of returning officials to their posts. It provides information on the likelihood of partner cooperation in the next government coalition if the current government cabinet ceases to exist. Additionally, ministerial turnover affects the incentives of coalition government cabinet partners and can be interpreted as an indicator of the likelihood of a government support loss. Depending on the nature of the phenomena underlying the ministerial stability analysis variables, different forms of ministerial danger can be pointed out. Certainly, relationship between interdependence of time and the processes, leading to the collapse of the government cabinet are widely discussed. On the one hand, E. Browne argues that events that tend to precede the resignation of a government cabinet occur regardless of the structural features of the political system. Therefore, in terms of the governments' survival analysis, a government is likely to resign throughout the entire government cabinet term of office and hence it is worth speaking about the potential danger of governmental «survival». On the other hand, P. Warwick suggests that the main process leading to the government resignation is not a random coincidence of a particular point in time and certain factors in the government performance.

In this regard, J. Huber argues that government portfolio volatility (ministerial turnover) is of utter significance²⁶. So, in conditions of high volatility, ministers hold offices for a relatively short period of time, while in contrast, senior civil servants face much lower thresholds for ministerial reshuffles. Therefore, considerable ministerial portfolios volatility is regarded as

²³ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

²⁴ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

²⁵ Strom K. Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Political Science Review* 1984, vol 79, s. 738–754.

²⁶ Huber J., How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Political Science Review* 1998, vol 92, s. 577–591.

a potential cause for ineffective decision-making. Moreover, since ministerial reshuffles are calculated by comparing the portfolio allocation between two successive government cabinets, several hypothetical situations can occur: the portfolio will be assigned to a retiring minister; the portfolio will be assigned to a new minister, belonging to the previous minister's resigning party; the new minister will not represent the previous minister's party; the portfolio will be eliminated altogether; a new portfolio and possibly a new ministry will be added. In reality, each of the abovementioned situations, except for the first, gives rise to a new form of ministerial volatility. However, the difference between the second and third situations is obvious. In the first case, some information surplus between the two ministers from the same party is quite likely. In the second case, especially if the two parties are far apart from each other in the right-left ideological spectrum, a limited information surplus occurs. Therefore, two different volatility measures will be calculated. The full government cabinet portfolio volatility is the sum of the number of changes in all government government portfolios holders and the number of removed and added ministerial portfolios.

In this regard, M. Laver and K. Shepsle elaborated the concept of a «strong party». A Party S will be strong if it participates in every government, passed on to cabinets where Party S gets all the portfolios. However, even if a strong party acquires significant market political power, it can still find itself on the brink of dismissal from government cabinet»²⁷. Moreover, if individual ministers did not experience government and party dependence, there would be no difference between the ministries, therefore «the balance between individual ministerial autonomy and collective cabinet decision-making plays a crucial and ultimate role in predicting efficiency and stability»²⁸.

This stipulates elaboration of an additional method of analyzing ministerial stability, which employs an indicator of estimation of relative ministerial weights. This method combines the model of operations for a government cabinet formation with the maximum likelihood of such a government cabinet. The data that is needed for estimation is information about who the formateur is, what each party's voting weight is, what government portfolios each party obtains. In addition, this approach enables to estimate effects and benefits of the roles of formateurs and ministers²⁹. Thus, relative ministerial weights suggest that each party benefits from government formation, although the political power of the formateur is dominant³⁰. It is particularly noticeable, given the fact that even following a government cabinet formation and obtaining ministerial posts, each party is unique, since different ministerial posts have

²⁷ Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, "American Political Science Review" 1990, vol 84, s. 873–889.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

²⁸ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government: A Research Agenda*, [w:] *Developing Democracy. Comparative Research in Honor of J. F. Blondel*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

²⁹ Adachi T., Watanabe Y., *Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania 2004.

³⁰ Adachi T., Watanabe Y., *Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania 2004.

a very different and variable weight. However, how important is a minister's post compared to another minister's post? Despite the importance of this issue, comparative studies do not provide a clear statistical method for estimating ministerial weights. In this respect S. Ansolabehere, J. Snyder, A. Strauss, M. Ting³¹ argue that «this is a common problem of coalition government research.» Yet the issue is aggravated by the fact that ministerial weights indicate not only the party's actual profits from forming government offices, but also the importance and cost of participating in certain ministries. The point is that each party's policy area is of the highest ministerial importance, likewise the government portfolio that determines party spending is also of the utmost significance. In this light, the so-called weights are relevant to the analysis of income, derived from holding portfolios, that is, to the impact of a government party size upon the size of its ministerial, governmental and political influence. Once the «Hamson Rule» was introduced, according to which «the share of posts for a party in a government cabinet is proportional to their relative size in the coalition»³². However, at present, it is believed that various ministerial posts still have different governmental and political weights, susceptible to change over time³³. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to estimate the importance of all government parties by ministerial posts they hold, as this is a volatile phenomenon. In turn it means that changing the weight of ministerial positions can significantly determine the change in the stability of certain ministerial positions³⁴.

All considered, the present study found that ministerial reshuffles, ministerial turnover, and ministerial stability largely account for government stability, yet being directly dependent on factors that determine governmental stability. The study argues that ministerial stability can also be viewed as an independent factor in the study of government performance, for it can independently answer questions, concerning peculiarities of formation, performance and responsibility of governments. Against this background, it was found that ministerial stability and ministerial reshuffle depend on the following factors: as the level of uncertainty in the selection of a potential cabinet official, the importance of political and technical expertise of a future official, the degree of inter-ministerial trust in government, the limitation of appointments and dismissal. Simultaneously, ministerial stability is largely determined by the weight of different ministerial posts, which is crucial for both parties and individual politicians.

³¹ Ansolabehere S., Snyder J., Strauss A., Ting M., *Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments*, Wyd. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Columbia University 2003, s. 18

³² Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, *"American Sociological Review"* 1961, vol 26, s. 373–382.

³³ Browne E., Franklin M., Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Political Science Review"* 1973, vol 67, s. 453–469.; Browne E., Frendreis J., Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1980, vol 24, s. 753–768.; Warwick P., Druckman J., Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments, *"British Journal of Political Science"* 2001, vol 31, s. 627–649.; Ansolabehere S., Snyder J., Strauss A., Ting M., *Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments*, Wyd. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Columbia University 2003, s. 18

³⁴ Adachi T., Watanabe Y., *Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania 2004.

References

1. Adachi T., Watanabe Y., *Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania 2004.
2. Ansolabehere S., Snyder J., Strauss A., Ting M., *Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments*, Wyd. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Columbia University 2003.
3. Austen-Smith D., Banks J., Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes, "American Political Science Review" 1988, vol 82, s. 405–422.
4. Baron D., A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems, "American Political Science Review" 1998, vol 92, s. 137–164.
5. Baron D., Government Formation and Endogenous Parties, "American Political Science Review" 1993, vol 87, s. 34–47.
6. Baron D., Ferejohn J., Bargaining in Legislatures, "American Political Science Review" 1989. Vol 83, s. 1181–1206.
7. Browne E., Franklin M., Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies, "American Political Science Review" 1973, vol 67, s. 453–469.
8. Browne E., Frensdreis J., Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations, "American Journal of Political Science" 1980, vol 24, s. 753–768.
9. Diermeier D., Merlo A., Government turnover in parliamentary democracies, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2000, vol 94, s. 46–79.
10. Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.
11. Epstein D., O'Halloran S., *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.
12. Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, "American Sociological Review" 1961, vol 26, s. 373–382.
13. Huber J., How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, "American Political Science Review" 1998, vol 92, s. 577–591.
14. Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., Cabinet Instability and Experience in the Cabinet: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective, "British Journal of Political Science" 2004, vol 34, s. 27–48.
15. Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.
16. Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

17. Laver M., Shepsle K., *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government: A Research Agenda*, [w:] *Developing Democracy. Comparative Research in Honor of J. F. Blondel*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.
18. Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, "*American Political Science Review*" 1990, vol 84, s. 873–889.
19. Laver M., Shepsle K., Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival, "*American Journal of Political Science*" 1998, vol 42, s. 28–55.
20. Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.
21. Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.
22. Lupia A., Strom K., Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections, "*American Political Science Review*" 1995, vol 89, s. 648–665.
23. Merlo A., Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment, "*Journal of Political Economy*" 1997, vol 105, s. 101–131.
24. Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.
25. Powell B., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000.
26. Riker W., *Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.
27. Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.
28. Strom K., Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies, "*American Political Science Review*" 1984, vol 79, s. 738–754.
29. Warwick P., Druckman J., Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments, "*British Journal of Political Science*" 2001, vol 31, s. 627–649.
30. Ziller Z., *Politiko-administrativni sistemy krayin ES. Porivnyalnyi analiz*, Wyd. Osnovy 1996.

LANGUAGE, POLITICS AND POWER: THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, PRACTICAL AND EMPIRICAL PARAMETERS OF RELATIONSHIP

The article is devoted to analyzing theoretical, methodological, practical and empirical parameters of the interconnection among language, politics and power, including through the prism of ideology. The author affirmed that language is a driving force for changing politics and society, because it influences and depends on them. At the same time, it was stated that language as an instrument of influence and social differentiation is certainly political, but it can also be politicized. The “imperialism” of language, thus hypothetically resulted, is a linguistic and political planning strategy on the basis of which political elite promotes its own language through power structures. It was also justified that language is a form of social and even political action and reality, which is always determined by values and norms, political conventions, ideologies and social practices, and is always delimited by the influence of power structures and historical processes.

Keywords: language, discourse, politics, power, ideology, society, influence.

МОВА, ПОЛІТИКА ТА ВЛАДА: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНІ ТА ПРАКТИЧНО-ЕМПІРИЧНІ ПАРАМЕТРИ ВЗАЄМОЗВ'ЯЗКУ

Проаналізовано теоретико-методологічні та практично-емпіричні параметри взаємозв'язку мови, політики та влади, в тому числі крізь призму ідеології. Встановлено, що мова є рушійною силою, яка спрямована на зміну політики й суспільства, адже вона впливає на них і залежить від них. Водночас констатовано, що мова як інструмент впливу та соціальної диференціації безумовно є політичною, проте може бути і політизованою. Гіпотетично результатом таким чином “імперіалізм” мови є стратегією лінгвістично-політичного планування, на підставі якої політична еліта просуває власну мову через владні структури. Також обґрунтовано, що мова є формою соціальної і навіть політичної дії та реальності, яка завжди визначається цінностями і нормами, політичними конвенціями, ідеологіями і соціальними практиками й завжди відмежована впливом владних структур та історичних процесів.

Ключові слова: мова, дискурс, політика, влада, ідеологія, суспільство, вплив.

In the modern world, there is practically no social phenomenon or aspect of human life that would not be political in nature, and therefore would not attract the attention of political analysts. Even mainly “natural” (and therefore, as it is expected, apolitical) problems are more often becoming the subject of political science research, as they relate to politics and power. Accordingly, politics and power are not merely institutionally and conflict-related spheres of social life, but in fact, all social life, even if it is not entirely perceived politically or in terms of power. This is particularly evident, given argumentation that modern politics and power related issues are increasingly less class struggle oriented, but instead focus on post-materialistic values and preferences.

Taking into consideration the above, in recent decades, the problematic of language and politics and power, language in politics and power, and also politics and power in language, among other things, has gained considerable scientific interest. Hence the idea of expediency of studying the language not only as an object of linguistics and literary criticism but also as an object of interest in political science. This, for example, is examined in the scientific works of the following scientists P. Bourdieu¹, R. Bugarski², M. Craith³, D. Crystal⁴, F. Dallmayr⁵, N. Fairclough⁶, H. Gruber and F. Menz⁷, M. Holborow⁸, E. Loos⁹, K. Morrison¹⁰, S. Nahrkhalaji¹¹, A. Pelinka¹², R. Phillipson¹³, T. Ricento¹⁴, P. Seargeant¹⁵, J. Tollefson¹⁶,

¹ Bourdieu P., *Language and Symbolic Power*, Wyd. Polity Press 1991.

² Bugarski R., Language policies in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 189–208.

³ Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.

⁴ Crystal D., *The Stories of English*, Wyd. Penguin 2004.

⁵ Dallmayr F., *Language and Politics*, Wyd. University of Notre Dame 1984.

⁶ Fairclough N., *Analysing Discourse*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

⁷ Gruber H., Menz F., Language and political change: Micro- and macro-aspects of a contested relationship?, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 175–188.

⁸ Holborow M., Language, ideology and neoliberalism, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 51–73.

⁹ Loos E., Composing “panacea texts” at the European Parliament: An intertextual perspective in text production in a multilingual community, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 3–26.

¹⁰ Morrison K., Ideology, Linguistic Capital and the Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 2000, vol 21, nr. 6, s. 471–486.

¹¹ Nahrkhalaji S., *Language, Ideology and Power: a Critical Approach to Political Discourse*, źródło: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df03/59393b3d61b2033b5a1edce8f7a7ba6cbef7.pdf?_ga=2.256435788.672418996.1572779182-770480320.1572779182 [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

¹² Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

¹³ Phillipson R., *Linguicism: Structures and Ideologies in Linguistic Imperialism*, [w:] Cummins J., Skutnabb-Kangas T. (eds.), *Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1988, s. 339–358.; Phillipson R., *Linguistic Imperialism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992.

¹⁴ Ricento T., *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Introduction*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Focus on English*, Wyd. John Benjamins Publishing Company 2000, s. 1–8.; Ricento T., *The limits of language policies in the United States and Canada: Vague intentions, unpredictable outcomes*, Paper presented at the American Association for Applied Linguistics Annual Conference, Washington, March 1999.

¹⁵ Seargeant P., Language ideology, language theory, and the regulation of linguistic behavior, *Language Sciences* 2009, vol 31, s. 345–359.

¹⁶ Tollefson J., *Planning Language, Planning Inequality: Language Policy in the Community*, Wyd. Longman 1991.

R. Wodak¹⁷ and many others. Moreover, this has become the norm not only for political science in general, but also for some of its branches, in particular for comparative politics, which objectively began to appeal to the problems of language in explaining social fragmentation and constructing various models of democratic and autocratic political regimes¹⁸. One of the explanations is that language both reflects and affects the structure of power and therefore can be considered as an indicator of social and political situations.

Therefore most of the available studies claim, that language is a driving force aimed at alteration of politics and society considering its influence and dependence on the latter¹⁹. Nevertheless, the political focus on the language studies is largely limited, since, despite the undeniable connection between politics, power and language, political science is not that interested in generation and structuring of ideas about political aspects of a language. On the contrary, much more research results on this topic are typically received in the linguistics, sociolinguistics and political linguistics environment. At the same time, hardly sole constant problem of the political science regarding relation between language, politics and power is interpreting language as a competitive phenomenon that necessarily causes political consequences²⁰. Additionally, when it comes to political science, language is often positioned as a tool to achieve the goals of certain concepts, for instance, as a function and a means of communication in the tradition of political systems and cybernetics theory; as a part of symbolic politics; as a cause of social fragmentation, that provokes specific political reactions; as a tool for advocacy, competition and mobilization. This means that language, on the one hand, describes politics and power, but, on the other hand, can contribute to the distortion of politics and power²¹. A striking example was the role of language in the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany by 1933 or in the stabilization of the Nazi regime in Germany since 1933. In addition, it fits in well with J. Goebbels's remark that language is both a political tool and an instrument of propaganda and manipulation²². Therefore, its «political power» must be characterized by ambiguous potential²³, since language can be a tool for or against the enlightenment, for or against emancipation, for or against democracy, for or against human rights, etc. Accordingly, language can be used by totalitarian and authoritarian political regimes and as a means of resistance to them as well. At the same time, language policy can promote the formation of states, and may threaten the existence of not only states but also ethnic groups.

¹⁷ Wodak R., Preface. The power of language in political discourse, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 381–383; Wodak R., *Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Verschuren J., Ostaman J., Blommaert J. (eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics-Manual*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1995, s. 204–210; Wodak R., 1968: *The power of political jargon*, [w:] Wodak R. (ed.), *Language, power, ideology*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1989, s. 137–163.

¹⁸ Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University 1977.

¹⁹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

²⁰ Dallmayr F., *Language and Politics*, Wyd. University of Notre Dame 1984.

²¹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

²² Wodak R., Panagl O., *Text und Kontext. Theoriemodelle und methodische Viverfahren in transdisziplinärenVergleich*, Wyd. Königshausen & Neumann 2004, s. 87–104.

²³ Wodak R., Preface. The power of language in political discourse, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 381–383.

In this context, the function of modernization and nation-building that is attributed to languages is of particular importance. As G. Almond and B. Powell point out, “nation-building” refers to the “problem of integration and control”²⁴. The fact is that the nation is an idea based on the processes of inclusion and exclusion, entrusted with the territorial dimension of statehood. Therefore, language is one of the criteria that determines the processes of inclusion (in the “we” format) and exclusion (in the “others” format). This determines the fact that modern nation and nationalism are formed as a result of specific understanding of language: identifying “themselves” and separating from “others”. Therefore, language unites, integrating different segments of society into an imaginary nation; however, it also separates, attributing specific features and differences to others in a particular segment of society. Such importance of a language is due to the fact that it is used in a specific analytical case in official or quasi-official political terms, in particular as the official language of the state or linguistic collective memory, which structures social and political differences and relations²⁵. At the same time, language is not the only factor influencing the construction of a nation and a state. Therefore, language itself does not create nations, but it is used for this purpose, because it is an instrument of processes of integration and differentiation that lead to the birth of a nation²⁶, or the localization and hierarchy of societies in modern nation²⁷. With this in mind, language does not necessarily overcome social and political differences, but helps to understand them. Accordingly, language is “the predominant form of modern imagined community”²⁸. This means that language promotes national or ethnic unity, even with other social differences. In this context, language competes with other factors of national creation - religion, geography, history²⁹. However, the defining characteristic of language is that it has the potential to construct a nation because of its functions.

A striking example is the fact that in Austria both until 1938 (the the annexation of *Austria into Nazi Germany*), and after that the majority of the population spoke German, and therefore it was the reason to regard the Austrians as Germans. At the same time, after 1945, without changing the language situation, but as a result of changes in its understanding, the above mentioned fact did not prevent the Austrians from developing and adopting a strong non-German national identity³⁰. As a result, despite changing perceptions, the development of a specific non-German Austrian identity has not eliminated the importance of the German language as a determining factor for Austrian nationality and statehood. The existence of a specific Austrian version of the German language, used for emphasizing the difference between Germany and Austria contributed to this. As a result, the Austrians perceive the

²⁴ Almond G., Powell B., *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach*, Wyd. Little, Brown and Co. 1966, s. 314.

²⁵ Lane J.-E., Ersson S., *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, London 1994, s. 52–101.

²⁶ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

²⁷ Gellner E., *Nations and Nationalism*, Wyd. Blackwell 1983.

²⁸ Finlayson A., *Imagined Communities*, [w:] Nash K., Scott A. (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*, Wyd. Blackwell 2001, s. 283.

²⁹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

³⁰ Weiss H., *Nation und Toleranz? Empirische Studien zu nationalen Identitäten in Österreich*, Wyd. Braumüller 2004.

German language as their own.³¹ It determines that the «natural» majority in Austria is German-speaking, but not German population of this nation.³²

In parallel with this, the importance of language in politics can be reduced to minimizing the consequences of other sociopolitical divisions in any society. A vivid example of such kind of logic of the relationship between language and politics is Switzerland, with its inherent differentiation by linguistic and religious principles. In particular, French-speaking Swiss areas are different primarily because their group is characterized by the conflict relations between Catholics and Protestants. Instead, the German-speaking Swiss cantons are more homogeneous, since they are consolidated mainly in terms of language, not religion³³. That is why correlating language and other policy leads to the complication of the latter, while uniting to its simplification. The situation revealing linguistic and religious distance on the island of Cyprus as well as the one illustrating cultural and religious dissonance in the former Yugoslavia (primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina), serve as examples of conflicts of different periods³⁴. Instead, Croatia, which after 1991 began to differentiate its official language from the former understanding of Serbo-Croatian as one language with two different alphabets, is a good example of solving political problems through a linguistic factor and “erasing” religious context. Such linguistic-political engineering eventually led to shifting the nature of the conflict from linguistic-religious to a merely linguistic conflict, and thus promoted political harmonization³⁵.

To sum up, this means that language always plays a role in politics. Moreover, language is or can be both a catalyst and an interpreter of politics on the highest level of political processes - nation building and state formation. Therefore, political perceptions of language in the construction of social life automatically make it a factor in politics and socio-political differentiation and mobilization³⁶, manifested in the existence of social movements and political parties³⁷. Although language can be both a tool for simplifying and complicating the political process³⁸. In this regard, researchers have traditionally appealed to the linguistic-political experience of Belgium, in which language has proved to be an example of an instrument with effective and mobilizing influence. In this country, two major languages - Flemish (or Dutch) and Walloon (as Romance / French) - did not prevent the unification of the party system in the first half of the twentieth century.

³¹ Wodak R., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 1998, s. 133–140.

³² Reiterer A., *Gesellschaft in Österreich*, Wyd. WUV 2003, s. 130–156.

³³ Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University 1977.

³⁴ Kramer H., Dzihic V., *Die Kosovo Bilanz. Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft?*, Wyd. LIT 2005.

³⁵ Bugarski R., Language policies in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 197.; Gruber H., Menz F., Language and political change: Micro- and macro-aspects of a contested relationship?, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 175–188.

³⁶ Lane J.-E., Ersson S., *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, London 1994, s. 52–101.; Rokkan S., *Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa. Die Theorien Stein Rokkans aus seinen gesammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeleitet von Peter Flora*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 2000, s. 123–274.

³⁷ Inglehart R., *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Wyd. Princeton University 1997.

³⁸ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

Moreover, in the middle of the twentieth century, the prevailing design of the three-party competition in Belgium (Christian socialists, socialists and liberals as the country's largest political forces) was replaced by a linguistic competition of two blocs, each having a different number of participants, of first social movements and then political parties, in particular, Flemish and Walloon linguistically oriented³⁹.

Therefore, language is one of the most powerful factors in identifying and spreading socio-political differences, and thus shaping politically-mobilizing identities and communities. In this context, the experience of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism or the phenomenon of "Italian unity", etc., is remarkable, because it was through the perception and awareness of linguistic differences and commonalities that they were generated and manifested, thus becoming the basis for constructing common cultures and heritage, within very different, however individually related political entities (Germany and Austria, Italy, Slavic states).

The language is also related to other characteristics of social life, such as class, economic and regional differences⁴⁰. The fact is that language, in particular, as an ability to communicate, is an absolute reason and aspect of social development. In this regard, A. Pelinka notes that language, as an ability to speak and write, is specifically linked to the hierarchy of social classes and the perception of vertical difference between them⁴¹. Since class-determined language indicates a certain social and even political position of different groups of asymmetrical society. Similarly, S. Rokkan notes that language is important in the "center-periphery" differences, because it is the language that can generate political discontent of the periphery against the center (as in the case of Flemish language against Walloon in Belgium, Catalan against Spanish (or Castilian) in Spain, Welsh and Gaelic against English in the United Kingdom, Kurdish against Turkish in Turkey, etc)⁴². Linguistic differences also highlight other dimensions of political confrontation. In particular, the racist views of members of the political elite differ significantly from the racist statements of the general public. All this proves that language as a social and political phenomenon can be different—more or less controlled, more or less formalized or hidden—mainly depending on political goals, and therefore on the peculiarities of perception of language as a tool of politics⁴³. This is why, even when language is an unquestionable commonality (unifying factor) of a particular nation (and even more so, when language is not a means of political and national harmonization), its social and political diversity is not excluded at all, but serves, or at least can serve, as an instrument of political mobilization and competition to achieve specific goals and to differentiate the roles of individual subjects and objects of politics, in particular the elites and the masses, social groups, left, right, and centrist parties, and so on. Therefore,

³⁹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. ECPR 2005, s. 304; Woyke W., *Das politische System Belgiens*, [w:] Ismayr W. (ed.), *Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas*, Wyd. Leske + Budrich 2003, s. 403–407.

⁴⁰ Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University 1983, s. 28–63.

⁴¹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

⁴² Rokkan S., *Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa. Die Theorien Stein Rokkans aus seinen gesammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeleitet von Peter Flora*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 2000, s. 138–154, 208–233.

⁴³ Wodak R., van Dijk T., *Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*, Wyd. Drava 2000.

language as an instrument of influence and social differentiation is a priori political, but it can also be politicized, mainly due to its sensitivity, openness, activity and strictness⁴⁴.

All this makes it possible to justify that language, being a tool of nation-formation (though not in all states), is at the same time a prerequisite for the development of social and political diversity not only of monoethnic and multinational societies, but also of their political systems. At the same time, from a theoretical and methodological point of view, it is advisable to distinguish different options of linguistic diversity, in particular when: a) within one official language social, regional and cultural differences are traced; b) in the linguistically homogeneous nation / state, languages of national minorities are used in certain spheres of social life; c) languages of national minorities are the result of intensive migration processes; d) the linguistic palette is defined by the coexistence of different languages that have no official status and / or are not regulated. All of these options suggest the possibility, or even the likelihood, of certain assimilation tendencies based on the assumption that there is a formal or informal hierarchical ranking between different languages. The obvious result is quantitative variability in the ranking of languages: the language which is considered as superior «wins», whereas the one that is positioned or perceived as lower «loses». And this, in turn, often leads to unexpected and contradictory linguistic and political tendencies. As, for example, in the case of Slovenian dialect in Carinthia, the speakers of which - Carinthian Slovenians - often deny that they belong to *Slovenian* speaking group⁴⁵. Therefore, different types of social differences are generated by different options of linguistic differences, both in the political context exclusively, and in the political and legal framework. In particular, when linguistically homogeneous nations use minority languages in certain spheres of life, it often leads to constitutional arrangements that give preference to minority languages in certain regions - Swedish in the Åland Islands in Finland or Catalan in Catalonia in Spain. Instead, where minority languages are the result of intense migration processes, it usually causes the need to ponder about policy of multiculturalism, assimilation or integration (as in many Western European countries). Finally, the biggest number of questions and problems arises in the political system when different languages with unsettled status coexist. The situation in Canada, Belgium and Switzerland is a vivid example of such linguistic - political confrontation. Despite the fact that there are distinct linguistic majorities in these countries, English, Dutch and German, correspondingly, it does not imply their official precedence over the other officially recognized languages. Therefore, in the above countries two and more languages (English and French in Canada, Dutch and French (and to a certain extent German) in Belgium, as well as German, French, Italian, Rhaetian in Switzerland, are considered politically equal on the central (federal) level of political management⁴⁶, but on a regional level a monolingual structure prevails.

⁴⁴ Pelinka A. Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science. *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

⁴⁵ Reiterer A., *Doktor und Bauer. Ethnischer Konflikt und sozialer Wandel: Die Sozialstruktur der slowenischen Minderheit in Kärnten*, Wyd. Drava 1986, s. 105.

⁴⁶ Pelinka A. Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science. *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

The logic in the confederal European Union (EU) and Federal India is somewhat different. If in the former case the principle of linguistic diversity has been laid down⁴⁷ and all the languages are proclaimed as official and equal in the institutional structure of the EU⁴⁸, though in practice English and French dominate⁴⁹. Alternatively, in the latter, 22 languages are proclaimed as officially recognized, but used on the state level. However, according to the constitution, only one language is official on the federal level – Hindi, English being considered semi-official. This is due to the fact that in India there is no single national Indian language, whereas all the 22 Indian languages are sort of minority languages⁵⁰. That is why the linguistic diversity in India is recognized, but not so much as the political pattern of linguistic equality, but with a reservation, according to which all the languages are equally significant, since it is officially claimed that the existence of Indian identity preceded the construction of a federal state⁵¹.

As a consequence, some linguistic diversity options lead to the establishment of the political logic of majoritarian democracies (where competition between majority and minority is constant and predominant), and some options involve the development of consensus-based consociational democracy⁵² (where power-sharing arrangements are embraced and implemented beyond competition by majority and minority). It also means that pragmatic order of languages ranking is becoming more and more characteristic of different countries and international organizations. Especially against the background that political-legal equality and the diversity of all languages cannot overcome the political-linguistic reality in which English is, if not the most widespread, at least the most important second language in the world⁵³. This is especially evident given that the development of democracy in the late XX - early XXI centuries was able to produce an array of theorizations and instrumental formulas (even within constitutional engineering) regarding the possibility of peaceful political and social coexistence against the backdrop of explicit and latent language conflicts. It is up to them to instruct how to act politically in the case of competition and diversity of languages. Accordingly, purely from the theoretical and methodological point of view, pluralism of languages is not positioned today as a direct challenge to democratic regimes, but instead, as an absolute attribute of democracies. However, in the context of the “erosion of democracy”, which became a feature of political development in the second half of the first decade of the twenty first century, as well as given the rejection of some ideas of globalization, now there is an increasing tendency to rethink the relationship between politics and language, especially against the backdrop of the latter’s diversity.

⁴⁷ Laitin D., The cultural identities of a European state, *“Politics and Society”* 1997, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 277–302.

⁴⁸ Loos E., Composing “panacea texts” at the European Parliament: An intertextual perspective in text production in a multilingual community, *“Journal of Language and Politics”* 2004, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 3–26.

⁴⁹ Neisser H., Verschraegen B., *Die Europäische Union. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit*, Wyd. Springer 2001, s. 135.

⁵⁰ Salzmann Z., Stanlaw J., Adachi N., *Language, Culture, and Society: An Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology*, Wyd. Westview Press 2014.; Pelinka A., *Democracy Indian Style. Subhas Chandra Bose and the Creation of India’s Political Culture*, Wyd. Transaction 2003, s. 129–224.

⁵¹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *“Journal of Language and Politics”* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

⁵² Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University 1977.

⁵³ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *“Journal of Language and Politics”* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

This is largely due to the fact that globalization processes have covered virtually all spheres of social life, with the exception of politics, which still lacks an articulated global structure. This is especially noticeable against the backdrop of political failures of the United Nations, which failed to implement the concept of “equality of states.” This is somewhat less common for the European Union – perhaps the most successful attempt to infringe upon national sovereignty and establish transnational governance in at least one part of the world. Rather relevant in this regard are the views of A. Etzioni, who believes that the EU formation process is part of the General model of political unification, but it is flawed, given a constant confrontation between the patterns of its implementation, in particular in the format of harmonization (which should be implemented through Confederation) or integration (which should mainly be implemented through Federation)⁵⁴. At the same time, the sociologist notes that integration provides a more effective and, presumably, a more successful option for political unity, which can lead to a broad and stable political consensus. In this context, the problem of the relationship between politics and language is mainly reduced to the expectation that integration implies a generally accepted balance between diversity and central power based on the model of transnational democracy. However, since this model does not exist in the reality of implementation of European diversity, especially after the EU Constitution was not adopted, the political future of democratic transnational governance is still « open » and even threatened (especially against the background of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 and the European migration crisis, starting with 2014-2015). This is especially noticeable against the background of cultural globalization (especially in the context of promoting English in the Internet, at international conferences, international transport and international communication in general), which strongly affects integration processes in the context of real language diversity.

In view of this, the construction of language diversity is often considered as make – believe, since in social life it does not always have anything to do with reality. In contrast, though language conflicts have been a real controversy between the center and the periphery, based on economic, cultural, and political hegemony. Accordingly, the differences between the theoretized and real order of language ranking are a consequence of differences in the expected political integration and the actual political process, which proves irrelevance of the idea of the end of relationship between language - politics. After all, if earlier the relationships between language and politics were mainly determined in terms of national and international conflicts within the framework of variable socio-political divisions based on language, today they are an attribute of the globalization of conflicts within the dichotomy « language-politics ».

It is largely due to the fact that one of the theoretical and methodological perspectives of the outlined issues is the interrelation of the categories “language” and “power”⁵⁵. These cat-

⁵⁴ Etzioni A., *Political Unification Revisited. On Building Supranational Communities*, Wyd. Lexington Books 2001, s. 301.

⁵⁵ Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.

egories are related to the concept of “cultural capital” - an idea first proposed by P. Bourdieu and M. Foucault in the early ‘70s, of the 20th century. The researchers have broadened their understanding of the phenomenon of capital beyond its traditional economic explanation by distinguishing the social and linguistic (cultural) constituents of capital. The latter refers to a wide range of linguistic abilities and orientations that are available in the family and in the state in the institutionalized or non-institutionalized (artifact) form⁵⁶. In view of this, as K. Morrison points out, that language capital is defined as fluent and comfortable language proficiency in a global language by groups of people who have economic, social, cultural and political power and a status in local and global society⁵⁷. This determines that individuals and groups speaking global languages and languages of the majority have significant advantages over their counterparts, whose native languages are ranked lower by the number of speakers and, hence, their importance and are hardly needed for discussion in an economic context. In other words, those individuals and groups who speak the main or dominant language are given the economic and therefore political advantages (a kind of power)⁵⁸. Moreover, such individuals and groups receive preferences in the form of prestige and honor, since the “right” language becomes a form of peculiar capital or investment that can consolidate or enhance authority in the tangible and intangible sectors⁵⁹. Today, this mainly concerns a peculiar kind of “imperialism” of the English language, because it is the most widespread in the world as a second language. Even despite the fact that it is so differentiated and that it is used in a number of variations, even in the countries where it is native⁶⁰. Moreover, such “linguistic imperialism” is a direct testimony to a close interconnection in the “politics-power-language” triad, since the spread of the English language (and a number of other global languages) once was and still remains a linguistic-political planning strategy, on the basis of which political elite promotes its own language through power structures⁶¹ and through its displaced citizens / immigrants⁶².

In addition it should be noted that power oriented language capacity can be efficiently illustrated by the examples of the political and linguistic sphere of the European Union. In this context the EU, theoretically, should be described as a ‘force field in which the distribution of capital represents the hierarchical set of power relationships between the competing individuals, rival groups and organizations’.⁶³ The thing is that formally the EU positions itself as a forum, in

⁵⁶ Bourdieu P., *Language and Symbolic Power*, Wyd. Polity Press 1991.

⁵⁷ Morrison K., Ideology, Linguistic Capital and the Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 2000, vol 21, nr. 6, s. 471.

⁵⁸ Foucault M., *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Wyd. Vintage Books 1978, s. 93.

⁵⁹ Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.; Swarz D., Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu’s Political Economy of Symbolic Power, *Sociology of Religion* 1996, vol 57, nr. 1, s. 76.

⁶⁰ Crystal D., *The Stories of English*, Wyd. Penguin 2004.

⁶¹ Phillipson R., *Linguicism: Structures and Ideologies in Linguistic Imperialism*, [w:] Cummins J., Skutnabb-Kangas T. (eds.), *Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1988, s. 339–358.; Phillipson R., *Linguistic Imperialism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992.

⁶² Spolsky B., *Language Policy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.

⁶³ Swarz D., Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu’s Political Economy of Symbolic Power, *Sociology of Religion* 1996, vol 57, nr. 1, s. 79.

which native speakers of minority languages (or separate countries) can act cooperatively with one another at the transnational level instead of being isolated or opposed each other⁶⁴. The thing is that formally the EU positions itself as a forum, in which native speakers of minority languages (or separate countries) can act cooperatively with one another at the transnational level instead of being isolated or opposed each other⁶⁵.

Besides, power oriented language capacity should be interpreted through ideological structure of society in general and the political process in particular. The described dichotomy is cyclic because among the most important social practices, influenced by political ideologies, are language and discourse, which in turn influence the way political ideologies are forming and changing. The thing is that language and discourse are the forms of social and even political action and realities, which are always determined by certain values and norms, political conventions, ideologies and social practices and are always demarcated by the influence of power structures and historical processes. Accordingly, political discourse, as a tool and indicator of the interrelation of language and politics, is necessarily constituted by ideologically biased and unbiased opinions. In addition, political discourse is often a tool for learning and understanding ideologies⁶⁶. Therefore, ideology is not an innate, but an acquired feature and system of beliefs of particular individuals and groups⁶⁷, because it is implanted with the means of language and mainly political discourse.

Only in this form, language and discourse affect the realism of certain models of social and political action and events, which may eventually be generalized and abstracted in the form of social perceptions and ideologies⁶⁸. In such a dichotomy, each of the phenomena occupies a niche, since ideology is a system of values that generates and manages large blocks of society, and language is the “mediator” of the functioning of ideology and ideological blocks, and therefore a means of legitimizing power relations and etc. Moreover, if the legitimization of organized power relations is not articulate and purposeful, then language is also ideological⁶⁹. This means that the use of the phrase “linguistic ideology” may be appropriate, but it may have quite different meanings, such as denoting the “correct” conceptualization of the language or displaying a “misinterpretation” of the language, if different from the facts⁷⁰. In this case, the power in the language-ideology dichotomy is of particular importance to the authorities, which necessarily conceptualize both from the point of view of asymmetry between the participants

⁶⁴ Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.

⁶⁵ Nahrkhalaji S., *Language, Ideology and Power: a Critical Approach to Political Discourse*, źródło: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df03/59393b3d61b2033b5a1edce8f7a7ba6cbe7.pdf?ga=2.256435788.672418996.1572779182-770480320.1572779182> [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

⁶⁶ Wodak R., *Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Verschuren J., Ostaman J., Blommaert J. (eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics—Manual*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1995, s. 204–210.

⁶⁷ Van Dijk T., *Principles of Critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Wetherell M. (ed.), *Discourse theory and practice*, Wyd. A Reader 2001, s. 300–317; Augoustinos M., *Social representations and ideology*, [w:] Flick U. (ed.), *The psychology of the social*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998.

⁶⁸ Van Dijk T., *Ideology and discourse: a multidisciplinary introduction*, Wyd. Pompeu Fabra University 2000.

⁶⁹ Heberman J., *Theory and practice*, Wyd. Beacon 1973.

⁷⁰ Seargeant P., Language ideology, language theory, and the regulation of linguistic behavior, *“Language Sciences”* 2009, vol 31, s. 345–359.

of political discourse, and from the point of view of unequal ability to control how political discourses are created, disseminated and consumed in specific linguistic- political contexts⁷¹. Therefore, it undoubtedly argues that language can both support power and undermine trust in power⁷², certainly changing policy over time⁷³, but in the meanwhile it “denaturates” political ideologies⁷⁴ through political discourse and clarifies the political and social categories it needs.

It is a common knowledge that language is a driving force that is aimed at changing politics and society, since it affects them and depends on them. On the one hand, language describes politics, but on the other it can contribute to the distortion of the latter. A language can be used by totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and simultaneously can be used as a means of resisting them. At the same time, language policy can promote the formation of nation-states, but may threaten the existence of not only states but also ethnic groups. To sum up, it means that language has always played a certain role in politics and is a factor in socio-political differentiation and mobilization, because it is or can be both a catalyst and an interpreter of politics and political processes. Therefore, language, as an instrument of influence and social differentiation, without any doubt becomes political, but it can also be politicized. Against this background it is argued, that various socio-political differences are generated by different options for linguistic divergences, both exclusively in the political context and in the political and legal context. Empirically, it can be seen from the fact, that economic and political advantages, social prestige and the power are acquired by those individuals and groups of people, who communicate by means of the primary or dominant language, which takes the form of some kind of capital or investments. The resulting “imperialism” of language, thereby, is a strategy of linguistic-political planning, on the basis of which the political elite promotes its own language through various power structures. Eventually, it is stated that a language is a form of social and even political action and reality, which is always determined by values and moral norms, political conventions, ideologies and social practices and is always demarcated by the influence of high authorities and historical processes.

A list of references

1. Almond G., Powel B., *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach*, Wyd. Liltle, Brown and Co. 1966.
2. Atawneh A., The discourse of war in the Middle East: Analysis of media reporting, “*Journal of Pragmatics*”2009, vol41, s. 263–278.

⁷¹ Nahrkhalaji S., *Language, Ideology and Power: a Critical Approach to Political Discourse*, źródło: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df03/59393b3d61b2033b5a1edce8f7a7ba6cbe7.pdf?_ga=2.256435788.672418996.1572779182-770480320.1572779182 [odczyt: 01.11.2019].; Wodak R., 1968: *The power of political jargon*, [w:] Wodak R. (ed.), *Language, power, ideology*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1989, s. 137–163.

⁷² Atawneh A., The discourse of war in the Middle East: Analysis of media reporting, “*Journal of Pragmatics*”2009, vol41, s. 263–278.

⁷³ Tollefson J., *Planning Language, Planning Inequality: Language Policy in the Community*, Wyd. Longman 1991.; Ricento T., *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Introduction*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Focus on English*, Wyd. John Benjamins Publishing Company 2000, s. 1–8.

⁷⁴ Fairclough N., *Critical discourse analysis*, Wyd. Longman 1995.

3. Augoustinos M., *Social representations and ideology*, [w:] Flick U. (ed.), *The psychology of the social*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998.
4. Bourdieu P., *Language and Symbolic Power*, Wyd. Polity Press 1991.
5. Bugarski R., Language policies in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 189–208.
6. Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.
7. Crystal D., *The Stories of English*, Wyd. Penguin 2004.
8. Dallmayr F., *Language and Politics*, Wyd. University of Notre Dame 1984.
9. Etzioni A., *Political Unification Revisited. On Building Supranational Communities*, Wyd. Lexington Books 2001.
10. Fairclough N., *Analysing Discourse*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.
11. Fairclough N., *Critical discourse analysis*, Wyd. Longman 1995.
12. Finlayson A., *Imagined Communities*, [w:] Nash K., Scott A. (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*, Wyd. Blackwell 2001, s. 281–290.
13. Foucault M., *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Wyd. Vintage Books 1978.
14. Gellner E., *Nations and Nationalism*, Wyd. Blackwell 1983.
15. Gruber H., Menz F., Language and political change: Micro- and macro-aspects of a contested relationship?, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 175–188.
16. Heberman J., *Theory and practice*, Wyd. Beacon 1973.
17. Holborow M., Language, ideology and neoliberalism, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 51–73.
18. Inglehart R., *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Wyd. Princeton University 1997.
19. Kramer H., Dzihic V., *Die Kosovo Bilanz. Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft?*, Wyd. LIT 2005.
20. Laitin D., The cultural identities of a European state, *Politics and Society* 1997, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 277–302.
21. Lane J.-E., Ersson S., *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, London 1994.
22. Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University 1977.
23. Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University 1983.
24. Loos E., Composing “panacea texts” at the European Parliament: An intertextual perspective in text production in a multilingual community, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 3–26.
25. Morrison K., Ideology, Linguistic Capital and the Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 2000, vol 21, nr. 6, s. 471–486.
26. Nahrkhalaji S., *Language, Ideology and Power: a Critical Approach to Political Discourse*, źródło: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df03/59393b3d61b2033b5a1edce8f7a7ba6cbef7.pdf?_ga=2.256435788.672418996.1572779182-770480320.1572779182 [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

27. Neisser H., Verschraegen B., *Die Europäische Union. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit*, Wyd. Springer 2001.
28. Pelinka A., *Democracy Indian Style. Subhas Chandra Bose and the Creation of India's Political Culture*, Wyd. Transaction 2003.
29. Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, "Journal of Language and Politics" 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.
30. Phillipson R., *Linguicism: Structures and Ideologies in Linguistic Imperialism*, [w:] Cummins J., Skutnabb-Kangas T. (eds.), *Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1988, s. 339–358.
31. Phillipson R., *Linguistic Imperialism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992.
32. Reiterer A., *Doktor und Bauer. Ethnischer Konflikt und sozialer Wandel: Die Sozialstruktur der slowenischen Minderheit in Kärnten*, Wyd. Drava 1986.
33. Reiterer A., *Gesellschaft in Österreich*, Wyd. WUV 2003.
34. Ricento T., *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Introduction*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Focus on English*, Wyd. John Benjamins Publishing Company 2000, s. 1–8.
35. Ricento T., *The limits of language policies in the United States and Canada: Vague intentions, unpredictable outcomes*, Paper presented at the American Association for Applied Linguistics Annual Conference, Washington, March 1999.
36. Rokkan S., *Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa. Die Theorien Stein Rokkans aus seinen gesammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeleitet von Peter Flora*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 2000.
37. Salzmann Z., Stanlaw J., Adachi N., *Language, Culture, and Society: An Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology*, Wyd. Westview Press 2014.
38. Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. ECPR 2005.
39. Seargeant P., Language ideology, language theory, and the regulation of linguistic behavior, "Language Sciences" 2009, vol 31, s. 345–359.
40. Spolsky B., *Language Policy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.
41. Swarz D., Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu's Political Economy of Symbolic Power, "Sociology of Religion" 1996, vol 57, nr. 1, s. 71–85.
42. Tollefson J., *Planning Language, Planning Inequality: Language Policy in the Community*, Wyd. Longman 1991.
43. Van Dijk T., *Ideology and discourse: a multidisciplinary introduction*, Wyd. Pompeu Fabra University 2000.
44. Van Dijk T., *Principles of Critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Wetherell M. (ed.), *Discourse theory and practice*, Wyd. A Reader 2001, s. 300–317.
45. Weiss H., *Nation und Toleranz? Empirische Studien zu nationalen Identitäten in Österreich*, Wyd. Braumüller 2004.
46. Wodak R., *Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Verschuren J., Ostaman J., Blommaert J. (eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics—Manual*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1995, s. 204–210.

47. Wodak R., Preface. The power of language in political discourse, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 381–383.
48. Wodak R., *1968: The power of political jargon*, [w:] Wodak R. (ed.), *Language, power, ideology*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1989, s. 137–163.
49. Wodak R., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 1998.
50. Wodak R., Panagl O., *Text und Kontext. Theoriemodelle und methodische Ververfahren im transdisziplinären Vergleich*, Wyd. Königshausen & Neumann 2004.
51. Wodak R., van Dijk T., *Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*, Wyd. Drava 2000.
52. Woyke W., *Das politische System Belgiens*, [w:] Ismayr W. (ed.), *Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas*, Wyd. Leske + Budrich 2003, s. 389–414.

FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT PRECONDITIONS AND FEATURES OF DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF TRANSPORT LOGISTICS, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SYSTEM IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES

The article is dedicated to analyzing the evolution and current state of financial and investment preconditions and features of the development and modernization of transport logistics, infrastructure and system in the Visegrad Group countries. The author argued that the financial and investment component and conditionality of the development and modernization of transport logistics, infrastructure and system in the Visegrad Group countries is a key resource for the development of the economy of the countries of the region, since it helped to overcome the economic crisis, introduce structural changes in management and accelerate scientific and technological progress in the sector, etc. It was also stated that the investment of the transport system and infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries had an effective impact on the level of trade activity and exports, the volume of transportation, the general level of investment and capital activity of the countries of the region, as well as on the level of population income, gross product and inflation fluctuations.

Keywords: transport, logistics, infrastructure, transport system, investments, the Visegrad Group countries.

ФІНАНСОВО-ІНВЕСТИЦІЙНІ ПЕРЕДУМОВИ Й ОСОБЛИВОСТІ РОЗВИТКУ ТА МОДЕРНІЗАЦІЇ ТРАНСПОРТНОЇ ЛОГІСТИКИ, ІНФРАСТРУКТУРИ І СИСТЕМИ В КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ

Проаналізовано еволюцію та поточний стан фінансово-інвестиційних передумов і особливостей розвитку та модернізації транспортної логістики, інфраструктури і системи в країнах Вишеградської групи. Аргументовано, що фінансово-інвестиційна складова й зумовленість розвитку і модернізації транспортної логістики, інфраструктури й системи в країнах Вишеградської групи є ключовим ресурсом розвитку економіки країн регіону, адже вони допомагали вийти з економічної кризи, впроваджувати структурні зрушення у господарюванні і прискорювати науково-технічний прогрес в секторі тощо. Констатовано, що інвестування транспортної системи та інфраструктури в країнах

Вишеградської групи ефективно вплинуло на рівень торговельної активності та експорту, обсяги транспортування, загальний рівень інвестиційної і капітальної активності країн регіону, а також на рівень доходів населення, валовий продукт та інфляційні коливання.

Ключові слова: транспорт, логістика, інфраструктура, транспортна система, інвестиції, країни Вишеградської групи.

Modern global and European trends, especially namely the those in the EU, including the transport development, require continuous improvement of infrastructure management and attracting investment. Therefore, the condition and level of transport infrastructure and logistics development are among the most important factors of socio-economic development of both the Visegrad Group countries, and any other countries of the world. It is precisely the development of transport infrastructure and logistics that stimulates the reallocation of resources and labour from the stagnant sectors of the economy into those capable of maintaining continual and sustainable economic growth. Respectively, being a useful tool to overcome the economic crisis, introduce structural changes in the economy and accelerate scientific and technological progress in the sector, the financial and investment component along with conditionality of the evolution and modernization of transport logistics, infrastructure and system in the Visegrad countries are a key resource for the development of the economy of any country in this region. This is especially true based on the experience of the EU countries, having illustrated that the development of transport infrastructure / system determines the intensity of economic ties and is one of the crucial prerequisites for economic development. Alternatively, economic growth can be hampered and even halted by infrastructure constraints, caused by a poor road quality and the transport network infrastructure low capacity. Accordingly, investments in transport infrastructure and logistics within and beyond the borders of individual countries should be made in order to improve transport provision, thus making an impact on the GDP growth, in particular through the entry of transport companies into new markets, the growth of infrastructure capital assets, and hence the increased volume of realization and profitability of their activity. This, being particularly relevant to the countries of the Visegrad Group, urges the research issue of financial and investment preconditions and features of development and modernization of transport logistics, infrastructure and system both in the entire region and in some of its countries.

The abovementioned research problems were highlighted in the works of F. Bafoil and L. Ruiwen¹, R. Crescenzi, M. Di Cataldo, A. Rodriguez-Pose²,

¹ Bafoil F, Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119.

² Crescenzi R., Di Cataldo M., Rodriguez-Pose A., Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions, *Journal of Regional Science* 2016, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 555–582; Crescenzi R., Rodriguez-Pose A., Infrastructure and regional growth in the European Union, *Papers in Regional Science* 2012, vol 91, s. 487–513; Crescenzi R., Rodriguez-Pose A., Infrastructure endowment and investment as determinants of regional growth in the European Union, *EIB Papers* 2008, vol 13, s. 62–101.

B. Flyvbjerg³, M. Gawrychowski⁴, T. Hovorushko and N. Obushna⁵, G. Hunya⁶, R. Kierzenkowski⁷, M. Musiat-Malago⁸, O. Riabchenko⁹, I. Schmideg i G. Lajtha¹⁰, Y. Shcherbanyn¹¹, J. Short ra A. Kopp¹², O. Shyba¹³ and many others. However, these scientists failed to fully systematize information about financial and investment preconditions, as well as peculiarities of development and modernization of transport logistics, infrastructure and the entire system in the Visegrad countries. Hence, the present study attempts to bridge this gap. Simultaneously, the contribution of the abovementioned scientists proves that capital investments in the transport infrastructure of individual countries, the Visegrad Group including, is the key to expanded reproduction, not only in terms of quantitative indices, but also qualitative improvement. Eventually, it is due to them that the fixed capital of the existing enterprises and the general economic system are constantly updated. In addition, it is stated that investments in transport infrastructure help to improve the structure of production, maintain the economic balance, produce the necessary raw material supplies base for the development of all sectors of the economy. Accordingly, on the basis of the listed above, the scientific and technological development of the countries is intensified, while the quality and the range of products and services is increased. All of this is certainly the reason for the growth of the real GDP of the countries.

Upon the collapse of the «real socialism» regimes it was evident that the Visegrad countries followed the outlined course, as they gradually began to infuse and attract considerable investment to develop transport infrastructure. In particular, since the early 1990's investing in transport infrastructure and maintaining the system stood out as one of the regional economic policy priorities, since the growth of national economies required large-scale domestic and foreign investments, which would enable to diversify national economies, especially after the stagnation, following the collapse of the USSR. Accordingly, the implementation of transport infrastructure projects, in particular in the form of investments directed to the transport system, and therefore to the development and support of the national economy, became crucial for

³ Flyvbjerg B., Survival of the Unfittest: Why the Worst Infrastructure Gets Built- and What Can We Do About It, "Oxford Review of Economic Policy" 2009, vol 25, s. 344–367.

⁴ Gawrychowski M., Bruskela akceptuje ostatni polski program, "Gazeta Prawna" 2007, nr. 248, s. 21–23.

⁵ Hovorushko T., Obushna N., Sumnist priamykh inozemnykh investytsii ta yikh klasyfikatsiia, "Teorii mikro-makroekonomiky" 2013, vol 41, s. 91–99.

⁶ Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, "Communist Economies & Economic Transformation" 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369–384.

⁷ Kierzenkowski R., The Challenge of Rapidly Improving Transport Infrastructure in Poland, "OECD Economics Department Working Papers" 2008, vol 640.

⁸ Musiat-Malago M., Transport and infrastructure in Poland: the current state and projects for the future, "European Transport" 2005, vol 30, s. 54–60.

⁹ Riabchenko O., Ekonomichni metody derzhavnogo upravlinnia v period reformuvannia ekonomiky, "Vistryk Universytetu vnutrishnikh sprav" 1999, vol 9, s. 327–334.

¹⁰ Schmideg I., Lajtha G., *Hungary: Network Development Report*, Wyd. Mimeo 1993.

¹¹ Shcherbanyn Y., Transport i ekonomycheskyi rost: vzaymosviaz y vlyianie, "Evraziyskaia ekonomycheskaia inehratsiia" 2001, vol 3, nr. 12, s. 65–78.

¹² Short J., Kopp A., Transport infrastructure: Investment and planning. Policy and research aspects, "Transport Policy" 2005, vol 12, s. 360–367.

¹³ Shyba O., *Vplyv rozvytku transportnoi infrastruktury na ekonomichne zrostannia krain-chleniv Yevropeiskoho soiuзу*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017.

the Visegrad countries. Being initially either purely state-owned or exclusively private, these infrastructure projects subsequently began to take the form of public-private partnerships. However, the main peculiarity of investing in the transport system infrastructure and logistics of the Visegrad Group countries was that its volumes were steadily increasing from year to year (though not in all sectors), as illustrated by the data, provided in Table 1.

Table 1. Investment in the Transport System and Infrastructure of the Visegrad Countries (1995–2016), by Type of Transport, in Millions of Euros

Country	Investment in inland transport, EUR million			Investment in road transport, EUR million			Railway investment, EUR million			Investments in inland waterway transport, EUR million			Investment in air transport, EUR million		
	1995	2006	2016	1995	2006	2016	1995	2006	2016	1995	2006	2016	1995	2006	2016
Poland	895	2965	3402	638	2605	3075	248	353	327	10	7	61	27	133	70
Slovakia	133	637	877	53	411	746	59	225	132	21	1	0	4	14	5
Hungary	217	679	1136	131	584	803	85	91	323	1	4	10	33	9	18
Czech Republic	396	1975	1541	283	1492	849	112	465	682	1	19	10	73	71	65
Total	1641	6256	6956	1105	5092	5473	504	1134	1464	33	31	81	137	227	158
Average	410	1564	1739	276	1273	1368	126	284	366	8	8	20	34	57	40

Źródło: *Transport infrastructure investment and maintenance spending*, International transport forum, Źródło: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=ITF_INV-MTN_DATA [odczyt: 01.11.2019]; Bafoil F., Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119.

Simultaneously, one of the important prerequisites for optimizing the development of the countries of the region (prior to and upon their accession to the EU) was the availability of a sufficient transport routes network, once developed within the framework of Warsaw Pact. Respectively, at the point of the USSR collapse, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, were characterised by a minimal basis for transport infrastructure that needed modification, development and considerable improvement so as to become a key driver of economic growth. It is for this reason, as well as for expansion and construction of transport infrastructure, that internal and external investments in the transport network of the Visegrad Group countries were directed. Despite significant funding problems, they gradually began to serve as a basis for accelerating the pace of transport infrastructure and logistics modernization, and the irreversible socio-economic development of the Visegrad countries¹⁴. The following processes have been vivid examples and outcomes of this in the Visegrad Group countries over time: construction and development of highways/motorways, increase in volumes of freight and passenger transportations, increase in volumes of pipeline transportations, accelerated development of air transport.

¹⁴ Hovorushko T., Obushna N., Sutnist priamykh inozemnykh investytsii ta yikh klasyfikatsiia, *Teorii mikro-makroekonomiky* 2013, vol 41, s. 91–99.

Such results have been achieved through a number of national and supranational transport and infrastructure projects (primarily within the EU). National projects were mostly implemented within the framework of long-term state programs, defining the indicators for the transport network development along with the respective amount of financing. In their turn, supranational or international projects were initiated and implemented mainly within the framework of the EU operation and concerned mainly the creation of the trans-European transport network and corresponding transport infrastructure and logistics, considering the possibilities as well as consequences of its integration with the Visegrad countries.

In this light, priority projects for the development of the transport network of the countries of the region were financed either by the countries themselves or with their participation, including the public-private partnership projects. At the same time, from the theoretical viewpoint, it was obvious that for the Visegrad Group countries the share of the GDP, which has been aimed at transport investments, was not certainly known well in advance. The point is that theoretically growth economics determines dependence of the investment share on the country's geography, transport intensity of its manufacturing industries, population density and geographical distribution¹⁵. However, on the other hand, the criterion for the correct level of financing and investing in the transport sector is fairly simple: it must have a profit margin that is equal to a profit margin in any other public or private activities. Instead, any overestating of profit margins in transport logistics as well as infrastructure projects and programs attests to insufficient financing and investment, and a level of profit that does not correspond to the alternative cost of capital means the creation of excess capacity. Accordingly, the profit margin in all potential uses of capital should entirely depend on the country development, or more precisely on the gap between the long-term per capita transport infrastructure resource and its present value¹⁶. In other words, a rational answer to the question of how much should be invested in transport infrastructure, including in the countries of the Visegrad Group, has always required information on capital ratio¹⁷. On the other hand, quite a significant impact on the financing and investment level in the transport system and infrastructure depends on not always foreseeable factors, in particular: political emphasis on investments in the transport system and infrastructure by supporting and reconstructing the existing infrastructure; a political emphasis on investing in international relations.

Against this background the Visegrad Group countries proved to have been characterized by different trends and peculiarities of planning national and supranational investments in transport logistics and infrastructure. On the one hand, infrastructure planning and

¹⁵ Short J., Kopp A., Transport infrastructure: Investment and planning. Policy and research aspects, *"Transport Policy"* 2005, vol 12, s. 360–367.

¹⁶ Arrow K.J., Kurz M., *Public Investment, the Rate of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Baltimore 1970.; Banister D., Berechman J., *Transport Investment and Economic Development*, London 2000.

¹⁷ Short J., Kopp A., Transport infrastructure: Investment and planning. Policy and research aspects, *"Transport Policy"* 2005, vol 12, s. 360–367.

investment are purely a national issue, as infrastructure and logistics have always been an problem to plan, discuss, estimate, address and eventually fund primarily at the national level. Accordingly, planning methods, economic forecasts, estimation methods and decision-making procedures for financial investments in the transport system and infrastructure at the national level are variable. In addition, investing in transport infrastructure at the national level in different Visegrad countries is explained by the fact that this process takes more and more time and money than before. Factually, the implementation of transport projects is becoming more complex and time consuming, for even quite good projects can be blocked by hostile pressure and interest groups¹⁸. In addition, national planning and decision-making in the scope of transport is generally politicized and, seldom absolutely transparent, resulting in the fact that implemented projects fail to meet initial expectations. On the other hand, supranational (in particular from the EU structures) investments in the transport system, logistics and infrastructure significantly improve coordination within national planning, in spite of frequently inconsistent implementation. This is due primarily to the fact that institutional changes have led to an increase in the role of the EU, and inasmuch such an increase in international trade indicators, to a broad discussion of the nature and purpose of international infrastructure development planning, particularly the following shortcomings: defects due to the prolongation of negotiations between countries at the level of local, regional and national authorities; the frequent incompatibility of legal powers, political structures, responsibilities and financial responsibilities and levers at national and supranational levels¹⁹. This stipulates the fact that full financing and investment of transport projects must be determined both nationally and supranationally deterministic, being, however, decisively balanced at the national level.²⁰

It is noteworthy that the investment sources in the transport system and infrastructure of the Visegrad countries have been quite variable²¹. These include: (a) State funding and investment through budgetary allocations that have been generated by general budget revenue, special taxes or government borrowing. In each case, the investment funds come directly from the budget to a specific transport project or initially come to an extrabudgetary fund that controls their costs efficiency during the project implementation. For instance, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have normally created extrabudgetary funds to finance the construction of motorways, whereas Hungary and Poland have used those funds to maintain them; b) private financing, coming from commercial banks and international financial institutions of companies enjoying limited ownership of transport projects. In this

¹⁸ Short J., Kopp A., Transport infrastructure: Investment and planning. Policy and research aspects, *"Transport Policy"* 2005, vol 12, s. 360–367.

¹⁹ Flyvbjerg B., Bruzelius N., Rothengatter W., *Megaprojects and Risk. An Anatomy of Ambition*, Cambridge 2003.

²⁰ Vickerman R., Transport Infrastructure and Region Building in the European Community, *"Journal of Common Market Studies"* 1994, vol 32, nr. 1.

²¹ Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *"Communist Economies & Economic Transformation"* 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369–384.

case, the state can guarantee the loans, taken out by the project operators, yet the tariffs and other revenues associated with the projects implementation must be covered by the loans taken out on them. In the transport sector, as attested by the Hungarian experience, this has traditionally occurred in conditions of high traffic density; c) mixed financing, in terms of which most of the investment comes from government sources, but also important are commercial loans and multilateral investment in addition. In this light, investments and operations are made by concession companies, and fees are charged, at least, to offset the non-public portion of the financial resources.

Interestingly, the choice between public or private, foreign or domestic sources of investment financing, including the Visegrad countries, has always been a complex political and economic decision²². Consequently, the countries of the region never found a specific set of options for financing and investing in transport projects. As a consequence, since the early 1990s financing for transport logistics and infrastructure in the region has increasingly begun to be provided by a complex set of financial resources, which were predominantly banks rather than state and local governments. It was believed that this could guarantee better project orientation as well as more efficient use of resources, thus leading to improved coordination and clarity in the regulation of governments in the region. Especially against the background that the objectives of national investors have always drastically differed from the goals of supranational investors. Moreover, the choice of sources for the transport system financing, either by the state or by private institutions, was largely determined by the socio-economic situation of each country. As a result, for instance, the Hungarian government, having owed a great deal of debt both externally and domestically, took a more liberal and externally oriented stance than the Czech government with lesser debt. Respectively, in the early 90's of the twentieth century transport infrastructure development programmes in Hungary have set a high priority for private financing, thus resulting in substantial progress in the privatization of transport companies²³. In contrast, the Czech Republic, being initially characterized by a relatively balanced budget, relied more on domestic and state-owned companies, so privatization of transport infrastructure services did not require significant external financial resources. Respectively, price level was considerably higher in Hungary rather than that in the Czech Republic, with the former being characterised by a more competitive environment than the latter²⁴. In general, in the early 90's the Visegrad countries calculated the expediency of constructing a network of motorways of about 5000 km long by 2020, however, later this adjustment was adjusted to a more realistic one with 700-1000 km

²² Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *"Communist Economies & Economic Transformation"* 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369–384.

²³ Szanyi M., *Services: A privatisation success story?*, [w:] Csaki G. (ed.), *Transition-Infrastructure*, Wyd. Institute for World Economics 1994.

²⁴ Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *"Communist Economies & Economic Transformation"* 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369–384.

of motorways as of 2000²⁵. Simultaneously, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have initially agreed to do this primarily at the expense of state sources of financing and funds, partly from foreign loans, whereas in Hungary and Poland - mostly by concession contracts with minimal involvement of public finances, but attracting broad external financing instead.

Even despite the fact that prior to joining the EU in 2004 the state budget was the key source of financing transport logistics and infrastructure projects in the Visegrad countries²⁶ since all the powers were concentrated in the government. Simultaneously, as state budgets of the central countries of the region as the main source of funding transport infrastructure projects were far from equal, there were fewer opportunities to allocate large funding for transport infrastructure and logistics. Hence, only upon the accession to the EU did Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic qualify for the EU funds. At the same time, the EU funding opportunities for the Visegrad Group countries have improved since the start of the EU's new financial perspectives for 2007-2013. For example, over 2007-2013 approximately EUR 24.4 billion in investment from the EU structural and cohesion funds were allocated for Poland, particularly for its various transport projects and the entire transport sector²⁷. Of these, € 14.9 billion (over 60 percent) was planned for the road sector (50 percent of which were targeted for projects related to the European TEN-T network), € 5.5 billion (more than 20 percent) for railways, 0.7 billion euros (about 3 percent) for maritime and inland waterway transport and only 0.2 billion euros (slightly less than 1 percent) for intermodal facilities. These funds covered almost 700 km of motorways and more than 800 km of highways totaling EUR 16 billion that were constructed or upgraded in 2007-2013, of which EUR 10 billion was co-financed by the EU²⁸. At the same time, the state / budget financing of the road transport sector in Poland over the period from 2008 to 2012 was significantly lower, being estimated at EUR 10 billion. This stipulates that the planned and real allocation of transport costs in Poland has never indeed corresponded to the «State Transport Policy for 2006-2025», which emphasizes the need for balanced development of transport infrastructure, in particular, enhancing the competitiveness of other modes of transport compared to the road network²⁹. A similar situation is typical for all Visegrad countries, having traditionally lagged behind Mid-European (particularly in Western Europe³⁰) indicators and shares of public-private partnerships and investment in transport³¹, as can be proved by the data in Table 2.

²⁵ Schmideg I., Lajtha G., *Hungary: Network Development Report*, Wyd. Mimeo 1993; Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *Communist Economies & Economic Transformation* 1995, vol 7, nr 3, s. 369–384.

²⁶ Musiat-Malago M., Transport and infrastructure in Poland: the current state and projects for the future, *European Transport* 2005, vol 30, s. 58.

²⁷ *Wpływ członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej i realizowanej polityki spójności na rozwój kraju*, Wyd. Ministerstwo Infrastruktury i Rozwoju 2014, s. 20.

²⁸ *Poland's 10 years in the European Union*, Wyd. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, s. 16.

²⁹ *Polityka Transportowa Państwa na lata 2006–2025*, Wyd. Ministry of Infrastructure 2005.

³⁰ Blanc-Brude F., Goldsmith H., Valila T., Public-private partnerships in Europe: An update, *Economic and Financial Report* 2007, vol 3.

³¹ Atkinson P., van den Noord P., Managing Public Expenditure: Some Emerging Policy Issues and a Framework for Analysis, *Economics Department Working Papers* 2001 vol 285; *OECD Principles for Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure*, Wyd. OECD 2007.

Table 2. Relative financial involvement of the Visegrad Group countries and other European countries in public-private partnership projects (particularly in the transport sector) (1990-2006), as a percentage of all public-private partnership projects in Europe

Country	Share of the value of the signed projects, in %	Share of the number of the signed projects, in %
United Kingdom	57,7	76,2
Spain	12,8	8,6
Portugal	5,8	2,3
France	3,9	2,8
Greece	3,9	0,6
Italy	3,7	2,1
Germany	2,9	2,4
Hungary	2,7	0,8
Netherlands	1,7	1,0
Belgium	1,1	0,7
Poland	0,9	0,4
Ireland	0,7	0,7
Austria	0,6	0,2
Cyprus	0,4	0,3
Czech Republic	0,4	0,2
Finland	0,2	0,2
Sweedden	0,2	0,1
Malta	0,1	0,1
Romania	0,1	0,2
Latvia	0,1	0,1
Slovakia	0,1	0,0
Slovenia	0,0	0,0
Total	100,0	100,0
Average	4,5	4,5
On average in the region	1,0	0,4

Źródło: *Economic and Financial Report 2007/03 "Public-private partnerships in Europe: An update"*, Wyd. European Investment Bank 2007.; Kierzenkowski R., The Challenge of Rapidly Improving Transport Infrastructure in Poland, "OECD Economics Department Working Papers" 2008, vol 640.

Therefore, the effective mobilization of European funds by countries in the region is aimed primarily at achieving quantitative rather than qualitative indicators of the transport development, especially regarding the spending of all available funds, and not their efficient allocation³². In addition, the fact that there is little evidence that both the EU-related and

³² Kierzenkowski R., The Challenge of Rapidly Improving Transport Infrastructure in Poland, "OECD Economics Department Working Papers" 2008, vol 640.

non-EU-related transport projects take due account of the interconnections between different modes of transport³³. Even though national and European programmes and strategies for transport development have declared the feasibility of implementing a comprehensive plan, which takes into account the impossibility of substitution and complementarity in the transport sector. As a consequence, in order to avoid misallocation of resources, it is important to improve coordination between various levels of government when developing investment plans for the development of transport logistics and infrastructure.

This presupposes that the financing of the transport infrastructure and the system of the Visegrad Group countries occurred mainly on a mixed basis, i.e. involving both transport companies' own resources and budget expenditures, as well as private / non-state investments, including those from outside the countries of the region. In this respect, the sources of funding the development of transport infrastructure in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were the state budget funds, local budget funds and other sources (investments, credit funds, etc.)³⁴. Since 2004, when the Visegrad countries joined the EU, investment and financing of transport projects has become more far-sighted and systematic, since it has begun to take into account the tools to address the lack of financial and economic resources, in particular by additional budgetary appropriations and targeted taxes for users of infrastructure services, attracting government guaranteed loans, extrabudgetary investments through the use of public-private partnership mechanisms and other forms of investment. This has led to a significant diversification of prices for transport infrastructure-related jobs and services, particularly those in the Visegrad countries.

In general, deliberate investment policies, aimed at developing the network and transport infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries, have made a significant contribution to the socio-economic development of the region. The fact is that by aiming at reducing the transport component in the final price of goods moving between the periphery and the center, they have played an important role in balancing socio-economic disparities between individual countries and regions, enhancing their competitiveness, facilitating access to new markets, labour migration, specialization and cooperation, reduction of the cost of moving goods within external and internal logistics systems. In general, this has significantly contributed to the growth of labour productivity as well as the creation of new competitive advantages of the Visegrad Group countries. It has manifested itself in the following: improvement of high-quality transport and therefore socio-economic characteristics, due to investment in the construction of high-speed highways, airports, railways for high-speed trains, repair and maintenance of high-level transport infrastructure; promoting the efficient use of existing transportation facilities; optimization of the transport process using intelligent systems; an increase in the overall level of competitiveness. In addition, investments in the transport system and infrastructure in the

³³ Gawrychowski M., Bruskela akceptuje ostatni polski program, "Gazeta Prawna" 2007, nr. 248, s. 21–23.

³⁴ Shcherbanyn Y., Transport i ekonomycheskiy rost: vzaymosv'яз y vlyaniye, „Evnazyiskaia ekonomycheskaia intelektualnaya” 2001, vol 3, nr. 12, s. 67–68.

Visegrad Group countries have led to such parameters and markers of socio-economic growth as: growing levels of trade activity and exports; increase in network traffic; increase in the overall level of investment and assets; increase in income levels (in particular GDP per capita); increase in gross product and decrease in inflation fluctuations; acceleration of innovative investments in the economy; increase in industrial growth; acceleration of social development; ecologisation³⁵.

This is evidence of the close ties between investment in the transport infrastructure and the economic growth of the Visegrad Group countries. The matter is that transport infrastructure investments, and therefore an improved transport system, is the key to a fast transportation of goods from producers to consumers, from transport stations / centers to manufacturers and consumers, as well as the prerequisite for a more comfortable and safe transportation of passengers. In addition, as the experience of the Visegrad Group countries demonstrates, the development and investment of the transport system and infrastructure have stimulated the accumulation of other factors of production, and may therefore be an important factor in generating aggregate demand. After all, transport and infrastructure projects are accompanied by significant investments in construction, and subsequently in repair and reconstruction of facilities, thus increasing the demand for products of related industries³⁶. Thus, investment in the transport infrastructure of the Visegrad Group countries has a positive effect on the gross accumulation of capital and capacity in industry, along with the share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption. Yet an important by-effect of the socio-economic development of the Visegrad Group countries was that the investment in the transport infrastructure led not only to the development and improvement of its current state, but also to a considerable investment, especially foreign, in other economic sectors, with a growing total return on investment projects.

It is therefore obvious that transport infrastructure investments in the Visegrad Group countries have remained the basis of strategies, stimulating economic growth and, in general, regional development in the European Union³⁷. However, such a conclusion is rather relative and holds true for the time being only, since historically, particularly in the 1990s, the returns on transport infrastructure investment in the Visegrad Group countries were more limited than expenditures on other areas of development, including human capital and innovation³⁸. The situation began to slightly change before, but mainly after the region's accession to the EU. Moreover, theoretically, such a vector of the transport development as well as its impact on the economic system was quite multifaceted. Firstly, changes in transport accessibility, having

³⁵ Shyba O., *Vplyv rozvytku transportnoi infrastruktury na ekonomichne zrostantia krain-chleniv Yevropeiskoho soiuзу*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017, s. 95–96.

³⁶ Riabchenko O., *Ekonomichni metody derzhavnoho upravlinnia v period reformuvannya ekonomiky*, „*Visnyk Universytetu vnutrishnikh sprav*” 1999, vol 9, s. 328.

³⁷ Crescenzi R., Di Cataldo M., Rodriguez-Pose A., *Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions*, *Journal of Regional Science* 2016, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 555–582.

³⁸ Rodriguez-Pose A., Fratesi U., *Between development and social policies: The impact of European Structural Funds on Objective 1 regions*, *Regional Studies* 2004, vol 38, s. 97–113; Crescenzi R., *Innovation and regional growth in the enlarged Europe: the role of local innovative capabilities, peripherality and education*, *Growth and Change* 2005, vol 36, s. 471–507.; Crescenzi R., Rodriguez-Pose A., *Infrastructure and regional growth in the European Union*, *Papers in Regional Science* 2012, vol 91, s. 487–513.

begun from new roads and routes, benefited the Visegrad Group's economic centre and core at the expense the periphery³⁹. Secondly, transport infrastructure ROI began to be mediated by the quality of state and local institutions, responsible for ensuring the selection and implementation of specific transport projects. The fact is that the institutional environment for investments makes an impact upon the scale and types of new transport infrastructure investments and therefore their economic profitability⁴⁰. Although, in contrast, the problem, according to which new transport infrastructure investments may be more associated with political and individual rather than economic and collective interests have not been fully eliminated yet⁴¹.

Accordingly, this means that the economic effects of the transport system investments in the Visegrad countries have been both independent and synthetic, in particular given the overlapping of certain institutional characteristics. However, both from practical and theoretical perspectives, this is due to the following facts: transport infrastructure investments in poor, inefficient or inadequate institutional settings can seriously undermine the ROI; investing in new transport infrastructure is better and more efficient than supporting the existing transport infrastructure⁴². Moreover, the countries of the Visegrad Group have not yet reached such a level of transport infrastructure development, when, as some researchers argue⁴³, additional road extensions will have limited impact on economic performance.

In addition, there frequently occurs an effect when the link between economic growth and transport infrastructure disappears two or three years following the full accessibility of the latter⁴⁴, especially when it comes to long-distance and inter-regional routes within individual countries⁴⁵. This is particularly true in relation to the view that the system of incentives and constraints, created by government institutions and the effectiveness of political administration affect the overall transport infrastructure ROI⁴⁶. The point is that political and institutional factors can

³⁹ Puga D., Venables A., Preferential trading arrangements and industrial location, *Journal of International Economics* 1997, vol 43, s. 347–368.

⁴⁰ Crescenzi R., Di Cataldo M., Rodriguez-Pose A., Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions, *Journal of Regional Science* 2016, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 555–582.

⁴¹ Cantarelli C., Flyvbjerg B., Molin E., van Wee B., Cost Overruns in Large-scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness, *European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research* 2010, vol 10, s. 5–18.; Flyvbjerg B., Survival of the Unfit: Why the Worst Infrastructure Gets Built- and What Can We Do About It, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 2009, vol 25, s. 344–367.; Esfahani H., Ramirez M., Institutions, infrastructure, and economic growth, *Journal of Development Economics* 2003, vol 70, s. 443–477.

⁴² Crescenzi R., Di Cataldo M., Rodriguez-Pose A., Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions, *Journal of Regional Science* 2016, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 555–582.

⁴³ Crescenzi R., Rodriguez-Pose A., Infrastructure and regional growth in the European Union, *Papers in Regional Science* 2012, vol 91, s. 487–513.; Cappelen A., Castellacci F., Fagerberg J., Verspagen B., The impact of EU regional support on growth and convergence in the European Union, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 2003, vol 41, s. 621–644.

⁴⁴ Crescenzi R., Rodriguez-Pose A., Infrastructure endowment and investment as determinants of regional growth in the European Union, *EIB Papers* 2008, vol 13, s. 62–101.; Crescenzi R., Di Cataldo M., Rodriguez-Pose A., Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions, *Journal of Regional Science* 2016, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 555–582.

⁴⁵ Puga D., European regional policies in the light of recent location theories, *Journal of Economic Geography* 2002, vol 2, s. 373–406.; Cappelen A., Castellacci F., Fagerberg J., Verspagen B., The impact of EU regional support on growth and convergence in the European Union, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 2003, vol 41, s. 621–644.; Rodriguez-Pose A., Fratesi U., Between development and social policies: The impact of European Structural Funds on Objective 1 regions, *Regional Studies* 2004, vol 38, s. 97–113.

⁴⁶ Crain W., Oakley L., The Politics of Infrastructure, *Journal of Law and Economics* 1995 vol 38, s. 1–17.; Henisz W., The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment, *Industrial and Corporate Change* 2002, vol 11, s. 355–389.

influence both the cost of transport infrastructure and the economic return at each investment stage⁴⁷. Therefore, starting from the planning and selection of transport projects up to their actual implementation, the peculiarities of the public administration system play an extremely important role in determining the future transport system efficiency.

This means that the relationship between transport infrastructure investments and their planning system, as well as the need for large budgets, large numbers of participants, and the complexity of applying effective control mechanisms make the transport sector particularly vulnerable to political interference and corruption⁴⁸. Moreover, inadequate political institutions can have a very negative impact upon the economic profitability of transport infrastructure investments, even long before the actual use of the funds invested. For this reason governments and local administrations have a direct responsibility for proper infrastructure planning and rigorous project selection, making transport infrastructure planning and financing a purely political issue⁴⁹. For example, in the Visegrad countries, other European countries likewise, this means that decision-making on new transport investments is «generally politicized, rarely fully transparent»⁵⁰, as a result, transport investments frequently meet clientele political expectations rather than the expediency requirements⁵¹. It has been exemplified by the fact that, for instance, in Poland and Slovakia, occasionally there have been cases of pre-determined tender prices for projects in the transport system⁵². This is especially true when it comes not to the central, but to the local level of governance and the transport infrastructure development management, which prioritizes political and individual preferences over economic and collective interests. Thus, institutional and state failures, typical of the peripheral regions of the Visegrad Group countries, can be an obstacle to transforming transport infrastructure investments into new economic activity and development. However, from the purely practical angle, the countries of the Visegrad Group (though to a different extent) since 1991 showed significant improvements in the transport infrastructure development, which considerably correlated with the increase in transport system investments. This confirms the viewpoint that development strategies focused

⁴⁷ Esfahani H., Ramirez M., Institutions, infrastructure, and economic growth, *Journal of Development Economics* 2003, vol 70, s. 443–477.

⁴⁸ Flyvbjerg B., Survival of the Unfittest: Why the Worst Infrastructure Gets Built- and What Can We Do About It, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 2009, vol 25, s. 344–367.; Cantarelli C., Flyvbjerg B., Molin E., van Wee B., Cost Overruns in Large-scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness, *European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research* 2010, vol 10, s. 5–18.; Kenny C., Measuring and Reducing the Impact of Corruption in Infrastructure, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2006, vol 4099.

⁴⁹ Crescenzi R., Di Cataldo M., Rodriguez-Pose A., Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions, *Journal of Regional Science* 2016, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 555–582.

⁵⁰ Short J., Kopp A., Transport infrastructure: Investment and planning. Policy and research aspects, *Transport Policy* 2005, vol 12, s. 363.

⁵¹ Short J., Kopp A., Transport infrastructure: Investment and planning. Policy and research aspects, *Transport Policy* 2005, vol 12, s. 360–367.; Flyvbjerg B., Survival of the Unfittest: Why the Worst Infrastructure Gets Built- and What Can We Do About It, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 2009, vol 25, s. 350.; Kenny C., Infrastructure, Governance and Corruption: Where Next?, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2007, vol 4331.

⁵² Crescenzi R., Di Cataldo M., Rodriguez-Pose A., Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions, *Journal of Regional Science* 2016, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 555–582.

on spending on new transport infrastructure may not be sufficient enough to stimulate growth potential in each country or region⁵³.

It resulted in an opportunity to substantiate that the transport infrastructure investments in the Visegrad Group countries made a positive impact upon the level of trade activity and exports, the volume of transport in the network, the overall level of investment and capital activity of the countries of the region, as well as the level of income of the population, gross product and inflation fluctuations⁵⁴. In turn, it enabled to actively use modern technologies in transport logistics, further develop transport infrastructure and influence the efficient allocation of productive forces and capacities of manufacturing enterprises, use natural resources effectively, as well as expand markets for the sale of products (goods, works and services). This was attested to by the relationship between capital investment in the development of transport infrastructure, remuneration and reduction of unemployment in the Visegrad countries, yet with regional differences, e.g.: Hungary and Slovakia have remained outsiders, being directly dependent on transport infrastructure investments and overall direct foreign investment; Poland is the leader in the relationship between transport infrastructure investments and overall GDP, whereas Hungary and Slovakia are lagging behind; Hungary and Slovakia are the outsiders in terms the relationship between transport infrastructure investments and innovation costs. It testifies that the mechanism of investments influence on the development of transport infrastructure of the Visegrad Group countries consists of the stimulating positive effect of the transport infrastructure investments in the region both on the improvement of working conditions and for the services market: lower prices, time savings and greater market flexibility. As a consequence, the accessibility and capacity of markets are growing, in their turn affecting the «scale effect» of growth and innovation.

References

1. Arrow K.J., Kurz M., *Public Investment, the Rate of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Baltimore 1970.
2. Atkinson P., van den Noord P., Managing Public Expenditure: Some Emerging Policy Issues and a Framework for Analysis, *"Economics Department Working Papers"* 2001 vol 285.
3. Bafoil F., Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *"Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs"* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119.
4. Banister D., Berechman J., *Transport Investment and Economic Development*, London 2000.
5. Blanc-Brude F., Goldsmith H., Valila T., Public-private partnerships in Europe: An update, *"Economic and Financial Report"* 2007, vol 3.
6. Cantarelli C., Flyvbjerg B., Molin E., van Wee B., Cost Overruns in Large-scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness, *"European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research"* 2010, vol 10, s. 5–18.

⁵³ Vickerman R., Regional impacts of Trans-European Networks, *"Annals of Regional Science"* 1995, vol 29, s. 237–254.

⁵⁴ Shyba O., *Vplyv rozvytku transportnoi infrastruktury na ekonomichne zrostantnia krain-chleniv Yevropeiskoho soiuзу*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017, s. 101.

7. Cappelen A., Castellacci F., Fagerberg J., Verspagen B., The impact of EU regional support on growth and convergence in the European Union, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 2003, vol 41, s. 621–644.
8. Crain W., Oakley L., The Politics of Infrastructure, *Journal of Law and Economics* 1995 vol 38, s. 1–17.
9. Crescenzi R., Innovation and regional growth in the enlarged Europe: the role of local innovative capabilities, peripherality and education, *Growth and Change* 2005, vol 36, s. 471–507.
10. Crescenzi R., Di Cataldo M., Rodriguez-Pose A., Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions, *Journal of Regional Science* 2016, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 555–582.
11. Crescenzi R., Rodriguez-Pose A., Infrastructure and regional growth in the European Union, *Papers in Regional Science* 2012, vol 91, s. 487–513.
12. Crescenzi R., Rodriguez-Pose A., Infrastructure endowment and investment as determinants of regional growth in the European Union, *EIB Papers* 2008, vol 13, s. 62–101.
13. *Economic and Financial Report 2007/03 "Public-private partnerships in Europe: An update"*, Wyd. European Investment Bank 2007.
14. Esfahani H., Ramirez M., *Institutions, infrastructure, and economic growth*, *Journal of Development Economics* 2003, vol 70, s. 443–477.
15. Flyvbjerg B., Survival of the Unfittest: Why the Worst Infrastructure Gets Built- and What Can We Do About It, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 2009, vol 25, s. 344–367.
16. Flyvbjerg B., Bruzelius N., Rothengatter W., *Megaprojects and Risk. An Anatomy of Ambition*, Cambridge 2003.
17. Gawrychowski M., Bruskela akceptuje ostatni polski program, *Gazeta Prawna* 2007, nr. 248, s. 21–23.
18. Hovorushko T., Obushna N., Sutnist priamykh inozemnykh investytsii ta yikh klasyfikatsiia, „*Teorii mikro-makroekonomiky*“ 2013, vol 41, s. 91–99.
19. Henisz W., The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment, *Industrial and Corporate Change* 2002, vol 11, s. 355–389.
20. Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *Communist Economies & Economic Transformation* 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369–384.
21. Kenny C., Infrastructure, Governance and Corruption: Where Next?, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2007, vol 4331.
22. Kenny C., Measuring and Reducing the Impact of Corruption in Infrastructure, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2006, vol 4099.
23. Kierzenkowski R., The Challenge of Rapidly Improving Transport Infrastructure in Poland, *OECD Economics Department Working Papers* 2008, vol 640.
24. Musiat-Malago M., Transport and infrastructure in Poland: the current state and projects for the future, *European Transport* 2005, vol 30, s. 54–60.

25. *OECD Principles for Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure*, Wyd. OECD 2007.
26. *Poland's 10 years in the European Union*, Wyd. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014.
27. *Polityka Transportowa Państwa na lata 2006–2025*, Wyd. Ministry of Infrastructure 2005.
28. Puga D., European regional policies in the light of recent location theories, *“Journal of Economic Geography”* 2002, vol 2, s. 373–406.
29. Puga D., Venables A., Preferential trading arrangements and industrial location, *“Journal of International Economics”* 1997, vol 43, s. 347–368.
30. Riabchenko O., Ekonomichni metody derzhavnoho upravlinnia v period reformuvannia ekonomiky, „*Visnyk Universytetu vnutrishnikh sprav*“ 1999, vol 9, s. 327–334.
31. Rodriguez-Pose A., Fratesi U., Between development and social policies: The impact of European Structural Funds on Objective 1 regions, *“Regional Studies”* 2004, vol 38, s. 97–113.
32. Schmideg I., Lajtha G., *Hungary: Network Development Report*, Wyd. Mimeo 1993.
33. Shcherbanyn Y., Transport i ekonomycheskyi rost: vzaymosviaz y vlyianie, „*Evraziyskaia ekonomycheskaia intebratsyia*“ 2001, vol 3, nr. 12, s. 65–78.
34. Short J., Kopp A., Transport infrastructure: Investment and planning. Policy and research aspects, *“Transport Policy”* 2005, vol 12, s. 360–367.
35. Shyba O., *Vplyv rozvytku transportnoi infrastruktury na ekonomichne zrostannia krain-chleniv Yevropeiskoho soiuzu*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017.
36. Szanyi M., *Services: A privatisation success story?*, [w:] Csaki G. (ed.), *Transition-Infrastructure*, Wyd. Institute for World Economics 1994.
37. *Transport infrastructure investment and maintenance spending*, International transport forum, źródło: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?&datasetcode=ITF_INV-MTN_DATA [odczyt: 01.11.2019].
38. Vickerman R., Regional impacts of Trans-European Networks, *“Annals of Regional Science”* 1995, vol 29, s. 237–254.
39. Vickerman R., Transport Infrastructure and Region Building in the European Community, *“Journal of Common Market Studies”* 1994, vol 32, nr. 1.
40. *Wplyw czlonkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej i realizowanej polityki spójności na rozwój kraju*, Wyd. Ministerstwo Infrastruktury i Rozwoju 2014.

Before the State Police. Formation genesis.

Abstract

Contemporary Polish Police celebrates its jubilee under the slogan of the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the State Police. This took place on July 24, 1919, when the Legislative Sejm adopted the State Police Act. Before this happened, the evolution of Polish organizations and public order services continued, which resulted in the establishment of the first, after Poland regained independence, a centralized police service. In this work, the author points to the then realities of practical activities of organizations and services working for public security, their mutual relations, official pragmatics against the background of legal and political changes at the turn of 1918/1919. The content based on contemporary publications, but also on numerous sources from the 1920s, such as legal acts, departmental press, journalism records and the police practice of that time, constitute the precursor character of this study.

This year Poland's Police force celebrates the centenary of the founding of the Polish National Police. On July 25, 1919, National Police was called into existence by an Act the Polish Diet. Before the National Police was formed, the law and order organizations kept evolving to result in the formation of a centrally controlled police force. This author discusses the functioning of the organizations and units which maintained public safety under the conditions that prevailed at the time. The paper shows how these different services interacted with each other during the period of 1918/1919 in the context of the political and legal transformations the country was undergoing. The novel character of this presentation lies in its use of contemporary sources, in conjunction with archival documents from the second decade of the 20th century, including laws passed, trade publications, diaries, to study developments in police work.

Keywords: state police of the Second Polish Republic, security,

2019 is the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the State Police, the first Polish police formation uniform throughout the country. Contemporary Police, which shapes its structure and working methods on the basis of legal changes brought about by the Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police. He places his traditions in the predecessor of the interwar period. However, there was such a time in the history of Polish security organizations that the process of shaping them had to be started from absolute basics. The Act of July 24, 1919, which was established as the State Police, began to form a centralized police service in independent Poland. This process lasted at least until 1922 and was extremely difficult considering the legacy of the partitioning

powers. The way to build a modern police service was not straightforward and did not always mean an evolution in the construction and merging into unity of many services operating at one time, whose task was to guard the internal security of the state and protect citizens. Generally, the names of police authorities from the turn of 1918/1919, known at that time as public order services or security guards, are known. However, in widely available publications it is difficult to find the realities of those services, their mutual relations and information on effectiveness. Hence, addressing these issues in the article may be pioneering. The material is based in publications devoted to the State Police, but its „life dimension” is evidenced primarily by sources from the early 1920s, among which, in addition to legislation, mention should be made of the departmental press and diary entries.

The Act of July 24, 1919 on the State Police¹ (hereinafter PP) was the first step of the state to build a modern, centralized public order service, whose task was to guard the internal security of the state and its citizens. The beginnings of PP organization and activities were very difficult. It was a process whose opening can already be seen with the outbreak of World War I and the beginning of hostilities in the Polish territories covered by the partitions.

The outbreak of World War I and the course of hostilities on the Polish lands were a challenge for the services dealing with the protection of order and security. Along with the changes in the functioning of the administration of the partitioning powers of the war, Polish security organizations of various ranges began to appear and structure, dealing with the protection of people and infrastructure against common crime and criminal. Their activities became the foundation for building a modern, centralized police service.

Before this happened, Polish society began rapid changes related to the restoration of state structures. Countries that after 123 years of captivity created their institutions from scratch. As Janusz Żarnowski notes: These were, of course, above all institutions related to the state, resulting from the constitutional order in the system: parliament and elections: government; judiciary; armed forces; administration of all types and levels². Independence meant changes in the functioning of public life. The statement that: Some previously educated institutions have lost their current role should be considered consistent. Various socio-economic, cooperative and educational organizations during the partitions they played a role far beyond their statutory goals³. The social or socio-economic organizations operating until now, which during the partitions conducted activities that were much broader than the statutory ones, along with the organization of the state began to lose their significance. This situation also directly concerned the activities of social security organizations. While on the threshold of independence, a significant part of them arose as civic guards or militia loosely connected

¹ Act on the State Police of July 24, 1919 Journal of Laws of the Polish State, R 1919, No. 61, Pos. 363

² J. Żarnowski, *Dwudziestolecie międzywojenne 1918-1939 jako etap rozwoju narodu polskiego*, w *Polska Niepodległa 1918-1939*. Wszechnica PAN, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1984, p. 14.

³ *Ibidem.*, 14.

with the apparatus of the partitioning powers - although acting with their consent⁴, the rebirth of statehood was associated with the taking over of their tasks by state structures. In this „social” phase of the organization of security services, one should not forget about their pro-independence orientations, bearing in mind the building of human resources for future, already state security services⁵.

Basically, the emergence of security services on Polish soil during the war had two main strands: social (civic guards) and institutional. In the latter, the appointed services had a different genesis and not always purely police character, sometimes having their roots in political parties, e.g. People’s Militia of the Polish Socialist Party and many self-government organizations such as city militia, powiat militia. Often the creation and activities of these organizations were organized in consultation with the partitioning authorities still in office, an example of which is the fate of these services in Warsaw. Therefore, it is worth dividing the period of their creation and functioning into the one still under the control of the partitioning powers and the one when these organizations were already functioning within the structures of the reviving Polish state existence.

A picture of the formation of Polish public order organizations yet Henryk Wardęski presents during the operation of the partitioning police and in the coming years of regaining independence⁶ in the title „My police memories.” The author in his diary work shows the evolution of these organizations and their activities, captures the complicated matter of building Polish public order services, primarily on the example of the capital city of Warsaw⁷. On the basis of these diaries, it is easier to understand how necessary the unification and centralization of police services became as soon as Poland regained independence.

The first Citizens’ Guards, usually formed by Citizens’ Committees, began to be created in the former Kingdom of Poland together with the withdrawal of the Russian administration. Often, the guards began their operation under the guidance of the tsarist administration, then to conduct their activities after the invasion of German or Austro-Hungarian troops. This does not mean that these organizations were fully accepted by the occupiers.

By tolerating the Guard’s activity in general, the occupation authorities sought to reduce their scope of activity and, above all, to become dependent on their own military bodies. The struggle for Polish possessions created against this background was crowned with a serious

⁴ An example of activities aimed at creating Polish security organizations with the approval of partitioning countries may be the delegation to create them contained in the Regency Council decree of 3 January 1918 on the temporary organization of general authorities in the Kingdom of Poland. His art. 24 said that the competence of the interior minister was to prepare, and then take over and manage all matters falling within the scope of general national management and supervision over the local government, police of all kinds (...).

⁵ More about the role of the emerging state and its impact on society in *Spoleczeństwo międzywojenne: nowe spojrzenie*, edtion W. Mędrzickiego i J. Żarnowskiego, Instytut Historyczny PAN, Warsaw, 2015.

⁶ Henryk Wardęski - lawyer and author of „Moje wspomnienia policyjne.” Published by the „Policyjny Dom Zdrowia” Association Warsaw 1925. (1925 appears in the imprint, 1926 on the cover of the book). H. Wardęski officer of many Polish public order services. In the years 1914-1919, among others in the Citizens’ Guard of the Capital City of Warsaw, City Militia, Municipal Police. In the State Police he held, among others functions of the commander of the PP of the Warsaw District I, deputy commander of the PP in 1922-1929.

⁷ J. Paciorkowski, *Zapomniany komendant*, monthly 997 Police, vol.106/01.2014.

effect: both the Guards and later Militia retained a purely Polish character and possibly an independent position⁸. Examples of guards organizing in this way date back to July 1914.

The Organized Militia in Warsaw (initially referred to as the Warsaw Citizens' Guard and then - from February 1, 1916 City Militia (Capital City of Warsaw) should be regarded as having the greatest impact on civil guard organizations. This influence was, among others, an organizational model for other guards. But above all, the germ of the central character of the public security services of the capital's guard, which was manifested by directing police instructors to other cities, where they became chiefs of local guards, in Radom, Płock, and Łuków, directed there from the Warsaw Municipal Militia.

In turn, the Civic Guard of the Dąbrowski Basin is recognized as the first chronologically functioning civic guard.

On 30 July, the hastily organized Guard began to take over the posts, in the face of the still existing, but ever thinner, police of Russia. In this way, July 30, 1914 became not only the day on which the Citizens' Guard of the Dąbrowski Basin commenced operations, but at the same time the day of commencing the activity of the first Polish security organization, which became the Basin Guards under the uniform management of the Zagłębie Civil Guard District Headquarters headed by the president of the district of Sokoła, late Kazimierz Srokowski⁹.

Citizens' guards were social organizations, not uniformed (usually the sign was the armband on the left shoulder), generally serving without arms or equipped with private clubs or walking sticks. Their evolution to militia institutions with legally regulated powers, most often in order to maintain order, sanitary, industrial, commercial, construction and uniforms and equipment mainly in the form of melee weapons and paid from municipal coffers lasted until the withdrawal of troops and administration of the partitioning powers. From the first days of November 1918, the Polish administration proceeds through the activities of the police department established in July by the Regency Council in the Ministry of the Interior (department since September) to establish and organize a uniform police service. However, due to the multitude and variety of functioning services and the extremely dynamic situation related to the takeover and shaping of political power in an independent state, this task will be developed until July 1919.

Matters related to ensuring public order and security were from the beginning put as essential for the situation of the state rebuilding from the ruins. This is evidenced by the records of the Lublin Government Manifesto of November 7, 1918, issued by the Provisional People's Government of the Republic of Poland: 9) after the final constitution, we will immediately reorganize ourselves on the principles of sincerely democratic councils municipalities, powiat assemblies and municipal governments, as well as to organize around cities and villages of the

⁸ E. Grabowiecki (red.), *Dziesięciolecie Służby Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce Odrodzonej*, Wydawnictwo „Gazety Administracji i Policji Państwowej”, Warszawa 1925, (oryginal spelling), p. 2.

⁹ *Ibidem.*, p. 2.

people's militia, which would ensure order and security to the people, and to obey and execute the ordinances of our executive bodies and to properly address the issue of food provision¹⁰.

The announcements related to raising the state of internal security of the state were rooted in a drastic decline in this security related to the situation of the new legal state of the state and the result of hostilities in Poland. One of the results of these activities was also the situation of the population. Jan Molenda draws her attention in the context of the breakdown of society as a result of vocations to the military service of partitioning countries. He emphasizes the scale of this phenomenon in the context of sources illustrating it: (...) several million Poles lived apart from their families as a result of their vocation to serve in the partitioning armies and mass migrations and waited in uncertain times looking forward to hearing about the fate of loved ones¹¹.

Large amounts of weapons and the criminal gangs using them, poorly protected, unregulated borders, the lack of authority of Polish police services, were great challenges for young Polish statehood. That's why the authorities with police regulations did not hesitate and sought to sort out this matter of state activity. Almost from the beginning, subsequent governments sought to unify and centralize police services in post-Army Polish lands.

It was not an easy task, given the number of public order formations operating at that time, including PPS People's Militia, National Guard (related to the ending), People's Militia (hereinafter ML), City Police (local government), National Gendarmerie¹², Field Gendarmerie, Railway Guard. The catalog of the then operating services is also quoted by Juliusz Kozolubski, mentioning also the Earth Guards (in the villages), the Gendarmerie of Lviv Defense, the River Guard, the Police Presidium in Poznań he describes the situation as follows:

This condition gave rise to frequent conflicts of competence; besides, the abundance of security organs was dangerous for small thugs, but serious criminals escaped the hands of justice due to the lack of any coordination of the efforts of all these security organizations¹³.

Similarly, the situation is illustrated by the daily press of that period, which reports about events that occur in connection with the activities of many security organizations politically motivated and not hesitating to use any means in confrontation with competing service. And so the Warsaw titles at the time still reported on incidents in which public order organization officers were questionable heroes.

In the titles we read: „Robotnik” No. 291 of 12/11/1918: Dowborians conducted brutal searches of several socialists, No. 296 of 15/11; members of the National Guard beat a member

¹⁰ Manifesto of the Lublin Government of November 7, 1918, item 9.

¹¹ J. Molenda, *Polska w Wielkiej Wojnie 1914-1918. Kilka refleksji w sprawie stanu badań (part I 1914-1939)*, *Dzieje Najnowsze*, year XLVI - 2014, 3, p. 64. Review of the scientific literature on the state of Polish society in the period preceding regaining independence. Author, among others draws attention to the massive involvement of Poles in the partitioning armies and presents numerous sources that may form the basis for research, including the state of order and public security, and, consequently, the situation in which Polish police authorities began operating.

¹² J. Suliński, *Zandarmeria Krajowa załączkiem Policji Stanowej (1918-1922)*, *CSP Police Quarterly*, No. 2/2014; more about the gendarmerie M. Przeniosło, *Zandarmeria w Galicji Zachodniej w początkach niepodległości (1918-1919)*, *Dzieje Najnowsze*, year XL - 2008, 4.

¹³ J. Kozolubski, *Dwudziestolecie Policji Państwowej w Polsce, w Przeglądzie Policyjnym* - bimonthly edited by Superintendent Dr. Leon Nagler, Warsaw, November 1938, No. 6 (18), year III, p. 404.

of the ML PPS breaking off appeals from the „Liberation Army”; No. 302 from 18.11; the Dowbor soldiers invaded the workers’ club Bronisław Grosser, conducting a search. „Kurier Warszawski” No. 314 from 14.11; ML PPS disarmed the Second Commissariat MM, No. 315 of 14/11: a socialist militia disarmed the SN unit. The situation was even more aggravated in the provinces, where there were clashes between ML PPS and the army, military police and POW. „Various armed formations,” Moraczewski wrote, „spontaneously created, created an indescribable mess in the field of security”¹⁴.

Clashes occur both between security organizations and between them and the army.

On December 5, 1918, the first legal act was intended to be pursued to establish a nationwide police authority. Regulations issued by the Provisional Head of State Józef Piłsudski¹⁵ clearly indicate the direction of the centralization of police services on the threshold of the formation of an independent Polish state: When joining the formation of the People’s Militia, all previously spontaneously organized volunteer formations of guard and civic militia are dissolved. This provision does not extend to Militia of municipal and powiat self-government bodies. Members of the dissolved formations will find their place in the ranks of the army, People’s Militia or militia of local government bodies¹⁶. Ignacy Boerner became the Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Militia¹⁷. The People’s Militia General Command was established, consisting of a staff and four departments, i.e. active service, reserves, information and intelligence services, administration.

Information and Intelligence Department III had a special significance, as it dealt with political intelligence and informing the government about the state of security in the country¹⁸. Following the Regulations (which were in fact treated as a decree of the Provisional Head of State), the Interior Minister Stanisław Thugutt issued a regulation regulating the activities of the People’s Militia.

Analysis of the provisions of the Regulations and the Regulation of the Ministry of the Interior of December 16, 1918.¹⁹ it clearly indicates that they are the first attempt to build a central service, organized and trained in a military manner, although subordinate to the

¹⁴ J. Kochanowski, *Zapomniany prezydent... : życie i działalność Ignacego Boernera 1875-1933*, DiG Publishing House, Warsaw 1993, pp. 78 and 81.

¹⁵ OJ Ministry of Interior, R. 1918, No. 2, item 18, Regulations on the organization of the People’s Militia of December 5, 1918.

¹⁶ *Ibidem.*, p. 6.

¹⁷ J. Kochanowski writes more about Ignacy Boerner. The title refers to the events of 1905, when it was I. Berner who headed the Revolutionary Committee in the Republic of Ostrowiec, proclaimed on December 27. A little later the name of his function became known as „President of the Ostrowiec Republic. 1914 - soldier of the Polish Legions, commander of the platoon in the 1st Cadre Company. On December 13, 1918, he was promoted to the rank of captain and appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Militia. From May 1919 in the Polish Army in Branch II. He was often directed by Józef Piłsudski for domestic and foreign missions. He was transferred to the reserve in the rank of colonel qualified in 1929. This year he took the post of minister of post and telegraphs, which he held until 1932. Member of the Sejm of the Second Republic of Poland, acting in the Non-Partisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government.

¹⁸ A. Misiuk (ed.), *Kształtowanie się instytucji policyjnych w odradzającej się II Rzeczypospolitej (1915-1922), w Powstanie Policji Państwowej w odrodzonej Rzeczypospolitej 1915-1922*, Szczytno 2009, p. 18.

¹⁹ Regulation of the Minister of the Interior of December 16, 1918, Polish Monitor of 1918, No. 232, including in No. 2 of *Dziennik Gazeta for Poviats of Łowicki and Sochaczewski*.

Interior Minister. Its central character is clearly determined by the records on the dissolution of all existing self-organized volunteer formations in the form of civic guards or civic militia, leaving room for municipal and poviats self-government in this area.

The view on the first fully police character of the People's Militia is shared by Boleslaw Sprengel: (...) as the first state because the police formation subordinated to the Interior Minister should be considered the People's Militia formed on December 5, 1918. (...) Noteworthy is the establishment of an information and intelligence division, divided after some time into three sections, two of them carried out operational tasks provided for the political and criminal police, and the third fought against speculation. The specificity of ML consisted in giving it the character of an „organized military force dependent directly on the Ministry of the Interior”²⁰.

The Ministry of the Interior itself also transformed its structures, including departments responsible for internal security issues of the state and the police.

We know the first organizational structure of the Ministry of the Interior from the end of November 1918. It consisted of 4 sections (without names) and 18 departments. (...) Section II is: 6) personnel department in poviats and police offices, 7) police department and public safety, 8) press department²¹. This structure of the ministry survived until May 20, 1919. In the new structure, police affairs were placed in Section III - Public Safety and Decency, under which the department 11) state police, 12) public security operated. While structural changes in the Ministry of the Interior were progressing at a rather moderate pace (another reorganization on January 2, 1920), changes in the interior ministers to whom security and police matters were subject could not have an impact on the shape of the services responsible for this security. The more so because the future shape of the services was influenced by changes in political directions in government.

However, it soon became apparent that political changes at the summits of state power were changing the accents of trust in the security service so strongly associated with the interim socialist government as the People's Militia. On January 9, 1919, a new formation of the security service was established, the Municipal Police (hereinafter PK), referring more to city militia than to ML. The appointment of PK was another step towards unification and centralization of security services. This is evidenced by the provision from the Decree on the organization of municipal police: All public security organizations currently existing in the Polish State except the militia should be immediately transformed into municipal police according to the provisions of this decree²². It was also an element of political changes in the government, whose

²⁰ B. Sprengel, *Policja Państwowa a organy władzy publicznej w polityce obrony bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego w Polsce w latach 1918-1939*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernik, Toruń 2011, p. 42.

²¹ W. Kozyra, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych w Polsce Odrodzonej 1918-1939*, Recent History, Yearbook XLII - 2010, 2. The publication mentions, among others subsequent, since the independence of the Interior Ministers, among which the most important for the subject of publication should be: Stanisław Thugutt (17.11.1918 - 16.01.1919), Stanisław Wojciechowski (16.01.1919 - 23.06.1920), Józef Kuczyński (23.06 - 24.07.1920), Leopold Skulski (July 24, 1920 - June 28, 1921), Władysław Raczkiewicz (June 28 - September 19, 1921), Stanisław Józef Downarowicz (September 19, 1921 - March 10, 1922), Antoni Kamiński (March 10 - December 11, 1922), Ludwik Darowski (11-16.12.1922), Władysław Sikorski (16.12.1922 - 28.05.1923).

²² Decree on the organization of the Municipal Police, Dz. P.P.P., 1919 98, art. 16.

prime minister was Ignacy Jan Paderewski and the interior ministry was taken over by Stanisław Wojciechowski. In the ministry, Jan Jur-Gorzechowski took over the functions of the director of the Municipal Police and the head of the security section, to whom all the security authorities of the Ministry of the Interior were subject, including PK and ML.

Marian Borzęcki became the head of the Municipal Police²³, later the chief commander of the State Police, and the core of its staff were largely the current city policemen. He took the position of Borzęcki's Chief Inspector of Municipal Police on January 20, 1919.

What tried to sort out police law did not mean an easy transition from theory to practice. The police practice of the turn of 1918/1919 was very imperfect. These imperfections consisted of both shortcomings in the quality of staff, as well as chaos related to the legal disorder of competences between government and self-government police bodies, as well as the effects of political struggle.

Henryk Wardęski cites examples of competence disputes arising from the lack of a strong, central organization of public order: In those cities where there were all three or even four security organizations, there must have been constant misunderstandings and even clashes between these bodies. Yes in Ostrowiec there was a formal skirmish between the People's Militia and the Railway Guard. There were mutually sharp charges at each other. (...) For reasons of the wrong (original spelling), often clashes and misunderstandings People's Militia attacked police stations and disarmed them. The Municipal Police did the same if they found any illegal act of the Militia. The Military Railway Guard, very poorly organized, considered the railway zone to be inviolable. The Commune Police and People's Militia did not allow this area to enter. If a municipal policeman hunted down a thief or bandit and he escaped to a railway station, the policeman was forced to refrain from further action, because in order to continue his speech he had to report to the officer on duty and ask for permission to track the offender. If he did not do so due to lack of time or other circumstances, the Guard arrested such a cheeky man, took his weapon and drove him out of his kingdom. The Municipal Police paid back to the Guard vet in the city. It is understood that the security issue must have suffered²⁴.

A picture of the reality of the functioning of security services from the beginning of 1919. in the account of a direct witness, it probably best captures the situation of inertia and chaos caused by duplication of rights, the lack of functioning of the hierarchy principle and the existence of

²³ A. Misiuk on the person of Marian Borzęcki in the *Police Chief Commanders 1918 - 2009*, edited by Piotr Majer, WSPol Szczytno 2009, p. 55 et seq. PP Inspector Marian Borzęcki was the Commander-in-Chief of the PP from 01.07.1923 to 05.11.1926. He has been associated with the service for public security since 1915, when he joined the ranks of the City Militia in Warsaw. He began his service as a regular officer in MM. Then he gained experience in various positions in this formation. From January 1919, he was assigned to serve in the Supreme Criminal Police Inspectorate. He participated in the preparation of the structures of the unified State Police, in which he first served as deputy chief commander (from June 17, 1919 to November 9, 1920). He also held high positions in administration, including Commissioner of the Government of the Capital City of Warsaw. After being released from the position of commander-in-chief of the PP and leaving the service, he became involved in political activities. After the outbreak of World War II, he became involved in the defense of Warsaw, and during the German occupation in the underground work - he became the first representative of the Polish Government in the country. He was arrested in March 1940 and imprisoned in Pawiak, from where he was transported to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. He died in the Mauthausen concentration camp in 1942.

²⁴ H. Wardęski, *Moje wspomnienia policyjne, publishing house Association „Policyjny Dom Zdrowia”*, Warsaw 1925, pp. 257 and 258.

several uncoordinated security services. Disputes and conflicts involving organizations involved in the protection of public security occurred throughout the country and sometimes took the form of serious incidents during which weapons were used.

In March 1919, officers during a strike in the Dąbrowa Basin The People's Militia took the side of striking workers against right-wing militants and the army, while on April 10, 1919, an open conflict occurred in Siedlce between the offices of the Municipal Police and the People's Militia. Similar events also took place in Ostrowiec and Łomża, and in the Krasnystaw poviát occurred to disarm the officers of the People's Militia by police from the Municipal Police²⁵.

Lack of effectiveness in the context of areas of competence of individual services and supervision over them was not without the reaction of the central government. Another attempt, which, however, did not lead to ordering these matters, was the publication by the Minister of Internal Affairs of a Circular on the People's Militia and Municipal Police of April 3 1919 We read in it that: the Municipal Police Inspection and the Main Command and District Headquarters of the People's Militia do not have the right to have police and militia in the field of security services. Their supreme power concerns organization, administration and supplies and training²⁶. This action did not lead to an improvement in public order in the country. The post-war situation favored criminals who had easy access to firearms, and the poor quality of their duties performed by services ineffective in the face of the chaos of competence was in favor of criminals.

Imperfections in the activities of security services have become the subject of public debate, which can be expressed by the voice of Stefan Urbanowicz titled Some of our decrees in the light of criticism of their practical application²⁷. Based on the content of the article, which refer to the legal basis of the organization and competence for the operation of the People's Militia and Municipal Police clearly show the imperfections of the then proposals relating to the central body of a police nature. At least because of the fact that, as the author argues, the People's Militia has more than just legal grounds for action of an investigative nature, and the practice of ML's service was far from social expectations in detecting perpetrators of crimes.

Analysis of the legal basis for the appointment and operation of ML (established for protection and ensuring peace and security of cities and villages, as well as combating all forms of social disorder as well as for carrying out the ordinances of state authorities) in the context of such, regarding the Municipal Police and local militia, it indicates too narrow giving ML typical „police” powers, such as conducting criminal investigations. To sum up, ML was seen as a force whose main task became to protect state property, occurring during riots and against acts of anarchy, displaying service in the form of outposts in sensitive areas of the city. Her

²⁵ A. Misiuk, *Historia Policji w Polsce od X wieku do współczesności*, Academic Publishing and Professional, Warsaw 2008, p. 99.

²⁶ A. Misiuk, A. Pepłoński, *Organizacja instytucji policyjnych w II Rzeczypospolitej 1918-1926*. Source selection and documents. Police College Publishing House. Szczytno 1992, p. 23.

²⁷ S. Urbanowicz, *Niektóre nasze dekrety w świetle krytyki praktycznego ich stosowania*, Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska, edited by Henryk Konic, 1919, No. 20-18 / 42, pp. 194 and 195.

„internalization” was manifested not only in the way of training and billing, but above all in putting the disciplinary matters of ML militia officers under military judiciary.

This character of ML's official speeches, whose criminal investigations - as the author indicates - was a marginal and inefficient (due to the low level of training in this area) part of activity, should be described as closer to contemporary police prevention units. The units that carry out their police tasks in structures based on military models, and the forms of official appearances are primarily preventive and compact in nature.

A completely different picture of police competence is drawn on the basis of one analysis from documents indicating the organization of the operation of the Municipal Police - Circular (281) of the Chief Police Inspector of the Ministry of the Interior to all Municipal Police Offices regarding the introduction of books in the municipal police offices²⁸ of May 13, 1919. This document regulates the issues of documentation kept at various organizational levels by the Municipal Police. Lists among others what kind of documents are subject to registration by this service. Among them are: protocol control containing data on prosecutors or the injured party (surname, first name and address), accused's data (surname, first name, father's name, address), witness data, content of the report, material evidence where the case was directed. In addition, PK was obliged to keep an index of accused, an index of prosecutors or victims, an index of wanted (who is looking for, on what grounds, where the case was referred), control of material evidence, control of arrested persons, control of outposts in cities and towns, control of movement of police officers.

The conclusions of this document are clear. The Municipal Police were to carry out the tasks based primarily on police activities, and there were certainly among them those from the basic police canon, i.e. receiving and registering notifications about crimes, directing accusations to competent authorities, securing material evidence accompanying notices, conducting searches for persons, arresting persons (today detention), control of posts (currently performing patrol service), control of movement of police officers (today conducting service dislocation). So, based on her police workshop, PK had considerable makings to increase the efficiency of public order services.

However, obstacles of various nature that prevented the effective collaboration of services in those circumstances were not lacking. They included political changes in the state authorities, which influenced the competence and personnel preferences of individual formations, imperfection or lack of legal provisions defining cooperation between them.

This state caused just fears of the highest state authorities about the directions of system solutions for the security service - as then the areas often referred to as police were often defined.

At the highest levels of power, two ideas for centralized state security service were actually presented. Organizing it in a military way and putting it under direct supervision of the Minister of the Interior or dissolving existing organizations and organizing a police modeled on the

²⁸ Dz. MSW 1919, No. 35, item 450, Circular No. 281.

Field Gendarmerie²⁹ reporting to the Minister for Military Affairs, but also being the executive body of the Minister for the Interior.

The account of such formulated considerations is contained in the fragment of the note In the matter of the Security Service in Poland dated March 4, 1919, probably by Mieczysław Skrudlik³⁰.

The appointment of the State Police by the Legislative Sejm on July 24, 1919 was an important step to raise the state of public order in the state. First of all, PP became by far the leading state organization of the security service, being the executive body of state and local authorities. Its organization and training were defined by the act as „on a military pattern,” and gave the subordination to the Minister of the Interior.

Interesting, from today's perspective is the naming that accompanied the work on the concept of centralized, nationwide police service being developed in 1919: (...) On June 26, 1919, the Ministry of the Interior issued a circular addressed to poviats government commissioners. In it informing about plans to create a Security Guard (SB), (...) ³¹. The activities of qualifying committees aimed, among others to accept candidates directly from ML, PK and other services to the Security Guard.

The process of centralization of services responsible for order and security in the state continued parallel to the legislative work conducted in the Sejm. These works were carried out in the Ministry of the Interior, which first set up a main headquarters for the People's Militia and the Municipal Police in Warsaw, entrusting on April 8, 1919 the position of chief commander for both formations to Captain Kazimierz Młodzianowski - subordinate to the Minister of the Interior. The existence of the joint main command was very temporary, as already on June 17, 1919 it was dissolved and the General Headquarters of the Security Guard was created from the Supreme Municipal Police Inspection. This happened even before the parliament passed the proceeding bill. Following this, the local PK units were transformed, and their commanders headed a new formation - the Security Guard, to which all security services were to be subject throughout the country.

The Sejm bill was called „Law on the Security Guard”. Finally, on July 22, an application submitted during the work of the Parliamentary Administration Committee for a change of the

²⁹ W. Śleszyński, *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne w polityce państwa polskiego na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej*, Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of History of the University of Białystok, Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, Warsaw 2007, pp. 72-78. The field gendarmerie operating under the auspices of the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands was divided into Poviats Gendarmerie and Coastal Gendarmerie operating in areas of direct armed conflict. Poviats Gendarmerie was delegated to perform tasks in poviats on the basis of the national security service. It was a military formation, but in civil matters in poviats it was subordinate to ZCZW. The actions of the Field Gendarmerie in civilian appearances were assessed as inefficient and unprofessional. Competence chaos often did not allow the identification of units of the Poviats Gendarmerie and the Coastal Gendarmerie, especially on lines of warfare. Officials quickly realized that the police should deal with public policy matters instead of the gendarmerie. However, due to the organization of the police that had just begun, the transitional state lasted in the eastern districts until mid-1920, when together with the return to these territories after repelling the Bolsheviks, the Polish police were already the state police.

³⁰ A. Misiuk, A. Peplowski, *Organizacja...*, op. cit., p. 30.

³¹ R. Litwiński, *Korpus Policji w II Rzeczypospolitej. Służba i życie prywatne*, publishing house of the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin 2010, p. 29.

name of the Security Guard to the State Police led to the adoption of the Act with the police in the name. Władysław Henszel became the first chief commander of the PP³².

About the Security Guard in the context of the Police Act he also mentions a central character in his memoirs H. Wardęski, stating that it was to enter into force on July 1, 1919 and absorb the existing organizations i.e. People's Militia, Railway Guard, National Gendarmerie and Municipal Police.

Based on the Act of July 24, 1919 on the state police (spelling from the original) The Interior Minister, often in consultation with other ministers, issued a number of legal acts regulating the police service, the scope of its competence and powers, while at the same time eliminating - often by incorporating existing security services into PP. Among the regulations important for the unification of these services, the following legal acts should certainly be mentioned: *Instructions for qualifying committees of the State Police, issued by the Minister of the Interior on the basis of art. 25 of the Act about the State Police*³³, *Regulations on the organization of powiat police headquarters, issued by the Minister of the Interior pursuant to art. 5 and 8 of the Act of July 24, 1919 about the State Police*³⁴, *Ordinance of the Minister of the Interior on the organization of state police branches serving on railways in the following voivodeships: Warsaw, Lubelskie, Kielecki, Łódź and Białostocki, issued in consultation with the Minister of Iron Railways pursuant to art. 9 of the Act on the State Police of July 24, 1919 (Journal of Laws, No. 61, item 363)*³⁵, *Regulation of the Minister of the Interior issued in consultation with the Minister of Military Affairs, the Iron Railways and the Treasury, regarding the incorporation of the Military Railway Guard in the following provinces: Warsaw, Lubelskie, Kielecki, Łódź, Białostocki, and the city of Warsaw to the State Police, pursuant to art. 2 Transitional provisions to the Act on the State Police of July 24, 1919 (Journal of Laws, No. 61, item 363)*³⁶, *Executive ordinance of the Minister of Military Affairs and the Minister of the Interior on the incorporation of national gendarmerie and military police in the former Galicia to the State Police pursuant to art. 3rd Flow Transitional to the Act on the State Police of July 24, 1919 (Journal of Laws, No. 61, item 363)*³⁷. The titles of the abovementioned acts already indicate a huge organizational effort of the state, aimed at creating uniform structures of the new service.

Despite the establishment of the State Police, unification of security services did not run smoothly. Invaluable information about the difficulties of this the process is forwarded by Henryk Wardęski: Apparently Railway Guard (probably Military The Railway Guard) enjoyed the support of some political parties, because in 1919 we failed to unify the Guard. (...)

³² W. Henszel was the commander-in-chief of the Polish Home Army from July 24, 1919 to April 20, 1922. He gained his experience in the tsarist army and administrative apparatus. He returned to Poland in December 1918 and started working in government administration. In April 1919, he was transferred to the Security Office of the Ministry of the Interior. Along with the adoption of the Act on the State Police, he assumed the function of its commander – based for the aforementioned work P. Majer (ed.) *Police Chief Commanders 1918-2009*.

³³ Monitor Polski, R. 1919, nr 196.

³⁴ Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, R. 1919, nr 94, poz. 58.

³⁵ Ibidem, R. 1920, nr 6, poz. 42.

³⁶ Monitor Polski, R. 1920, nr 23.

³⁷ Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, R 1919, No. 97, item 475.

After several months of idle academic disputes, life itself forced the managers of the military Railway Guard to surrender and put themselves on the grace and disgrace of the State Police. The Railway Guard was very numerous and was dependent on the Ministry of Railways. The expenditure was so serious that the Ministry of Railways finally refused loans for the future. The Ministry of Military Affairs also refused to accept the Guard on its full-time job. Therefore, the organization's position became impossible and the guards had to be liquidated. On February 1, 1920, the Military Railway Guard ceased to exist. In its place, police stations and railway police stations were created, which we have also deleted over time and police at railway stations we joined the poviats headquarters or police stations in cities³⁸. It is worth emphasizing the coincidence of the dates of the journalistic source are My Police Memoirs dated February 1, 1920, contained in the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior issued in consultation with the Minister of Military Affairs, the Railways and the Treasury, regarding the incorporation of the Military Railway Guard in the provinces: (...).

At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that in parallel, a service pragmatics of the State Police related to its functioning in the field, uniforms, armaments, supplies, etc. was organized. This task was even more difficult because it took place during the fighting for the shape of the borders of the Second Polish Republic and in such a critical moment, like the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920.

Although the Polish-Bolshevik war already falls outside the time frames included in the main content of the publication topic, its anniversary nature is related to with the 100th anniversary of regaining independence and the establishment of the State Police, he orders a bow towards so little known facts from police history. Facts that above all show that the formation's attitude was the result of its experiences far beyond the date of July 24, 1919. There can be no doubt that there is a close relationship between the experiences gained over the years 1914-1919, by persons serving the organization public order, and the activities of the State Police, so shortly after its establishment. What's more, the government in the face of the turmoil of war decided to return to the already proven methods of social support of law enforcement organs, i.e. the already established State Police, by civil guards. As the State Police Gazette reports:³⁹. In view of the difficult situation in the country, a draft statute for the civic guard was created, which would constitute a civil formation for cooperation with administrative and police authorities. and under their supervision carried out tasks to protect security, peace and order in the country. The statute was approved by: the head of the interior ministry, Mr Kuczyński⁴⁰. The statute provided for the development of civic guard structures in the counties and poviats, and its implementation was dealt with by a commission at the Ministry of the Interior with deputy commander-in-chief of the PP. On the urgent need for police social support in the face

³⁸ H. Władęski, *Moje ...*, op. cit., p. 279.

³⁹ *Gazeta Policji Państwowej*, 1920, nr 29 z dnia 10.07.1920, w tytule *Straż obywatelska*.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

of a threat to the state's existence, it is also evidenced by the appointment of the Citizens' Guard commandant, who was the Supreme Court's sub-prosecutor Stanisław Popowski⁴¹, former commander of the civic guard of Warsaw.

The State Police passed their first „secondary school-leaving examination”, which was hostilities in less than a few months of its creation. The police from the Warsaw district stood out particularly well, whose skirmishes with the enemy and efficient organization were described in this way by Henryk Wardęcki: and the Police Commander-in-Chief Henszel, went on a detour of the towns that were occupied by the enemy. Everywhere it was stated that the Warsaw District police heroically persevered to their last positions, fulfilling their duty to their homeland and society everywhere. Minister Skulski praised police officers of the Płońsk, Płocki, Rypiński and Włocławski counties for energy, bravery and zeal (...) ⁴².

The attitudes that dominated among police officers at that time, which should clearly be described as patriotic, are demonstrated by the appearances of both senior and lower officers with a request to direct them to the front. Threat to the independence of the homeland caused an avalanche of reports of PP police officers for referral to military service. The eagerness to fight was so great that the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Home Army Władysław Henszel on 9 July 1920 issued an order mobilizing him to serve „(...) guarding law and order - on this trench of the internal front. In relation to your homeland, you will perform a service equal to that of a soldier (...)” ⁴³.

The police wanted to take part in the defense of the country so much that they required the leadership of the Polish People's Party to obtain the consent of the Ministry of the Interior to establish a police volunteer combat unit. At the turn of July and August 1920, hauls to the future police 213 infantry regiment began. The commander of the regiment was commissioner Brunon Betcher, and deputy Ryszard Gallera.

The involvement of policemen can be demonstrated by the following: At the end of July 1920, at the request of the State Defense Council, approximately 80% of officers of the 2nd Police District in Łódź volunteered for military service⁴⁴.

Although the regiment, as a compact combat unit, was not used for operational operations, all the more remarkable is the participation of its units in direct clash with the Bolshevik forces in the Włodawa region. In September 1920, the second lieutenant Jerzy Komes, commanding the V Company of II Battalion 213 Volunteer PP, deserved the Allied Cross of Valor for carrying out the attack on the Bolshevik foot in the area of the village of Chrysk.

⁴¹ More about the activity of civic guards in Warsaw and the person of S. Popowski in A. Kroński, *Citizens' Guard of the Capital City of Warsaw* Warsaw, 1915, by the Association of B. Citizens' Guard Members of the Capital City of Warsaw Warsaw 1915, Warsaw 1934.

⁴² H. Wardęcki, *Moje ...* op. cit., p. 338.

⁴³ J. Biechoński, *W dziesiątą rocznicę zurycyerstwa nad Rosją Sowiecką*, Na Postunku, No. 35, Warsaw 1930, k 3. The full text of the order was also published in the Gazette of the State Police, 1920, No. 28 from July 10.

⁴⁴ M. Gajewski, *213 Policijny Pułk Piechoty wojny 1920 r.*, Ośrodek Badań Historii Wojskowej Muzeum Wojska w Białymstoku, Białystok 2003, p. 17.

In the fight, the volunteers have discovered extraordinary combat values and bravery. After crossing the Bug River, the company, well commanded by its commander, further rejected the Soviet infantry defending in the village of Chrysk, at the same time forcing her to hurry away from her positions⁴⁵.

A horse police squadron was also created, whose commanders were Commissioner Andrzej Jezierski and Commissioner Stefan Rozumski (deputy). The core of the squadron were policemen from Łódź, who were supported by volunteers from Warsaw, Białystok, Polesie and Volhynia. The squadron was then incorporated into the volunteer Death Hussar Squadron of Lieutenant Józef Siła Nowicki⁴⁶.

An example of great dedication and commitment to combat operations is the participation of policemen in the defense of Płock on August 16-18, 1920. Numerous, but little-known sources indicate that PP units from Płock and the surrounding area not only ensured public order, they did not fall apart in the face of the advancing enemy, but they were effectively acquiring intelligence and fighting, including melee weapons. The names of many policemen whose names are quoted by H. Wardęski and the local press of *Kurier Płocki* and *Głos Mazowiecki* are well known.

Despite the fact that the Płock policemen, along with the army, actively participated in the Polish-Bolshevik war, none of them, according to the collected materials, was decorated during the visit of Marshal Józef Piłsudski in Płock on April 10, 1921, nor received decorations in the form of the Cross for Bravery and Courage⁴⁷. The example from Płock is unfortunately not an exception in forgetting the role of PP in the fight for independence and its maintenance.

The involvement of the State Police in 1920 war operations and, in general, positive assessments of its activities during this period testify to the properly conducted organizational efforts integrating state order forces into one centralized formation. The more so that the process of unification of the formation was far from complete.

Noteworthy is not only the organizational effort, but also the care of the enlightened citizens about the level of ethics of the police service and its service role towards the Polish state and its citizens. He presents the picture of this state and expectations regarding the role of the policeman among others Józef Bek in the article *Policeman - a seedbed of culture*⁴⁸. The author rightly points out the shortcomings related to the quality of police staff, but sees the role of a policeman among the elite of the reviving state (next to clergy and teachers), an educator of values that it brings with you law, state protection, public order and culture. He points to the dark legacy of the police customs of the partitioning times and draws a vision of the

⁴⁵ Ibidem., p. 37.

⁴⁶ R. Litwiński, *Korpus...*, op. cit., p. 361 and further. The squadron took part in the battles of Srock, Nieporęt, Benjamin, Kuligov and Myszyniec. Policemen also defended cities. Big merits in fights o Włocławek and Płock and the defense of the Vistula line on the section from Nieszawa had policemen from the surrounding counties.

⁴⁷ Łaszczewski A., *Płocka policja okresu międzywojennego, wydanie II uzupełnione i rozszerzone*, NSZZP przy KMP w Płocku, 2019 r., p. 188.

⁴⁸ *Gazeta Policji Państwowej*, rok 1920, nr 26.

development of police formation through the education of the policemen themselves and broadly understood social education.

The then presented main command of the PP agreed with the vision, because already in the pages of one of the next issues of the National Police Gazette editors in the article *On post*⁴⁹ presents the position of police management and announces the preparation of educational materials for police officers in the form of a special supplement (weekly) for police officers and lower police ranks at the National Police Gazette. Topics included in the form of short lectures on law, administration, hygiene, etc. were to educate both policemen and the less enlightened layers of the people⁵⁰.

Thus, next to efficient organization, the care of the rulers and the police leadership was the care for the ethical development of the new formation and the fight against all pathologies of the police service remaining after the partitioners.

One of the contractual points of unification of the State Police can be 1922, when the state borders included lands under Polish administration such as the former Kingdom of Poland, Lesser Poland, Eastern Borderlands, Greater Poland, Pomerania and Vilnius and the autonomous Silesian Voivodeship with its autonomous Police of the Silesian Voivodeship established in that year. The merging of the state territory has set new challenges for the State Police. In addition to improving their own staff and structures, police officers began to protect the eastern border. The unification phase has gone into the development phase of the State Police organization.

The establishment of the State Police by the Sejm Act and defining it as a state organization of the security service meant the beginning of the functioning in an independent state of the structure responsible for the internal security of the state and its citizens. This event took place eight months after November 11, 1918, which is widely accepted as a borderline for the revival of Polish statehood. Considering all the difficulties associated with the unification of the state after the partitions, the efficiency of reaching the legal and organizational foundations of a new state police formation should be assessed positively.

Initial failures in restoring social order and public order using the young state's police authorities generated experience based on which a Polish police model was adopted that was adequate to the challenges of that time. The next twenty years confirmed that this model was effective in the implementation of basic police tasks, which were combating crime and protecting the internal security of the state. What's more, PP quickly started cooperation on the international forum. Representatives of the newly appointed Polish State Police participated in the work to establish the International Criminal Police Commission, which took place in 1923. Among them was Wiktor Ludwikowski, considered a co-creator of police forensics in Poland.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem.*, no. 29.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem.*

The leading role in building these successes was played by the team, which from July 1919 entered in the composition and began the creation of the Police Corps. It should be noted that they were not they are random people, without police experience. In this area, the legacy of the partitions was able to be used by the newly created Polish state very well, placing in the ranks of the PP officers who had experience behind them both in the police service of the partitioning powers and Polish public order organizations that had operated in Poland since the outbreak of World War I. This is precisely illustrated by the memories of Henryk Wardęski, also illustrating the picture of the development and preparation of human resources to a large extent, they first joined ML and PK, and later PP. Such people as the author of 'My Police Memoirs', or Marian Borzęcki, Wiktor Hoszowski (first in the National Gendarmerie, later the Commander-in-Chief of the PP), Kazimierz Młodzianowski (captain of the Polish Army, commander of the ML and the Polish Army) and many others, they gained their first police experience before regaining independence by the Polish state. In turn, the military and war experiences of many senior and lower officers quickly increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the new police formation. A formation that did not forget about the people who built its foundations, and which was accompanied by the awareness that without the experience of the civil guard period, building the Polish police would not be possible in such a short time. An expression of this memory and the important role of the civil guards was that the anniversary of security services in independent Poland for the tenth anniversary was adopted in 1925. Thus recognizing the beginning of the organization of the police service in 1915, when these organizations were formally created under partitioning laws, on the basis of which Polish police formations have been fully formed.

The State Police began their mission in the post-partition and wartime reality. The beginnings of her activities came at an extremely difficult time, taking into account the Polish-Bolshevik war and the shaping of borders in the new post-war reality. The next twenty years of her service and the sacrifice of life made by several thousand of her officers after the outbreak of World War II constitute that the Police Corps of the Second Polish Republic did well to Poland.

Selective Bibliography:

1. Gajewski M., 213 Policynny Pułk Piechoty wojny 1920 r., Ośrodek Badań Historii Wojskowej Muzeum Wojska w Białymstoku, Białystok 2003
2. Kroński A., *Straż Obywatelska m.st. Warszawy 1915 roku*, Nakładem Związku B. Członków Straży Obywatelskiej m.st. Warszawy 1915 r, Warszawa 1934.
3. Kochanowski J., *Zapomniany prezydent ... : życie i działalność Ignacego Boernera 1875-1933*, Wydawnictwo DiG, Warszawa 1993.
4. Majer P. (red.) *Komendanci Główni Policji 1918 – 2009*, WSPol Szczytno 2009.
5. Mędrzecki W. i Żanowski J. (red.), *Spoleczeństwo międzywojenne: nowe spojrzenie*, Instytut Historyczny PAN, Warszawa 2015.

6. Misiuk A., *Historia Policji w Polsce od X wieku do współczesności*, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2008.
7. Misiuk A. (red.), *Powstanie Policji Państwowej w odrodzonej Rzeczypospolitej 1915-1922*, WSPol Szczytno 2009.
8. Misiuk A., Peplowski A., *Organizacja instytucji policyjnych w II Rzeczypospolitej 1918-1926. Wybór źródeł i dokumentów*. Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Policji, Szczytno 1992.
9. Litwiński R., *Korpus Policji w II Rzeczypospolitej. Służba i życie prywatne*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2010.
10. Łaszczewski A., *Płocka policja okresu międzywojennego, wydanie II uzupełnione i rozszerzone*, NSZZP przy KMP w Płocku, 2019 r.
11. Sprengel B., *Policja Państwowa a organy władzy publicznej w polityce ochrony bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego w Polsce w latach 1918-1939*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2011.
12. Śleszyński W., *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne w polityce państwa polskiego na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, Warszawa 2007.
13. Wardęski H., *Moje wspomnienia policyjne*, Stowarzyszenie „Policyjny Dom Zdrowia” Warszawa 1925.
14. Żarnowski J. (red.), *Polska Niepodległa 1918-1939. Dwudziestolecie międzywojenne 1918-1939 jako etap rozwoju narodu polskiego*, Wszechnica PAN, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1984.

Scientific journals and press articles

1. Grabowiecki E. (red.), *Gazeta Policji Państwowej*, 1920, nr 26, 27, 29.
2. Grabowiecki E. (red.), *Dziesięciolecie Służby Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce Odrodzonej*, Wydawnictwo „Gazety Administracji i Policji Państwowej”, Warszawa 1925.
3. Kozolubski J., *Dwudziestolecie Policji Państwowej w Polsce, Przegląd Policyjny*, dwumiesięcznik pod redakcją nadinspektora dra Leona Naglera, Warszawa, listopad 1938, nr 6 (18), rok III.
4. Kozyra W., *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych w Polsce Odrodzonej 1918-1939*, Dzieje Najnowsze, Rocznik XLII – 2010, 2.
5. Molenda J. *Polska w Wielkiej Wojnie 1914-1918. Kilka refleksji w sprawie stanu badań* (cz. I 1914-1939) (cz. II 1939-2014), *Dzieje Najnowsze* rocznik XLVI-2014 i XLVII-2015.
6. Paciorkowski J., *Zapomniany komendant*, miesięcznik *Policja* 997, numer 106/01.2014.
7. Przeniosło M., *Żandarmeria w Galicji Zachodniej w początkach niepodległości (1918-1919)*, *Dzieje Najnowsze*, rocznik XL – 2008, 4.
8. Suliński J., *Żandarmeria Krajowa załącznikiem Policji Państwowej (1918-1922)*, *Kwartalnik Policyjny CSP*, nr 2/2014.
9. Urbanowicz S., *Niektóre nasze dekrety w świetle krytyki praktycznego ich stosowania*, *Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska*, red. Henryk Konic, 1919, Nr 20-18/42.

Legal acts chronologically

1. Dekret Rady Regencyjnej z 3 stycznia 1918 r. o tymczasowej organizacji władz naczelnych w Królestwie Polskim, Dziennik Praw Królestwa Polskiego Nr 1 z 1 lutego 1918 r.
2. Manifest Tymczasowego Rządu Ludowego Republiki Polskiej z 7 listopada 1918 r., opublikowany w nadzwyczajnym numerze „Naprzód” z 9 listopada 1918 r.
3. Przepisy o organizacji Milicji Ludowej z 5 grudnia 1918 r., Dz.U. MSW, R. 1918, Nr 2, poz. 18.
4. Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych z 16 grudnia 1918 r., Monitor Polski z 1918 r, Nr 232.
5. Dekret o organizacji policji komunalnej z 9 stycznia 1919 r., Dz.Pr.P.P, R. 1919, Nr 5, poz. 98.
6. Okólnik Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w sprawie Milicji Ludowej i Policji Komunalnej z 3 kwietnia 1919 r. (źródło za przypisem nr 29 - Archiwum Państwowe w Siedlcach, zespół Komendy Policji Państwowej powiatu siedleckiego, sygn. 23, k. 439).
7. Okólnik (296) Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych do Komisarzy Ludowych w sprawie reorganizacji Milicji Ludowej z 4 kwietnia 1919 r., Dz.U. MSW, R. 1919, Nr 22.
8. Okólnik (281) Naczelnego Inspektora Policji Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych do wszystkich Urzędów Policji Komunalnej w sprawie prowadzenia ksiąg w urzędach policji komunalnej z 13 maja 1919 r., Dz.U. MSW R 1919, Nr 35, poz. 450.
9. Rozkaz nr 1 Komendanta Głównego Policji Komunalnej i Milicji Ludowej z dnia 17 czerwca 1919 r., AAN, Komenda Główna Policji Państwowej w Warszawie (sygn. 2/349/1/1.1/1).
10. Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w przedmiocie organizacji oddziałów Policji Państwowej, pełniących służbę na kolejach, na obszarze Województw: Warszawskiego, Lubelskiego, Kieleckiego, Łódzkiego i Białostockiego, wydane w porozumieniu z Ministrem Kolei Żelaznych na zasadzie art. 9 ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24 lipca 1919 r., Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363 – Dz.U.R.P., R.1920, nr 6, poz. 42.
11. Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych wydane w porozumieniu z Ministrem Spraw Wojskowych, Kolei Żelaznych i Skarbu, w przedmiocie wcielenia Wojskowej Straży Kolejowej na obszarze Województw: Warszawskiego, Lubelskiego, Kieleckiego, Łódzkiego, Białostockiego, oraz miasta Warszawy do Policji Państwowej, na zasadzie art. 2 Przepisów przejściowych do Ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24 lipca 1919 roku, Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363 - Monitor Polski, R. 1920, nr 23.
12. Rozporządzenie wykonawcze Ministra Spraw Wojskowych i Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w przedmiocie wcielenia żandarmerii krajowej i policji wojskowej na obszarze byłej Galicji do Policji Państwowej na zasadzie art. 3-ego Przep. Przejściowych do Ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24-go lipca 1919 r., Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363 – Dz.U.R.P., R 1919, nr 97, poz. 475 .

Nota o autorach

Białobłocki Zbigniew – doktor habilitowany nauk politycznych, profesor w Wyższej Szkole Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie

Burdiak Viera – profesor Katedry Administracji Publicznej Państwowego Uniwersytetu im. J. Fedkowicza w Czerniowcach, e-mail: Vira_Burdjak@rambler.ru <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0037-2173>

Lytvyn Vitaliy – doktor habilitowany nauk politycznych, docent Katedry Politologii Lwowskiego Uniwersytetu Narodowego im. I. Franka, e-mail: lytvyn.vitaliy@gmail.com

Białobłocki Tomasz – doktor nauk politycznych, adiunkt w Wyższej Szkole Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, t.bialoblocki@icloud.com

Haponenko Vira Anatoliyвна, PHD of Political Science, Associate Professor, doctoral student of the National Pedagogical Dragomanov University pvgap@ukr.net

Panczak-Białobłocka Nadija – doktor habilitowany nauk politycznych, profesor w Wyższej Szkole Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, e-mail: nadia.panczak@gmail.com

Slipetska Julia doktor nauk politycznych, docent Katedry politologii Lwowskiego Uniwersytetu Narodowego im. I. Franka, e-mail: slipetska.julija@gmail.com

Białobłocka Sławomira Maria – doktor habilitowany, profesor w Wyższej Szkole Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, wsgk@wsgk.com

Volskyi Oleg graduate student of the Department of Political Science, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, e-mail: olevolsky17@ukr.net.

Witalij Diakiw graduate student of the Department of Political Science, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, e-mail: dyakivv@gmail.com;

Białobłocki Krzysztof – asystent w Wyższej Szkole Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, wsgk@wsgk.com

Fedorchak Tetiana Professor, Ph.D, Department of Social Sciences Ivano-Frankivsk National Technical University of Oil and Gas e-mail: tetiana.fedorchak@gmail.com <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8404-5526>

Moszczyńska Aneta asystent w Wyższej Szkole Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, aneta.kosiorek@poczta.onet.pl

Kozak Tamara doktor nauk politycznych, docent Lwowskiego Uniwersytetu Narodowego im. I. Franka, e-mail: palm1330@ukr.net

Białobłocka Magdalena – asystent w Wyższej Szkole Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, m.bialoblocka@gmail.com

Bartosiak Zbigniew magister, doktorant na Krakowskiej Akademii im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego. Absolwent Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego – Wydział Prawa i Administracji i studiów podyplomowych: zarządzanie jednostką organizacyjną w administracji publicznej; pedagogika kryminologiczna – profilaktyka i zapobieganie przestępczości migracyjnej oraz prowadzenie procesów edukacji, szkolenia i doskonalenia zawodowego w tym zakresie. Aktualnie w stopniu podinspektora Policji. Od 2014 r. wykonywał zadania związane z edukacją społeczną, w tym w obszarze klas policyjnych, historii policji i ceremoniału policyjnego w Komendzie Głównej Policji. Absolwent Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie związany z uczelnią poprzez prowadzenie wykładów, przygotowywanie konferencji i prowadzenie konsultacji programowych.

Zasady przygotowywania tekstów do druku w Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej – Półrocznik

Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie

1. Teksty powinny być przygotowane w języku polskim, angielskim, ukraińskim a ich tytuły w języku polskim, angielskim i ukraińskim.
2. „Streszczenie” w języku polskim, „Summary” w angielskim i „Анотація” w ukraińskim powinny zawierać do 100 słów i odnosić się do celu, założeń, wyników badań, konkluzji.
3. „Słowa kluczowe” w języku polskim, „Keywords” w angielskim ta „Ключові слова” w ukraińskim powinny oddawać istotę rozważań i odpowiadać kategoriom przyjętym w danym obszarze badawczym / od 3 do 8/;
4. Informacja o autorze /w j. Polskim, angielskim i ukraińskim/ powinna zawierać następujące dane: stopień lub tytuł naukowy, imię i nazwisko, miejsce pracy oraz adres e-mail.
5. Teksty, przygotowane w programie WORD i TeX, czcionka 12 New Times Roman, 1,5 odstępu między wierszami, powinny być przesyłane Redakcji pocztą elektroniczną. Redakcja zastrzega sobie możliwość wprowadzania zmian w tekstach.
6. Teksty artykułów w czasopismach z zasady powinny być podzielone na numerowane części zaopatrzone w tytuły.
7. W czasopismach teksty artykułów, łącznie z przypisami, nie powinien przekraczać 22 stron znormalizowanych, artykuł recenzyjny 8 stron znormalizowanych a sprawozdanie naukowe 6 stron znormalizowanych. Redakcja zastrzega sobie prawo dokonania skrótów.
8. Wyróżnienia w tekście należy zaznaczać drukiem rozstrzelonym.
9. Każda tabela, rysunek, wykres powinny mieć kolejną numerację, tytuł własny oraz źródło. Numer i tytuł należy umieścić nad ilustracją, natomiast opis bibliograficzny źródła pod ilustracją.
10. Wtrącenia obcojęzyczne należy zaznaczyć kursywą, cytaty należy ujmować w cudzysłów (bez kursywy). W tekście tytuły książek należy pisać kursywą bez cudzysłowu. W przypisach kursywą należy pisać wyłącznie tytuły książek i artykułów.
11. W przypadku stron WWW należy podać tytuł strony WWW, adres URL i koniecznie datę odczytu [w nawiasach kwadratowych].
12. Przypisy należy umieszczać na dole strony.
13. Opisy bibliograficzne w przypisach należy sporządzać wg poniższych zasad:
 - książka: A.Elliott, Współczesna teoria społeczna. Wprowadzenie., Warszawa 2011, s. 4.
 - artykuł w czasopiśmie: T. Kowalski, Witkacy dzisiaj, „Przegląd Polonisty”, 2007 nr 4, s. 7.
 - praca zbiorowa: Demokracje zachodnioeuropejskie. Analiza porównawcza, red. A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Wrocław 2008, s. 22.
 - artykuł z pracy zbiorowej: J. Witkowski, Polskie wybory, w: Wybory parlamentarne w Polsce po roku 1989, red. S. Kobus, Warszawa 2007, s. 54.
 - dokument elektroniczny: www... [odczyt: 5.06.2007]